ASK THE RABBI

There is no need to use a tallit to wrap a sefer Torah. Certainly, when it is in the aron kodesh, it is uncommon to drape anything on a sefer Torah other than its mantle; the aron provides the necessary honor and/or protection. It is more common that when it is being transported or placed down for a while, we like to cover it, which is probably a combination of protection and honor. When this is done, it is common to use a tallit, which presumably gives more honor to the sefer Torah by not only covering it, but doing it with a particularly honorable object. However, even if the sefer Torah was being kept out of the aron, any respectable covering would be fine. Therefore, the tallit’s purpose for covering the sefer Torah is not a significant factor.

On the other hand, there is not a serious halachic requirement to wear a tallit during davening. It is possible that it is important for one davening Shacharit to show he is fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit, which is mentioned as part of the tefilla (compare to Berachot 14b, see Tosafot ad loc.), but this is fundamentally accomplished by his pair of tzitzit. Indeed, if wearing a tallit during Shacharit were particularly important, Ashkenazim would not have the minhag that single men do not wear them (see Living the Halachic Process III, F-7). Still, the minhag of those who wear a tallit has some significance, as does the human element of a visitor being embarrassed or feeling that he is missing something. Therefore, the “greater purpose” is likely to be for the visitor.

What still deserves attention is the matter of taking something away from a sefer Torah to be used for a person. If the tallit is designated for ongoing use for the sefer Torah, it becomes sanctified as a tashmish kedusha, which should not be used for matters of lower kedusha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 154:6), irrespective of the mitzva importance of the new usage. A tashmish kedusha has higher kedusha than an object used for a mitzva (Megilla 26b).    

However, an object does not become a tashmish kedusha by being used on a temporary basis (Mishna Berura 154:11), and even when it is more permanent, an understanding that it should not be set aside for the kedusha sometimes works (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8). So, one should check whether the nature of the designation of this tallit for the sefer Torah was intended to be ongoing before using it for other things.

Another question is of situational disgrace to the sefer Torah by taking the tallit directly from the sefer Torah to a person’s back. We find halachic precedent for this concern from the matter of taking a light from a Chanuka candle (other than the shamash) to use to light another (Shabbat 22b). Using the candle for something else can be bizuy (degradation of a) mitzva. While we fundamentally allow this, because it is for the purpose of the mitzva, there are various opinions about cases that are arguably less mitzva-tied (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 674:1). The Rama makes a distinction that is instructive for us. After the candle has been lit long enough for the mitzva to be completed, it becomes permitted to use it. It is difficult to determine whether halachically, during use that does not sanctify it long term, bizuy to the sefer Torah applies, but we would have recommended the following “compromise,” which seems balanced and safe for the letter and spirit of the law.   

Remove the tallit when the sefer is in the aron, and, if possible, replace it with another nice cloth if the congregation wants it covered. After a few minutes, give the no-longer-in-use tallit to the visitor, and after davening, do not return the tallit immediately to the sefer Torah, thereby lessening the image of the visitor taking the “sefer Torah’s tallit.” If, at some point, someone returns it, that is fine.

We will first identify a roll of aluminum foil’s muktzeh status. An object that is not fit for use on the present Shabbat is muktzeh. If it is a usable “utensil,” but its main use is for forbidden purposes, it is a relatively lenient form of muktzeh called kli shemelachto l’issur. If it is not yet a utensil (or a food) and making it one would require a Shabbat violation or a pre-Shabbat designation for permitted usage, it is the more severe muktzeh machamat gufo (intrinsic muktzeh) (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:38; Rama ad loc. 7).   

Aluminum foil is not used when on its roll; rather, one cuts a piece to size for its present purpose, which is then a usable utensil. Since it is forbidden to cut such a piece (see Orchot Shabbat 19:125), we view the roll according to its present stage – as an unusable object (ibid.). (A roll of toilet paper, though, is not muktzeh (ibid. 126) because when there are no viable alternatives, there are halachic ways to use the toilet paper (see Living the Halachic Process I, C-16)).

When a muktzeh item rests on an otherwise non-muktzeh object, the “base” can take on the muktzeh item’s status, based on a concept called bassis l’davar ha’asur (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:7). There are several conditions for the status of bassis to exist: 1) The muktzeh was on the base when Shabbat entered (ibid.; Mishna Berura 266:26). 2) The muktzeh was placed with the intention that it would remain there on Shabbat in a significant manner (Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:4; see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:520). 3) The muktzeh item(s) is more “important” than non-muktzeh items that also rest there (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:8).

From your description, it sounds like conditions 1 and 2 are met, so the question depends on whether the aluminum foil (and other muktzeh items) is more important than the non-muktzeh. In this context, a kli shemelachto l’issur is treated as non-muktzeh. Since such items may be moved for usage purpose and when they are in the way (ibid. 308:3), the drawer may be opened to make available the objects you wish to use and then closed.

The individual homeowner’s perspective on importance is the determinant (Mishna Berura 310:33). A prominent early source, the Magen Avraham (277:8), posits that challa is more important than the candles on the table. However, regarding more exact parameters, there are many opinions (see Orchot Shabbat 19:(414)). Some suggest that importance depends on overall value to the person (i.e., if he could choose what to hold on to, which would it be, so that price is crucial) (Q&A 14 of Rav S.Z. Auerbach in Tiltulei Shabbat). Other opinions stress functionally in the specific context (Igrot Moshe, OC V, 22.17 assumes that glasses are more important than a relatively large amount of money, but only if it is his only pair). Still others consider the relationship between the objects and the specific bassis (Shevet Halevi VIII:52 says that a challa is more important than candles/candlesticks on a table where one eats). Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (20:55) posits that it is crucial for the permitted object to be necessary for Shabbat. In any case, these parameters are unlikely to make a difference in a drawer used for general storage, where many things could possibly be used at this time.

Usually, when a muktzeh item does not make the base a bassis, we should still shake off the muktzeh before further moving the base, if this is feasible (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:8). However, it is not feasible to simply shake out a cabinet drawer. While moving the muktzeh aluminum foil along with the drawer seems regrettable, no halachic construct forbids keeping it in the drawer when it does not create a bassis (see Orchot Shabbat 19:(386)).

Although your description seems to indicate no problem of refu’ah (medical actions) on Shabbat, your wife was correct that smearing a cream onto one’s skin is forbidden on Shabbat. This is clear when one wants a film of cream to be on the skin for a while, but is likely true even if will be absorbed relatively quickly (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 33:13). It is possible to dab small lumps of cream and let them spread out by themselves. However, we will address your excellent question regarding normal application.

You may be aware that even after accepting upon herself the halachot of Shabbat, a wife may ask her husband who did not yet do so to do melacha for her. The gemara (Shabbat 151a) allows Reuven to tell Shimon who is in the techum Shabbat of Reuven’s produce to look after it, even though Reuven is out of the techum himself. The Rashba (ad loc.)  derives from this that one who has accepted Shabbat can tell a Jew who did not yet do so to do melacha on his behalf. The Ran (Shabbat 64b of the Rif’s pages) says that one may not generalize based on the gemara regarding techum, where there is a special way to get to the distant place (burgenin), but elsewhere one may not ask someone to do something that he may not. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 263) counters by stressing that the one who accepted Shabbat could have not accepted Shabbat early. The Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 263:17) accept the Rashba’s leniency, including physically benefiting on Shabbat from that which was produced on his behalf.

Your question, then, is whether the leniency of letting Reuven, who did not accept Shabbat, do melacha for Sarah, who accepted it, applies even if Sarah will be directly involved in the melacha (e.g., have the cream applied to her skin). I did not find a source on this case, but sources on parallel matters should suffice, as the question is general: is direct involvement but, primarily, as an object (i.e., another person does the melacha to him) make one considered a partner in the action (which in your case, would be chillul Shabbat for your wife).

One equivalent matter is when a non-Jew is allowed to do a melacha to heal a sick Jew, where a Jew, including the sick person, may not do that same thing (Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). The Rama (ad loc.) says that in such cases, one “may assist [the non-Jew] a little, for assistance is not [halachically] significant.” This follows the rule found in various gemarot that “assisting is not significant” (see Beitza 22a; Shabbat 93a). Admittedly, some point to a gemara (Makot 20b) that seems to indicate the opposite – one who lets someone cut his hair in a forbidden manner is punished like the one who cut it. The Taz (OC 228:1) reconciles the sources by distinguishing between cases where the person having the violation done to him needs to do something to enable the one acting to do the violation. The Taz thereby rejects the Rama’s (OC 228:3) permission to have a non-Jew pull a Jew’s tooth when necessary, because the Jew has to open his mouth. However, most poskim agree with the Rama, not the Taz (see Mishna Berura 328:11, 61). (Many say that forbidden haircuts is more stringent in this regard than melacha on Shabbat – see Nekudot Hakesef (the Shach) to Taz, Yoreh Deah 198:21).

Another question about whether one having melacha done to him is considered a halachic “collaborator” is when a woman who did not cut her nails needs to go to the mikveh on Shabbat. Most poskim allow a non-Jew to cut them (see Nekudot Hakesef ibid.; the Taz is again stringent); Be’ur Halacha 340:1; Yalkut Yosef, OC 340, Gozez 11).

The standard p’sak is thus that your wife could even maneuver herself to help you apply the cream. However, it was probably simple enough to apply it without her needing to do anything, in which case, even the Taz would permit it.

Asking your question takes bravery, as we understand that the prospect of not being able to duchen would be a great disappointment.

We will start with the strict requirements. BK must be done standing (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 128:14). The gemara (Sota 38a) learns this from the Torah’s connecting of the kohen’s beracha to his service in the Mikdash, which must be done standing. Because standing is a full requirement, if one leans on something during BK, it is invalid (Mishna Berura 128:51). However, one may lean a little, as long as removing the thing he is leaning on would not make him fall (see Zevachim 24a; Mishna Berura 94:22). It is also absolutely required for kohanim to lift their hands in the subscribed manner for BK (Shulchan Aruch ibid.; Sota 38a). This makes balance more difficult. You thus must figure out if you can use the wall for balance/security and “pass this test.”

Realize that there are legitimate corners to cut to help you qualify. The Mishna Berura (128:52) accepts the Ktav Sofer’s (OC 13) idea that the kohen needs to lift his hands only when he pronounces each individual word; he can rest in between. The same thing should be true regarding standing – one may lean as he likes in between pronouncing the words (Even Yisrael VII:10; Dirshu 128:70).  

Let us rule out another question. A kohen may not duchen with blemishes on visible parts of the body because they distract the congregation’s attention (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 30). Arguably, people could view your cane as distracting. However, this is not a problem. First, this is a questionable assumption. Second, if people are used to a distraction, e.g., the situation has existed for 30 days, it is no longer distracting (ibid.). Furthermore, since the cane is not in your hand during BK, it is not a halachic issue.

We did not find discussion on the presumably most physically difficult part of the process – turning around during the beracha, which kohanim do with the hands already up. We will share two good solutions for this challenge, after discussing the practice of turning around. The most important parts of davening are done facing the aron kodesh, and it is improper, without a good reason, to stand with one’s back to it. However, Halacha made BK, at which the kohanim address the congregation, an exception (see Sota 40a). However, the kohanim turn to the congregation only when they need to, right before BK. The matter of timing of turning around and raising the hands is not intrinsic to BK, unlike the above matters. In fact, there is a machloket whether to turn around before the beracha (… asher kid’shanu … levarech …) or after it, and the present minhag is to turn in the middle of the beracha (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 128:20). There is also a machloket whether to lift the hands before or after the beracha (see opinions in Va’ani Avarchem 19:2).

Given the fact that these questions of timing are just a matter of minhag, in your situation you can do what is physically best for you (you do not need to worry that other kohanim will resent your acting differently). Specifically, you can turn with everyone else, but holding your cane, and not raise your hands until you finish turning around and making the beracha. You can also turn, with the cane and at more leisure, before the beracha, and then put down the cane and raise your hands sometime before the BK itself.

In summary, you can appraise whether you can stand well enough at the critical times and figure out how to use legitimate corner cutters. You must make sure you are not endangering yourself concerning a dangerous fall. The wall may be a good solution, but something like a heavy shtender in front of you may be more effective and safer. Do not be embarrassed to ask for help to set things up best. Your lifetime of past and future berachot gives you rights!

Indeed, one should daven Mincha by shki’ah. Although the Rama (Orach Chayim 233:1) says that those who daven Mincha after plag hamincha (now widely practiced) have until [close to?] tzeit hakochavim, the Mishna Berura (233:14) argues that one must daven by shki’ah. However, at least for several minutes after sunset, it is possible that b’di’eved one may still daven Mincha (ibid.).

You seem aware of the above and do not want to rely on the opinions (many do for at least several minutes) that when one must daven Mincha after shki’ah, he may assume it works. Your idea of dealing with the doubt contains positive points. Let us analyze it and determine how you should have proceeded.

Classical sources discuss tefillat nedava in two cases – #1. One who is unsure if he already davened may do Shemoneh Esrei (=SE) as a nedava; #2. One who wants to daven a second time and adds new elements to SE (Shulchan Aruch, OC 107:1, based on Berachot 21a). Your idea relates to #1, with the doubt being not whether the tefilla is necessary but whether it works as desired (for Mincha). There is no clear precedent for a tefillat nedava at a time that is not viable for tefilla, but your assumption (the Be’ur Halacha to 233:1 concurs), is that if it is too late for Mincha, it must be possible to daven Ma’ariv. Your nedava faces another challenge. If your tefilla did not work for Mincha, it is nedava of Ma’ariv … before you do the obligated Ma’ariv. This might be possible (see Ohalei Shimon, Tefilla 20), but it is difficult to determine if all agree with this possibility.

We now follow your system to Ma’ariv. If your tefilla did not count for Mincha, you needed SE at Ma’ariv twice, the second as tashlumin (makeup) of Mincha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:2), for a total of three SEs that evening. On the other hand, you could not be sure the third one is necessary, because if the first counted for Mincha, no tashlumin was necessary. Therefore, the third tefilla would also need to be to be done as a tefillat nedava (a variation of scenario #1 above).

However, poskim (see Ishei Yisrael 27:6) do not embrace your system of dealing with the safek, but that of the Be’ur Halacha (ibid.). He says that post-ski’ah SE should be on condition that if it does not work for obligatory Mincha, it should be for obligatory Ma’ariv. If the first was for Ma’ariv, then you missed Mincha and the later SE (which will be preceded by Kri’at Shema and its berachot) will be tashlumin of Mincha.

The Be’ur Halacha’s system has weak points if your first tefilla did not fulfill Mincha. SE of tashlumin should be directly after the SE of the present tefilla (Mishna Berura 108:15). In this case, if the SE after shki’ah ended up being for Ma’ariv, then the tashlumin, done with the Ma’ariv of everyone else, is likely to be several minutes and perhaps much more after the first SE. However, when need be, there can be a break, as long as it is within the timeframe of Ma’ariv (ibid.). Also, Kri’at Shema and its berachot will turn out to be (perhaps, significantly) after the main SE of Ma’ariv (the first tefilla). Once again, while not ideal (Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:2), it is permitted when there is need (ibid. 3).

The Be’ur Halacha avoids two weaknesses in your system that exist even if, as is likely, your first tefilla worked for Mincha. 1) You need three SEs instead of two; 2) We try to avoid tefillat nedava, which should ideally be done only if one concentrates throughout SE (Shulchan Aruch, OC 107:4).

According to our research, your idea is unlikely to bring the results you expect. Namely, mature grapevines generally survive without irrigation (Hashem gave trees great survival “skills”), although lack of water is among conditions that will decrease yield. Possibly, if you learn how to improve your care for the vines, you can still enjoy the grapes and want to keep them. However, we are not experts, and in any case, “to each his own.” We will investigate your question, first according to your assumptions, and then deal with practical halachic advice.

While it is forbidden to be destructive with anything of value (bal tashchit), destroying a fruit tree (including a grapevine) is more severe and forbidden more broadly than other objects (see Bava Kama 91b; Rambam, Melachim 6:8). The Rambam (ibid., based on Sifrei, Devarim 203) rules that it is forbidden not only to cut down a fruit tree but even to divert water flowing to it in order to dry it up. There are different opinions as to how severe a sin it is to divert the water (see Etz Hasadeh 1:4).

What you are asking about is more lenient than the Rambam’s case, as the Rambam discusses a case where the damager performs an action, albeit one which brings on the damages indirectly. You ask about refraining from doing something that is critical for the tree’s survival. On the other hand, you are refraining from something basic and with intention to kill the tree.

Contemporary poskim cite on the withholding of water with the intention to dry up a tree from a compilation of the Chazon Ish on the Rambam. He writes (on Rambam ibid.) that it is permitted to withhold water. Since the Torah forbids destruction, lack of action, by not providing, cannot be included. The Chazon Ish claims that this is compelling because the Torah forbids destruction equally if done by the owner or someone else, and it is inconceivable that someone other than the owner would be required to provide water. Shevet Halevi (VI:112) claims that it is common practice for those who want to cut down a tree to first kill it by withholding water. We note, though, that the Chazon Ish says that it is still objectionable (not bal tashchit), to withhold water if there is no need for it.  

Let us consider, though, the likelihood that withholding the water will not quickly or reliably kill the tree but will reduce the yield further. The gemara (Bava Kama 91b) gives minimum yields of dates and olives, under which it is likely permitted to cut down the trees. Grapes are not listed, and there are different opinions about whether there is a minimum amount and what it is, and whether it is fully permitted in such a case (see Rosh, Bava Kama 8:15; Etz Hasadeh 3:(11)). In general, when it is unclear whether a tree counts as a viable fruit tree, we are stringent (Shut Chatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 102). More fundamentally, if a tree has the potential to be viable and is not presently because of neglect or mistakes, it likely cannot be cut down due to its potential (see Etz Hasadeh 3:5). Therefore, for your system to work, the tree would have to clearly reach the point of no return, possibly when it is dead.

We have discussed elsewhere (Living the Halachic Process I, H-10; ibid. VI, G-13) when need (for space, damage from tree) permits cutting down a tree. You do not sound close to that, although it might be enough for the Chazon Ish’s leniency for killing it by not watering. Additionally, since lack of watering does not generally kill a mature vine, how could it be forbidden for you to withhold the water, especially if watering requires you to spend time and money on vines from which you do not get benefit?

In summary, you are not required to water the vines but due to botanical and halachic reasons, it is unlikely that this will enable you to uproot them anytime soon.

Regarding sukka, it seems to be an explicit gemara (Sukka 8b; see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 635:1) that a non-Jew can make a kosher sukka as long as he did so to provide shade. The Rama (OC 649:1) confirms that the same is true for tying up the hadasim and aravot with the lulav. However, it is somewhat more complicated. The Magen Avraham (649:3) infers from the Rama’s wording that such a sukka or lulav is only kosher after the fact, but that, l’chatchila, a non-Jew should not do it.

The Magen Avraham traces stringency to the halacha for tefillin and tzitzit. The gemara (Gittin 45b) derives from the proximity of “you shall tie” and “you shall write” (Devarim 6, regarding tefillin and mezuza, respectively) that only those who are connected to the mitzva of tefillin can write sacred scrolls. Tosafot (ad loc.) cites Rabbeinu Tam as using this source to disallow a woman tying on tzitzit or assembling arba’a minim because they are exempt from these mitzvot. The Magen Avraham accepts Rabbeinu Tam, but only partially. Rabbeinu Tam seems to disqualify people even b’dieved, whereas the Magen Avraham, working within the Rama, who fundamentally accepts non-Jews for sukka and lulav, recommends avoiding them l’chatchila.

Tosafot, for their part, reject Rabbeinu Tam’s extension of the disqualification to women, as even non-Jews are disqualified even for tzitzit only due to a pasuk, as well as his extension to other mitzvot, based on the gemara that allows a sukka made by a non-Jew. Almost all poskim (see Be’ur Halacha to 14:1; Chochmat Shlomo (Kluger) ad loc.) fundamentally reject Rabbeinu Tam/Magen Avraham. However, due to the weight of these great authorities, many poskim recommend avoiding using a non-Jew for sukka/arba’a minim (ibid.; Mishna Berura 649:14).

If the disqualification from writing holy texts does not extend to other mitzvot, then why does the Rama (14:1; the Shulchan Aruch ad loc. is lenient) cite two opinions regarding women’s ability to tie tzitzit and prefer avoiding it? Acharonim distinguish between the mitzvot. The Be’ur Halacha (to 14:1) mentions those who disqualify women from tzitzit based on a pasuk. The Chatam Sofer (Shut, Yoreh Deah 271) distinguishes that the fact the Torah describes tying tzitzit as its own positive mitzva explains requiring someone to whom the mitzva of tzitzit is incumbent. In contrast, building a sukka is just a hechsher (preparation for a) mitzva, and thus anyone can do it. Chochmat Shlomo’s (ibid.) distinction is that tzitzit must be tied on lishma (for the purpose of the mitzva), but since sukka does not require it (just that it be done for shade), it does not need to be done by one who is obligated in the mitzva.

The indications regarding lulav are similar to those for sukka (see Rama OC 649:1 and Mishna Berura 649:14(, with two notable differences. On one hand, there is no gemara saying arba’a minim assembled by a non-Jew is kosher. On the other hand, the whole need for the binding together of the lulav, hadasim, and aravot is of a low or possibly technical level (see Sukka 33a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 651:1; development of this point is beyond our scope).

Now for our recommendations. If your neighbor would ask us, we might tell him that since the only part of the sukka that there is a question about is the s’chach, he could have his worker build the frame and walls and let you happily put up the s’chach (or even just lift it up – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 626:2). Similarly, he could let you assemble the arba’a minim without needing to teach you. However, since it sounds (it may be worth checking better) like he does not want you to do it and the case for chumra is quite tenuous and only l’chatchila, we recommend to leave things as they are.

We will start with the less pressing and less severe matters – the inuyim (Yom Kippur prohibitions) of washing, anointing, and shoes. The Magen Avraham (introduction to Orach Chayim 624) permits them before Havdala. Several poskim (including the Machatzit Hashekel ad loc.; Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 624:15) assume that these are permitted even before any declaration of Havdala (i.e., in Ma’ariv or “Baruch Hamavdil …). On the other hand, some are machmir even on these inuyim before Havdala (Eliya Rabba 624:1) and others are inconclusive as to whether at least Hamavdil is required (Mishna Berura 624:2). Therefore, there is little reason to not simply say Hamavdil first if he did not yet daven Ma’ariv or forgot to say Ata Chonantanu, and that suffices. This would make it parallel to the requirements before doing melacha on Motzaei Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:10).

On Motzaei Shabbat, it is forbidden to eat or drink before making Havdala (Pesachim 105a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:1) because the obligation of Havdala is upon him. The same is true regarding Havdala after Yom Kippur. To be clear, at least after saying Hamavdil, the prohibition is related to the need for Havdala rather than an extension of the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Therefore, it is permitted to drink water, as it is on Motzaei Shabbat (ibid.). Although it is true that many have the minhag not to drink even water on Motzaei Shabbat, that is a chumra based on mystical reasons (Rama, OC 291:2). This probably does not apply at the end of Yom Kippur, and even if it does, it should not stand in the way of one who is thirsty due to fasting, and considering that low hydration is unhealthy. On the other hand, the minhag is to just hold on another few minutes until after Havdala. Therefore, one should not drink in front of everyone in shul, and several poskim are willing to permit drinking water only when there is some special level of need (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:25 (low-level need); Rav Elyashiv, cited in Ashrei Ha’ish III, 21:28 (higher-level need)). Rav SZ Auerbach is also cited (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(59)) as saying that one should drink water after Yom Kippur only after he has done Havdala in davening or by declaration (see (ibid.) why this is more necessary than on Motzaei Shabbat).

Sho’el U’meishiv (III:I:129) says that it is even possible, when important and in private, to drink water during Ne’ila which extends past tzeit hakochavim (a rare occurrence, especially in Israel). S’dei Chemed (vol. IX., p. 177) is highly skeptical about this possibility but does not fully disprove it.

The halachic situation is slightly different for women. It is unclear whether women are obligated in Havdala, even on Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 296:8). Therefore, there is logic to claim that we can be more lenient on women’s eating before Havdala after Yom Kippur (see Chayei Halevi III:43). Yet, poskim are reluctant to allow this because there is danger to the lives of those who eat before Havdala without justification (see Pesachim 105a; Piskei Teshuvot 299:1). Usually women, especially Ashkenazim women, avoid making Havdala themselves due to the doubt whether they are obligated in it (Rama ibid.), and it is possible that this is even more recommended after Yom Kippur when it is not also Motzaei Shabbat (Mateh Ephrayim 624:7). Nevertheless, poskim recommend that a woman who is hungry while waiting for her husband to come home after Yom Kippur should feel free to make Havdala and then eat (Shut Shevet Halevi III:43; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(86)).

Among the times we recite Shehecheyanu are for performing a mitzva that comes up cyclically (including shofar) and for acquiring a significant object that makes one happy (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:4; Mishna Berura 223:13). It is a machloket whether to make Shehecheyanu on an object whose importance is only because of the mitzva, as mitzvot are not considered to have worldly benefit (ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 22:1) says that one makes Shehecheyanu on the garment of tzitzit because it is clothes with importance, but not on tefillin. One can ask whether we look at a shofar as a musical instrument, which is important to a buyer like you (albeit because of the mitzva), like tzitzit, or whether we view it only as an article of mitzva, like tefillin, in which case there is a machloket and one would refrain out of doubt. Another factor is that many (see Piskei Teshuvot 223:6), especially Sephardim (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 223:3), have the minhag not to make Shehecheyanu on objects other than fruit and clothes. In cases of safek, poskim often recommend reciting Shehecheyanu by connecting first use of the object in question to Shehecheyanu on something that definitely requires it (Be’ur Halacha 22:1). This likely applies to shofar, and for you, when blowing on the first day could be a great time (see below).

Regarding reciting Shehecheyanu specifically on the second day, the situation differs for Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Sephardim do not recite Shehecheyanu on the second day if it was recited on the first (Shulchan Aruch, OC 600:3), and there is no minhag to “create” a need for it.

Ashkenazim always recite Shehecheyanu on the second day’s blowing (Rama ad loc.) even without help from a new object. However, some Acharonim (see Mishna Berura 600:7) express a preference for the ba’al tokeiah to wear new clothing on the second day to strengthen the beracha’s justification, like is done at Kiddush. If you were not going to be machmir, the good chance that the new shofar warrants Shehecheyanu only helps. However, if you use the shofar instead of the new clothes you would have worn, then there is a chance you are weakening the case for Shehecheyanu. However, concern for that is somewhat extreme, considering the Rama’s ruling and the good chance that your excitement over a new shofar (specifically if you do not often buy new ones) warrants Shehecheyanu.

The final question is your point about the shofar being used before. The Rama regarding Shehecheyanu on a tallit (22:1) says that if it is not recited when attaching the tzitzit, it should be recited during the first wearing. While some Acharonim claim that it does not have to be the first wearing (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), contemporary poskim generally agree that one can make Shehecheyanu on a new garment as long as he has not removed it, but he cannot do so for a second wearing (see Mishneh Halachot VI:42; V’zot Haberacha p. 167). By extension, if you use it on the first day, it is no longer new enough for Shehecheyanu on the second day. (One could also ask about the propriety of using it on the first day, when Shehecheyanu is said due to the mitzva, and having in mind that it should not also go on the shofar.) If you will not use the new shofar on the first day but use it for practice during Elul, it is logical to distinguish between the type of practice usage. Just practicing at home a few times to check the alignment of the shofar and the lips is like trying on a garment for size or alterations, which does not preclude Shehecheyanu for the first real wearing (V’zot Haberacha ibid.). However, using the shofar in shul at the end of Shacharit or for extensive practice, should preclude Shehecheyanu thereafter.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 131:4) rules to omit Tachanun in the “house of a chatan,” a shul that will host a brit that day, and a shul which a chatan is attending. While the Rama (ad loc.) says that only a chatan on his wedding day pushes off Tachanun, Acharonim rule that it applies throughout the week of Sheva Berachot (Mishna Berura 131:26), which is the minhag. The minhag is also to push off Tachanun if the father, the planned mohel, or the sandek of a baby on the day of his brit is davening there (ibid. 22). The idea is that the simcha that the tzibbur absorbs from these people is incongruous with Tachanun, as we find on happy days throughout the year. While it is not fundamentally severe to say Tachanun anyway, we have no reason not to follow the poskim’s instructions.

There is more than one reason not to push off Tachanun in this way at Selichot. One applies to the simcha of brit if the Selichot finish before daybreak. As opposed to the chatan, whose halachic status of simcha lasts throughout the entire time period, those related to the brit do not have a formal status. Rather, the proximity of the important mitzva of brit conveys through them an atmosphere of joy that precludes Tachanun. The Pitchei Teshuva ((Isserlin) 581:1) is among those who posit that if they get up to Tachanun when it is too early for a brit mila, Tachanun should be recited. He is unsure what to do between alot hashachar and netz hachama, when the Torah-level mitzva of mila has begun but the Rabbis required to wait until sunrise (Megilla 20a). Machazeh Avraham (OC I:154) says that since mila at that time is valid b’di’eved, Tachanun is omitted.

B’tzel Hachochma (IV:146) sees the exemption as applying pre-daytime even though brit mila must be performed during daytime. He bases this is on the fact that the baby’s status of requiring brit mila exists from the beginning of the baby’s eighth day, i.e., from the previous night. Arguably, the baby’s halachic status is less relevant than the fact that people have awoken for the day on which the brit will take place. It is unclear if according to B’tzel Hachochma, we would omit Tachanun at a late-night Selichot when the brit will be the next morning.

Shevet Halevi (IV:54) succinctly presents a broader reason not to skip Tachanun for a brit or a chatan, upon which we will expand. Unquestionably, we do not waive the entire Selichot due to a chatan or a brit. He argues, then, that the role of Tachanun in Selichot is not as a relative “add-on,” like it is in during regular tefilla, which sometimes is said and sometimes not (e.g., Shabbat, major and minor chagim, Ma’ariv). Rather, Tachanun is part and parcel, in terms of structure and content, of the fabric of Selichot. Therefore, given we are doing Selichot, we cannot allow ourselves nor will we gain much by omitting Tachanun. Some point out that similarly while Erev Rosh Hashana is too festive to recite Tachanun in Shacharit, we recite it in Selichot.

One can argue whether this viewpoint fits well with the following general approach to Selichot, championed by Rav Soloveitchik (see Batei Yosef 581:2-3). Selichot of Elul and Tishrei have a semi-status of an independent tefilla, introduced with Ashrei, ending with Kaddish Titkabel, and including Tachanun. One can claim that Tachanun has a similar role in Selichot as in standard tefillot, so it can be omitted due to simcha. However, there is stronger logic to say that we lack precedent to amend the internal structure of Selichot, and also that the moods of Selichot and Tachanun are too similar to do one and not the other.

Both practical approaches have serious proponents (see opinions in B’tzel Hachochma ibid.), and each shul’s minhag is fully acceptable. Some communities have a preference to make Selichot short, while some communities prefer consistency; factoring in these preferences is also legitimate.