



HaRav Shaul Israeli zt"l  
Founder and President

# HEMDAT YAMIM

## PARASHAT HASHAVUAH

Korach 23 Sivan 5771

### Man is Beloved; Israel is Beloved

Harav Shaul Yisraeli - from Siach Shaul, pp. 396-398

Korach posited: "For the entire nation is holy" (Bamidbar 16:3). The Jewish outlook is that unity emanates from the fact that we all share one Father. However, the outlook is not complete if one does not recognize that there are levels of status that Hashem placed into the world. Without that, the world is a confused mixture of creations with different natures, and, instead of having unity, one disturbs the other.

The wiser a person is, the more he realizes distinctions, which unity does not preclude. Rabbi Akiva realized mankind's greatness. He said: "Beloved is man, who was created in Hashem's image" (Avot 3:14), stressing, before it was popular, that which mankind shares. However, Rabbi Akiva continued: "A special love was bestowed upon Israel, who are called sons to Hashem." This does not contradict seeing what we share, but complements it.

Within Israel, there are distinctions in sanctity, as *Kohanim* having special sanctity (Divrei Hayamim I, 23:13). When people of such stature exist in the nation, the sanctity spills over to the nation. An example is the prophets, who were separated above the people, and thereby were able to rebuke them in a manner that inspired improved behavior.

In the beginning of the Christian period, some wanted to blur the distinctions and accuse us of chauvinism because of our thesis of "You chose us from among the nations." Yet, we defended our position stubbornly, both regarding privileges and the obligation of "Be holy," despite the resulting sacrifices.

Moshe told Korach, who tried to erase levels, "In the morning, it will be made known" (Bamidbar 16:5). Just as Hashem set boundaries between night and day, so did He make distinctions between nations and within them. Denying that reminds us of the disorder that existed before Hashem decreed "Let there be light." In addition to the challenges from the outside, some members of our nation refused to accept our special status and calling. Some felt we had to choose between Rabbi Akiva's two statements. When we denied our specialness, the nations of the world also viewed us in that way, paving the way for them to display cruelty toward us.

To this day, there are people in Israel who cling to the thesis of "Israel, like all other nations." Leaders speak on our behalf, but while their best defense of our rights is the *Tanach*, they turn their backs on what is written in it. While we have succeeded in finding a basis in the Torah for our national status, there is still much confusion. The same people who say we are all equally holy say that this holiness does not demand us to serve Hashem. It is crucial to build and work the Land, but this must be done with an acceptance of the requirements of sanctity. People must realize that not all who can serve as leaders on social matters can speak with authority on Torah values. We can say metaphorically that there is a difference between true *techelet* and fake *techelet*, and only an expert can tell the difference.

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# Ask the Rabbi

by Rav Daniel Mann

**Question:** I learned that a hot water kettle is either milchig or fleishig. In other words, once one pours from it into a milchig *kli* (utensil) it may no longer be used to pour into a fleishig *kli*. Could you please remind me of this halacha's source?

**Answer:** We can provide you with a source but must tell you that we do not agree with its application. The Rama (Yoreh Deah 105:3) says: "It is forbidden to pour from a *kli* that contains kosher fats into a lit candle cup that contains forbidden fat." His source is a Mordechai based on a *mishna* in Machshirin (5:10) that when one pours a cold pure liquid into a hot impure liquid, the liquids are connected in the process and the contents of the pouring *kli* become impure. While some contemporary kashrut guide may learn from here that one cannot use one urn for milchig and fleishig *keilim*, we will present for you the consensus of the *poskim* and the logic behind it.

The strongest argument against the Mordechai's thesis is that one cannot compare the laws of impurity, which revolve around contact, to the laws of *kashrut*, which depend on imparting taste (Terumat Hadeshen, P'sakim 103). Since several *Rishonim* disagree with the Mordechai, we can understand why the Rama concludes the quote above, "...and if was already done, one need not be concerned." The question in the *poskim* is thus whether one should avoid pouring, not what happens to the *kli*.

Your case is more lenient than the Rama's in several ways. One is that the *mishna* says said that the stringency applies (according to the accepted opinion) only when pouring from cold to hot, where the hot on the bottom sends up steam (see Shach, YD 105:11; Taz ad loc. 6; Pri Megadim ad loc.). In contrast your case is talking about pouring from hot into either hot or cold (see Pleiti ad loc. 8).

There are further points of leniency. Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted (see Vayizra Yitzchak, Melicha, pg. 32) as saying the Rama was speaking only in a case of forbidden foods, not with milk and meat. We find several leniencies in regard to taste coming from milk or meat into a *pareve* food or *kli* (see Avoda Zara 76a and Yoreh Deah 95). Even if we would decide that when hot water is poured from an urn onto milk, all the water becomes *milchig*, new water subsequently heated in that urn would be only *b'chezkat chalavi* (*milchig*-leaning). Regarding such water, there is a *machloket* between Ashkenazim (stringent) and Sephardim to what extent and under what circumstances it can be consumed together with meat (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Yoreh Deah 95:3 with commentaries). Therefore, it is very logical to not apply the stringency of transfer through pouring to more lenient areas.

Applying the stringency to pouring into milk or meat is in our opinion reasonable but unnecessary. However, it would certainly be permitted to pour from a *pareve* urn into a *milchig* cup when the cup does not contain milk. After all, even Ashkenazim who do not to eat *pareve* food that was cooked in *fleishig* or *milchig* with food of the other type agree that *pareve* food cooked in *milchig* or *fleishig* can be put hot into a *kli* of the other type (ibid.).

When a significant amount of hot steam reaches a *kli* from a food, it can change the *kli*'s status (Rama, YD 108:1). Therefore, in a case that an urn gets close enough to relatively thick steam of milk or meat, the type of issues we are discussing may exist (Darkei Teshuva 105:101).

Based on the above analysis we feel it is perfectly acceptable to have one hot water kettle to be used with milk and meat. It is proper, in addition to making sure that it is not soiled by *milchig* and *fleishig* substances, not to get it too close to foods that contain actual meat and milk because of the steam that can come out (see Hakashrut (Fuchs) 1:69). However, one does not have to assume that that has or will happen and in almost all cases, the *kli* will remain *pareve*. Further precautions beyond what we have mentioned are, in our opinion, unwarranted. However, you can check with your personal halachic advisor to clarify his stance.

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# Ein Ayah

(from the writings of Harav Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook, z.t.l.)

## Internal and External Impact of a Beracha

(condensed from Ein Ayah, Berachot 7:3)

**Gemara:** How do we know that the one who answers “*amen*” should not raise his voice above that of the one who made the *beracha*? It is from the *pasuk*, “Declare Hashem’s greatness with me, and we will extol Him together” (Tehillim 34:4).

**Ein Ayah:** *Berachot* are recited by using the parts of the body that accomplish speech. However, a person needs to recognize that the physical side just enables one to express the essence, which is the internal inspiration and true recognition that come with the speech. The *berachot* contain in their depths lofty emotions of knowledge and fear of Hashem. These have a major impact on the individual people who make the *berachot* and even upon those who join together in regard to the *berachot*.

Answering *amen* demonstrates the internal goal of agreeing to and internalizing the *berachot*. Since the main element of *amen* is internal, it is important to demonstrate that the excitement that comes with external actions is not the main thing. That is why it is proper not to answer *amen* louder than the one making the *beracha*. If the answerer is louder, it shows that he feels that what he is adding is the additional excitement. It is true that this can sometimes be worthwhile, but it is not the foundation of true success but a means of reaching true realizations. Therefore, he is allowed to show his excitement physically, but he should do so in a manner that shows that it is not by answering loudly but rather by increased concentration. This concentration does not require verbalization, as it is above the level of verbalization.

The point of speech is to express to others that which one is thinking. The internal success of a person is in meriting feeling the good fortune of success in one’s circumstances. The internal recognition of the beauty of truth will fill the world and be etched upon every heart.

This is the meaning behind the *pasuk*, “Declare Hashem’s greatness with me.” One should do so in a visible manner along with others, starting with an external action and internalizing. In order for it to have impact on others it is proper that it be audible. However, “...we will extol Him together,” which refers to the internal recognition of Hashem’s great honor, purity, and kindness, is best accomplished in silence. This is to be contemplated within one’s own mind after being inspired by those people of complete wisdom who informed him of the truth. This is the matter of “extolling together” in a way that the voice is secondary, and the main thing is the realization and internalization that *amen* demonstrates. That is the reason why *amen* is said as one word, when really it represents three Hebrew words (*kel melech ne’eman*), meaning “Hashem is the trustworthy King.” The idea is that one should speak in short and think at length. For the same reason, one should not be too loud.

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## Does a Mother Have an Obligation to Support Her Children?

(based on Shurat Hadin, vol. IV, pp. 66-72)

A father has an obligation to support his children after the age of six at least as an obligatory form of *tzedaka*, and giving to his children who are in need has precedence over supporting people who are further removed (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 251:3). The Rashba (cited in Beit Yosef, YD 151) says that he can be forced before we ask the *tzedaka* disbursers to give them. The Maharach Algazi posits that even one who is not wealthy enough to be expected to give large amounts of *tzedaka* might be wealthy enough to have to support his children before communal funds are used.

In contrast, the Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 82:8) says that if a woman who can have custody does not want it, she can thrust the children upon the community. The Maggid Mishneh (Ishut 21:18) says that there is no basis upon which to build an obligation for the mother. Interestingly, when the Rama (EH 82:5) says that when the mother is the only one who can nurse, she can be forced to do so, the Beit Shmuel wonders why the community would not be obligated to pay her if she asks for pay. The Beit Meir (ad loc.) answers that she is obligated as a form of *tzedaka* in a case where the father and his relatives cannot afford it and she can. He holds that she does have a status of obligation that puts her before non-relatives of the same level of wealth. It is possible to explain the mother's obligation to nurse differently – that it is the fact that she is uniquely qualified to nurse her own baby that creates the obligation.

Based on the assumption that the mother does not have a specific obligation to her child, the Gilyon Maharsha says that a maternal grandfather does not have an obligation to support, for it is not logical that he should be obligated more than his link to the child. The Shach (YD 251:1) is uncertain on the maternal grandfather's obligation regarding the child's education. One can demonstrate that this obligation does not follow the status of relative regarding testifying together.

The Gilyon Maharsha's thesis regarding a maternal grandfather is difficult because even a paternal grandfather is not obligated as an extension of the middle generation but by virtue of his status of relative. It does not have to do with the ability to inherit (which does not go through a mother) because a brother through the mother does have a special *mitzva* of *tzedaka* despite the fact that he does not inherit. It is possible to obligate the mother and her relatives not under the obligation of relatives, which might have to do with inheritance, but as no less than the obligation towards neighbors before non-neighbors, as there is certainly closeness. Then they would be obligated only if they were wealthy enough to be obligated toward neighbors.

In conclusion, a mother only has a general obligation of *tzedaka* towards her child.

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