ASK THE RABBI

When considering involvement in “non-Shabbat-friendly” fields on Shabbat without a forbidden action per se, one has to look at four Shabbat prohibitions.

1. Hachana (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 323:6) – Doing something on Shabbat so that it does not need to be done after Shabbat, even if no melacha is needed after Shabbat. This issue does not apply to this case, because the opportunity that arose on Shabbat is unique and is not instead of something you would have had to do after Shabbat.

2. M’tzo cheftzecha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:1) – Taking steps to advance a specific melacha after Shabbat. Here, there is no specific melacha on the horizon, as your son would just be amassing information, with no actions related to it on the horizon.

3. Shitrei hedyotot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:13-16) – Reading matters that could cause problems on Shabbat. There is discussion in the gemara (Shabbat 149a) as to the exact concern, but the Rambam (Shabbat 23:19) and Rosh (Shabbat 23:1) both connect it broadly to weekday-like activity (see this column, Mishpatim 5784, dealing with newspapers. There is a consensus (see Dirshu 307:70) against reading commercial advertisements, even if one is not intending to thereby “shop.”) However, shitrei hedyotot does not apply to oral exchanges.

4. Daber davar (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:1) – Speaking about things that will need to get done that involve Shabbat prohibitions. Regarding the stock market, one does not violate daber davar per se if he does not discuss actual plans of buying or selling stocks.

Thus, just discussing the stock market generally avoids all of the above prohibitions. However, as a kind of composite of these issues, it is accepted among bnei Torah not to engage freely in nitty gritty economic discussion. This is in line with the halacha (Rambam, Shabbat 24:4; Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:1) that one should not speak at length about idle matters. Commerce matters are “worse” in this regard than many idle matters (see Mishna Berura 307:63). While most of the strict sources discuss reading commercial matters, not speaking, speech is worse than thought (Shabbat 113b).

It is too draconic and not in line with halacha to forbid a passing statement about the stock market or a business. Even regarding more serious discussion, like the people you mentioned, a conversation about stocks can be justifiable because the Rama (OC 307:1) says that one may talk at length about idle matters if he gets enjoyment from such discussion. For some people, discussing stock trends is enjoyable like for other people discussing the NBA playoffs is. However, we do not recommend to people (including your son) to center a discussion on Shabbat on the stock market.

1. Kiddush - The gemara (Pesachim 101a) teaches that we must make Kiddush in a place where a “meal” will follow. That discussion also refers to “tasting” after Kiddush, which implies less than a classic meal. Although some authorities require the tasting to include bread, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5) rules that wine satisfies this requirement. The Magen Avraham (273:11) reasons that if wine qualifies, then foods made from one of the “five grains,” which are more meal-like, certainly suffice (OC 273:11). The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) extends this to dates, but most poskim disagree (see Yabia Omer VII, OC 35).

Based on the above, one who cannot eat from the “five grains” (many gluten-sensitive people can eat specially cultivated oats) should drink a revi’it of wine or grape juice (Mishna Berura 273:22). When this is not feasible, two minority leniencies are sometimes cited: 1. In cases of need, any food can constitute a “Kiddush meal” (Chayei Adam II:6:22); 2. It suffices that one person involved in the Kiddush eat the requisite food/amount (see B’Tzel HaChochma IV:2). If relying on such positions, it is best to eat something filling/meal-like, which satisfies at least the “spirit of the law.”

2. Lechem Mishneh – Ordinarily, Shabbat meals require two loaves of bread made from halachic grain in a manner that requires Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 274:5). However, a gluten-sensitive person should view himself as fulfilling the mitzva of seuda in the best way he can.

It is appropriate (not halachically required) for him to use two gluten-free loaves of “bread.” Treating non-five-grain foods as bread has limited halachic precedent. An eiruv chatzeirot requires “bread,” yet that bread may be made from rice or lentils (Shulchan Aruch, OC 366:8). Moreover, the requirement of two loaves is derived from the manna, which was not grain-based, but was still the bread of Israel. Similarly, rice or potato bread can arguably be considered bread for gluten-free dieters (Mishna Berura ad loc. 47). It is also positive to eat or drink something that will have a beracha acharona of me’ein shalosh, which enables him to parallel Birkat HaMazon and mention Shabbat.

 3. Seuda shlishit – The gemara (Pesachim 105a) says that one who is eating as Shabbat enters must interrupt his eating to recite Kiddush. It suggests that similarly one who is eating as Shabbat ends would have to interrupt the meal for Havdala. However, the gemara concludes that Havdala does not interrupt eating, but only drinking. This gemara is the basis for the halacha that one who starts seuda shlishit before shki’a may continue (Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:1).

Can one continue if he is in the middle of a less than complete Shabbat meal (including bread and Birkat Hamazon)? The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 299:5) says he may not continue. The Shevet Halevi (VIII, 36), keying on the fact that there are legitimate opinions that one does not need to eat bread at seuda shlishit (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5), posits that whatever one uses for seuda shlishit will be important enough to allow you to continue.

Therefore, you definitely have whom to rely upon. Actually, non-gluten eaters are better off than others who have seuda shlishit without bread. The Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.), in explaining his stringent opinion, argues that the fact that one did not have bread shows he did not give the meal requisite weight. While one can argue that in contemporary society, where many people rarely eat bread, other serious eating would also count. Regarding health motivated non-gluten dieters, we would expect a near consensus that their regular seuda shlishit would allow them to continue after dark, as the lack of bread is not a sign of a less level meal.

The gemara (Pesachim 4a) decides that when one rents a house from another Jew before Pesach, the one who has access to it on the night of bc is obligated in bc. So, since you are coming a few hours before Pesach, the hotel is obligated to do bc.

The gemara continues with a question – can one who starts renting on erev Pesach assume that the landlord indeed did bc? We rule that one may assume he did bc (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 437:2), but the renter must ask the landlord if he is available. So, ostensibly, if the hotel did not report they did bc, you should inquire.

There are a few reasons, though, why this might not be necessary. Arguably, the hashgacha on the hotel includes an assurance that the rooms were properly checked. While this is true in some hotels, there are definitely arrangements where the mashgiach is responsible for the kitchen, whereas non-rabbis are responsible for other proper halachic operation of the hotel. Just like in the gemara’s case one needs to ask a fine landlord whether he did bc, perhaps here too you must ask. Therefore, it is difficult to give clear guidance about unspecified locations.

Another sometimes valid point of leniency is that at some hotels, you may have difficulty receiving a credible answer. Will the receptionist know? Will you be able to get hold of the relevant person on this hectic day? Therefore, it may be equivalent to what the gemara calls “he is not around to ask.” While it could be more practical to ask in advance whether the hotel does a halachic bc on the rooms, if he did not, perhaps one there can rely on the assumption they did.

The major question is if there was no formal bc done but the hotel can assure you that the room is clean, because a hotel’s job is to provide clean rooms all year long. This should fall under the general rule that a professional will not endanger his professional standing (see Shach, Yoreh Deah 155:3). While no hotel is perfect, a standard bc is not perfect either.

But can a chambermaid’s cleaning without a candle and perhaps not on the night of the 14^th of Nisan count in lieu of bc? If one checks without the halachically prescribed lighting, he does not have to redo the bc (Shulchan Aruch, OC 433:1 and Mishna Berura 433:6). Also, most of us rely on the serious cleaning we do in the days leading up to Pesach but not with the characteristics of bc, and then do only a cursory bc, which would not uncover most of the chametz if it still existed. This is based on effectively creating places that are assumed to be chametz free (see Living the Halachic Process III, D-15).

Remember, that the mitzva of bc was not supposed to fall upon you (outside the one you likely will do at your home – see Living the Halachic Process II:D-14). It is just that there is a possibility that your concern about chametz may make it necessary. The gemara (Pesachim 8a) posits that one does not need to check outdoor areas frequented by chametz-eating animals because he can assume there will not be chametz there. The birds do not fulfill the mitzva of bc for us; they create a place which is excluded from the need of bc. For our purposes, the chambermaid is no worse than the birds. Even if she is not Jewish and cannot be an agent to fulfill the mitzva, she can still eliminate the likelihood of chametz.

We bend or break normal rules in order to make Purim “lively” in multiple ways. There are the ideas of drinking wine well beyond the norm and that one is exempt from payment for damages caused during the Purim celebration because the mayhem is part of the mitzva (Rama, Orach Chayim 695:2). Regarding Megilla reading, the minhag that the congregation reads out loud four p’sukim was designed “just for happiness, to make the youngsters happy, and encourage them to … listen to the reading” (Hagahot Maimoniot, Megilla 1:7). There, words are being said in a fundamentally unnecessary manner, but they are the words of the Megilla. The idea of putting down Haman finds expression in several statements of Chazal.

Is showing disdain for Haman grounds to bend any rules? The practices of “banging for Haman” has undergone changes over time, but is codified in the Rama (Orach Chayim 690:17). Normally, it is forbidden to do actions in a juncture where hefsek is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, OC 97:4 regarding returning a tallit that fell off). Much of the non-vocal noisemaking is as much of an action, so we see a bending of the rules. However, hefsek exists on a scale, and speech is at its top (Mishna Berura 104:10), so we must look for precedent for speaking due to Haman’s name.

The Magen Avraham (690:21) cites a minhag from the Levush (OC 690:17) to say “Shem resha’im yirkav” when Haman’s name is read, so there is indeed strong precedent. While “boo” lacks the profundity of words from Tanach, the fundamental underpinnings seem the same. On the other hand, the Pri Megadim (ad loc.) criticizes the practice, and it is not cited in the body of the Mishna Berura. In its footnotes (Sha’ar Hatziyun 690:57), he explains that he opposes the practice – however, his grounds (like the Pri Megadim’s; they both disapproved the pause in the laining) are that the confusion the proclamation brings can cause one to miss part of the leining. However, he suggests the following proof that hefsek is not a problem. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 13) validates a practice to elucidate the Megilla reading during the reading; in other words, with proper justification, one can speak things related to the reading. Igrot Moshe (OC I 192) discusses a deflection of the proof, and leaves the propriety of the Levush’s minhag unresolved. Regarding the complaint about confusion, in most shuls, vocalization is not going to “push the envelope” (see Living the Halachic Process VI, D-11).

Is wordless vocalization better than speaking with word(s)? Poskim treat communicating through remiza (hinting) as normally a problem, but when needed, preferable to speaking or even moving from one’s place during Shemoneh Esrei (Mishna Berura 104:1). That refers to hinting with hands or eyes, not to vocalization. Although I have not found a source for it, it is a longstanding practice (probably overused) for when you must not speak to say “Nu, nu” with gestures and intonations, meaning, “Do as I expect you to understand.” This is apparently worse than remiza and better than speaking. In some ways, “Boo” is more like speech, as the interjection “boo” is an entry in dictionaries and has a specific meaning (of disapproval), whereas “Nu” can mean anything, depending on context and intonation. If stretched out greatly, “Boooo” is more of a sound than a word, making it is more similar to “Nu.” Animal sounds are definitely not speaking, and would be not too different from mechanical noisemaking.   

In summary, there are enough ways to put down Haman without the more problematic use of words. On the other hand, words might be okay, even unrelated speech does not disqualify Megilla reading (Rama, OC 690:5), and cramping children’s style has a price. Each shul/rabbi should act according to its character and the religious/experiential needs of the Purim celebrants.  

It is an honor to field a question from one who is so concerned with the minutiae of this important mitzva that few people think about. Ostensibly, since bbst worked by the hour and finished before the end of halachic day, you/your wife had to pay before night (Bava Metzia 110b). We will analyze possible indications that you did not violate anything, some of which depend on nuanced details.

Like for most monetary rights mitzvot (ribbit is an exception), if the worker agrees to receive the money later than standard, there is no violation of bal talin or related mitzvot. (The employer may sometimes lose the positive mitzva of “on its day you shall pay his wages” (Devarim 24:15; see Pitchei Teshuva, Sechirut 9:(36)), but this quite innocuous). The rights’ waiver need not be explicit or enthusiastic. For example, the gemara (Bava Metzia 111a) says that one whose livelihood is from periodic market days can wait to pay when that day comes because we assume the worker understood all along that this is when he would be paid (Rashi ad loc.). Even when all parameters indicate on-time payment, if the worker did not ask yet for the money, there is no bal talin (Bava Metzia 112a); the lack of request is sufficient indication that he does not care to get paid yet (Ahavat Chesed I:9:11).

From this perspective, it is likely that bbst’s mindset was as follows: “The mother is willing to pay me now, and I asked for Paybox, which she can’t do and she has to ask her husband. Who knows if he is available now to do it? I really do not care if he does it right away or in several hours.” If so, what happened is fine. On the other hand, Halacha follows psychological assumptions Chazal make about cases like ours, and we are hesitant to make small distinctions between their case and ours or say that mindsets have changed – barring strong indications. In cases where we do not have an assumption of Chazal, like yours, it is difficult to rely on our own psychological assumptions.

Considering that the gemara (Bava Metzia 111a) says that bal talin is only when the person who must pay also hired the worker, how to view your home dynamics is significant. It sounds that your wife had both roles – until she lost the payment role. It is a good question to what extent to treat a couple as one unit or as partners (see Ahavat Chesed I:10:(10); Shevet Halevi VII:322).

According to the possibility that you entered the picture as a “player” and not just someone doing his wife’s technical bidding or a part of the “couple unit,” the following halacha is relevant. If the employer arranges for a storeowner to give credit to the worker on his behalf, the employer’s obligation is suspended (Bava Metzia 111a), at least if the worker agrees (see Beit Yosef, CM 339, Ahavat Chesed ibid. 5). However, if your wife assured bbst that you would pay immediately and you could not, you might not be equivalent to the storeowner.

In short, it is likely that your family’s forthcoming approach was enough that bbst was fine with the slight delay, based on psychological grounds or halachic precedent. The halachically safest thing was for your wife to stipulate that bbst waive the need to pay before night if she wanted Paybox. Although bbst would almost certainly agree, if needed, your wife had leverage, as an employer who has cash to pay cannot be told she must pay in another way. However, if your wife readily agreed that bbst would be paid with Paybox without receiving a grace period, it might be a problem.

Before explaining, we assure you that you should do nothing now.

A mishna (Makkot 5b) derives that if one of the members of a group of witnesses (=eidim) is pasul (invalid to serve), so is the testimony of its kosher members. The gemara (ibid. 6a) is bothered by the implication that events at which kosher and pasul (including relatives) eidim are together could not be halachically confirmed. The gemara provides a guideline: we ask if the people “came to see or to testify.” In other words, if they came to testify, there would be no testimony. Kf was apparently aware of this concept and was suggesting that your testimony, which was needed to effectuate the kiddushin (Kiddushin 65b), was pasul.

However, it is highly unlikely that this was a problem. Rishonim ask that if the presence of relatives pasuls kosher witnesses, what do we do at weddings? Tosafot (ad loc.) posits that just seeing an event does not turn an observer into an eid, which would happen only if he testified in beit din. Since this did not happen in your case, Tosafot would justify your inaction. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 36:4) cites two opinions, with a preference toward the opinion that argues on Tosafot.

The Rosh (Makkot 1:11) says that even when pasul eidim would invalidate the function of kosher witnesses at the point of observation, if the kosher witnesses were appointed eidim, their status is unaffected by others. (A critical question, subject to machloket, is when one of the appointed eidim was pasul, whether kosher observers at the wedding can effectuate the kiddushin. This is beyond our scope – see Otzar Haposkim, Even Haezer 42:31.) Since here too, you and your co-witness were appointed (as is standard), the Rosh would also have you ignore kf’s provocation.

Another approach in Tosafot (ibid.) is that the gemara’s asking about the eidim’s intention refers not to the pasul eidim but to the kosher ones. Specifically, we ask the kosher eidim whether they intended to join a witness group with the pasul ones or to remain separate. Since you did not intend to be eidim with kf, what he intended is irrelevant.

There is an approach that explains that we are not concerned at weddings because we assume that relatives do not intend to be witnesses (see Shach, CM 36:8). Kf seems to say that this wedding was a problematic exception. Apparently, though, even one who relies somewhat on the pasul observer’s intention also accepts at least one of the previous distinctions (see ibid.), which do help in your case.

It is also not clear that we should trust kf that he intended to be an eid when there are no indications other than his word (and after all he is pasul for this too) that this is the case (see Ramban, Makkot 6a; Shach, CM 36:5). It is also difficult to understand exactly what he was saying about his intention and to put it in halachic perspective – did he actually plan to testify, did he just mean to cause a problem, and would that amorphous idea qualify? Did he have a real reason to disqualify the wedding? If he did, wouldn’t he have sat down with the mesader kiddushin or the couple and explained himself? It is far more likely that he was trying to be “cute” or trying to get under your skin.

In summary, even if kf tried to disqualify the kiddushin, he almost definitely did not and could not do so. If it were so easy, any of the many relative guests at anyone’s wedding could, and Halacha does not want us to start worrying about that. While kf did say something unusual, a passing comment to you is definitely not enough for us to start worrying about it. Now, when the marriage is an established fact, it would be a big mistake to sow doubt about it.

Earliest Mincha time on our halachic calendars is a half hour after chatzot (astronomical midday). Since the three tefillot relate to morning, afternoon, and night, we would have expected Mincha to begin at chatzot. The reason it does not is critical to answering your question.

One gemara (Yoma 28b) reports that Avraham davened Mincha right after chatzot and wonders why in the Beit Hamikdash they never slaughtered the afternoon korban until a half hour later. One of the gemara’s answers is that Avraham was an expert in knowing when it was chatzot, whereas others wait a half hour to make sure it is afternoon. The Magen Avraham (233:1) learns from here that fundamentally the earliest time for Mincha is chatzot¸ and our practice of waiting a half hour is precautionary.

Another gemara (Berachot 26b) writes categorically that the earliest first starting time of Mincha (Mincha Gedola) is 6.5 hours (i.e., half an hour after chatzot), which corresponds to the earliest afternoon korban of the year (Mincha Ketana is at 9.5 hours into the day, the usual time of the korban). One reconciliation of the gemarot is that Yoma follows the approach that the tefillot were modeled after the patriarch’s tefillot and that Berachot follows the approach that they are modeled after the korbanot, i.e., never before 6.5 hours (Magen Gibborim 233:1).

Conceptually, the Magen Avraham (ibid.) saw the extra half hour as a precaution, according to which we would expect that if one accidentally davened during the half hour he would be yotzei. Yet, he infers from the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 233:1) that since he views Mincha Gedola itself as b’di’eved, before 6.5 hours must be totally invalid. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) counters that there could be three levels: optimal- Mincha Ketana; less than optimal- Mincha Gedola; b’di’eved- during the half hour.

The Mishna Berura (233:2) suggests that if we wait a half hour due to concern for mistake, we should treat someone who davened then like one who is unsure if he davened properly, who does not need, according to the basic law, to daven again (see Be’ur Halacha 107:1). However, he also raises the following reason not to be yotzei b’di’eved. Irrespective of the original reason for adding the half hour, once it was set, prior to that time is simply and fully the wrong time (Sha’ar Hatziyun 233:6). This approach finds expression in the opinion that during this half hour, one can even daven Shacharit (see Mishna Berura 89:7). The Mishna Berura does not resolve the question whether one who davened Mincha during the half hour must repeat Mincha. (If one chose to do so, she might make a condition that if she was already yotzeit, the second tefilla is a nedava (see opinions in Ishei Yisrael 27:(9)).)

We now turn to your case’s specific details. The fact that you ended SE at the right time does not help. Although a minority opinion holds that if one starts SE at the right time, he is yotzei even if he finishes after the end point, that is because the beginning may have special importance (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 110:5). The end does not have such importance!

What is helpful is that your case occurred in early winter. It is not clear whether the half hour is a sha’ah zemanit or 30 minutes on the clock (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 233:8), and most calendars are machmir in both directions. Therefore, you started before the end of the 30 minutes, but after half of a winter sha’ah zemanit. Your being a woman might call for slight leniency. Women are obligated in tefilla, but some say that once a day suffices (see Mishna Berura 106:4). Even if you daven Mincha regularly, this doubt can be added to the others.

Most poskim rule that one who davened Mincha during the half hour after chatzot was yotzei (see Ishei Yisrael 27:5; Tefilla K’hilchata 3:39). This is clearer in your case due to the additional indications.  

The short answer is that an avel may not cut his nails during Shloshim. A baraita (Moed Katan 17b) cites Rabbi Yehuda, who equates cutting hair and cutting nails, in that both are forbidden on Chol Hamoed and during aveilut. Rabbi Yossi does not equate nail cutting to haircutting and permits cutting nails in both circumstances. The gemara (ibid. 18a) concludes with Shmuel’s opinion that we follow Rabbi Yossi and permit cutting nails during aveilut as well as Chol Hamoed, except that during aveilut it must be done without a nail cutting utensil. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 390:7) indeed forbids cutting nails with a utensil during aveilut, throughout Shloshim.

Some leniencies are broadly accepted; some leniencies are a matter of opinion; others are dependent on need and circumstances. The philosophy of many of the halachot of aveilut, including haircutting and nail cutting, is that one should be in a state of mind where his physical and especially his aesthetic side should not be pursued in a normal manner. This can explain some leniencies.

The Gesher Hachayim (21:11:9) rules that if one’s nails are particularly long so that it takes away from the honor of Shabbat, he may cut them. In other words, the prohibition was not meant to negate certain values or other needs that are not aesthetic. This is reminiscent of the halacha regarding haircutting that if one’s mustache is impeding his eating in any way, he may trim it (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 1). In other words, these halachot are not meant to take away from functionality.

A leniency that includes functionality and mitzva is that of a mohel who can fix the nails he needs to perform a brit mila most effectively (Rama, YD 393:3). Another religiously related need is the permission for a woman who needs to go to the mikveh to cut her nails in preparation (Shulchan Aruch, YD 390:7).

We saw above (Mo’ed Katan 18a; see also the Rambam, Avel 5:2) a major distinction. It is permitted without special need to cut nails by hand or teeth, even during shiva (Shulchan Aruch, YD 390:7). The logic is that only the normal manner of cutting was forbidden. Yalkut Yosef (Aveilut 37:8) says that one can even use a nail cutter to merely start the cut, and then one does the main part of the cutting by hand or with teeth.

On the other hand, the fact that there are different ways to get the job done can create limitations even when other leniencies apply. For example, regarding the permissibility of cutting before going to the mikveh, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) requires that she have a non-Jew cut them for her. The Rama (ad loc.) does not see why, if it is not done by the aveila herself, it would make a difference whether a Jew or non-Jew would do it, considering that for even a Jewish cutter, there is no prohibition involved. Therefore, the Rama posits that even the Shulchan Aruch meant just that it be done by someone else, but it could even be a Jew. Among the commentators, some do require specifically a non-Jew to cut (Shach ad loc. 4) whereas some say that the aveila can do it even herself since it is for a mitzva (Taz ad loc. 3), As far as the bottom line, when there is a good reason to be lenient, one may be (Mei’olam V'ad Olam 33:21).

One way in which nail cutting is more lenient than haircutting, is according to most opinions, regarding what happens after Shloshim for parents. For haircutting, one must wait until people “criticize” his long hair after Shloshim (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 4). However, R. Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) says that this is not required for nails; rather, it is automatically permitted after Shloshim. (There are dissenters, but the lenient opinion is standard halacha – see Divrei Sofrim 390:44.) Interestingly, though, R. Akiva Eiger’s source (Shut Halachot K’tanot I:113) seems to indicate that the distinction is technical rather than hierarchical.

A mishna (Shekalim 2:5) says that if money is raised to support a poor person or ransom a captive, any leftover money after the needs were taken care of goes to the person for whom the money was raised. There are multiple opinions of what to do with money remaining from what was raised for a funeral – to the inheritors; left untouched; to create a commemoration. The Yerushalmi (ad loc.) brings a machloket regarding money that was raised but turned out was not needed.

Among Rishonim, the Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 253) cites a machloket between the Rashba and Rosh regarding unspent money of pidyon shvuyim. The Rashba (Shut IV:55) says that if money was raised to ransom someone and he died before being ransomed, the money goes to his inheritors, based on the mishna above. The Rosh (Shut 32:6) addresses a case where the kidnapped woman decided not to return to the Jewish community. He ruled that since the donors did not intend to donate money for such an occurrence, the money should return to them. He distinguishes between his case and the mishna – the mishna is when the money was primarily used as planned, in which case, donors do not seek any returns. In contrast, if the money turns out to not be needed, it is returned. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 253:7) cites both opinions, but prefers the Rosh. The Rama (ad loc.) and other poskim (see Shut Chatam Sofer II:237) also accept the Rosh.

Therefore, the general answer to your question is that if the need disappeared, the money should be returned to the donors. However, cases can differ from each other. The Chevel Nachalato ((Epstein) II:37) refers to a case where the fundraising campaign focused on the dire financial situation of the family of the sick woman, so that there was logic to want the money to go to the family when she died pre-surgery. He justifies this due to a weaker assumption that people would want their money and also due to authority of tzedaka collectors, as we now explain. A public charity organization has the right to make decisions to change the intended recipient from that which the donors were informed of (Shulchan Aruch, YD 256:4). Therefore, Rav Epstein encouraged the charity fund to change the funds from medical to helping the impoverished family.

It is not clear if you are fundraising independently for the family or funneling funds to and through an NPO. The latter has some technical and halachic advantages. First of all, donors who pass the tax threshold benefit from significant tax breaks through a qualified NPO. It also shields you from questions that could arise about how you handled the money. On the halachic end, we have seen that public charity gabbaim have the authority to make decisions what to do with funds in cases like you raise. If someone specifically does not want that but wants the money back if the need changes, he could indeed use you with an explicit stipulation, which would work. On the other hand, some organizations (one should not generalize) take a percentage of the contributions earmarked for a person to cover overhead (which is legitimate), so raising and giving the money directly to the person in need can sometimes help him.

If you act independently, you should document the sources of the money carefully, for several reasons. The Rosh (above), while fundamentally advocating return to the donors in cases like these, acknowledges that this is not always feasible, and suggests using the money for a project helping the masses or for a need of the same type. If you have already passed the money on, you have no responsibility to try to get it back. However, if you document at least sizable donations that are still in your control, you would owe to the people who trusted you to ask them what to do with the money that became unused for its intended purpose.