ASK THE RABBI

There are different levels of muktzeh l’mitzvato. The gemara (Sukka 9a) derives from shared terminology between a sukka and korban chagiga that just as the latter is off limits for people due to its holy status, so too the “wood of sukka” becomes forbidden. This is a Torah-level law (Tosafot, Beitza 30b). There is a machloket whether it applies only to the s’chach (Rosh, Sukka 1:13) or even to the walls (Rambam, Sukka 6:15). There is also discussion about if it applies only to the minimum size of the sukka and whether it applies after it has fallen down (see Tosafot, ibid.; Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 638).

However, there are Rabbinic extensions of this basic concept. The gemara (Shabbat 45a) discusses the Rabbinic prohibition of muktzeh in regard to leftover oil from Chanuka candles and sukka decorations (noyei sukka), due to the fact these are set aside for mitzva use. A gemara earlier in Shabbat (22a) implies that the reason it is forbidden to use noyei sukka for other things is bizuy (degrading a) mitzva. Tosafot (ad loc.) says that both reasons are needed, as muktzeh does not apply on Chol Hamoed and bizuy does not apply after they fall. The Ran (Beitza 17a in the Rif’s pages, citing the Ramban) distinguishes between the categories as follows: the wood of the sukka is forbidden based on Torah law, use of the objects during the chag is because of bizuy mitzva, and muktzeh explains why the prohibition continues throughout the eighth day.

The Rama (638:2) points out that on Shabbat and Yom Tov, the decorations’ muktzeh status precludes moving them, like other forms of muktzeh. The Gra (ad loc.) explains that anything from which one may not get personal benefit is muktzeh (apparently, unless its mitzva use includes movement (e.g., an etrog)). Paradoxically, if the decoration fell, one should not move it on Shabbat/Yom Tov even if one could have thereby returned it to use as a noy sukka. Similarly, one cannot move them to protect from the rain, thus enabling future use. The Biur Halacha (ad loc.) discusses the case of decorations falling on the table and disrupting the Yom Tov meal – whether they can be moved directly or indirectly to facilitate the continuation of the meal.

Regarding the Torah-level or Rabbinic-level prohibition against use of objects connected to mitzvot, there is no issue with moving the object per se except on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Thus, one may move decorations on Chol Hamoed or leftover Chanuka oil other than on Shabbat. (There is a machloket among contemporary Acharonim whether decorations may be removed from the sukka on Chol Hamoed when one is not going to use them for something else – see Dirshu, ftnt. 638:19. Presumably, it should be fine to remove them in order to protect and later return them – see ibid. and Piskei Teshuvot 638:7).

There is a way to be able to remove and even use noyei sukka (not the sukka itself) for other things. The gemara (Beitza 30b) says that one can make an oral condition to “not separate himself from use of the objects when the days of Sukkot begin.” When one does so, the decorations never develop the connection to the mitzva of sukka, and it is permitted to remove them from the sukka or use them for other things, even if they did not first fall (Shulchan Aruch, OC 638:2; Mishna Berura 638:19). Consequently, on Shabbat/Yom Tov, as well, they are not muktzeh. (That being said, many decorations are attached to the sukka in a way that forbids them from being taken from where they are attached due to melacha considerations. This applies on Shabbat and Yom Tov and, in some cases, even on Chol Hamoed.) There are requirements for how to make such a condition, and for that reason the Rama (638:2; see dissenting view in Mishna Berura 638:23) prefers that people not rely upon it.

The Torah commands us to afflict ourselves (“initem”) on Yom Kippur, and Chazal derived from p’sukim the forbidden activities this entails. The gemara (Yoma 77a) cites p’sukim describing people in states of mourning who went “yachef” and determine this means shoeless.

The gemara (ibid. 78a) asks whether one can wear a shoe of sha’am (a sort of plant) and answers with stories of Amoraim who wore such shoes. On the other hand, Rava implies that a wooden shoe is forbidden. As the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 614) summarizes: the Rif says that only leather (or leather lined) shoes are forbidden. The Ba’al Hamaor says that the gemara’s conclusion is that whatever functions as a shoe is forbidden, regardless of the material. Rashi says that only leather and wooden shoes (which are strong and protective) are forbidden. The Beit Yosef/Shulchan Aruch accepts the Rif’s lenient opinion. The Magen Avraham (614:2) reports that this is the minhag, and the Taz (614:1) criticizes anyone who forbids non-leather shoes, considering that Amoraim were personally lenient.

The Mishna Berura (614:5) confirms that the primary ruling permits all non-leather shoes. However, he also encourages those who want to be stringent to not wear (especially, while indoors) wooden shoes and even any shoe that protects the foot well and prevents the wearer from feeling the ground.

Unquestionably, the present-day widely accepted practice among observant communities is to allow any shoe that does not have leather. (Admittedly, it is hard to talk about a minhag regarding the uncommon wooden shoe). Let’s be as clear as possible. We reject any suggestion to change this standard ruling for our communities.

On the other hand, if there is any day when personal stringencies should not be criticized as “holier than thou,” Yom Kippur is that day. Therefore, for the benefit of one who has such an inclination or conviction, let us discuss the relative logic of stringency for different footwear.

Comfortability of footwear is not an issue, as the gemara (Yoma 78b) makes clear. Thus, even if someone loves wearing fabric/thin-rubber-sole slippers or flip-flops, there is no reason to avoid them. (Although many people would take off their shoes in shul every Shabbat, if protocol allowed it, comfortable (non-leather) socks are permitted according to all opinions (see Yevamot 102b.))

Crocs are slightly more like shoes, and there was an uproar when Rav Elyashiv was quoted as saying that it is worthwhile to not wear them on Yom Kippur (he did not said they were forbidden). Crocs are pretty good at preventing wearers from feeling the ground, but, in addition to not being leather, they do not give the type of support and protection that normal shoes do, which are crucial for the main stringent opinions.

Sneakers are much more shoe-like than the above, which makes them a candidate for stringency according to the minority of classic poskim who say that leather is not the only factor. Even so, they are often thinner and flimsier (which has some advantages for sports), which make them less shoe-like.

Chumra is most logical regarding shoes that look and function like standard shoes, but for whatever reason (including production price) are made with a substitute material. It is possible (not necessarily correct) that even the majority opinions who forbade only leather shoes may be stringent here. First, some argue that there is a problem of marit ayin (Minchat Shlomo II:53; Rav Elyashiv is cited as being lenient on this point). Second, if leather shoes were singled out because their characteristics made them normal shoes, it is possible that in whatever time and place one is in, standard looking/feeling shoes are forbidden. (Analysis of this point is fascinating but beyond our present scope). Therefore, not wearing normal shoes that happen to be synthetic is the most logical of the stringencies on this matter for those inclined to stringency (see Dirshu footnotes 614:9).

There are various credible minhagim on these matters. We will mainly explain the issues, although we will show mild preferences for certain practices for those who lack a clear minhag.

The gemara (Kritot 6a) says that since symbolism has significance, one should “be in the practice” of eating (some texts – “seeing”) certain foods (dates and four vegetable simanim) in the “head of the year.” While some say that “being in the practice” refers to all Rosh Hashana meals and some say that it is only for the year’s first meal, the more accepted practice is to eat the simanim at both night meals (see discussion in Mishneh Halachot XIII:80; Torat Hamoadim, Yamim Noraim 4:1).

The more prevalent minhag (in homes and among poskim) is to eat the foods after Hamotzi (see Tur, Orach Chayim 583; Magen Avraham 583:1; Taz 583:2). Besides the logic of eating the foods during the meal, some poskim claim it solves a halachic problem (see Torat Hamoadim ibid. 2). If one eats them before the bread, we have the same question about needing a beracha acharona as after eating karpas before matza. While we solve that problem by eating less than a k’zayit of karpas (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 473:6), many people want to eat more than a k’zayit (combined) of the simanim.

Actually, eating the simanim after bread raises other beracha questions. The poskim assume that one makes a beracha rishona on the fruit simanim even though it is during the meal, which is not simple. While fruit eaten for desert requires a beracha rishona, fruit served as an “appetizer” gets no beracha (see Mishna Berura 174:39; V’zot Haberacha, p. 77). Perhaps the fact that it is eaten for ritual, not culinary, reasons is a contributing factor to justify a beracha (see Divrei Yatziv, OC 252).

A related question is whether to recite Borei Pri Ha’adama on a vegetable siman. As a rule, we do not do so on vegetables during a meal, as they “accompany the main meal.” In our case, there are varied opinions. The more common practice is to make the beracha, perhaps because they are eaten as simanim, but some argue that this makes no difference (Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:269; Torat Hamoadim, ibid.). Some (see Halichot Shlomo, Moadim II:1:18) compromise by saying to make the beracha on the least “normally eaten” of the vegetables, which some assume is kara (gourd family). (Piskei Teshuvot (583:(13)) cites Rav Diblitski as suggesting a safe although unnatural idea – first eat from a Borei Pri Ha’adama fruit (e.g., watermelon, banana), which certainly requires a beracha.)

Another question of minhag vs. regular rules of berachot relates to the order of berachot. When one plans to eat multiple fruit, he makes the Borei Pri Haetz on a fruit of “the seven species” (including dates and pomegranates, in that order, based on their order in the pasuk – Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 211:1,4). Yet, the common minhag for Ashkenazim is to eat – with a beracha and Yehi Ratzon – the apple dipped in honey first. (It is hard to know how the minhag developed. Is the idea of “shana tova u’metuka” more central (even though it is post-Talmudic) and warrant precedence?) Some take the purist approach, making Borei Pri Haetz on the date, and have the apple later (Halichot Shlomo ibid.). A way to keep the order of the Yehi Ratzon yet follow the regular rules of berachot is to have the dates and pomegranates off the table, while having them in mind, when making the beracha on the apple (ibid.). One can also make the beracha on the date, eat a small amount, then eat the apple, pomegranate, and date with the order that fits his Yehi Ratzon preference.

We will start with your assumption – that melacha is involved. The workers carry 4 amot in a public domain and into a private domain (the truck), which is a melacha, but only if there is no eiruv. It is possible that no part of the operation of the truck is done specifically for you (it would be a problem if the whole area is Jewish). The Rabbinic violation of muktzeh is a problem regarding garbage. While it is often permitted to take out garbage on Shabbat, e.g., leaving it in the home will likely cause a bad smell (see Orchot Shabbat 19:88), it usually need not be a bother in a garbage can outside.

So assuming it is forbidden for a Jew to throw the garbage into the truck on Shabbat, can non-Jewish workers do it for us? The critical factor for leniency is that the Jew does not tell, or, in this case, even care if the non-Jew does the work specifically on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 247:1). You too presumably do not care if the pickup is specifically on Shabbat. (This might not be true if they have not come in several days, they never work after sunset or on Sunday, and residents would have significant hardship and complaints if they did not come on Saturday.)

However, that leniency helps only if it is halachically considered that the work the crew is doing at that time is for their sake, not for yours. The most common way to fulfill this condition is when the worker is paid per job (kablan), so that we consider it that he is doing it for the money he receives (ibid.; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 1). If, though, he is paid by the day or other unit of time (po’el), he is considered to be paid money to fulfill the Jew’s requests, explicitly or implicitly, which is forbidden (ibid., based on Avoda Zara 21b).

The analysis of a sanitation crew’s categorization is not simple. They are presumably paid by the day/month (po’el) and not, for example, by the amount of garbage they remove. On the other hand, maybe we should look at the relationship between the homeowner and the municipality. The homeowner pays (usually with municipal taxes) for a host of services, including garbage disposal, which makes the municipality kablanim. The sanitation workers are working for the municipality, not the homeowners, and therefore the worker’s pay scheme is not relevant. There is another reason to consider them kablanim. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 244:5; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 24) says that if one has a long-term worker whose responsibility is to do one specific job, he is equivalent to a kablan. This is provided the Jewish employer does not complain if he takes off days here and there as long as the job gets done.

One can ask that it is forbidden for the non-Jew to work for a Jew on the Jew’s property (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2), due to marit ayin (people will think he is violating Shabbat – see Mishna Berura 252:17). Here, though, people usually put the garbage cans in the public domain before pickup. One might argue that this is a technicality, as the workers are still clearly doing work for the homeowner. However, since everyone knows that the homeowner has no special arrangement with the crew, and the general setup is permitted, marit ayin is not a problem (see ibid.). We are also not supposed to have non-Jews take things on Shabbat from a Jew’s house even when there is no intrinsic violation (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:1). However, this too is due to marit ayin issues, which should not apply.

It is permitted to put out the garbage even on Shabbat (when muktzeh is not a problem), but there are likely advantages to doing so before Shabbat (beyond our present scope).

First, it is standard, recommended practice for dayanim who are unsure of the proper ruling to send the case’s details to get a greater authority’s opinion (Shulchan Aruch, CM 14:1). The dayanim are responsible for presenting the claims accurately and ruling; the expert may rely on them.

The Me’il Tzedaka (53) cites sources and a broad practice for a talmid chacham to answer when he knows the querier and is confident he wants to know the truth and will not formulate false claims. (The Me’il Tzedaka rejects this leniency unless the respondent believes the case does not apply to the querier.)

Other sources for leniency refer to various cases with great need to get involved, such as: 1. The information is needed to save people from sin (Shut Maharashdam, Yoreh Deah 153). (There are many teshuvot about poskim who got involved when there were suspicions about a shochet.) 2. Someone was attacking the integrity of a talmid chacham (Shvut Yaakov III,99). 3. The opinion was needed for the mitzva of helping a widow (Shut Maharshal 24).

Another type of case where some permit discussion is where the question relates to general halachic issues and not to factual background about which everyone agrees (Shut HaRama 112). In a related justification, poskim will often also say that they are not suggesting a ruling for the case, but are just explaining gemarot or general halachic issues to interested parties, and it is not their responsibility what conclusion those who now understand the halachic topic will say about their case.

The Pitchei Teshuva also cites an exception when the question is about which beit din has jurisdiction. The logic is that the alternative of addressing the matter formally before beit din does not apply if they cannot agree on a beit din.

While some of the cases where we are lenient are based on one of the above, our most common justification to express tentative opinions is in cases where there are not clear litigants. (Most of the sources discuss those who are or are expected to be litigants.) For example, a person does not want to go to beit din and is happy to pay or forgo the money if he is wrong. We often say: “We cannot tell you that you are right, but only if you are wrong” (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. I, J-1), and even then only when we know the person or have indications that he is sincere on this point. When it appears that someone wants to adjudicate, and we feel that he will create enemies and head/heart aches with a small chance of winning, we often will advise in general terms (and with a lack of certainty) that he would be wise to drop the matter.

Our policy is based on the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 17:5, based on the Rashba III:98 and the Rivash 179). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) says that one may not listen to the claims of one litigant while the other side is not present. The Rama says that this refers to one who is a dayan in this case. However, he continues that a talmid chacham should never express even a tentative opinion (“if indeed …”) on a case without hearing both sides.

The first reason cited is that the presentation might teach the litigant which claims to make, including false ones. Our contemporary experience teaches us the following. While the sources speak of falsehood, it is not limited to premeditated lying, but includes describing the nuances of a gray situation in a slanted manner. Even honest people can do this under the pressure of litigation, where significant money and stature are on the line.

The Rama also explains that due to what surfaces in the trial, the ruling may appear to contradict the talmid chacham, which could discredit him. We note that the concern is not just for the non-dayan’s credibility. Our beit din’s staff have received post-ruling complaints: “I asked my rabbi about the case, and he said beit din was wrong, so the dayanim are either incompetent or biased.” Of course, two rabbis can have different views without either being incompetent or biased, which is why we bother having three dayanim. The disgruntled litigant does not care that we heard and interrogated both sides and spent dozen of hours analyzing and researching, while he may have asked his rabbi while he was folding up his tefillin. (Since we offer an option of appeal (with an added fee to avoid it being automatic), we do not object to a litigant showing our ruling to a talmid chacham for his advice on whether it is worthwhile to appeal.) The point is that even provisional statements made prior to adjudication can be used by otherwise respectable and respectful people to decide that they are right and that there is something wrong with anyone (litigant, dayan, or whoever) who does not agree with what they understood from what they were told.

Our experience makes us concerned about another issue that the Rama does not discuss (it is likely that he was not addressing that case – see part II). There are times that the sides prefer to avoid the trouble of litigation, which we applaud on fundamental and practical grounds. The well-intentioned “non-litigant” may ask us or another rav the question, as he honestly but subjectively sees it, and may even be willing to inform the other side if we said he was wrong. However, if we answer that “based on your description, you are right,” since he knows that he is not a liar, he is likely to say, “I asked a dayan, and he said I am right.” Now, the other side is at a disadvantage. Is he to question the dayan or call his neighbor, friend or business partner a liar? Will he know and choose to say: “If the dayan did not hear me describe the case in my own words, he could/should not have said, ‘You are right’”?

Two of our “hats” are: an “Ask the Rabbi” service, where we try to be responsive to all, and a beit din, where we make very strong efforts to be ethical, impartial, and cautious. (One fear is that our present anonymous querier will be our future litigant.) The correct policy, in our opinion, is to almost always refuse to answer questions of one side that have a hint of being related to practical dispute resolution. We regret that some people are resentful; that is part of the price of being principled.

We start with a look at the halachic indications when there are not extenuating circumstances. Then we can look for the best solutions based on need.

 The gemara (Pesachim 106b) cites a machloket on whether one who ate before making Kiddush is able to make Kiddush afterward. We accept the opinion that he may (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:4). However, all agree with the implication that it is wrong to eat, even small quantities, before Kiddush (ibid.). 

Often, prohibitions on eating do not apply to drinking water, including before Havdala (ibid. 299:1). The Rosh (Shut 25:2) explains that due to the concept that any eating done on Shabbat has importance, it is forbidden to drink water before Kiddush. However, there is a machloket whether this concept applies during twilight, and thus it is not clear whether one may drink water at that time (Da’at Torah, OC 271:4).

When does the basic (Rabbinic) prohibition begin? The poskim assume that once it is possibly Shabbat (from sunset) or one accepted Shabbat, it is forbidden to eat (Bach, OC 271; Mishna Berura 271:11). When women light Shabbat candles, they accept Shabbat (Rama, OC 263:10). Therefore, most assume that it is forbidden for a woman to eat or drink after lighting candles before making Kiddush (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:45).  

The Dagul Meirevava (to Shulchan Aruch, OC 261:4) says that while davening Ma’ariv makes it Shabbat in regards to all Shabbat prohibitions, it is questionable whether other forms of accepting Shabbat early obligate one to adhere to all Rabbinical laws (Shulchan Aruch, OC 393:2). The Minchat Yitzchak (VIII:18) entertains the possibility that it would be permitted to eat after candle lighting before Ma’ariv. However, he is unwilling to be practically lenient without the presence of other reasons for leniency (e.g., the case he discusses, where one is drinking water to swallow medicine). The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (43:46) is willing to be lenient for a woman who is thirsty to drink water and, in a case of need, tea.

As mentioned, candle lighting likely makes it forbidden for a woman who lit to eat because, with it, she accepts Shabbat. It is generally accepted conceptually that a woman can have explicitly in mind to not accept Shabbat with her lighting (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 263:10). In practice, because this is not a unanimously accepted possibility, poskim rely on such a condition only in cases of significant need (Mishna Berura 263:43). Along these lines, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (43:47) allows a woman who is feeling weak or who is nursing to eat as she likes after candle lighting if she made that condition.

However, these leniencies of the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata’s are only if she finishes eating before sunset. What if a woman gets particularly hungry after that, especially if she is nursing? While there are significant leniencies for nursing mothers so that their milk supply should not be affected, waiting an hour is unlikely to affect that. However, she is still the type of person who, in many cases, may have unusual tza’ar if she cannot eat when the feeling hits her. Nevertheless, in almost all cases, it is hard to be lenient, and that is because she almost always has a great alternative – to make Kiddush before her husband comes home (see Minchat Yitzchak ibid.). There is no halachic reason not to do so. Even if it is not accepted in the family, hopefully a simple discussion with her husband, with the pertinent information, should convince all that her making Kiddush is better than her eating or drinking after sunset before Kiddush. On the other hand, every rule has exceptions, and when there is an acute need, one can be lenient soon after sunset as well, especially to drink any amount of water.

There are sources and traditions about boiling at least three eggs together. While at first glance the practice flies in the face of halachic logic, the laws of blood spots in eggs are unique, as we will see.

 A blood spot in an egg can be the beginning of an embryo, in which case the egg is forbidden, while there is a machloket if it is based on Torah law or Rabbinic law (see Tosafot, Chulin 64b; Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 66). If the blood comes from the hen, the blood is forbidden (Rabbinically), but the egg is permitted and can be eaten after the blood is removed (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 66:2-3). Poskim provide physical signs of when it is more likely that the blood belongs to one category or the other, but after the egg is handled, it can be difficult to recognize these signs.

We assume that in a case where only the blood is forbidden, there will be 60:1 ratio of permitted material to forbidden to nullify (bitul) the blood (see Darchei Teshuva 66:40). However, if the whole egg is forbidden, bitul requires 60 times more permitted material in the pot against the volume of the egg, and three eggs will not help too much.

There are times that bitul takes place by means of a simple majority. When the minority forbidden food and the majority permitted food are of the same type (min b’mino) and they are “combined” yavesh b’yavesh (separate solid items that are intermingled only in that the identity of the forbidden food is not known), all the pieces are permitted (Shulchan Aruch, YD 109:1). However, this will not help for two kosher and one non-kosher eggs being boiled together because boiling causes their tastes to mix, making a ratio of 60:1 necessary for bitul (ibid. 2).

Rather, the logic of having three eggs is based on the following Rama (YD 66:4).  The Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.) discusses cases of opened raw eggs that have been mixed together and blood was found, and he rules how much has to be thrown out in each case. The Rama adds that this is only when the signs of the blood indicate that the entire egg is forbidden. However, if there is a doubt whether the whole egg is forbidden, we “permit the mixture, since in any case, one [forbidden egg] is batel in two [permitted eggs].” The Taz (ad loc. 5) explains that even though in lach b’lach (physical mixtures, like the contents of eggs mixed together) a 60:1 ratio is needed for bitul, the Rama is more lenient for an egg with a blood spot. The reason is that he holds that the egg is at worst forbidden Rabbinically, and when the type of blood spot is questionable, we do not forbid the mixture when a majority of it is permitted. This leans on the fact that the requirement of 60:1 for lach b’lach of min b’mino is itself only a Rabbinic law (a majority suffices by Torah law).

The Yad Yehuda (66:7) explains the practice in question as follows. With two eggs boiling, there is not a permitted majority for bitul if one has a blood spot, and the taste coming from the forbidden egg would render the other egg not kosher. The water in the pot does not help because it is of a different food type. Therefore, three eggs will help you if you find a blood spot after peeling the boiled eggs. The more eggs, the better the chance of a majority, and odd numbers help slightly statistically. The number of eggs is thus not required but suggested.

Almost all egg producers separate roosters and hens, rendering the chances of a blood spot coming from an embryo and forbidding the entire egg very small. Igrot Moshe (Yoreh Deah 1:36) says that since eggs are cheap, we should, as a chumra, throw out the egg for any blood spot. However, he says that we need not throw out another egg cooked with it or require hagala for the pot in which a blood-spotted egg was boiled. While some continue the old practice of using three eggs (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:384), this is not halachically called for.

Let us start with the bottom line. You should not make a beracha. You have identified some of the several doubts about the need for a beracha. One does not make a beracha unless there is a significantly better than even chance it is called for (safek berachot l’hakel), and that is not the case here. We will take a quick look at some of the indications on various doubts.

 There is a machloket Rishonim whether one ever makes a beracha on the mitzva of ma’akeh. The reasons against a beracha include the following: it is done to remove danger, rather than being a classic positive mitzva; it is mitzva that is rooted in natural logic; there is a concern that the one building the ma’akeh will not carry through. However, despite the principle of safek berachot l’hakel, there is enough consensus of Rishonim and Acharonim to generally justify a beracha (see Yalkut Yosef, Sova Semachot p. 676).

A non-Jew is not able to be a halachic agent, certainly including regarding doing mitzvot on behalf of a Jew (Kiddushin 41b). Therefore, your non-Jewish workers’ actions ostensibly cannot fulfill the mitzva on your behalf. It is not that the ma’akeh is invalid and needs to be redone, as it suffices that the danger was obverted. However, a beracha, as well as much of the positive mitzva opportunity would be missing (see Menachot 42b).

On the other hand, the Machaneh Ephrayim (Shluchin 11) says that if the non-Jew is your salaried worker, we apply the rule that a “the worker’s hand is like the employer’s hand” (Bava Metzia 10a). This enables the Jewish homeowner to fulfill his mitzva through his non-Jewish employees’ actions, and a beracha is appropriate. Many Acharonim reject the Machaneh Ephrayim’s thesis. Their main claim is that the rule that a worker is like his employer does not apply to a non-Jew’s performance of mitzvot on behalf of his Jewish employer, and this is the stronger position. Certainly there is enough doubt to eliminate a beracha in such a case (Yabia Omer IX, Choshen Mishpat 10). Furthermore, the Pitchei Teshuva (CM 427:1) says that the Machaneh Ephrayim applies only to salaried workers and not to contractors (which you are talking about).

You imply that there are other investors. The mitzva of ma’akeh applies even when the property is co-owned (Chulin 136a). However, not all agree that this is true when the partners include non-Jews, and Rav B. Zilber (Birur Halacha, p. 249) claims that this is enough reason to not make a beracha in such a case.

The fact that the fence will replace an existing one raises an interesting question. There is discussion on whether one who switches one mezuza scroll for another has to make a new beracha (see Yabia Omer II, Yoreh Deah 17), as well as similar discussions regarding tzitzit and tefillin. There are major similarities between the cases but also possible distinctions (see Avnei Shlomo (Bloch) p. 41). The matter may also depend on how long the interim period with no functioning ma’akeh will be or on whether the roof required a ma’akeh before renovations make the roof more accessible.

Finally, it appears that before you got involved, there were already people renting apartments in the building, in which case, the tenants were obligated in ma’akeh (Bava Metzia 101b). The Minchat Chinuch (#546) says that although renters are obligated, the landlord might also be obligated. However, others say that the Rabbis uprooted the mitzva from the landlord and gave it to the renters. According to them, although you could argue that the renters are making you an agent for making the ma’akeh, it is still not simple that, if there were a beracha, you would be the one to make it.

Seuda Shlishit: The baraita (cited in Ta’anit 29a) says that one may eat an extravagant meal on Shabbat even when Tisha B’Av falls on Motzaei Shabbat. The Tur (Orach Chayim 552) cites minhagim that one is allowed and would do best to curtail the Shabbat meal. This is especially so at seuda shlishit, which is, in effect, the seuda hamafseket (the last meal before Tisha B’Av, which usually has strong elements of mourning). However, these considerations are countered by the need to avoid displaying mourning on Shabbat. Therefore, there are no real restrictions, even at seuda shlishit (Shulchan Aruch, OC 552:10). However, the mood should somewhat reflect the coming of Tisha B’Av, as long as it does not bring on clearly noticeable changes (Mishna Berura 552:23). One important halachic requirement is that one must finish eating before sunset (Rama, ad loc.(.

Havdala: One says Havdala in tefilla or separately with the declaration of “Baruch Hamavdil…,” which enables him to do actions that are forbidden on Shabbat. Havdala over a cup of wine is done after Tisha B’Av (Shulchan Aruch, OC 556:1). If one forgot to mention Havdala in Shemoneh Esrei, he does not repeat Shemoneh Esrei even though he will not make Havdala over wine until the next day. Rather, he makes the declaration of Baruch Hamavdil (Mishna Berura 556:2). Unlike Havdala during the Nine Days, where we try to give the wine to a child (Rama 551:10), after Tisha B’Av an adult can freely drink that wine (Mishna Berura 556:3). The beracha on besamim is not said this week. On Tisha B’Av it is not appropriate, because it is a reviving pleasure, and one can make this beracha only on Motzaei Shabbat.

The beracha on fire is specific to Motzaei Shabbat, is not a pleasure, and does not require a cup. Therefore, we recite the beracha on fire in shul after Ma’ariv, before reading Eicha (Mishna Berura 556:1). There are those who say that a woman should, in general, avoid making Havdala. A major reason is the doubt whether a woman is obligated in the beracha on fire, which is not directly related to Shabbat and thus is a regular time-related mitzva, from which women are exempt (Be’ur Halacha 296:8). Therefore, it is better for one whose wife will not be in shul at the time of the beracha to have in mind not to fulfill the mitzva at that time, but to make the beracha on the fire together with his wife (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(98).

Taking off shoes:  As mentioned, one may not do a noticeable act of mourning before Shabbat is over. While finishing eating before sunset or refraining from washing need not be noticeable, taking off shoes is. There are two minhagim as to when to take them off: 1) One waits until after Shabbat is out, says Hamavdil, and then changes clothes and goes to shul. One can do so a little earlier than the regular time listed for Shabbat ending, which is usually delayed a little bit beyond nightfall to allow for a significant extension of Shabbat. The exact time is not clear and depends on the latitude of one’s location. It is advisable to start Ma’ariv a little late in order to allow people to do so and make it to shul (ibid.:40; Torat Hamoadim 9:1), unless the rabbi has ruled that everyone should take the following approach. 2) One takes off his shoes after Barchu of Ma’ariv. One who takes the second approach should bring non-leather footwear and Eicha/Kinot to shul before Shabbat to avoid hachana (preparations for after Shabbat). However, if one uses these sefarim a little in shul before Shabbat is out, he may bring them on Shabbat (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.:41).

Restrictions after Tisha B’Av: Since much of the Beit Hamikdash burned on 10 Av, the minhag developed to not eat meat or drink wine on this day. Some are stringent on laundering, bathing, and haircutting until midday of the 10th.  On a year like this, only meat and wine are restricted and only at night (Rama, OC ibid.; Mishna Berura ad loc. 4).