Shabbat Parashat Vayeishev 5786

Ask the Rabbi: Intention when Tying Tzitzit

Question: I am involved with a branch of the broad efforts to make tzitzit for IDF soldiers. We always have people say before tying that they are doing so for the mitzva of tzitzit. However, we received a p’sak that if someone forgets to make the declaration, the tzitzit are kosher, because coming to a center for tying tzitzit shows it is for the mitzva. Once, a man took the tzitzit to work on at home and then forgot to make the declaration. Can I assume the tzitzit are kosher?

Answer: There are a few halachic questions to deal with, including the extent to which lishma (intent for the mitzva) is needed. The gemara (Menachot 42b) says that the spinning of tzitzit strings must be done lishma, as the Shulchan Aruch rules (Orach Chayim 11:1). There is a machloket whether there is a lishma requirement for the attachment/tying of the tzitzit strings. The Rambam (Tzitzit 1:12) says that lishma is not required for that. He implies (see Beit Yosef, OC 14) that the proof is from the fact that a pasuk is needed to disqualify a non-Jew from attaching them (Menachot 42a), even though generally a non-Jew’s action relating to mitzvot is not considered lishma. The Rosh (Tzitzit 14) rules that the tzitzit must also be attached/tied lishma. Indeed, intuitively, this would be expected because tying is a more integral part of making the tzitzit and maybe even a major part of the mitzva (see Tosafot, Yevamot 90b) and should thus definitely require lishma. The Rambam may reason that it is not situationally clear that the spinning is for mitzva strings, so one needs positive lishma, whereas attaching the tzitzit to the garment is situationally clear that it is for the mitzva (Shut K’tav Sofer, OC 2). The bottom line is unclear. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 14:2) rules that if one attached the tzitzit without proper intention, he can rely on the Rambam to wear the garment, but that there is enough doubt about it that he should not recite a beracha on the mitzva.

Another area of doubt is what is needed to ensure things were done lishma. In the context of spinning, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 11:1) requires that one “say in the beginning of the spinning that he is doing it for the purpose of tzitzit or that he tell the woman ‘spin for me tzitzit for a tallit.’” The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 4) stresses that this entails explicit speech, not sufficing with clear thought, and leaves it as an unsolved question whether, after the fact, if there was correct thought but no statement, the tzitzit could be used.

Putting the two matters together, the Be’ur Halacha (to 14:2) says that when there was proper intention without a statement of intent when attaching the tzitzit, one can assume the tzitzit are valid and make a beracha on them. He adds an additional reason for leniency – the standard assumption that the action was done for the mitzva is stronger for attaching the tzitzit than for spinning the strings. You spoke in your questions of a p’sak received, that going to a tzitzit making center may be even better than the Be’ur Halacha’s case, as the surroundings bolster the logical assumption of lishma.

Your question comes down to whether your case is like the Be’ur Halacha’s or is even better. It is likely better for the following reason. He received instruction that it should be done lishma, which we saw in the Shulchan Aruch (11:1) is equivalent to making the statement yourself. What is not fully clear is whether the break in time and place between the instruction and the performance breaks the transference of lishma. It is very possible that the formal impact of the declaration passed (see Moadim U’zmanim 59), but the logic of it being on one’s mind would remain. (If he had started right away and continued at home, it would be somewhat simpler (see Chazon Ish, OC 6:10).).

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