ASK THE RABBI

Assuming there is no eiruv in the wooded area, it is forbidden to carry bear spray there. Although saving a life would allow ignoring that and other violations of Shabbat, here one does not need to enter the situation of danger and can stay home. The mitzva of going to shul does not allow one to violate a prohibition in order to get there. The mitzva would though justify hiring a non-Jew to escort you with bear spray or other protective gear, as this area is presumably a reshut harabim (literally, a public domain) only on a rabbinic level.

It is worthwhile to speak to experts about whether the fear of bear attacks is justified. As we are well aware, there are all sorts of dangers that exist (heaven forbid, someone can be hit by a car in an urban are, etc.). Not every remote danger counts halachically or should affect our personal decisions. However, we are not in a position to pass judgment on a situation we are not sufficiently familiar with.

The gemara (Beitza 6a) says that if one dies on the first day of Yom Tov, when melacha (forbidden work) is a Torah level prohibition, he is to be buried by non-Jews on that day. If he dies on the second day (or there was not an opportunity to do it on the first day), Jews do the burial on the second day of Yom Tov. The Shulchan Aruch’s claim that on Shabbat (and Yom Kippur) Jewish burials are not performed is easier to prove than to explain. The gemara (Rosh Hashana 20a) says that one reason to avoid certain calendar arrangements is to avoid Yom Kippur falling right before or right after Shabbat, in which case there would be two days without burial, with the prospect of decay and disgrace to the deceased.

While the laws of Shabbat are significantly stricter than those of Yom Tov, when it comes to having the melacha done by non-Jews, there does not need to be a difference. Asking a non-Jew to do the work is only a rabbinic prohibition and there are several scenarios, including for the needs of someone who is sick but not dangerously so, that one may ask a non-Jew to do even a Torah level melacha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). Burial is one of the needs that is taken with utmost urgency by halacha (see Berachot 19b). So halachically there could have been room to allow non-Jew’s doing the burial even on Shabbat. An early source who gives an explanation is the Ramban (Torat Ha’adam, pg. 80 in Mossad Harav Kook edition). He says that we do not want there to be a disgrace for the deceased in that Shabbat was desecrated for his burial. While one could make the same claim about Yom Tov, the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 526:4) explains that on Yom Tov there are anyway melachot that are permitted, so to permit this type of burial would not “raise eyebrows” in the same way.

On the second day of Yom Tov, as mentioned, Jews may do the burial themselves. However, Ashkenazic practice (Rama, OC 526:4) is that non-Jews, if available, do the full-fledged violations of Yom Tov. (The details of who does what are beyond our present scope.)

Regarding practice nowadays, there is not unanimity. One of the leading chevrot kaddisha in Israel told us they still follow the classic halacha with one caveat. They will perform a first day burial only if they are confident no one will violate Yom Tov in order to take part in the funeral. This brings us to the next point.

There are major authorities who oppose doing funerals on either day of Yom Tov. Of prominent note, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III, 76) says that two things have changed from Talmudic times. One is that there is now refrigeration, which prevents serious decomposition and odors. He claims that had that been the case then, Chazal would not have allowed the burials and would have said that it would be disrespectful to the deceased to bury on Yom Tov. He admits that once they permitted the matter, it might not make a difference that times have changed. However, he points to another halachic phenomenon that was classically applied sparingly but now may apply more broadly. People from a certain town were forbidden to bury on Yom Tov because they were not careful in their Torah observance and thus the permission might be abused (Shabbat 139a). While this approach was not applied broadly in the past (see Tosafot 6a), Rav Feinstein felt that it should be applied in America of his time. As he acknowledged, not all agreed.

One can also point out that nowadays when people come from significant distances to take part in funerals and when, again, refrigeration makes waiting feasible, few people want to do a funeral on Yom Tov. Therefore, even if the gemara’s and Shulchan Aruch’s rules apply theoretically, you are correct that their implementation is uncommon.

 There are two realms to discuss regarding the use of a goy shel Shabbat. One is mentchlichkeit. You are apparently talking about one who is paid by the community, whose main concern is its members’ most pressing needs. This includes taking people to the hospital, preventing large losses, and helping with a great need of individuals or groups. He is possibility not paid for helping with small inconveniences (and might ask for more money if he is bombarded incessantly). More importantly, he cannot be in two places at the same time, so if he is taking care of one person’s small need, he will be temporarily unavailable for someone else’s big needs. Sometimes that delay is crucial.

Now we will discuss the laws of Shabbat. While it is not a simple matter, we assume that some types of hints are considered as if the Jew did not make a request. The source is the Magen Avraham 307:31, who distinguishes between types of hints to answer the following contradiction. The Rama (Orach Chayim 307:22) says that whenever one may not do something, he may not hint to a non-Jew to do it for him. He contrasts that with classical sources that say that one may tell a non-Jew that he cannot read a letter, thereby hinting to open the letter. He answers that one is allowed to mention a need but not tell the non-Jew to do an action in a way that will serve as a hint to do that which he wants the goy to do. The Mishna Berura (307:76) and contemporary poskim accept this Magen Avraham, which is apparently referred to in your question.

However, there are two problems that must somehow limit use of this leniency. Firstly, when one sees a non-Jew doing forbidden work in a Jew’s home and/or using the Jew’s property on the Jew’s behalf, he is required to protest the activity (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2). This is because the Jew appears like one who is enlisting the non-Jew’s help in a forbidden manner. If it is necessary to protest when the goy initiated the work, how could it be permitted to hint to him to do it in the first place? The other problem is that if a goy does forbidden work on a Jew’s behalf, even without his involvement or knowledge, the Jew may not benefit from the result until enough time transpires after Shabbat for that particular chore to have been done (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:1). Again, a hint is no better, and it should be forbidden to benefit from the result.

Thus several recent poskim limit the efficacy of hinting on Shabbat to cases such as the following: 1) a situation where the Jew could have continued doing what he was doing without the non-Jew’s action, such as eating in a room where there was already sufficient (if less than ideal) light to eat by (Igrot Moshe, YD III, 47.2). 2) The nature of the benefit provided is one of removing impediments, not one of providing something positive new (Orchot Shabbat 23:(46)). Examples include shutting a light and perhaps opening an envelope (the Magen Avraham’s case; see various opinions in article #14 at the end of Orchot Shabbat). 3) He will receive benefit only after Shabbat.

In cases of significant need, where it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform what would be for us a rabbinic violation, it is also permitted to benefit from whatever work was done. Therefore, if one was careful on the mentchlichkeit matter and thus the need is great, there are many additional cases where the benefit element is resolved as well. In any case, if one is not familiar enough with the halachot, he may have to ask a rabbi before going to the goy shel Shabbat. Many communities help out in the matter by having the goy keep “an instruction manual” (as it were) handy for those who seek his help.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 8:9) rules that one should check that his tzitzit strings are kosher (and did not rip) before making the beracha to avoid possibly uttering a beracha l’vatala (of no value). There a few indications that this is more of an act of piety than a real halachic obligation and might only apply if one has to make a beracha on this tallit (see discussion and applications in Bach, OC 8 and Mishna Berura 8:22). The reason the check is not absolutely required is that there is a chazaka (a presumption based on status quo and/or experience) that the tzitzit remain kosher. On the other hand, there is a rule that we prefer not relying on a chazaka when one can easily check (see Pri Megadim, MZ 8:8).  Yet, if one checked the tzitzit before putting them away, he need not check the next morning because the likelihood of change is too remote (Magen Avraham 8:11).

Nowadays, few people check their tzitzit daily, (which is why you were taken aback), a phenomenon that Rav O. Yosef (Yechave Daat VI, 1) justifies. Possibly, our tzitzit are stronger or there are fewer things that can rip them than in the past. If this is the reason, it makes a lot of sense to check a shul tallit, as experience shows that such tallitot are often not checked for a long time and have many ripped strings. Since a guest has no way of knowing, one can argue that he is actually required to check before putting them on with a beracha. The guidelines of how to check (some disqualifications are uncommon and not every imperfection renders the tallit unfit- see Magen Avraham 8:11 and Shulchan Aruch, OC 12) are beyond our present scope.

There is no halachic prohibition to check tzitzit on Shabbat. The Biur Halacha (to OC 13:2) just discusses what you gain by doing so when it is not possible to fix them on Shabbat. He says that at the very least, it will stop one from making a beracha l’vatala if they end up being unfit.

Based on the above, the guest followed the preferred approach of the classical halachic sources and, from your perspective, should be seen as acting honorably.

This matter has a flipside, which we intend for those who are in the guest’s, not the observers’, predicament. The Rabbis were often concerned (see 4^th perek of Pesachim) lest people act in a manner that could upset others, especially in the context of religious observance. Since few people check their tzitzit and since a guest should avoid doing things that give the impression of disrespect of a host shul, the question is whether one who is strict about checking tzitit has alternatives when he feels this might be the case. Two options are to be discreet or to rely on the lenient opinions, but there is another one.

Wearing a tallit is not necessary in order to fulfill the mitzva of tzitzit when one is wearing the “small tzitzit.” Although putting on a tallit with a beracha requires owning the tallit, one can do so with a shul tallit (Mishna Berura 14:11), either because a public tallit might be jointly owned or he has permission to acquire it to fulfill the mitzva (Biur Halacha to OC 14:3). However, many have the minhag not to make a beracha on it (see Mishneh Halachot IX,234) and would thus not have in mind to acquire the tallit. The matter of joint ownership is also very questionable in our case, certainly regarding a guest to shul. Those who do not make the beracha are neither obligated in nor fulfill the mitzva and thus have no need to check the tzitzit. This is, in our opinion, from the perspective of a guest who thinks of asking, better than making a spectacle that people in shul (rightly or wrongly) are insulted by.

f we had to guess, we would assume that this question is not an actual case but an inquiry into the halachic view on issues of monopoly (if not, we will need more details). This is not the forum to write a complete learned treatise on the Jewish approach to monopoly law. The matter also depends on local laws, as on a matter of public welfare like this, halacha accepts the law of the land as binding (see Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 44, regarding the opposite question of too much competition). However, we will provide a reasonable picture based on classical rabbinic sources to help understand how a Torah-based society would handle such issues.

This specific question’s most basic problem is the matter of mispricing. If the proprietor raises prices 20% above an item’s going rate, he violates the Torah prohibition of ona’ah (Vayikra 25:14; see Shulchan Aruch, CM 227:1). While the price can depend on different factors and change, one cannot create a monopoly, artificially changing the supply and demand equilibrium and then say that his price is the local going rate. (One may mildly affect the prices by deciding how much of his own produce to put on the market – see Bava Batra 90b and Rashi, Bava Metzia 60a).

The gemara (Bava Batra 90b) forbids charging artificially high prices, most especially for staple goods in Israel (so rule the Rambam, Mechira 14:6 and Shulchan Aruch, CM 231:25). The question is how this is different from the laws of ona’ah. The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 231:25; see also Pitchei Choshen, Ona’ah 14:(31)) understands that this is referring to market manipulation to alter the price. The gemara (ibid.) also forbids creating a scarcity of staple produce, irrespective of the pricing issue. Historically, there have been many ordinances approved by leading rabbis to root out market abuses, including monopolistic practices.

So much for the public impact upon the consumer. Is there a problem in regard to unfairness to competitors? The most acute issue of competition is when an “outsider” sets up shop where a local is selling (hasagat g’vul- Bava Batra 21b). Other than that, it is permitted to do promotions or charge lower prices in order to gain more customers at the expense of others. The gemara (Bava Metzia 60a) explains that, regarding promotions, competitors can also do promotions, and regarding prices, one cannot outlaw it because of the benefit to consumers.

One can make the claim that here he is leaving no room for anyone else, so that the person who would have wanted to open a business will be totally unable to do so. When one person’s business makes another’s untenable, we have the concept of pasik l’chiyutei (Bava Batra 21b) which in some cases requires him to stop his activities. However, that is when one already has a business and is financially pressured to give it up. If one just arranges things so that another decides it is not advantageous to open a store as he was contemplating, we find no prohibition (see Pitchei Choshen, IV, 9:(9)). It is even possible that the monopolist had reason to fear that planned competition would have made his business untenable or otherwise have used unfair practices, in which case preventing such competition would not be halachically or morally objectionable.

There is an approach that even an ostensibly good practice such as lowering prices can be wrong. The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 228:14) says that lowering prices to an unsustainable price is unfair to other proprietors who cannot follow suit. After all, Bava Metzia 60a agreed to special incentives to the consumer because it was possible for the others to do likewise. Whether this would hold someone back when the competition does not exist yet and therefore no one is having his existing livelihood taken away is very questionable.

Case: The plaintiff (=pl) hired the defendant (=def) to handle an investment sum of $5,000 at his discretion. According to pl, def claimed to be able to reach 50% profits annually. Pl maintained the ability to follow the investment’s progress and withdraw the money at any time. They signed a contract that stipulated the conditions for distributing profits. The contract also mentioned the risk factor, which, it said, corresponded to the great possibility of high returns. The contract also warned against investing more than 40% of one’s portfolio in this type of investment. After achieving a 10% profit in the first few days, the investment plummeted to a mere $36. Pl does not claim that there was negligence in the way the investment was handled but said that he was not sufficiently warned about the degree of danger of loss this investment carried (def disputes this claim). Rather, pl says that since he was misinformed about the investment, the whole transaction should be void and the money should be reimbursed.

Answer: Let us first investigate whether there are grounds to obligate def as one who caused damage. The money that pl invested, while remaining his, was overseen and handled by means of power of attorney by def; thus, def was a shomer (watchman). There is discussion among the poskim on the degree to which a shomer is obligated for indirect damage (gerama) he causes (see Pitchei Teshuva, Choshen Mishpat 55:1). The Chatam Sofer (CM 140) obligates the shomer for even very indirect damage, as this is included in the obligations of a shomer. The Rama (CM 386:3) maintains that there are elements of exemption for gerama even for a shomer.

However, even according to the Chatam Sofer, here there is not an obligation for damages. Beit din’s research revealed that def acted in a normal manner for high potential gain, high-risk investments. In fact, pl did not claim negligence. Furthermore, the contract stated that the investor waived the right to make claims of poor handling of the investment fund. Pl was not able to substantiate his claim that def did not follow the guidelines that pl had given him, as in fact there are clear indications that pl gave def freedom to act as he deemed prudent.

The claim of misrepresentation, justifying voiding the agreement between the parties, also lacks merit. Def’s alleged claim of a projected 50% annual profit was not proven to be unrealistic. In fact, in a matter of a few days, there was a 10% gain. The eventual great losses do not prove that there was no potential for continued gains. Regarding the possibility of great losses, the contract spelled out that the potential for loss was great, like the potential for gain, and suggested not to invest more than 40% of one’s portfolio in such an investment.

Def did not stress orally that there was a chance of a total loss of the principal (which, in effect, happened), something which pl never considered, but pl admits that the contract relates to such a possibility. The Shulchan Aruch (CM 61:13) rules that a husband who agreed to a ketuba with certain conditions cannot say afterward that he was unaware of what was written in it. The Rama (ad loc.) continues that he is even responsible for implications one can draw from the contract’s language, and it is not possible to claim that he is not savvy enough to understand the nuances of the language. The Beit Yosef (CM 45) states further that even if one who signed a contract did not understand the language it was written in, he relinquished his rights to complain about the contract’s provisions when he signed it without reading it. One cannot claim that it is illogical to have agreed to the possibility of losing all the capital of an investment, as Tosafot (Ketubot 47a) says that it is normal for one to put himself in a situation of great loss if it also gives him the possibility of great gain.

Question: The defendant (=def) hired a distinguished law firm (=pl) to work on a major project. After pl sent def a letter outlining the work and payment guidelines and def responded positively, pl began working for def in 02/07. One matter that was raised was that billing would be on a quarterly basis. For 02-04 /07, pl billed for 73,000 shekels. In 06/07, def met with members of pl; one of the issues was def’s dissatisfaction with the high fees. Def claims that pl then set the total fee for successful completion of the project at 100,000 shekels (50,000 to be paid immediately). After much activity from 05/07 till 02/08, pl sent def a bill for 207,000 shekels. Def refuses to pay the full amount with the following claims: def did not sign a formal contract with specific sums of money spelled out; the agreement was changed to have a 100,000 shekels cap; def had specified his expectation that a specific senior lawyer would handle the project, while he actually did little work; pl did not succeed in the project’s goal.

Answer: The written communication between the pl and def, even if it involved def’s representatives, suffices to set the work agreement between the sides. It specified that they are governed by pl’s standard practices and rates. While def’s response mentioned his trust in a specific lawyer’s ability to succeed, it does not stipulate the level of his involvement. It is standard practice at law firms for younger staff members to do most of the work, under the supervision of a seasoned lawyer.

Pl denies they agreed to change the billing procedure. Def brought witnesses only to the fact that he said after the meeting that he was relieved by its outcome, whereas he is required to prove a change was agreed to. The fact that there was a long delay in billing after the meeting fits well with def’s claim but falls short of proof.

The main question is whether the delay in billing is a significant breach of contract. Considering the agreed upon fact that def reacted strongly to the quarterly bill of 73,000 shekels, it was clearly and legitimately important to him to realize the mounting costs that reached an additional 207,000 shekels. While small delays should not invalidate a contractual agreement, there must be some cutoff point. We conclude that after five months without billing (10/07), def was no longer bound by their written agreement.

Even without a contract, one has to pay for work done on his behalf, but the rate must be determined. There are a few halachic models, none of which fit perfectly here. When one is hired but no rate is discussed, one pays according to the lower rate for such workers in the field. However, it appears to us that had def known how much this work would cost him, he would not have continued pl’s employment (he already had full-time legal counsel) so it is not considered working with approval. If the work was slated to be done, he receives the amount that a person would pay for such a job. If not, he is paid no more than expenses (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 375:1). Here it is hard to determine because he wanted the work done but not at the cost discussed now.

Our case seems more similar to people who ate someone else’s meat, thinking it was from their animal. The gemara (Bava Kama 112a) says that they pay at a cheap rate (two thirds of the going rate- Bava Batra 166b) because they would have refrained from eating had they known how much they would have to pay out of pocket. In this case, where def had legal counsel on hand at a lower rate per extra work, one third of the requested payment, starting 10/07, suffices.

Def’s claim that there was no benefit is rejected because pl helped in certain areas and also made progress regarding the project, for which they deserved compensation. The fact that afterward things did not work out does not retroactively erase the previous obligation.  

 Washing one’s skin is forbidden on Tisha B’Av, including even putting one’s finger in water without justification (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 554:7). When there is justification, such as for the need of a mitzva, it is permissible to wash as much as is necessary (ibid.:8). There are other justifications besides mitzvot, as the gemara (Yoma 77b) says that one whose hands are dirty may wash his hands normally on Yom Kippur (and thus certainly on Tisha B’Av). In explaining this halacha, the Tur (Orach Chayim 554) says that only washing for enjoyment is forbidden.

Thus, there is logic to say that since few people intend to have washing enjoyment from doing dishes, it should be permitted to wash dishes normally. However, there are strong indications that we permit non-enjoyment washing only under circumstances that justify it. For example, the gemara (ibid.), when allowing one to wade through water on Yom Kippur to visit his rabbi (a mitzva), leaves it as an open question whether the rabbi may go to visit his student. We are stringent on the matter (Shulchan Aruch, OC 613:7). One can claim that this is perhaps a more objectively enjoyable form of real bathing, which thus requires a more serious justification. However, even when allowing one to wash the hands for a mitzva need, he is required to wash the minimum area of the hand, not the whole hand as we normally prefer (Shulchan Aruch, OC 554:11). This does not seem to be such a clear objective enjoyment, and thus it seems that there must always be a clear need.

We do find that preparing a meal is a legitimate justification to get one’s hand wet. The gemara (Shabbat 114b) allowed doing keniva of vegetables toward the end of Yom Kippur, so that one will have the presence of mind that he will be ready to eat when the fast ends. The Rashba and Ramban explain that keniva is washing and thus the fact that one’s hands will undoubtedly get wet in the process does not prohibit it. (We do not practice this leniency, but for an unrelated side reason (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, OC 611:2)). Also, the Magen Avraham (554:11, cited by the Mishna Berura 554:19) says that women who are cooking on Tisha B’Av may wash meat even though their hands will get wet.

On the other hand, getting the hands wet in that context is somewhat of an issue. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) makes two comments on this Magen Avraham. One is that it is talking about one who needs meat. The Machazeh Eliayhu (87) understands that he was bothered by the fact that it is forbidden to eat meat until the next afternoon. The fact that he must point out that he needs the meat earlier is a sign that it would be forbidden to wash one’s hands while cooking on Tisha B’Av for the next day’s meal. The second point is that one should not use warm water, which is a higher level of enjoyment. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 554:46) takes issue on the second point, at least in cases where warm water is necessary, and it seems logical to be lenient in that case.

The position of avoiding touching water when possible is the topic of the following disagreement. The Beit Yosef (OC 615) and Taz (615:1) say that when a child needs to be washed, a non-Jew should do it, so the Jew can avoid the pleasure of the water. The Magen Avraham (ad loc.:1) and most authorities say it is permitted for a Jew to wash him.

In the final analysis it is proper to wash only those dishes that need to be washed on Tisha B’Av. This can be to avoid flies and odors or to make sure there are as many dishes as are needed for those who need to eat on Tisha B’Av or to break the fast right afterward. In other cases, one should either use rubber gloves or wait until after Tisha B’Av. Also, unless one cannot wait, housekeeping type activities should be done after chatzot (midday), even when issues of washing do not apply (Rama, OC 554:22).

One thing that this matter depends on is whether women are obligated in Mincha. The Rambam (Tefilla 1:2) says that women are obligated by Torah law to daven daily. Since the Torah law is for any request once a day and the rabbinic idea that one daven twice or three times a day is time-based, women might not be obligated in the structure of Shacharit and Mincha as we know them. Many women follow this approach (Magen Avraham 106:2). The Mishna Berura (106:4) prefers the Ramban’s opinion that tefilla is entirely a rabbinic obligation but because of its importance as a request of mercy from Hashem, the Rabbis obligated men and women equally. According to this approach, women are obligated in at least the essentials of Shacharit and Mincha like men. The difference is in regard to Ma’ariv, which is essentially a voluntary tefilla (Berachot 27b). While men accepted it upon themselves as an obligation, women did not (Mishna Berura, ibid.). Another difference is that women who are especially busy, especially those responsible for the unpredictable needs of small children, may be exempt from Shacharit and Mincha, either by relying on the lenient opinion or because their involvement exempts them (see Ishei Yisrael 7:7).

You categorize yourself as one who davens Shacharit and Mincha but not Ma’ariv, and thus your situation is as follows. If you are obligated as men, you should do tashlumin (the makeup prayer) like them. However, tashlumin was instituted as a makeup tacked on to the set tefilla at the next tefilla slot (in this case, Ma’ariv). In fact, if one does something that shows that the first tefilla was the makeup, preceding the set one, he does not fulfill tashlumin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 108:1). Thus, if you do not daven Ma’ariv, you will not be able to do tashlumin; it cannot be done at Shacharit, as it must be done at the next tefilla period (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:(110) in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach). (One could raise the argument that for a woman, Shacharit is the next tefilla after Mincha, but Rav Auerbach rejects that logic). Even if you are not obligated in Ma’ariv, if you decided to daven it, you could then do tashlumin (see Mishna Berura 263:43). However, it is unclear whether you would be required to go so far as to daven Ma’ariv in order to make tashlumin possible (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, ibid.).

The following claim is incorrect. Between Mincha and Ma’ariv a woman is obligated in one tefilla, classically Mincha. If she davens Ma’ariv voluntarily, in effect she got to the correct number of tefillot. The above is incorrect because she had an obligation for Mincha that turned into one for tashlumin for it. A normal Ma’ariv is neither. In fact, once you would daven Ma’ariv, you would be required to do the tashlumin of Mincha (see Ishei Yisrael 36:(15)). Thus, while it is questionable whether you have to daven Ma’ariv, it is a question of two or nothing.

If one falls into the category of one who has not accepted upon herself the obligation to daven Mincha then she obviously cannot be obligated more in tashlumin than she is in the original tefilla. The question would only be if one tries to daven Mincha quite regularly except when she is quite busy, but on a given day she forgot without a real excuse. In this case, she presumably is not obligated since, in the final analysis, she does not treat Mincha as a full obligation.

Again, in your case, it is unclear whether you should say two Shemoneh Esrei’s at Ma’ariv.  While it is hard to outright require it, it can be worthwhile (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 13:8), especially if it makes you feel better or will help you remember about Mincha in the future.

[The following is an adaptation of a responsum found in one of Eretz Hemdah’s books of sh’eilot u’teshuvot, Bemareh Habazak IV, 40, featured in our Hebrew weekly Torah dispatch, Hemdat Yamim, a few weeks ago.] 

One must distinguish between cases, depending on what results from his passing by and the different ways that one activates the electric devices. Certainly we cannot discuss every possibility and “before the ink dries” there are likely to be new technologies, but we will address some major applications.

It is forbidden to step on a mat or pass by a sensor that directly activates the opening of a door (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 23:53). (In a footnote, he does raise the possibility that in certain cases, one might just stop a flow of light that keeps the device deactivated, but the above is the bottom line.) In these cases, one should wait for a non-Jew to activate the opening of the door and follow him in.

Sensors that are part of fire alarm systems are not usually affected by normal movement in the room but by smoke that makes its way toward the system. 

Regarding motion detectors on alarm systems that are used to notify that someone has entered the room, the best thing is to cover the system before Shabbat or have it work on a timer so that it is not picking up the movement during times of the day that people are meant to use the area. However, we are aware that this is not always possible.

It is important to know approximately how the system works. The system has a part that sends waves and a part that receives waves. There is then a part that analyzes any differences between that which was received during different times based on the movement of objects. The system can involve, among other things, the activation of a notification light and/or a sound alarm. (The alarm will be timed to not sound during times when people are expected in the building or room.) If the light is deactivated, there is much less of a problem because according to the standard approach to electrical devices, the connection of electrical circuits does not by itself involve a Torah violation. Under these circumstances one can more easily apply the concept of p’sik reishei d’lo nicha lei. In other words, the person who is detected by the sensor does not intend to affect the electrical circuits and even if he is certain to do so, he does not benefit from this outcome. According to many authorities, this is permitted regarding rabbinic prohibitions.

In the case where a light on the system will go on, the matter is much less clear, as this can involve a Torah prohibition. Yalkut Yosef (Shabbat V, p. 216) leaves the matter as an unsolved question whether one is allowed to walk in a place where a light will go on when he passes. Although a Shabbat prohibition results, the opinion of the Rashba, permitting closing the door of a house where a deer is inside (and getting inadvertently trapped), is relevant. Some explain that this is so because the action the person does is not related to the object of the melacha (in his case, the deer), in which case it would be permitted unless he intended for the result. The situation is similar for one entering a building and tripping a light. Yalkut Yosef cites Rav Wozner as saying that a person simply walking is even less of a direct act than closing a house’s door, which is an act of trapping under many circumstances. One could make the claim that our case is worse, as usually the people going into the area are those who operate the system, who might have in mind at times to check the system.

Thus, one should detach all lights. However, if he failed to do so and not being able to enter the area would cause an embarrassing situation or an inability to enjoy Shabbat on a basic level, he has a right to rely on the lenient approach.