ASK THE RABBI

Earliest Mincha time on our halachic calendars is a half hour after chatzot (astronomical midday). Since the three tefillot relate to morning, afternoon, and night, we would have expected Mincha to begin at chatzot. The reason it does not is critical to answering your question.

One gemara (Yoma 28b) reports that Avraham davened Mincha right after chatzot and wonders why in the Beit Hamikdash they never slaughtered the afternoon korban until a half hour later. One of the gemara’s answers is that Avraham was an expert in knowing when it was chatzot, whereas others wait a half hour to make sure it is afternoon. The Magen Avraham (233:1) learns from here that fundamentally the earliest time for Mincha is chatzot¸ and our practice of waiting a half hour is precautionary.

Another gemara (Berachot 26b) writes categorically that the earliest first starting time of Mincha (Mincha Gedola) is 6.5 hours (i.e., half an hour after chatzot), which corresponds to the earliest afternoon korban of the year (Mincha Ketana is at 9.5 hours into the day, the usual time of the korban). One reconciliation of the gemarot is that Yoma follows the approach that the tefillot were modeled after the patriarch’s tefillot and that Berachot follows the approach that they are modeled after the korbanot, i.e., never before 6.5 hours (Magen Gibborim 233:1).

Conceptually, the Magen Avraham (ibid.) saw the extra half hour as a precaution, according to which we would expect that if one accidentally davened during the half hour he would be yotzei. Yet, he infers from the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 233:1) that since he views Mincha Gedola itself as b’di’eved, before 6.5 hours must be totally invalid. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) counters that there could be three levels: optimal- Mincha Ketana; less than optimal- Mincha Gedola; b’di’eved- during the half hour.

The Mishna Berura (233:2) suggests that if we wait a half hour due to concern for mistake, we should treat someone who davened then like one who is unsure if he davened properly, who does not need, according to the basic law, to daven again (see Be’ur Halacha 107:1). However, he also raises the following reason not to be yotzei b’di’eved. Irrespective of the original reason for adding the half hour, once it was set, prior to that time is simply and fully the wrong time (Sha’ar Hatziyun 233:6). This approach finds expression in the opinion that during this half hour, one can even daven Shacharit (see Mishna Berura 89:7). The Mishna Berura does not resolve the question whether one who davened Mincha during the half hour must repeat Mincha. (If one chose to do so, she might make a condition that if she was already yotzeit, the second tefilla is a nedava (see opinions in Ishei Yisrael 27:(9)).)

We now turn to your case’s specific details. The fact that you ended SE at the right time does not help. Although a minority opinion holds that if one starts SE at the right time, he is yotzei even if he finishes after the end point, that is because the beginning may have special importance (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 110:5). The end does not have such importance!

What is helpful is that your case occurred in early winter. It is not clear whether the half hour is a sha’ah zemanit or 30 minutes on the clock (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 233:8), and most calendars are machmir in both directions. Therefore, you started before the end of the 30 minutes, but after half of a winter sha’ah zemanit. Your being a woman might call for slight leniency. Women are obligated in tefilla, but some say that once a day suffices (see Mishna Berura 106:4). Even if you daven Mincha regularly, this doubt can be added to the others.

Most poskim rule that one who davened Mincha during the half hour after chatzot was yotzei (see Ishei Yisrael 27:5; Tefilla K’hilchata 3:39). This is clearer in your case due to the additional indications.  

The short answer is that an avel may not cut his nails during Shloshim. A baraita (Moed Katan 17b) cites Rabbi Yehuda, who equates cutting hair and cutting nails, in that both are forbidden on Chol Hamoed and during aveilut. Rabbi Yossi does not equate nail cutting to haircutting and permits cutting nails in both circumstances. The gemara (ibid. 18a) concludes with Shmuel’s opinion that we follow Rabbi Yossi and permit cutting nails during aveilut as well as Chol Hamoed, except that during aveilut it must be done without a nail cutting utensil. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 390:7) indeed forbids cutting nails with a utensil during aveilut, throughout Shloshim.

Some leniencies are broadly accepted; some leniencies are a matter of opinion; others are dependent on need and circumstances. The philosophy of many of the halachot of aveilut, including haircutting and nail cutting, is that one should be in a state of mind where his physical and especially his aesthetic side should not be pursued in a normal manner. This can explain some leniencies.

The Gesher Hachayim (21:11:9) rules that if one’s nails are particularly long so that it takes away from the honor of Shabbat, he may cut them. In other words, the prohibition was not meant to negate certain values or other needs that are not aesthetic. This is reminiscent of the halacha regarding haircutting that if one’s mustache is impeding his eating in any way, he may trim it (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 1). In other words, these halachot are not meant to take away from functionality.

A leniency that includes functionality and mitzva is that of a mohel who can fix the nails he needs to perform a brit mila most effectively (Rama, YD 393:3). Another religiously related need is the permission for a woman who needs to go to the mikveh to cut her nails in preparation (Shulchan Aruch, YD 390:7).

We saw above (Mo’ed Katan 18a; see also the Rambam, Avel 5:2) a major distinction. It is permitted without special need to cut nails by hand or teeth, even during shiva (Shulchan Aruch, YD 390:7). The logic is that only the normal manner of cutting was forbidden. Yalkut Yosef (Aveilut 37:8) says that one can even use a nail cutter to merely start the cut, and then one does the main part of the cutting by hand or with teeth.

On the other hand, the fact that there are different ways to get the job done can create limitations even when other leniencies apply. For example, regarding the permissibility of cutting before going to the mikveh, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) requires that she have a non-Jew cut them for her. The Rama (ad loc.) does not see why, if it is not done by the aveila herself, it would make a difference whether a Jew or non-Jew would do it, considering that for even a Jewish cutter, there is no prohibition involved. Therefore, the Rama posits that even the Shulchan Aruch meant just that it be done by someone else, but it could even be a Jew. Among the commentators, some do require specifically a non-Jew to cut (Shach ad loc. 4) whereas some say that the aveila can do it even herself since it is for a mitzva (Taz ad loc. 3), As far as the bottom line, when there is a good reason to be lenient, one may be (Mei’olam V'ad Olam 33:21).

One way in which nail cutting is more lenient than haircutting, is according to most opinions, regarding what happens after Shloshim for parents. For haircutting, one must wait until people “criticize” his long hair after Shloshim (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 4). However, R. Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) says that this is not required for nails; rather, it is automatically permitted after Shloshim. (There are dissenters, but the lenient opinion is standard halacha – see Divrei Sofrim 390:44.) Interestingly, though, R. Akiva Eiger’s source (Shut Halachot K’tanot I:113) seems to indicate that the distinction is technical rather than hierarchical.

A mishna (Shekalim 2:5) says that if money is raised to support a poor person or ransom a captive, any leftover money after the needs were taken care of goes to the person for whom the money was raised. There are multiple opinions of what to do with money remaining from what was raised for a funeral – to the inheritors; left untouched; to create a commemoration. The Yerushalmi (ad loc.) brings a machloket regarding money that was raised but turned out was not needed.

Among Rishonim, the Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 253) cites a machloket between the Rashba and Rosh regarding unspent money of pidyon shvuyim. The Rashba (Shut IV:55) says that if money was raised to ransom someone and he died before being ransomed, the money goes to his inheritors, based on the mishna above. The Rosh (Shut 32:6) addresses a case where the kidnapped woman decided not to return to the Jewish community. He ruled that since the donors did not intend to donate money for such an occurrence, the money should return to them. He distinguishes between his case and the mishna – the mishna is when the money was primarily used as planned, in which case, donors do not seek any returns. In contrast, if the money turns out to not be needed, it is returned. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 253:7) cites both opinions, but prefers the Rosh. The Rama (ad loc.) and other poskim (see Shut Chatam Sofer II:237) also accept the Rosh.

Therefore, the general answer to your question is that if the need disappeared, the money should be returned to the donors. However, cases can differ from each other. The Chevel Nachalato ((Epstein) II:37) refers to a case where the fundraising campaign focused on the dire financial situation of the family of the sick woman, so that there was logic to want the money to go to the family when she died pre-surgery. He justifies this due to a weaker assumption that people would want their money and also due to authority of tzedaka collectors, as we now explain. A public charity organization has the right to make decisions to change the intended recipient from that which the donors were informed of (Shulchan Aruch, YD 256:4). Therefore, Rav Epstein encouraged the charity fund to change the funds from medical to helping the impoverished family.

It is not clear if you are fundraising independently for the family or funneling funds to and through an NPO. The latter has some technical and halachic advantages. First of all, donors who pass the tax threshold benefit from significant tax breaks through a qualified NPO. It also shields you from questions that could arise about how you handled the money. On the halachic end, we have seen that public charity gabbaim have the authority to make decisions what to do with funds in cases like you raise. If someone specifically does not want that but wants the money back if the need changes, he could indeed use you with an explicit stipulation, which would work. On the other hand, some organizations (one should not generalize) take a percentage of the contributions earmarked for a person to cover overhead (which is legitimate), so raising and giving the money directly to the person in need can sometimes help him.

If you act independently, you should document the sources of the money carefully, for several reasons. The Rosh (above), while fundamentally advocating return to the donors in cases like these, acknowledges that this is not always feasible, and suggests using the money for a project helping the masses or for a need of the same type. If you have already passed the money on, you have no responsibility to try to get it back. However, if you document at least sizable donations that are still in your control, you would owe to the people who trusted you to ask them what to do with the money that became unused for its intended purpose.

We understand that you are asking only out of halachic “curiosity,” which allows us to answer you. Nevertheless, since you have not relayed potentially impactful details that are likely difficult to determine, our answer is quite general. We will take a quick look at a few scenarios and halachic concepts.

Aveida mida’at: The gemara, in a few places excludes from the mitzva of hashavat aveida (returning lost objects) an object that is an aveida mida’at (when the object is in a precarious situation and its owner does not act to protect it). The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 261) says that in such a case, the object is presumed to be hefker, whereas the Rambam (Gezeila 11:11) says that while hashavat aveida does not apply, the owner still owns it, so that it is forbidden for others to take it. The Shulchan Aruch (CM 261:4) rules like the Rambam, and the Rama (ad loc.) cites the Tur. The fact that some gemarot imply one way and others the other way (see Bava Batra 87b and Bava Matzia 21a) provides impetus for poskim to make distinctions. Thus, each side in the machloket can agree with the other side in exceptional cases (see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. aveida mida’at).

One of the gemara’s cases of aveida mida’at (Bava Metzia 31a) is similar to our case. Reuven’s cow was grazing in a (non-Jewish) vineyard, and the vineyard owner warned Reuven that if this persisted, he would kill the cow. The gemara says that if Reuven ignored the warning, it is aveida mida’at, and it is likely that the machloket of the Rambam and Tur applies here (see Even Ha’ezel Gezeila 11:11). Most explain that whether it is hefker depends on the assumptions about the object owner’s mindset (see Beit Yosef, CM 261), which would make it dependent on the specific case. In our case, too, contractors ignore the warning of having their materials confiscated, raising the question of what they are thinking when they leave them there.

Several poskim recommend putting up signs in batei midrash to tell people they will relinquish their rights to sefarim left for a long time (see Living the Halachic Process III, I-12). However, this will not work here, if the noncompliant contractors are not agreeable to management’s dictates. Therefore, unless we can assume the contractors do not care about the remaining materials, aveida mida’at will probably not make them available to be claimed.

Authority to force removal: At times, one may take strong, unilateral steps to ensure their rights (see Bava Kama 27b-28a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 4). If Shimon’s objects impede use of Reuven’s property, Reuven can take steps that include breaking the objects to get by, but not to purposely break them. Factors that affect what Reuven can do include prominently how necessary it is to take the steps and how grievous Shimon’s actions were (see Pitchei Choshen, Sh’eila 1:25). In one very grievous case (Bava Metzia 101b; Shulchan Aruch 319:1), Reuven can sell some of the objects to pay porters to remove the others.

However, this is an insufficient precedent regarding your question. Shimon’s ownership can be overlooked only to the extent needed to move the objects, not to give away the offending objects. The contractors’ objectionability is also not as severe as the one in the gemara’s case. If management is forbidden to confiscate, it also distinguishes our case from that of Bava Metzia 31a, where it is aveida mida’at because the non-Jew’s threat will not be tempered by Halacha.

The mitzva of neirot Shabbat has a dual purpose – to provide an atmosphere conducive to a pleasant Shabbat (Rambam, Shabbat 5:1); to show respect for Shabbat (see ibid. 30:5). Regarding electric lights, there are two main questions to consider: 1. Is turning on the light considered an action that “fits the mold” of the mitzva? 2. Is the fuel/light combination valid for neirot Shabbat?

Quality of the action: To oversimplify, when one switches on a light, he connects wires in a way that allows electricity to flow to the fixture and operate it. Acharonim debated whether that is considered a direct act or if we view it as gerama (indirect causation) – just a removal of the separation between the sides. We agree with the approach that views this as direct (see Yabia Omer II, Orach Chayim 17), which indicates leniency here but in the context of Shabbat prohibitions obligates people fully for what is accomplished by connecting an electric circuit. Others also claim (see the Rambam’s language – Shabbat 5:1) that there is no need for an action of lighting, but of making sure that lights are lit (Tzitz Eliezer I, 20:11; see Har Tzvi, OC I:143). According to this approach, it is not important whether turning on the light is a direct action.

Source/type of light: Some question whether electricity fits the prototype of the mitzva. Levushei Mordechai (OC III, 59), using Chanuka candles as a precedent, argues that it is invalid because it lacks a classic fuel that one needs to light. Others distinguish between Chanuka, which is commemorating a specific event involving oil, whereas regarding Shabbat, the main thing is the desired light (Yabia Omer ibid.). An interesting “proof” (see ibid.) that one does not need a classic fuel is the story of the miraculous lighting of Shabbat lights from vinegar (Ta’anit 25a). Rav SZ Auerbach is cited (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:(22)) as saying that the source of the light must be present at the time of lighting, which exists in a battery-operated light, but not the home’s electricity, which needs constant refreshing from outside. Also, the light does not look like that of a flame (Tzitz Eliezer ibid. is concerned that it looks like a torch). These issues can apply even to an incandescent light, where the light comes from a hot, glowing filament, all the more so to other technologies such as fluorescent and LED. Still, those who focus on the result of a nice atmosphere that helps people and provides honor for Shabbat, should not care about the scientific distinctions on how the light is created.

Regarding bottom line, there is no question that one who cannot light standard candles should use electricity, putting them on at the time of candle lighting with the intention of using it for the mitzva. It is also clear that this suffices to not apply the minhag (Rama, OC 263:1) that one who forgot to light one week, has to add an additional candle the rest of her life. (If it was truly not possible to light candles, she is anyway exempt from this penalty because of the extenuating circumstance – Mishna Berura 263:7).

The existence of significant opinions on both sides of the debate whether one fulfills the mitzva could lead us to a conclusion that it is better not to make a beracha (see Radiance of Shabbat p. 12). However, we agree with the approach that part of relying on this best possible solution is to make the beracha as well (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.). Realize that part of the mitzva is that it should be clear that one is lighting for the mitzva. In our days, while there is a challenge raised by the fact that most of our light for Shabbat is provided by electric lights (see idea of a halachic solution for this - ibid. 34), the candles have the advantage of being clearly done for Shabbat. When one is putting on normal electric lights he would have had even without a mitzva, the beracha seems to have added value.

While any amount of food requires a beracha rishona (=br) before it, there is a ba only after eating a k’zayit (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 210:1). If one eats small amounts of foods with different berachot acharonot that combine to form a k’zayit, he recites the “lower beracha” (usually, Borei Nefashot) (Magen Avraham 210:1).

The question is how to view a single food made up of different ingredients. Regarding br, when a food significantly contains (not as filler) wheat or other flour of the “five minim” (=5mn) along with even a majority of foods with other berachot, one recites only Mezonot (or Hamotzi), which covers even the non-Mezonot ingredients (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:2).

Regarding ba, in one place, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) says that the ba for such a food is Al Hamichya even if the flour is clearly a minority. In another place (ibid. 9), he writes that if there is not a k’zayit of flour within a pras (eight k’zeitim) of food, one recites only Al Hamichya on bread made from it, and if cooked, only Borei Nefashot rather than Al Hamichya. So, we see that the ba can be reduced due to the presence of a predominance of other ingredients. How much it is affected is disputed, as the Gra (ad loc.) says that without a k’zayit within a pras worth the ba is always Borei Nefashot. The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 47) contends that in order to make the higher beracha, the Shulchan Aruch requires not only a one eighth concentration but that one needs to eat a k’zayit worth of the 5mn flour. Conceptually, this means that a minority of flour is central enough to a complex food to control its overall identity and justify a “higher-level” ba, but the other foods are not subsumed enough to counts towards the ba of the 5mn flour.

There is significant machloket to what extent to limit the power of flour regarding ba. The Magen Avraham (208:15) says that the latter, more limiting Shulchan Aruch refers to the mixing of multiple types of grain but that other non-Mezonot ingredients team up with flour to reach the necessary k’zayit. The Chayei Adam (I, 50:21) is among those with misgivings over the Magen Avraham’s distinction. The Mishna Berura (208:48), in noting that the common practice is to recite Al Hamichya after a k’zayit of a piece of cake, even though it has less than a k’zayit of flour, gives the following explanation. Since “spices” (e.g., sugar, oil) are there to improve the prominent flour base, they are counted toward the k’zayit. Another idea is that the minimum amount of liquid needed to turn the flour into dough (but not the extra that makes it loose batter) counts toward the k’zayit (V’zot Haberacha, p. 236). The Chazon Ish (OC 26:8) similarly distinguishes between ingredients that are kneaded along with the flour, which count toward the k’zayit, and ingredients that are added after the kneading (e.g., the chocolate in rugelach). In the other direction, in cases where ingredients form a very distinct filling, e.g., in apple pie, it is accepted that it does not count toward the k’zayit (V’zot Haberacha, p. 47).

In summary, while it is unclear whether a k’zayit of flour is needed to call for Al Hamichya, common practice is that a k’zayit of cake (not including filling) suffices. Other factors give a boost to the practice. First, while the most accepted measure of a k’zayit is 27 cc. (appr. 1 fl. oz.), it may be smaller, so that there may be an actual k’zayit of flour in a piece that is not that much larger than a “standard k’zayit.” Also, Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II:133) posits that the b’di’eved situation favors Al Hamichya. He claims that since a k’zayit of food requires some ba and since cake is associated with the flour element, one would be yotzei with Al Hamichya even if Borei Nefashot is preferable. In contrast, if Al Hamichya is necessary, Borei Nefashot does not suffice. While eating additional cake is a logical halachic solution for the doubt, it may be unwise healthwise.

Your friend can fulfill his basic mitzva in this way (Mishna Berura 676:9). If your neighbor comes home very late, it is a good question whether it is better for him to light himself then or have you do it for him at a “better” time (see Living the Halachic Process VI, D-7). We will leave that decision to him and his rabbis.

In general, “Reuven” recites a beracha before doing a mitzva on behalf of “Shimon” (Rambam, Berachot 11:13, mentioning the mitzvot of mezuza, hafrashat ma’asrot, ma’akeh, and mila). This is because birchot hamitzvot relate to the mitzva’s action, not its fulfillment (Minchat Shlomo II:58). However, the way Reuven and Shimon team up in the fulfillment of the mitzva can differ significantly from mitzva to mitzva. We will give some examples.

All valid mohalim are halachically capable of doing mila to Shimon’s son, with Shimon just being the one with a specific obligation to do so. If Reuven does the mila, he fulfills the mitzva for himself, irrespective of whether Shimon asked him or fulfills his mitzva (see Shach, Choshen Mishpat 382:4).  In contrast, Reuven needs Shimon’s authorization to take off ma’asrot and the mitzva’s impact applies to Shimon. In both cases, Reuven makes the beracha (Rambam ibid.; Derech Emuna, Terumot 4:1). Therefore, we would expect that if Reuven lights Chanuka candles in Shimon’s house, he would make the beracha.

The complication begins with the Bach, cited by the Magen Avraham (676:4) and Mishna Berura (675:9). He seems to say that one who already lit Chanuka lights can light for a woman (his case) but can make the beracha only if she is listening, because it is “the responsibility of a person’s body.” If Shimon listens, it is as if he makes the beracha himself. Rav SZ Auerbach, while puzzled why Chanuka lights are different from other mitzvot, explains that since the mitzva devolves on Shimon’s house, which does not relate to Reuven, Reuven cannot make the beracha for himself.

There are other understandings of the Magen Avraham (Mikraei Kodesh (Frank) Chanuka 23; Igrot Moshe (OC I, 190) and Chovat Hadar 1:(42) generally concur). They say that the first beracha, i.e., a standard birkat hamitzva, can be made even if the home’s resident is not there. The need for Shimon’s presence concerns only the berachot of She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu (on the first night). This is because these berachot are connected to the experience of seeing the publicizing of the miracle, and they can only be made by or in the presence of the one to whom the mitzva applies. (If Reuven will not have an opportunity to make these berachot in his home, it is a different story.)

A precedent for these berachot being separate from the mitzva of lighting per se is found in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 676:2) – if someone has not lit or is connected to a lighting, he should make She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu when he sees someone else’s candles. What is the subject of considerable debate is whether when members of one’s household light on his behalf, he needs to make She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu himself (see Mishna Berura 676:6; ibid. 677:14).

Let us move on to practical suggestions. The indications are strong enough that you should definitely not recite She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu at your neighbor’s house, and therefore, he should try to find Chanuka lights upon which to recite them. Regarding Lehadlik Ner, it is very difficult to decide whether you can recite it. Therefore, it is usually best to light at your neighbor’s home right after lighting at your own home, in which case the beracha goes on both venues (Acharonim, including Dirshu 675:15, in the name of Rav Elyashiv). An exception would be when your neighbor is abroad, in Central or Western Europe, in which case, you should light at a time when it is night where he is (see Living the Halachic Process VI, D-8). In that case, it is safer not to make any of the berachot.      

There are a few halachic questions to deal with, including the extent to which lishma (intent for the mitzva) is needed. The gemara (Menachot 42b) says that the spinning of tzitzit strings must be done lishma, as the Shulchan Aruch rules (Orach Chayim 11:1). There is a machloket whether there is a lishma requirement for the attachment/tying of the tzitzit strings. The Rambam (Tzitzit 1:12) says that lishma is not required for that. He implies (see Beit Yosef, OC 14) that the proof is from the fact that a pasuk is needed to disqualify a non-Jew from attaching them (Menachot 42a), even though generally a non-Jew’s action relating to mitzvot is not considered lishma. The Rosh (Tzitzit 14) rules that the tzitzit must also be attached/tied lishma. Indeed, intuitively, this would be expected because tying is a more integral part of making the tzitzit and maybe even a major part of the mitzva (see Tosafot, Yevamot 90b) and should thus definitely require lishma. The Rambam may reason that it is not situationally clear that the spinning is for mitzva strings, so one needs positive lishma, whereas attaching the tzitzit to the garment is situationally clear that it is for the mitzva (Shut K’tav Sofer, OC 2). The bottom line is unclear. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 14:2) rules that if one attached the tzitzit without proper intention, he can rely on the Rambam to wear the garment, but that there is enough doubt about it that he should not recite a beracha on the mitzva.

Another area of doubt is what is needed to ensure things were done lishma. In the context of spinning, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 11:1) requires that one “say in the beginning of the spinning that he is doing it for the purpose of tzitzit or that he tell the woman ‘spin for me tzitzit for a tallit.’” The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 4) stresses that this entails explicit speech, not sufficing with clear thought, and leaves it as an unsolved question whether, after the fact, if there was correct thought but no statement, the tzitzit could be used.

Putting the two matters together, the Be’ur Halacha (to 14:2) says that when there was proper intention without a statement of intent when attaching the tzitzit, one can assume the tzitzit are valid and make a beracha on them. He adds an additional reason for leniency – the standard assumption that the action was done for the mitzva is stronger for attaching the tzitzit than for spinning the strings. You spoke in your questions of a p’sak received, that going to a tzitzit making center may be even better than the Be’ur Halacha’s case, as the surroundings bolster the logical assumption of lishma.

Your question comes down to whether your case is like the Be’ur Halacha’s or is even better. It is likely better for the following reason. He received instruction that it should be done lishma, which we saw in the Shulchan Aruch (11:1) is equivalent to making the statement yourself. What is not fully clear is whether the break in time and place between the instruction and the performance breaks the transference of lishma. It is very possible that the formal impact of the declaration passed (see Moadim U’zmanim 59), but the logic of it being on one’s mind would remain. (If he had started right away and continued at home, it would be somewhat simpler (see Chazon Ish, OC 6:10).).

In short, the kashrut of the tzitzit stands on very strong ground. It still would be respectful and prudent to inform/ask the people in charge of these operations, who are in touch with the IDF rabbinate, to see if they agree that it meets their standards.

Personal concerns can significantly affect the best choice for you. These include the impact on your wife’s morning, your sleep needs, and the subjective quality of your tefilla. Since you do not raise these issues, we will focus on the generic halachic issues, starting with the issue of davening before netz (sunrise).

The optimal time to daven Shacharit is “as vatikin” – starting Shemoneh Esrei as the sun rises (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:1). One can fulfill the mitzva as early as alot hashachar (72 minutes or more before sunrise), but this is on the level of b’di’eved and is recommended only for those in extenuating circumstances, e.g., they must be on the road at the optimal time (ibid. 8). Soon after alot hashachar, there is also a problem that it is, under normal circumstance, too early to recite Kri’at Shema and its berachot (ibid. 58:1,3), which is to precede Shemoneh Esrei. The starting time for Kri’at Shema is called misheyakir, some 50 minutes before netz (with variations due to various opinions and geographical adjustments). What is less clear (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 6; Minchat Yitzchak IX, 10) is whether davening at any time before netz is only b’di’eved (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 89:14) or is after misheyakir fine, and it is just less preferable than vatikin (Shut Pri Yitzchak I, 2). “Fine” can come in different gradations (see Ishei Yisrael 13:2).

The next question is whether and/or to what degree it is objectionable to get involved in an activity like taking children to daycare before Shacharit. Among the things that are forbidden before Shacharit is “involvement in one’s affairs” and traveling (Berachot 14a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 89:3). Arguably, taking children to daycare is both. However, there are possible leniencies.

Taking care of children, intrinsically, and as help to one’s wife, is likely an involvement of mitzva (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 2:5; Living the Halachic Process, VII, H-1), which is permitted before davening (see Mishna Berura 89:36). This may apply to taking to good daycare. Also, there are indications that short trips are not considered traveling (see Living the Halachic Process VI, A-1). On the other hand, while simple help in the house with children might not be involved enough to qualify as involvement in affairs, presumably taking children to daycare is usually a formal and serious enough chore to be considered involvement. The Rama OC 89:3) cites an opinion that if one recites Birchot Hashachar beforehand, it is permitted to do tasks and travel. While we avoid relying on this alone (ibid.), poskim factor in reciting Birchot Hashachar first regarding borderline cases of activity (see Ishei Yisrael 13:23-24). There is also a possibility that if one has a set time for a minyan, then fitting in tasks before that time is permitted (Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 2:(8)).

Putting our findings into perspective, neither davening between misheyakir and netz nor taking kids to daycare before davening is ideal, nor highly objectionable. It is often difficult to find sources and decide between two b’di’eved situations. (That said, if one must do real work early, he should first daven even before netz (Tefilla K’hilchata 3:(63)).) It is logical to consider subjective factors to help decide, and you can change schedules from day to day according to need. It may be worthwhile to consider how likely you are to come late to minyan if you take the kids first, or have to leave a little early if you take them later.

After weighing the factors, we suggest the following. If your community is like many, where main minyanim are in the pre-netz time slot (but Shemoneh Esrei is after misheyakir), at least during much of the year, and you sometimes attend such a minyan for convenience, it seems better to start the day by davening first with a clear mind. If you have set as a priority not to daven before netz, then take the kids first.