ASK THE RABBI

According to our research, your idea is unlikely to bring the results you expect. Namely, mature grapevines generally survive without irrigation (Hashem gave trees great survival “skills”), although lack of water is among conditions that will decrease yield. Possibly, if you learn how to improve your care for the vines, you can still enjoy the grapes and want to keep them. However, we are not experts, and in any case, “to each his own.” We will investigate your question, first according to your assumptions, and then deal with practical halachic advice.

While it is forbidden to be destructive with anything of value (bal tashchit), destroying a fruit tree (including a grapevine) is more severe and forbidden more broadly than other objects (see Bava Kama 91b; Rambam, Melachim 6:8). The Rambam (ibid., based on Sifrei, Devarim 203) rules that it is forbidden not only to cut down a fruit tree but even to divert water flowing to it in order to dry it up. There are different opinions as to how severe a sin it is to divert the water (see Etz Hasadeh 1:4).

What you are asking about is more lenient than the Rambam’s case, as the Rambam discusses a case where the damager performs an action, albeit one which brings on the damages indirectly. You ask about refraining from doing something that is critical for the tree’s survival. On the other hand, you are refraining from something basic and with intention to kill the tree.

Contemporary poskim cite on the withholding of water with the intention to dry up a tree from a compilation of the Chazon Ish on the Rambam. He writes (on Rambam ibid.) that it is permitted to withhold water. Since the Torah forbids destruction, lack of action, by not providing, cannot be included. The Chazon Ish claims that this is compelling because the Torah forbids destruction equally if done by the owner or someone else, and it is inconceivable that someone other than the owner would be required to provide water. Shevet Halevi (VI:112) claims that it is common practice for those who want to cut down a tree to first kill it by withholding water. We note, though, that the Chazon Ish says that it is still objectionable (not bal tashchit), to withhold water if there is no need for it.  

Let us consider, though, the likelihood that withholding the water will not quickly or reliably kill the tree but will reduce the yield further. The gemara (Bava Kama 91b) gives minimum yields of dates and olives, under which it is likely permitted to cut down the trees. Grapes are not listed, and there are different opinions about whether there is a minimum amount and what it is, and whether it is fully permitted in such a case (see Rosh, Bava Kama 8:15; Etz Hasadeh 3:(11)). In general, when it is unclear whether a tree counts as a viable fruit tree, we are stringent (Shut Chatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 102). More fundamentally, if a tree has the potential to be viable and is not presently because of neglect or mistakes, it likely cannot be cut down due to its potential (see Etz Hasadeh 3:5). Therefore, for your system to work, the tree would have to clearly reach the point of no return, possibly when it is dead.

We have discussed elsewhere (Living the Halachic Process I, H-10; ibid. VI, G-13) when need (for space, damage from tree) permits cutting down a tree. You do not sound close to that, although it might be enough for the Chazon Ish’s leniency for killing it by not watering. Additionally, since lack of watering does not generally kill a mature vine, how could it be forbidden for you to withhold the water, especially if watering requires you to spend time and money on vines from which you do not get benefit?

In summary, you are not required to water the vines but due to botanical and halachic reasons, it is unlikely that this will enable you to uproot them anytime soon.

Regarding sukka, it seems to be an explicit gemara (Sukka 8b; see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 635:1) that a non-Jew can make a kosher sukka as long as he did so to provide shade. The Rama (OC 649:1) confirms that the same is true for tying up the hadasim and aravot with the lulav. However, it is somewhat more complicated. The Magen Avraham (649:3) infers from the Rama’s wording that such a sukka or lulav is only kosher after the fact, but that, l’chatchila, a non-Jew should not do it.

The Magen Avraham traces stringency to the halacha for tefillin and tzitzit. The gemara (Gittin 45b) derives from the proximity of “you shall tie” and “you shall write” (Devarim 6, regarding tefillin and mezuza, respectively) that only those who are connected to the mitzva of tefillin can write sacred scrolls. Tosafot (ad loc.) cites Rabbeinu Tam as using this source to disallow a woman tying on tzitzit or assembling arba’a minim because they are exempt from these mitzvot. The Magen Avraham accepts Rabbeinu Tam, but only partially. Rabbeinu Tam seems to disqualify people even b’dieved, whereas the Magen Avraham, working within the Rama, who fundamentally accepts non-Jews for sukka and lulav, recommends avoiding them l’chatchila.

Tosafot, for their part, reject Rabbeinu Tam’s extension of the disqualification to women, as even non-Jews are disqualified even for tzitzit only due to a pasuk, as well as his extension to other mitzvot, based on the gemara that allows a sukka made by a non-Jew. Almost all poskim (see Be’ur Halacha to 14:1; Chochmat Shlomo (Kluger) ad loc.) fundamentally reject Rabbeinu Tam/Magen Avraham. However, due to the weight of these great authorities, many poskim recommend avoiding using a non-Jew for sukka/arba’a minim (ibid.; Mishna Berura 649:14).

If the disqualification from writing holy texts does not extend to other mitzvot, then why does the Rama (14:1; the Shulchan Aruch ad loc. is lenient) cite two opinions regarding women’s ability to tie tzitzit and prefer avoiding it? Acharonim distinguish between the mitzvot. The Be’ur Halacha (to 14:1) mentions those who disqualify women from tzitzit based on a pasuk. The Chatam Sofer (Shut, Yoreh Deah 271) distinguishes that the fact the Torah describes tying tzitzit as its own positive mitzva explains requiring someone to whom the mitzva of tzitzit is incumbent. In contrast, building a sukka is just a hechsher (preparation for a) mitzva, and thus anyone can do it. Chochmat Shlomo’s (ibid.) distinction is that tzitzit must be tied on lishma (for the purpose of the mitzva), but since sukka does not require it (just that it be done for shade), it does not need to be done by one who is obligated in the mitzva.

The indications regarding lulav are similar to those for sukka (see Rama OC 649:1 and Mishna Berura 649:14(, with two notable differences. On one hand, there is no gemara saying arba’a minim assembled by a non-Jew is kosher. On the other hand, the whole need for the binding together of the lulav, hadasim, and aravot is of a low or possibly technical level (see Sukka 33a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 651:1; development of this point is beyond our scope).

Now for our recommendations. If your neighbor would ask us, we might tell him that since the only part of the sukka that there is a question about is the s’chach, he could have his worker build the frame and walls and let you happily put up the s’chach (or even just lift it up – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 626:2). Similarly, he could let you assemble the arba’a minim without needing to teach you. However, since it sounds (it may be worth checking better) like he does not want you to do it and the case for chumra is quite tenuous and only l’chatchila, we recommend to leave things as they are.

We will start with the less pressing and less severe matters – the inuyim (Yom Kippur prohibitions) of washing, anointing, and shoes. The Magen Avraham (introduction to Orach Chayim 624) permits them before Havdala. Several poskim (including the Machatzit Hashekel ad loc.; Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 624:15) assume that these are permitted even before any declaration of Havdala (i.e., in Ma’ariv or “Baruch Hamavdil …). On the other hand, some are machmir even on these inuyim before Havdala (Eliya Rabba 624:1) and others are inconclusive as to whether at least Hamavdil is required (Mishna Berura 624:2). Therefore, there is little reason to not simply say Hamavdil first if he did not yet daven Ma’ariv or forgot to say Ata Chonantanu, and that suffices. This would make it parallel to the requirements before doing melacha on Motzaei Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:10).

On Motzaei Shabbat, it is forbidden to eat or drink before making Havdala (Pesachim 105a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:1) because the obligation of Havdala is upon him. The same is true regarding Havdala after Yom Kippur. To be clear, at least after saying Hamavdil, the prohibition is related to the need for Havdala rather than an extension of the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Therefore, it is permitted to drink water, as it is on Motzaei Shabbat (ibid.). Although it is true that many have the minhag not to drink even water on Motzaei Shabbat, that is a chumra based on mystical reasons (Rama, OC 291:2). This probably does not apply at the end of Yom Kippur, and even if it does, it should not stand in the way of one who is thirsty due to fasting, and considering that low hydration is unhealthy. On the other hand, the minhag is to just hold on another few minutes until after Havdala. Therefore, one should not drink in front of everyone in shul, and several poskim are willing to permit drinking water only when there is some special level of need (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:25 (low-level need); Rav Elyashiv, cited in Ashrei Ha’ish III, 21:28 (higher-level need)). Rav SZ Auerbach is also cited (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(59)) as saying that one should drink water after Yom Kippur only after he has done Havdala in davening or by declaration (see (ibid.) why this is more necessary than on Motzaei Shabbat).

Sho’el U’meishiv (III:I:129) says that it is even possible, when important and in private, to drink water during Ne’ila which extends past tzeit hakochavim (a rare occurrence, especially in Israel). S’dei Chemed (vol. IX., p. 177) is highly skeptical about this possibility but does not fully disprove it.

The halachic situation is slightly different for women. It is unclear whether women are obligated in Havdala, even on Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 296:8). Therefore, there is logic to claim that we can be more lenient on women’s eating before Havdala after Yom Kippur (see Chayei Halevi III:43). Yet, poskim are reluctant to allow this because there is danger to the lives of those who eat before Havdala without justification (see Pesachim 105a; Piskei Teshuvot 299:1). Usually women, especially Ashkenazim women, avoid making Havdala themselves due to the doubt whether they are obligated in it (Rama ibid.), and it is possible that this is even more recommended after Yom Kippur when it is not also Motzaei Shabbat (Mateh Ephrayim 624:7). Nevertheless, poskim recommend that a woman who is hungry while waiting for her husband to come home after Yom Kippur should feel free to make Havdala and then eat (Shut Shevet Halevi III:43; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(86)).

Among the times we recite Shehecheyanu are for performing a mitzva that comes up cyclically (including shofar) and for acquiring a significant object that makes one happy (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:4; Mishna Berura 223:13). It is a machloket whether to make Shehecheyanu on an object whose importance is only because of the mitzva, as mitzvot are not considered to have worldly benefit (ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 22:1) says that one makes Shehecheyanu on the garment of tzitzit because it is clothes with importance, but not on tefillin. One can ask whether we look at a shofar as a musical instrument, which is important to a buyer like you (albeit because of the mitzva), like tzitzit, or whether we view it only as an article of mitzva, like tefillin, in which case there is a machloket and one would refrain out of doubt. Another factor is that many (see Piskei Teshuvot 223:6), especially Sephardim (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 223:3), have the minhag not to make Shehecheyanu on objects other than fruit and clothes. In cases of safek, poskim often recommend reciting Shehecheyanu by connecting first use of the object in question to Shehecheyanu on something that definitely requires it (Be’ur Halacha 22:1). This likely applies to shofar, and for you, when blowing on the first day could be a great time (see below).

Regarding reciting Shehecheyanu specifically on the second day, the situation differs for Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Sephardim do not recite Shehecheyanu on the second day if it was recited on the first (Shulchan Aruch, OC 600:3), and there is no minhag to “create” a need for it.

Ashkenazim always recite Shehecheyanu on the second day’s blowing (Rama ad loc.) even without help from a new object. However, some Acharonim (see Mishna Berura 600:7) express a preference for the ba’al tokeiah to wear new clothing on the second day to strengthen the beracha’s justification, like is done at Kiddush. If you were not going to be machmir, the good chance that the new shofar warrants Shehecheyanu only helps. However, if you use the shofar instead of the new clothes you would have worn, then there is a chance you are weakening the case for Shehecheyanu. However, concern for that is somewhat extreme, considering the Rama’s ruling and the good chance that your excitement over a new shofar (specifically if you do not often buy new ones) warrants Shehecheyanu.

The final question is your point about the shofar being used before. The Rama regarding Shehecheyanu on a tallit (22:1) says that if it is not recited when attaching the tzitzit, it should be recited during the first wearing. While some Acharonim claim that it does not have to be the first wearing (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), contemporary poskim generally agree that one can make Shehecheyanu on a new garment as long as he has not removed it, but he cannot do so for a second wearing (see Mishneh Halachot VI:42; V’zot Haberacha p. 167). By extension, if you use it on the first day, it is no longer new enough for Shehecheyanu on the second day. (One could also ask about the propriety of using it on the first day, when Shehecheyanu is said due to the mitzva, and having in mind that it should not also go on the shofar.) If you will not use the new shofar on the first day but use it for practice during Elul, it is logical to distinguish between the type of practice usage. Just practicing at home a few times to check the alignment of the shofar and the lips is like trying on a garment for size or alterations, which does not preclude Shehecheyanu for the first real wearing (V’zot Haberacha ibid.). However, using the shofar in shul at the end of Shacharit or for extensive practice, should preclude Shehecheyanu thereafter.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 131:4) rules to omit Tachanun in the “house of a chatan,” a shul that will host a brit that day, and a shul which a chatan is attending. While the Rama (ad loc.) says that only a chatan on his wedding day pushes off Tachanun, Acharonim rule that it applies throughout the week of Sheva Berachot (Mishna Berura 131:26), which is the minhag. The minhag is also to push off Tachanun if the father, the planned mohel, or the sandek of a baby on the day of his brit is davening there (ibid. 22). The idea is that the simcha that the tzibbur absorbs from these people is incongruous with Tachanun, as we find on happy days throughout the year. While it is not fundamentally severe to say Tachanun anyway, we have no reason not to follow the poskim’s instructions.

There is more than one reason not to push off Tachanun in this way at Selichot. One applies to the simcha of brit if the Selichot finish before daybreak. As opposed to the chatan, whose halachic status of simcha lasts throughout the entire time period, those related to the brit do not have a formal status. Rather, the proximity of the important mitzva of brit conveys through them an atmosphere of joy that precludes Tachanun. The Pitchei Teshuva ((Isserlin) 581:1) is among those who posit that if they get up to Tachanun when it is too early for a brit mila, Tachanun should be recited. He is unsure what to do between alot hashachar and netz hachama, when the Torah-level mitzva of mila has begun but the Rabbis required to wait until sunrise (Megilla 20a). Machazeh Avraham (OC I:154) says that since mila at that time is valid b’di’eved, Tachanun is omitted.

B’tzel Hachochma (IV:146) sees the exemption as applying pre-daytime even though brit mila must be performed during daytime. He bases this is on the fact that the baby’s status of requiring brit mila exists from the beginning of the baby’s eighth day, i.e., from the previous night. Arguably, the baby’s halachic status is less relevant than the fact that people have awoken for the day on which the brit will take place. It is unclear if according to B’tzel Hachochma, we would omit Tachanun at a late-night Selichot when the brit will be the next morning.

Shevet Halevi (IV:54) succinctly presents a broader reason not to skip Tachanun for a brit or a chatan, upon which we will expand. Unquestionably, we do not waive the entire Selichot due to a chatan or a brit. He argues, then, that the role of Tachanun in Selichot is not as a relative “add-on,” like it is in during regular tefilla, which sometimes is said and sometimes not (e.g., Shabbat, major and minor chagim, Ma’ariv). Rather, Tachanun is part and parcel, in terms of structure and content, of the fabric of Selichot. Therefore, given we are doing Selichot, we cannot allow ourselves nor will we gain much by omitting Tachanun. Some point out that similarly while Erev Rosh Hashana is too festive to recite Tachanun in Shacharit, we recite it in Selichot.

One can argue whether this viewpoint fits well with the following general approach to Selichot, championed by Rav Soloveitchik (see Batei Yosef 581:2-3). Selichot of Elul and Tishrei have a semi-status of an independent tefilla, introduced with Ashrei, ending with Kaddish Titkabel, and including Tachanun. One can claim that Tachanun has a similar role in Selichot as in standard tefillot, so it can be omitted due to simcha. However, there is stronger logic to say that we lack precedent to amend the internal structure of Selichot, and also that the moods of Selichot and Tachanun are too similar to do one and not the other.

Both practical approaches have serious proponents (see opinions in B’tzel Hachochma ibid.), and each shul’s minhag is fully acceptable. Some communities have a preference to make Selichot short, while some communities prefer consistency; factoring in these preferences is also legitimate.

Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 124:7) quotes and rules like the Orchot Chayim, who disparages those who speak idle matters during chazarat hashatz. Furthermore, it is one of the few times that the Shulchan Aruch directs observers of a wrongdoing to scold the perpetrator. So, at first glance, you could not be more right.

Let us briefly put things in perspective. Chazarat hashatz is far from the most severe time to speak (see LTHP III, A-10); the critical thing is to have the nine answering the chazan for all the berachot (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 4). There is a machloket about, when the quorum is clearly met, whether others can learn Torah (see Mishna Berura 124:17). On the other hand, it is disgraceful if, while the tzibbur stands before Hashem, members thereof are talking freely. This is both disruptive to people like you and a chillul Hashem, including in comparison to other religions’ houses of prayer (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 124:12). Perhaps because of the unseemliness or the tendency of our nation to slip into bad habits of such talking that the poskim tried to nip the problem in the bud with strong language and action.

 Classic tochacha (rebuke) is done to change the actions of one who sinned knowingly. Although the mitzva exists nowadays, most follow the approach that one should not rebuke when it is not expected to be heeded, and, to the contrary, cause a negative reaction (see Yevamot 65a; see Amud Hay’mini, siman 10; regarding feared severe reactions, see Minchat Shlomo I:35). In most of today’s Orthodox shuls, where people basically understand that they should not be talking, there is little concern of causing hatred of religion. However, as you witnessed, rebuke still causes friction, which should be avoided when it provides no gain.

There is less chance that tochacha will be successful when many people are in the wrong together. Psychologically, they may feel that if talking was a REAL problem, not so many good people would be doing it. Also, the rebuker becomes a “public enemy,” i.e., easier to dismiss and criticize. Indeed, we find in several poskim resignation about the ability to “take on” those who talk during chazarat hashatz (Aruch Hashulchan ibid.; Shevet Halevi X:13).

It is not always a question of if to correct someone but when, how, and by whom it should be done. Consider the following application (see Rashi, Devarim 1:3) regarding timing. Yaakov, Moshe, Yehoshua, and Shmuel all waited until close to their deaths to rebuke their constituencies, out of concern that earlier rebuke might have caused them to change allegiances in favor of a path of evil. The same is true regarding who should be rebuking and how. The community leaders, especially the rabbi, are the ones who should be in charge of decisions and efforts.

Therefore, we recommend discussing the matter again with the shul’s rabbi, who should have his finger on the pulse more than anyone else. His not taking a strong stand in the past certainly does not mean that he does not care. He is likely to request that you not make waves at all. He may give you some guidelines on how, when, and to whom to express your dissatisfaction with the talking. While it is sad to have to curb your correct emotions, this too is part of serving Hashem.

We believe the counterargument is correct.

Pirkei Avot actually cites two opinions, and the main one is that if one realizes that “yours is yours,” even if he treats “his as his,” employs an “average approach.” Furthermore, the mishna does not discuss specific actions but an approach to life. If someone is often forthcoming with his property, he is not following “sheli sheli” even if he asks money to use some of his things. It is wonderful for your friend to emulate Avraham Avinu and be consistently generous, but failing to reach that level does not put one in the opposite camp.

Is one required to allow to borrow his property (for free)? In five contexts in Shas, at least one opinion prescribes forcing Reuven to cede to Shimon a financial right in a way that does not hurt Reuven and thereby avoid middat S’dom. None of those cases refers to lending one’s property to someone else.

Consider the possibility that one is always required to let people use his things for free. Are the halachic discussions of rentals only for sinners? Realize that this would cancel large elements of healthy markets. What incentive would one who can afford more property than he needs have to buy and rent out property to one who can only afford a rental?

Undoubtedly, then, one who wants to be a landlord may buy property in order to rent it out. It is also obvious that if he bought it for secondary usage without a plan to rent but then decides that he wants rental income, he can turn it into rental property. The question is only if he does not plan to use it on any regular basis for rental, and the opportunity arises to allow someone to use it on a one-time basis. Here, there is logic to say that if he is not looking to use it for profit, why not be altruistic and give it for free?

The argument for no pay is bolstered by the sugya of zeh neheneh v’zeh lo chaser (Bava Kama 20a – 21a), regarding whether when Shimon already lived in Reuven’s property without permission, he must pay for that usage. The two pertinent variables are whether Shimon was otherwise slated to rent living quarters, in which case he benefited from Reuven, and whether Reuven is in the practice of renting out his property, so that he loses if Shimon lived there for free. We rule that if Reuven did not lose, Shimon is exempt even if he benefitted (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 363:6).

Does the fact that Shimon does not have to pay, because Reuven did not lose, mean that Reuven must permit free usage if asked for permission in the first place? Tosafot (ibid. 20b) says that the person has a right to refuse use of his property; it is not considered middat S’dom (see Noda B’yehuda II, CM 24). The Rama (CM 363:6) rules that as long as one can rent it out if he wants to, he may he charge for it. In contrast, if the possibility of rental does not exist, he cannot demand pay, as it would be considered middat S’dom.

Note also that the possibility of forcing sharing due to middat S’dom could exist only when lending causes no loss of any sort (see Pitchei Choshen, Geneiva 8:(1)). Regarding use of one’s apartment, there could be many factors of “loss.” We will mention a few out of many possibilities: concern that Shimon’s kids might damage it; Reuven may be inconvenienced making sure the place is tidy for Shimon; Reuven’s privacy could be compromised. If Reuven can refuse, he can also say that he is willing, but only if payment makes the danger/trouble worth his while.

The argument to have them – Mezuza is a Torah-level obligatory mitzva for one living in a standard house, applying as long as he lives there. Therefore, presumably one who is capable of fulfilling the mitzva without an interruption of hours or days (while it is at the sofer) should do so. There is even an opinion that if one’s mezuza falls on Shabbat, if he can spend the rest of the day somewhere else, he should do so (see discussion in Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 285:1).

In practice – There is no need. One strong indication not to require replacement mezuzot is that since Halacha requires checking every few years (Yoma 11a) and classical poskim do not talk about replacements, it must not be necessary. This is bolstered by accounts of great rabbis who did not seek replacements (see Revevot Ephraim V:548 about Rav Moshe Feinstein, albeit apparently regarding a shorter check at home). One can suggest a proof by means of “reduction to absurdity.” If one may not be without mezuza for hours/days, then it should not be permitted even for seconds (where is the cutoff point!?), which would require you to put one up exactly as you remove the one to be checked, which does not seem plausible. One could deflect this by saying that the Torah requires it to be done close to right away, or perhaps that it is not prohibited to be without it, but one who can have mezuzot all the time is expected to do so in a normal amount of time.

There are a couple of explanations why one need not be concerned. Arguably, the mitzva is “for the life of living there,” so missing hours every few years for a good reason is considered a 100% fulfillment of the mitzva. After all, many understand that tefillin is a mitzva all day (see Be’ur Halacha to 37:1), and yet we suffice, for good reasons, with wearing them during Shacharit. We seem to be doing better than that for mezuzot even without replacements during checking.

Another possibility (see discussion in Shevet Hakehati I:273) is that there is a special dispensation made for the purpose of checking mezuzot, which is, after all, a halachic requirement (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 291:1). Perhaps we can explain that since it is not practical to expect everyone to have replacement mezuza, the practice of checking includes a dispensation from mezuza as long as is necessary for the checking. Some possible differences between approaches are: how fast one must act once the sofer has completed his work (see Rivevot Ephrayim ibid., who thinks one should act promptly); order of action if the return of the mezuzot coincides with another mitzva (ibid.); whether it is a good thing to check the mezuzot more than Halacha requires (see Shevet Hakehati ibid.) or to do a check that takes longer.

Is there at least a voluntary preference to use replacement mezuzot? Although ostensibly “Why not?” there are a few drawbacks. Shevet Hakehati (ibid.) references a precedent regarding the laws of checking mezuzot that when we make it difficult to check, people push it off (see Rashi, Yoma 11a). We can add that it complicates the berachot situation. In Living the Halachic Process I:G-5, we discuss the machloket about whether to make a beracha upon returning the mezuzot after the check. If you put back different ones, or use replacements, it likely calls for berachot because berachot are impacted by the mezuza used (see Chovat Hadar 11:14). However, if one is exempt from having mezuzot during the check, there is an additional question whether a beracha is called for when putting up replacements (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 475:39). There is always the general question about how good an idea it is to act stringently when it is clearly not required (beyond our present scope).

Therefore, our recommendation is just to do what almost everyone does – not use replacement mezuzot. Exceptions can be when there will be a delay of several days or if the house will be left with no mezuzot.

The discussion breaks up into two parts. 1) Ma’asrot to which hafrasha (“taking off” – they are actually described as being set aside but only the trumot, not the ma’asrot are physically taken off) at processing centers, which is done on a mass scale. In that case, on the one hand, the mitzva is significant but on the other hand, it is daunting (one competes in the market with people who will not be taking off close to 20%). 2) Ma’asrot from produce that grew in one’s garden or was bought in a store that does not take off ma’asrot.

1) The major kashrut organizations do not require that the ma’asrot that were declared were given. Although there is an opinion that hafrasha that was done with an intention not to give is invalid, the consensus is that failure to give does not invalidate the hafrasha; therefore, that the produce is not tevel (Shut Har Tzvi, Zeraim I:44). Regarding ma’aser rishon, going to a levi, it has become standard to rely on the idea (Chazon Ish, Shvi’it 5:12) that since the practice is that that we give aliyot to levi’im just on their word, we do not want a situation in which one has significant financial benefit by claiming he is a levi. (It may be relevant, that on the level of spirit of the law, the mitzva is intended to compensate members of the tribe for their full-time involvement in the nation’s spiritual needs (see Bamidbar 18:31).)

There are obviously poor people who can prove their poverty, and so it is more difficult to not give to them. Presumably, kashrut organizations suffice with making the produce permitted to eat, and leave the decision of whether to give ma’aser ani (see below a way it can be done) to the farmer, who will also consider his ability to stay profitable.

2) Most produce in Israel undergoes the taking of trumot and ma’asrot at processing or distribution centers. Therefore, even if one buys at a supermarket without a hechsher, it is rarely more than a safek whether it needs further tithing. Under those circumstances, one does not have to give the ma’asrot he “took off” (see discussion in Mishpetei Eretz, Trumot U’maasrot 17:2).

In regard to that which grows locally or can be traced to a process that does not include hafrasha, the situation is as follows. Regarding ma’aser rishon, some still rely on the Chazon Ish and do not give. Presumably, it would be wonderful to have a levi to give the portion of the produce that correspond to the ma’aser, as a levi would likely be pleased to give expression to his levi status; he could then either keep the produce or gift it back.

Regarding ma’aser ani, it is usually not very useful and actually insulting to be designated a recipient of ma’aser ani and receive minimal benefit from it. A halachically practical system is to lend money to a poor person of an amount that corresponds to the expected value of all the ma’aser ani of that period. The loan works with the condition that it will be paid back only with the ani’s nominal (non-physical) acceptance (as ma’aser ani) and return (as loan payment) of the produce to the giver (Mishpetei Eretz ibid. 9). Because arranging all of this is not so simple, fine organizations (that deal with land-based mitzvot) arrange everything and have people sign up and pay a set fee, which includes the money for the loan that halachically facilitates the ma’aser giving. The same can be done regarding giving to levi’im. It can also work for farmers, who would have to give a lot more than a non-producer, but for whom there is also a mechanism that makes it much cheaper than 10% of the market value of his produce (details are beyond our present scope).  

The first candidate for prohibition is the melacha of koreiah (tearing/cutting material). The mishna (Shabbat 73a) describes the case as being done to subsequently sew up, but the Rambam (Shabbat 10:10) indicates that it applies whenever the tearing has a positive outcome (see Be’ur Halacha to 340:14).

Because it is flimsy, it is possible that koreiah does not apply to the thread itself (see Rav SZ Auerbach, cited in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (=SSK) 35:(48), regarding the fibers that rip when one pulls off a piece of cotton – admittedly, thread is stronger). Also, the thread has no independent significance and will never be used again.  

On the other hand, one is severing part of the garment, which is thereby improved. Location and context can make a difference. If one cuts off strings at the edges, it may violate the melacha of mechatech (Be’ur Halacha to 340:13 in the name of the Yerushalmi – a less than authoritative source applies that prohibition to our case). SSK (15:66) forbids removing a string of warp or woof from a woven fabric as potzeia (the opposite of weaving). Orchot Shabbat (11:(26), and citing communication with Rav N. Karelitz) makes a distinction for leniency in our case. The string protruding from a garment is not considered a part of the fabric, and so cutting it, even close to the garment, relates only to the thread. This is different from the leftover stitching from a button that fell or pieces of wool that protrude from the fabric, where they are more significantly interconnected and many forbid removing them (see SSK 15:68; Orchot Shabbat 11:18). The case for leniency is bolstered by the opinion (Be’ur Halacha ibid.) that koreiah is when both sides of the rip are used afterwards, and perhaps it is not even Rabbinic koreiah when this is not so (Chut Shani, Shabbat I, p. 142).

Sometimes it is permitted to cut string around a utensil even when the cutting facilitates using the utensil (Shulchan Aruch, OC 314:8). However, that is a special leniency that applies to destroying an impediment that is preventing one to get to food (see Chazon Ish, OC 51:13). One cannot learn from there to cutting a string in order to beautify the thing to which it is attached.

Another potential problem is makeh b’patish (=mbp), a Torah-level prohibition of doing a final stage of preparing a utensil, or the related Rabbinic prohibition of tikkun mana. In other words, a suit with uncut threads from its sewing is a not fully ready-to-wear suit. The gemara (Shabbat 48a) forbids on the Torah-level opening the knots that are made to the collar area of a cloak, and Rashi (ad loc.) explains that this is mbp. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 302:2) forbids purposely removing the pills that formed on clothing as mbp. The more serious the imperfection, the more likely it is that it might be considered mbp/tikkun mana. Since in the garment industry, one of the final things that was classically done before sending the suit to market is “thread trimming,” it is quite plausible that the cutting would be mbp, especially regarding a new suit where the thread always stuck out. On the other hand, while poskim debate whether and when one may remove a label from a suit (SSK 15:79; Orchot Shabbat 11:13), they do not consider it mbp, even though it is something one always does before wearing it. There are differences with this case (see ibid. (20)), but applications of mbp are among halachic matters that are very difficult to predict.

To be honest, your case has happened to me many times, and I have always thought (I believe like most shomrei Shabbat), that it was forbidden to cut the hanging threads. To my surprise, the only serious discussion I found is in Orchot Shabbat (11:(26)), which is not a lenient sefer, and he believes it is permitted to cut them. I have read and heard “passing” opinions of respected rabbanim who forbid it. So, I do not plan to be lenient for myself, but I would not rule clearly that it is forbidden.