ASK THE RABBI

If you were just missing a tallit, it would clearly be better to daven with a minyan (Ishei Yisrael 12:19). Arguably, it is improper to recite Kri’at Shema (=KS), whose third parasha commands to wear tzitzit, without a tallit on, like doing so without tefillin is (see Berachot 14b). However, not all agree that it is an issue because the mitzva applies only if one is wearing a four-cornered garment (Tosafot ad loc.). Furthermore, you presumably are fulfilling the mitzva with your tzitzit. While we are somewhat concerned that the tzitzit garment is not large enough for the mitzva (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 8:3) and there are other advantages to davening with a tallit (including covering one’s head with it), most Ashkenazi single men demonstrate that this is far from critical, as they men rely on the assumption they are big enough (see Living the Halachic Process III, F-7).

Regarding tefillin, we mentioned the gemara that it is problematic to do KS without them, because it contains their commandment. Important sources (see Tosafot ad loc., Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:4) extend this to Shemoneh Esrei (=SE). This is not an absolute rule, as we recite KS without tefillin when sof z’man KS is before our davening and we will later repeat KS with tefillin on (see Yabia Omer I, OC 4). Which is stronger – the preference to daven with a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:16) or reciting KS/SE with tefillin?

The Magen Avraham (66:12) writes that one who is waiting to borrow tefillin should forgo SE with a minyan in order not to daven without them. His source is based on what we might call the halachic transitive property of inequality: If one enters shul when the congregation is about to start SE of Shacharit, he must not skip straight to SE because the importance of davening SE immediately after mentioning geula is greater than that of davening SE with a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 111:3). Nevertheless, if one attains tefillin between geula and SE, he should put on the tefillin at that point, despite the resulting break (ibid. 66:8.). This shows that the importance of davening with tefillin is greater than the proximity of SE to geula. If SE with tefillin is of greater importance than the proximity of geula and tefilla, and that proximity is of greater importance than SE with a minyan, it follows that davening SE with tefillin is more important than davening SE with a minyan.

We have shown (Living the Halachic Process IV, A-3) how to deflect the Magen Avraham’s proof and pointed out that some disagree with him, but the Mishna Berura (66:40) and most Acharonim (see Ishei Yisrael ibid.) accept his ruling. However, especially because the Magen Avraham is already a chiddush, we need not extend the choice to prefer the tefillin over minyan to your case because you would lose other things as well. Although we consider minyan more important for SE than for being able to recite other devarim shebekedusha (see Chayei Adam I:19:1), it is very possible that the Magen Avraham would agree that the two together are more important than tefillin for davening. You can add to that the value of davening in a shul (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:9). Therefore, we would recommend to stay in shul rather than daven at home and put on t&t and repeat Kri’at Shema after going home.

You may have overlooked better alternatives. Many shuls have spare pairs of t&t or people to borrow from at some point in tefilla. (In order to make a beracha on a tallit and fulfill the mitzva, one must acquire it temporarily (ibid. 14:3); for tefillin, it just must not be stolen (ibid. 25:12).) Another possibility was to return with t&t and although not making it to SE with the tzibbur, partake in some of the devarim shebekedusha. (You would just need to ensure that you did not miss sof zman KS or tefilla.)   

We must first examine what makes Y&Z special. The historical background comes from two tribes of Israel described (Devarim 33:18, see Rashi ad loc.) as Zevulun going out and Yissachar staying in tents (which often represents Torah study – see Bereishit 25:27). Rashi (ibid.) describes their partnership as follows: Zevulun’s commerce was shared with Yissachar, enabling them to engage in Torah. The midrash (Bereishit Rabba 72:5) gives Zevulun primary reward for Yissachar’s Torah learning. The Rama (Yoreh Deah 246:1) rules based on this concept that two people can make a deal whereby Zevulun supports Yissachar and they divide the spiritual reward.

Is this concept unique or does it follow established rules? Generally, one cannot be credited when another does a mitzva that calls for personal involvement, on his behalf. Reuven cannot ask Shimon to put on tefillin and have it count for Reuven (see Tosafot Rid, Kiddushin 42a). Likewise, it should be impossible to have Yissachar learn on Zevulun’s behalf and have it count for him. On the other hand, there is a concept of being rewarded, not as a performer of a mitzva but as a facilitator (Makkot 5b) “like those who perform the mitzva.” This should not be surprising, as just as facilitating another’s aveira is forbidden (Vayikra 19:14), so too facilitating a mitzva deserves reward. Even making efforts to fulfill a mitzva and not succeeding supplies credit (Kiddushin 40a). Indeed, reward for dedication to a mitzva can come from many directions. From this perspective, there is no major difference whether you facilitate talmud Torah, including with your money, or a different mitzva.

Could there be something unique about Y&Z, perhaps specifically for talmud Torah? Three possible elements could make Y&Z special: 1. Yissachar and Zevulun make an agreement whereby Yissachar shares his merit with Zevulun (see Avkat Rochel 2). 2. It is not just a sizable donation but an equal partnership in Zevulun’s earnings (see Igrot Moshe, YD IV 37). 3. It refers to enabling someone to learn (fulltime/significantly more) in a way he could not have without the support (see Meishiv Davar III:14).

One could argue that Y&Z is discussed regarding Torah study because it is uncommon for another mitzva enterprise to preclude earning a living and thus requiring sponsorship. If so, if two friends agreed that Zevulun will work “for both” while Yissachar spends his days building mikvaot “for both,” this could indeed “check all the Y&Z boxes,” and they could share that great mitzva’s reward.

However, Y&Z regarding Torah may have intrinsic advantages: 1. Many sources (including Shabbat 127a, Avot 1:15) give intensive talmud Torah greater centrality than any other mitzva. 2. Becoming a talmid chacham who can contribute at a high level is difficult without serious financial support, of which Y&Z is one mode. 3. Because not everyone can be a serious learner, and close connection to Torah’s virtue is critical for every Jew, Chazal identified special ways of connecting to Torah through a talmid chacham (wife or mother – Berachot 17a; father-in-law – Sanhedrin 99a; doing business with – ibid.). Y&Z fits well with those close connections.

In summation, many donations bring great reward and spiritual gain, and there is no expectation that many people will choose the special and, according to some, demanding system (50% of earnings) of Y&Z. There are too many “moving parts” to calculate expected reward for supporting various causes, and man does not “control” his reward to transfer it to others at will (see Rama and Meishiv Davar ibid.). So, while some sources say Y&Z’s unique value applies only to talmud Torah (see opinions in Minchat Asher, Bereishit 73; Yissachar U'Zevulun (Cohen) pp. 187-189), this need not dictate how one spends on good causes.

It is important to understand that ma’aser kesafim (which you are blessed with the wherewithal to perform and bodes well for your financial future – see Ta’anit 9a with Tosafot) is not an independent mitzva but rather a mode of fulfilling the mitzva of tzedaka (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 249:1). There are various opinions whether ma’aser kesafim is required from the Torah, required Rabbinically, or a recommended practice (Shut Chatam Sofer II:231), with the latter being the more accepted opinion (see Living the Halachic Process, G-8). Poskim say that the practice has the potential of become binding as a repeated mitzva practice. Therefore, one should begin ma’aser kesafim with a stipulation that it not become a neder, or at least that he not be bound to follow the more stringent opinions (see Chatam Sofer ibid.; Ahavat Chesed II:18). It should not be too surprising that this less structured and halachically fluid practice has fewer classical sources and analysis than one might have expected.

Regarding timing, ma’aser kesafim differs from ma’aser of produce, including ma’aser ani. There is no prohibition on using funds before taking off ma’aser kesafim and no fundamental deadline by which the tzedaka must be given. (The prohibition regarding tzedaka is refusing an ani’s proper request for help without excuse (ibid. 247:1).) However, there are sources on timing intervals, especially regarding calculating when to deduct expenses and losses from profits. The Noda B’yehuda (II, Yoreh Deah 198) demonstrates that classical sources hint at a year as a likely calculation period, and the Shut Chavot Yair (224) posits that erev Rosh Hashana is a logical time to do so.

Let us discuss principles of preference and suggest a basic approach that will work well for many people. First, realize that ma’aser kesafim adds two stages to the basic action of tzedaka: calculating and setting aside the money. It is generally worthwhile to do these in proximity to each other, as once one has determined how much he “owes,” he should act with diligence.

One principle of tzedaka is that quantity of actions counts. The more chesed-related acts one does (even “smaller” ones), the better it is for developing positive attributes (Rambam to Avot 3:15). While the Rambam refers to giving money to the ani, this should apply to setting aside money as well. Ma’aser kesafim, after all, separates the experience of tzedaka, as one “takes money out of his pocket” at a different time from when he gives it to the poor person. Therefore, it is good to actively set aside money periodically, even if exact calculation is only done once yearly. One may estimate the amount due and adjust later, including downward (see two opinions in Ahavat Chesed ibid. and the lenient ruling in Tzedaka U’mishpat 5:11 and Living the Halachic Process I, F-5).

Some people’s style and finances make it wise to set aside money as it comes in (for most, from salary), and some set up a hora’at keva (standing order) to ensure consistency. However, this is not necessary and may not even be preferable according to the above Rambam. It is perfectly acceptable to time contributions when you have extra income (e.g., bonuses, help from parents, investment sales).

Nowadays, when much finance is done through bank accounts and electronic payments, it is usually wise to set aside funds in forms that make contributing sizable sums efficient. While there is logic to disbursing money diligently, for many there is great wisdom in keeping significant funds on hand. This makes sense when one wants to be prepared for large needs among family or friends or is waiting for campaigns of favorite charities. Placing such "donations in waiting" in a gemach that guarantees return of funds as needed is ideal to both keep tzedaka money in use and remain prepared.

May we always have the ability to give to others.

Joining would make you sacrifice the following: 1) Not being part of a minyan for Shemoneh Esrei (see Living the Halachic Process (=LTHP) V,A-1). 2) Having to skip, daven quickly, start Shemoneh Esrei when you probably should not have (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 109:1) and/or have compromised concentration considering your need to be at good places to answer devarim sheb’kedusha. 3) Makom kavu’a, perhaps (LTHP I,A-1). Your “hosts” gain was only moderate because: 1) Vatikin without a minyan (LTHP II,A-5) done in shul (LTHP V,A-3) has significant value without a minyan; 2) The level of their tefilla b’tzibbur with you lagging behind is questionable (LTHP VII, A-2). 3) The likelihood of their having enough people answering all of chazarat hashatz is shaky (LTHP I,A-10; VI,A-8). Presumably, most of them could have davened at a later minyan, although we can imagine their inconvenience/disappointment.  

There is a broad rule that while we should go to significant lengths to help others, one’s own interests have precedence. Examples – One saves his own life first before another’s (Bava Metzia 62a); one should not sin even a small sin in order to save another from a bigger sin (Shabbat 4a); one should not give more than 20% of his resources to tzedaka (Ketubot 50a); if only a k’zayit of matza is available for Seder night, one should try to get it for himself (Sha’arei Teshuva, OC 282:1). One would expect, then, that you should not sacrifice your tefilla to improve others’.

What the vatikin minyan had going for them is that Halacha gives great weight to the needs of a group of people who are just short of a minyan. The gemara (Berachot 47b) justifies releasing an eved k’na’ani, even if that is usually forbidden, so that he can become the tenth man for a minyan, calling the minyan a mitzva of the rabim. (Rishonim, including Tosafot, Bava Batra 13a, deal with the apparent contradiction to the rule not to sin for another’s religious gain; this is beyond our present scope.)

Closer to home, the Rama (OC 55:22, based on the Rivash 518) rules that one can force a tenth man in town to come to shul to ensure a minyan. The presence of a minyan in a community is powerful and the lack thereof "upsets" Hashem (Berachot 6a-b). Some claim that this is only for the only minyan in town (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 55:26). Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III:16) is among several poskim (see LTHP VI,A-3) who learn from the following ruling that it is important to strengthen shuls even when there are other minyanim in town. The Eliya Rabba (55:22, brought by the Mishna Berura 55:73) cites a ruling that yeshiva students should daven in the local shul which needs them for a minyan rather than daven in their beit midrash, even though, theoretically, the members of the shul could have gone to the beit midrash. This is particularly instructive because the students were asked to sacrifice both their learning and their davening (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:18). On the other hand, these sources refer to cases where the minyan in need was important for the community and/or the “tenth man” had a connection to it (Shut B’er Sarim 34).

So, on the basic halachic level, you did not have to join the vatikin minyan. The “equation” is different if you are recruited to an avel’s minyan, whose creation is a special mitzva (see Pnei Baruch 10:(32)) even if they will not wait for you to catch up. If a minyan adds something significant to a neighborhood (e.g., it is the only vatikin minyan in a nice-sized community), sacrificing for it from time to time is laudable. Remember also that employing compassion and avoiding angering stressed-out minyan seekers should be quite a “Jewish thing.” It is difficult to spell out clear guidelines.

The gemara (Erurvin 45a) says that one who goes to save someone can move 2,000 amot from his place at danger’s end (those who leave their techum Shabbat are normally limited to four amot) and carry his weapons (even without an eiruv). The Rambam (Shabbat 27:17) and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 407:3) codify this. The rationale it gives for taking the weapons is based on an incident where they hid their weapons, and tragedy occurred. Elsewhere, the Rambam (ibid. 2:23; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 329:9) says that those who go to repel an enemy can return afterward, implying even past his 2,000 amot. The reason he gives is, shelo l’hachshilan … – if we do not allow them to return home, next time they might go to save; this is not found in the above gemara.

There are two general approaches to dealing with the Rambam (see Asya 97, pp. 65-94.): 1. The former Rambam provides the halachic details that the latter omits. 2. Whereas there are set leniencies for 2,000 amot and weapons, broader leniencies in line with shelo l’hachshilan, found in Beitza 11b and Rosh Hashana 23b, apply as appropriate.

There is a machloket among poskim regarding emergency/medical personnel who have finished an episode, on whether they may violate Torah-level prohibitions (e.g., driving) or only Rabbinic ones (e.g., being driven by a non-Jew). In the lenient camp are the Chatam Sofer (V:194), Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV:80), Eretz Hemdah’s mentor, Rav Shaul Yisraeli (Amud Hayemini 17, regarding policemen). Rav Asher Weiss (Minchat Asher II:40) is lenient if needed to secure sufficient volunteers. Eretz Hemdah’s policy is similar (see Bemareh Habazak III:35; VII:34). Minchat Shlomo (I:8) critiques and rejects Rav Feinstein’s leniency. Orchot Shabbat (20:60) and Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (40:67) permit only Rabbinic prohibitions and forbid going out of the techum Shabbat. (Beit Shemesh and Yerushalayim are out of each other’s techumin. The possibility of techum Shabbat on a Torah level and its impact are beyond our scope).

A major complication is that many posit that expanded leniency, out of concern one may not go to save, does not apply when the person in danger is a close relative (see Bemareh Habazak VII:34; Piskei Teshuvot 329:10). The lenient approaches embrace practical assessments for each case, so would close relatives refrain from saving due to inconvenience?! In Bemareh Habazak, we made a logical and paradoxical distinction. If the danger is clear and acute, we should be stringent because the assisting relative will not be deterred. However, when the danger is borderline (safek pikuach nefesh), the inconvenience may deter the escort or even the sick person from going to the hospital, which is unacceptable. In this case, which includes understandable concern for your children’s traumatic experience, there is real concern you might not have gone. Therefore, there are grounds to be lenient, especially by having a non-Jew take you (which might mitigate even regarding techumin (see Asya ibid.)).

However, after asking many questions, I told the husband to stay in the hospital based on the following considerations. The children, who do not have issues of anxiety, will have awoken before you can return; your neighbors are people of chesed and experience with children. Your wife’s situation, although apparently under control, deserves greater concern and involvement.

Update: B’ezrat Hashem, Shabbat went fine for wife and children.

This practice comes from the gemara (Sanhedrin 92a), which says that one needs to leave bread on the table if he wants to have blessing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 180:1-2) brings this idea and also writes in more halachic language not to remove the bread until after Birkat Hamazon.

Several reasons are given (see Mishna Berura 180:1-2). Most of them focus on bentching, which perhaps explains why the concept only appears regarding bread. The Zohar is quoted as saying that in order for Birkat Hamazon to leave blessing, there must be something left on which the blessing can take hold and then “expand.” (Along the mystical side of Birkat Hamazon, the Kaf Hachayim recommends keeping salt on the table during Birkat Hamazon, so the table will resemble a mizbe’ach.) The Levush (ad loc. 1-2) explains that it is proper for it to be evident what one is thanking Hashem for, and also to show that he had more than enough to eat. The one explanation that focuses on the meal itself comes from Rashi (on the gemara) – we want there to be food left to give a poor person.

One difference between the reasons relates to the size of the piece. According to Rashi, it should be considerable (Sha’ar Hatziyun 180:3). Rashi’s explanation does not seem relevant nowadays, so Az Nidberu (XI:46) says that where it is uncommon for a poor person to come (we add – if he comes, we will not give him leftover bread), one does not have to leave a nice-sized piece. Another difference is that according to the others, the bread does not need to be on the table while eating, but can be removed and returned for bentching.

Why indeed do many not follow this practice, especially during the week? Yalkut Yosef (OC 180:(1)) says that since poor people are not an issue, any leftover is enough, including crumbs, and presumably there are always crumbs. It is difficult, though, to assume that the other elements can be accomplished with inadvertent, tiny leftover bread, and the classical sources who say to leave bread also do not seem to assume this.

I heard third hand in the name of an important talmid chacham that he does not follow this practice because in our days, it will likely cause one to waste or even disgrace the bread (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 3-4). Again, the question is: what changed that this should be a problem, when the gemara and poskim were not concerned?

It is possible that the different usage of bread in our days has played a role. It is clear from many sources (including Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 89:4) that traditionally, one would bring a loaf of bread to the table and cut off pieces as needed. (The concept of “sliced bread” is a 20^th century innovation.) The normal thing, then, is for there to be bread left over from the loaf at the end of the meal, and then the practice is not to remove it before bentching. Now, it is more common for people, if they eat bread at all at a weekday meal, to bring the number of slices they want. Therefore, arguably, it is less common for there to be leftover pieces, and people have less of an idea what to do with them.

It is difficult to know whether this practice is a full-fledged halachic obligation or a recommended minhag linked to the prospect of beracha (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.). It is also difficult to know how to deal with a situation in which there is lack of adherence to such a codified practice – was there logic to its suspension or was it a case of a not famous halacha just being forgotten or ignored, especially under changed settings?

If one has a loaf or extra slices on the table, we recommend keeping some there until bentching or returning leftovers for bentching (but not a full loaf – see gemara ibid). If he just brought a roll or sandwiches to the table, it is hard to know whether to recommend bringing bread just to have for bencthing, especially when not eating at one’s own table (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.).

The key to your fine system is that when one plans to eat intermittently, a beracha can continue even for a whole day (Rambam, Berachot 4:7), if he does not leave his place (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 178:1). If one takes breaks of more than several minutes, this system faces some challenges: A. After no more than 72 minutes, but for drinking, more like a half hour (see Living the Halachic Process, II, B-4), the ability to fulfill the obligation of a beracha acharona (=br ach) lapses, when the food is considered “digested.” B. After the above amount of time, there is a machloket whether the efficacy of the beracha rishona (=br rsh) also ceases (Magen Avraham 184:9) or whether it remains as long as one plans to continue eating/drinking (Even Ha’ozer ad loc.).

Due to a lack of consensus of poskim (see Mishna Berura 184:17), we recommend that if one drinks a revi’it (approx. 90 ml. or 3 fl. oz.) at one time (slower is a machloket – see below) and is likely to break for at least half an hour, that he recite Borei Nefashot on the previous drinking. This solves problem A (missing the br ach). This situation brings us to another machloket – does a br ach end the first eating period in regards to needing a new br rsh before the next eating in a case that at the time of the br ach he was planning to continue relatively soon (see Be’ur Halacha to 190:2). We posit that one should make a new br rsh (see Minchat Yitzchak V:102), but that before starting the original drinking, should intend that the br rsh’s efficacy end with the br ach (see V’zot Haberacha p. 52, ftnt. 6).

Whether you sip frequently or follow different halachic guidance (both are fine), since you do not make a new br rsh on the new drinks, you raise a good question. You cannot avoid a br ach on the food you eat (see Har Tzvi, OC I:96, that continuing drinking does not allow for an indefinite stay of the ber ach at the end of the snack). The situation depends on the br ach you recite. If it is Birkat Hamazon, you can assume the entire eating/drinking experience is completed, and you require a new br rsh when eating/drinking again (see Magen Avraham 190:1; V’zot Haberacha, Birur Halacha 37). If you eat something whose br ach is Me’ein Shalosh (e.g., Al Hamichya), that br ach will not impact the unrelated berachot on drinks.

The question is if the br ach you need to make is Borei Nefashot. Do we say that the Borei Nefashot will apply to the drinks as well as the Borei Nefashot foods? If it does apply to the drinks, the situation will be as above, for one who needs to make a br ach before too long goes by. The Har Tzvi (ibid.) recommends that when making the br ach, he should intend that it should not relate to the drinks, and then he will not need a new br rsh. However, some argue that it is not possible to exclude foods that could be included in the br ach (Pri Megadim, intro. to Hilchot Berachot). While one can exclude some foods from a br rsh, this is because before eating them, there is no existing obligation to make a beracha, so the beracha can be focused on what one wants. In contrast, when one has eaten and has an existing Borei Nefashot obligation, some say that it will apply to everything that it can.

An alternative suggestion is to make the br ach on both the food and drink. This has an added advantage in cases in which that which is drunk may not be covered by any ber ach, which is regrettable especially because according to some (see Mishna Berura 210:1), moderately paced drinking of a revi’it requires a br ach. To make the new beracha on drinking more clearly justified, there are a few ideas: 1. Limit the scope of the intention during the first beracha (see above). 2. Step outside before resuming drinking (see above). 3. Wait a half hour before resumption (V’zot Haberacha, p. 53). We recommend the second approach for people who will remember when to do what.

Question: Before leaving the house on Shabbat, may I select a hat from a box of hats in case I will be cold on the way home, or is that a borer problem, because the selection is not for immediate use?

Answer: The three requirements (each required by Torah law) of permitted borer (selection), when separating two things that are “mixed together” (ta’arovet) are: 1. One takes what he wants from what he does not want; 2. He does not use a special separating utensil; 3. The separated item will be used “immediately” (l’altar) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 319:1-2). You ask about whether one who does not plan to wear the hat for quite a while but is leaving the house now is considered l’altar. At first glance, if you will not use the hat anytime soon, it is not l’altar and is therefore forbidden (how long is a good question – see Rama ad loc.). Possible arguments that it is still l’altar are: A. Since you do not have an opportunity to do it later, the last possible time might be I’altar; B. Maybe leaving the house “properly equipped” is considered a use as you leave. Are these arguments correct?

Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (3:(190)) posits that the fact that this is the last opportunity to select does not turn the selection into l’altar. As far as leaving the house equipped, he cites (3:(185)) Rav SZ Auerbach as saying something similar (not all agree): If one selects something to lend to a friend, it is fine if he selects soon before giving it even if the friend will use it only later because, from the lender’s perspective, his use (giving to his friend) is done right away. In your case, though, you are not thinking of “helping yourself” but about being ready if you are cold later, and this is not l’altar.

There are, however, other reasons that might permit taking the hat, in certain cases. While the gemara talks about separating good and bad (pesolet), Rishonim apply it also to separating two things that are both good (but one is wanted now), if the two items are of different minim (types) (Terumat Hadeshen I;57; Rama, Orach Chayim 319:3). Two different species of fish are two minim (ibid.); one species of fish but one is cooked and one is fried are two minim (Chayei Adam II, 16:5; Mishna Berura 319:15); if the difference between the pieces is size, it is one min (ibid.).

If the contents of the box are all interchangeably usable hats (women are often more discerning), they are likely to be one min and there will be no borer. Poskim say that if one wants to choose a specific book or article of clothing, borer does apply (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:68-69). It is unclear where to draw the line on the question of how different the hats are from each other and how thought out your preference of one is (e.g., color match, quality, appropriate for Shabbat). If you cannot determine there is one min, if you are willing to take the first one that comes to hand without choosing (and without repeating until you are satisfied), it is not borer (see ibid. 78).

While we assume there can be a ta’arovet of relatively large objects (see Terumat Hadeshen ibid.), borer is less likely with large objects (see Shevitat Hashabbat, Borer 11). It is possible, then, that if the hats are arranged in an orderly manner, there is no ta’arovet (see Orchot Shabbat 3:23).

  There are two possible ways to solve an existing borer problem. According to Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV 74), one can undo the ta’arovet by randomly throwing its contents in a manner that the items become clearly distinct, and then there are no requirements. Not all agree to this “divide and conquer” approach (see Orchot Shabbat III:119).

Another suggestion is to “create” an immediate use, by wearing the hat you choose for a short time. It can be a contrived use (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:69), like the Be’ur Halacha’s (to 319:4) idea for one removing bones from meat to lick them before discarding them. A prominent rabbi told me that you would not need to enjoy wearing the hat at all, but there might be some bar to reach (see Piskei Teshuvot 319:12).

If Reuven left his property in a place/manner it has no right to be, and Shimon’s animal went by and purposely kicked it, Shimon must pay damages, but Shimon is exempt from the animal’s inadvertent damage while walking by (Bava Kama 32a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 389:20). You might compare your bicycle to Shimon’s animal. However, the exemption of inadvertent damage to improperly positioned objects applies to damage done by one’s animal, not done by a person (Tosafot, Bava Kama 27b; the person powering/steering the bicycle is considered a direct damager).

The mishna (Bava Kama 27a) says that if Reuven left his vessel in the public domain and Shimon tripped over it and broke it, he is exempt. The gemara (ibid. 27b) wonders why we cannot expect Shimon to be careful, and cites four answers. The most accepted one (Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:1) is that people are not expected to inspect their walking path. You might claim that, similarly, you cannot be expected to lead your bike through a tight place without possibly scratching an obstructing car. However, poskim (Nimukei Yosef to gemara ibid., Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 5:9) say that the leniency is limited to cases where the damager was unaware that the object was present, but when he knows there is something to avoid damaging, we expect him to succeed. The fact that the object is not supposed to be there and the damager’s lack of intent to damage do not seem to exempt.  

A stronger ground for exemption, although not for too many cases, is based on Rav’s explanation to the gemara’s exemption – in the mishna’s case, Reuven’s vessels made the public path impassable. This is based on the concept that in certain cases, a person can take the law into his own hands to protect his interests (Shulchan Aruch, CM 4:1). So, if the situation warrants it, a person may purposely break the vessels in order to get by, and he certainly is exempt if when trying to squeeze by, he accidentally did damage (Bava Kama 28a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:2).

Regarding your question, each case can be different and can be unclear. How crucial is it to squeeze by (i.e., is there no reasonable detour?)? How likely is it that you will damage the car, and does it make a difference? What is the halacha if you could have gotten by without damage, but you did a poor job? The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 412:4) seems to take a measured, practical approach to this matter, understanding the passerby’s predicament, but gives few details. I saw an approach that gives great leeway to the passerby (Mishpetei Hatorah, Bava Kama 53), but it was low on sources and proofs.

There is a third reason not to have to pay in certain cases. The damage a slow-moving bicycle might make to a car is likely to be minor. Damage payment is either to fix the object or to pay for its depreciation. (There will not be a need to replace the car.) In Living the Halachic Process (I, J-6) we pointed out that only when the normal thing is to fix such damage can the owner demand it to be fixed. This might depend not only on the extent of the scratch but also how nice the car looks other than the new scratch. When repairs are not called for, one needs to determine depreciation, and depreciation is also affected by the above factors. For an old, beat-up looking car, the amount due could thus be 0 NIS.

It is good that you not only regret what you did but want to make amends properly. Given that there are many unknown pertinent factors (to us and even to you), we will provide general rules and ideas. You can decide yourself or ask us or others for further advice.

The gemara (Bava Kama 118a-b) brings opinions and distinctions on the level of awareness the victim needs for the return to remove the thief’s culpability. We now present the Shulchan Aruch’s (Choshen Mishpat 355:1) summary regarding inanimate objects, which we will call money. If the victim knew money was stolen, he must become aware it was returned, although the realization need not come at the time of return. If the victim was unaware the money was stolen, it is enough return it to his possession without any knowledge [but in a way that he will get to use it].

There are different opinions whether the victim’s knowledge of the theft means that he saw the thief taking it (Rashba, Bava Kama ibid., who says he then has to remove the victim’s grievance) or just that he became aware (Ra’avad, ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch’s language implies that general knowledge suffices. However, it is unclear how to view a case when one notices he cannot find money but considers many possibilities – it was stolen; it was lost; he misremembered how much there was; or it will show up soon. In your case, you are unsure what your father knows/suspects. It is at least proper, if not required, for your father to become aware that he has more money at his disposal than he thought he had prior to the return, and this would fulfill your basic obligation.  

Let us now put things in broader moral perspective. A main discussion in the halachic sources is on whether if the questionably returned object gets lost, the thief is still obligated. This is likely linked to when one fulfills the positive mitzva to return the stolen object (Vayikra 5:23), which significantly weakens the theft’s stain and consequences (see Makkot 16a). Indeed, one cannot get atonement for repenting on sins between man and man without rectifying the wrong to the extent possible, e.g., by returning what was stolen (Rambam, Teshuva 2:9). One must also appease a victim over the hurt (practical and/or emotional) caused by the sin (ibid.). Regarding theft, if one takes something and returns it five minutes later without the owner’s knowledge, there is no hurt. If someone has $15,000 stolen for years, he might have lost opportunities when it was needed, and/or spent unpleasant time looking for it and worrying, and/or have been upset wondering if someone stole it, who, and why, etc. Therefore, it behooves the thief to ask explicitly for forgiveness.

However, we accept Rav Yisrael Salanter’s premise (see Living the Halachic Process I, H-5) that an atonement seeker must not cause the victim additional pain in the process. On the one hand, $15,000 in cash just appearing could raise confusion, suspicions, and sometimes technical problems. It might work to “admit it anonymously” (e.g., by hiring a lawyer to give the money without divulging your identity; sending an anonymous email on where to find the money) along with a heartfelt request for forgiveness. Hiding your identity even due to embarrassment is justifiable, especially if it makes it more likely for you to act promptly (see Gittin 55a; Shulchan Aruch Harav, CM, Gezeila 8). Considering how much upset knowing that any confidante robbed him will cause and whether he will suspect someone else, other alternatives may be better. (Giving extra tzedaka is anyway recommended.) B’hatzlacha in choosing the best way to rectify your stumble; hopefully your father’s nachas from you will bring great rectification.