ASK THE RABBI

This practice comes from the gemara (Sanhedrin 92a), which says that one needs to leave bread on the table if he wants to have blessing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 180:1-2) brings this idea and also writes in more halachic language not to remove the bread until after Birkat Hamazon.

Several reasons are given (see Mishna Berura 180:1-2). Most of them focus on bentching, which perhaps explains why the concept only appears regarding bread. The Zohar is quoted as saying that in order for Birkat Hamazon to leave blessing, there must be something left on which the blessing can take hold and then “expand.” (Along the mystical side of Birkat Hamazon, the Kaf Hachayim recommends keeping salt on the table during Birkat Hamazon, so the table will resemble a mizbe’ach.) The Levush (ad loc. 1-2) explains that it is proper for it to be evident what one is thanking Hashem for, and also to show that he had more than enough to eat. The one explanation that focuses on the meal itself comes from Rashi (on the gemara) – we want there to be food left to give a poor person.

One difference between the reasons relates to the size of the piece. According to Rashi, it should be considerable (Sha’ar Hatziyun 180:3). Rashi’s explanation does not seem relevant nowadays, so Az Nidberu (XI:46) says that where it is uncommon for a poor person to come (we add – if he comes, we will not give him leftover bread), one does not have to leave a nice-sized piece. Another difference is that according to the others, the bread does not need to be on the table while eating, but can be removed and returned for bentching.

Why indeed do many not follow this practice, especially during the week? Yalkut Yosef (OC 180:(1)) says that since poor people are not an issue, any leftover is enough, including crumbs, and presumably there are always crumbs. It is difficult, though, to assume that the other elements can be accomplished with inadvertent, tiny leftover bread, and the classical sources who say to leave bread also do not seem to assume this.

I heard third hand in the name of an important talmid chacham that he does not follow this practice because in our days, it will likely cause one to waste or even disgrace the bread (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 3-4). Again, the question is: what changed that this should be a problem, when the gemara and poskim were not concerned?

It is possible that the different usage of bread in our days has played a role. It is clear from many sources (including Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 89:4) that traditionally, one would bring a loaf of bread to the table and cut off pieces as needed. (The concept of “sliced bread” is a 20^th century innovation.) The normal thing, then, is for there to be bread left over from the loaf at the end of the meal, and then the practice is not to remove it before bentching. Now, it is more common for people, if they eat bread at all at a weekday meal, to bring the number of slices they want. Therefore, arguably, it is less common for there to be leftover pieces, and people have less of an idea what to do with them.

It is difficult to know whether this practice is a full-fledged halachic obligation or a recommended minhag linked to the prospect of beracha (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.). It is also difficult to know how to deal with a situation in which there is lack of adherence to such a codified practice – was there logic to its suspension or was it a case of a not famous halacha just being forgotten or ignored, especially under changed settings?

If one has a loaf or extra slices on the table, we recommend keeping some there until bentching or returning leftovers for bentching (but not a full loaf – see gemara ibid). If he just brought a roll or sandwiches to the table, it is hard to know whether to recommend bringing bread just to have for bencthing, especially when not eating at one’s own table (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.).

The key to your fine system is that when one plans to eat intermittently, a beracha can continue even for a whole day (Rambam, Berachot 4:7), if he does not leave his place (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 178:1). If one takes breaks of more than several minutes, this system faces some challenges: A. After no more than 72 minutes, but for drinking, more like a half hour (see Living the Halachic Process, II, B-4), the ability to fulfill the obligation of a beracha acharona (=br ach) lapses, when the food is considered “digested.” B. After the above amount of time, there is a machloket whether the efficacy of the beracha rishona (=br rsh) also ceases (Magen Avraham 184:9) or whether it remains as long as one plans to continue eating/drinking (Even Ha’ozer ad loc.).

Due to a lack of consensus of poskim (see Mishna Berura 184:17), we recommend that if one drinks a revi’it (approx. 90 ml. or 3 fl. oz.) at one time (slower is a machloket – see below) and is likely to break for at least half an hour, that he recite Borei Nefashot on the previous drinking. This solves problem A (missing the br ach). This situation brings us to another machloket – does a br ach end the first eating period in regards to needing a new br rsh before the next eating in a case that at the time of the br ach he was planning to continue relatively soon (see Be’ur Halacha to 190:2). We posit that one should make a new br rsh (see Minchat Yitzchak V:102), but that before starting the original drinking, should intend that the br rsh’s efficacy end with the br ach (see V’zot Haberacha p. 52, ftnt. 6).

Whether you sip frequently or follow different halachic guidance (both are fine), since you do not make a new br rsh on the new drinks, you raise a good question. You cannot avoid a br ach on the food you eat (see Har Tzvi, OC I:96, that continuing drinking does not allow for an indefinite stay of the ber ach at the end of the snack). The situation depends on the br ach you recite. If it is Birkat Hamazon, you can assume the entire eating/drinking experience is completed, and you require a new br rsh when eating/drinking again (see Magen Avraham 190:1; V’zot Haberacha, Birur Halacha 37). If you eat something whose br ach is Me’ein Shalosh (e.g., Al Hamichya), that br ach will not impact the unrelated berachot on drinks.

The question is if the br ach you need to make is Borei Nefashot. Do we say that the Borei Nefashot will apply to the drinks as well as the Borei Nefashot foods? If it does apply to the drinks, the situation will be as above, for one who needs to make a br ach before too long goes by. The Har Tzvi (ibid.) recommends that when making the br ach, he should intend that it should not relate to the drinks, and then he will not need a new br rsh. However, some argue that it is not possible to exclude foods that could be included in the br ach (Pri Megadim, intro. to Hilchot Berachot). While one can exclude some foods from a br rsh, this is because before eating them, there is no existing obligation to make a beracha, so the beracha can be focused on what one wants. In contrast, when one has eaten and has an existing Borei Nefashot obligation, some say that it will apply to everything that it can.

An alternative suggestion is to make the br ach on both the food and drink. This has an added advantage in cases in which that which is drunk may not be covered by any ber ach, which is regrettable especially because according to some (see Mishna Berura 210:1), moderately paced drinking of a revi’it requires a br ach. To make the new beracha on drinking more clearly justified, there are a few ideas: 1. Limit the scope of the intention during the first beracha (see above). 2. Step outside before resuming drinking (see above). 3. Wait a half hour before resumption (V’zot Haberacha, p. 53). We recommend the second approach for people who will remember when to do what.

Question: Before leaving the house on Shabbat, may I select a hat from a box of hats in case I will be cold on the way home, or is that a borer problem, because the selection is not for immediate use?

Answer: The three requirements (each required by Torah law) of permitted borer (selection), when separating two things that are “mixed together” (ta’arovet) are: 1. One takes what he wants from what he does not want; 2. He does not use a special separating utensil; 3. The separated item will be used “immediately” (l’altar) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 319:1-2). You ask about whether one who does not plan to wear the hat for quite a while but is leaving the house now is considered l’altar. At first glance, if you will not use the hat anytime soon, it is not l’altar and is therefore forbidden (how long is a good question – see Rama ad loc.). Possible arguments that it is still l’altar are: A. Since you do not have an opportunity to do it later, the last possible time might be I’altar; B. Maybe leaving the house “properly equipped” is considered a use as you leave. Are these arguments correct?

Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (3:(190)) posits that the fact that this is the last opportunity to select does not turn the selection into l’altar. As far as leaving the house equipped, he cites (3:(185)) Rav SZ Auerbach as saying something similar (not all agree): If one selects something to lend to a friend, it is fine if he selects soon before giving it even if the friend will use it only later because, from the lender’s perspective, his use (giving to his friend) is done right away. In your case, though, you are not thinking of “helping yourself” but about being ready if you are cold later, and this is not l’altar.

There are, however, other reasons that might permit taking the hat, in certain cases. While the gemara talks about separating good and bad (pesolet), Rishonim apply it also to separating two things that are both good (but one is wanted now), if the two items are of different minim (types) (Terumat Hadeshen I;57; Rama, Orach Chayim 319:3). Two different species of fish are two minim (ibid.); one species of fish but one is cooked and one is fried are two minim (Chayei Adam II, 16:5; Mishna Berura 319:15); if the difference between the pieces is size, it is one min (ibid.).

If the contents of the box are all interchangeably usable hats (women are often more discerning), they are likely to be one min and there will be no borer. Poskim say that if one wants to choose a specific book or article of clothing, borer does apply (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:68-69). It is unclear where to draw the line on the question of how different the hats are from each other and how thought out your preference of one is (e.g., color match, quality, appropriate for Shabbat). If you cannot determine there is one min, if you are willing to take the first one that comes to hand without choosing (and without repeating until you are satisfied), it is not borer (see ibid. 78).

While we assume there can be a ta’arovet of relatively large objects (see Terumat Hadeshen ibid.), borer is less likely with large objects (see Shevitat Hashabbat, Borer 11). It is possible, then, that if the hats are arranged in an orderly manner, there is no ta’arovet (see Orchot Shabbat 3:23).

  There are two possible ways to solve an existing borer problem. According to Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV 74), one can undo the ta’arovet by randomly throwing its contents in a manner that the items become clearly distinct, and then there are no requirements. Not all agree to this “divide and conquer” approach (see Orchot Shabbat III:119).

Another suggestion is to “create” an immediate use, by wearing the hat you choose for a short time. It can be a contrived use (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 3:69), like the Be’ur Halacha’s (to 319:4) idea for one removing bones from meat to lick them before discarding them. A prominent rabbi told me that you would not need to enjoy wearing the hat at all, but there might be some bar to reach (see Piskei Teshuvot 319:12).

If Reuven left his property in a place/manner it has no right to be, and Shimon’s animal went by and purposely kicked it, Shimon must pay damages, but Shimon is exempt from the animal’s inadvertent damage while walking by (Bava Kama 32a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 389:20). You might compare your bicycle to Shimon’s animal. However, the exemption of inadvertent damage to improperly positioned objects applies to damage done by one’s animal, not done by a person (Tosafot, Bava Kama 27b; the person powering/steering the bicycle is considered a direct damager).

The mishna (Bava Kama 27a) says that if Reuven left his vessel in the public domain and Shimon tripped over it and broke it, he is exempt. The gemara (ibid. 27b) wonders why we cannot expect Shimon to be careful, and cites four answers. The most accepted one (Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:1) is that people are not expected to inspect their walking path. You might claim that, similarly, you cannot be expected to lead your bike through a tight place without possibly scratching an obstructing car. However, poskim (Nimukei Yosef to gemara ibid., Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 5:9) say that the leniency is limited to cases where the damager was unaware that the object was present, but when he knows there is something to avoid damaging, we expect him to succeed. The fact that the object is not supposed to be there and the damager’s lack of intent to damage do not seem to exempt.  

A stronger ground for exemption, although not for too many cases, is based on Rav’s explanation to the gemara’s exemption – in the mishna’s case, Reuven’s vessels made the public path impassable. This is based on the concept that in certain cases, a person can take the law into his own hands to protect his interests (Shulchan Aruch, CM 4:1). So, if the situation warrants it, a person may purposely break the vessels in order to get by, and he certainly is exempt if when trying to squeeze by, he accidentally did damage (Bava Kama 28a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:2).

Regarding your question, each case can be different and can be unclear. How crucial is it to squeeze by (i.e., is there no reasonable detour?)? How likely is it that you will damage the car, and does it make a difference? What is the halacha if you could have gotten by without damage, but you did a poor job? The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 412:4) seems to take a measured, practical approach to this matter, understanding the passerby’s predicament, but gives few details. I saw an approach that gives great leeway to the passerby (Mishpetei Hatorah, Bava Kama 53), but it was low on sources and proofs.

There is a third reason not to have to pay in certain cases. The damage a slow-moving bicycle might make to a car is likely to be minor. Damage payment is either to fix the object or to pay for its depreciation. (There will not be a need to replace the car.) In Living the Halachic Process (I, J-6) we pointed out that only when the normal thing is to fix such damage can the owner demand it to be fixed. This might depend not only on the extent of the scratch but also how nice the car looks other than the new scratch. When repairs are not called for, one needs to determine depreciation, and depreciation is also affected by the above factors. For an old, beat-up looking car, the amount due could thus be 0 NIS.

It is good that you not only regret what you did but want to make amends properly. Given that there are many unknown pertinent factors (to us and even to you), we will provide general rules and ideas. You can decide yourself or ask us or others for further advice.

The gemara (Bava Kama 118a-b) brings opinions and distinctions on the level of awareness the victim needs for the return to remove the thief’s culpability. We now present the Shulchan Aruch’s (Choshen Mishpat 355:1) summary regarding inanimate objects, which we will call money. If the victim knew money was stolen, he must become aware it was returned, although the realization need not come at the time of return. If the victim was unaware the money was stolen, it is enough return it to his possession without any knowledge [but in a way that he will get to use it].

There are different opinions whether the victim’s knowledge of the theft means that he saw the thief taking it (Rashba, Bava Kama ibid., who says he then has to remove the victim’s grievance) or just that he became aware (Ra’avad, ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch’s language implies that general knowledge suffices. However, it is unclear how to view a case when one notices he cannot find money but considers many possibilities – it was stolen; it was lost; he misremembered how much there was; or it will show up soon. In your case, you are unsure what your father knows/suspects. It is at least proper, if not required, for your father to become aware that he has more money at his disposal than he thought he had prior to the return, and this would fulfill your basic obligation.  

Let us now put things in broader moral perspective. A main discussion in the halachic sources is on whether if the questionably returned object gets lost, the thief is still obligated. This is likely linked to when one fulfills the positive mitzva to return the stolen object (Vayikra 5:23), which significantly weakens the theft’s stain and consequences (see Makkot 16a). Indeed, one cannot get atonement for repenting on sins between man and man without rectifying the wrong to the extent possible, e.g., by returning what was stolen (Rambam, Teshuva 2:9). One must also appease a victim over the hurt (practical and/or emotional) caused by the sin (ibid.). Regarding theft, if one takes something and returns it five minutes later without the owner’s knowledge, there is no hurt. If someone has $15,000 stolen for years, he might have lost opportunities when it was needed, and/or spent unpleasant time looking for it and worrying, and/or have been upset wondering if someone stole it, who, and why, etc. Therefore, it behooves the thief to ask explicitly for forgiveness.

However, we accept Rav Yisrael Salanter’s premise (see Living the Halachic Process I, H-5) that an atonement seeker must not cause the victim additional pain in the process. On the one hand, $15,000 in cash just appearing could raise confusion, suspicions, and sometimes technical problems. It might work to “admit it anonymously” (e.g., by hiring a lawyer to give the money without divulging your identity; sending an anonymous email on where to find the money) along with a heartfelt request for forgiveness. Hiding your identity even due to embarrassment is justifiable, especially if it makes it more likely for you to act promptly (see Gittin 55a; Shulchan Aruch Harav, CM, Gezeila 8). Considering how much upset knowing that any confidante robbed him will cause and whether he will suspect someone else, other alternatives may be better. (Giving extra tzedaka is anyway recommended.) B’hatzlacha in choosing the best way to rectify your stumble; hopefully your father’s nachas from you will bring great rectification.  

The two major categories of situations in which doing melacha is permitted are: 1. When the purpose of the work is appropriate for Chol Hamo’ed, e.g., it enhances the chag, it is for a mitzva or communal needs. 2. Davar ha’aved – i.e., if the work will not be done on Chol Hamo’ed, a loss will be incurred. While davar ha’aved permits even to perform “expert work” (Mishna Berura 545:35), it is forbidden to purposely set up the situation whereby the work will be needed specifically on Chol Hamo’ed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 538:1) While the classic cases are of loss to possessions (see ibid. 537-8), poskim posit that defying an employer’s work policy in a way that will likely result in firing or disciplinary steps is also davar ha’aved (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 67:11), which seems to be your case.

All things being equal, it is proper to arrange matters so that one’s yearly vacation time includes [as much of] Chol Hamo’ed [as possible]. Halacha is aware that in practical life, often “all things are not equal,” including in regards to choosing vacations (see Zichron Shlomo, ruling #18 of Rav Moshe Feinstein; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 67:14). To deal with the many “moving pieces” in such matters, it is best to discuss borderline cases with one’s personal rav. We will focus on what you asked: assuming you may work because of davar ha’aved, can you receive payment for it, or is the payment gain rather than preventing loss?

The primary problem with working on Chol Hamo’ed is any melacha you must do, but you are correct that being paid complicates matters. The gemara (Mo’ed Katan 12a) says that the workers in the Exilarch’s house were allowed to benefit from their work on Chol Hamo’ed because it was not in the form of classical pay. The Rosh (Mo’ed Katan 2:9) infers from this that it is forbidden to pay the worker even when his actions are permitted on Chol Hamo’ed because the pay makes it “like mundane matters.”

The problem of receiving reward differs from the parallel issue on Shabbat and Yom Tov, which is even when the person is inactive. Here it is a problem only if the pay relates to activity with a problematic element, with the pay tipping the scale towards stringency (see Noda B’yehuda II, OC 104; Chut Shani, OC 542:1). Some sources focus their requirements on the Jewish employer who employs a Jew, (see language of the Shulchan Aruch, OC 542:1 and Be’ur Halacha ad loc.). While one might think that there would not be a problem if the employer is not Jewish, there are indications that there is a problem from the worker’s perspective (see discussions in Chol Hamo’ed K’hilchato, p. 307, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 66:(164)).

If your work is not based on melacha or tiresome work, payment may be permitted (Noda B’yehuda ibid.). Also, the Rama (OC 542:1) rules that when one’s work needs to be done because of the employer’s davar ha’aved, the worker can charge for it; the Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) allows relying on this only when there is no good alternative. Arguably, since you are working due to davar ha’aved, you too can get paid for it. This seems the assumption of several poskim discussing allowing employees to work to avoid being fired, who do not raise the caveat of not being paid for it. While perhaps they refer to workers who are paid a flat amount, not by the hour, this distinction is unproven conjecture.

In any case, since you have a set job, it is permitted to receive the pay because it is b’havla’ah (“swallowed up” by inclusion with other earning – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:4), even if you are paid per hour (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:65). According to most poskim (ibid. 66:40; Moadim U’zmanim IV:301, against Chut Shani, OC 242:21), this works also for Chol Hamo’ed.

In the final analysis, you may get paid.

While it is not simple to apply the gemara’s rules on when one is required to do hashavat aveida (returning lost objects, =hshav) to modern cases, it appears the Jewish bus company is obligated. Between the brand of air pods, the bus (or possibilities of buses) it was left on, and the date, there is enough of a siman.

Presumably, a clear majority of air pods in the stash were lost quite a while ago, and if their owners did not come to claim them yet, most of them are after yei’ush. This alone does not erase the bus company’s obligation to return them because yei’ush must precede the finder’s taking them (Bava Metzia 21b). However, Tosafot (Bava Kama 66a) posits that yei’ush has taken hold, just that the finder cannot remove the existing obligation of hshav. According to the simple understanding of Tosafot, that obligation is not transferred to you if you received them after yei’ush (see Kehillot Yaakov, Bava Metzia 25). While you should not facilitate the company’s abrogation of hshav, it should suffice for you if they have legitimate grounds (see below) to believe they have done all they need to.

However, there is another approach to the matter of yei’ush after the finder finds it. The Ramban (to ibid. 26a) and Ritva (to ibid. 21b) explain that the obligation of hshav makes the finder a shomer for the loser. Consequently, the object is considered in the loser’s possession, in which case we say that yei’ush has no impact. Accordingly, the yei’ush will not help regarding you either. Without bringing further analysis (see K’tzot Hachoshen 259:1; Imrei Moshe 37), it is difficult to justify taking the air pods based on the standard rules of yei’ush. We now look for other ideas.

We have discussed (see Living the Halachic Process III, I-12 & IV, I-4) that operators of venues who are concerned about being overburdened with lost objects can stipulate to those who frequent them how long they will hold onto them. This probably works based on mechila (relinquishing) of the right to hshav. It is proper to stipulate in an explicit manner so the losers will accept the provision. However, it is plausible that those who use a large transportation system realize that they have lost and found policies and implicitly accept them.

This idea is augmented by other plausible grounds for leniency. While one is expected to exert himself to do hshav, he is not required to outlay money that will not be returned for it (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1). Large bus companies often provide lost and found services that cost money (labor and space) as part of their customer service, and it is likely they are not required to do so (at least, for free). Therefore, if they agree to do so voluntarily, they should be able to set their own reasonable policies, even if their policy would not be halachically valid if they were fully obligated in hshav.

Finally, the idea of allowing people to essentially swap air pods (you can take Reuven’s and if Revuen asks for his, he can take Shimon’s) could possibly conform with the halacha for a case where it is not feasible or required (based on sheer volume) for the company to keep lost items forever. In some cases, it is permitted for the finder to sell the object and be prepared to give the proceeds to the loser (Shulchan Aruch, CM 267:23-25). While the policy you describe is different from that halacha, it seems primarily equivalent (i.e., there is a plan by which the loser will be compensated, likely to his satisfaction).

Therefore, for a combination of the grounds mentioned, we can justify the company’s policy as a win-win situation for almost all and allow you to take someone else’s lost object.

It is good that you realize that guns not only protect but also can cause danger to its owners and their surroundings. We of course are not experts in the tradeoffs for each specific case, but will try to provide a general Torah perspective. Torah Judaism is often based on finding the critical balance, and we start with your well-chosen sources. Although the Shulchan Aruch (427:8) says literally to remove and guard from any “stumbling block that can endanger a life,” we are not actually commanded to remove the dangerous things, but to manage them properly so that the danger is removed or sufficiently limited. Roofs and pits are dangerous, but they serve purposes; therefore, the roofs are to be fenced and the pits covered (ibid. 7). One may own and use oxen, but they must be guarded when proven necessary (see Shemot 21:29).

The Torah requires Jews to be prepared to protect each other. including from attacking enemies or bandits (see Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvot, Lo Ta’aseh 297; Yereim 196). One is allowed to use force even to repel a burglar, even though this could cause the death of either the burglar or the homeowner (see Rashi to Shemot 22:1; Magen Avraham 329:5). To make this feasible, the average person needs a weapon, and every time period has its example. In fact, when Chazal discuss going to repel an attack, it talks about taking weapons, even on Shabbat (Eruvin 45a).

On the other hand, weapons are not glorified in Jewish thought and practice. We find an aversion between things of special sanctity and weapons. Metal could not be used in building the Beit Hamikdash because of its use for swords (Shemot 20:21; Melachim I, 6:7). One should avoid (when possible) having (uncovered) weapons in a shul (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 151:6; Mishna Berura ad loc. 22). Connection to the sword is fundamental to Eisav’s being (Bereishit 27:40), whereas Yaakov was a peace lover who used weapons only as necessary (see ibid. 22 and ibid. 32:8-9 with Rashi).

The main difference between the prohibition of having a dangerous animal and the permissibility of having weapons is that the animal is liable to act without its owner’s approval, whereas a person is presumed to use his weapons properly until proven otherwise. Also, even dangerous animals are permitted, based on special need (a dangerous location) and/or precautions (always tied up) (Bava Kama 83a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 409:3).

This does not mean that it is wise for any given individual to possess guns. Accidents occur, guns can be stolen, and their presence can “up the ante” of a conflict. Some prefer more defensive precautions, e.g., pepper spray, connectivity with security services. But the weighing of plusses and minuses depend on the time and place, as well as the individual’s circumstances, skill, and training.

It is interesting to contrast the firearm policies of the United States and the Jewish State. In America, the Second Amendment guarantees (on some level – let’s avoid debate) the rights to “bear arms,” even when few have served in the armed forces. In Israel, where a high percentage of the population has/does serve, one needs special circumstances to be eligible for a private gun license. It also requires significant training in usage and safety precautions. Israeli society has shown repeatedly that, in our circumstances, it is crucial to have guns in any vicinity, but not in the hands of every citizen.

While we leave the details to experts, we agree that the safety of Jewish communities and individuals may be enhanced by more access to firearms than in the past. An individual should consider his specifics to determine whether he is best served by having a gun.

It is a fair assumption that the videoing process only included Rabbinic prohibitions. We will see the significance of that below.

We will start with the assumption that the video was done by a Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:1) rules like the middle opinion in Ketubot 34a, that if one violated Shabbat intentionally, the result of his action is forbidden for the violator forever but is permitted for others after Shabbat. The Mishna Berura (318:5) comments that while the household of the violator may not use that which was done even after Shabbat, others can, including people whom the violator had in mind when he violated Shabbat. Therefore, ostensibly, even your relative might be permitted to benefit from the video.

However, we must consider two issues. The K’tav Sofer (OC 50), regarding a restaurant, posits that while generally a Shabbat violator may sell the food he cooked on Shabbat, that is because he is penalized for his violation in that he cannot eat the food himself. However, in a case of someone who regularly cooks on Shabbat to sell to customers, the penalty must preclude his doing according to plan, so that it is forbidden for him to sell. Consequently, it is forbidden to buy from him. While this could forbid the celebrants to pay the videographer, this does not impact their showing it to you.

The bigger issue is the question of when Shabbat “ends” in this regard. There are opinions that anyone who wants to benefit needs to wait bichdei sheya’asu (the amount of time it would take to get the result if one started after Shabbat). This question is critical here, because one cannot video the bar mitzva after Shabbat, so requiring bichdei sheya’asu would forbid it forever. This concept is found regarding a non-Jew who did work on behalf of a Jew, even in cases that the Jew did not improperly tell him to do so (Beitza 24b). Two possible reasons are advanced for this halacha. Rashi (ad loc.) says that it is in order to not benefit from work done on Shabbat. Tosafot (ad loc.) says that it is to reduce the chance one will ask the non-Jew to do work. The Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 325:22) reasons that Rashi’s reason should apply to a Jew who regularly violates Shabbat, whereas according to Tosafot’s reason, we do not expect a religious Jew to ask a Shabbat desecrator to do work on Shabbat. The Mishna Berura (ibid.) adds a reason not to say bichdei sheya’asu for a Jew’s violation – a Jew will not listen to a request to do melacha. One can argue that this does not apply to regular Shabbat violators. The Pri Megadim leaves the matter unresolved, and there is not a consensus among contemporary poskim (in Bemareh Habazak I:31 we leaned toward leniency; Orchot Shabbat 25:(25) leans toward stringency). Bichdei sheya’asu is also less likely to apply to Rabbinic violations (see Mishna Berura 325:42).

If a non-Jew did the videoing, it should definitely require bichdei sheya’asu. On the other hand, the extension of the prohibition to benefit to all Jews is only for Torah-level violations, whereas for Rabbinic ones, it is only for the non-Jew’s intended beneficiaries (Shulchan Aruch, OC 325:8). The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 38) includes members of the recipient’s household and some of his guests in the prohibition, but based on primary sources (see Beit Yosef, OC 515), it is likely that a “relative” viewing the video is not included.

We have seen significant grounds for leniency; there are additional, creative grounds, but we do not wish to commit them to writing. Therefore, if you feel that watching the video helps maintain a good relationship with the family, not only may you watch the video, but you should do so. May your relationship help bring increased appreciation and observance of mitzvot to the bar mitzva and his family.

Since this case is no longer practical, we can discuss more freely both principles, and possible arguments relating to this specific case.

There are two bases for obligation to pay for a service one person provides to another: agreement to pay; payment for neheneh (benefit). One of the major sources about pay for neheneh is the gemara (Bava Metzia 101a), which discusses someone who planted trees in his friend’s field without permission. The gemara concludes that if the field is fit for planting, we estimate how much the work is worth, and if it is not, the worker gets the lower of possible payments. According to Rashi (ad loc.) and the S’ma (375:2), this means the lower between expenses outlaid and benefit provided. In other words, when there is benefit but it was not done in a way that should be appreciated, there is no payment beyond expenses.

There are subjective factors that help determine whether a job was called for. For one, the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 375:4) rules that if the field that was planted was owned by a man who usually does the work himself, the outside help is considered largely uncalled for. Even though most people would appreciate the work, the main benefit is saving the owner from hiring another worker, so when he does his own work, the owner only has to pay for the benefit of not having to toil. In the other direction, according to the Shulchan Aruch (CM 375:3) if the owner “built on” the work that was done, he cannot subsequently claim that he did not gain from it. The Shach (ad loc. 3) cites dissenters. One has to weigh the circumstances in each case.

Let us analyze your case. One could claim that the work was done with the beneficiaries’ knowledge, and therefore they should be responsible. However, this is wrong because their silent acquiescence was based on a misunderstanding, and agreement b’ta’ut does not obligate. The lack of protest could have some significance. There is an opinion that even when a recipient did benefit, he is exempt if he warned that he refuses to pay (see discussion in Pitchei Choshen, Sechirut 8:(64)), and here they at least did not warn.

Should we characterize the performance as fitting, since people enjoyed it, and enjoyment is valued at weddings? I have attended many weddings and am hard-pressed to remember such a performance. Most people pay good money for a band, and participants often do creative shtik, but professional shtik is uncommon in the circles I know, even at weddings at which expense is not a factor. Therefore, it would be difficult for the entertainer to prove that he deserves more than a return of expenses, which are presumably small.

Furthermore, benefit refers to net benefit (e.g., regarding the field, the vegetation planted must be preferable to alternatives). Even if many people enjoyed, others could have been appalled by such a childish performance at a wedding. Also, the time taken on it may have taken away from “valuable” eating, dancing, interacting, etc. time. Therefore, it is again hard to ascertain that there was benefit.

In all, it is unlikely that the families could be forced to pay any significant amount of money for this uninvited performance. Although the propriety of the entertainer’s actions was very questionable, paying him a not insulting amount might have been a proper act of chessed and/or avoiding machloket. (Others might argue that such a person must not be encouraged to do such things.)