ASK THE RABBI

We will deal only with your specific idea. Other factors that are involved in the use of a regular elevator are found in Bemareh Habazak II, 23.
A non-Jew may do melacha (work) for a Jew if he does so for his own purposes. One case is when he gets paid per-job (as opposed to per time). Then even though the Jew benefits directly from the action, we say that the non-Jew does it for his wages (Shulchan Aruch, OC 243:1-2). However, even so, the Jew may not tell him to do the work specifically on Shabbat (ibid. 307:4). If the non-Jew does the work for his own direct benefit, a Jew may tell him to do it even if he also benefits. For example, if a Jew sees a flood in their joint building, he may tell his non-Jewish neighbor (at least before Shabbat) to fix it because the non-Jew will have his own welfare in mind.
This would seem to be true in your case. The question is whether the Jew tell the non-Jew to do the work that he does for his own good but also for the Jew specifically on Shabbat? While the non-Jew uses the elevator for his own purposes, he does so at the time the Jew desires it. There are sources that imply that when it is directly for the non-Jew’s benefit, the timing is not a problem (see Taz 307:3 & Biur Halacha to 276:2 in the Nishmat Adam’s name). However, it is difficult to rely upon this alone.
In the case you devise, the Jew need not have the non-Jew act because he said so. Rather, he can tell him to not do the work at another time on Shabbat so that the chances the Jew will benefit go up. The non-Jew might even decide not to do work at all on Shabbat. The problem might exist though if the workers would have done their work later and move it up to the appointed time because the Jews asked.
The best approach to permit your idea is to say that the Jews do not ask the non-Jew to do work for them at all. The maintenance work will not be ordered by the Jews, and joint work is done for the majority (can we assume that?) (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:3). Regarding the fact that he takes an elevator in a way that Jews benefit from consider the following. The Mishna Berura (276:27) says that one can ask a non-Jewish worker to do dishes on Shabbat (which need not include melacha) and it is not a problem that the non-Jew will light a candle to help. In fact, although a Jew may not benefit from melacha done by a non-Jew of his own accord on behalf of a Jew, here he may benefit from the candle later, as the non-Jew lit it for his own benefit. Although the Jew may not benefit immediately from the light (or in this case, the elevator) that is probably because he initiated the work. Furthermore, there must be a legitimate independent reason for the non-Jew to have gotten involved in the activity. Therefore, one cannot suggest to a non-Jew to go up together to a certain floor and have him use the elevator to get there (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 30:52). Therefore, if the workers understand the plan and purposely go with the Jew as a favor, it would be a problem to benefit from their service on his behalf. If it is a safek whether their intention was for the Jew, the matter is unclear (Mishna Berura 307:24 & 276:15, Biur Halacha, ad loc.).
There is more to say on the topic, but it appears that the plan has merit (especially for cases of great need) but is not always feasible for pragmatic and/or halachic factors.

I’m afraid that it does violate at least a rabbinic prohibition on sailing of any sort (Beitza 36b).

The three main conditions one needs to fulfill to permit the selecting of one object from another are: 1) One must take the good (ochel) from the bad (p’solet), as taking p’solet from ochel is forbidden. 2) One must plan to use the ochel in the near future. 3) One may not use a special utensil to facilitate the selecting. #3 is not a problem, as it is not necessary to use a specific type of utensil to aid separating the foods. However, since you will not use the food that you separate off in the near future, #2 seems to be missing.

To deal with that problem, we have to analyze #1. Is only p’solet from ochel forbidden and other things are permitted, or is only ochel from p’solet permitted? What happens if one takes ochel from ochel, i.e., if one separates two things that will both be used at the same type in the future, but not immediately? On this point, the Pri Megadim is lenient but the Biur Halacha (to 319:3) rejects his opinion and says that if that which is removed will not be used in the short term, it is forbidden. However, our case is one of separating p’solet from p’solet in a manner that neither will be used in the future, and the Biur Halacha agrees that it is permitted to do so. The reason this case is more lenient has to do with the definition of borer as a positive act. When one separates p’solet from ochel, the act is positive because it leaves an improved ochel behind. However, when both elements are thrown out, the fact that they are separated in the process is not positive in a significant manner.

This is one of the bases for permitting to pour an undesired mixture of liquid and solid pieces into the sink even though the liquid goes down the drain and the solid pieces are held back by a sieve-like drain cover. Rav S.Z. Orbach (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:16 and ibid.:(47)) says that since both things are being discarded, the fact that they are separated in the process does not make it borer. One could claim that the same is true in our case that one’s plans to put the two types of leftovers in two different garbage receptacles is not a problem.

Despite the reasonable logic and halachic basis for permitting separating the holy and non-holy unwanted leftovers (see Orchot  Shabbat 3:44), several contemporary poskim were unwilling to permit it practically (ibid. in the name of Rav N. Karelitz and Rav Vozner; Ayil Meshulash 9:24 in the name of Rav Elyashiv). The matter may depend on the logic behind a Shemitta receptacle. Is it that one can throw out kedushat shvi’it food but because of its holiness one should do so in a respectful manner (see Katif Shvi’it 63:7)? Or is it that one has no right to waste Shemitta produce that is fit to eat and so one puts it aside where he can, at least in theory, eat it later? If the latter is the case, then removing kedushat shvi’it from other food is like selecting ochel from p’solet for non-immediate use, which is forbidden (see Ayil Meshulash ibid.). I heard in the name of Rav H. Schachter that the fact that the food requires a specific halachic process might (he did not render a ruling on the matter) make the selection halachically significant and therefore a problem.

In any case, one should consider the following. According to our mentor, Rav Yisraeli z.t.l., it is sufficient to put the Shemitta food in a bag before throwing it in the garbage. Whether one does so or accepts the stringency of having a receptacle where the food is to rot first, one may put non-Shemitta garbage along with the Shemitta as long as the former is not already decomposing or otherwise disgracing the Shemitta food. Therefore, there is no halachic need to separate.

The classic examples of the melacha of gozez (shearing) on Shabbat are the removal of hair and nails from a live or dead human or animal (see Rambam, Shabbat 9:7). However, one gemara (Eiruvin 103a) mentions warts and another (Shabbat 94b) removing strands of partially detached skin as Torah-level prohibitions. This would ostensibly be the case regarding removing dry skin. In fact, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (35:32) rules that removing a dry wart and dry skin are similarly forbidden. Similarly, one is not allowed to purposely remove dandruff (which is another form of dry skin) that is still attached to the scalp (ibid. 14:43).

However, several mitigating factors are relevant to your case. Firstly, there is at most a rabbinic violation if the wart is dried out (Eiruvin 103a). The gemara (Shabbat 50b) says that one is permitted to remove [some types of] scabs on Shabbat. There are different possible distinctions between that which is forbidden (rabbinically) and that which is permitted. These include whether the matter to be removed grew from within the body and whether it comes off itself over time.

The gemara regarding warts says that if one removes them by hand there is only a rabbinic prohibition even if it is not dried out because the normal way to remove warts is to use a utensil. This is likely not to apply to dry skin, along the lines of the Biur Halacha (to 340:2) who raises the possibility that it is normal (and forbidden from the Torah) to remove strands of skin by hand. However, if one used an elbow or otherwise did things unusually there would once again be reason for no more than a rabbinic issue.

A further mitigating situation, which likely applies to dry skin and not to warts, depends on gozez’s basic definition. We accept the predominant opinion that gozez applies whether one needs that which is removed (e.g., wool for fabric) or whether the removal improves the surface from which it is taken (ibid.). However, scratching off dry skin does not normally help in either regard, thus providing yet another reason that there is no Torah prohibition.

In order to turn the mitigating factors into a lenient ruling, we need to employ an important general rule. One may do an action even if it may bring on a prohibited result because of his lack of intention for that result (davar she’eino mitkaven). Admittedly, when it is definite that the prohibited result will occur (p’sik reishei) it is strictly forbidden (Shabbat 103a). When the problematic result is forbidden only rabbinically some are lenient, but the accepted opinion is that it is still forbidden (Mishna Berura 316:18). However, when there are two reasons why there is no Torah prohibition, then most authorities permit a p’sik reishei at least when the result is not desired (ibid.:14; see Sha’ar Hatziyun 316:18; Yabia Omer VI, Orach Chayim 36). We have demonstrated that there are at least two reasons that scratching dry skin is not a Torah prohibition. After consultation with a dermatologist (who happens to be the respondent’s brother) it appears that it is not in the interest of the person who itches to have the skin removed. It certainly does not seem to be a p’sik reishei that attached skin that it is helpful to remove will come off.

If one wants to be machmir, he can refrain from scratching, especially considering that the dermatologist said that it is, as a rule, better not to scratch in the first place.  Certainly one can try to scratch lightly and/or with an elbow. However, in a case where the discomfort of the itch makes it difficult to control himself, the laws of Shabbat need not be the thing to hold one back.

According to your description, the food was k’ma’achal ben d’rosai (=kmbd; nominally edible) when you took it out but not mevushal kol tzorko (fully cooked). According to the most accepted opinion, returning such food until it cooks fully is a Torah-level violation of cooking on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 318:4, based on the Rambam). (See lenient opinion below.) You also previously violated a less severe prohibition of meigis (stirring), which regarding not fully cooked food exists even when one just removes food with a spoon even off the fire (ibid.:18). In general, we urge chulent preparers to make a decision to do one of the following. Either cook it long and/or hard enough to ensure that it is fully cooked before Shabbat or refrain from handling it (including its lid) until the morning.

Is the food forbidden b’dieved (after the fact)? There are differences in this matter between the two issues involved in returning food to the flame on Shabbat. One issue is actual cooking, which may include a Torah prohibition when the food was not fully cooked or it contains liquid that cooled and is forbidden to be reheated according to many. The other is the rabbinic prohibition of improperly putting even cooked foods on a heat source (chazara) in a manner where there is a concern that one will tamper with the fire or it may look like cooking (see Orach Chayim 253).

Regarding cooking, the Shulchan Aruch ( OC 318:1) rules that even if something was cooked unintentionally (=b’shogeg), it may not be eaten on Shabbat. The Mishna Berura (318:7) says that in a case of need one can rely on the opinion that when Shabbat was violated b’shogeg, the result is permitted b’dieved. There is another reason to be lenient b’dieved. The Rashba and several others (see Biur Halacha to 318:4) say that there is no prohibition (from the Torah and, perhaps, at all) to cook food after it is kmbd. The logic is that since the Torah forbids cooking raw food to the point of kmbd, kmbd must be halachically cooked after which there is no prohibition. When we accept a stringent position and one acted according to significant authorities who rule leniently, the Rabbis did not prohibit the result b’dieved (Mishna Berura 318:2). This applies to our case. Even if the Rashba prohibits cooking kmbd food rabbinically, if one violates Shabbat rabbinically b’shogeg, the result product is permitted (Gra, accepted by Mishna Berura 318:3).

Paradoxically, the result of the rabbinic prohibition of chazara is more stringent b’dieved because of the concern that someone will purposely violate these rules which he views lightly and claim that he did so b’shogeg (Shabbat 38a). Therefore, one may not benefit on Shabbat from the fact that he left (or returned) food on the flame even b’shogeg. Thus, if it became fully cooked during that improper time it is forbidden to eat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:1).

However, the five basic various requirements of chazara differ in this regard. They are: 1) a covered flame; 2) one kept it in his hand; 3) he intended to return it; 4) the food was fully cooked; 5) the food is slightly warm (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:18). The first three are related to chazara per se and are governed by its strict rules regarding b’dieved. However, the fact that it must be fully cooked beforehand is only to avoid cooking, not chazara (Biur Halacha to 318:4; Orchot Shabbat 2:40). In fact, according to the lenient opinions regarding kmbd, chazara was permitted in our case and, in the final analysis, the chulent in question was permitted.

Care of Animals on Shabbat

A. Walking one’s pet on Shabbat

It is permissible to walk one’s animal on Shabbat, whether in an area that has an eruv or an area that does not have an eruv.

In a place without an eruv, one must be careful to observe the following guidelines:

1.      It is forbidden for the animal to bear a load on its body.^[1][1]

2.      It is permitted to dress the animal in clothing in order to protect it from the elements, such as cold, etc.^[2][2]

3.      It is permitted to walk an animal with a leash that is attached to it for its protection.^[3][3] However, one must ensure that the end of the leash should not protrude a tefach or more passed the hand of the one who is walking it.[AZ1] [AZ1] Similarly, one must ensure that the leash does not sag within a tefach of the ground.^[4][4] Both of these problems can be solved by using a retractable leash; none of the leash will extend past the walkers hand and the leash will remain taut and not approach the ground.

B. Feeding an animal on Shabbat:

It is permissible to feed an animal on Shabbat on condition that the animal depends on its owner for sustenance; however, it is forbidden to feed an animal that does not depend on its owner for sustenance.⁵

 1.      Touching an Animal on Shabbat:

There is a distinction between touching an animal on Shabbat and carrying an animal on Shabbat. Animals are muktzeh⁶ and are therefore forbidden to be lifted or handled on Shabbat.

However, it is permissible to touch an animal on Shabbat.⁷

 Additional Response:

As per your request, we have enclosed sources and the main points for further research regarding tzar baalei chaim, (causing animals to suffer).

The topic of tzar baalei chaim and its implications has a very large scope. In light of its magnitude, we will only present the main points.

Source of the ruling:

The Talmud (Tractate Baba Metzia 32a-32b) deliberates on one’s obligation to unload cargo from an animal that is struggling with its load. The Talmud brings a debate whether the law of tzar baalei chaim is Torah-based or rabbinic. By the end of the discussion, no clear-cut conclusion is decided regarding this question. Rav Yosef Karo’s statement in Shulchan Aruch, (Choshen Mishpat 272:9-10) implies that the prohibition of tzar baalei chaim is Torah-based. Indeed the Rama (in sif 9) rules so in his commentary.^[i][i]

Implications:

 Hunting-It is not fitting for the Jewish People, the Children of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov to kill animals for pleasure.^[ii][ii] To even participate in capturing animals with the intention of releasing them is improper. We have previously discussed this in volume 2 of the responsa BeMareh HaBazaq, which is attached.

Desecration of Shabbat in order to prevent Tzar baalei Chaim-Our Sages permitted us to milk animals in certain fashions^[iii][iii] in order to prevent the animal from being pained even though the act of milking an animal causes desecration of the Shabbat.^[iv][iv] When animals experience pain, it is permissible to handle them[AZ2] [AZ2] on Shabbat. In a similar vein, our Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to perform a melacha on Shabbat, even if the activity is forbidden by the Torah--when there is a fear for the animal’s life. Another case is as follows: The Sages ordinarily forbid intentionally causing a vessel to become muktzeh; however, if there is a problem of tzar baalei chaim, this rabbinic injunction is suspended.^[v][v]

 Animal Experiments and Tzar Baalei Chaim: Although it is permitted to perform experiments on animals, one is obligated to ensure that one will not unnecessarily inflict pain onto the animals.^[vi][vi]

Obligation to Feed Animals: One is commanded to feed the animals that he owns. He is even obligated to feed his animals before he feeds himself.^[vii][vii]

The concept of tosefet arises in connection with holy days (or Shemitta years), originally regarding Yom Kippur. The gemara (Yoma 81b) learns from the Torah’s mention of fasting from 9 Tishrei in the evening until the next evening that the fast begins a little before day’s end and ends a little after it. It shows that one should act similarly regarding refraining from melacha (forbidden work) on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Admittedly, the Rambam omits this concept in the laws of Shabbat and even in the laws of Yom Kippur mentions it in regard only to fasting (see Maggid Mishneh, Shvitat Asor 1:6). However, the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 261:2 requires tosefet Shabbat.

There are two or three elements to tosefet. 1) One violates tosefet if he ignores the coming day’s laws until it begins (Beitza 30a, regarding those who ate “until dark” on Yom Kippur. 2) One’s acceptance of the new day is binding even if he did so earlier than necessary (Shulchan Aruch, OC 263:10). 3) It is a mitzva or even an obligation to accept tosefet actively. It is #3, which is not clear, about which you are inquiring.

The Mishna Berura (261:21) says that accepting Shabbat is accomplished orally. He cites the Rama (608:3 and 553:1) that cognitive acceptance without speech is invalid and therefore one who only mentally decided to end eating before a fast may eat again. The Mishna Berura (553:2) cites important poskim who feel that a mental decision is binding and does not seem to decide between the approaches. Based on these passages, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (46:2) says that one is required to accept Shabbat before day’s end, preferably with speech, although it is possibly binding with a cognitive decision. Neither author mentions dissenters to this concept (#3).

Two things trouble us. First, few observant Jews or shuls are careful to actively accept Shabbat early. In fact, many shuls finish Mincha moments before or even after sunset, at which time tosefet has likely kicked in automatically and one has lost the mitzva. (It is unclear how long tosefet is but it is a matter of (almost certainly single digits of) minutes- see opinions in Piskei Teshuvot 261:2). It is also strange that the Mishna Berura does not cite a source for the need to accept Shabbat early. The Rama he cites refers only to element #2, that oral voluntary acceptance is binding. Possibly, it just makes sense that one should accept (even though it is not done before Shemitta or at Shabbat’s end) rather than be forced into tosefet and that it is meaningful only if done in a binding manner. However, it is still troubling that the classical sources do not seem to mention this requirement, even regarding Yom Kippur, the original source (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 608:1).

In fact, it is not clear that explicit acceptance is necessary. Rav O. Yosef (Yabia Omer VII, OC 34) argues that if one is in a shul where Mincha (which must be done before Shabbat) will finish after sunset, he may daven without accepting Shabbat, claiming that the essence of tosefet is simply refraining from melacha. Shevet Halevi (I, 50) is also not convinced that acceptance is necessary, although he says that many Rishonim consider it a mitzva (mentally may suffice). Ohr L’Tzion (18:2) concurs and understands even the Mishna Berura to have been referring only to element #2.

There is little reason not to actively accept Shabbat a few minutes before sunset, when it is unlikely to need to do melacha. However, the fact that most people do not do so need not be a mistake. For Ashkenazi women, the matter is a non-issue, as they normally accept Shabbat when lighting Shabbat candles (Rama, OC 263:10). When they do not do so, their status is like a man’s.

We are not familiar with the particular design of this filter. After consulting with Rav Yisrael Rozen, the director of the Zomet Institute, we were able to clarify the following principles:

[In order to know if your water filter is acceptable for Shabbat use, you have to find out what type of sensors is in your water filter.]

There is a type of electronic filter that has a sensor that continuously measures the filter’s status, which constantly changes according to the water quality. It measures the amount of water flow or the duration of water flow. A warning indicator turns on after a particular stage of operation.

If your filter has such a sensor, you would need to disconnect the sensor for use on Shabbat. The problem of Shabbat desecration is not limited to an indicator turning on due to a power interruption. Rather, there is a problem with the continuous electronic operation each time that the water is turned on.

In contrast, an electronic filter which contains an edge sensor is less problematic. The edge sensor only operates after sensing when the filter reaches a particular efficiency point. Only then does a light turn on. In such a case, using such a filter might be permitted since the chance that precisely at the moment of turning on the tap on Shabbat will the user get to a point of breaking the circuit is remote. This is similar to (using a device which has) a thermostat on Shabbat. If the chances are slim that the sensors will immediate turn on upon operation, many rabbis would allow such a filter.

By the way, there are types of water filters of which the water flow causes an ultra-violet beam to turn on and purify the water streaming into it, and therefore in many cases, water filters need rabbinical approval in order to ascertain that they may be used on Shabbat.

1.     If the subject of discussion is a website which is maintained by Shabbat desecrators, such as a news site that gets updated on Shabbat, it is forbidden to surf it, even when it is still not Shabbat for the surfer. It is similarly forbidden to benefit from the desecration of Shabbat.

2.     If the website is not maintained by Shabbat desecration, it is permitted to surf it under the above conditions and to even perform transactions, as long as they do not entail desecration of Shabbat by the website owners.

Sources for the ruling can be found in the responsa BaMareh HaBazaq, (volume 5, siman 37, se'ifim 2, 3).

We wish a complete recovery for the person on whose behalf you are praying, along with the rest of our sick brethren.

One should not pray on Shabbat or say Tehillim or a subsequent prayer for one who is ill, unless he or she has a life-threatening illness. There is an opinion that even the saying of the Mi Sheberach prayer, which is said during the Torah reading on behalf of one who is sick, should not be recited. Nonetheless, in practice, it is permissible to recite the Mi Sheberach.

Sources: Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 288:10; Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim, Volume 1, siman 105.

Halachic authorities debate what the reason is for prohibiting wringing moisture from one’s hair [on Shabbat]. While discussing the laws of laundering, the Rambam in his Mishnah Torah (Hilchot Shabbat 9:11), writes that there is no prohibition of sechita [wringing moisture] from hair. The Maggid Mishnah explains that the Rambam meant that although no Torah obligation exists, a rabbinic prohibition still exists.

Some derived from this ruling, which is juxtaposed along with cases of [the prohibition of] laundering on Shabbat, that the prohibition of sechita is rabbinically forbidden because one might perform the melachah of malbin, laundering. Indeed, this is what the Biur Halachah writes (302:9, “assur”). The prohibition is similarly codified in halachah in the responsa Az Nidbaru (volume 1, siman 55) and the sefer Mehuchat Ahavah (volume 2, p. 421, note 68). According to this approach, the questions that were asked are resolved.

In contrast, some wrote that the rabbinic prohibition of wringing moisture from one’s hair is not because of malbin but rather mefarek, taking apart. This appears to be the opinion of the Pri Megadim in siman 320 (Mashbetzet Zahav, ot 12) and in Rav Moshe Feinstein’s responsa, Igrot Moshe (Ohr HaChaim, volume 1, siman 133). This similarly appears to be the approach of Shemirat Shabbath Kehilchatah (volume 1, chapter 14, note 64, quoting Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). According to their opinion, it would be permitted to wring moisture from one’s hair in a situation where the water would otherwise be wasted or would be absorbed by a towel. This is especially the case when the liquid does not collect in a way that is perceived by the naked eye (Shemirath Shabbath Kehilchata, Ibid).

At first glance, your friend is making Kiddush at a time when he is not obligated to do so on behalf of those who have (presumably) accepted (or are accepting) Shabbat and are thus obligated in Kiddush. In general, one who has already discharged his obligation of a certain mitzva can perform the mitzva with its beracha to fulfill the obligation of one who has not yet done so (based on the concept of arvut) (Rosh Hashana 29a). However, the mishna limits this. The one who performs the mitzva must be as obligated in it as the one for whom he is doing it. We must consider: is your friend considered obligated in Kiddush because generally it applies to him, like one who already fulfilled his obligation? Or should we say that one for whom the time is such that the mitzva does not apply is not considered obligated at all?

Regarding cases similar to this, Acharonim cite a Yerushalmi (see Tosafot, Yevamot 14a) that says that inhabitants of un-walled cities cannot read the megilla on behalf of those from walled cities (whose obligation is a day later). We see that one who is obligated in theory but not at this time is not considered obligated. R. Akiva Eiger (to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 277) in regard to our case, raises the following distinction. Here, the one who has not accepted Shabbat can accept it and become obligated immediately. Therefore, the obligation is considered relevant even before he did so. However, R. Akiva Eiger left the matter as an unsolved doubt.

In the past generation, several poskim have tried to resolve the doubt. Tosafot (Berachot 48b) says that one who did not eat is considered obligated in regard to performing Birkat Hamazon on behalf of one who ate because he could eat. Rav S.Z. Orbach (Minchat Shlomo I, 3), makes the following distinction between that case and ours. At the time of Birkat Hamazon, the mitzva applies to the one who has not eaten if only the circumstances were that he had eaten. In contrast, before Shabbat is simply not a time that Kiddush is relevant for one who has not accepted Shabbat even if he could do so.

On the other hand, we should consider whether it is clear that Kiddush is inappropriate before Shabbat. The Rambam apparently does not accept the concept of tosefet Shabbat (the ability/obligation) to usher in Shabbat early. Yet he (Shabbat 29:11) says that it is possible to recite Kiddush toward the end of Friday afternoon. This lends credence to the concept that Kiddush (as well as its parallel, Havdala) applies and can be done close to the time of the transition between Shabbat and weekday. Thus the obligation of Kiddush may already apply on a certain level soon before Shabbat even for one who has not accepted Shabbat. While it is difficult to rely on this thesis, it can be thrown in to the mix when contemplating grounds for leniency in various related cases (see Minchat Shlomo, ibid.).

Some of our generation’s important poskim have differed as to whether it is proper to rely on R. Akiva Eiger’s more lenient position and allow one who has not accepted Shabbat to make Kiddush for others. In a case such as ours where one is doing a mitzva by doing so and it is not easy to replace him with someone else who can make Kiddush in a better way, we feel that it is proper to be lenient on the matter (see Tzitz Eliezer XII, 25; Yabia Omer VIII, OC 46). While it is best if someone who is hearing the Kiddush should be eating upon it at that time, it is possible that even this is not an absolute necessity (Tzitz Eliezer XII, 24). (The details of that issue are beyond our present scope.)

You imply that you do not feel that the cell phone is consistently needed on the level of safek piku’ach nefesh (the chance that it will save a life). You may be taking into account that where your live [the questioner included an address] many fine Jews would drop everything to help a person in distress and there is an active Hatzala organization. We begin with your assumptions.

A cell phone is generally muktzeh as a kli shemelachto l’issur (=kshmli), as its main purpose is to make phone calls that are prohibited on Shabbat. A kshmli can have a higher level of muktzeh (muktzeh machmat chisaron kis) if one is concerned enough about its safety to refrain from using it for other purposes. Nowadays people use cell phones for just about anything they desire.

A kshmli may be moved for tzorech gufo u’mekomo (to use it for a physical use or remove it from a place one wants to use) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:3). It may not be moved to be protected from damage (ibid.). You are not interested in protecting the phone, but rather want it for its possible permitted usage. Is it enough that you are not moving it to protect it, or do you need a positive tzorech gufo u’mekomo? If it must be positive, how exacting are we in determining utility?

There are discussions among the Acharonim that seem to revolve along these questions. For example, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (20:10) rules that the “need of the place” must be literally that the muktzeh object is occupying a place one wants to use. If it is only that the object is an embarrassment or is otherwise unwanted where it is, it may not be moved. In other words, there has to be a well-defined need of mekomo. Yet not all agree with him (see ad loc.:(20); Az Nidbaru VIII, 30), and all may permit it if due to the utensil’s presence, one will not use the room (ibid.).

The Mishna Berura (308:12) says that one may not move a kshmli to use it if a non-muktzeh object is available. Many poskim limit his stringency to cases where the non-muktzeh is easily useable (Igrot Moshe, OC V 21.12; Minchat Shlomo II, 34.30). Many feel that the Mishna Berura’s reasoning is unanimously accepted (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilachata 20:29; B’er Moshe I, 21). However, our basic assumption is that tzorech gufo u’mekomo must meet significant standards.

Our case is special in two opposing ways. On one hand, the potential usage is the most important one possible (saving lives). On the other hand, the chances of needing to use it on Shabbat appear extremely small. The gemara (Shabbat 124a) says that placing sticks to separate the loaves of the lechem hapanim and prevent their spoilage is not considered tzorech gufo because it is unlikely that there will be spoilage in a short time. This implies that if the chance the object is needed is small, it is not considered a valid need.

Tying things together, we suggest as follows. If, after discussing the matter with the appropriate, sensitive health experts, it is felt that there is even a remote but normal chance that the cell phone will be needed to save a life (this will also make it tzorech gufo), it is permitted to take it. If it is felt that the chance of use does not reach even that low threshold, then not only would piku’ach nefesh not apply, but muktzeh would also be a problem.

As you are apparently aware, it is forbidden to buy things on Shabbat and Yom Tov, either because commerce could lead to writing or because the navi warns against “looking for your interests and speaking matters on Shabbat” (Beitza 37a with Rashi). On the other hand, the mishna (see Beitza 29a, b) permits acquiring items even from a professional proprietor on Yom Tov and (almost unanimously- see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 323) Shabbat. This is permitted if the product is to be used on the holy day and the acquisition is done in a way that avoids classic signs of commerce (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 29:17).

What must one be careful about? One of the issues, measuring quantities or perhaps even using a measuring utensil without actually measuring, does not apply assuming the baked goods are sold by unit and are not weighed. However, it is a problem to mention the purchased item’s price when discussing its acquisition (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 323:4). One also should not mention the term “buy” but something like “receive” (Mishna Berura 323:1). Here, there is obviously no explicit mention of a price. After all, as one acquires (buys?) the object on the honor system there is no one with whom one needs to interact. On the other hand, one can argue that since the price is listed and the buyer is acquiring the food in the same basic manner it is done during the week (see Beitza 29a) it may still be considered a forbidden sale by price.

In truth, though, the fact that a price is found in writing need not be a problem. In fact the Rama (OC 323:4) uses the existence of a known set price as an alleviating factor. In discussing what one should not say, the gemara mentions the idea of s’chum, which usually means a total. The Rishonim dispute whether it is permitted to mention only the measure of the specific item one is acquiring without adding it to previous purchases to arrive at a sum total. The Rif seems to go as far as to say that one can ask for a certain object at a certain price as long as he doesn’t add up various obligations (see Beit Yosef, ibid.). The Rama accepts this opinion, on provision that the price is a known one. In that case, the mention of the price is viewed not as a commercial discussion but as a means of identifying the amount of product that one wants (see Mishna Berura 323:19). Although the poskim question whether we should rely on this leniency (ibid.:20; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 29:19), we see at least that the fact that a price is clearly known does not render the transaction forbidden. Even the Shulchan Aruch (ad loc., whose stringent opinion is accepted by Sephardim (Yalkut Yosef 323:1)), who says that a single price should not be mentioned, does not object to an object’s price being clearly known when agreeing to the transfer.

One thing one must avoid is studying the price list, as detailed written accounts of transactions are known as shitrei hedyotot and are forbidden to be read (see Mishna Berura, ibid.). In that context, the Mishna Berura also points out that one should not put pins next to the name and amount of money that corresponds to the details of the transaction. (It is possible that the pin or similar system can be used for mitzva purposes such as recording pledges at an appeal (ibid.), but that is beyond our present scope).

Although issues of Shabbat do not prevent taking the baked goods on credit, one should make sure that he is allowed to take them without immediately writing down his debt. It is possible that the seller may trust him not to lie but not to remember to update the account after Shabbat.

Use of any of the devices that you mentioned includes various concerns of Shabbat desecration. However, pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbat, saving a life pushes aside the mitzvah of Shabbat, even when there is a doubt whether the circumstances are life threatening. Nonetheless, one should try to lessen the Shabbat prohibitions, even in a time of need (Cf. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 328: 12, in the Ramah; Mishnah Berurah, Ibid., sif katan 35).

On the other hand, one should be careful that the doctor’s work would not be affected, in which case, one’s losses would be more than one’s gains.

As a rule, speaking on the phone is not forbidden, and the problem is only in operating a device. If it is sufficient to rely on a landline phone, one should use this, and not a mobile phone or pager, since there is no problem of writing (it is preferable to use a telephone which does not have a display, where the display would indicate that the receiver was picked up).

Next in preference is to use a mobile phone. By a pager, the switchboard operator is required to type a message, which some claim is a Torah prohibition (Shevet Halevy, volume 6, siman 37). In contrast, when calling on a mobile phone, it is true that the phone display changes by pressing the call or answer button, however the writing is much shorter. It probably is considered a “lighter” prohibition since the writing is usually not permanently stored, whereas a pager does store data.

In addition to the above, it appears that handling a mobile phone is much easier than handling a pager, since there is a great reasoning to say classify a mobile phone as a klei shemelachto le’issur u’leheter, an object that can be used for both prohibited and permissible actions on Shabbat. In addition to using a mobile phone as a means of communication, it also functions as a timepiece and a date organizer. Proof of this is that fewer people wear wristwatches in wake of the widespread use of the mobile phone. In comparison, a pager is certainly an object that is exclusively used for a prohibited act. Only if the item is needed – or if the object is occupying a place that is needed – would its handling be permitted (Even if we’d claim that a mobile phone is an object used only for prohibited activities, if one could always view the time without having to press any of the buttons, then a doctor would be using this phone during Shabbat for an activity that is not prohibited, which is not the case by a pager.

First, we are assuming that the food, as you found it over Shabbat, was not only not cooked but not considered even marginally edible. If it was marginally edible, it would not be considered muktzeh (Mishna Berura 308:126). If it was fit for a dog’s consumption but it was (as in your case) made for human consumption, then most poskim consider it muktzeh (ibid.:27).

Almost all of the issues you raised are discussed in one gemara (Beitza 26b). The gemara tries to determine whether there is muktzeh for part of Shabbat. One of the proofs it brings is from the case of one who took some fruit and put them on the roof to turn into dried fruit. The baraita rules that they are muktzeh unless he designated them before Shabbat for use. The gemara tries to understand what the state of the fruit was when Shabbat started: “If it was fit, why does it need to be designated? If it was not fit, what does it help to do so? If you want to say that he did not know if it was fit or not, didn’t Rav Kahane say that muktzeh that dried up [before Shabbat] without the owner knowing is permitted? Therefore, it must be talking about a case where it had been fit, became unfit and then became fit again [on Shabbat]. If you say there is no muktzeh for part of Shabbat, why do you require designation? On the other hand, if there is muktzeh [for part of Shabbat], how does designation help? You must say that it is talking about a case where it was partially fit, as some people eat it and some do not. If he designated it, he revealed his thought process [that he will use it]. If he did not designate it, he did not reveal his thought process.”

This gemara, whose conclusions are brought as halacha in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310: 3-5), teaches the following things regarding your questions. Whether or not something is muktzeh does not depend on the owner’s perception of if it is useable but on whether it actually is (see ibid.:4 and Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 22:17). Even if something was not muktzeh when Shabbat started, if it became unfit during the course of the Shabbat in such a manner that it could not be permissibly and reliably assumed to be turned into being fit again, it would be muktzeh from the time the status began. That which the gemara says that an object does not become muktzeh for part of Shabbat is talking about a case where the object not only started Shabbat as fit but, after becoming not fit, subsequently became fit again. In that case, it reverts back to not being muktzeh anymore, according to the lenient opinion, which is accepted as halacha (ibid.:3). However, in your case, the uncooked food remained unfit and muktzeh.

Although the raw food in question was apparently muktzeh, you could have possibly moved it, not only to make room but even to refrigerate it, in the following manner. Moving muktzeh with parts of the body that are not usually used for moving (tiltul b’gufo), such as legs and elbows, is permitted (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 311:8). Moving the object by pushing, pulling, carrying it, etc. with the use of a non-muktzeh item that one is handling directly (tiltul min hatzad) is permitted for purposes other than the protection of the muktzeh item (ibid.). Most poskim, though, say that this it is forbidden to use this system to protect the muktzeh object.

There are two main discussions in the gemara about allowing things to cook by themselves on Shabbat (shehiya). One (Shabbat 36b-38b) discusses when it is required to have the fire covered or removed for fear of stoking coals. One opinion says that if the food has reached maachal ben d’rusai (nominally cooked) it may be left as one desires, while another requires covering. Apparently, if there the fire is covered, so that there is no concern of stoking the coals (or its equivalent), one could leave any food. According to a wide spectrum of poskim, a non-adjustable heat source needs no covering even when it contains uncooked food. Even if a coffee maker has many settings and controls, if it has only one level of heat (and only one speed of brewing), having the machine activate the brewing process on Shabbat would be permitted from this perspective.

Another gemara (Shabbat 18b) deals more broadly with systems set up before Shabbat that would be Shabbat desecration if set up on Shabbat. Regarding dyeing wool, the gemara says that due to a concern that one will stir the cauldron, he must seal the lid before allowing the dyeing to occur on Shabbat. Regarding uncooked food left on the fire from before Shabbat, the gemara refers only to a problem of stoking coals and not that he might stir. R. Akiva Eiger (to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 253:1) suggests that if the food had started cooking but had not reached maachal ben d’rusai before Shabbat started, it would be a concern (which could not be solved by a blech or by having a non-adjustable heat source). Although the Biur Halacha refers to this stringency (in passing), it appears that the great majority of present-day poskim accept the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling (see OC 253:1) that when the rabbinic concern lest one stoke the coals is handled, even uncooked food can be left on the flame (see Orchot Shabbat 2:68).

The Tzitz Eliezer (II, 6), nonetheless, forbids putting uncooked food in a place which will be activated by a timer on Shabbat. He bases himself on the Ramban (Shabbat 18b) who deals with the question of why the concern of stirring is not raised regarding cooking food. One of his answers is that the Rabbis were concerned about stirring only in regard to dye. However, his first answer is that the serious concern of stirring food applies only in the beginning of the cooking process, which, classically, happens before Shabbat. However, says the Tzitz Eliezer, when the timer activates the cooking process on Shabbat, we should be concerned about stirring. Rav S.Z. Orbach (Minchat Shlomo II, 34.1) responded that we accept the Ramban’s lenient answer, that we are not concerned about stirring, paving the way for timers starting cooking on Shabbat. The way (at least most) coffee machines work, it is anyway not feasible to stir the coffee as it brews.

A final issue is that the Rama (OC 252:5, as opposed to the Shulchan Aruch, ad loc.) forbids operating from before Shabbat a mechanism that is forbidden to operate on Shabbat if it makes noise because it is degrading for Shabbat (avsha milta). It is permitted only if it is common for people to set up the mechanism in advance and thus there is no reason to suspect that one desecrated Shabbat in its regard (ibid., regarding a clock that chimes at certain times). Since coffee makers are usually not operated on a time delay, this could be a problem. However, most machines are probably not loud enough to cause a prohibition, which exists when it can be heard in another room (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 70).

There are (and will be) many models of coffee makers, so one must ensure that his meets all the requirements and not assume or quote us as giving a blanket leniency.

: It is possible to make an eiruv techumin for a period of many Shabbatot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 413:1). (One has to use something with a long shelf life and ensure it is in a safe place.) When making the declaration that accompanies the placing of the eiruv (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 415:4) he should indicate that it should take effect only on the Shabbatot when he will want to make use of them (Biur Halacha to 413:1). This could be important for the following reason. An eiruv techumin does not increase the distance one may walk. Rather, it changes the central point around which the 2,000 amot radius is calculated. On a week that you are not going to lain, you might want mobility in a different direction. The same food that was put aside for that purpose for one week can be reused. You do not even need to know before a given Shabbat if you are going to activate it that Shabbat, but can rely on the original global declaration (Shulchan Aruch, OC 413:1). This is because we can say that certain details of a halachic process can be retroactively determined (b’reira) regarding rabbinic halachot. (Techum Shabbat on walking above 2,000 amot is rabbinic up to 24,000 amot. The eiruv is effective only up to a maximum of 4,000 amot.) In this case, the eiruv is functional based on the original declaration, and the days for which declaration will apply can be determined later (see Mishna Berura 413:8).

The next question is if everyone in the group can share an eiruv. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid., based on Eiruvin 82a) says that one can place an eiruv techumin on behalf of a group of people and that this works even if it is unclear who will be included in that group (e.g., all the people who will go to the house of mourning- mishna ibid.). This, again, can be determined by b’reira.

There are, though, a few conditions that must be met. First, the people to whom it will apply need to be made aware of their possible inclusion in the eiruv before the given Shabbat begins, even though they do not have to decide at that point whether they want to be included (gemara ad loc.- see Mishna Berura 413:7). Someone also must have acquired a requisite portion of the eiruv (even in the open-ended manner) for each person who is to be included. As the amount is enough food to eat for two meals (which, according to the standard opinion, is up to a little more than a pound of bread- Netivot Shabbat 31:(38)) this may be challenging.

There are at least two ways to solve the problem. One is to use a food that does not require much quantity. Unlike an eiruv chatzerot, which must be of bread, an eiruv techumin can use any food (Shulchan Aruch, OC 409:7). One only needs the amount of the given food that would be used in a classic meal (ibid.). For drinks, this is two revi'iot (approximately, a cup). Regarding foods that are used as relish with bread or other foods, including salty water, the amount is how much would be consumed in a meal, which is very little (Shulchan Aruch, OC 386:6). Thus, using salty water (ibid.), a bottle could probably be enough for the entire group of people who will end up going to lain. The other system is that each week, after using the eiruv, the person who used it does a kinyan (the easiest is a kinyan sudar, in which the transferred object does not have to be present) to pass it on to the next person or back to a central person who is in charge of making a kinyan on behalf of the relevant participants. According to the Shevet Halevi (VI, 44) it is not even necessary to make a kinyan back, as the present may be only for a Shabbat at a time.

 If the owner works in the store on Shabbat, one has to assume that he has the status of a mechallel Shabbat b’farhesia (one who desecrates Shabbat publicly), who loses all halachic ne’emanut (credibility) (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 119:6; see Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 175 regarding operating a store on Shabbat). If, though, a wife who does not violate prohibitions vouches for all the food’s purchase and preparation it would be permitted to eat there. Your question implies that the owner only keeps the store open, and let’s assume with non-Jews selling and working. You also imply that the person seems to generally follow the laws of the Torah.

Since you give no details, we cannot say whether your acquaintance’s store is allowed to be open on Shabbat with non-Jews working in it. Some relevant factors include whether there is a non-Jewish partner and the nature of the partnership; whether it is known publicly that it is a Jewish-owned business; how the workers are paid and whether they are required to open on Shabbat. We will work with your apparent assumption that the owner violates a rabbinic prohibition by keeping it open. There is considerable debate, without a clear consensus, regarding whether the sweeping disqualification for chillul Shabbat b’farhesia applies to the violation of rabbinic prohibitions of Shabbat (see Baer Heitev, Yoreh Deah 2:15; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 2:8; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, ad loc.; Aruch Hashulchan, YD 2:16).

Besides the special disqualification of a mechallel Shabbat, there is the general matter that one who does follow a halacha loses credibility. The gemara (Bechorot 30a) cites a machloket Tannaim whether one who is not trustworthy in one area of halacha is not trusted for anything or whether he is trusted in areas that are more severe and thus it is less likely that he would violate them. We accept the opinion that one is still believed regarding matters that are more severe (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:5). On one hand, one who violated rabbinic prohibitions should not be suspected to violate ones of Torah origin (Bechorot 30a). On the other hand, when one eats by someone, he has to be sure that not only are there are not Torah violations but that there are also not rabbinic violations. Regarding questions of general kashrut, this should not be a problem because the transfer of distrust from a severe violation to a lighter one applies only when the violations are of the same general type (i.e., from forbidden food to forbidden food) and would not apply from Shabbat to kashrut (see Shach 119:12). Yet, if one wants to eat in this person’s house on Shabbat, don’t we have to be concerned that he will violate a rabbinic prohibition of Shabbat as he did regarding the store?

The solution to these problems is found in the Rama (YD 119:7). One does not lose his reliability if he violated a prohibition that people don’t think is a real prohibition. Since there are cases where one can have his store operated on Shabbat and since, for a long time in many places, there has been an atmosphere where many believed that doing so in general is not forbidden, the storeowner is not categorized as a mechallel Shabbat nor is he considered one who is suspect of sinning. Of course, it may be questionable if someone of this level knows enough to keep a sufficiently kosher home, but the matter of the store per se should not make it forbidden to eat in his house even on Shabbat.

It is an hour and a quarter before sunset using relative hours. This means that you divide the time between sunrise and sunset by 12 to get to an hour. This is significantly less than 75 minutes in the winter and significantly more than 75 minutes in the summer. If you look at a good calendar, this time will be called plag haMincha.

We will first introduce the stringency of “right before Shabbat” that you refer to and then apply it to your case.

There are two categories of cases regarding having foods on a flame (irrespective of the melacha of actually cooking): shehiya and hachazara.

Shehiya means leaving a pot/food on the flame, after putting it there to cook or to heat up before Shabbat. In certain cases (about which there is a major machloket for thousands of years), one must do something to the system to reduce the chance that he will “stoke the coals” or its equivalent. The bottom line is that blechs and non-adjustable hot plates fulfill the halachic requirement, when necessary.

Hachazara means returning a food/pot to a heat source after it had previously been removed. The classic case is when one does so on Shabbat. Hachzara is a more severe case than shehiya (for reasons beyond our present scope) and in order for it to be permitted in the classic case, five basic requirements must be met: 1) The food must be fully cooked before returning it. 2) The heat source must be covered. 3) The pot should remain in one’s hand since being removed. 4) The remover should have had in mind to return it. 5) The food should still be warm. Only condition #2 applies to shehiya.

The general assumption, that the difference between shehiya and hachzara is that the former is when the food is left from before Shabbat and the latter is on Shabbat, is challenged by the following gemara (Shabbat 38b). “According to the one who says people may do hachzara (as we pasken), he may do hachzara even on Shabbat.” This implies that there is a case of hachzara that is not on Shabbat (and is easier to permit). Tosafot (Shabbat 36b) say that this refers to putting the food back on the flame so close to Shabbat that if the food were cold, it would not have a chance to become hot before Shabbat. Although several Rishonim disagree with Tosafot, the Rama (Orach Chayim 253:2) says that it is good to follow Tosafot's opinion.

If putting food on the flame at that time is hachzara, does that mean that all of the aforementioned five conditions of hachzara are needed? Your question raises the possibility that the food needs to be warm at the time of this Erev Shabbat hachzara or at least that the food has to be fully cooked. (While the soup is fully cooked, reheating liquid is forbidden like cooking uncooked solid foods.)

This is actually not the case. The five conditions of classic hachzara can be broken up into a few categories of the problems they solve. One is that putting the food on the flame should not violate bishul. This applies to condition #1 and #5. However, one will not violate bishul when he puts food on before Shabbat, and we have no source to extend this rabbinically to Erev Shabbat. Within the remaining three conditions, the covered flame (#2) is a matter of standard concern, whereas keeping the food in the hand and having intention to return it are special stringincies regarding hachazara. The Rosh (Shabbat 3:2) says that the stringency of hachazara soon before Shabbat applies to #2 no matter what state the food is in, which is not the case regarding shehiya (see Shabbat 36b and Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:1)) However, the other requirements do not apply before Shabbat (Mishna Berura 253:72). Since a non-adjustable hot plate is no worse than a blech (which solves #2), you do not have a problem.

Let us point out that regarding non-adjustable hot plates, important poskim allow returning fully cooked food (dry, or, if liquid, when it is still warm) even on Shabbat.  Also, exactly what time one has to put up the food in order to avoid Tosafot’s stringency is a topic that deserves discussion. However, in the case you described, you can ignore this stringency.

There seem to be two problems with removing the hair. Firstly, the loose hair is unwanted, and it is forbidden to remove an undesired object that is mixed in among the desired because of borer (selecting - see Orach Chayim 319). Secondly, detached hair is not part of the human body and has no clear purpose; therefore, it should be muktzeh and forbidden to handle directly.

Yet, there are strong indications (but not full proof) that neither of these issues will forbid removing the hair. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 303:27) forbids combing one’s hair normally on Shabbat because of the certainty that some hair will be uprooted from the scalp (shearing). The poskim (see Mishna Berura ad loc.: 86-87) say that one may go over the hair gently with a soft brush because it is uncertain if any hair will thereby be uprooted and it is not his intention. Poskim do not forbid the latter out of concern that if there are detached hairs on the hair, they will certainly be removed, which we hypothesized would be borer. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 316:9) also allows picking out lice or other insects from clothing or hair without the matter being considered borer. The Rama (OC 302:1), in discussing the prohibition of laundering, permits removing feathers stuck to clothes, which also would seem to be removing bad from the good and borer. Another indication is that women remove anything superfluous from the hair (including loose hairs) that could be a chatzitza before going to the mikveh, and the major sources do not limit how this should be done on Shabbat, except for the matter of combing the hair, which, as above is a problem of “shearing.”

It is harder to explain why there would not borer. Possibly, some substances or circumstances are too distant from the classic cases of borer, which refer to separating different types of food. Perhaps, removing impurities from hair and fabrics fall under the categories of shearing and laundering, and when those do not apply, borer is not a factor. Similarly, Rav S.Z. Orbach (Minchat Shlomo I, 11) suggests that since it is normal for things to get on hair and fabrics, it is considered cleaning them rather than selecting. There may be other distinctions. The exact parameters of the explanation are important because there are likely test cases that can go either way depending on the explanation. However, our relatively strong halachic intuition, based on similar precedents, is that your case is permitted.

Regarding muktzeh, in some of the sources above (including Shulchan Aruch, OC 319:9), the poskim speak of removing the apparently unusable objects directly by hand. The most likely explanation is along the lines of the Chazon Ish (47:21) that when cleaning an object from unwanted “impurities” (e.g., washing dishes) the unwanted is subsumed under the non-muktzeh and we view the action as cleaning dealing with the useable object. So here you would be considered handling your head of hair rather than grabbing detached hairs. While apparently not everyone agrees with this thesis (see Shvut Yitzchak, Muktzeh, p. 308), this does seem to be a mainstream view (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 14:(149) and Orchot Shabbat, II, 19:207 ) and other possible explanations may also cover your case.

In summary, while we can conclusively neither prove nor explain exactly why we believe one may reach into her hair and remove a detached hair, indications for permitting it far exceed those for forbidding it.

The mishna (Megilla 21a) says that one may read Megillat Esther standing or sitting. The gemara (ad loc.) says that, in contrast, Torah reading must be done standing. As support, the gemara cites the pasuk regarding the transmission of the Torah from Hashem to Moshe: “You [Moshe] stand here with Me” (Devarim 5:27). Just as, symbolically, Hashem was “standing,” so too later transmitters of the Torah should do the same. Our questions are: what the nature and severity of this requirement are, whether leaning is considered like standing in this regard, and whom it applies to.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 141) says that if one does not read the Torah standing, he has not fulfilled the mitzva, and thus the leining has to be repeated. He seems to understand the requirement as a fully derived requirement from the pasuk. The Yerushalmi (Megilla 4:1) says that it is an element of honor, related to the idea that the Torah must be transmitted with an air of trepidation, not casualness. The Beit Yosef (OC 141) points out that Rashi views the requirement to stand as only l’chatchila, that it is proper to show respect in that way, but in case he does not do so, the reading is still valid. The matter may depend on the situation regarding Megilla reading, as Torah reading is more stringent than it. If the Megilla should l’chatchila be read standing, then Torah, being a step further, is invalid b’di’eved if one did not stand. In any case, the Magen Avraham (141:1) rules that one does fulfill b’di’eved the mitzva without standing, as is evidence from the fact that we allow a king to read seated. The Mishna Berura (141:1) and most recent poskim take this lenient view.

Despite our relative leniency on the matter of standing, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 141:1, based on a Yeruhsalmi, ibid.) says that, at least l’chatchila, one should stand without leaning on anything. This can be understood in two ways: 1) leaning is not considered standing; 2) since one must show proper regard to the Torah’s transmission, standing that is not fully austere, i.e., leaning, is thereby wrong. The Magen Avraham (ad loc.:2) says that both issues are true, but in different cases. If one stands with a partial lean so that if the object one was leaning on were removed he would fall, this is not halachic standing. If he stands in a manner that he would not fall, this is generally considered standing but it is still not standing in awe. Therefore he reasons that the Mordechai’s permission for an obese person to lean (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) applies only to partial leaning, as, when his leaning is understandable, it is not a sign of disregard. However, full leaning simply does not fulfill the requirement to stand. The Shaarei Ephrayim (3:11) says that it is also customary to allow some leaning when looking at the top lines of a long sefer Torah, which are far away from the readers. He reasons that crouching over in order to see well is not disrespectful to the Torah.

In general, the laws governing Torah reading apply both to the ba’al korei and to the oleh (the one who receives the aliya), and this is no exception (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, ibid.; Sha’arei Ephrayim ibid.) The Sha’arei Ephrayim (ibid.) and Mishna Berura (141:5) say that even the gabbai must stand. (Regarding the congregation, there is a major discussion- see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 146:4).

Like many other halachot in whose regard observance is not 100%, a rabbi should find opportunities to educate his congregants. Regarding partial leaning, which is likely not overly haughty and, according to the majority of opinions, does not affect the congregation’s fulfillment of the mitzva, one should point out to the oleh only if he is confident it will be taken in the right away. If many people lean in the more severe way, it would be more worthwhile for one who can educate effectively to point out to the olim in a way that does not embarrass them.

At first glance, there would not seem to be fundamental problems with operating the machine on a timer, as the same activation of the electric device and the heating of the water will occur regardless of if you fill the racks with dishes. As for the removal of the grime from the plates by using hot water (which occurs only because you put the plates in), that is not considered borer (removing impurities) or bishul (cooking). The reasons this is true are beyond our present scope. Some say that the soap is being cooked and should be put in before Shabbat (Techumin XI, pp. 137-154).
However, a safety device usually changes everything. In order that hot water should not come out of the dishwasher, the system is designed so that the machine works only when the door is locked until the end of the cycle. Obviously, the door is open when you load the dishwasher on Shabbat, and then you must lock it in order that the timer will be able to activate the machine. Closing the door thus causes the prohibition of Shabbat to occur at a later point when the timer will activate the dishwasher. Such a delayed reaction is only gerama, which is not a full violation of Shabbat, and is permitted in certain special situations that warrant a low-level violation of Shabbat (see Shabbat 120b and Rama, Orach Chayim 334:22). However, in most cases, it is forbidden to cause such a delayed reaction. For example, we do not allow one to press the buttons of an air conditioner to make it go on when a timer activates the system.
There is a technical solution, albeit a problematic one, that one can arrange with an electrician’s help. You can by-pass the aforementioned safety device (The Zomet Institute provides this service). Then when you lock the door, it will make no difference regarding the dishwasher’s operation. Unless one can ensure that this will not cause dangerous situations (such as opening the door during operation), we would say this is forbidden because “danger is more severe than prohibitions.” However, we cannot preclude the possibility that someone can create safeguards.
Regarding using the dishwasher a second time, when the dishes will not be reused, there is an additional problem. It is forbidden to prepare on Shabbat for after Shabbat (hachana), even if the preparation does not include a prohibited action. Filling the racks with dishes need not be preparation, as many people find it a good place to temporarily store dirty dishes. However, refilling detergent is clearly done to facilitate cleaning the dishes, and if they will be used only after Shabbat, it is hachana.
A final issue, which may or may not cause it to be forbidden to have the dishwasher go on, is called avsha milta. The Rama (Orach Chayim 252:5, as opposed to the Shulchan Aruch, ad loc.) forbids operating from before Shabbat a mechanism that is forbidden to operate on Shabbat if it makes noise. This problem certainly exists if the system went on by timer during Shabbat. It is permitted only if it is common for people to set up the mechanism in advance and thus there is no reason to suspect that one desecrated Shabbat in its regard (ibid, regarding a chiming clock). This could be a problem for a dishwasher. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 70) says that the forbidden level of noise is such that it is expected to be heard in the next room, which is borderline for a dishwasher. While Rav O. Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at III, 18) and Rav N. Rabinowitz (Si’ach Nachum OC 15) say that avsha milta applies to dishwashers, regarding relatively quiet models, this issue would not be a problem.
In short, while there may be a way to use dishwashers on a timer on Shabbat, a combination of technical and halachic problems makes it not simple in practice.

According to the great majority of authorities, human nursing, not only milking a cow, is a Torah violation, at least in many cases. We obviously allow a baby to nurse on Shabbat, but usually it is the baby who performs the very important, “problematic” act. Is it permissible for a woman to express milk for her baby’s needs, classically, or, in this case, for medicinal purposes? It is easiest to say it is forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:34) says that a nursing mother may not express milk into a cup to feed her child (it is permitted to express to relieve an oversupply in a manner that the milk is immediately lost). However, there are instances where expressing milk is permitted, which may shed light on our case.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 328:35) rules that a woman may express milk (into the baby’s mouth - Mishna Berura 328:112) in order to interest him to nurse. Most understand that this is not a level of need that we can consider life threatening, so why is it permitted? Similarly, the Shibolei Haleket (123, see Beit Yosef, OC 328, and (slightly altered) the Rama, OC 328:35) says that a woman may not squirt someone who is under the influence of a strange malady because there is neither danger nor extreme pain. This implies that it would be permitted if there were such pain. Why?

The Magen Avraham (ad loc. 40) and Mishna Berura (ad loc.:113) explain the implied leniency by saying that this expressing is a melacha she’eina tzricha l’gufa (=mstlg), which usually means that the object that the Shabbat violation produces is not itself used in a classical, positive way. Once reduced to a rabbinic violation, it is then permitted on Shabbat to relieve significant pain (see Shabbat 107a; Ketubot 60a). While it is difficult to understand how mstlg applies there, it is hard to dismiss an approach posited by such prominent proponents, and this seems apply to our case (realize that even non-illness needs of a small child are equivalent to those of sick adults (Rama, ibid.:17)). In fact, the Kaf Hachayim (328:209) says, based on the above, that a woman may express milk into the ear of someone with a serious earache (assuming it has therapeutic value).

The Tosefet Shabbat (328:59), not seeing a mstlg in the above, suggests that expressing milk from a woman in a way other than nursing is an unusual form of mefarek, and thus rabbinic, similar to a person “nursing” from a cow (Ketubot 60a). Such reasoning would also make this case permitted. While the Mishna Berura is skeptical of this approach, the Magen Avraham’s explanation and leniency that he cited and this one are the main explanations of the Shulchan Aruch’s accepted leniency for expressing (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 81).

Other possible grounds for leniency may be related to the small amount of milk that will be expressed and the fact that it is being used immediately (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 328:(35)). This respondent has thought of at least one other novel approach that would apply to this case (but it is not sufficiently developed to share in this forum).

We have seen significant grounds to permit the pediatrician’s suggestion although it is far from unanimous (see Ketzot Hashulchan 138:30, for one; we have also spoken to important poskim whose initial reaction was to not allow it). Since the eye is an area where halacha tends to be liberal about the possibility of danger (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 9) and we are also very careful regarding such a young baby, we would be lenient at the “bat of an eye” if there was any urgency to the suggestion. However, you indicate that other effective medicinal alternatives exist and the doctor does not think that it is of even remote importance to favor mother’s milk. Therefore, it is halachically preferable, because of doubt and because it is better to avoid the rabbinic mefarek when there are good alternatives, to not use the system of expressing mother’s milk on Shabbat.                            

Regarding making coffee on Shabbos, we must pay attention to two issues-

1.             Borer (separating) – we will differentiate between a few cases-

A mug or vessel that has no filter, and has water and ground coffee (or beans) in it – in such a case you may pour the water out, and even then you must stop pouring when the liquid contents are nearly emptied. One should ensure that some liquid remains with the coffee grounds, to avoid the prohibition of borer be’keli (separation by using a vessel) which applies even without a filter (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 319: 14).

Even when a filter is attached, all opinions permit pouring a clear liquid through the filter, as long as the liquid isn’t mixed with coffee grounds.

If the coffee is mixed with coffee grounds in a manner that one would not ordinarily drink it [without filtration], it would be forbidden to strain it by means of a filter. However, in a vessel that is made for immediate use, such as a tea infuser or French press, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l allows its use, since it isn’t considered a vessel intended for filtration. Thus, one may be lenient as long as one allows a bit of the clear liquid to remain (cf. Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata, chapter 3, note 125).

2.             Cooking-

The Rishonim disagree whether a food item can be halachically cooked after it is baked or roasted (Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi) or just like there is no bishul achar bishul [a food item can’t be further cooked after it has already been cooked], a food item can’t be cooked after it is baked or roasted (Ravya).

The Shulchan Aruch (318: 5) cites both opinions, and the Ramah sides with Rav Eliezer Mizrachi’s stricter opinion.

It follows that Ashkenazim must follow the stricter opinion which forbids putting roasted (Turkish) coffee into a keli rishon (primary vessel). On the other hand, Sephardim have many rabbinical authorities to rely upon to be lenient (cf. Yalkut Yosef, siman 318, p. 240).

The Rishonim furthermore argued whether one should be concerned about cooking even in a keli sheini [a secondary vessel]. The Ramah also was stringent regarding this. Thus, it is preferable to only pour the coffee into a keli shelishi (in other words, to transfer the contents from the urn to the above-mentioned jug by means of a cup).

Regarding instant coffee that is pre-cooked, Ashkenazim can also be lenient. However, it is preferable to place the coffee into a keli sheini (in other words, one should first pour water into the cup and subsequently place the instant coffee into the cup).

It is permitted to remove cosmetics from one's body with products intended for that purpose, such as water and liquid soap. (Orchot Shabbat I,15,59)

While the two cases you give seem to depend on the same issues, there are halachic differences between them. Timing also plays a major role in the halachic status. We will start with the case of the wax

The wax is unusable on Shabbat, and is muktzeh machamat gufo, the basic level of muktzeh. If it started dripping onto the plate and this was one’s intention when putting them next to each other, the plate could theoretically become a basis l’davar ha’asur (an otherwise permitted object that becomes muktzeh by serving as a base for something muktzeh). However, it is likely that the wax is not important enough to accomplish that (see Mishna Berura 310:31; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 22:(38)).

In some ways the matter is even more lenient if one did not put the plate under the candle until definite nightfall of Shabbat (after tzeit hakochavim), as according to many opinions, a basis l’davar ha’asur cannot be created in the midst of Shabbat (Mishna Berura 266:26). When that is the case, if one wants the base utensil, he can shake off the muktzeh item and use the utensil, and if it would cause damage or is not possible to remove the muktzeh, he can use it as is (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:47). The problem, though, is that it is forbidden on Shabbat to take a kli out of use (mevatel kli meihechano), and according to some, even if you could later remove the muktzeh (see presentation of the positions in Menuchat Ahava 14:20). For this reason the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 265:3) forbids putting a kli under the candle to catch (in his case) the oil. The Mishna Berura (ad loc.:6) says that this can be remedied by putting something usable on Shabbat on the plate as well.

Let us move on to your question about the water. If one put a bucket before Shabbat to catch the water, then the situation depends on the following. If the water is fit for washing or animal consumption, where animals are around, there is no problem of muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, OC 338:8). If the water it is not usable, it is muktzeh, and the bucket should not be moved unless the following situation exists. The gemara (Shabbat 124a) says that we apply the rule that a g’raf shel re’i (portable toilet) can be removed with its excrement if it is in a place where people go about activities and find its presence disturbing, to milder cases.  This includes a pot with food residue (ibid.) or our case of a bucket filled with unclean water in a room in use (see Mishna Berura 338:33).

The problem is putting the bucket there in the first place on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) or returning it after spilling out the water, and this, due to the convergence of two concepts. One is not allowed to create a situation of g’raf shel re’I of his own volition (Beitza 36b). Thus, he should decide that if he puts the bucket there, he should leave it there. But if he does that, then he will have violated the prohibition of mevatel kli meihechano. The Tur (OC 338) argues on this stringency, and the Biur Halacha (to Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) shows from the fact that people collect mayim acharonim or morning netillat yadayim water in a receptacle (by their bed, for those who do that), that we rely on the Tur’s opinion. (It is possible to distinguish between the cases- Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 22:(38)). Also one can create a situation of g’raf shel re’I in order to avoid significant loss (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 338:15).

If the water already has caused a g’raf shel re’I situation on the floor, then just as one can remove the unseemly muktzeh by hand, so he can remove it with or in a kli. Thus, one could sweep the water into a kli of some sort in the process of removing it.

Your question is affected by many halachic concepts, including some that are too complicated to resolve in this context, but we will be able to give you a final ruling for this case.

It is forbidden to kill animal life on Shabbat, and this is even more severe than the prohibition to trap them (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 316:9). Yet, there are several potential reasons for leniency. We are assuming that your main intention in closing the door is unrelated to moths or to keep the smell out of the room. (Experts question the safety of moth balls, which are toxic and probably carcinogenic; this may be sufficient reason not to use them, at least without precautions. Hopefully you have a safer material.) There is sufficient time to kill the moths, larvae (developing moths), and/or eggs during the week.

If it is clear that closing the door will kill moths, this unintentional but definite and otherwise desired violation of Shabbat is called a p’sik reishei (=pr), which is usually forbidden from the Torah (Shabbat 75a). On the other hand, the manner in which the killing happens is not a classic action. Rather, one puts out poison, which later kills. There is a machloket Acharonim whether one is allowed to put poison in front of animal on Shabbat so that it will eat it and die. The Shvut Yaakov (II, 45) makes a strong argument that it is gerama (indirect causation), which can be permitted with other alleviating factors. Here, the killing is a melacha she’eina tzricha l’gufa (it is not done to make use of the final result, i.e., the dead moth), which almost all Rishonim agree is only a rabbinic prohibition. The Shvut Yaakov says that it can be permitted to avoid tza’ar (and likely, similarly, a loss). Even in the case of a pr of a direct but unintentional action, significant opinions permit the matter if only a rabbinic prohibition is involved (Terumat Hadeshen 64; see Yabia Omer I, OC 19). 

Our case, though, is different in the directions of both stringency and leniency. Here, the moths are not enticed to eat the poison, but rather the fumes reach the moths, which is more direct (Yabia Omer, OC III, 20 makes this distinction regarding a case of spraying). On the other hand, here the substance is placed before Shabbat, and that which you are inquiring about is closing a door on Shabbat. This does not create the fumes but stops them from dissipating. In a parallel case, when one closes a pot of not yet cooked food so that the heat will not escape and the food will cook faster, most consider this a full violation. On the other hand, it is unclear that this model should be applied in all contexts. (The matter needs further investigation beyond our present scope).

The strongest grounds for permitting this is the uncertainty whether any moths will die on Shabbat as a result of closing the doors. First there is the question whether there are any moths or larvae there at this time, especially after using the substance over time. That might already make it considered a davar she’eino mitkaven, not a certainty that a forbidden status will be reached, which is permitted. There is major discussion whether this leniency applies even when the uncertainty has to do with an existing situation (i.e., are there moths?) (see Taz, OC 316:3) or whether if there is a pr assuming there are moths, this is a pr and forbidden. Furthermore, our research suggests that it is probably not clear if moths that are there will definitely die on Shabbat because the extermination process is a slow one. Therefore, assuming that the reason to close the door is not primarily to kill the moths as quickly as possible, it should be permitted.

In summary, because of a few possible factors and perhaps their confluence, it should be permitted to close the door.

There are a few circumstances in which a non-Jew can do work on a Jew’s behalf on Shabbat. Some involve using hints, as you mention. One possibility is to use a hint in which you mention only the need and do not use any active verb. For example, you could say, “It is too light in many of the rooms for people to fall asleep,” as opposed to, “It would be nice if someone shut the lights before people go to sleep” (based on Rama, Orach Chayim 307:22 and Mishna Berura 307:66). Also, one can use even the latter type of hint before Shabbat so that the non-Jew will do the action on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:2).

Despite the fact that these distinctions are quite accepted, there are certain problems with their application. The Magen Avraham (252:9) says that one is not supposed to allow a non-Jew to do melacha for a Jew with the latter’s property, even when he does so of his own volition. This can be remedied by katzatz, i.e., having the non-Jew receive money by the piece of work done. However, even the leniency of katzatz does not work on a Jew’s property when people are apt to think that the Jew may have paid him according to time, and even if the non-Jew starts doing the work of his own volition on Shabbat, he should be stopped (Shulchan Aruch, OC 244:1). Why, then, does it help to do a special hint to the non-Jew if, when push comes to shove, he is doing the work on the Jew’s property? Acharonim struggle with this issue (see the Sanctity of Shabbos, p. 24), but in general the minhag is to allow this type of non-commercial activity.

Even when it is considered that the Jew did not tell the non-Jew to do the work, it is prohibited to receive positive, direct benefit until after Shabbat from that which a non-Jew did on a Jew’s behalf on Shabbat (Shabbat 122a). However, not everything is considered such benefit, and a classic example the poskim discuss is creating darkness, which is considered just removing light and is permitted.

In addition, there is an over-arching heter for allowing telling (even directly) a non-Jew to shut the lights under the circumstances you describe. Shutting a light is a rabbinic prohibition (Mishna Berura 278:3). Under quite a few circumstances of need, it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to do a rabbinic prohibition, including shutting a light to allow a child to sleep (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 38:26). One of the examples is for a mitzva (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:5) and here there is a double mitzva. One is the (albeit, small) chance that this act of the non-Jew will be a part of enabling your Jewish participant to embark upon a way of life of Shabbat/Torah observance. The other is the mitzva of afrushei me’isura (preventing one from sinning), even on a one-time basis. Although we do not usually say that one should perform a small sin to save someone else from a big sin (Shabbat 4a), the rules of instructions to non-Jews have a special built-in leniency for such cases.

Therefore, in addition to permissibility through hints, it should be permitted because of your perceived need. This being said, we would caution that your plan, especially if not planned properly, could have negative educational ramifications in addition to positive ones. Since you are in the field of working with this population, we leave such considerations to your discretion.

[The following is an adaptation of a responsum found in one of Eretz Hemdah’s books of sh’eilot u’teshuvot, Bemareh Habazak IV, 40, featured in our Hebrew weekly Torah dispatch, Hemdat Yamim, a few weeks ago.] 

One must distinguish between cases, depending on what results from his passing by and the different ways that one activates the electric devices. Certainly we cannot discuss every possibility and “before the ink dries” there are likely to be new technologies, but we will address some major applications.

It is forbidden to step on a mat or pass by a sensor that directly activates the opening of a door (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 23:53). (In a footnote, he does raise the possibility that in certain cases, one might just stop a flow of light that keeps the device deactivated, but the above is the bottom line.) In these cases, one should wait for a non-Jew to activate the opening of the door and follow him in.

Sensors that are part of fire alarm systems are not usually affected by normal movement in the room but by smoke that makes its way toward the system. 

Regarding motion detectors on alarm systems that are used to notify that someone has entered the room, the best thing is to cover the system before Shabbat or have it work on a timer so that it is not picking up the movement during times of the day that people are meant to use the area. However, we are aware that this is not always possible.

It is important to know approximately how the system works. The system has a part that sends waves and a part that receives waves. There is then a part that analyzes any differences between that which was received during different times based on the movement of objects. The system can involve, among other things, the activation of a notification light and/or a sound alarm. (The alarm will be timed to not sound during times when people are expected in the building or room.) If the light is deactivated, there is much less of a problem because according to the standard approach to electrical devices, the connection of electrical circuits does not by itself involve a Torah violation. Under these circumstances one can more easily apply the concept of p’sik reishei d’lo nicha lei. In other words, the person who is detected by the sensor does not intend to affect the electrical circuits and even if he is certain to do so, he does not benefit from this outcome. According to many authorities, this is permitted regarding rabbinic prohibitions.

In the case where a light on the system will go on, the matter is much less clear, as this can involve a Torah prohibition. Yalkut Yosef (Shabbat V, p. 216) leaves the matter as an unsolved question whether one is allowed to walk in a place where a light will go on when he passes. Although a Shabbat prohibition results, the opinion of the Rashba, permitting closing the door of a house where a deer is inside (and getting inadvertently trapped), is relevant. Some explain that this is so because the action the person does is not related to the object of the melacha (in his case, the deer), in which case it would be permitted unless he intended for the result. The situation is similar for one entering a building and tripping a light. Yalkut Yosef cites Rav Wozner as saying that a person simply walking is even less of a direct act than closing a house’s door, which is an act of trapping under many circumstances. One could make the claim that our case is worse, as usually the people going into the area are those who operate the system, who might have in mind at times to check the system.

Thus, one should detach all lights. However, if he failed to do so and not being able to enter the area would cause an embarrassing situation or an inability to enjoy Shabbat on a basic level, he has a right to rely on the lenient approach.

We don’t have this book. Therefore, we can’t respond to what appears in it. If the puzzle pieces don’t attach in a particularly strong manner, then it is permissible for all (including adults) to assemble the puzzle on Shabbat.

An explanation why it is written that only children are permitted to play a game can be found in the beginning of chapter sixteen of Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah. The author states that it’s preferable that an adult not play any games on Shabbat since the Rambam writes in his commentary on the Mishnah that Shabbat is a time designated for learning Torah and not for other passtimes.

Nevertheless, every parent should find the ways to relate to his children and this also includes play time. It is very important for a parent to strengthen his bond with his children from an educational perspective. Indeed, playing together with one’s children is invaluable.

Regarding the law of borer (separation), Rav Nachum Rabinowitz (Siach Nechmad, siman 54) wrote that it is permitted to separate the pieces in a Scrabble game. Taking a single piece is not considered borer if you will eventually need the entire amount.

Assuming there is no eiruv in the wooded area, it is forbidden to carry bear spray there. Although saving a life would allow ignoring that and other violations of Shabbat, here one does not need to enter the situation of danger and can stay home. The mitzva of going to shul does not allow one to violate a prohibition in order to get there. The mitzva would though justify hiring a non-Jew to escort you with bear spray or other protective gear, as this area is presumably a reshut harabim (literally, a public domain) only on a rabbinic level.

 There are two realms to discuss regarding the use of a goy shel Shabbat. One is mentchlichkeit. You are apparently talking about one who is paid by the community, whose main concern is its members’ most pressing needs. This includes taking people to the hospital, preventing large losses, and helping with a great need of individuals or groups. He is possibility not paid for helping with small inconveniences (and might ask for more money if he is bombarded incessantly). More importantly, he cannot be in two places at the same time, so if he is taking care of one person’s small need, he will be temporarily unavailable for someone else’s big needs. Sometimes that delay is crucial.

Now we will discuss the laws of Shabbat. While it is not a simple matter, we assume that some types of hints are considered as if the Jew did not make a request. The source is the Magen Avraham 307:31, who distinguishes between types of hints to answer the following contradiction. The Rama (Orach Chayim 307:22) says that whenever one may not do something, he may not hint to a non-Jew to do it for him. He contrasts that with classical sources that say that one may tell a non-Jew that he cannot read a letter, thereby hinting to open the letter. He answers that one is allowed to mention a need but not tell the non-Jew to do an action in a way that will serve as a hint to do that which he wants the goy to do. The Mishna Berura (307:76) and contemporary poskim accept this Magen Avraham, which is apparently referred to in your question.

However, there are two problems that must somehow limit use of this leniency. Firstly, when one sees a non-Jew doing forbidden work in a Jew’s home and/or using the Jew’s property on the Jew’s behalf, he is required to protest the activity (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2). This is because the Jew appears like one who is enlisting the non-Jew’s help in a forbidden manner. If it is necessary to protest when the goy initiated the work, how could it be permitted to hint to him to do it in the first place? The other problem is that if a goy does forbidden work on a Jew’s behalf, even without his involvement or knowledge, the Jew may not benefit from the result until enough time transpires after Shabbat for that particular chore to have been done (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:1). Again, a hint is no better, and it should be forbidden to benefit from the result.

Thus several recent poskim limit the efficacy of hinting on Shabbat to cases such as the following: 1) a situation where the Jew could have continued doing what he was doing without the non-Jew’s action, such as eating in a room where there was already sufficient (if less than ideal) light to eat by (Igrot Moshe, YD III, 47.2). 2) The nature of the benefit provided is one of removing impediments, not one of providing something positive new (Orchot Shabbat 23:(46)). Examples include shutting a light and perhaps opening an envelope (the Magen Avraham’s case; see various opinions in article #14 at the end of Orchot Shabbat). 3) He will receive benefit only after Shabbat.

In cases of significant need, where it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform what would be for us a rabbinic violation, it is also permitted to benefit from whatever work was done. Therefore, if one was careful on the mentchlichkeit matter and thus the need is great, there are many additional cases where the benefit element is resolved as well. In any case, if one is not familiar enough with the halachot, he may have to ask a rabbi before going to the goy shel Shabbat. Many communities help out in the matter by having the goy keep “an instruction manual” (as it were) handy for those who seek his help.

The Talmudic sources for comparing the work performed in the mishkan to the forms of work on Shabbat are:

1.         Talmud Bavli, Tractate Shabbat 49b :

“Where was it taught that the primary forms of work are forty minus one? Rabbi Chaninah bar Chama told him: It is derived from the work of the mishkan.”

2.         Talmud Bavli, Tractate Baba Kama 2a

But according to Rabbi Eliezer who obligates the liability [of an offering] for a derivative act along with a primary act, why does he call it a ‘primary’ act and the other a ‘derivative’? Those acts essential in the construction of the mishkan are called ‘primary’, whereas those unessential in the construction of the mishkan are called a ‘derivative’.

Rashi, regarding the discussion in Shabbat 49b, explains that the source for this is the fact that the section discussing Shabbat is adjacent to the section dealing with the mishkan in the Torah portions of Ki Tisa and VaYakel.

Several explanations can be given for this juxtaposition.

On the simple level, one can answer that the prohibition of work on Shabbat only applies to significant creations. Since the mishkan is the most significant structure that the Jewish People built in the desert, and perhaps throughout the generations, we derive from it what is considered a significant creation.

A deeper reason is suggested from the words of the Maharal (Tiferet Yisrael, chapter 40) and the Sfat Emet in the beginning of the parshah of Ki Tisa. They explain that the purpose of every Jew in the world during the six days of work is to transform the world in such a manner that the Divine Presence will emanate, which is precisely the same purpose of constructing the mishkan. Shabbat, in contrast, is an essence of the world to come. In other words, it’s a special day in which the world is already prepared for the emanation of the Divine Presence and the feeling of the closeness of Hashem without the need for human interaction to change the world.

Thus, when the Children of Israel are commanded to build the mishkan, HaKadosh Baruch Hu tells them that on Shabbat it is forbidden for them to continue its construction. This is because on Shabbat, the world itself is prepared for the emanation of the Divine Presence. The mishkan represents an archetype for the forms of work that enables the Divine Presence to emanate in the world. Therefore, every type of work that was involved in the construction of the mishkan is forbidden on Shabbat.

We are taught from this that a Jew who performs even the most mundane creative act — even not involved in the building of the mishkan but involved in his livelihood — the real purpose of his work is to advance the truth and create an environment appropriate for the emanation of the Divine Presence and for a person’s feeling a closeness to Hashem. It follows that on Shabbat it is forbidden to perform such forms of work. A non-Jew is permitted to work on Shabbat since during the six days of his activities he doesn’t intend on the emanation of the Divine Presence.

It was permissible to call the police. As the Torah tells us, when one comes to a home to steal, we have to take into account the real possibility that he will be willing to resort to violence, including murder, Heaven forbid. Even if the robber no longer endangers the people at this moment, apprehending him so that he does not steal and endanger people again is worthy of a call to the police. This would be the case even if the call were the violation of a Torah law, all the more so since we assume that the call is only a rabbinic violation. 

1.         The accepted custom is to recite Havdalah after reading the Megillah. The reason for this is that one must make the Shabbat as long as possible in order to allow the holiness of Shabbat to become part of the regular days. Nevertheless, there are some Sephardim who recite just Borei Me’orei Ha’aish, the blessing over fire, prior to reading the Megillah.

2.         Regarding the order of praying, the Ashkenazi custom is that after praying the Amidah, the prayer leader recites Kaddish “Titkabeil,” one reads the Megillah and the congregation subsequently recites “Vihi Noam” and “Yoshev BeSeter.”

See Hebrew below for more details

1.       îðäâ ëì äòãåú ìòùåú äáãìä ìàçø ÷øéàú äîâéìä[1] åæä îëéåï ùöøéê ìäåñéó îçåì òì ä÷åãù, àîðí éù äîçîéøéí îòãåú äîæøç ìáøê áøëú îàåøé äàù áìáã ìôðé ÷øéàú äîâéìä[2].

2.       áòðéï ñãø äúôéìä îðäâ àùëðæ ùìàçø úôéìú äòîéãä àåîøéí ÷ãéù "úú÷áì" ÷åøàéí àú äîâéìä åìàçø îëï àåîøéí "åéäé ðåòí" å"éåùá áñúø"[3].

One may eat edamame from the pods on Shabbat just like other foods with a peel may be eaten, if they are eaten immediately after being peeled (see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 321, 19).

First, let us understand what happens. When gas goes into a fatty substance (like whipping cream), the fat traps much of it, causing it to fluff up and coalesce. Whipped cream canisters contain pressurized nitrous oxide. Pressing their button does two things more or less at the same instant: forces gas into the fatty liquid; forces the contents out of the canister. There are several possible grounds, some stronger than others, upon which to base a prohibition. After a quick review, we will present a practical answer.

Arguably, combining two substances so that they form a mixture that is different in texture than each one separately is lisha (kneading) (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 11:(124)). However, trapping a gas (even if in unnoticeably small pockets) inside a liquid so that it turns into foam is different enough from classic lisha for it to be difficult to forbid without classical sources.

The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (11:31) prohibits hand-whipping cream for a few reasons. One is related to the scrambling of eggs, which is forbidden because it is usually a step in the cooking process. While one can argue whether or not this applies to whipping cream, the process is totally different when done by pressing the button on a canister.

Recent poskim discuss creating seltzer/soda on Shabbat, where a somewhat significant change occurs to a liquid by inserting a gas. While some poskim object to it for creating something new (see Maharsham I, 140), the most realistic problem is uvdin d’chol (weekday-like activities, in this case, of producing things). While this might apply to the process of inserting a gas canister and fastening a machine to make soda (or the similar device for cream), it is hard to apply it to using a pre-prepared canister, which the average user sees as simply dispensing.

The most serious issue is molid, creating a new reality by changing the phase of an object. The baraita (Shabbat 51b) forbids crushing ice and snow. Rashi explains that it is like a melacha, in that one creates something new, i.e., a liquid from a solid. Some say that, similarly, one may not turn a liquid into a solid, e.g., freeze water to make ice cubes (see Doveiv Meisharim I, 55). We dealt with this issue in Hemdat Yamim (Miketz 5767), and cited strong grounds for leniency. Orchot Shabbat (15:(45)) says that even those who forbid making ice cubes could permit spraying whipped cream from a canister because the only purpose of the cream in the canister is to be turned into whipped cream. On the other hand, here one actively and directly, with the press of the button, creates the foam, as opposed to putting water in a freezer, which only provides a cold setting for the slow process of freezing to begin (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 10:(14)). However, Rav Mordechai Willig told me another reason for leniency: the change, from a thick liquid to a foam, is not enough to be considered molid.

While one can make the argument that it is forbidden to spray whipped cream from its canister, common practice is to permit it. Since we have shown the halachic basis for the practice, we do not feel it is necessary to change it. (We have not dealt with the issue of using the cream to write words or make likenesses of specific objects.)

Your question is indeed a very interesting one. As it seems your are asking this theoretically, we will provide a theoretical discussion of the issue. There are a number of different opinions regarding where the Halachic dateline is, each placing Samoa on different sides of the dateline. You can see at length the different opinions regarding this including maps in Rav Kasher's book "Kav Hata'arich Hayisraeli." According to these opinions the change in the international dateline should have no impact.

The interesting point is according to Rav Kasher's own opinion. He claims that there is no Halachic dateline in the ocean (although Asia is clearly on one side of the dateline and North America on the other, there is no clear line in the ocean) , but rather every person has to continue according to his own count of days, the seventh day being Shabbat, unless he reaches a place where there is an established custom as to Shabbat, by which case he needs to switch to the custom of the place. Therefore, if a person leaves on a ship from California to China, he should follow California Shabbat until reaching China, and if a person leaves on a ship from China to California, he should follow China Shabbat until reaching California.

Thus, according to his opinion, the Shabbat in all the islands in the Pacific Ocean is determined by the Jews who first arrived there, depending on if they came from the east or the west. Once a custom is established then everyone who goes there must follow the locally accepted Shabbat. Therefore, if there is already a Jewish community in Samoa, then according to this opinion the Shabbat should not be changed. However, if there is no Jewish community, then perhaps the change in the dateline could have a future effect in how a Jewish community might establish the Shabbat there.   

The halachot of what may be done at a Jew’s business are complicated, both in terms of the root concepts and in terms of applying the rules to similar yet divergent cases. We spelled out many of the principles in Living the Halachic Process, vol. II, C-23. We will focus here on applying the rules to your case and providing two practical suggestions. There may be other ideas, and if you have suggestions you prefer, we can analyze for you if and how they would be permitted.

A non-Jewish worker may do work for a Jew on Shabbat if he is paid per the job (katzatz), as he is viewed as doing it for his own benefit, as opposed to being paid by the time put in (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 244:1). Since your workers receive a commission for visiting clients’ houses, this condition is fulfilled satisfactorily, even though they also receive a set salary, as long as the following problem is avoided. One must not require the non-Jew to do this work specifically on Shabbat, even in a classic case of katzatz (ibid. 252:2). If he is not required to do the work specifically on Shabbat, he may do so on Shabbat, even if the Jewish employer clearly gains and would like him to do so (see referenced article). It seems that you can conform to this requirement as well, at least if you follow one of the following systems:

System #1: Arrange with a non-Jewish worker that when a job comes in where the request is to have the visit done on Shabbat or a Jewish holiday, he will be given the job and receive all of the profits. It doesn’t matter if, from an accounting perspective, the client writes out a check to your company, as long as the worker receives all of the proceeds (minus real expenses, processing, taxes, etc.). It should be up to the worker to decide whether he will do the job on Shabbat or work it out with the client to do it at a different time from what he originally requested. The set-up, though, should be that the worker does not have to return the client to your discretion if the visit can be done at a time other than Shabbat. If you would make that demand of him, it would be like saying that you are giving him the client for Shabbat specifically, which, we have seen, is forbidden. (It would still be permitted if he has the right, without compunction, to tell the client that he cannot do the job as requested.) In contrast, when he can reschedule it for another time, it is like a case where it is likely but not a foregone conclusion that it will be on Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 307:15). This system divorces the work done from you and can be worthwhile for you if, as a result, you can reduce his salary.

System #2: The worker can share in the profit with your company along the same lines as for any other day. This arrangement raises the issue of s’char Shabbat, receiving pay for (permitted) work one did or use of one’s property on Shabbat. However, you may receive part of the money brought in from the work on Shabbat because if one receives payment in one logical lump sum for Shabbat and weekday it is not considered s’char Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:4). In this case, a major part of the money coming to the company is for setting up the business, making the connection between the client and the worker who serviced him, etc., much of which takes place during the week. In this case, though, the company is connected to the work done on Shabbat (see distinction in Igrot Moshe, OC II, 64), and therefore there is a problem of marit ayin (it looks as if one is using his worker to violate Shabbat). Then it would be permitted only if: it is not known that it is a Jew’s business, or it is common for such work to be done for a commission and not as a salaried worker.

Let us start our discussion with old clocks, which were operated in a manner that is halachically equivalent to winding watches. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:3) says that one can set such a clock before Shabbat even though it chimes loudly on the hour. Acharonim explain that people will assume he set the matter into motion before Shabbat (and thus the special marit ayin of noises does not apply – Mishna Berura 338:14). There is a major discussion among poskim whether pulling the chains to begin the operation of such clocks is considered creating or fixing a utensil (Chayei Adam 44:19) or whether this is just considered the way of using an existing utensil (Panim Meirot II, 123). According to the former, it is forbidden, very possibly on the Torah level, to set the clock into operation on Shabbat, and this is the consensus.

The next question is whether one can wind a watch that is already working to keep it operational longer than it otherwise would be. The Ktav Sofer (OC 55) compares this to cutting off part of a candle in a way that will make it go out earlier. A simple watch, though, seems to be significantly more lenient in that nothing problematic is happening later, and the question is whether making a change to keep an already operating instrument working longer is equivalent to creating a working instrument. Indeed, the Da’at Torah (on the Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) champions the idea that just extending efficacy is not forbidden. The Ktav Sofer also raises the possible distinction between clocks that chime for more hours than they otherwise would have and cases where the gears and handles just move longer. In any case, the minhag developed to not allow winding to continue the existing operation even if there is no chime, unless there are mitigating or extenuating circumstances (see Mishna Berura 338:15; Sha’ar Hatziyun 338:17; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:19-21).

More recent poskim have dealt with the advent of self-winding watches, which wind by one’s movements. In this case, the consensus has been that it is permitted while the watch is still working (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:28). Here the aforementioned case for leniency regarding watches that wind is bolstered by the fact that the person is not doing a discernable or intentional act of winding but that it is happening as a certain side result of his activities (p’sik reishei). Additionally, regarding this relatively new case, a minhag to be stringent has not developed.

The recent invention of kinetic watches is slightly different from self-winding watches. The mechanism of kinetic watches is based on a quartz system, which is normally operated by battery. In this case, instead of a battery, movement generates the small amount of electricity that the watch needs, and the watch stores the energy for anywhere from days to months. The relatively new question of a mini, mechanical electricity recharger is not a simple one, and we have found rabbis coming out in either direction. However, our feeling, is that such a transfer of energy of movement to electricity to be transferred again to “harmless” mechanical movement, without creating new circuits, is not included in the prohibitions of electricity that the halachic world has assumed since the advent of the use of electricity. (We may reverse our decision if a consensus forms to forbid it.)

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:6) says that single men not living with their families must light Shabbat candles. The Mishna Berura (263:29) adds that this is so even if they eat away at someone’s house. (This is a topic of its own.) Regarding this case, the Mishna Berura (ibid. 30) says that the candles should be long enough that he will use them when he returns; otherwise, his beracha is l’vatala (in vain). This seems to be based on the Shulchan Aruch’s (ibid. 9) ruling that if one lights in her house but eats in his courtyard and the candles will not suffice for him to use them, her beracha is l’vatala. What many women who go away for the meal do is have some benefit from the candles during twilight (see Mishna Berura 263:41). Presumably, your guest does not accept Shabbat with the lighting before davening Mincha and, thus, cannot do this. Therefore, at first glance, what your guest did was necessary.

However, the primary sources discuss a slightly different case: where there was no plan to use the lights. Given that your guest’s practice is to benefit from the candles and something arose to alter that, would he fulfill the mitzva without returning? It depends on which of the following formulations of the mitzva of lighting candles is correct: 1) The act of lighting candles is a matter of k’vod Shabbat, i.e., honoring Shabbat on Friday by preparing in a manner that should make it pleasant; 2) Ensuring that the house one occupies is set for pleasant usage on Shabbat; 3) The mitzva is the oneg Shabbat (enjoying the light, parallel to eating tasty food) itself on Shabbat, just that this must be prepared before Shabbat.

According to #1, your guest’s visit at home was unnecessary. At the time of the lighting, there was an expectation that the light would be of value. Therefore, at that time he honored Shabbat, and this is not uprooted retroactively by changes in the situation. (If one often does not benefit, then his “plan” is disingenuous and his lighting valueless). According to #2, the same is true. His room was properly lit, and it does not matter that he unexpectedly was not in there at the relevant time. According to #3, your guest’s actions were necessary because without benefit, it turns out that the mitzva was not fulfilled. The rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and Mishna Berura (above) do not apply here because in those cases, there was no expectation of using the lights.

One can find a basis for all the approaches, but we can only scratch the surface in this forum. The simple reading of Rashi (Shabbat 25b) is that the mitzva is kavod (#1) and of Tosafot (ad loc.) is that it is oneg (#3). The Rambam (Shabbat 5:1 and 30:4) mentions kavod and oneg, but his language implies that #2 is correct. Possibly, while the mitzva was instituted with the hope people will benefit (shalom bayit- see Shabbat 23b), the formal mitzva and its beracha relate to the act of kavod by lighting (Beit Halevi  I,11; Az Nidbaru 9:1). This side is bolstered (but not proven) by the fact that there is a beracha, which is recited well before the benefit (see Yaskil Avdi III, OC 18), and that if the candle was lit too early, it has to be re-lit (Rama, OC 263:4). If we follow the model of Chanuka candles, then as soon as the candles were lit properly, the mitzva is fulfilled even if they went out. (One telling matter is the machloket between the Magen Avraham (263:11) and R. Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) whether a non-Jew can light the candle on a Jew’s behalf (see Shulchan Aruch Harav 263, K.A. 3).)

Since the simple reading of the poskim is to require your guest to return and it is difficult to prove it wrong, you can applaud his diligence. On the other hand, we would not label failure to do so a breach of responsibility, especially if going would cause his host hardship.

The mishna (Beitza 36b) lists several matters that are forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov as gezeirot, rabbinical injunctions, lest one come to inadvertently violate a Torah prohibition. One may not climb a tree or ride an animal (lest he pull off a branch), float in a body of water (lest he build a raft), or bang to a beat (lest he fix a musical instrument). The list goes on. Probably, if people flew kites in Chazal’s time, they would have forbidden it on Shabbat. After all, kites often need adjustments, whether to the frame or in tying knots, many of which include Torah prohibitions.

Should we follow the spirit of Chazal and forbid things we intuit they would have forbidden? Our general approach is that just as we do not dismiss gezeirot whose reasons are weak in our times, so too we do not institute new gezeirot. Nevertheless, there are some things, including riding bicycles, that almost all observant communities forbid, even though most of the reasons given resemble gezeirot. These are apparently matters that the general rabbinic community felt are against the spirit of Shabbat or are very likely to cause violations. (There were times when bicycles were a major means of transportation with the potential to change the nature of life on Shabbat, not necessarily by making it more restful.)

We feel that a consensus will not emerge against kite-flying, given its recreational nature and our assumption that allowing it will not affect the nature of Shabbat observance. In searching for sources, we found a few short responses with the expected content: some rabbis forbid flying kites because it is not in the spirit of Shabbat or because of the possibility of violations. Others said that there are no set grounds to forbid it, and therefore it is permitted. We add our voice to the latter approach. Of course, there must be an eiruv so that the kite can be carried outside, and the kite, strings, and knots must not be adjusted on Shabbat.

Individually, we suggest for those who do not know what they may and may not do or are likely to forget themselves to refrain from kite flying as a personal precaution. Those who take kite-flying very seriously would do best to refrain so as not to infringe on the spirit of Shabbat. However, for others, we do not discourage it as an occasional activity, when it is apparently not taking away from a better use of the precious gift of Shabbat. We do not reject those who feel it is bad idea but are not convinced that our communities are likely to be negatively impacted by permission to fly a prepared kite.

Let us deal with two specific halachic issues. What happens if you fly the kite near the end of a reshut hayachid (private domain, based on fences or an eiruv) and it goes over? As long as this happens only in the air there is no problem, because the area above 10 tefachim outside the private domain is a makom p’tur (an area that is a halachic vacuum) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 345:19). It is permitted to move an object from a reshut hayachid to a makom p’tur (ibid. 346:1). However, throwing something from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim (public domain) through a makom p’tur is forbidden (ibid.), which is what happens if the kite lands outside the eiruv. There is much to discuss regarding carrying by means of the wind (see Yabia Omer IV, OC 35) and the fact that the kite’s string remains in reshut hayachid. However, as long as this is not a certain outcome and one does not intend it to occur, he need not be concerned if it happens accidentally. (If it does happen, he should not retrieve the kite).

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 308:45) says that one may not play with a ball on Shabbat because it is muktzeh since it does not have a “real purpose.” The Rama (ad loc.) argues. Some Sephardim are stringent on the matter, and some extend it to game pieces of different sorts (Yalkut Yosef 308: 26, 27). If one is stringent on that matter, the stringency should apply also to a kite.

It is assur to drink even water (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 289:1). The mitzva is to make Kiddush, and if he does not want to, he cannot eat anything. Only before davening, it is permitted to have certain simple things. At that point, it is not possible to make Kiddush. However, in a case like you ask there is no heter of coffee as one can (at least, in theory) make Kiddush.

The prohibition of melaben (literally, whitening, but, for our purposes, laundering) comes in various forms. We will investigate if this use of salt fits into one of the prohibited ones.

Melaben applies to cleaning fabrics and not to removing external dirt on top of hard surfaces. Whether a certain means of removing filth is permitted can depend on the surface from which it is being removed. For example, one may pour some water over a dirty leather object, but this is forbidden for a fabric, while one may wipe the fabric with a cloth (Mishna, Shabbat 142b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:9). In discussing this distinction, the gemara (Zevachim 94b) says that regarding fabric, “soaking it is laundering it.” Since a tablecloth falls under the category of fabric, putting water on it when it has become soiled is forbidden.

Removing liquid from a fabric might also be forbidden. The Rambam (Shabbat 9:11) says that squeezing water out of a garment is included in the prohibition of laundering. The Rishonim disagree as to whether this applies to all liquids or only to water, which is what is normally used in the laundering process (see Kesef Mishneh ad loc.).

Removal of dirt from a garment by means of shaking it out is also a matter of dispute. The gemara (Shabbat 147a) says that it is forbidden to shake out a garment on Shabbat. Tosafot says that this is talking about shaking out water from the garment, which makes it part of the laundering process. Rashi says that the prohibition applies even to shaking off dirt, and the Rama (OC 302:1) says that one should try to follow the strict opinion. The gemara, though, says that the prohibition applies only to the type of garments that one is careful to wear without the material that is shaken off.

With this background, let us now discuss removing wine by absorbing it with salt. Simply absorbing a big wine spill with a napkin or even a cloth rag is permitted (see Mishna Berura 302:60). This is on the condition that one is careful not to press on the tablecloth in a manner that would squeeze liquid out of it and not to squeeze the rag afterward (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:37-38).

In some ways, doing so with salt seems even better, as one places the salt in a manner that is less likely to squeeze the tablecloth, and it is not feasible to squeeze the salt afterward. However, our research indicates that the salt does not only absorb excess surface liquid. Rather, it draws out the wine that has already been absorbed in the tablecloth and would not be absorbed by, say, a paper towel. This is specifically why the “home remedies people” say that salt prevents the stain from setting and even removes at least some of it, which requires more than just absorbing surface liquid. From the world of halacha, as well, we know that salt is put on meat to draw out the blood from deep beneath the surface. On the other hand, we have seen that not every action that helps make a fabric cleaner is forbidden. In some ways, the salt acts similarly to water, which stops the dirt from setting, and “encourages” some of the dirt to come out (more complete results are reached through agitations/scrubbing).

With a dearth of classical sources on this or exactly identical cases, our gut feeling (based on the halachic precedents) is that putting on the salt is applying a stain remover to a fabric and is forbidden. A similar gut feeling may be what brought Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited and accepted by Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 15:(74) and Orchot Shabbat 13:20) to say that it is forbidden to put talcum powder on greasy clothes to soak up the fat. As our case seems to be equivalent, we concur with that ruling and recommend soaking up what one can with paper towels on Shabbat and treating the tablecloth after Shabbat.

Neither the Talmud nor the Rishonim state a minimal size for the two loaves of Shabbat. Later authorities dispute whether one can even use loaves smaller than the size of a "kezayit" (the size of an olive). Other authorities claim that the loaves should all together have at least a "kezayit" per person attending the meal. Nevertheless, it appears from the Talmud that ideally one should use large enough loaves that will be sufficient for the meal, for in this way one is honoring the Shabbat.

Usually, a non-Jew who is paid by the job may do such work for a Jew on Shabbat, as he is considered to be working on his own behalf for the pay. However, he may not be told to do the work on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 247:1). In this case, your instructions are that if the limit is reached on Shabbat, they should make the transaction specifically then.

We have ascertained that after you place the order by computer, there is rarely human intervention in the processing of your trade. When no melacha is being done on Shabbat on your behalf by a person, but only automatic computer activity, the main question disappears. Someone at your brokerage may do melacha in sending you confirmation notification. On the other hand, even if this does happen, you do not need to ask them to do so on Shabbat.

However, there is a much broader basis for not being concerned even in a case where work would be done on Friday. The final bell on the NYSE is at 4:00 PM and the earliest sunset in NY is 4:28 PM. Thus there is no stock activity work on Shabbat. The question, though, is whether the important thing is that they do work before Shabbat at their location or that the work they do for you is not on Shabbat at your location.

We start with the following halacha that the Rashba (accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 263:17) inferred from Shabbat 151a. If one accepts Shabbat early, he may ask a fellow Jew who did not yet accept Shabbat to do work on his behalf. This is surprising since after accepting Shabbat, one is supposed to act as if it is Shabbat, and if one cannot ask a non-Jew to do work for him on Shabbat, it should be forbidden to ask a Jew to do work. Three main distinctions are made: 1) The prohibition to ask others was not instituted when one had a way (and, in some cases, still does) to not be forbidden to do the work himself (Beit Yosef, ad loc.); 2) When one accepts Shabbat, he only accepts prohibitions that he performs himself (Levush 263:17); 3) There is no prohibition to ask someone else when that which he requests is not a melacha for the person requested (Taz 263:3). The Taz’s approach is strongest and most accepted (see Mishna Berura 263:64; Minchat Shlomo I, 19; Ta’arich Yisrael 8). Therefore, even though the work will be done when it is Shabbat for the requester, since for the person doing it, it is not a violation of Shabbat, it is permitted to carry out the work.

There is still a problem. R. Akiva Eiger (Shut I, 19) says that even when the practical dealings are complete before Shabbat, one may not have a transaction take effect on Shabbat. Therefore, ostensibly, even though nothing is being done wrong on Shabbat, the fact that the transaction may be going through on Shabbat should be a problem. However, R. Akiva Eiger’s idea is so novel that many poskim disagree with it and others limit it to cases similar to the contexts which are the basis of his idea. Thus, his concern need not be applied here (see discussion in Bemareh Habazak V, 37:(21)).

The following observation is of critical importance. If one prohibits the described trade orders on Friday because it will likely happen on Shabbat for the owner, then there are even stronger grounds to require the following stringency. While the owner of a kosher bakery in NY is visiting Israel, the bakery must be closed 7 hours before Shabbat. As several poskim point out, we have never heard of such a chumra being employed, and we have given a basis why it is unnecessary. The same logic can be employed to permit the less severe case of an automatic transaction on amorphous entities known as shares.  

First we will talk about mashing the avocado, which is easy to discuss but whose conclusion is hard to make decisive.

The gemara (Shabbat 74b) says that chopping up a vegetable very fine is a violation of tochein (grinding). However, the Rashba (Shut IV, 75) says that it is permitted if it is done for immediate use, and this is how the Rama (Orach Chayim 321:12) rules. Rav Yosef Karo seems to accept this opinion in the Beit Yosef, but he ends off that it is proper to leave them as “slightly big pieces” and then omits the Rashba’s opinion in the Shulchan Aruch. The Chazon Ish (OC 57) claims that not only do many Rishonim argue on the Rashba, but he only intended that immediate use permits cutting into small pieces, not actual grinding. On the other hand, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe IV, 74) understands the Rashba to apply even to grinding and mashing.

Rav Moshe feels even more confident regarding bananas, where there is additional logic for leniency. Classic tochein is taking grain and turning it into flour or at least into finely cut particles. However, when one crushes bananas, they remain clumpy, with the change being in their consistency. Not all agree that this distinction changes the halacha (Chazon Ish, ibid.), especially in light of the Tosefta (Beitz, ch. 1) that it is forbidden to crush dried figs. However, the lack of consensus on the matter provides a further point of possible leniency (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:(3)). Ripe avocado is equivalent to banana in this regard.

A final point of leniency is a rejected but significant opinion (see opinions in Beit Yosef, OC 321) that tochein applies only to produce that is inedible until it is crushed, and perhaps even still needs to be cooked afterward. While the Shulchan Aruch and later poskim do not accept this opinion, the existence of the opinion might encourage us to be lenient when combined with the aforementioned more accepted lenient opinions.

As he often does in such cases, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at V:27) combines the indications to confidently permit crushing bananas for babies on Shabbat when one plans to serve them soon thereafter. On the other hand, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:6 is willing to permit mashing only for the needs of a baby and only if one does the mashing in an unusual way, such as with a spoon or the handle of a fork,  and for imminent usage.  Orchot Shabbat (5:8) is not willing to take a stand on the matter. “The 39 Melochos” (pg. 461) falls in line with Rav Moshe’s ruling. However, Rav Moshe, when it came to practice, was not conclusive, as he agrees that one should try, if he can, to crush a banana for imminent use in an unusual way, in deference to the Chazon Ish. This is what we suggest regarding avocado as well.

Regarding mixing in minced onions (whose preparation raises overlapping questions to those discussed above), oil, and/or lemon juice, the question is of lash (kneading). There is a general question of whether the prohibition of lash is limited to the creation of a pasty substance by mixing flour or small particles with water, or whether all sorts of combinations of different substances, where the result is a somewhat unified mixture, is prohibited. Few poskim are willing to be lenient without other reasons to differentiate the process in question from classic kneading. Regarding guacamole, there is an additional, strong element of leniency in that the base of the guacamole (at least, your recipe) is clearly the crushed avocado, and the additions are just spicing (see similar idea in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 8:(81)). However, the explicit rulings we have found on this matter (most prominently, of Rav Abba Shaul (Ohr L’tziyon II, 33:5)) is to allow the mixing in only with a double change: put the oil/onions on the bottom and add the avocado on top; mix the ingredients in a criss-cross, as opposed to a circular, motion. 

There are many legitimate positions. Let us explain and put things in perspective, regarding the three main issues: shehiya, hachzara, and hatmana.

Shehiya (leaving on the ‘flame’): Chazal were concerned that with food cooking on a flame, one might stoke the coals to hasten the cooking. Tannaim (Shabbat 36b) dispute if this concern applies when the food was minimally cooked before Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 253:1) and Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) lean toward stringency, whereas the Rama (ad loc.) seems to lean toward leniency. Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe OC 1:93) raises further logic for leniency – the fuel in our gas stoves work (electricity is similar) does not resemble the coals of former ages but the more lenient case of straw (where one increases the flame by bringing more fuel). In any case, the minhag is to require a blech, certainly if it is not minimally cooked.

What needs to be covered? Igrot Moshe (ibid.) says that one covers the heat source to show he is reducing the heat and does not plan to raise it. Rav Aharon Kotler required covering the knobs, as a reminder not to adjust them. Many blechs cover both, as Igrot Moshe recommends. Regarding a crock pot, foil over the coils is not discernable and, more importantly, does not significantly reduce the heat. (The rocks or metal balls some use do allow heat to escape.) Therefore, it is necessary and reasonable to rely on Rav Kotler (along with the other indications for leniency) and cover the knobs. Removing the knobs or putting enough tape to make it difficult to turn is even better (see Shabbat 18b).

Hachzara (returning to a flame): If one removes the pot insert and wants to return it, there are many more necessary requirements, not specific to crock pots (fully cooked; still warm; holding the pot; having in mind to return it; a covering). A major issue for crock pots is that one may not return a pot to a closed oven (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2), which a crock pot resembles in some ways (as heat comes from the sides in addition to the bottom). There are, through, grounds for leniency beyond our scope (see Am Mordechai, Shabbat 4).

Hatmana (insulating): In one of his last rulings, Rav S.Z. Auerbach claimed that a crock pot is a form of insulation, apparently because the pot (the ceramic insert) is surrounded relatively tightly by additional walls. Since additional heat is entering the system (mosif hevel), one may not leave the food there even though it is set it up before Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 257:5). The minhag among crock pot users for years was not this way and the standard halachic assumption is that hatmana is only when there is an extra covering on all sides (a crock pot has only a single, standard cover). However, the idea of stones was devised to make the crock pot conform to Rav Auerbach’s objections. Since the crock pot is slightly tapered, raising the insert a couple inches removes the level of closeness that makes it hatmana. We would not require one to follow this stringency, but we would not scoff at one who follows Rav Auerbach, whose rulings, including many lenient ones, so many of us follow.

Adding water: For Ashkenazim, it is permitted to add water, as long as the chulent is fully cooked and the water is warm. (Rav O. Yosef forbids this for Sephardim- Yechaveh Da’at IV:22). Some say to be careful to pour it in gently to avoid the issue of mixing (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:17). Some usually recommend removing the pot from the heat source (where mixing is less of a problem) before pouring in water and returning it. However, in this case, we believe that one who strives for stringency loses by doing this because he creates the need for a bigger leniency regarding hachzara (as above).

1. It is permitted to play scrabble on Shabbat even with the deluxe board as one is not writing any letters but rather putting together letters that are already written (Siach Nachum 24).

2. For this reason it is also permitted to assemble a puzzle on Shabbat, even if it contains letters or numbers, unless one is planning to keep it assembled for a long period of time (such as those who have it framed and hang it on the wall).

One may not rely upon Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion, as his opinion is not consistent with the astronomical reality as it is known to us.  This is what the Vilna Gaon clearly stated, and so is the common practice in almost all Jewish communities nowadays.

One may not use the chafing dish on Shabbat if a non-Jew lit the flame on Shabbat as it is prohibited to benefit from work done by a non-Jew for a Jew on Shabbat. Only in very specific circumstances is one allowed to benefit from work done by a non-Jew, and this is not one of them.

Let us start with a review of the terminology and basic halachot. A pot sitting on the fire is called a kli rishon she’al gabei ha’eish. (In general, one would not put a ladle into a pot on the flame because of the problems of stirring- see Mishna Berura 318:117). When taken off the fire, it is called a kli rishon, which is assumed to be capable of cooking, and keeps that status as long as the food is yad soledet bo, which may be as low as 45° C = 113° F (Rav S.Z. Auerbach). The next utensil the hot food is transferred into is a kli sheni. While the gemara (Shabbat 40b) says it is not capable of cooking, many say there are (perhaps, many) foods that are easily cooked (see Mishna Berura 318:39).

The difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheni is that the former’s walls start off hot and keep its contents hot for longer, whereas the latter’s walls start off cold and speed the cooling off of its contents. There are some borderline cases where it is difficult to decide if something is a kli rishon or a kli sheni. One is your question, where the kli in which the food is now found also was itself in a kli rishon, becoming hot not only from the food within it but from heat from the outside. There is a machloket on the matter (see the Taz, Yoreh Deah 92:30), and it is generally viewed as an unresolved issue to be treated as a safek (doubt). The Chazon Ish (OC 122:3) claims that if the ladle is in a pot while it was on the fire, it turns into a kli rishon. The consensus is that if the ladle sits in the kli rishon for a long time, it takes on halachic characteristics of a kli rishon (Mishna Berura 318:87). How long this takes is arguably affected by how hot the soup is and the heat conductivity of the material. However, in general terms, the poskim do not distinguish in this matter based on what material the ladle is made of. It is only in tangentially related contexts that a possible distinction between metal and other materials exist (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 94:1).

How we practically deal with the safek about the status of a ladle depends on what other factors are involved, and we will mention a few, according to the Mishna Berura. One should not pour from the ladle onto something that is forbidden to be cooked (318:87). Even according to the Rama (OC 318:5) that one may not put bread into a kli sheni, he may put bread into a bowl into which soup was ladled in. Acharonim explain that the leniency in this case is due to the fact that many do not agree that it is forbidden to cook bread that is already baked (see Orchot Shabbat 1:(163)). Another case where the Mishna Berura (253:84) is lenient regarding a ladle is pouring from a ladle onto the leftover soup in a bowl that already cooled down totally, and thus is usually forbidden to reheat. (This is the case regarding pouring doubles of soup into leftovers of firsts.) The apparent logic there is that since it is not unanimously agreed that it is forbidden to reheat a liquid that was cooked and cooled off (see Rama, OC 318:15), we can be lenient to treat the ladle as a kli sheini.

If one wants to avoid the ladle becoming a kli rishon by consensus, he should leave it out of the soup pot. However, then there is an issue of returning the ladle to the soup when one wants doubles without first cleaning off the liquid residue. There are indeed some who recommend cleaning it off before putting it back in (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:40). However, we feel that (at least, Ashkenazim) may rely on the Igrot Moshe (OC IV, 74:19) that insignificant quantities of already cooked liquid may be heated up again.

The candles should be lit close to the time one is accepting Shabbat. According to most authorities, the earliest time one can accept Shabbat is Plag Hamincha (hour and a quarter prior to sunset in sha'ot zemaniot – hours calculated by dividing the time from sunrise to sunset by 12). Therefore, if the wife wants to accept Shabbat at Plag Hamincha, she can light as early as close to Plag Hamincha (no exact time but up to approximately half hour before). If she wants to accept Shabbat later, then she should light the candles accordingly near that time (see our response in Bemareh Habazak vol 7 siman 25).

In regards to when she should accept Shabbat, as mentioned, the earliest time is Plag Hamincha (if there is special need to accept earlier please consult with us). As to accepting later, some authorities say that when the husband accepts Shabbat (at the end of Lecha Dodi when saying B'oi Kallah)), his accepting of Shabbat obligates his wife as well (Pri Megadim Mishbetzot Zahav 263, 1). Others disagree that the husband's accepting of Shabbat does not obligate the wife (Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim 3, 38; see at length regarding this issue in Rav Zvi Ryzman's book Ratz Katzvi on Shabbat, siman 2).

One should preferably refrain from brushing a wig on Shabbat or Yom Tov, particularly if one will either be pulling out hairs or substantially improving the wig's appearance. However, a light "touching up", where these aforementioned concerns do not exist, is fine.

For discussion, see Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchatah 14:52 (ed. 5770), and in particular, the sources cited there in footnote 136.

It appears that since the person will be acting regularly and not doing any special actions to affect the turning on or off of any device it is permitted to use on Shabbat (see Orchot Shabbat vol. 1 page 513 in the name of Rav Vozner; Siach Nachum siman 25).

 The halachic name for the apparatus you are talking about is a tzurat hapetach (the form of a doorway), which consists of two vertical posts (lechis) and a horizontal wire from one to the other (kaneh [al gabeihen]). Regarding whether a tree can be used as a lechi, the gemara (Eruvin 11b) says clearly that it can. However, there are several conditions that you will have to meet, and it will take careful explaining on our part and clear perception of the halacha and the engineering on your part for you to fulfill them correctly.

The main reason that trees are rarely used as lechis is probably the halacha that the horizontal wire must be straight above the lechi (although there can be vertical space between them), not to its side. Therefore, if one were to tie a rope around the trunk of a tree or attach a string to it with a nail, it would be invalid. The string cannot be attached to branches for two reasons: almost all branches are horizontal, and it does not help that they extend from the vertical trunk (see Netivot Shabbat 19:(72)); the branches generally sway too much in the wind to be valid lechis (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 362:1). What can be done (in some trees) is to attach a string (using a nail or by wrapping) on top of the trunk where it splits into main branches. See picture 1.

Another possibility is to connect the string to the tree in a manner that is not valid in relation to the tree but to attach a lechi to the tree in a manner that the string goes directly over the lechi. This must be checked with a plum line going down from the string to see that there is a point on the string that is directly above the lechi. This system will only succeed if the tree is very straight or leans in the correct direction in relation to the lechi. The lechi must be connected somewhat strongly so that it will not be uprooted or swayed by normal winds (Shulchan Aruch, OC 363:5). It must be at least ten tefachim tall and start within three tefachim of the ground (ibid. 362:11). See picture 2.

Regarding the side of the house, there is also what to be concerned about. A wall cannot serve as a lechi, which must be somewhat distinct as part of the doorway and not part of the rest of a structure (Magen Avraham 363:28). On the other hand, as a doorpost, the lechi can be connected to or protruding from the wall (ibid.). Therefore, if there is a thin protrusion from the main direction of the wall or you can attach a valid lechi to the side of a wall (with the same requirements as above), that suffices. If by slats, you mean that you want to attach the string to a horizontal or diagonal protrusion from the house, this would have the same problem that we discussed regarding attaching a string to branches.

Because of the complicated nature of some of these issues, we urge you to arrange an on-sight consultation with someone who knows the laws of eruvin.

Picture 1                                                                       Picture 2

Let us start with the bicycle-driven rickshaw and its smaller problems. When bicycles became popular, many poskim discussed their use on Shabbat, and almost all forbade it, for one or more of the following reasons. 1) Uvdin d’chol – This is a weekday-like activity, for amongst other reasons, it is a mode of transportation that takes people to many places for many purposes, including non-Shabbat-appropriate ones (see Tzitz Eliezer VII:30). 2) Bicycles often need repairs that the rider performs while forgetting about Shabbat (see ibid. and Yaskil Avdi III, Orach Chayim 12). 3) One might ride outside the techum Shabbat (boundaries of travel outside the city). While Rav Yosef Chayim of Bagdad (Rav Pe’alim III, OC 25, responding to the community of Bombay, India) dismissed these issues (some say he later changed his mind), the consensus of both Ashkenazi and Sephardi poskim and the broad minhag is to forbid it.

One might claim that when the vehicle is being ridden by a non-Jew for a Jewish passenger, one can be much more lenient, and a rickshaw thus operated might be too uncommon to have a clear minhag. While not totally dismissing this approach, the logic is somewhat difficult. The Jewish participant is taking part in the weekday-like activity, he could (help) fix the rickshaw if necessary, and he could be taken out of the techum Shabbat.

These problems do not seem to apply to a man-driven rickshaw, which is conceptually similar to a baby carriage or a wheelchair. While there is what to discuss in their regard (see Simchat Cohen, OC 78-79), the accepted consensus is clearly to permit them.

However, there is another problem in some places, including all of India. Pushing or pulling a carriage through the streets, by foot or by bicycle, is a form of carrying. Since there are not eiruvin in India, this is an additional problem on Shabbat. Admittedly, there are some mitigating factors. Carrying or pulling a person who is able to walk himself is forbidden only rabbinically because of a concept called “chai nosei et atzmo” (Shabbat 94a). While here the driver/puller is also transporting the rickshaw that they are sitting in, we say that the carriage is just an extension of the person (see Shabbat 93b). (The Jew cannot be carrying anything that he could not take into the streets himself.)

Another factor is that there is no Torah-level violation when the carriage is large enough to be its own “private domain” (Shabbat 8a – the details are beyond our present scope). While, even after these factors, there is still a rabbinic prohibition, one must remember that you asked about a non-Jew doing the work. In fact, Rav Yosef Chayim (in the aforementioned responsum) did permit a non-Jew pedaling a rickshaw that was of the right dimensions, but only if the Jew needed it to enable him to do a big mitzva. In general, one is allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform what is for us a rabbinic prohibition in order to facilitate a mitzva (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:5). While we saw that many disagree because of the issues of bicycles, it is theoretically possible to use this leniency for a person-drawn rickshaw in the case of specific mitzva that one cannot get to in another way, which is unusual for a healthy person.

Paying a non-Jew in advance for that which he will do on Shabbat is not permitted when the non-Jew is required to do the work (that is forbidden for a Jew) specifically on Shabbat (ibid. 247:1). This is all the more so when it will be done with the active participation of a Jew. In this case, various forms of hinting will also not be effective.

The rabbinic community might want to discuss having non-Jews transport Jews in rickshaws on Shabbat for extreme cases like the mitzva or crucial needs of the sick or infirmed. However, under normal circumstances, this system is forbidden, all the more so in an area that does not have an eiruv.

[Before putting a fabric on a heat source, one should determine that there is no fire hazard.]

Hatmana is forbidden rabbinically on Shabbat (not including other problems) in two basic circumstances: 1) if the hatmana is done on Shabbat; 2) if the hatmana is done in a medium where heat is being added, even if set up before Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 257:1). Regarding your question, since the covered food is sitting on a heat source, even if you set things up before Shabbat, you must cover the food in a manner that is not hatmana.

Insulation is forbidden as hatmana only when the covering is done in a relatively extensive manner. Two pertinent parameters are the percentage of the pot that is covered and the proximity of the cover to the pots.

The standard assumption is that it is hatmana only if virtually the entire pot is covered. It is sufficient for a somewhat significant amount of it to be exposed to prevent problems (see Orchot Shabbat 2:80). (There is an opinion that if the majority of the pot is covered, it is hatmana, but this is against the consensus.) Depending on the size of the pot(s) and of the covering, it is possible that there will be parts of the bottom of the pots that will not be covered, and, in any case, one can be careful to make it so and thereby solve the problem.

Another factor in insulation is the degree to which the covering hugs the pots. The Rosh (Shabbat 4:2, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, OC 257:8) says that if the covering is not directly on top of the pots but it is suspended by a board above it so that there is significant air in between, it is not hatmana. The same is true if there is significant space between the covering and the sides of the pot(s) (Shulchan Aruch ibid.), even if it touches some sides but not others (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:66). Let us analyze our case. On one hand, if there is more than one pot, the covering will never touch all the sides of all the pots, as there will be sections facing inward, and the covering will probably not hug the whole exterior, considering the shape that will be formed. However, one should look at the pots as a group, and if the pots as a group are covered as normal when draping a cover over them, this is hatmana (Orchot Shabbat 2:(144)).

There are at least three ways to have the “plata blanket” pass this second test. 1) I have seen such products that are stiff so that they do not turn at an angle that would allow them to hug the sides of the pots. 2) One could put a board on top, extending beyond the pots so that the blanket will turn vertically beyond where the pot reaches (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 3) One can put an empty pot on one side to separate the blanket from the relevant set of pots at least on that side (Orchot Shabbat, ibid.).

There are two legitimate but not mainstream opinions that should be mentioned in this context. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 8) says that it is forbidden to do partial hatmana. While his main discussion is when it is sitting on coals, it appears that even when sitting on a blech, partial hatmana is forbidden. Therefore, there is significant logic for Sephardim to be machmir in this regard. However, the minhag among Sephardim seems to be more lenient than the Shulchan Aruch (see Ohr L’tzion II:17:10 and Yabia Omer VI:33).

The Ohr Zarua says that if one seals before Shabbat the oven in which the hatmana is taking place so that one is not going to forget and stoke the coals, there is no prohibition of hatmana (see Rama OC 257:8 who accepts this and the Mishna Berura ad loc. 47, who is inconclusive). Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer ibid.) says that the same leniency applies to a non-adjustable hot plate. Nevertheless, it is better to follow one of the steps above to prevent hatmana issues.

Each congregation’s rabbi should set policy on such halachic issues, but the issue is worth discussing.

Such an envelope is muktzeh, at least as a kli shemelachto l’issur (=ksmli), a utensil whose main purpose is for something forbidden on Shabbat (Mishna Berura 308:10). After all, it is meant for putting in money and often subsequently sealing before mailing, which are forbidden on Shabbat. If it is muktzeh machamat chesron kis (one would refrain from using it for a secondary purpose), it would be forbidden to move it at all (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:1). However, since such envelopes are usually plentiful and inexpensive enough to not qualify, one can move them while they are fulfilling a use that is unrelated to something forbidden (ibid. 3). 

Let us analyze how this donation-related envelope is used. One could suggest that its use as a harmless preparation for a mitzva after Shabbat is as valid as a simple purpose on Shabbat. However, those who posit that tefillin are ksmli do not allow one to move them so he can put them on on Sunday (see Magen Avraham 308:11; Taz 308:3). One could claim that the envelope’s permitted purpose on Shabbat is so the potential donor will not forget his opportunity. However, not forgetting is significant only if attached to a donation and therefore there is no positive gain on Shabbat of the oleh taking the envelope.

I heard a claim that I cannot understand in the name of a talmid chacham –  the envelope is not muktzeh at all either because it is also a reminder or because it can be used for putting in permitted things. However, a ksmli is always something that can be used for something permitted, just that is not its main purpose, and still one is permitted to move it only while he is using it for a positive, active permitted use. Even if the shul says they are using it actively as a reminder, this will not help the person who takes it home without necessarily being interested in that.

Another problem that needs discussion is hachana, preparation from Shabbat to weekday. Hachana is a problem even if one does a totally permitted act, when it is done for the needs of weekday. Here, giving the envelope is only useful so that the shul will get the donation later. A strong precedent for this application of hachana is the halacha that one may not bring wine on Shabbat to the place where it will be needed for Havdala on Motzaei Shabbat because of hachana (Magen Avraham 667:3; Mishna Berura 667:5). Therefore it is forbidden for the oleh to take home the envelope even if we can solve the problem of muktzeh and even if there is an eiruv. We see that the fact that it will be used for a mitzva does not overcome the problem. The Chayei Adam (153:6) does permit (for the purpose of a mitzva and when there is no other choice) bringing the wine when there is time to drink it on Shabbat. The leniency is because it is not noticeable that it is being done for after Shabbat. In our case, not only are there other options, but it is also clear that the envelope is meant for use only after Shabbat.

An idea that solves both problems is to give the envelope a permitted purpose by putting a dvar Torah or other usable memento into the envelope. Then the ksmli is being used for a permitted purpose and is permitted. Taking the envelope and the dvar Torah home in it is also not hachana because the two together have a purpose on Shabbat – the page for reading and the envelope for storing (Yalkut Yosef 308:12). One problem is that the recipient might remove the dvar Torah from the envelope and not put it back, in which case the envelope would no longer be in use for a permitted purpose. Another suggestion is to attach the two together so that one would be carrying the envelope along with the dvar Torah (Nachalat Yisrael (Krauss) pg. 236).

If our readership can explain outright leniency, we will, bli neder, publicize it in the future.

There are few questions one has to ask. While the money is muktzeh, does it make the suit jacket muktzeh? Even if the jacket is not muktzeh, may one continue to carry around the money?

The general subject of this question is of basiss l’davar ha’asur, an object which is intrinsically not muktzeh but it is supporting something that is muktzeh. The basic halacha is that the basiss is muktzeh and that if this situation existed when Shabbat began (at first glance, your case), it cannot be moved even after the muktzeh is removed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 310:7). However, there are many exceptions to the rule. You did not give much detail, but presumably at least one of them applies, which would have partially solved your problem.

When two intrinsically separate objects are firmly attached, one of them is the main part of the joint object, and the less important part is a basiss l’davar ha’asur, the joint object as a whole is not muktzeh (Rama ad loc., based on Shabbat 44b). This is the case regarding pockets that are sewed onto an article of clothing, where the suit, in your case, is more important than the pocket. Therefore, if the pocket has money in it, the suit is not considered a basiss to the money or to the pocket, and the suit can be moved. Even when the garment is not muktzeh through the laws of basiss l’davar ha’asur, the pocket can become a basiss. In that case, one should not stick his hand in to the pocket (Mishna Berura 310:29), even in order to remove the money (Orchot Shabbat 19:302) and even after the money has been removed. 

There is a type of pocket where the whole garment can become a basiss l’davar ha’asur. When a pocket is not just sewed on to the fabric but the fabric serves as part of the pocket (most common in shirt pockets), then if there is muktzeh in the pocket, the whole garment can be a basiss l’davar ha’asur (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:74) . Some jackets have such pockets.

There are other reasons for a garment to not be a basiss. A basic requirement for the status is that the muktzeh was placed on the potential basiss with the intention that it stay there on Shabbat  (Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:4). In regard to garments regularly worn on Shabbat, the assumption (without a need for cognitive thought) is that one did not intend the muktzeh to remain there until Shabbat. In that case, even the pocket itself would not be muktzeh. Even if the suit was meant to be used primarily during the week, it still would not seem to be a basiss. Most people do not purposely leave $20 bills in their pocket, irrespective of the laws of muktzeh. Assuming you meant to take it out either of the pocket a few minutes later or at most at the end of the day, there is no issue of basiss whatsoever.

There is a machloket about whether one who is wearing a non-basiss garment with muktzeh in it, has to remove the muktzeh as soon as possible (see Mishna Berura 310:29). (If it were a basiss, this would not suffice, as a basiss when Shabbat starts remains such even after the muktzeh source is removed.) We usually try to remove the object at the first opportunity (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:75). However, there are several legitimate excuses to delay doing so (see ibid.). Included in this category is when a loss will likely occur to the muktzeh object (i.e., someone will take the money); it will be difficult to do so without removing the clothing (when the pocket is not a basiss, it is easier to remove the money, by grabbing the pocket and shaking out the money); when it will be embarrassing for the muktzeh to fall out or it will be an eyesore. Therefore, it is likely that you could have waited until you got home or to a private place before emptying out the $20 bill.

We will begin by looking at a precedent regarding non-standard cooking. The gemara (Shabbat 39a) says that it is permitted to “cook” a food in the sun on Shabbat. The prohibition of cooking is when something is cooked by heat that emanates from some sort of fire (Shabbat ibid.). Rashi (Shabbat 39a) says that the leniency is because it is not normal to cook in the sun. The Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim III:52) says that because of the abnormality, we cannot extend the prohibition from the cases of cooking in the Mishkan, which are the model for what is forbidden. Others disagree, based on another gemara (Pesachim 41a), which says that just as there is no Torah level violation of Shabbat to cook meat not through fire or its by-product (e.g., hot springs) so there is no prohibition of eating Korban Pesach meat that was so cooked. Since it is the result, not the process that is important regarding Korban Pesach, the Avnei Nezer (OC 163) and Minchat Shlomo (I, p. 105) say that Chazal must have posited that the unusual process produces a result that is different from standard cooked food.

The Pri Megadim (OC, Mishbetzot Zahav 318:6) briefly discusses whether it is permitted to put something that has been cooked in the sun through a conventional cooking process on Shabbat. His context is the machloket of the Rishonim on whether it is forbidden to cook (in liquid) on Shabbat something that was baked (dry) before or vice versa. We rule stringently but not conclusively (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 318:5; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:(180)). The Pri Megadim’s case has elements of both stringency and leniency in comparison. On one hand, there the food already underwent a halachic cooking, whereas here it has not. On the other hand, cooking something baked and vice versa makes a discernable change, which might not be the case when repeating basically the same process in a “halachic manner.” The Pri Megadim’s leaning is that there is certainly not a Torah violation and it is likely permitted, apparently based on the idea that the cooking process is (fully) forbidden only when it changes and/or improves the food (see Rambam, Shabbat 9:3).

If we equate microwave cooking to cooking in the sun, your question is equivalent to the Pri Megadim’s. However, that equation deserves evaluation. With the advent of microwaves, the question arose whether it is as a new-fangled but essentially standard form of cooking or whether it is a new application of Chazal’s non-halachic fireless cooking. (Problems of the use of electricity basically preclude the use of a microwave on Shabbat in any case.) The Igrot Moshe (ibid.) claims that since microwave cooking is now a normal form of cooking, it is derivable from the Mishkan. While the context of his ruling was to be stringent (not to cook), which is easier to do than to rule leniently (see Rashi, Beitza 2b), he probably considers microwaving to be cooking regarding the halacha that there is no problem of cooking thereafter. In fact, all might agree that the results of microwaving are more similar to regular cooking than cooking in the sun is and permit reheating such food with a standard heat source.

Some people like rice crispy, and the relatively high heat of many of today’s hotplates can accomplish that. Doing so is a problem even for normally cooked rice, as this is a significant act of baking after cooking (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:60). If one makes sure it will not become crispy, that should suffice for our case as well.

If one wants to be stringent (see uncertainty in Tzitz Eliezer X:62; Yalkut Yosef 318:(19)), he can bake the rice in a regular oven after taking it out of the microwave, to make sure it is halachically cooked before Shabbat (see Be’ur Halacha to 318:5). Five minutes, a nominal cooking process, should suffice. If one likes the rice crispy, this should be done on Friday (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:71).

If it is an expensive and/or delicate lamp, which one would not usually move around for random purposes because of the above, then it it is muktzeh machamat chisaron kis and may not be moved under the circumstances described. If not, it is characterized as a kli shemelachto l'issur and may be moved in order to be used in a permitted manner (not turning on and off but positioning it where it will be helpful).

There are two categories of objects/situations one can have on his body without violating carrying on Shabbat without an eiruv: 1. Begadim derech malbush (clothes worn normally); 2. Tachshitim (adornments or accessories) (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301 at length). The category of tacshit includes things that are placed on the body to help the body function properly (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 18:11), including slings, arch supports, glasses, etc.

The first thing we need to see is whether decreasing the chance of danger is a positive use regarding these halachot. The mishna and gemara (Shabbat 60-61) discuss the circumstances under which one can wear an amulet in the public domain. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that when used appropriately, an amulet “is a tachshit for an ill person, like one of his garments.” Not only is that true when used for healing, but warding off illness from those susceptible to it justifies wearing it as well (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:26). Thus, wearing something that can reduce the chance of getting hit by a car, Heaven forbid, e.g., in a dark area without traffic lights and/or sidewalks, is legitimate. On the other hand, two distinctions challenge the proof from this and similar sources.

One distinction is that the amulet protects a person from within, whereas a reflector helps in regard to an external danger (cars). Nevertheless, logic dictates that the source of the danger should not make a difference in this regard (L’horot Natan VIII:18).

A stronger distinction is that regarding the amulet, one is “using” the amulet on an ongoing basis. In contrast, sometimes one wears the reflector for a long walk in which only a short time will be in a dark, dangerous place. What is the status of the reflector the rest of the time? The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (18:16) and Yalkut Yosef (301:32) say that one should not wear reading glasses, which one often carries in his pocket, because of the rabbinic concern that he may take them off and carry them. Why not state an intrinsic problem – reading glasses are not used while on the street – as the Orchot Shabbat (28:127) claims? Apparently, the fact that they are generally usable and/or will be used later is sufficient. Even the Orchot Shabbat may agree that it is sufficient for it to be useful sometime during this walk.

There are indeed many cases of tachshitim that, intrinsically, should have been permitted to wear, but the Rabbis were concerned that people would take them off in the middle or they might fall and be carried. It is difficult to determine when we apply this rabbinic concern and when not, and there may be additional reasons for leniency here (see below).

Our case is somewhat reminiscent of the badges Jews were required to wear by law (centuries before the Nazis y”s). The Rama (OC 301:23, based on the Ohr Zarua II:84) says they could be worn but only if they were attached (not necessarily sewed) to the clothes. The reason given for leniency is that one wears them all week long and would not dare take it off (see Mishna Berura ad loc.) – logic that does not fully apply here. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (new edition18:25), says that one is permitted to wear reflective belts on Shabbat, as it is considered a normal mode of dressing, and the Rabbis did not forbid because it is for protection. It is not clear, though, if an armband is considered a normal mode of dress.

We would certainly not tell someone who needs a reflective band for safety to not wear one. However, from a halachic perspective it is better to either: have one permanently attached to a real garment; to wear a reflective vest, which is a normal garment (even if it looks funny); or at least use a reflective belt (belts are semi-clothes, semi-accessories of necessity (see sources related to Rama OC 301:36)). If only an armband is available, one can be lenient.

The main issue involved in this question is the definition of tochein (grinding). While the classic case is grinding wheat into grain flour, the gemara (Shabbat 74b) states that it is forbidden even to cut up vegetables into fine pieces. In the past [Mishpatim 5772, regarding making guacamole], we cited different opinions as to whether the Rashba’s leniency (Shut IV:75) that one may do the above soon before eating applies only when he leaves the vegetables in “slightly big pieces.” We also cited Rav Moshe Feinstein’s opinion (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:74) regarding mashing bananas that this is not grinding, as one does not create new fine particles, but just mashes the food into a softer form. On the other hand, the Chazon Ish (OC 57) rejected this distinction.

Skipping other possible leniencies mentioned in that context that can be applied to the potatoes you discussed, let us get straight to the leniencies that applies to your potatoes, that did not apply to guacamole. The poskim (see Rama, OC 321:19) understood from the Rambam (Shabbat 21:13) that one may take a food that was already made soft by cooking and complete the process of mashing it. The Chazon Ish (OC 58:9) explains that the softness created by the cooking causes the additional mashing to be too trivial to be forbidden by the melacha of tochein. Contemporary poskim (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:9; Orchot Shabbat 5:9) discuss your explicit case and say that it is permitted to mash soft, well-boiled potatoes on Shabbat for this reason.

However, the bad news is that you violated a rule of this leniency. That is that even when tochein does not apply, it is forbidden to use a utensil that is set aside for the mincing or crushing of food items (Shulchan Aruch, OC 321:10). A hand-masher seems to fit that bill; you should have used a fork. This stringency applies even to a food to which tochein does not even apply, such as cheese (ibid.), and even if one did the mincing right before the use (Mishna Berura 321:36; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:2). The reason for this prohibition is that using such a utensil is uvdin d’chol (a weekday-like activity) (see Mishna Berura ibid.).

In order for there to be a question of borer, there has to be a basic level of ta’arovet (intermingling of different objects), where one wants to separate between different types. On the level of a physical ta’arovet, even relatively big objects, such as different pieces of fish on a platter, can be considered intermingled and be subject to the laws of borer if they are not distinct one from the other (Rama, Orach Chayim 319:3; see Terumat Hadeshen 57). While it is not always easy to determine how separate things have to be distinct, a platter of candies is very likely to be considered a ta’arovet.

There is another factor that can cause borer to not be an issue: the lack of contrast between the different items. According to the great majority of poskim (see Mishna Berura 319:15), there is borer only when there are at least two different categories of objects. If there is only one type, just that one wants some of the items now and some he wants for later, the laws of borer do not have to be followed. (The Taz, OC 319:2 is a lone stringent opinion on this matter). In your case, there is only one type of candy, and thus one might claim that borer does not apply. However, even within one type of item, if some of the objects are considered pesolet (undesired objects), borer applies to them. The Rama (OC 319:1) says that when there are spoiled vegetable leaves among good leaves of the same type, the former is pesolet. The Magen Avraham (319:5; see Machatzit Hashekel 319:3) breaks the matter up into different categories. If the pesolet is inedible, there can be Torah-level borer. If the pesolet is edible but not readily so, there is the potential for rabbinic-level borer. If the food is totally edible, just that it is less desired, then there is no borer in selecting among the more and less desired items of the same type. (See discussion of the status of whole and broken pieces of matza in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:28). If the laws of borer apply, you have a problem, as one may not take out the undesired from the desired (Shulchan Aruch, OC 319:4) which is what you did.

If your daughter was selecting the licked candy to remove from the rest, we can say that for her it was a totally edible piece of candy, and borer would not exist. You could even have taken out the candy, even if you would not eat it licked, in order to give it to your daughter. (See Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:23, who allows someone who does not eat onions to remove onions from a salad to give them to someone else for the latter’s immediate consumption). The fact that something is edible for one person does not help in regard to the selection performed by and for one for whom it is not edible (Be’ur Halacha to 319:10).

If, as appears from your question, you did not want to let your daughter to eat the candy, what else could you have done? Even when one ideally prefers not to use something, if he takes it out in order to use it under the circumstances, it is permitted. For example, one can remove a bone from fish if he sucks the bone before throwing it out (Be’ur Halacha to 319:4). If you would not eat the candy as it is, you still could have taken it out, washed it, and then eaten it directly thereafter.

One other thing that you could have done according to the consensus of authorities is to take out a group of candies, including the licked one and untouched candies, together. This is based on the Taz (319:13) that one may remove a fly from a drink if he removes some of the drink as well (see Orchot Shabbat 3:64).  

An inhaler is used for medical purposes, and would therefore, theoretically, be forbidden to be used on Shabbat, as all means of medications are rabbinically forbidden.  The reason being that in the times of the Gemara, there was a concern that if one would be permitted to take medication, s/he could come to grind herbs for that purpose, which would be a Torah prohibition.  However, it is permitted to use an inhaler to treat asthma, even for a minor case of asthma, as the prohibition against medications was not made for someone who has an illness, even one that isn't life threatening.

For more information on the general prohibition of taking medication on Shabbat, see: Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 328:1, and regarding inhalers see Shemirat Shabbat Kihilchita vol. 1 34:10.

Our research indicates that at least some wine experts are more discriminating than you and say that even with the pump, the wine can “survive” only 3-5 days. For them, we imagine there is significant loss to wait until the end of Shabbat. We will start our answer for them.

The Magen Avraham (321:7) discusses meat before kashering whose deadline for washing before the salting is on Shabbat. He posits that, in theory, if it were necessary to prevent loss, one would be allowed to rinse it without hachana being a problem. One of the sources for this concept is the halacha that one may move a non-muktzeh utensil to protect it from breakage or theft, even if he does not need it on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:4).

In practice, the Magen Avraham forbids the rinsing because even after the deadline, one may kasher the meat by broiling. Considering that some people prefer salting to broiling, we see that not any “loss” justifies hachana, thus raising questions about freshness of wine. On the other hand, there is certainly not a requirement of total loss. Even meat that cannot be kashered at all can be sold to a non-Jew, and yet if not for the solution of broiling, rinsing would have been permitted. Those for whom their expensive wine will lose its value if they do not promptly pump the air out may do so on Shabbat. (We also see from the halacha about protection from theft, that preventing possible significant loss suffices).

Let us now deal with your question from the perspective of one like you for whom waiting until after Shabbat is not impactful. A husband may revoke his wife’s oaths on Shabbat only because he cannot do so after Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 341:1). In general, when there is an alternative to avoid loss after Shabbat, one must wait (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:91). The concern that you might forget to pump after Shabbat is probably not sufficient, under normal circumstances, to justify doing so on Shabbat (we do not find that concern regarding the oaths).

Yet, there are a few ideas that might justify pumping on Shabbat. The Orchot Shabbat (22:(270)) posits that an action whose only purpose is to prevent loss is totally divorced from concerns of hachana. (He explains that regarding washing the meat, we require alternatives because washing has a positive element to it other than avoiding loss.) Thus, in your case, you could claim that since one pumps only to avoid loss, it does not matter that you could do it after Shabbat.

Another possible leniency is based on a rule championed by Rav S.Z. Auerbach and cited by several contemporary works (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:89). Actions that a person does naturally, as a matter of course, without specific thought of doing it now to save time later, are permitted even if their benefits are only after Shabbat. Some examples are taking home one’s tallit and siddur after shul and putting food in the refrigerator (and even the freezer- ibid.; that is a considerable extension). These are considered finishing off the previous usage. While pumping air from a wine bottle seems to me to be a deliberate action with a clear thought process, perhaps for more serious wine consumers, it is as natural as returning the cap to a soda bottle.

In summation, it is permitted to pump the air from a wine bottle on Shabbat for those who consider it a real loss to wait. Other users have what to rely upon if they want to do so on Shabbat instead of waiting. The strength of the leniency may depend on the level of discrimination and the extent to which doing so is a standard, almost trivial action.

We will discuss whether this arrangement violates s’char Shabbat (pay for permitted services one provided on Shabbat), which is forbidden rabbinically like other commercial activity, lest one come to write (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:4).

The most common way to allow receiving money for work that was done on Shabbat is through havla’ah – having the Shabbat-related money “swallowed up” when combined with weekday pay, as pay for a period of work that includes Shabbat (ibid.). However, it is not enough for the pay to be received together with that from weekdays, if the obligation was accrued in a way that some of it is connected distinctly to Shabbat (see Rama and Biur Halacha ad loc.). Regarding our case, it is forbidden to receive special overtime money for work done on Shabbat (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:64). Orchot Shabbat (22:(158)) suggests that it is permitted to receive pay at a higher rate for work on Shabbat than for during the week, but only when his salary is set in a way that includes a certain amount of required work on Shabbat. However, for one’s pay to be changed based on a fluctuating amount of work one does on Shabbat is forbidden. Still, though, if the overtime includes related work before or after Shabbat, it is permitted if you can generally specify hours for the weekends without specifying how many of the hours were for Shabbat itself or list the exact times (see  Shemirat  Shabbat K’hilchata 28:65).

Another area of leniency to explore, if the above does not help, is the matter of pay for doing a mitzva. The Beit Yosef (OC 306) cites a machloket whether s’char Shabbat is prohibited when the work done is for a mitzva. There are indications in the gemara both ways. The gemara in Pesachim (50b) says that a meturgeman (one who translates laining into Aramaic – now practiced primarily in Yemenite communities) will not see blessing from his salary. This implies that it is permitted, just frowned upon. On the other hand, the gemara (Nedarim 37a) says that a Chumash teacher may take money for teaching on Shabbat because it is done with havla’ah. Apparently, the mitzva of teaching Chumash does not justify taking money for Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 306:5) cites both opinions, with a preference toward the strict opinion. On the other hand, the minhag is that chazanim get paid on Shabbat. On yet another hand, some chazanim also get paid for davening they do during the week (including Selichot), and thus havla’ah plays a role. Other chazanim can stretch havla’ah and say that part of their pay is for preparing during the week (see Aruch Hashulchan OC 306:12; discussion in Orchot Shabbat 22:(149)).

Your case includes an educational element that can make the machloket of pay for a mitzva on Shabbat relevant. It is not important whether your employers intend for the same mitzva element, as s’char Shabbat applies (directly) only to the worker (see Mishna Berura 306:21), and you have the mitzva in mind. Still, it is likely forbidden and even more likely not a good omen. Therefore, it is proper for your employers to restructure compensation for your efforts.

Another possibility is for you to have a maximum salary for a global amount of work that exceeds your base job, based on expected overtime. In this case, the money you get will be with havla’ah. Overtime hours (not necessarily on Shabbat) can factor in specially in fulfilling your maximum work obligation, and you can report your Shabbat hours in arriving at the number. If you do not make it to those hours, they can take off from your salary.

A few days ago, the Torah world lost a true talmid chacham, Rav Yehoshua Yeshaya Neuwirth (pronounced, Noyvirt), zt”l, who died at the age of 85. We have not in the past used this column to eulogize but felt that this case was different – not because of various connections with Rav Neuwirth or even the fact that we have quoted him in this column hundreds of times. The main reason we are writing about Rav Neuwirth and his sefer, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, is that it has served as the model of a new genre of halachic works, followed by hundreds of seforim (including, to a great degree, our series, Bemareh Habazak.

We will start with a quick biographical look at Rav Yehoshua Neuwirth, whose life was symbolic of Jewish history of the last century. His father, Rav Aharon Neuwirth, served as rabbi in important communities in pre-war Germany, including Mainz and Berlin, and later in Yaffo. Most of the family survived the Holocaust, hiding in Amsterdam, amidst miracles. After the war, a teenaged Rav Yehoshua decided to move to Eretz Yisrael and resume his rabbinic studies. Organizers said that the illegal immigration boat to Palestine had to leave on Shabbat, and he decided that the situation justified the violation of Shabbat due to pikuach nefesh. At that time, he promised himself that if he would make it to Israel, he would do something to glorify Shabbat observance.

Upon arriving in Eretz Yisrael, he enrolled in Yeshivat Kol Torah, founded by German Jewish rabbis, and became close there with his life-long rabbi, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l. In addition to spreading and applying much of Rav Auerbach’s scholarship, as finds expression in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, Rav Neuwirth was also his student in regard to modesty and active concern for people, prominently including the poor.

The first edition of Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata came out when Rav Neuwirth was still a sparsely known talmid chacham in his thirties. The sefer stood out for being user-friendly and making the laws of Shabbat accessible to the broad public. This he did in a few ways. One was to change the focus of the choice of halachot. The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch are strongly based on discussions in the Talmud, written 1500 years ago. Yet, much of the subject matter relates to practices, foods, and utensils that are no longer prevalent. Many of today’s pressing issues relate to situations and technologies that developed in recent times, and Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata addresses them very deliberately and thoroughly.

Another innovation, which had roots in the Mishna Berura, is the breakup between the body of the work, in which practical halacha is clearly, succinctly presented, and the footnotes, which contain the sources and halachic analysis. This system, which we too employ in Bemareh Habazak, makes the study of the basic halacha accessible to those who cannot follow the intricate world of halacha and helps the more developed scholar with better organization.

The sefer also has a detailed index, enabling one to easily find the discussion of the practical application for which he needs a ruling. This is a great improvement, taken from the world outside of Torah scholarship, over previous seforim, which had no more than a table of contents, perhaps following an order such as that of the Shulchan Aruch. A final point that opened to a wider target audience the laws of Shabbat, and through his emulators, many other areas of halacha, is the style of writing. Instead of the classical rabbinic language, with a mix of Hebrew and Aramaic, with difficult, run-on sentences, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata is written in clear modern Hebrew. The index and the editing were both provided by Rav Neuwirth’s friend of many years, Rav Asher Wasserteil, who while yeshiva trained, was not a rabbi by profession. We are proud to have a long-term relationship with this unsung partner in the revolution in the presentation of halacha, as Rav Wasserteil, father of Eretz Hemdah’s long-time chairman of the board, also edited the first five volumes of Bemareh Habazak.

May Rav Neuwirth’s life works, and those that he inspired, bring him eternal merit.

We start our discussion with a fascinating machloket about cooking bones between two of last generation’s great poskim, Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (in an exchange of letters that appear in the books of each).

Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:76-77) writes that the requirement of fully cooked food does not apply to bones, as they are not considered food. He relies both on his logic/observation (people do not eat them) and on halacha (the bones do not have a halacha of meat in regard to the laws of kashrut- see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 87:7; ibid. 99:1). Therefore, making them soft enough to be theoretically fit for consumption on Shabbat is not considered cooking. Rav Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo I:6), living in Israel, where it is much more common to eat at least some bones, says that bones are food in regard to the laws of Shabbat, even if they are not equivalent to meat regarding kashrut. Therefore, he says that one must make sure that the bones are fully cooked before doing something to hasten the cooking (e.g., returning to the fire, moving them to a hotter part of the surface of a blech, returning a pot cover one had removed). Since Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata was written by a close disciple of Rav Auerbach, it should be no surprise that he was stringent on the matter. However, you now know that his opinion is not unanimous. These two giants argued to an extreme: Rav Feinstein said that even one who eats the bones can have them cook on Shabbat because his nonstandard behavior does not turn bones into food. Rav Auerbach says that even one who does not eat bones must be careful, as it is considered cooking food because many people do eat them.

We are torn as far as which approach to accept. On one hand, Rav Auerbach’s general logic (halachic details are beyond our present scope) is compelling. On the other hand, the fact that common practice had long been to ignore the bones’ status and the lack of explicit earlier sources on this common weekly occurrence, are crucial indicators supporting Rav Feinstein. Furthermore, if one were to take Rav Auerbach’s position to its logical conclusion, one would end up with an untenable stringency (I refuse to share it). Rav Auerbach himself does not take his thesis the whole way.  Although one is not allowed to increase the heat on food on which there is a doubt whether it is fully cooked (Be’ur Halacha to OC 318:4), Rav Auerbach allows those who do not plan to eat the bones to increase the heat in such a case.

In addition to the claim that bones are not food, there are two other basic reasons toward leniency (see a citation of several contemporary poskim in Melechet Shabbat (Leitner) II, pp. 67-76): the fact that one’s intention is on the meat rather than the bones; the claim that it is not clear how to define what is considered cooked (considering also that it is a machloket whether there is cooking after a food is nominally cooked – see Be’ur Halacha ibid.). We would certainly not criticize one who ignores the bones, at least if members of his household do not eat bones. Even if you want to be machmir like Rav Auerbach, you can be lenient in your case. After having the stew cooking (albeit on low heat) for a long time, the bones that are not ready at night are also not the ones that you and presumably most others eat. Regarding those bones, Rav Auerbach presumably agrees with Rav Feinstein that the halachot of cooking do not apply.

This case is similar to permitted “coverings” discussed in the gemara and Rishonim and to a different one that was forbidden by the Acharonim. Let us see those sources and see where your parasol falls.

Since you don’t keep this garden parasol open for long, there is only a question of a rabbinic prohibition of making a temporary tent (ohel ara’i), not of a Torah violation on a permanent tent (see Shabbat 138a and Shaar Hatziyun 315:6). The halacha of a temporary “tent” can depend on its use. If it is to protect that which it covers, it is forbidden even if there is only a roof of a tefach (a handbreadth) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 315:2). If a horizontal surface is spread out just to serve the area above it (e.g., a table) and the fact that it also covers something is incidental, it is forbidden only if the “roof” is placed on vertical “walls” (ibid. 3). At first glance, your parasol seems forbidden, as it is a roof to shade the area beneath.

However, we must consider that the prohibition on making tents is a subcategory of binyan (building). Therefore, Chazal (see Shabbat 138a) allowed several apparent walls/roofs when they were not creating something new. One is extending an existing surface of a tefach (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2). Although the folded up parasol has a width of a tefach that hangs over the ground, opening it is worse than just extending because the existing tefach is measured only from beyond its folded up state.

Another broad leniency is when the “tent” is attached in a way that it is ready to be opened. When a cloak is attached by a string, ready to be pulled open, it is permitted to do so (Shabbat 138a). Another case is a folded chair whose seat is soft leather, where the leather becomes a horizontal surface when the chair is opened. This too is permitted (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5). The Rama (OC 626:3) allows opening an extending roof over a sukka to protect from rain, when it is attached by hinges to the wall.  

Based on the above, one would expect it would be permitted to open an umbrella on Shabbat, as its “tent” is made ready to be opened and closed easily. Why then is it accepted that it is forbidden to do so? The Noda B’Yehuda (II, OC:30) is concerned with the Rif’s opinion that the leniency for the cloak with the string is limited to cases where there will not be a tefach of horizontal extension. He also says the chair is permitted because it is not done to protect that which is underneath. Many (see Shut Chatam Sofer, OC:72; Chazon Ish, OC 52:6;) reject the Noda B’Yehuda’s strict analysis. The Chazon Ish argues that his distinctions do not apply where the leniency is based on the fact that the ohel already exists and is in waiting to be opened.

Your garden parasol is essentially an umbrella. Many see the umbrella prohibition as largely a stringency (with many nuances raised as to what factor(s) triggered the minhag- see Be’ur Halacha 315:8; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 24:15; Chazon Ish ibid.). It is likely this minhag does not extend to your parasol, which is different in several ways. Perhaps most significantly, the fabric extends from a stationary pole, which is unlike picking up an umbrella and creating an ohel situation in its present location from scratch (see Noda B’Yehuda ibid).

Therefore, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) rules that it is permitted to open garden parasols, and we concur. Whatever can be opened on Shabbat can also be closed. (Based on your picture and description, it appears that it is even easier to be lenient in your case. Your apparatus is movable enough to not be considered attached to the ground, something that made Rav S.Z. Auerbach “wary” of the above leniency – see ad loc. (57). It also looks like the downward slope is too small/gradual to be considered additional vertical walls, which was one of the reasons the Noda B’Yehuda forbade umbrellas.)

The mishna (Beitza 36b) forbids one to clap, bang with his hands on his thighs, or dance on Shabbat, and the gemara explains that it is out of concern one will be metaken (lit., fix) a musical instrument. The gemara (Eiruvin 104a) says that while there is a machloket whether one can use a utensil to make non-musical sounds, one certainly may not use an instrument to produce pleasant noises.

There has long been tension between these halachot and practice. The gemara (Beitza 30a) says that the reason rabbis did not protest when people clapped and danced is that it is better that people sin unknowingly than knowingly. The Rama (Orach Chayim 339:3), bothered by such practices in his time, said that either that concern of non-compliance still exists or people rely on Tosafot (Beitza 30a). Tosafot says that since nowadays people do not know how to make musical instruments, the prohibition does not apply. Although Tosafot’s thesis is surprising and not widely accepted, the Rama cites it as a second possible explanation for lenient practice.

How far does the leniency go? The Mishna Berura (339:10) says that the Rama (reluctantly) condones only clapping, thigh banging, and dancing, not use of noise-making and musical instruments. Others understand the Rama broadly. Actually, the Rama elsewhere (OC 338:3; Shut 125; see Magen Avraham 338:5) clarifies himself. One may make a beat with non-instruments. Musical instruments are permitted only for a non-Jew to play at our behest (the Rama referred to wedding celebrations, which in the past could continue into Shabbat).

Our minhag nowadays is not to use musical instruments (even by non-Jews for mitzvot). Regarding not classical musical instruments for music, including making an audible beat while singing (e.g., “drumming” on a table), the Mishna Berura (ibid.) and contemporary poskim (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:41; Yalkut Yosef 338:1; Orchot Shabbat 21:33) forbid it; we agree. Yet, it is undeniable that many serious Jews do bang on the tables during zemirot. They apparently rely on the lenient opinions and the assumption that any action that enhances an activity that enhances Shabbat (e.g., davening, zemirot) is grounds for leniency in the case of a mitzva. (The latter assumption is far from simple – see Tosafot, Sukka 50a – further discussion development is beyond our scope). We would neither permit nor come out against one who “drums” in this way.

Back to your cups. Cups are not a musical instrument. Are cups on a table worse than hands on a table, considering that, either way, the table is a makeshift drum? (Unlike most drums, a bongo drum is played by hands on an instrument). They might be slightly worse, as hands hitting many things, including each other, produce noise, so hands on a table may be compared to clapping, while cups on a table more closely resemble a makeshift musical instrument (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 339:3). Importantly, the lenient practice is regarding hands, not instruments, on the table (Bnei Banim I:12).

You were filmed during the week, like Chassidic music artists singing zemirot with orchestras. Yet because people might think what you did is permitted on Shabbat, they could mistakenly copy you on Shabbat. Lifnei iver does not apply to cases where you neither facilitate nor encourage a violation. If it were a clear violation of Shabbat, there would be more reason to make clear disclaimers to avoid confusion. However, since some rabbis would permit the cups and most rabbis do not protest when people do something similar (i.e., banging with hands), any step you might take to avoid confusion is, perhaps laudable, but not mandated.

We will try to make a little order in what the Shabbat mode does and what it does not do. We will be able to provide only an overview of the most basic of the many complex halachot that remain to be discussed.

The main element of the type of Shabbat mode you describe is to circumvent systems in modern ovens that cause problems for Shabbat. The obviation of the shut-off feature is of technical value for the Shabbat observer and is irrelevant to the question of returning food on Shabbat.

Another element is to circumvent the direct impact of opening the doors on a variety of lights, sensors, etc., which would make opening the door forbidden. Regarding an oven in which even in Shabbat mode it works with a set temperature that is controlled by a thermostat, there is still an issue that opening the door cools off the chamber and causes the oven to turn back on sooner and/or stay on longer, which is debated by the last generation’s poskim (see Shemirat Shabbat K’Hilchhata 1:29 – stringent; Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:74.28 – lenient; Yalkut Yosef, OC 253:5 – inconclusive). There are ovens in Israel with Shabbat modes that cause the oven to work steadily at a low intensity without a thermostat, and it is thus not a problem to open the door. That does not appear to be the system you are describing.

In any case your question relates to the rules of hachzara (returning food to a heat source), which is a stricter application of the laws of shehiya (having the food stay on the heat source). The basic law of shehiya is that one may not leave food on a heat source on Shabbat when he may have an interest to raise the heat and an ability to do so, without certain steps to reduce that concern. A blech, for example, works by reducing the intensity of the heat on the food by covering the flame, and thus serving as a reminder that reinforces the message not to consider increasing the heat. Non-adjustable hot plates make it unfeasible to raise the heat and thus are permitted. An oven is problematic in that it is hard to duplicate the positive these elements and its heat is adjustable. Leniency can be contemplated if one tapes up the controls or based on the Rama’s (OC 253:1) minhag that for foods that are nominally cooked, there is little interest in raising the heat.

Returning dry food to an oven on Shabbat is much more problematic (including, that it might look like cooking), and it apparently requires the fulfillment of six conditions (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:2): 1) The food must be fully cooked (easy); 2) The heat source must be covered according to the aforementioned criteria (see above); 3) If one takes food off, he must hold it if he wants to return it (not feasible in your case); 4) One has to have in mind, when removing the food, to return it to the heat (easy); 5) The food did not cool down (not feasible). 6) The food should be put onto an open heat source, not into an enclosed one, especially when it is a place where food is often cooked (see Mishna Berura 253:58; Yalkut Yosef OC 253:8). An exception to these requirements is a place that is less hot than yad soledet bo (app. 45̊ C= 113̊ F) (Rama, OC 253:2) or one made for reheating rather than cooking where it is also not feasible to adjust the heat. These include ovens that are off with residual heat (Rama 253:5) and, according to some, non-adjustable hot plates made for Shabbat reheating (see Yechaveh Da’at II:55).

There are certain conditions in which there are opinions (including one by Rav Soloveitchik, which requires much explanation) that one can reheat in an oven, and you are free to ask the rabbi of your choice about the matter. The point of this overview is to explain that your Shabbat mode is no better in regard to reheating than standard ovens of decades past.

A necktie is considered part of one's clothing and therefore may be worn even where there is no eruv (Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 18, 29).

We will start from the related question of making simple marks in a book to highlight a specific place on the page, which is discussed in classical sources.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 340) says that it is permitted to make a mark with one’s fingernail on a book because it does not last. The Bach (ad loc.) argues because Rabbi Yossi (Shabbat 103b) says that the etchings made on the beams of the Mishkan were a classic example of kotev (the Torah prohibition of writing) and the lack of permanence only reduces the violation to a Rabbinic level. One strong response to the Bach is that we accept the opinion that argues on Rabbi Yossi, and since a simple marks is only Rabbinically forbidden, it is permitted when it is not permanent (Eliya Rabba 340:13). Other answers are given to lower the issue to no more than a Rabbinic level.

The Shulchan Aruch (340:5) allows making a mark in a book, but the Mishna Berura (340:25 and Biur Halacha ad loc.) is stringent on the matter, especially regarding a scratch on paper (as opposed to parchment), as the Taz (OC 340:4) says that it is considered a permanent mark. In our generation, the Yalkut Yosef (340:6) permits it, whereas the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (28:15) forbids it.

Folding a certain page to help one find it later is significantly more lenient than making a mark. Certainly, if one folds the page gently, even if the pressure on the book makes the line impression stronger over time, that indirect consequence is likely not considered a violation of Shabbat. However, even if one presses down hard, his intention is not to make a line but to create the effect of a folded page (which helps both by “thickening” the page and creating a tab-like indentation at the corner where the folded part is “missing.”) Several authorities (including Yalkut Yosef ibid.) say this is an example of p’sik reishei d’lo niche lei. In other words, although the ostensibly permitted action that one is doing (folding) includes a definite, direct, forbidden outcome (a line), the forbidden outcome is not desired (one has no interest in having a line after unfolding the page). While most poskim forbid p’sik reishei d’lo niche lei, many say it is permitted when the violation is only Rabbinic in the first place. (See Yabia Omer V, OC 28, who is lenient. The Mishna Berura 314:11 is among many who generally rule stringently). In our case, the situation is even more lenient, as even purposely making the mark is permitted according to many important authorities. Therefore, it is not surprising that the consensus of poskim is that it is permitted to fold the page (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.; Shemen Afarsimon 7; Piskei Teshuvot 340:19).

It seems to me that there is a more fundamental reason to permit the folding. Some melachot are quite subjective, and without a certain level of intent for the outcome, the action/result is not considered a melacha at all. It seems to me that leaving an imprint that is neither a word nor a picture is such a case. Thus, even according  to the opinions that p’sik reishei d’lo niche lei is forbidden even regarding Rabbinic violations, folding without intent for the line is permitted. This thesis can explain why the line that is made when one folds a napkin is not considered writing (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 11:40, who permits simple folding). Poskim struggle with the reason it is permitted to walk on soft ground with shoes that have writing on the soles that leaves an imprint on the ground (see Yabia Omer ibid.). Yet, the question is not even raised on shoes without writing, even though they also leave a clear imprint. Our thesis can explain why there is no question in such cases. (Thank you to my son for presenting this idea to one of the leading authorities on Hilchot Shabbat, who agreed with the analysis.)

For one reason or another, it is quite clear that it is permitted to fold the pages of a book on Shabbat.

To the best of our understanding, these programs operate automatically and can be set up before Shabbat without any intervention being required on Shabbat, and the bitcoins are awarded for the general computing effort and not for what specifically is done on Shabbat (even though they are only awarded when a specific solution or something similar is found, the idea is to only award them after a large computing effort), it is permitted to have these programs on Shabbat and there is no problem of Sechar Shabbat (receiving payment for work done solely on Shabbat).

This question reminds us of a similar one we answered years ago – whether a rock collection is muktzeh (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. I, C-15). We will summarize our discussion there and then see how a coin collection compares.

Rocks are muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:21) because generally they do not have a use that would make them considered a kli (utensil). However, if one prepares them for a given purpose or if their owner decides to use them for a specific permitted purpose, they are not muktzeh (ibid.:21-22). Thus, rocks that were incorporated in a rock collection need not be muktzeh because they are to enjoy looking at.

The question we had was regarding a case where the rocks are on display in a manner that the arrangement remains untouched over long periods of time. Does that turn the collection into muktzeh machmat chisaron kis, something one is careful not to use for various uses that may come up? While the usual cases of muktzeh machmat chisaron kis are utensils that are basically for forbidden purposes, where other uses are ruled out, does it extend to an object whose purpose is permitted but one is careful to rarely move it (e.g., wall clocks and paintings)? Rav Moshe Feinstein (responsum #13 in “Tiltulei Shabbat”) said such things are not muktzeh; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (20:22) said they are muktzeh machmat chisaron kis.

Coins are muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:7). This is not only because their use is related to a prohibited activity (commerce), for then their muktzeh status would be only partial. Rather, they are not considered utensils (see introduction of Mishna Berura to OC 308) because their value is not intrinsic but based on convention. However if one uses coins as something of interest they would not, on the basic level, be muktzeh (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:38, regarding coins incorporated into jewelry, which are not muktzeh).

In some ways, a standard coin collection is more likely to not be muktzeh than a rock collection, if we are correct in assuming that the coins are made to be handled. One keeps them in books, whose pages are turned to look at coin after coin. While they are nestled within plastic coverings, turning the pages is still considered moving the coins, as the pages and the plastic serve the coins. Therefore, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata should agree the coins are not muktzeh unless one keeps locked in a safe and rarely handle. If the collection is slated for sale and the owner is careful not to use it in the meantime, the coins would be muktzeh (see Rama, OC 308:1). However, we understand that you are talking about a collection for the owner’s personal interest.

The one remaining issue is the Chazon Ish’s opinion. The gemara (Shabbat 65b) says that if one attaches a stone to an article of clothing for a purpose of utility, it is permitted to move the stone along with the clothes, as long as he intended to use the stone for that purpose before Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 303:22). The gemara says that, as opposed to a stone, intention for that purpose would not suffice for a coin. Most understand that this is only if the coin was not permanently set aside for the use before Shabbat (see Beit Yosef, OC 303, Mishna Berura 303:74). Thus, if coins are permanently on display and no longer act as “money,” they would be permitted. However, the Chazon Ish (OC 42:17) says that coins cannot be considered as set aside for another purpose, as they are always candidates to be used again as money and remain muktzeh.

You, though, do not have to be concerned with the Chazon Ish’s opinion. Firstly, we follow the majority lenient ruling (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilcata 20:38). Secondly, the Chazon Ish’s logic seemingly does not apply to a coin collection. Since the coins involved have a special collectors’ value that exceeds their value as money, there is no reason to suspect they will revert to use as money.

We will not relate to issues of tzniut that can arise from sunbathing, which are of course important. Our discussion should also not be construed as a statement on the medical advisability of the practice. We just remind you that a certain amount of exposure to the sun can be beneficial (vitamin D, etc.), whereas over-exposure can be dangerous. Relatively recent poskim have discussed the matter, and the main discussions relate to the halachot of taking medicines on Shabbat and the melacha of tzoveia (coloring).

Regarding one who wants to sunbathe due to a specific medical condition, there are too many variables to address in this forum. If it is for general health benefits, the matter is similar to the discussion about vitamins on Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) says that one may eat/drink medically-oriented foods that are eaten regularly by healthy people. However, the Magen Avraham (328:43) says that this is so only when he is eating the food for its food value, not when he is doing so entirely for its medicinal value. Igrot Moshe (OC III:54) says that this stringency is true only when the person, while not sick, needs strengthening, but not when he is simply trying to keep his body “well stocked” so that he will not deteriorate. Some are more stringent than this (see conditions to permit vitamins in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 34:20). In any case, since sunbathing is something which people in our times do not usually associate with its health benefits, we posit that the limitations on medicines do not apply to it (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 328:78).

The question of coloring the skin is fascinating. Coloring applies to the human body, as we know from the prohibition of certain cosmetics on these grounds (Shulchan Aruch, OC 303:25). While no one would forbid going outside in a place where he could get a sunburn or a tan, perhaps it is forbidden to purposely get one, especially if he take steps to increase the extent of the coloring. Indeed some poskim do forbid it (Minchat Yitzchak V:32; Az Nidberu II:30). Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (14:44 and 18:(70)) implies that it is permitted because the person does not color through an action; rather he puts himself in a place where the sun does so. (Rav Neuwirth and his rebbe, Rav Auerbach, use this logic as part of their leniency for wearing photo gray lenses on Shabbat – see ibid.). Others add that the process is drawn out and has no immediate impact (see Torat Hamelachot 15:25). (Some melachot, such as cooking, always involve putting an object in a place where an outside force will have a gradual impact; the question is whether coloring is in this category.) Another claim is that the tanning is a natural, not artificial, color for skin (Nishmat Shabbat 215). It is hard to find conclusive proof from classical sources on these claims. However, for us, a general principle of “halachic philosophy” tips the scale. Since it is unreasonable to assume that the Torah and Chazal forbade walking in the sun on Shabbat, even if a person likes tanning, it is hard to imagine that the Torah/Chazal extended tzoveia to coloring the skin in the sun. Therefore, even purposeful tanning would be permitted.

Therefore, while not being particularly enthusiastic at the prospect of someone spending a good part of his Shabbat sunbathing, we would not forbid it on halachic grounds.

We have permitted Israelis to make a stock order to be carried out on Friday afternoon in NY (Shabbat in Israel). We will review and see if this case is the same.

The gemara (Shabbat 151a) says that Reuven may ask Simon to watch Reuven’s fruit that are out of Reuven’s techum Shabbat but within Shimon’s. The Rashba (accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 263:17) extrapolates from this that if Reuven accepted Shabbat early, he may ask Shimon, who did not yet accept it, to do work on his behalf. Why don’t we say that the action relates to the one who requested through shelichut (agency), as we do to forbid the work done by a non-Jew on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat (see Rashi, Shabbat 153a)?

Three answers appear in the poskim: 1) The prohibition to ask others was not instituted when one has or had (in the past) a way to not be forbidden to do the work himself (Beit Yosef, ad loc.; Magen Avraham 263:30). In the above cases, Reuven could have not accepted Shabbat and could have gone to the fruit via “burgenin.” 2) One accepts Shabbat only regarding prohibitions he performs himself (Levush 263:17; see Shulchan Aruch Harav, K”A 253:8). 3) Reuven may request of Shimon something that is not a melacha in regard to Shimon (Taz 263:3; Levushei S’rad 307:12).

In our case, the Beit Yosef and the Levush would seem to forbid the matter, as the work is being done during Reuven’s actual Shabbat, and ostensibly he has and had no way of doing the action at that time in a permitted way. In some ways our case is more lenient in that the request was made before Shabbat. However, while that is helpful in regard to the issue of not involving oneself in matters that are forbidden on Shabbat (Rashi, Avoda Zara 15a), regarding the aforementioned element of shelichut there seems to be a problem. According to the Taz, there should be no problem, as the important thing is that you were asked to do work on Motzaei Shabbat. Among the reasons we were lenient in the case of the stock orders was that the Taz’s approach is the strongest and most accepted (see Mishna Berura 263:64; Minchat Shlomo I, 19; Ta’arich Yisrael 8). We also noted, as a few poskim did, that if we rule stringently, when the owner of a kosher bakery in NY visits Israel, his bakery must be closed 7 hours before Shabbat in NY.

However, my halachic intuition tells me this case is worse. In the permitted cases, the work was intrinsically permitted even for Reuven, just that he was in an “artificial situation” that precluded his specific involvement (i.e., out of techum, early Shabbat). In our case, a person in America wants melacha that he would normally do himself done involving activities in America specifically during Shabbat. Modern technology allows him to find someone to do the work from a “halachic time warp” from a place where Shabbat is out. Is it clear that the Taz and Rashba would extend their leniency to that which is, from the requester’s perspective, an intrinsic violation of Shabbat? Would we allow someone to have Jews in different places in the world run his life or his business by remote control from various continents? This would seem to violate the Rambam’s (Shabbat 6:1) logic for the prohibition of amira l’nochri: one who treats Shabbat lightly enough to have work done by a non-Jew may come to do those things himself. While important talmidei chachamim found “sympathy” for my logic of stringency, it is difficult to forbid such a thing without a source. Our Rosh Kollel, Rav Carmel, acknowledged the problem of having someone “out of Shabbat” remotely operate household items during the requester’s Shabbat, but reasons that the “ethereal” world of Internet follows the place of the person who enters it (marit ayin does not apply there).

In the final analysis, you may fulfill your friend’s request.

When the above occurs when a Sephardi woman or an Ashkenazi man lights, for whom Shabbat prohibitions do not begin after lighting me’ikar hadin (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 263:7 and Mishna Berura 263:42), he or she should certainly relight the candles. This is because (as opposed to the mitzva of Chanuka candles), the mitzva’s action of lighting is not a replacement to the heart of the mitzva, the benefit from them on Shabbat. However, what does an Ashkenazi woman, who generally accepts Shabbat through the lighting (Rama, Orach Chayim 263:100), do.? Could a failed lighting preclude her from relighting?

There is a basis to say that candles that go out quickly are as if they were never lit. While the K’tzot Hashulchan (Badei Hashulchan 74:(14), cited by several poskim) makes this claim, it may not apply to our case. First, he is talking about a case where the flame never took hold of most of the wick (your description is unclear on this point). Second, he refers to a case where the beracha was not yet recited. Then, since the acceptance of Shabbat comes from the lighting, this does not occur until the lighting is completely over, including all planned candles and when it is clear they are properly lit. In fact, there is significant debate (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:(179)) as to whether it is the lighting or the subsequent beracha that ushers in Shabbat. Rav S.Z. Auerbach leans toward the “beracha approach,” and Mishneh Halachot (VIII:31) who agrees, therefore permits blowing out the match before making the beracha (as opposed to letting it go out itself – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 263:10). Thus, since your wife already made the beracha, which includes an indication that she is finished lighting, she should not have relit the candles (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:37).

However, there is a (usually) simple solution – to ask someone else to relight the candles, as one who accepted Shabbat significantly before sunset can ask those who have not done so to do melacha for him (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 17). In general, members of the household are not bound by the wife/mother’s acceptance of Shabbat (Rama, OC 263:10). They may (re)light as many as is desired to get to the normal number. If no Jews are available, one may ask a non-Jew to light, and this can be done up until the time of tzeit hakochavim (at least 13 minutes after sunset) and even when there is sufficient electric lighting (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.; see Mishna Berura 263:21). In the case of a non-Jew’s lighting at twilight, it is not clear whether more than one candle should be lit.

In the various cases where candles are relit, one does not make another beracha (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:37; see Chovat Hadar, p. 87; Yalkut Yosef ibid.). (The explanation is beyond our scope.)

It is permitted to massage and stretch the muscles on Shabbat to alleviate the pain and enable walking, in both stages. If possible, one should do the massage in a different way from the normal fashion that one would do on a weekday, but if this is not possible then one may massage regularly.

Regarding heat applications, if one has already hot water and just wants to apply it (using a bottle or something similar) it is permitted.

There is a Torah-level violation to erase (mochek) writing or, according to many, a picture or figure (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 340:3; Beur Halacha to 340:4). When the erasure does not serve a positive purpose such as enabling new writing, the violation is only Rabbinic (Mishna Berura 340:17). Thus, the diapers in question would seem to have no more than a Rabbinic prohibition. Another possible reason for no Torah prohibition is that the erasure’s result may be “destructive” (mekalkel). It is debated whether considering the side benefit, that the disintegration provides desirable information, it is mekalkel (see Beur Halacha to 340:13).

The main cause for leniency relates to who and how the erasing is done. Directly, it is the baby who erases by urinating, but he is almost always too young to require training in Shabbat prohibitions. Although one must not “feed” children prohibited matters, he may allow a situation in which a baby might choose to do a forbidden action (see Yevamot 114a). Here it is even better, as the baby “violates” Shabbat without any knowledge of this consequence of his action, in which case it is not a fundamental Shabbat violation even for an adult (see Shut Rabbi Akiva Eiger I:8).

Thus, the question is whether the adult violates Shabbat by creating a situation in which a future event will set off a melacha. Specifically, putting the diaper on the baby creates a situation where erasure will occur. When the direct cause (urination) of the erasure has yet to occur at the time of the adult’s action (diapering), we say that the adult acted through gerama (indirect action). Violation of Shabbat through gerama is a very low level violation of Shabbat, to the extent that it is permitted in certain cases of need (Rama, OC 334:22).

In this case, there are often additional points of leniency. For parents who are not interested in the erasure, as they can easily determine the “old way” when the diaper is soaked, the erasure is permitted as a davar she’eino mitkaven (an unintentional forbidden result of one’s action) of the diapering. It is true that when the forbidden result is a definite outcome (psik reishei), the action is forbidden by Torah law (Ketubot 6b). However, when the result is arrived at through gerama, many important poskim permit psik reishei (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:18, based on Rav Auerbach; see discussion in Orchot Shabbat 29:(41)). Some say that gerama is permitted in cases where direct action is only Rabbinically forbidden. Other opinions disagree, and in any case the leniency likely does not apply to every Rabbinic prohibition (see Yabia Omer III, OC 17). Yet the above is probably not needed, as, in actuality, the erasure is not a psik reishei. For a variety of reasons, including the baby soiling with solids before the diaper is soaked, diapers do not always reach the point that forms are erased.

When there are not meaningful figures of letters but just a line or dots, there is even more room for leniency, as erasing such nondescript things is not a (full) violation of mochek unless the erasure uncovers or enables writing (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 340:3; Orchot Shabbat 15:59). We find this distinction in such cases as cutting cake with writing or clear figures vs. nondescript shapes (Rama, OC 340:3).

One may generally use diapers with disintegrating ink (Orchot Shabbat 15:52). However, note that many of the reasons for leniency are based on the assumption that one does not have intention when diapering for the erasure, which is a valid assumption when one did not intentionally buy diapers with this marginally useful feature. However, for one who values this function, use of such diapers on Shabbat may very well be forbidden and should be avoided. (Regarding a slightly stricter case of a color-changing strip, see the Star-K website, which has a similar ruling to the above.)

The gemara (Berachot 27b) discusses the concept of an acceptance of Shabbat on false pretenses (b’ta’ut), specifically when people davened Maariv of Shabbat before the normal time due to darkness caused by heavy clouds. An amora allowed doing melacha when they discovered the mistake because acceptance of Shabbat b’ta’ut is invalid. Regarding a shul that similarly davened Maariv of Motzaei Shabbat early, it says that while we would have expected the tefilla to be invalid, there is a special leniency for a community to not have to repeat Maariv under these circumstances. Most Rishonim rule that melacha is permitted after an acceptance b’ta’ut (see Beit Yosef ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:14) cites this opinion, followed by (his understanding of) the Mordechai’s opinion that ta’ut does not erase acceptance done by the action of lighting Shabbat candles, which is stronger. Therefore, we might think that that if you did not light candles (and the acceptance of early Shabbat was not community-wide – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 263:12), you could have done melacha after realizing your mistake.

However, this premise is flawed. First, several Acharonim rule that after one has accepted Shabbat with tefilla, one can no longer do melacha even if it was accepted b’ta’ut (Magen Avraham 263:26; Mishna Berura 263:56). Furthermore, your case is very different from the gemara’s case of ta’ut. In the latter, the entire basis for going through the motions of accepting Shabbat was misguided. You, though, did want to accept Shabbat early, just that an unknown factor was a counterbalance to that decision. In the former case, the acceptance was null even if people desired to leave things as is (e.g., an individual who davened Maariv early under those circumstances must repeat it). That is appropriate only in cases where the mistake is objective and clear cut.

The Taz (600:2) seems to counter our argument. Concerning a community that accepted Shabbat early on Friday that was the second day of Rosh Hashana, after which a shofar became available, he rules that they should blow shofar even though this is usually inappropriate on Shabbat. He compares their acceptance of Shabbat to a ta’ut, even though it was fundamentally done for a real reason, just that it was counteracted by a desire to blow shofar. However, study of the Taz shows that other factors are involved in his ruling, and, more fundamentally, the lack of fulfillment of shofar is an objective factor that applies to all communities in that situation. (The Taz goes as far as to argue that even if people want to accept Shabbat fully, they have no power to undo their mitzva obligation.) Your case, though, is qualitatively incomparable to the sources on ta’ut. 

What can be considered is being shoel (a process of releasing oneself, done before three people) on the acceptance. Some, including the Levush (OC 263:17), compare early acceptance of Shabbat to a neder (acceptance of extra halachic obligations) and say that one can be sho’el. However, the majority opinion is that one cannot be shoel on acceptance of Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 263:65 and presentation in B’tzel Hachochma IV:96). The strongest explanation is that while a neder is a halachic reality that is totally created by a person, the Torah mandates accepting Shabbat early, with each person just deciding when that is for him. In your case, undoing Shabbat causes an extra problem in that it would invalidate your Ma’ariv.

A non-electric crumb sweeper may be used on Shabbat.

In general it is forbidden to discuss monetary matters and prohibited activities on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306). This is derived from the pasuk (Yeshaya 58:13, so that this is a Rabbinic, not a Torah-level, law) about the proper atmosphere of Shabbat, which requires refraining from “metzo cheftzecha v’daber davar” (tending to your interests and speaking of [forbidden] matters). However, the gemara (Shabbat 150a) derived that only “your interests” are forbidden, whereas “interests of heaven” are permitted. It is thus permitted to discuss money and other actions forbidden on Shabbat in the context of plans for mitzvot. Generally, mitzva opportunities do not override Rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, metzo cheftzecha and daber davar are lesser prohibitions (see Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 306:12). Furthermore, there is likely a more sweeping distinction. Metzo cheftzecha and daber davar are context-oriented, rather than objective Rabbinical prohibitions, so that if the activity is for the sake of a mitzva, the context is appropriate for Shabbat.

Among the mitzvot that are explicitly mentioned as justifying discussing money (Shabbat 150a, Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:6) is pledging money for tzedaka. The Ran (Shabbat, ad loc.) is surprised by this application of the heter of interests of heaven. After all, the mishna (Beitza 36b) says that it is forbidden to be makdish (donate to the Beit Hamikdash) on Shabbat because this can be confused with commercial activity. Ostensibly, this should also apply to pledging to charity. The Ran answers that the prohibition of making hekdesh refers to specific objects, whose transfer to hekdesh is more similar to a monetary transaction than a pledge to charity is. The Beit Yosef (OC 306) extends the distinction and points out that even pledging an object to a shul or the like is different from hekdesh, for in the latter the pledge takes effect immediately.

There are times when one may get involved in semi-commercial discussion but is not allowed to mention a sum of money (see Shulchan Aruch ibid., Rama ibid. 3). However, in regard to tzedaka pledges, the pledges may include specific amounts (Rama ibid. 6; Mishna Berura 306:33; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 29:55). Of course, if one is allowed to make pledges, then it is also permitted to try to interest people in doing so.

The non-profit organization you are, baruch Hashem, involved in serves a cross-section of the New York population. One might think that raising money on Shabbat might be permitted only if the recipient is a Jew, who keeps the laws of Shabbat. However, this is not so (see the Magen Avraham 306:21). As long as the money is for a valid tzedaka cause it is under the category of the interests of heaven. Giving tzedaka to any human being, Jew or gentile, is a mitzva, as the baraita (Gittin 61a) states, and the Rambam (Melachim 10:12) so beautifully formulates. This is the case not only when the charity is given to a cross-section of society, which applies to Jews and non-Jews alike, but even if the charity would be for non-Jews exclusively (Shach, Yoreh Deah 251:2). Money that is raised for tzedaka, including from ma’aser funds, can be used for Jews and non-Jews alike. Therefore, your organization is worthy of the special dispensation to allow raising interest in it on Shabbat and even to receive specific oral pledges.

Although we accept the opinions among Rishonim that it is forbidden to reheat boiled water that has cooled down (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 318:4,15), you would not be considered cooking since this is done automatically.

The question is whether your setup violates the Rabbinical prohibitions of shehiya or chazara. Shehiya, leaving food on the flame from before Shabbat, is sometimes forbidden, out of a concern one will raise the heat. It is permitted if the heat source is covered in a way that reduces its efficiency (Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:1) or (likely) regarding a non-adjustable heat source (Hilchot Shabbat (Eider), p. 340). However, neither lenient factor exists here (one can raise the heat from Shabbat to normal mode). It is usually permitted to use this urn when the water has already been boiled, as further boiling causes unwanted evaporation (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.). Your case could possibly be more problematic since one may desire the extra heat to heat the cold water.

Chazara, returning food on Shabbat that had been removed from the heat, has more stringency, including that it is forbidden on a normal, adjustable heat source even if raising the temperature is detrimental (ibid. 2). Is your case considered chazara, considering that the heat is returned to function by a machine rather than a person? The answer may depend on the reason of the stringency of chazara. Rabbeinu Tam says it is a heightened concern one will raise the heat since the food was returned after time off the flame. The Ran says that returning cooked food to a heat source can be confused with cooking. In this case, Rabbeinu Tam’s reason seems to apply, while the Ran’s does not since you do nothing on Shabbat.

Let us examine discussion about a parallel case. The Pri Megadim (OC, EA 253:41) and the Chazon Ish (OC 37:21) wonder about the permissibility of various cases similar to what the Rama (OC 253:5) allows. A non-Jew may put, on Shabbat morning, cold cooked food near a fireplace, which a non-Jew will be permitted to light due to the great cold, thereby also heating the food. Why are we not concerned that after the fireplace is on, a Jew will stoke the coals? The Pri Megadim suggests that this must rely on the opinion that reheating liquids is permitted, and so too the reheating is not significant enough to prompt one to stoke the coals. The Chazon Ish gives a few possible answers. One is that we treat a case where the food is put down when there is no heat as equivalent to shehiya. This helps since the Chazon Ish claims elsewhere (37:27) that the concern of raising the flame regarding shehiya does not apply to fully cooked food even if it is now cold. On the other hand, reheating cooled water may be worse than reheating other cooked foods (Orchot Shabbat 2:(11)). There is further room for leniency considering that Shabbat started with the urn operating and there was no action since then (see Am Mordechai, Shabbat, p. 51). Still, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (1:40) is stringent when the water has cooled off totally, and the Orchot Shabbat (2:(49)) is uncertain.

Your urn has a feature that provides further grounds for leniency – when the Shabbat mode is on, one cannot raise the heat. This is similar, in some ways, to one who seals an oven where food is heating, which is permitted even though the seal can be removed (Shabbat 18b). It is unclear if the Shabbat-mode button that is deactivated by a simple press is sufficient deterrent (see cases in Orchot Shabbat 2:18-19). It is also unclear if this leniency applies when elements of chazara exist (see ibid. 55). However, combining this factor along with the aforementioned grounds for leniency, it is not difficult to justify leniency.

S’char Shabbat (pay for permitted services one provided on Shabbat) is indeed forbidden Rabbinically like other commercial activity, lest one come to write (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:4).

The most common way to allow receiving money for work that was done on Shabbat is through havla’ah. That means having the Shabbat-related money “swallowed up” by combining it with weekday pay, as pay for a period of work that includes Shabbat (ibid.). You apparently assume that the applicability of havla’ah depends on the payment period. In other words, each payment has to include pay for work not related to Shabbat or Yom Tov. Therefore, you would forbid a paycheck for a payment period (month) in which there is no weekday work.

However, poskim point out that “havla’ah units” are determined not by the interval of payment but by the period of employment. The period of employment is the time during which there is a commitment to continue the employer-employee relationship, without the ability to back out under normal circumstance. This has ramifications for leniency and for stringency, respectively. If the employee is owed for work on Shabbat and the employer is not obligated to continue the employment during a period that includes weekdays, the work on Shabbat is viewed independently and it is forbidden to receive pay. One common application is a babysitter, who usually gets hired for each job on its own (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:58; Orchot Shabbat 22:94). Your situation is in all likelihood an example of the lenient ramification. A shul usually hires youth workers for “a year” (often, Sept.-June), which is the relevant time unit even if the payments are made in monthly installments. If that is the case, then since the year includes work on Tu B’Shevat and Purim, the pay is permitted.

Indeed, there is often another, related leniency – another application of havla’ah. Some suggest (including Aruch Hashulchan, OC 306:12) that the preparations chazanim do during the week justifies their receiving pay for their work on Shabbat and Yom Tov due to havla’ah. For this to constitute havla’ah, it does not suffice for the preparation to be theoretical work, but obligatory work that is time-consuming enough to warrant pay (Orchot Shabbat 22:90 – he (ibid. (149)) doubts whether chazanim are considered to receive any pay for their preparations.) Similarly, there is often an assumption that youth workers, beyond their frontal work with the children on Shabbat and Yom Tov, have necessary preparatory work that is slated for weekday. This can include buying prizes or food, setting or cleaning up, or preparing props. The shul can ensure from the outset that there are serious weekday preparations by requiring the leaders to come to a training session or meeting or to call the children and/or parents with whom they will be working. As mentioned above, one such serious practice during the employment period suffices.

The matter of chazanim introduces a final potential justification for receiving pay. There are two opinions in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 306:5) whether the prohibition on s’char Shabbat applies to mitzva activities. While the Shulchan Aruch seems to lean toward stringency, the Mishna Berura (306:22) acknowledges that the more prevalent minhag is to be lenient on the matter. Contemporary poskim leave the matter open (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:66). Whether or not a synagogue’s youth groups are considered a mitzva depends on the content of the activities.

Food that is cooked on Shabbat is one of many examples of ma’aseh Shabbat (the result of chillul Shabbat), and as such is forbidden to be eaten. Your question is a good one: does such food treif up utensils?

The answer seems dependent on whether ma’aseh Shabbat regarding food is a prohibition against benefit (which, for food, is usually eating) or whether the food is considered ma’achalot assurot (what we call nonkosher). If the former, any residue in the oven will not bring you real benefit. If the latter, then the food is like any other that treif up an oven (we will not discuss how an oven becomes treif or how it is kashered).

One reason to not consider this food ma’achalot assurot is that it is prohibited for an external reason – not because of an intrinsic problem with the food per se, but due to its connection to a bad situation. The Ktav Sofer (Orach Chayim 50) compares ma’aseh Shabbat food to bishul akum, as that food is also not intrinsically problematic but tainted by a situation. There is a machloket Rishonim whether bishul akum treifs up a pot (see Tur, Yoreh Deah 113 – the Rashba is strict; the Rosh is lenient). The Shulchan Aruch (YD 113: 16) cites both positions, but prefers the stringent one (he is slightly lenient on how to kasher it).

Indeed, the Magen Avraham (318:1) cites the Rashba as saying that ma’aseh Shabbat food treifs the utensil in which it was cooked, and he and the Mishna Berura (318:4) accept this position. Regarding the above fundamental chakira, Rav Orbach (Minchat Shlomo I:5) sees this Magen Avraham as a proof that ma’aseh Shabbat food is ma’achalot assurot.

On the other hand, many disagree. Besides significant opinions that are lenient regarding a pot used for bishul akum, this case includes additional reasons for leniency. The Mateh Yehuda (cited by Livyat Chen 42) says that the Rashba only implies that according to R. Yochanan Hasandler (Ketubot 34a) who views ma’aseh Shabbat as an intrinsic Torah law, a utensil would become treif. However, according to the Tannaim that ma’aseh Shabbat is a penalty, only the actual food, which gives real benefit, is forbidden. Some (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:196) point out that the Gra rules like R. Meir (Ketubot ibid.) that even the food itself becomes permitted after Shabbat.

Finally, there are strong indications that ma’aseh Shabbat does not create ma’achalot assurot. According to the opinion of R. Yehuda, which the Shulchan Aruch (OC 318:1) accepts, the food is forbidden forever only for the person who was mechallel Shabbat. This distinction is difficult if ma’aseh Shabbat is ma’achalot assurot, which are generally objective prohibitions (Ktav Sofer, ibid.). I would add that the fact that ma’aseh Shabbat applies to many nonfood melachot works more cleanly if they all share the categorization of prohibitions of benefit.

It is hard for an Ashkenazi posek to argue with the opinions of the Magen Avraham and the Mishna Berura, at least without other grounds for leniency (see Orchot Shabbat 25:53). Rav Ovadia Yosef (Livyat Chen 42), on the other hand, concludes that the basic halacha is to be lenient and views kashering utensils in this case as only laudable.

When a non-Jew does melacha on behalf of Jews, even without prompting, they may not benefit from it (Beitza 24b). While this suggests your compromise was right, we must consider various factors pointing to other conclusions.

First, might one be allowed to ask a non-Jew to plug in the hot plate, even though this is a Torah-level melacha? After all, the Rama (Orach Chayim 276:2) cites the minhag of some to have a non-Jew light a candle for a Shabbat meal because a proper Shabbat meal is a mitzva, and this includes having hot food (Mishna Berura 325:60). Where need justifies asking a non-Jew, benefit is also permitted. While the Rama condones this approach only for exceptional need, the Mishna Berura (276:25) permits it for a mitzva of the masses. However, heating up kugel is not critical for a shul Kiddush at least under normal circumstances.

A more promising way to use the non-Jew is with a “good hint.” A regular hint made to him on Shabbat to do melacha on Shabbat is forbidden (Rama, OC 307:22). However, Acharonim rule that a hint that mentions only a need without mentioning any action is permitted (Magen Avraham 307:20; Mishna Berura 307:76). Poskim point out that, for several reasons, this leniency cannot obviate the whole prohibition of amira l’nochri for those who use good hints (see Orchot Shabbat 23:(24)). However, some serious poskim permit it when the non-Jew’s action provides no “halachic benefit” (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (30:3). Does heating up a fully cooked kugel provide halachic benefit?

When usage of an object is possible (a hard word to define) without the melacha, it is not considered benefit. One application is that if a non-Jew lights a second candle, it is permitted to do things that could have been done, even with difficulty, with the first light alone (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:4; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 20). Arguably, since (almost any) kugel can be eaten at room temperature, heating it up is not benefit. On the other hand, Igrot Moshe (YD III:43) limits this leniency to cases where the benefit (e.g., light) is provided by a different object (e.g., candle #1); one may not receive benefit (e.g., coolness) provided only by a non-Jew’s melacha (e.g., putting on an air-conditioner) even if one can do the same thing (e.g., eat in the room) without that benefit. Rav Auerbach argues similarly and also distinguishes between Torah-level and Rabbinic melachot (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 30:(167)). If this is correct, then when the non-Jew provides all the re-heating by plugging in the hot plate, a good hint would not help. (How one deals with the apparent contradiction regarding using shoes that a non-Jew finished preparing on Shabbat – see Mishna Berura 252:30, 327:16, and 253:98 (below) – may be crucial). Without exhausting the topic, it is questionable whether a good hint would allow heating up the kugel.

Does letting the kugel cool off solve the problem? The Rashba (cited by Beit Yosef, OC 253) discusses (almost exactly) our case and forbids eating the food even after it cools down (see Minchat Shlomo I:5), as a penalty for one who violated the rules of amira l’nochri. While the Rama (OC 253:5) paskens like the Rashba in a slightly modified case, the Mishna Berura (ad loc. 98) limits the stringency to the part of the food that is not readily eaten cold (unlike most kugels). The Rashba himself refers to a case where the Jew knew he was acting improperly.

The sources leave room for much hypothesis but little conclusive evidence.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim271:14) deals with the way(s) to fulfill the requirement that a m’lo lugmav (enough to fill cheeks – approximately 2 fl.oz) of the Kiddush wine is drunk. Some say that one person has to drink the whole amount; others say we can add up that which different people drink. The Shulchan Aruch points out that either way, the choice way to perform the mitzva is for everyone to drink. It is sufficient for each person to have a small amount (Taz ad loc. 17), and if their drinking interferes with one person having a m’lo lugmav or leaving wine for the next day, the idea of everyone drinking is waived (Magen Avraham 30). Yet it is important enough to delay the mekadesh between his beracha and drinking (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 16).

The Shulchan Aruch’s source (see Beit Yosef) is the Rosh (Pesachim 10:16), who explains the goings on in the gemara’s about people drinking Kiddush wine: “Although they are not required to drink, still it is a preferable mitzva to drink.” He does not offer a source, or an explanation, nor does he mention if it is a special mitzva regarding Kiddush, which is the gemara’s context.

The Rambam (Shabbat 29:7) says that after drinking a m’lo lugmav, one “gives to all the members of the group to drink.” The Mirkevet Hamishneh (ad loc.) looks for a Talmudic source for the Rambam (who rarely includes a halacha that lacks one). He points to the gemara in Berachot (51a) that lists things one is supposed to do to enhance a kos shel beracha (cup of wine used in a mitzva context). Rav Avahu mentions ten things and then that some say to send it to the members of one’s household. R. Yochanan argues that only four of the practices need to be kept. The Mirekevet Hamishneh says that R. Yochanan reduced the ten to six but did not take issue on sending to one’s household. If this is the source, then it should apply to all cups of beracha. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 190:40) says so regarding wine for Birkat Hamazon, and it should ostensibly apply to Havdala. The logic is that drinking the wine bestows importance to this mitzva cup (Darchei Moshe, OC 182:1).

The Rambam (Berachot 7:15) while not stressing the matter, does talk about drinking the wine used for Birkat Hamazon in the plural. Within the halachot of Havdala, the Rambam (Shabbat 29:24) doesn’t mention drinking at all, which could indicate that the drinking of Havdala wine follows the same rule as Kiddush. The Shibolei Haleket (64), accepted by the Magen Avraham (296:4), is an early source that says that our practice is to not give Havdala wine to others to drink. The Mishna Berura gives a technical explanation of why not. Since Havdala is not made in the framework of a meal, we want the mavdil to drink enough (a revi’it, which is more than m’lo lugmav) for a beracha acharona on the wine to be a certainty. Whether all agree and why the Shulchan Aruch does not mention this issue regarding wine for Birkat Hamazon is unclear (see Mishna Berura 190:17). Our minhag seems to be that not all drink that wine either.

One can suggest positive reasons for drinking specifically at Kiddush, which will also explain the minhag. Some claim that the obligation to make Kiddush over wine has a stronger basis than other cups of beracha (see Encyclopedia Talmudit, v. 27, col. 510). Also, Kiddush is connected to the meal in which all are partaking (there are different explanations of the connection). Since it is positive to drink wine during the meal (Shulchan Aruch, OC 250:2) and when one drinks wine at Kiddush, he is exempt from a beracha during the meal (Shulchan Aruch, OC 174:4), it makes sense to start drinking at Kiddush.

In any case, while halacha does not obligate everyone to drink Kiddush wine nor forbid it at Havdala, your observation has both sources and a variety of possible explanations.

Regarding presenting sources, as we like to do, we have little to add, but we will try to add a little perspective. 

The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (OC 271:1) do say: “When one comes to his house, he should hurry to eat right away.” Although the idea of hurrying does not seem to be found in the gemara or early Rishonim, these are still weighty sources. Let us understand the need for hurrying. The Beit Yosef (OC 271) explains that the issue is not the delay per se, and the meal is not the problem. Rather, since Kiddush is made to sanctify Shabbat as it enters, it should be close to the beginning of Shabbat (see Pesachim 106a with Rashi). The Taz (271:1) seems to understand it to also hint that one can make Kiddush even before nightfall. Thus, davening earlier, faster, or at a shul that is closer to home is as valuable in this regard as skipping the pre-Kiddush zemirot.

There also is no question that one can fulfill the mitzva of Kiddush any time during the night and, on a certain level, even during the day if he missed it at night (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8; see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 47:(31)). Considering that according to most Rishonim, those who have davened have already fulfilled the mitzva of Kiddush from the Torah (see Magen Avraham 271:1), one need not be as pressured by the matter as the simple language of the Shulchan Aruch implies. As one example, the Mishna Berura (271:1) says that if the family does not have much of an appetite when people come home from shul, they do not need to make Kiddush and eat right away.

I do not claim to understand the full depth of the timing or even content of these zemirot, but it does not seem that they are given greater importance than Kiddush, but that they are intended to set the tone for the upcoming Kiddush. It is similar in that way to the p’sukim we say before a brit mila or the “Hineni muchan u’mezuman” that some say before performing mitzvot. Even the detractors of the latter minhag (see Noda B’yehuda I, YD 93), do so based on content, not on the issue of delaying the mitzva. 

After completing the specific, technical part of the question, we will move on to the general, philosophical part, which we believe is the more instructive element of the answer to your question. Shalom Aleichem and Eishet Chayil were written/instituted for recital on Shabbat evening within the Kabbalistic community of 16^th century Tzfat. This is a continuation of the work of that community which introduced to the world Kabbalat Shabbat, including Lecha Dodi. Not being Kabbalists, we cannot explain to you the full depth of all of these tefillot. I cannot explain why it was worthwhile to “fiddle around” with the tried and tested Shabbat tefillot or delay the beginning of Ma’ariv, Kiddush, etc. Who knows?! If we were 16^th century rabbis, we might have spoken out against it, using your arguments. However, we are firm believer in the collective wisdom of the rabbinic and serious laity of Bnei Yisrael. As the gemara (Pesachim 66a) says: “Leave Israel alone. If they are not prophets, they are the sons of prophets.” So, if (almost) all homes do it, it is a minhag we accept even without knowing why it is important. (While understanding is worthwhile, it is not necessary.) Making a statement by action or not careful words against an accepted practice (including the one in question) can raise issues of appearing “holier than thou” and sometimes causes machloket, and we are sure that this is not your intention.

We will all but ignore halachically complicated issues about pleasure cruises for which there are legitimate lenient opinions. One is setting sail within three days of Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 248:1-2; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 30:66; Yalkut Yosef, Shabbat I, pp. 48-52). We will focus on seeing if there are cases where we cannot find any legitimate leniency.

Operating the motor is among full melachot that are done while sailing. If a Jew is performing these actions, it is forbidden to benefit from them, and so if that may be the case, one may not go on the cruise (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.). What if the relevant crew includes no Jews?

There are two issues with using a non-Jew’s work on Shabbat. 1) Telling the non-Jew to do the work. 2) Receiving benefit from the work a non-Jew did on behalf of a Jew (Shabbat 122a). There are more possible ways around the former, and we will focus on the latter.

The gemara (ibid.) says that if a non-Jew does melacha on behalf of a group including Jews and non-Jews, we consider it as being performed on behalf  of the majority. Thus, if the majority of a ship are Jews, it forbidden to benefit from the sailing done on their behalf. Now, let us clarify two points. First, regarding each melacha done, we have to consider who the beneficiaries are. Some (e.g., putting on the cabin air-conditioning) are done for all aboard, including staff. However, the sailing, as opposed to docking or anchoring at sea, is done because the vacationers want to arrive at a good time at the next destination. The second point is that when the benefit comes, it is too late for the individual, who cannot change the itinerary mid-cruise or jump ship, to do anything. Therefore, if he knows he will get forbidden benefit, he must not get on the ship.

There is a legitimate albeit surprising leniency (depending on how far one takes it – see Orchot Shabbat, vol. II, p. 457). The Magen Avraham (276:6) has a stringency that even with a majority of non-Jews, if we know that the work was done also on behalf of the Jews, it is forbidden to benefit. The Tiferet Yisrael (Kalkalat Hashabbat , Melechet Shabbat 9) says that if this were so, any Jew who paid to be on a ship would be forbidden to be on it on Shabbat. He argues with the Magen Avraham and also says that the Magen Avraham would agree if the ship would proceed even without the passengers (e.g., they anyway must sail to transport cargo). It is unclear if the Tiferet Yisrael meant that in the latter case, it is permitted even if the Jews constitute a majority of the passengers (which was rare in his time). Nevertheless, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (30:66) says that if the ship sails on set schedules even without passengers, it is permitted even for a majority of Jews to go (see Shevitat Hayam (Waldenberg) 5). Similarly, Igrot Moshe (OC, IV:64) says that if an electric company is required to provide electricity even for a single customer, then it is permitted to benefit from their work even if a majority of the area’s residents are Jews.

Presumably, a round-trip pleasure cruise from Israel would not set sail without passengers or plan to continue sailing on Shabbat if all prospective Jewish passengers objected to it. The problem comes up when many of the passengers are unaware of the halachic issues and others are not Shabbat observant and are thus unwilling to sacrifice “covering ground” to keep Shabbat. I heard a suggestion that, statistically, some of the Israelis must not be Jewish. However, it is hard to believe that there are enough non-Jews on a round-trip Israeli cruise to be able to implement the above leniency. (Also, who will check lineage or cancel the cruise if too many clearly Jewish people participate?).

Therefore, we do not see a legitimate heter for going on the standard cruise that fits your description.

Much of this answer is developed at length in a teshuva that will appear in Bemareh Habazak IX:10. We will add points that apply to this case.

There are two halachic issues to consider: commerce on Shabbat and amira l’nochri (requesting a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat).

Rashi (Beitza 36b) gives two possible reasons for the prohibition on commerce on Shabbat: it is against the navi’s instructions to refrain from mundane activities; it may bring one to writing. Simple logic dictates that when the Jew’s involvement took place before Shabbat and matters are finished up by others or automatically, the prohibition should not apply. However, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shut I:159) extends the prohibition to cases in which the interaction was during the week but it was to take effect on Shabbat. So arguably, regardless of when you arranged it, the payment of your debt (which is also commerce – Rama, Orach Chayim 307:11) on Shabbat is forbidden.

One does not need to be concerned by this opinion for (a combination of) two reasons. 1. It is far from clear that we accept R. Akiva Eiger’s opinion (see opinions in referenced teshuva). After all, even doing full melachot before Shabbat that finish by themselves on Shabbat are permitted. Furthermore, the best answer for R. Akiva Eiger from sources (including Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:4) that a Jew can have a non-Jew acquire something on his behalf on Shabbat is that a transaction finished off by a non-Jew is permitted even if one that finished by itself is forbidden. If so, there would not be a problem in this case.

Regarding amira l’nochri, the main solution is technical. Our research indicates that there is no need for human intervention at the time of the transfer. Since it can be finished before Shabbat, even if the non-Jew chooses to do it on Shabbat, the Jew has no halachic problem (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 247:1). If the bank takes a set fee per transfer (katzatz), we consider it that they are doing it for themselves (ibid. 247:1), and the permissibility is even clearer. Granted, even regarding katzatz, the Jew may not tell the non-Jew to do it specifically on Shabbat. However, even if melacha would have been needed at the time of the transfer, it likely could be done after nightfall (in today’s global financial institutions) or probably even a day earlier (with the account charged later) or later.

We could stop here, but we do not want to imply that there is no other logic for leniency. One should be aware that amira l’nochri is among the most complicated areas of hilchot Shabbat, and people should become accustomed to asking, as there could be more room for leniency or stringency than one might expect.

We should consider whether the bank is working for you when making the transfer. One might be able to look at the transaction between the bank and the credit card company as being done primarily on behalf of the credit card company. They are the ones who initiate the payment on a monthly basis, when the time comes, and they receive the money. Perhaps we should view your instructions to the bank as acquiescing in advance to the payment (albeit if it was not worth your while, you wouldn’t do it). These analyses may differ from case to similar-sounding case.

It is also possible that giving the order during the week to pay on a date that usually falls during the week, is not considered amira l’nochri even if, down the line, it happens to fall out on Shabbat or Yom Tov. There are several precedents (e.g., Mishna Berura 247:10 and Mishbetzot Zahav, OC 307:2) of the idea that statements that cause the non-Jew’s work on Shabbat may still not be considered direct enough to be amira l’nochri. However, it is very tricky to apply such a concept.

The bottom line is that you can allow these bank transfers arrangement to continue no matter when they fall out.

It is permitted. As to the operation of the computer on Shabbat, there is no problem as you set it up before Shabbat. As to the readers, it is certainly possible for them to read the blog without chillul Shabbat, and no matter when you put it up it is always possible for someone to read it b'issur. The only problem might be if someone were to suspect you of chillul Shabbat by posting on Shabbat, but it seems this type of automation is well known and therefore this too does not pose a problem.

It is permitted to use a frozen challa for Lechem Mishne. So have ruled a number of prominent authorities (Minchat Yitzchak 9, 42; Tzitz Eliezer 14, 40; Betzel Hachochma 3, 110; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 55, 13; and others).

To understand this ruling, we need to provide a little background. The Gemara (Berachot 39b and Shabbat 117b) states that we take two loaves of bread on Shabbat, in memory of the Manna by which it is stated that Hashem provided "Lechem Mishne" for Shabbat. The Gemara then continues to discuss whether one has to actually eat from both loaves, or from only one loaf. Rashi understands the conclusion of the Gemara as saying that one needs to eat only from one loaf, while according to the Rashba's interpretation it seems that one needs to eat from both loaves (see a lengthy discussion of this in the Aruch Hashulchan 274). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 274, 1) rules that one need to eat only from one loaf, and this is the prevalent custom.

Since we are only required to eat from one loaf, some authorities claim that one may use for the second loaf of bread, even a loaf which is inedible at the current moment (Tzitz Eliezer ibid.). An interesting example of this is on Erev Pesach which comes out on Shabbat. The question arises whether you may use Matzah for the second loaf for the Shabbat morning meal, as it is prohibited to eat Matzah on Erev Pesach. According to this opinion you may, as since you are not required to eat from the second loaf, the second loaf need not be edible at this meal. However, other authorities disagree and state that even though one is not required to eat from the second loaf, it still has to be potentially edible during the meal (Betzel Hachochma ibid.) Nevertheless, even according to this opinion, it is still permitted to use a frozen loaf for Lechem Mishne, since if one would leave it to thaw it would become edible during the continuation of the meal, it is considered an edible loaf which may be used for Lechem Mishne.

It is not clear what you mean by “separated some challa,” and the situation for your sons depends on that.

Among the mishna’s (Beitza 36b) long list of Rabbinic prohibitions of Shabbat and Yom Tov is taking terumot and ma’asrot, which includes the taking of challa (which is likewise theoretically slated to go to a kohen). Therefore, if your sons’ hosts did hafrashat challa on Shabbat, they apparently acted improperly. We do find leniency for taking ma’asrot in a case where one does not have alternative food to eat for Shabbat, due to the mitzva of eating on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 261:1; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 4). However, that is only to do so during bein hashemashot (twilight, at the time when it is a doubt whether it is day or night). (One can contemplate some leniency as to when bein hashemashot ends in regards to this question, considering the issue is a Rabbinic prohibition, but we will not analyze all the opinions as to specifics.) On Yom Tov, it is permitted to take challa if the obligation began (with kneading) on Yom Tov (which is prohibited on Shabbat) or by making more dough and taking off from it on the existing dough/challa (Shulchan Aruch, OC 496:3).

However, regarding your sons, even if their host did hafrasha improperly, they were still allowed to eat the challot. This is because if one took ma’asrot improperly on Shabbat unintentionally (including out of ignorance of the halacha), the food may be eaten (Gittin 54a). (It is a fascinating question why we do not say that since when Shabbat started the food was not fit to be eaten, it should be muktzeh. However, it apparently is not muktzeh – see Tosafot, Shabbat 43a, Shut R. Akiva Eiger II:103; Minchat Shlomo 62.11).

Perhaps the hosts did not actually take challa but left enough of the challa (loaf) over to take challa from it after Shabbat. (There is a discussion among the Rishonim whether one may eat everything except the part that will become challa or whether he must leave over enough to take challa off and still have some bread that is permitted to eat – see Tosafot, Beitza 9a.) This practice has a strong basis, but if this is what they did, they misapplied it. Shmuel says (Beitza 9a): “Regarding the taking of challa of chutz la’aretz, one may eat now and take off the challa later.” This is different from the situation regarding ma’asrot, where until the ma’aser has been taken, the produce is forbidden as tevel.

Shmuel clearly states that this halacha is true specifically regarding chutz la’aretz, not Bnei Brak. However, one might want to suggest that it might apply even in Israel of our time, for the following reason. The Tur (Yoreh Deah 323) explains that Rabbinic-level challa has several leniencies, including that it does not have a status of tevel, as above. Challa outside Eretz Yisrael is certainly only Rabbinic (Rambam, Bikkurim 5:8). However, there is significant Talmudic machloket as to whether challa is of Torah or Rabbinic level in Eretz Yisrael (or parts thereof – see Rambam ibid.) of our times. The more accepted opinion is that even in Eretz Yisrael, challa is now Rabbinic (see Beit Yosef, YD 322). So can we consider being lenient to eat the bread from which challa will be taken later in Israel of our times? The answer is that we cannot be lenient. The Beit Yosef (YD 323, and in the Shulchan Aruch, ad loc.) rejects the above reading of the Tur and proves that, even if both are Rabbinic, challa in Eretz Yisrael is of a higher level and is modeled after the Torah law which did (and will) exist there. This is in contrast to challa in chutz la’aretz, which has “no root in Torah law.” Therefore, if challa was taken only on Motzaei Shabbat, then that which your sons ate had a Rabbinic status of tevel, which of course is forbidden to eat.

The main reason that some people do not carry on Shabbat in an area with an eiruv is actually not a lack of trust in a given rabbi’s expertise, as it is more commonly on fundamental grounds. Rather, they (including some rabbis who are responsible for eiruvin) are not convinced that an eiruv can be effective in the place in question. While all agree to the efficacy of eiruvin, some trust them only for small areas, not city or neighborhood eiruvin. Why?

What most people call an eiruv (a slight misnomer) is a collection of various structures, including walls and sets of strings connecting poles (tzurot hapetach). When an area is sufficiently encompassed with structures, it is a reshut hayachid (private domain, where one may carry, if certain other requirements are met). With all the possible places things that can go wrong in a big eiruv, including a need to rely on certain leniencies and the chance of changes (e.g., fallen or disqualified tzurot hapetach) since the last check, there is concern that something will. An eiruv is only as strong as its weakest link.

More fundamentally, the gemara (Eiruvin 6a-b) says that tzurot hapetach do not work in a reshut harabim (public domain, in which carrying more than four amot is forbidden by Torah law). Only in a karmelit (an area with reshut harabim-like status based on Rabbinic law) do tzurot hapesach make an area into a reshut hayachid, in which one may carry. Only actual physical impediments, such as walls and doors/gates can turn a reshut harabim into a reshut hayachid in which one may carry, and these are rarely feasible in municipal settings. Thus, in order to use our standard eiruvin, we need to assume that the areas in question are not reshuyot harabim. Are they?

The only Talmudicly explicit requirements of a reshut harabim are that it is sixteen amot wide (Shabbat 99a), it is not roofed over (ibid. 98a), and perhaps that is frequented by people (Eiruvin 6b). Such places abound (see Rambam, Shabbat 14:1).

How, then, can the great majority of Shabbat-observant Jews use an eiruv that relies on tzurot hapetach? First, rest assured that usage of such eiruvin is indeed the Ashkenazi minhag, supported by leading poskim for hundreds of years (see Magen Avraham 345:5) and to this day (see Igrot Moshe, OC I:139). The main source of leniency, which the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:7) cites, albeit as a secondary opinion, is that a reshut harabim requires the presence of 600,000 people. The Magen Avraham (ad loc. 5) says that this is the more accepted opinion. The Beur Halacha (ad loc.), while citing many Rishonim who accept it, cites even more Rishonim who are stringent. He also questions the Shulchan Aruch’s contention that the 600,000 must be on an individual street in the course of a normal day. Another “disqualification” of reshuyot harabim is when they are not mefulash (i.e., if streets are lined by buildings on their sides and their openings end or they curve before making it through the city (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid. and Magen Avraham ad loc. 10).

There are other theses to explain our lenient practice (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 345:20; Chazon Ish 107:5). Perhaps the strongest, found in the Avnei Nezer (OC 273), is that the idea that tzurot hapetach are ineffective in a reshut harabim is just a Rabbinic stringency. After erecting the classic eiruv, then, the worst-case-scenario is only a Rabbinic prohibition, making it is easier to rely on the lenient opinions that a reshut harabim requires 600,000 people.

While we have confirmed the validity of the practice of most of us to rely on eiruvin, we have seen that there are often also strong reasons to refrain from usage, even if an illustrious rabbi vouches for the eiruv. Although we would warn people of the dangers of being machmir on this matter (e.g., due to communal and family dynamics), one should not misinterpret the intention of those who do so.

The simplest thing for you to have done is to appoint a shaliach to light candles where you would be for Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 263:21).

We start with what one should/can do when he has time. The main place for Shabbat candle lighting is the place of the Shabbat meal (Rama, Orach Chayim 263:11). If the homeowner is lighting there, there seems to be little point to add on. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 263:7) says that if a guest has no place to light or person lighting for him, he should become a partner in the homeowners’ lighting, a practice rarely done these days. The Mishna Berura (263:33) cites a Magen Avraham in the related context of a guest on Chanuka, that if a guest relies on the homeowner (especially regarding food, which is very common), he has no obligation to light.

However, if the guest has a room entirely set aside for his purposes, he has an obligation to light there (Mishna Berura 263:31). From this it follows that you should have lit in the place you were sleeping, which many poskim prefer (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 45:8; Chovat Hadar p. 95), and is the prevalent Sephardi minhag (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 263:20). The Ashkenazi minhag is to light with a beracha where they eat, although it is hard to justify the minhag when the homeowner has already lit there (Tehilla L’David 263:7; see Kavod V’oneg Shabbat p. 11 in the name of Rav M. Feinstein).

(While poskim often discuss the bedroom, common practice assumes that it is anachronistic to light in the bedroom. The point of light in a bedroom is to not trip over things (Mordechai, Shabbat 294), which takes away from tranquility in the home. Nowadays, few people feel tranquility with a candle in their bedroom. Rather, they find an electric nightlight, light from the hall or the window, etc., to be preferable to a candle. In many ways, electric lights remove the need for Shabbat candles. However, we assume that the Rabbinic mandate of a flame still adds honor and extra festive light to Shabbat (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:171, in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach; Yalkut Yosef, OC 263:8).  If one is sleeping in another’s house, lighting a candle in the normal place where they light adds honor and can be used upon returning from seudat Shabbat. Certainly, when the homeowners have not shown you a secure place to light in the bedroom, one has no halachic right to assume permission to light there and endanger their house (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 45:3).)

If one lights before leaving his home or the place he is sleeping, he must ensure he will get benefit from the light on Shabbat. The suggested way is for the candles to last until one returns (Mishna Berura 263:30). This was apparently not feasible in your case. If it was already starting to get dark, you might have been able to receive benefit before leaving for Shabbat by doing an activity in a way that the candlelight made it more pleasant (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 45:8). This works if the wife accepted Shabbat at that time (i.e., she did not need to do melacha afterward), so that she has “Shabbat benefit” even before nightfall. Those Sephardi woman who do not always accept Shabbat with candle lighting (see Yabia Omer II, OC 16) would need to intend to accept Shabbat early this time.

The simplest thing for you to have done is to appoint a shaliach to light candles where you would be for Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 263:21). If you are an Ashkenazi woman, the place of eating is also the simplest technically. If you are a Sephardiya, someone lighting safely at the neighbors is best. (If someone can take care of the electric lights, this can be of value both for the main halachic lighting (see Yalkut Yosef 263:22) and the general need of proper lighting.) However, if the shaliach is anyway making her own beracha, adding candles on your behalf, without a new beracha, where you are eating carries little risk.

There is a dispute where exactly the Halachic dateline is and in accordance as to when Shabbat is in Hawaii (Friday or Saturday). However, practically, Shabbat should be observed in Hawaii as the local Jewish community does, which is on Saturday.

The consensus is that activating light-emitting diodes (LEDs) on Shabbat is not a Torah-level prohibition, but is a Rabbinic level one. One connects a circuit and light is emitted (by the transfer of electrons through junctions of semi-conductors). It is not simple to pinpoint what the Rabbinic violation is (when the diodes do not form writing or pictures). Some (including Rav S.Z. Auerbach) say it is molid (creating something new), even though there is no explicit Talmudic category of molid with light. Others say it is under the category of uvdin d’chol, which is a sort of catch-all for things that by halachic intuition and precedent, must be forbidden on Shabbat, which we assume regarding operating electric systems on Shabbat.

In the case of a child’s shoes, we can raise various grounds for leniency. This is especially the case if we assume, as depends on the circumstances, that despite the initial excitement of watching himself light up his shoes, a child eventually walks without thinking about the lights. Since the lights definitely will go on, this is a case of p’sik reishei, someone who intends to do an act (e.g., walking) for a certain purpose, but, by necessity another result, which is forbidden (e.g., activating LEDs on Shabbat), also occurs. While p’sik reishei is forbidden, the Terumat Hadeshen (64) says that a p’sik reishei of a Rabbinic violation is permitted. While we accept the opinion of the Magen Avraham (314:5), who forbids p’sik reishei even of a Rabbinic prohibition (see Mishna Berura 314:11), it is still a mitigating factor.

At some point, it is possible that the child is not considered to have a preference that the shoes light up, in which case, we have a p’sik reishei d’lo nicha lei, which the Aruch permits (see Beit Yosef, OC 320). Admittedly, the Aruch’s opinion is not generally accepted (Shulchan Aruch, OC 320:18; see Mishna Berura 320:53, that all agree with the Aruch that there is no Torah prohibition).  However, there are quite a few opinions (including Yabia Omer V, OC 28) that a p’sik reishei d’lo nicha lei on a Rabbinically forbidden result is permitted. While many are stringent even in that, in cases in which refraining from the matter at hand causes particular trouble, it is quite accepted to be lenient (Orchot Shabbat 30:5). Thus, if an adult were to ask about wearing the shoes in question, we would not allow it without special need, but this strict ruling would not be a definite one if he did not care out all about the lights.

When we turn to the question of a child wearing such shoes, the situation becomes much more lenient. If it is a toddler, who is too young to train in any serious way about observing Shabbat, then his parents do not have to distance him from violations of Shabbat. On the other hand, when one is involved in facilitating the prohibition for the child (the applications are broader than the Talmudic term of “feeding him by hand,” and certainly include putting shoes on him), it is prohibited. The Rashba and Ran say that this prohibition does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions (see Beit Yosef, OC 343). While the Shulchan Aruch (OC 343:1) does not accept this opinion, many are lenient in certain cases of need, at least with small children (Orchot Shabbat 24:(32) - see Bi’ur Halacha to 343:1). Regarding something which is not even unanimously agreed to be forbidden for an adult, it is much easier to be lenient for a child.

In general, it is preferable to use wine for or grape juice for Kiddush. If one is unable to obtain kosher wine, then on Friday night it is preferable to make Kiddush on bread. On Shabbat morning, one who does not have wine, should make Kiddush on an important and commonly drunk beverage in his location that people do not drink just for thirst but rather is a celebratory drink. If alcoholic apple cider fits this definition where you live, it may be used.

We start with a look at the halachic indications when there are not extenuating circumstances. Then we can look for the best solutions based on need.

 The gemara (Pesachim 106b) cites a machloket on whether one who ate before making Kiddush is able to make Kiddush afterward. We accept the opinion that he may (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:4). However, all agree with the implication that it is wrong to eat, even small quantities, before Kiddush (ibid.). 

Often, prohibitions on eating do not apply to drinking water, including before Havdala (ibid. 299:1). The Rosh (Shut 25:2) explains that due to the concept that any eating done on Shabbat has importance, it is forbidden to drink water before Kiddush. However, there is a machloket whether this concept applies during twilight, and thus it is not clear whether one may drink water at that time (Da’at Torah, OC 271:4).

When does the basic (Rabbinic) prohibition begin? The poskim assume that once it is possibly Shabbat (from sunset) or one accepted Shabbat, it is forbidden to eat (Bach, OC 271; Mishna Berura 271:11). When women light Shabbat candles, they accept Shabbat (Rama, OC 263:10). Therefore, most assume that it is forbidden for a woman to eat or drink after lighting candles before making Kiddush (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:45).  

The Dagul Meirevava (to Shulchan Aruch, OC 261:4) says that while davening Ma’ariv makes it Shabbat in regards to all Shabbat prohibitions, it is questionable whether other forms of accepting Shabbat early obligate one to adhere to all Rabbinical laws (Shulchan Aruch, OC 393:2). The Minchat Yitzchak (VIII:18) entertains the possibility that it would be permitted to eat after candle lighting before Ma’ariv. However, he is unwilling to be practically lenient without the presence of other reasons for leniency (e.g., the case he discusses, where one is drinking water to swallow medicine). The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (43:46) is willing to be lenient for a woman who is thirsty to drink water and, in a case of need, tea.

As mentioned, candle lighting likely makes it forbidden for a woman who lit to eat because, with it, she accepts Shabbat. It is generally accepted conceptually that a woman can have explicitly in mind to not accept Shabbat with her lighting (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 263:10). In practice, because this is not a unanimously accepted possibility, poskim rely on such a condition only in cases of significant need (Mishna Berura 263:43). Along these lines, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (43:47) allows a woman who is feeling weak or who is nursing to eat as she likes after candle lighting if she made that condition.

However, these leniencies of the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata’s are only if she finishes eating before sunset. What if a woman gets particularly hungry after that, especially if she is nursing? While there are significant leniencies for nursing mothers so that their milk supply should not be affected, waiting an hour is unlikely to affect that. However, she is still the type of person who, in many cases, may have unusual tza’ar if she cannot eat when the feeling hits her. Nevertheless, in almost all cases, it is hard to be lenient, and that is because she almost always has a great alternative – to make Kiddush before her husband comes home (see Minchat Yitzchak ibid.). There is no halachic reason not to do so. Even if it is not accepted in the family, hopefully a simple discussion with her husband, with the pertinent information, should convince all that her making Kiddush is better than her eating or drinking after sunset before Kiddush. On the other hand, every rule has exceptions, and when there is an acute need, one can be lenient soon after sunset as well, especially to drink any amount of water.

You can use a pre-existing pastry bag, as long as you do not make decorations that look like letters or pictures. You may not make a pastry bag on Shabbat, as that is making a "nice opening" which effectively creates a new utensil.

Assuming that the pilot light gives off a very small amount of heat, it is considered that the oven is off or at a level of heat which is not Halachically significant, in which case it is all permitted.

We will start with your assumption – that melacha is involved. The workers carry 4 amot in a public domain and into a private domain (the truck), which is a melacha, but only if there is no eiruv. It is possible that no part of the operation of the truck is done specifically for you (it would be a problem if the whole area is Jewish). The Rabbinic violation of muktzeh is a problem regarding garbage. While it is often permitted to take out garbage on Shabbat, e.g., leaving it in the home will likely cause a bad smell (see Orchot Shabbat 19:88), it usually need not be a bother in a garbage can outside.

So assuming it is forbidden for a Jew to throw the garbage into the truck on Shabbat, can non-Jewish workers do it for us? The critical factor for leniency is that the Jew does not tell, or, in this case, even care if the non-Jew does the work specifically on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 247:1). You too presumably do not care if the pickup is specifically on Shabbat. (This might not be true if they have not come in several days, they never work after sunset or on Sunday, and residents would have significant hardship and complaints if they did not come on Saturday.)

However, that leniency helps only if it is halachically considered that the work the crew is doing at that time is for their sake, not for yours. The most common way to fulfill this condition is when the worker is paid per job (kablan), so that we consider it that he is doing it for the money he receives (ibid.; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 1). If, though, he is paid by the day or other unit of time (po’el), he is considered to be paid money to fulfill the Jew’s requests, explicitly or implicitly, which is forbidden (ibid., based on Avoda Zara 21b).

The analysis of a sanitation crew’s categorization is not simple. They are presumably paid by the day/month (po’el) and not, for example, by the amount of garbage they remove. On the other hand, maybe we should look at the relationship between the homeowner and the municipality. The homeowner pays (usually with municipal taxes) for a host of services, including garbage disposal, which makes the municipality kablanim. The sanitation workers are working for the municipality, not the homeowners, and therefore the worker’s pay scheme is not relevant. There is another reason to consider them kablanim. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 244:5; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 24) says that if one has a long-term worker whose responsibility is to do one specific job, he is equivalent to a kablan. This is provided the Jewish employer does not complain if he takes off days here and there as long as the job gets done.

One can ask that it is forbidden for the non-Jew to work for a Jew on the Jew’s property (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2), due to marit ayin (people will think he is violating Shabbat – see Mishna Berura 252:17). Here, though, people usually put the garbage cans in the public domain before pickup. One might argue that this is a technicality, as the workers are still clearly doing work for the homeowner. However, since everyone knows that the homeowner has no special arrangement with the crew, and the general setup is permitted, marit ayin is not a problem (see ibid.). We are also not supposed to have non-Jews take things on Shabbat from a Jew’s house even when there is no intrinsic violation (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:1). However, this too is due to marit ayin issues, which should not apply.

It is permitted to put out the garbage even on Shabbat (when muktzeh is not a problem), but there are likely advantages to doing so before Shabbat (beyond our present scope).

You should answer amen as after every beracha, but eventually you should smell besamim and if it won't be any time soon, then you should make the beracha before smelling. If you are not sure how long it will be, have in mind not to be yotzei with the amen and say the beracha before smelling.

Mazal tov! Chazal forbade measuring things on Shabbat. This comes up in the gemara in Beitza (29a) in the context of using utensils with measure markings in transferring produce from one person to another. It also comes up in Shabbat (157a-b) in the context of measuring a mikveh and other pools of water.

There seem to be two approaches to the underlying reason behind the prohibition, and they are likely to be complementary rather than alternative. The Rambam (Shabbat 23:13) connected measuring to Rabbinic prohibitions related to commerce, which itself is forbidden lest one come to write (Rambam ibid. 12). However, the Rambam (ibid. 24:5) also brings it among things that are forbidden as weekday activities (uvdin d’chol). The need for a second element of the prohibition makes sense because many of the applications discussed are totally unrelated to commerce. Likewise, the Mishna Berura in some contexts invokes the reason of commerce (e.g., 323:3, 324:4), whereas elsewhere (306:34) relates measuring to uvdin d’chol.

The Beit Yosef (OC 308) cites the Maharil, who was uncertain whether an hourglass is muktzeh because it is used for measuring. Indeed, it is not classical measuring, which is when one uses an instrument to measure an object. In contrast, here one uses an instrument to determine the passage of the non-physical entity of time. While the Shulchan Aruch (OC 308:51) leaves the matter as a doubt, the Rama (ad loc.), like the Maharil, says that the minhag is to prohibit an hourglass. This is the ruling of contemporary poskim as well (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:35). (Poskim agree that a wrist watch is permitted – see Mishna Berura 308:168; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:20. The distinction between this and an hourglass that makes most sense to me is that a watch tells you what time it is, whereas an hourglass measures the “distance” between point A and point B in time).

So indeed, the ruling you received was due to your special need. The idea that measuring is permitted for cases of special need is explicit in the gemara (Shabbat 157b) regarding measuring a mikveh to see if it is still valid, because this is a mitzva. Rishonim extend the leniency from mitzva use to the needs of a sick person. The Tur (OC 306) brings discussion of an ancient “alternative medicine” procedure for one with a headache that included measuring a certain distance and then saying an incantation. One authority forbade it, one permitted because the measuring is not done in a serious manner (see Shabbat 157b), and the Maharam MiRutenberg permitted it because healing the sick person is a mitzva. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 306:7) accepts the latter opinion. It is clear from the context of the above discussions that the needs of a sick person in this regard include one who is not dangerously sick (see also Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:35). Tosafot (Shabbat 126b) explains that we are more lenient regarding measuring for a mitzva than for most Rabbinic prohibitions in which a mitzva is not sufficient (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). Measuring, which is forbidden only because of uvdin d’chol, is more lenient than most Rabbinical prohibitions.

In your case, there are actually two ways of looking at how it was a mitzva. One is that it was necessary to allow you to eat according to the ruling you received, so it was the needs of a “sick” person. The other way is that given that you were allowed to eat, the hourglass helped you fulfill the mitzva of lessening the necessary violation of eating on Yom Kippur. Either way, it was permitted for you, even though without a special reason it would have been forbidden to mark the passage of time with an hourglass on Yom Kippur.  

When bicycles became popular, many poskim discussed their use on Shabbat, and almost all forbade it, for one or more of the following reasons. 1) Uvdin d’chol – This is a weekday-like activity, for, amongst other reasons, it is a mode of transportation that takes people to many places for purposes that include non-Shabbat-appropriate ones (see Tzitz Eliezer VII:30). 2) Bicycles often need repairs that a rider might perform while forgetting about Shabbat (see ibid. and Yaskil Avdi III, Orach Chayim 12). 3) One might ride outside the techum Shabbat (boundaries of travel outside the city). 4) When riding on ground, one makes grooves (Shut R. Azriel Hildesheimer I:49). While Rav Yosef Chayim of Bagdad (Rav Pe’alim I, OC 25) dismissed the issues and permitted riding a bicycle (some say he later changed his mind), the consensus of both Ashkenazi (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 16:18) and Sephardi poskim (see Kaf Hachayim 403:8) and the broad minhag is to forbid it. While, in theory, Rav Ovadia Yosef did not find any of the halachic issues formidable, he agreed that one should not ride a bicycle on Shabbat (see Yabia Omer, OC 55:29 and Chazon Ovadia IV, p. 40). The increasing popularity of electric bicycles likely makes all bicycles even more problematic (one can make the opposite claim).

Your question, regarding children riding, deserves consideration on a few grounds. First, most of the reasons to forbid bicycles apply less to a child, especially a young one. He uses a bicycle as recreation, which is harder to call uvdin d’chol, and he is arguably less likely to leave the city or fix it when it breaks. Furthermore, when there are strong grounds to claim that a certain practice is permitted but a stringent opinion is more accepted, we have halachic precedent for being lenient regarding children. See for example, Rav Ovadia Yosef’s suggestions regarding waiting less than six hours between meat and milk for children (Yabia Omer III, Yoreh Deah 3) and allowing for them cheese produced by a non-Jew without supervision in a case of need (ibid. V, YD 11; Sdei Chemed vol. VIII, p. 238, regarding feeding children certain foods on Pesach that adults refrain from due to a (remote) possibility of chametz). See also a statement in this direction in Beit Yosef, OC 269.

We have seen at least one important posek who permitted bicycles for adults and others who implied that while the minhag is to be stringent, it is possible that this is a stringency. This makes bicycles for children a good candidate for leniency. Contemporary poskim do take this approach – but only partially. Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) says that, except in places where the minhag is to be stringent, children may ride tricycles – but not bicycles. He cites two distinctions between the two (see ftnt. 53). 1) Tricycles wheels do not have an inflatable tube, which is one of the reasons to forbid bicycles. 2) A tricycle is clearly a form of recreation, as opposed to serious transportation. It is also likely that he factored in the fact that the average tricycle rider is usually much younger than the average bicycle rider.

We summarize as follows. Conventional Orthodox wisdom has determined that bicycles are forbidden – period. Therefore, we are not open to leniency just based on age. Only in the separate, albeit related case of tricycles, have poskim added up the halachic indications in a manner that permits their use.

Since a large part of the prohibition of bicycles, especially for children, is based on minhag, there is no need to oppose a practice of leniency that may exist in certain communities (more likely among Sephardim). In general, even if a child is violating a clear Rabbinic prohibition, one does not have to stop him or even tell his father to do so (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 343:1 and Mishna Berura 343:3). It is even legitimate, even for a father, to allow his minor child to ride a bicycle on Shabbat if it is in consonance with the local minhag.

A community’s candle lighting time is not the time that all community members are expected to accept Shabbat but is the first formal action done towards that end. The Behag (cited in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 263:10) posits that a woman accepts Shabbat with this lighting. This is true at least for Ashkenazi women (see Rama, ad loc.), who for this reason recite the beracha only after completing lighting (see Darchei Moshe, OC 263:2). (The ruling for Sephardi women is more complicated – see Yabia Omer, IX, OC 24).

However, lighting candles is not a home’s absolute acceptance of Shabbat. For one thing, the Rama (ibid.) allows a woman to not accept Shabbat by lighting by means of even a mental condition. After all, lighting is innately a preparatory act before Shabbat, not an act of Shabbat, such as davening Maariv or making Kiddush. In fact, men do not accept Shabbat when they light candles (Mishna Berura 263:42).

On the other hand, there are several indications that candle lighting it is not merely a technical preparatory act. First, we must light Shabbat candles even if we are happy with the existing light situation and this mitzva is accompanied by a special beracha. Additionally, not everyone allows a woman to make a condition to light candles without accepting Shabbat. We rule it requires a real need (Magen Avraham 263:20; Mishna Berura 263:44; see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:24).

Regarding your question, the Rama states clearly that members of the household other than the woman who lights do not accept Shabbat with that lighting. Most men do not want to accept because they want to daven Mincha in shul, which is usually after candle lighting time (women should daven Mincha before (Mishna Berura 263:43)) and often will drive there. In some households, daughters generally accept Shabbat when their mother lights, which has a certain appropriateness to it. However, it is not halacha and in many households, after lighting candles, there may still be work to do. Therefore, it is not always healthy to expect the whole family to be ready or for the mother to feel the pressure that she must be sure everything is taken care of before she lights.

Do not teach your children that their father must cease work after their mother lights candles. Your assumption that it is confusing is based on your assumption that this is proper. To the contrary, it is confusing to see you being careful not to do melacha while neighbors are driving to shul.

Certainly there are many advantages to a father being home well before Shabbat, but life is not always that obliging. There is some question whether there is a minimum time before sunset to stop doing melacha for tosefet (early acceptance of) Shabbat (see Rosh, Berachot 4:6), and we usually assume a few minutes is enough. Of course, the closer to Shabbat, the more preferable it is to not do melacha. Forgetting the rejected opinion that bein hashemashot begins several minutes before sunset, according to some opinions, the time of sunset is affected a few minutes due to mountains in the area. On practical grounds, one’s watch can be off, he can forget the exact time, or he could lose track of time under the pressure of last minute delays. Therefore, it is prudent although halachically not required to leave at least, say, five minutes before sunset to be finished with all traveling and other melacha.

In short, your wife need not wait for you and should not wait more than a few minutes. Her correct time and yours are not linked.

[A fat separator is a regular container with a spout, except that the spout comes out from near its bottom. When one pours stock or gravy into it, forces of nature (lighter parts of a liquid mixture rise) cause the fat to rise to the top. By pouring the stock out from the bottom, the defatted part comes out first, and one stops pouring before getting to the fatty layer, which he later discards. Some models have a spout stopper, which traps air so that, until ready to pour out, the gravy with its fat stays out of the spout, so that all the fat remains in the container. (An on-line picture or demonstration may be helpful.)]

The baraita (cited in Shabbat 74a; see Tosafot ad loc.) mentions cryptically that selecting (borer) food from other types of food is sometimes forbidden and sometimes permitted. The following conditions for permissibility it brings to explain are accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:1-2). 1) The selection is done by hand, not by a utensil whose purpose is selection. 2) The food which one wants to eat is removed from that which he does not want now. 3) The food that is removed will be used in the short term. Only if all three are satisfied is the selecting not a violation of borer.

Let us analyze the fat separator. Most selecting takes place in one stage, either directly, by removing things from the mixture, or by putting something into a utensil that separates (e.g., a strainer) and removes immediately or one where the selection and removal occur when one shakes the mixture (e.g., a sifter). A fat separator, in contrast, employs two separate stages. The separation takes place over a few minutes after the gravy is poured in, and the removal of the defatted part occurs when one decides to pour it out. Let us first analyze each stage.

The first-stage separation happens naturally and is not significantly changed by the person’s action of pouring the gravy into the separator; the forces of gravity would perform the task in a pot or pan as well. Therefore, this cannot be prohibited.

The question is when one pours out the defatted part of the gravy and leaves the fat. There is enough intermingling between the parts of the stock to make it a question of borer. However, here you take the desired from the undesired (assuming one is interested in the defatted part, not the fat), which is good. (If there is some fat on the top of the spout in the beginning, do not throw it out alone.) Indeed, one should do this only if he plans to use the desired part shortly after removal.

The question is whether this is considered selecting that uses a (special) utensil. If we look at the whole process as one, then you are indeed using a utensil for it, and it would be forbidden borer. However, I am convinced one should look at it as two separate events: 1) natural separation; 2) removal of the good with a simple spout that does no separating. Besides an intuitive halachic conviction, a factor that indicates there are two separate stages is the fact that the second stage, which can come much later, occurs only if and when one decides to do it.

Therefore, pouring out only the part you want is not worse than pouring out some broth without vegetables from a soup pot, which is permitted if one does not use a pot cover etc. to hold back the vegetables. Indeed, one may pour from a utensil that which he wants and stop before getting to the unwanted material (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:47, who permits more severe cases). One could argue that a fat separator is worse because the pouring is effective only because this special utensil enables it. However, when discussing borer with utensils, the utensil is always involved in the separation, not in simple removal of that which was separated.

One could argue that the spout stopper is involved in separation, as it keeps fat out of the spout, and using it should be forbidden. However, this is wrong, as the air pressure does not hold back specifically fat but the entire mixture of gravy.    

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:12) rules, based on the Mordechai, that at whatever time the majority of the community accepts Shabbat, individuals, even those who have not come to shul, must accept it as well.

The acceptance of the community (according to most, at the end of Lecha Dodi – Mishna Berura 261:31) does not make it Shabbat for all in the fullest sense but creates a prohibition to do melacha. Those who have not yet accepted Shabbat may daven Mincha during this time, just not in the place the majority are davening Ma’ariv (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 15; see Biur Halacha ad loc.).

Let us see exceptions to the rule of communal acceptance, as perhaps one applies here. The Magen Avraham (263:24) says that in a community with multiple batei knesset, the first shul to accept Shabbat does not impact other shuls, even if it contains a majority. According to many, this applies also to two minyanim in the same shul (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 46:(43)). However, some say that a clearly central shul sets the tone for the entire community (Eliya Rabba 263:26). Private minyanim, i.e., those held in houses, are overpowered by a public one that contains a majority of the community (Mishna Berura 263:51).

A member of a shul (even if it does not have a community majority) is included in its Shabbat acceptance even if he or she was not there (Machatzit Hashekel 263:24), unless he decided to go to another shul that week (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 263:28). If most of the community’s members are not in shul, the shul does not draw along the community (Mishna Berura ibid.).

In determining the majority, who is included in the community? Poskim posit that it refers to Shabbat-observant Jews (see Shevet Halevi IX:56). This makes sense, as in trying to figure out the time at which Shabbat will be accepted, you should ask those who will practically accept it. Someone who is careful about Shabbat but may not keep every halacha or be a regular shul-goer likely counts, unless perhaps if he is socially divorced from the community of Shabbat observers. It is unclear from your question if those who accept Shabbat early in your community are the majority based on this perspective. The case for not having a single shul cause a whole area to accept Shabbat early is stronger in Israel, where the public announcement of Shabbat times, the end of bus service, etc. follow the regular time. (The boundaries of a community are not always easily set – is there a division between Rechavia, Shaarei Chesed, and Nachlaot, and if so, where? Are Teaneck and Bergenfield one or two communities?)

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III:38) and the Be’er Moshe (II:17) present a novel but logical distinction. The idea of accepting Shabbat early in a way that binds others makes sense when done in an effort to increase the time of sanctity or distance people from Shabbat desecration. However, where early minyanim are done only in the summer, when late nightfall creates technical problems, these halachot likely do not apply. This distinction seems to assume that the halacha is based on the nature of the acceptance of Shabbat. If, though, the halacha is a matter of avoiding degrading by doing melacha the Shabbat of the majority of the community who are already celebrating Shabbat (Shevet Halevi ibid.), it shouldn’t make a difference what the motivation is. Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (46:(42)) cites this opinion without accepting or rejecting it, and it may be pertinent that the halacha of getting pulled into Shabbat by the tzibbur is ostensibly only Rabbinic.

I imagine the question is about one that cools electrically but removes the water manually. If so, it is permitted in a similar way that people were always allowed to open refrigerators (without all sorts of sensors) even though it could affect the thermostat at some point.

[We trust that our readership is aware of the great distinction between drug abuse and between responsible use of medical marijuana – as prescribed by a doctor in a place it is legal, for those in great need].

It is generally forbidden to eat anything before davening except for water and, for some, tea and coffee (with various opinions about sugar – see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 22). However, it is permissible to eat food for a health need, even when one is not fully sick (Mishna Berura 89:24). Anyone who has a prescription for medical marijuana is sick enough to be justified to ingest his treatment as needed.

 Regarding Kiddush, there is a quandary. Assuming the brownies have a decent taste, they require a beracha, even though their main purpose is medicinal (Mishna Berura 204:42). Therefore, the halacha is that you should not eat it before Kiddush. On the other hand, you don’t need the Kiddush wine for health reasons, so what justifies Kiddush before davening? The Be’ur Halacha (to 289:1) says that one makes Kiddush before pre-davening eating for health purposes. The Igrot Moshe (OC II:26) disagrees in a case where not all halachic opinions agree that the food lends itself to Kiddush, which raises the purpose that the wine was not justified. However, assuming the brownies are real flour-based cookies and you are having a k’zayit of them, Kiddush is in place (see Mishna Berura 273:25).

Is it preferable to ingest the active ingredient as a non-food, to avoid the undesired situation of eating and Kiddush before davening? This “improvement” makes the halachic situation worse regarding medicines on Shabbat, which are permitted in a food form that is not recognizable as medicinal (see Orchot Shabbat 20:132). While the need likely justifies taking medicine (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17), the halachic issue of eating before davening is easier to waive than that of taking medicine on Shabbat. In the absence of a net gain by an alternative, the medicated brownies are fine.

Now to Birkat Kohanim. The gemara (Ta’anit 26b-27a) derives from a connection between Birkat Kohanim and both nazir and service in the Beit Hamikdash that it is forbidden to duchen when drunk. The gemara indicates this is only a Rabbinic derivation/halacha. A nazir is forbidden only in grape products and service is fully forbidden only after drinking wine (see Kritot 13b). Therefore, some say that there are no restrictions on Birkat Kohanim after consuming something intoxicating unless he is as drunk as biblical Lot was (Magen Avraham 128:55). The Taz (128:35) disagrees and disqualifies one who has drunk anything that makes him unfit to “speak before a king,” and we are stringent to follow this opinion (Mishna Berura 128:141). The halachic cut-off point wine of a revi’it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 128:38) does not apply to other drinks. While the Taz says one should therefore not drink anything intoxicating before Birkat Kohanim, this is reasonable for those who are drinking recreationally, not for one whose use of something “intoxicating” is medically necessary. (see Chayei Adam I, 32:7 regarding Kiddush on a small amount of whiskey before Birkat Kohanim.) Therefore, assuming you will make Kiddush on grape juice and that during Birkat Kohanim you will be acting in a fully presentable manner, you should perform the Torah-level mitzva of Birkat Kohanim.

There are two main issues to deal with: whether they are considered doing work on your behalf; whether there is a problem of marit ayin.

In this case, UPS is doing melacha on your behalf, at least in regard to driving to the pick-up point and perhaps other matters. (It might be somewhat of a lenient case since you do not interact with the person who is doing the work – see Mishna Berura 307:24.) It is generally permitted to have a non-Jew do work for you on Shabbat if they are doing it for their own purposes. When one pays the non-Jew to do work that the Jew wants, the major distinction is as follows. If the non-Jew is paid by time, it is considered doing work for the Jew; if he is paid per the job, it is considered that he is working on his own behalf (for the pay) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 247:1). UPS obviously gets paid for the job, which is good. On the other hand, even in that case, if one instructs him, explicitly or implicitly, to do the work specifically on Shabbat or Yom Tov, it is forbidden (ibid.).

Therefore, you would have to give them a time for pick-up that would not necessarily be on Shabbat or Yom Tov (i.e., they have time before or after). From a look at their site, it seems that one’s request can be made for anytime (24/7). On the other hand, in a response to my written question (I cannot gauge the expertise of the specific customer service worker), pickups are generally done from 9 AM to 7 PM. Accordingly, during some of the year, if you allowed them to come all day, it would not necessarily be on Shabbat/Yom Tov and at other times, it would be on the same halachic day. The halacha is that it is not enough to provide them a theoretical alternative to work on Shabbat, but it must be practical (Mishna Berura 307:15). (You could ostensibly give them a two-day window to come on, but your question implies that you have a reason for it to be on one specific day and not the day after. The day before would also be fine.)

An interesting consideration arises with two days of Yom Tov. Is it permitted to tell them to come, say, anytime on Monday, when Monday is the first day of Yom Tov and Monday evening starts the second? This should be fine for any Yom Tov other than Rosh Hashana. That is because we treat each day as a mutually exclusive doubt. Namely, if the first day is holy, the second is not. If the second is holy, the first is not (Shulchan Aruch, OC 513:5). So if they have all day and part of the night of Monday, they have the opportunity to pick up on chol. Rosh Hashana, in contrast, is treated as two definite days of Yom Tov (ibid.).

There is still a problem, due to the halacha that one is not allowed to have a non-Jew take an object from a Jew’s home on Shabbat, unless he took it unexpectedly (Shabbat 19a). All explain that it has to do with marit ayin, but differ as to what people will think. The Shulchan Aruch (246:2) says that one will think that the Jew told him to carry it out for the Jew’s benefit into the public domain. If that is the case, then if the non-Jew lives within the same eiruv as the Jew’s home, there would be no problem, and it is possible that the same would be true of at least some cases on Yom Tov even without an eiruv (Taz 246:3). The Rambam (Shabbat 6:19) says that people will think that the Jew improperly sold or the like to the non-Jew on Shabbat. In that case, it applies even within an eiruv (Magen Avraham 246:6; see Sha’ar Hatziyun 246:7). In this case, it would seem that according to everyone there should be marit ayin because one who sees the non-Jew taking it on Shabbat or Yom Tov will not realize that he did not tell him to come specifically on the holy day (see Mishna Berura 252:17). Therefore, if you want the pick-up, in addition to including a possibility of chol pick up, you should also have it picked up from a non-Jewish neighbor’s house.

Indeed, whatever is within the same valid eiruv chatzeirot, is considered within the city for techumin as well (see Netivot Shabbt 42:(1)).

From what I understand from the question, he is learning with the child both on Shabbat and during the week. If so, it is best if it can be arranged that he is employed per week or month. In other words, it is package deal. These are the (number of) hours that they are expected to work during the course of the week, including times that are not Shabbat, and this is the amount of money he is being paid for it. There should not be a weekly accounting of how much he actually worked each week and figure out the charge based on that. If a certain amount is agreed upon and then the session does not come about on Shabbat, less money can be paid. It should not be possible for the employer to simply back out of his obligation to employ on Shabbat. 

If there is preparing that needs to be done during the week (e.g., word sheets), there can be a lump sum payment for the Shabbat session including the teaching on Shabbat. These two examples of combining Shabbat and weekday work is called havlaah (swallowing up the Shabbat payment).

If these systems cannot be used, then it is possible but less than preferable to rely on the opinions that one may receive money for the work done on Shabbat when the work on Shabbat is considered mitzva work. Teaching mishnayot is of course mitzva work. 

Let us know if you need sources for these guidelines. That would take some more time, and we are trying to answer you more promptly then we would be able to with sources.

The basic question you ask is the subject of a machloket in the gemara (Berachot 39a) in regard to the preference of making a beracha on a full loaf of bread throughout the week. According to Rabbi Chiya, one does betziat hapat (the breaking of the bread, which, itself, has halachot) as he is making the beracha. Rava argues that the important thing is that at the conclusion of the beracha the bread is still whole, and therefore one should not cut off a piece until after the beracha is complete. The gemara (ibid. 39b) concludes that we accept Rava’s opinion (see also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 167:1).

As mentioned, the above is referring to weekdays, where the stakes are low, as one is not required to use a full loaf. On Shabbat, when one requires lechem mishneh, it is all the more important that the challot remain intact throughout the beracha. The Rama (OC 167:1) makes a practical distinction based on the heightened level of importance of wholeness on Shabbat. The Rosh (Berachot 6:19) says that although the separating off of the part of the bread to be eaten is done after the beracha, one should make a significant although partial cut of the loaf before the beracha. The reason is to minimize the delay between the end of the beracha and the eating of the bread. (See Bach, OC 167, who explains that it is not a halachically forbidden delay, but l’chatchila it should be minimized to the extent possible.) The Rama says that this preferable cutting is justified during the week when the wholeness of the loaf is only preferable, but on Shabbat, when it is crucial, one should not cut it at all. (If one did cut it, but only mildly, so that if one lifted the loaf by the smaller part, the weight of the larger part would not make it break into two, it is fine b’di’eved – see Rosh ibid. and Darchei Moshe, OC 167:2).

Poskim (Magen Avraham 274:1; Mishna Berura 274:5) recommend the following compromise, which most people follow, although to different degrees. One scratches a line on the challa at the place where he is going to want to cut, thereby saving time for that purpose. Many people do more than scratch but make a small cut, just not a significant one, due the concern the Rama addressed. (That seems to make more practical sense than scratching, because to have to position the knife exactly at the place of the scratch takes more time than to start cutting from the outset. In any case, any minhag along these lines is fine.)

Due to the above, using matza for the second “loaf” of lechem mishneh can cause challenges. (We are not even getting into the fact that using matza is a problem in regard to Sephardim (and, thus, when one has Sephardi guests), as matza is not bread for them, and its beracha is actually Mezonot.) One has to actually hold both loaves during the beracha (Berachot 39b; Shulchan Aruch, OC 274:1), and in the daytime the loaf which one is cutting should be on the top (ibid.). It requires some care to hold a nice-sized challa on top of a matza without the matza breaking. (Preferably no part of the lechem mishneh should break (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 55:8), although we generally assume that if the piece that broke off is less than 2% of the “loaf,” it is not a problem (see ibid. (24)).

It is a problem to have a non-Jew do it for you, even if he is paid per the job, because, as you describe it, you need him to do it specifically on Shabbat. 

We have two suggestions for you: 

1. If the non-Jew has your permission to do it after Shabbat (and the issue is that you will be very busy and have no time or by the time havdala is over etc. it will be too late), then you don't have a problem if they decide to do on Shabbat. Just they should be paid something for it.

2. If you have a friend in Israel (if you are in the US, for example, with 7-10 hours difference) who can do it for you after Shabbat is out for you or someone significantly west of you who can do it before their Shabbat, that would work.

It is permitted to use these soaps on Shabbat.

The Rambam (Shabbat 29:1; Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 155) is clear on the matter, as he views Kiddush and Havdala as equivalent “bookends”: “It is a positive mitzva from the Torah to sanctify Shabbat with words, as it says, “Remember the day of Shabbat to sanctify it” (Shemot 20:7); in other words, remember it as a remembrance of praise and sanctification. One needs to remember it as it enters and as it leaves: as it enters with Kiddush, and as it leaves with Havdala.”

Yet, there are notable distinctions between Kiddush and Havdala. Kiddush is done on Shabbat; Havdala is done after Shabbat. Kiddush focuses on Shabbat alone; Havdala distinguishes between Shabbat and chol. Indeed, one gemara (Sh’vuot 18b) seems to put the focus of Havdala on the distinction between Shabbat and chol, rather than viewing it is an appropriate time to praise Shabbat. It cites the pasuk, “To distinguish between the sacred and the mundane” (Vayikra 10:10) as the source for Havdala. One can also argue that Havdala is a way to usher in the weekday, as Shabbat continues (on some level) until Havdala ends it (see Tosafot, Berachot 27b).

Perhaps, whether Havdala relates more to Shabbat or to chol is the basis of a practical question, which Rishonim dispute (both opinions are cited in the Shulchan Aruch/Rama, Orach Chayim 296:8) –  are women obligated in Havdala? Women are obligated in Kiddush of Shabbat. Even though it is a time-based mitzva, the positive (zachor) and negative (shamor) mitzvot of Shabbat are linked so that whoever is commanded to refrain from melacha is obligated in Kiddush (Berachot 20b). If Havdala is part of zachor, as the Rambam indicates, women can be obligated from the Torah in Havdala, or even if Havdala is of Rabbinic origin, Chazal could have modeled it after Kiddush (Maggid Mishneh, Shabbat 29:1). The Orchot Chayim (Havdala 18) says that women are exempt from Havdala because it is not linked to the negative element of Shabbat, as the Rabbis only artificially connected it to that pasuk. The Pri Megadim (MZ 296:7) adds on to the Orchot Chayim’s argument that Havdala is done on chol, and therefore it is missing the Shabbat linkage.

One could read into this approach that women are exempt from Havdala because it is a mitzva of chol. The mitzva could be to allow melacha on chol, as it is prohibited to do melacha (all or some – see opinions in Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:10) before a declaration of Havdala (even without wine). However, that seems overstated. The Orchot Chayim probably just means that the chiddush that women are obligated in Kiddush despite it being time-based does not extend to Havdala because Havdala is not as connected to “zachor-shamor” as Kiddush is. All seem to agree that the main point is to stress, as chol begins, how special Shabbat is. Why then is melacha forbidden? One possibility is that until Havdala, it is still, on some level, Shabbat (Mishna Berura 299:33). Another possibility is that one is not allowed to go about normal life before he has fulfilled the mitzva of parting from Shabbat (see Aruch Hashulchan, Tzitz Eliezer XI:34).

Another telling point is the gemara (Berachot 27b) that seems to say (so rules the Shulchan Aruch, OC 293:3; the Mishna Berura 293:9 says not to do this in practice) that Havdala can be made on Shabbat (from plag hamincha). Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC VI:49) says that this is because the Rambam is right that Havdala is a mitzva of Shabbat, even if we usually do it after Shabbat is over. This proof seems refutable (in addition to the fact that early Havdala is only for unusual circumstances) as follows. We find elsewhere that mitzvot that relate to the night can be done (at least according to some opinions) from plag hamincha. Therefore, a declaration of ushering in chol can begin then, even if melacha will certainly be forbidden until nightfall.

Unquestionably, though, the Rambam’s approach, that it is a mitzva of Shabbat, is the most straightforward and accepted one.

The gemara (Shabbat 74b) states, according to the explanation of several Rishonim, that cutting certain vegetables into small pieces is a Torah-level violation of tochen (grinding).   

There are several lenient opinions that limit the scope of this prohibition on cutting. Some say (see Tosafot ad loc.) that it applies only to foods that are not edible whole, which makes cutting them into small, edible pieces a significant and thus forbidden change. The Rambam (Shabbat 21:18) implies that it is only when it is cut up in preparation for its being cooked. These two possibilities, and especially when one connects them, logically make cutting comparable to grinding grains to be used for baking bread. A further leniency is cited by many, including the Rama (Orach Chayim 321:12), in the name of the Rashba (Shut IV:75). The Rashba says that cutting done soon before consumption is considered part of the eating process and not a forbidden melacha, similar to the distinction regarding borer (selecting).

If one makes a standard salad right before the Shabbat meal it would thus seem that there should be several grounds to permit the matter. However, there are a few difficulties in allowing use of a salad slicer on Shabbat. First, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 321:12) considers the cutting into small pieces of all vegetables, even not for the purpose of cooking, as a full-fledged violation of tochen. Furthermore, the Magen Avraham (321:15) is among those who are unhappy with the leniency of cutting soon before eating (see Mishna Berura 321:45), at least when the vegetables are cut very small.

In this regard, a simple compromise is to indeed turn the device only enough for the vegetables to, by and large, be cut into relatively large pieces. Many poskim point out that there are no exact dimensions for what is considered small, and that the matter is relative to the normal preparation of the salad (see Dirshu 321:59). There is also a machloket about when a vegetable is cut thin in one dimension but remains larger in the other two dimensions (and thus, for example, the pieces still need to be chewed before swallowing). Igrot Moshe (OC IV, 74) is lenient on the matter, while some others say that cutting thin in any dimension is a problem (see Orchot Shabbat 5:(12)).

However, it is still a problem to use a salad slicer because it is a utensil that is made for the purpose of cutting into small enough pieces to be considered tochen. The Biur Halacha (to 321:12) follows the comparison that the Rashba made to borer. For borer, it is not enough that the selecting is done for short-term use, but it also must not use a utensil because that makes it more work-like. Using a regular knife that is used for cutting of all shapes and sizes does not impact the permissibility because that is the way that permitted cutting is done as well. However, when one uses a special set of blades which is made for making salads of small pieces, it is forbidden even if he limits the use so that it does not, in this case, produce small pieces (ibid.). This is on two possible grounds. One is that it turns the action into one which is closer to classic tochen. The other is that use of such a special preparing machine is a violation of uvdin d’chol, weekday-like activity, even in cases when the melacha of tochen does not apply to the object being cut (Shulchan Aruch, OC 321:10).

Mazal tov!! This thought-provoking question touches on important points.

A Jew is not allowed to receive benefit from the melacha a non-Jew did on a Jew’s behalf on Shabbat (Shabbat 122a). If he did it on behalf of himself or other non-Jews, a Jew may benefit (ibid.). When benefit is forbidden, the prohibition lasts bichdei sheya’asu – until the time that the result would have been available if the work had been done after Shabbat ended (Beitza 24b). In your case, bichdei sheya’asu is forever, as if the non-Jew had not videoed on Shabbat, the moments of interest would have never been available. In this context and many others, the content of the electronic recording is equivalent to an “object” from which one could be forbidden to benefit in whatever form it is now found.

So our first question is: for whose benefit did this non-Jewish guest take the video? There are four possibilities: 1. He did it for himself, due to his feelings about your son, and only afterward thought of sharing it with you. 2. He did it for your family, possibly knowing you are unable to video yourselves. 3. He did it with both himself and you in mind. 4. As is now common, people video interesting things with no clear intent about what they will do with it. If #1 or #4 is the case, there is no prohibition to benefit. If #2, it is forbidden. If #3, a discussion is required.

A baraita (Shabbat 122a) states that if a non-Jew did work on behalf of a group of people, then if the majority is Jewish, Jews may not benefit from it, and if the majority is non-Jewish, benefit is permitted. If there is an even number of Jews and non-Jews, it is forbidden. Why is it forbidden in a tie? Rashi (ad loc.) says that it is considered a doubt for whom it is considered done, and we decide stringently in the case of this doubt. Another approach (see Mishna Berura 276:16) is that in the case of a tie, we consider him to have acted on behalf of both, and when one does it for both, it is forbidden. Indeed the Rama (OC 515:6) says that when we know something was done for both Jews and non-Jews, it is forbidden even if the majority was non-Jewish.

Thus, if we really knew that it was for both of you, it would seem to be forbidden (see Bi’ur Halacha to 276:2). On the other hand, when the non-Jew who does the melacha benefits himself, we assume that he mainly has in mind for himself (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:2; see Shabbat 122b). Yet, the Magen Avraham says that if we know that he had in mind both for himself and others, it is forbidden. Not all agree with the Magen Avraham (the Mishna Berura 276:17 basically agrees; see Bi’ur Halacha ad loc.; see discussion in Orchot Shabbat 23:(97)).

We wrote in the past about whether it is permitted to fly a kite on Shabbat. We concluded that there are not sufficient grounds to forbid it, despite the possibility a person could make mistakes in the process (as is possible regarding many permitted Shabbat activities). Your question relates to an important scenario, especially because kites often get stuck in trees.

It is certainly forbidden to climb the tree in order to free the kite. It is forbidden to climb trees on Shabbat, out of concern that one who does so will pull off a branch or fruit from the tree (Beitza 36b). Although there is discussion if this prohibition applies to totally barren trees (see Eiruvin 100b), the halacha is that it applies to all trees and firm vegetation (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:1) as long as it is above three tefachim off the ground (ibid. 2). It is also forbidden to lean a ladder against the tree and climb the ladder, due to a prohibition to use a tree or that which is considered the “side of the tree” (Shabbat 154b; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 13).

Is it permitted to, without climbing, free the kite by pulling on the kite strongly? In many cases in which the kite is strongly intertwined with the leaves and branches, pulling strongly enough to remove the kite will certainly knock off parts of the tree even if that is not his intention (p’sik reishei). Assuming that one has no use for what comes off, this would be only a Rabbinic violation of Shabbat even if were done on purpose (see Shabbat 73b). According to most poskim, a p’sik reishei is forbidden even on a Rabbinic prohibition (Mishna Berura 314:11; Yabia Omer I, OC 19 cites poskim on both sides of the debate).

What about cases in which it is not definite that any part of the tree will be severed? It is forbidden to shake trees or parts of trees (Rama, OC 336:13; Mishna Berura 336:63, based on Beit Yosef in the name of Orchot Chayim). This is forbidden because it is using the tree (see above) (see Shabbat 155a; Aruch Hashulchan, OC 336:37). Since this is not just a violation of muktzeh, it is forbidden not only when one does so directly with his hand, but even with another instrument, e.g., the kite string (see Shabbat 155a). This is apparently so even if he did not do so intentionally but as a p’sik reishei. Seemingly whenever one has to pull on a caught kite, branches and leaves will be moved.

Even if one could just lift the kite out without moving anything, it would still be forbidden. The gemara (ibid.) forbids placing things on a tree, as it is prohibited to use a tree on Shabbat. The Rama (OC 336:1) is among those who say that it is likewise forbidden to remove things from a tree. Some understand that the Rosh (Shabbat 5:2) does not view removing things from a tree as using it (see Shevet Halevi IV:74). This is part of the Shevet Halevi’s grounds for allowing one to easily pick a tallit that accidentally fell on a low bush. However, assuming the part of the tree in question is at least 10 tefachim (about three feet) high, there would still be a prohibition out of concern one might climb the tree in order to remove the object (see Rosh ibid.; Mishna Berura 336:12; Shevet Halevi ibid.). Indeed, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (16:7) forbids removing a ball on Shabbat from a tree upon which it fell, whether doing so by hand or with the help of a pole. While it is not necessary to point this out from a halachic perspective, note that the chances one will come to climb the tree to rescue the kite are probably higher than in the classic case of placing something in a tree above ten tefachim.

In conclusion, once the kite is stuck in the tree, it should not be taken down on Shabbat, in any manner. This is something the kite flyer should consider before flying it. A rabbi might be wise to consider the chances that kids will know/remember this halacha and be disciplined enough to follow it, when setting policy for his community

There are three opinions among the Tannaim (see Ketubot 34a) about the extent of the prohibition of ma’aseh Shabbat (receiving the main benefit of a melacha done on Shabbat – see Rama, Orach Chayim 318:1; Mishna Berura 318:4). The most accepted opinion (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 318:1) is Rabbi Yehuda’s: if the violation was b’meizid (on purpose), the violator may never use the result; other people may use it after Shabbat. For a violation b’shogeg (by mistake), the violator and others may use the result, but only after Shabbat. You are talking about b’meizid. (Poskim primarily agree that although we generally consider one who was brought up not Shabbat observant as a tinok shenishba, that is regarding possible sanctions against him. His actions in ignoring the laws of Shabbat, though, are considered b’meizid.)

Therefore, your friend is forbidden to eat the fish. The Mishna Berura (318:4) rules that he is allowed to sell them (the Ktav Sofer, OC 50 says that when selling was the violator’s original intention, the benefit of selling is forbidden). Therefore, he is certainly allowed to give them away as a present, and ostensibly you would be allowed to eat them.

We, though, must discuss a complication. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 99:5) rules that if one purposely mixes non-kosher food with enough kosher food for bitul, the “mixer” is forbidden to eat the mixture, but others are permitted. It is also forbidden for a person on whose behalf the mixer acted. The Magen Avraham (318:2) states that logically the same thing should apply to ma’aseh Shabbat, i.e., the result should be forbidden forever not only to the violator but also for one on whose behalf he desecrated Shabbat. However, the Magen Avraham concludes that the Beit Yosef’s logic regarding bitul does not apply here. There, we are stringent because it is likely that one would improperly do bitul for a friend’s benefit since doing bitul is a weak aveira; Since Shabbat is a serious aveira, Chazal were not as worried that people would violate it on someone else behalf. On the other hand, the Ktav Sofer (ibid.) says that a mechallel Shabbat on a regular basis is willing to do so even for others. Whether or not we accept this Ktav Sofer is not a simple matter (see discussion in Bemareh Habazak I:31).

There are additional reasons for leniency. The Maharhsal and Taz (YD 99:10) say that the prohibition on the beneficiary of bitul is only if he was aware and/or happy about the perpetration. If the recipient was not in favor of it, he may benefit. The Pri Chadash (YD 99:13) argues. The machloket appears to be whether the penalty is to discourage from sin the perpetrator or the recipient. The lenient opinions seem to apply to your case, as well, as you do not want him to desecrate Shabbat. Furthermore, here your friend presumably fished primarily for himself (and perhaps more for the sport than for the fish), not for you. Indeed, we find regarding a non-Jew who did work for himself and for others, Halacha views it as the main intention being for himself (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:2).

[We dealt with this question long ago (Vayeitzei 5773). We reasoned that the envelope is a kli shemelachto l'issur (the main purpose is for a forbidden-on-Shabbat use) and that it is also hachana (preparation for after Shabbat), as this is done to facilitate mailing or presenting a check. We suggested solving both problems by putting a d’var Torah in the envelope, thus having it serve for a permitted use. We invited our readership to provide grounds for leniency without the system we proposed, promising to update our readers if this occurs. We now pay our debt, after one reader, who wants anonymity, made a good point.]

The Biur Halacha (to 279:6) cites an Eliya Rabba (279:13) who claims that an apparent kli shemelachto l’isur does not become muktzeh until it has been used. This is based on the rule of hazmana lav milta (merely preparing something for a certain halachically significant purpose does not yet invest the object with its planned status). Tosafot (Shabbat 44b) and the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 279:14) apply this leniency only when there are permitted uses for which it may be used. However, if from the outset it will clearly be used for primarily (perhaps, exclusively) forbidden activities, it is muktzeh.

The exact formulation of the above may be critical for our case. Once the envelope has the shul's address printed on it, it is identified as being intended to mail (presumably, checks) in it. According to several contemporary poskim (see Shemirat Shabbat K'hilchata 20:13, Orchot Shabbat 19:30; Tiltulei Shabbat (Bodner) p. 43), it is forbidden even if there are also permitted uses if it is clear that this is not the main intention. Each of them gives a hammer as an example of being muktzeh even before usage, despite the famous halacha about using a hammer to open nuts. According to the simple reading of Tosafot (and perhaps the Eliya Rabba), only items that have practically no permitted purposes are forbidden before use. One could argue whether our envelope is like a hammer or is more likely to be used for permitted uses. One can argue that since from the shul’s perspective, a major function of the envelope is to hint/remind the aliya recipient that he “owes the shul,” it would be permitted before its first forbidden use. Certainly, we see a more valid halachic claim for leniency in regard to muktzeh than we did five years ago.

What about the problem of hachana? First, the practical parameters of hachana are among the most complicated matters to set. To re-analyze this specific case, we will divide the question into two: Is it hachana for the shul to give the envelope? Is it hachana for the recipient to take it (home)?

There is a long-standing albeit controversial practice to sell aliyot on Shabbat, and we will assume that it is permitted (see Mishna Berura 323:20). As part of the process, it is permitted to create “pledge cards” (without writing) (ibid.). Although these notations will be used only to “enforce” payment of the pledge after Shabbat, it is permitted to not lose the opportunity for this mitzva. Giving out the envelope, as a hint and reminder to donate, is ostensibly not worse than marking those pledge cards.

There is a different reason to allow the recipient to take them. For one, it is not clear if he will use the envelope for donating, as he might not donate or might donate without using the envelope; so, he might use the envelope for something else, perhaps even on Shabbat. Actually, the main reason many take the envelope is to not turn down the shul’s suggestion that he take it, to not insult the shul or look cheap. That has immediate value and thus taking the envelope is not hachana for him either.

In summary, while we still think it is a good and nice idea to put something Shabbat-appropriate in the return envelope given to people after their aliyot, we can justify the practice of giving the envelopes as is.

The gemara (Pesachim 105a) says that one who is eating as Shabbat enters must interrupt his eating to recite Kiddush. It suggests that similarly one who is eating as Shabbat ends would have to interrupt the meal for Havdala. However, the gemara concludes that Havdala does not interrupt eating; it only interrupts drinking. Rashi explains that continuing the meal one started on Shabbat actually honors Shabbat. Since drinking is not considered a kavua (set, important) form of eating, there is nothing significant to continue. Furthermore, starting to eat when one should be making (or soon making) Havdala is a severe matter.

This gemara is the basis for the halacha that one who starts seuda shlishit before shki’a may continue freely (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 299:1). (The Shulchan Aruch ibid. mentions a minority opinion that once the time for Havdala has actually come, one must stop in any case; this is not accepted.)

May one continue when he has started eating but it is not a classic Shabbat meal, which must begin with bread and end with Birkat Hamazon (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 188:6-7)? The K’tzot Hashulchan (94, BHS 3) says that anything less than a proper meal is not the type of eating that allows one to continue. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 299:5) adds that the fact that one did not wash and have bread shows that he did not consider it important enough. The Shevet Halevi (VIII, 36) seems to disagree, positing that any food that one eats in order to fulfill the mitzva of seuda shlishit has importance, and that status determines the matter of continuing. Rav Abba Shaul (Ohr L’Tzion II, 22:8) is lenient if one ate cake since eating a lot of cake constitutes a full meal regarding Birkat Hamazon. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (59:(47)) cites Rav S.Z. Auerbach as being unsure about this matter, but rules stringently even for one who was eating cake.

It is not clear to what extent all the above opinions disagree and how far each opinion goes, as we will explain. There are different opinions found in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 291:5) as to what one must eat for seuda shlishit. While the main opinion requires a bread meal, there are others: a mezonot food; meal-like foods; even fruit. It is possible that some of those who do not count cake were working with the assumption that this does not suffice for seuda shlishit, and cake lacks importance on its own merits. If you accept the opinion that it works for seuda shlishit, it is not unreasonable that it does for continuing as well. It is also possible that in contemporary society, in which many people rarely eat bread, other serious eating would also count. We would expect a consensus (it is not widely discussed) that a gluten intolerant person in the middle of an otherwise normal seuda shlishit would be able to continue. The idea that no bread is a sign of not having a set meal does not apply in these cases.

In the other direction, perhaps the Shevet Halevi allows continuing eating only the main food with which you want to fulfill the mitzva. This likely includes all the intended non-Mezonot food and drink to go along with the Mezonot food of a breadless meal. However, if one intends to fulfill the mitzva with cake more or less alone and then, for example, when a nice desert is served, one decides to have that too, it is likely not included. Thus, it is difficult to answer your question, as it lumps many possible scenarios together, and each has its own opinions and nuances.

After discussing the halacha in general, we will examine if and how it can be different for a rabbi.

The gemara (Berachot 14a) forbids greeting someone with “Shalom” before Shacharit. It then asks from the mishna which allows, at times, greeting someone even during Kri’at Shema and its berachot. The gemara answers that the problem is when you go specially to his place to greet; if one chances upon him, it is permitted (see Rashi, ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:2) describes the case of not going out of his way as one in which he went to see to something that needed attention, and in the course of going there, greeted his friend.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) cites room for leniency once one has recited Birchot Hashachar. While most Acharonim severely limit this leniency (see Taz ad loc. 2), Ishei Yisrael cites some who are lenient to greet without saying “Shalom” after Birchot Hashachar.

The Magen Avraham (89:7, accepted by the Mishna Berura 89:12) says that once one has cause to be near his friend’s house, he may continue on to his house to greet him. A few Acharonim (including the Pri Megadim (89, Eshel Avraham 7), accepted by the Mishna Berura (89:9)) say that it is forbidden to go from his place in shul to his friend’s place. Why don’t these two rulings contradict each other? Is it permitted to go several feet out of one’s way for this purpose or not? I believe the following distinction explains the matter. If one legitimately went quite a distance to the point that he is near his friend’s house, going a few more feet to greet him is “called for” and permitted. If one is in shul and the natural thing is for him to daven, going over to someone else first is inappropriate. Therefore, one should not leave his place in shul or detour noticeably on his way there (Piskei Teshuvot 89:150 is lenient on detouring).

However, there are several arguments to allow you, the shul’s rav, to greet someone when you think it will be meaningful. One is need based. The Mishna Berura (89:10) says that one may greet a violent person before Shacharit to avoid enmity. On the other hand, he does not permit this for every legitimate need; he writes there that one should not go to greet his father or rebbe. Perhaps the distinction is that normally, these important people do not need or want one’s greeting specifically before davening. In contrast, if someone will be affected positively by the rabbi’s approaching him right away, this is likely sufficient need. Furthermore, if the problem is to not see to your needs first but to your relationship with Hashem, then your greeting to another Jew to further his relationship with Hashem should be permitted.

Additionally, the Eshel Avraham (Butchatch) suggests that it is only problematic to go greet someone in his place, but it is fine in a public place like a shul. Although most poskim reject this idea, a similar idea may be more widely acceptable. Part of the job of many rabbis is to deal with issues and help matters run nicely throughout the shul. Therefore, one can look at such a rabbi’s “domain” as throughout the shul, so that he is never really leaving his domain whenever he greets someone within the shul. Thus, there are ample halachic grounds to allow you greet and especially enquire if you can be helpful. It is certainly worthwhile, especially since it is easy, to first recite Birchot Hashachar and to avoid using “Shalom (Aleichem).”

This being said, a rabbi should consider carefully not only the positive but also the negative impact of potentially appearing talkative before (and/or during) davening. Others with less noble intentions might follow his lead, and it becomes harder to preach quiet. You are best equipped to make the local determination and find the right balance.

The gemara (Eiruvin 32b) cites R. Yehuda Hanasi (=RYHN) as saying that anything that is forbidden only Rabbinically on Shabbat is permitted during bhs. The gemara’s language implies that the Rabbis made a conscious decision to not extend their prohibitions to this period, not that it is based on sefika d’rabbanan l’kula. The Rosh Yosef (Shabbat 34a) does attribute RYHN’s rule to safek d’rabbanan l’kula, but he points out that this rule does not apply to all Rabbinic laws. If it were a simple application of safek d’rabbanan l’kula, it would apply equally to bein hashemashot entering Shabbat and bein hashemashot ending Shabbat. Saturday evening bhs is actually the subject of debate among the poskim (see Mishna Berura 342:2 and Biur Halacha ad loc.). In any case, the RYHN’s rule is “on the books” at least for Friday evening. However, there is a need for further halachic exploration.  

The Rambam (Shabbat 24:10, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 342:1) writes that the leniency applies only when it is needed to enable a mitzva or in a pressing situation. How great must this need be? On the one hand, the Mishna Berura cites the Gra as requiring the pressing need to be a great one. On the other hand, he writes (Biur Halacha, ad loc.) that even if the thing only adds oneg (enjoyment) to Shabbat, this is considered for a mitzva, even if there are alternatives. This seems to contradict what he writes (in Mishna Berura 261:4), in the context of taking ma’aser during bein hashemashot, that it is a mitzva only when there is not alternative food. The needs of guests are generally equivalent to those of mitzva (Rama, OC 333:1).

As we mentioned, not all d’rabbanans are equal. A mishna (Shabbat 34a) mentions actions that are permitted during bhs (eiruv chateizrot, hatmana, ma’aser of d’mai), and there are strong indications that these are permitted without special need. On the other hand, many poskim say that certain Rabbinic prohibitions are forbidden even during bhs for a mitzva because they bring one too close to a Torah-level Shabbat violation (see Mishna Berura 342:1). One example is a melacha that is done in the form of a melacha she’eina tzricha l’gufa. In the other direction, some say that actions that are forbidden as weekday-like activity or melacha­-related speech do not require special need (see Dirshu 342:11).

Where does muktzeh stand in this regard? Some explanations of muktzeh connect it to the concern that one will come to fully violate Shabbat, e.g., carrying to a reshut harabim (see Rambam and Ra’avad, Shabbat 24:13). However, indications are that muktzeh is a regular Rabbinic law in our regard, as the Mishna Berura (394:3) posits.

In addition to making sure the kugel and cholent are fully cooked before the transfer, two issues need to be addressed.

One issue is chazara – the prohibition on putting, on Shabbat, a food that was off a heat source onto one unless factors exist that make it considered an innocuous return to its place (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 253:2). The main factors are: the heat source must be in a state that raising the heat is unlikely; the food was removed from a heat source with the intention of returning it; one did not put it down (ibid.). When these conditions are met, one may transfer the food from one heat source to another, even if the latter is hotter (Rama, OC 253:2 and Mishna Berura 253:62). Thus, it would seem okay to take food from a hot plate to a crock pot assuming the steps were taken to reduce the chance of raising the crock pot setting (which is a separate discussion).

However, the matter depends on an important machloket: Is it permitted to move food from a refrigerator on Shabbat morning to a hot plate? Let us briefly explain the opinions and the connection. There are two Rabbinic concerns about returning food to a heat source: one may “stoke the coals” (i.e., raise the setting); placing the food looks like cooking. “Shabbat hot plates” have only one setting, eliminating the concern of adjusting. Regarding looking like cooking, some (Halachos of Shabbos (Eider), p. 313; Am Mordechai, Shabbat 7) argue that since hot plates are made only for reheating, no one will make a mistake. Rav Ovadia Yosef adds that the fact that a hot plate is known to be used only for reheating on Shabbat improves the situation, as does the fact that there is space between the heating element and the metal upon which the pot sits (Yechaveh Da’at II:45). They, thus, posit that the hot plate is not halachically considered “on the fire.” The Orchot Shabbat (2:(117)) argues cogently that if someplace is considered “on the fire” enough to forbid taking food from the refrigerator onto it, then one may move food from there to anywhere “on the fire.” However, if a place is categorized as “off the fire,” such that one may put food from the refrigerator onto it, then it is forbidden to move from that place to a full heat source. It is difficult to argue with this thesis, for if it is wrong, one could take food from the refrigerator to even a stove top with a blech in two steps. First, put it on a weak heat source, and from there move it to a full heat source.

Thus, if you follow the lenient opinions above, regarding the hot plate, you could not move the kugel from there to a crock pot, for the latter is a full heat source, as it is used for cooking food from scratch. If you follow the stringent opinions regarding placing food on a hot plate on Shabbat (such as Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:25), the laws of chazara would not preclude your moving a kugel from a hot plate to a crock pot. (If one is stringent for a hot plate only out of doubt/chumra, then it would be a problem to treat as a real heat source in order to allow moving from there to a crock pot.)

Another issue is hatmana – insulating something to keep it hot, which is forbidden on Shabbat and sometimes even before Shabbat (see details in Shulchan Aruch, OC 257-8). If the kugel is wrapped in aluminum foil or the like and put in the cholent, with the latter keeping it warm, it seems a candidate for this prohibition. (Food directly within other food is not a problem (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:72).) However, there are at least two ways to solve all problems. First, if the kugel is not fully submerged, it is not hatmana (see Mishna Berura 258:2). Second, if one makes holes in the aluminum foil, so that taste of cholent is expected to enter the kugel, the cholent and kugel are considered united enough for hatmana not to apply (Orchot Shabbat 1:93). (Additional grounds for leniency regarding hatmana are beyond our present scope.)

For the conclusion of the discussion see Moving Kugel into a Cholent Pot – Revisited

[In discussing the matter weeks ago (Bo 5779), we neglected to discuss (as pointed out by a reader) a topic that we will develop below. We also note that a discussion of the general use of a crock pot on Shabbat can be found on Eretz Hemdah’s website in Hemdat Yamim archives – Teruma 5772 or by searching in the Ask the Rabbi section with the keyword: crock pot. We already saw that the permissibility of chazara from a hot plate depends on the machloket on a hot plate’s status and that there are ways to ensure that hatmana will not be a problem.]  

Although we made the whole discussion contingent on all the food involved being fully cooked before making the move, we must see if there is a problem that the kugel was baked and now is going into a pot in which food is being cooked. There is a broad rule that ein bishul achar bishul (see 145b) – once a food has been (fully) cooked, further cooking is permitted, but this rule may have exceptions. There is a machloket whether this is true if one wants to reheat a liquid that has cooled down (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 318:4). Another machloket is whether a baked food can be put into a hot liquid, in which it can become cooked (ibid. 5). Why should added cooking be forbidden if the food is already halachically cooked (note that the melacha listed among the 39 melachot is ofeh (baking) –Shabbat 73a)?

The gemara (Berachot 38b) cites a machloket Tannaim whether matza that was subsequently cooked can be used for the mitzva of matza and surmises that those who say that cooking changes the matza’s status would also say that it changes its beracha status. However, the gemara concludes that matza is special in that it requires “the taste of matza.” This implies that later cooking does not change a baked good’s halachic statuses. Similarly, a gemara (Pesachim 41a) says that a Korban Pesach that was properly roasted could be ruined by a subsequent cooking, but concludes again that this is an exception due to the nature of Korban Pesach. Nevertheless, the Yerei’im (274) posits that the change caused by cooking a baked food is prohibited on Shabbat, probably even on the level of Torah law. The Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 318:5) cite both the Yerei’im and those who argue with him. Their conclusions are not fully clear, but the practice, at least of Ashkenazim, is to be stringent.

Many Acharonim are troubled how the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 15) allows placing cooked food opposite a fireplace, since this is, in effect, an act of roasting (see Biur Halacha ad loc.).  The Chazon Ish (OC 37:14) answers that if the fire just heats and slightly dries up cooked food but does not give the taste of roasting, it is permissible. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (1:60) forbids putting cooked (as opposed to baked/roasted) foods on the top of a pot on the flame, even though he cites several who are lenient. The Orchot Shabbat accepts the lenient position, and this is the prevalent minhag.

Thus, putting a food that was cooked in a roasting/baking situation but without impactful change, and probably vice versa, are permitted. What happens to potato kugel in a crock pot with cholent? The answer may depend on various factors: how liquidy the cholent is; whether there are big holes in the aluminum foil; where the kugel is situated; the level of interaction, etc. In most cases, the taste changes due to the interaction, but for our purposes the texture change is the real issue. It is hard to know exactly where to draw the line, and again the answer can change from kitchen to kitchen.

When considering all the questions that have arisen, many of which depend on the specifics of each case, it is hard to encourage putting the kugel in the crock pot on Shabbat, even while it is not correct to outright forbid it. Therefore, we recommend that if one wants to have potato kugel sit in the cholent pot overnight, put it in before Shabbat.

It is noteworthy that your premise of a prohibition is not obvious. The mishna (Shabbat 145b) teaches us that ein bishul achar bishul (=ebab – once a food has been (fully?) cooked, there is no further prohibition of cooking), and no gemara clearly distinguishes between solid and liquid. The distinction begins with Rashi (Shabbat 34a) on the topic of hatmana (insulating food) on Shabbat, who raises a concern one might heat up the food before insulating and thus violate bishul. The Rosh (Shabbat 3:11) in reconciling the two sources above posits that Rashi’s problem refers to food with liquid. Many poskim have offered suggestions why liquid is worse. Perhaps the most accepted is that the change in the food from the first cooking is less noticeable regarding liquids that have cooled off (see Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 37:13).

Several Rishonim, including the Rambam, Rashba, and Ran, apply ebab even to liquids (see Beit Yosef, OC 318). Yet, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 318:4) is stringent on the matter. The Rama (ad loc. 15) cites those who are lenient on reheating liquid and concludes that it is permitted unless the food cooled off totally. The more accepted explanation of this compromise is that the Rama fundamentally accepts the lenient position, but is stringent Rabbinically when it is cooled off because it is unnoticeable that it was already cooked. Even for Sephardim, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer X, OC 26) posits that the Shulchan Aruch did not totally discount the lenient position. This leads the way for various leniencies. For example, he ruled that if one did reheat a liquid on Shabbat, it does not become forbidden to eat and that it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to reheat a liquid on his behalf.

There are broad differences between opinions on the parameters of a liquid. The Beit Yosef (OC 318) cites Rabbeinu Yona as saying that it depends on the majority of the food. This seems surprisingly lenient; after all, even if the prohibition does not apply to the solid part, how can one ignore the cooking occurring to the liquid? There are a few approaches to explain. One is that we find elsewhere regarding the laws of Shabbat that an object is defined by its majority. Also, the food was already cooked, just that we say that the process was “lost” when it cooled down. Therefore, if regarding the object’s majority the cooking is not lost, we can apply the rule of ebab. Also, whether the cooking is positive or negative may depend on majority. Yabia Omer (VII, OC 42) follows this lenient position, and Igrot Moshe (OC IV, 74 Bishul 7) allows it in a case of great need.

The Chatam Sofer (Shut OC 74) says that any amount of (external?) surface liquid makes reheating forbidden. Most classical sources (see Rosh, Shulchan Aruch ibid.) seem to take an in-between approach, referring to “have liquid in it”. Unfortunately, few poskim go into detail of what that entails.