ASK THE RABBI

One is not required to eat bread at a meal, even if it means that he will not bentch (except on Shabbat and Yom Tov when one needs a meal including bread). Nevertheless, regularly avoiding eating bread because he doesn’t want to be bothered with bentching is regrettable.

If one has the philosophy that you espouse to try to wash and bentch at every meal, he should be careful not to cause more halachic problems than it is worth. One issue involves netillat yadayim. Although it is good to be stringent and wash before eating any amount of bread (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 158:3), the obligation likely begins only with a k’zayit (size of an olive) and possibly even a k’beitza (size of an egg). Therefore, one may not make a beracha on netillat yadayim for less than that amount (ibid.:2) (the questions of one who eats in between a k’zayit  and a k’beitza and of how to calculate the sizes are beyond our present scope).

Eating small amounts of bread in order to cover all the berachot under the umbrella of the meal’s berachot (Hamotzi and Birkat Hamazon) raises another problem. The gemara (Berachot 41b) says that wine exempts all other drinks from a beracha because of its importance and that bread exempts other foods that are eaten during the meal. However, according to the accepted opinion, Hamotzi can exempt foods only when they are subsumed under the meal. Based on this, the Magen Avraham (177:1) suggests that if one eats a little bread in order to exempt other foods, then the other foods do not revolve around the bread and the Hamotzi may not exempt them from their berachot. He counters that it is possible that the exemption was instituted across the board, regardless of one’s intention. However, according to the more accepted understanding of the Magen Avraham (see Machatzit Hashekel, ad loc.; Mishna Berura 177:3), one should not set up a situation where he is eating bread just in order to subsume other foods or presumably to set up a situation where he will have to bentch. Admittedly, some prominent authorities say that other foods are exempted even in that case (Even Ha’ozer 174:12; Aruch Hashulchan 177:2; Igrot Moshe OC IV, 41). However, this is hardly an optimal situation that we would suggest for one who would be happy not to eat bread at all. If one would eat bread for its own sake but would prefer not to “be bothered” with washing and bentching, it would be fine to convince him to regularly eat some bread and the Magen Avraham’s issue would not apply (see V’zot Haberacha, pg. 71).

If one does not eat even a k’zayit of bread then although he still recites Hamotzi, almost all authorities say he must make all of the individual berachot. Furthermore, he will not be able to bentch in any case and will have to make the appropriate berachot after eating. One also has to eat the k’zayit within k’dei achilat pras (a contested amount of time, which is within the range of a single digit of minutes) (Mishna Berura 210:1).

While we have not weighed all of the plusses and minuses (including the issue of one who eats bread-like foods during a full meal without bread- see Igrot Moshe, ibid.), we can fairly say that if a person is not interested in eating approximately a slice of bread, he should feel free to go without eating bread and “washing and bentching.” Whichever approach one takes, he should become familiar with the several halachic questions that arise in “bread meals” and “non-bread meals.”

Let us begin with a story, whose relevance should be clear later. An Ashkenzi boy got engaged to a Sephardi girl. At the engagement party, the girl’s father wished the boy’s father that soon he would have a grandchild named after him. The recipient of the “blessing” got upset, and the “good wisher” took it as a sign that he did not want to share grandchildren with the latter. It took some explaining for the Ashkenazi to realize that Sephardim covet grandchildren named after them while they are alive and he intended to bless his new mechutan. The Sephardi learned the hard way that Ashkenazim do not name after live grandparents, explaining the negative reaction.

The gemara (Berachot 42b) spells out when a person can make a beracha on behalf of others who are eating with him. Basically, there are two scenarios: they recline to eat together; they make a statement that they intend to eat together. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 167:11) points out that nowadays when people rarely recline when eating, the first criterion depends on whether they sit down to eat at one table. In your case, both criteria were apparently met (one is sufficient) and, therefore, you had reason to consider it appropriate that one person would make Hamotzi and the others would only answer and eat. In fact, when starting the meal as one group, there is a benefit in one making the beracha on behalf of all, based on the concept of “with a multitude of people, it is a glory for the King” (Mishlei 14:28) (Bi’ur Halacha to 167:11). (Regarding Birkat Hamazon after the meal, only if there is a zimun (three reciting Birkat Hamazon as a group) is it proper for one to listen and answer rather than recite separately (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 193:1).)

May a woman make Hamotzi on behalf of others? Only one who is fully obligated in a mitzva can perform it on behalf of others who are fully obligated (Berachot 20b). Women, who are not obligated in shofar blowing, cannot blow shofar for men to fulfill their mitzva (Rosh Hashana 29a). However, women are obligated (rabbinically, like men) to make berachot before eating and can exempt men. Indeed, in some fine families, the wife makes Hamotzi at the Shabbat meal.

It is understandable then that you might feel that your friend’s husband acted on an insulting social/political basis by making his own beracha, but it may be similar to the story above. Without crawling into his head, it is likely that he just followed a broad minhag (which you apparently do not share), which is well over a century old, that people generally make their own berachot rather than suffice by listening to another. One reason given is that we fear that one will speak between answering the beracha and eating (Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 167:18). A convincing reason for the general custom regarding many berachot is that we are afraid that people will not focus in a manner that enables them to be exempted by another’s beracha (Mishna Berura 8:13).

Only on Shabbat and Yom Tov is it still widely practiced that one person makes the beracha on everyone’s behalf, and this is because there is usually only one set of lechem mishneh (double loaves) upon which the beracha is recited. If one makes his own beracha on a piece of bread, it is questionable whether he is connected to the two loaves (see Mishna Berura 274:8 and Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 55:19). Even then, there are communities where people make their own beracha after the central one was made (see ibid.).

We must address different categories of berachot, with different reasons and details.

Netilat yadayim and “Asher yatzar”- There are two possible reasons (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 4) for washing our hands with a beracha upon waking in the morning, before davening: 1) Our hands probably got dirty as we slept (Rosh); 2) Because in the morning we are like a new being, we set out on a process of purification and blessing Hashem (Rashba; see Mishna Berura 4:1). There is a further element of removing an evil spirit from one’s hands (see Rama, OC 4:2).

Reason 1 does not apply if one did not sleep and kept his hands clean. It is not fully clear whether reasons 2 & 3 apply if one did not sleep. The Rama (4:13) says that although one should wash his hands as usual, he should not make the beracha out of doubt. Listening to the beracha of one who slept on behalf of others avoids the doubt. One who did not sleep but “went to the bathroom” and thereby touched covered parts of the body also makes a beracha (Mishna Berura 4:30). Reason 1 certainly applies to such a person and the others are likely to apply, as the night passed by the time of alot hashachar (break of dawn, 72 minutes before sunrise).

“Asher yatzar” can be said by anyone who recently went to the bathroom.

Birkot Hashachar- Most of the series of berachot thanking Hashem for elements of our lives were originally recited as one received the benefit (e.g. putting on shoes, clothes, straightening the body) (Berachot 60b). Nevertheless, our practice is to make the berachot at one time, whether or not we recently received the benefit (Rama 46:8; see Yalkut Yosef for Sephardic practice). Therefore even one who did not sleep and renew these benefits can recite the berachot because the praise of Hashem is true in regard to others. The main issue is with the berachot of “hama’avir sheina” and “elokai neshama,” which focus on awaking from sleep and are recited, at least partially, in the first person. The Mishna Berura (46:24) rules that one should hear these berachot from one who slept. On the other hand, it is legitimate to make these berachot despite not sleeping (see Ishei Yisrael 5:(40) & Piskei Teshuvot 494:7), especially if no one who slept is available.

Birkot Hatorah (=bht- before the study of Torah)- It is unclear whether the reason one is obligated to make bht every morning is the fact that it is a new day or that his sleep ended the efficacy of the old beracha. Due to this doubt, the Mishna Berura (47:28) rules that one who was up all night does not make bht at daybreak but hears them from one who slept. (Yechave Da’at III, 33 argues.)  However, he accepts R. Akiva Eiger’s idea that if one took a reasonably long nap during the previous day (and did not make the bht since he got up), he makes the berachot the next morning despite staying up in the night. This is because he is obligated according to both approaches, as he has slept and a day passed since his last bht. It is better to use such a person than one who put his head down for a few minutes at night. Note that one who sleeps at night makes bht before resuming learning. Thus, he is available to recite them on others’ behalf only if he came to shul when they are ready for the bht or if he did not recite them when he arose. (Note- everyone recites the Torah texts after the bht starting with “Yevarecheca”).

Tzitzit- It is unclear if we are obligated in tzitzit at night, and thus whether we need a beracha in the morning. One should be yotze with the beracha on his or another’s talit (Mishna Berura 8:42).

What is considered significant sleep may depend on where (bed or chair) and/or how long (opinions range from a minute to a half hour and beyond) he sleeps. The halacha may change depending on what topic is being discussed (see Ishei Yisrael 6:(64)).

First we must understand the halacha that you correctly assume that one who puts on a tallit does not make a beracha when putting on his tzitzit in the morning.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 8:10) says that one who puts on his tzitzit when his hands are still dirty from the night should put them on without a beracha, which he will recite later. He suggests doing so after purposely handling the tzitzit or when he puts on another pair of tzitzit. The Darchei Moshe (OC 8:3) relates the minhag to make a beracha only on the tallit that he wears for Shacharit, which also covers the smaller pair of tzitzit.

The Mishna Berura (8:24) provides different reasons for the practice to make the beracha only on the tallit and use it to cover the already worn tzitzit. He mentions the Chayei Adam’s (12:4) issue not to make two interchangeable berachot in close proximity. Since one beracha can accommodate multiple tzitzit, an unnecessary second beracha would be a beracha she’eina tzricha (unneeded and thus improper). (The Chayei Adam actually prefers making the beracha on the tzitzit to cover the tallit.) The Darchei Moshe (ibid.) was bothered by the possibility that the mitzva of tzitzit will not be complete (and thereby not warrant a beracha) because often the tzitzit’s garment is too small. Others point out other things that could make a beracha on the tzitzit unnecessary (e.g., the garment’s shape, having had the tzitzit on all night.).

This practice does raise problems. Berachot generally should precede the mitzva’s fulfillment; here the beracha comes after the mitzva of tzitzit. Rabbeinu Yonah (cited by the Beit Yosef, OC 8) says that it is sufficient that the beracha precedes part of the performance of the mitzva, in this case, the continuation of their being worn. The Taz (8:9) says that since one cannot put on the tzitzit right away, considering that the hands were dirtied during the night, it is fine to delay the beracha.                                                                        

The question is whether this system is best even if one will not put on his tallit until a significant time later, i.e., during chazarat hashatz, prior to duchening. Not only is the concern with two berachot in succession being unnecessary reduced, but the problem of waiting a long time without a beracha being on the tzitzit also increases. Several poskim therefore say that when a long time is expected between the two, one makes a beracha first on the tzitzit and later on the tallit (see Be’er Moshe VI, 4; Tzitzit 8:(52)). Some still prefer one beracha, on the tallit, because of the lingering concern that the tzitzit do not warrant a beracha (Minchat Shlomo II, 4.1.3). This is far from clear; recall that when there is no tallit, we take our chances and make a beracha on the tzitzit. It should also depend if the garment clearly requires tzitzit or not. On the other hand, it is hard to alter minhagim.

It is also not clear what constitutes a long break. There appear to be different opinions ranging from around an hour to two or three hours (see Minchat Shlomo, ibid.; Piskei Teshuvot 8:16). Therefore, when one waits between tzitzit and tallit from the time he dresses until chazarat hashatz, there is ample justification to prefer either approach on whether to make a beracha on each or make the beracha only on the tallit (if it is his own tallit or he acquires it temporarily before putting it on). One can continue as he was taught or how he has practiced until now. Either way, it is correct to have the proper intention: taking the first approach, intend not to cover the tallit with the beracha on the tzitzit; taking the second approach, have in mind with the beracha on the tallit to cover the tzitzit.

The Magen Avraham (299:7) says that one who bentches over a cup of wine at se’uda shlishit should drink it. Since the cup is part of the bentching process, drinking it is considered the end of the meal. Just as one can finish up se’uda shlishit at night before Havdala, so can he drink the wine that is connected to the meal. However, he says, if one does not regularly recite Birkat Hamazon over wine, he should not drink it before Havdala. This is because, for such a person, the connection between the wine and the meal is insufficient to justify drinking before Havdala (see Machatzit Hashekel, ad loc.). The Tosefet Shabbat is not convinced that the fact that one does not always use a cup for Birkat Hamazon makes a difference in this regard, but poskim are reluctant to reject the Magen Avraham’s ruling without further indications (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 299:24).

What would the Magen Avraham say about Sheva Berachot at se’uda shlishit? On one hand, most of us do not always bentch over a cup of wine. On the other, we always use a cup for Sheva Berachot. R. Shlomo Kluger (Chochmat Shlomo, ad loc.) says that although logic dictates that it is permitted to drink the cup of Sheva Berachot but not of bentching (remember, our minhag is to use two cups), that would diminish the status of the cup for bentching. Therefore, he prefers that one not drink from either before Havdala. The Eshel Avraham (Butchatch, cited in Minchat Yitzchak III, 113) says that the Magen Avraham would agree that regarding Sheva Berachot, one should drink because the Borei Pri Hagefen that precedes drinking must be recited for there to be seven berachot. Others say that it is sufficient that one always uses a cup for bentching at Sheva Berachot or at gatherings with a minyan (see Tzitz Eliezer X, 45 and Yabia Omer VIII, OC 33). Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, ibid.) also points out that, since our minhag is to mix the wine of the two cups together, one can drink from the Sheva Berachot cup without disgracing the Birkat Hamazon cup.

Assuming that the beracha of Borei Pri Hagefen is said and the wine is drunk, other issues and various opinions arise. R. Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe OC, IV 69) identifies two elements of the cups of wine at Sheva Berachot. The fact that the chatan and kallah drink is connected to the very nature of Sheva Berachot, which require a cup; therefore, they should drink. That which the person who bentches at Sheva Berachot drinks is related to the general matter of bentching on a cup. Since his drinking is not crucial, Rav Moshe posits that it is preferable that only the chatan and kallah drink the necessary cheeksful of wine. Some say the opposite, that the one who makes the beracha should drink (as well as the kallah, since not everybody believes that women are obligated in Havdala) but the chatan should not. The latter distinction is tenuous (Tzitz Eliezer, ibid.).

Some say that it is better that people only take a sip (see Tzitz Eliezer, ibid.), which might be permitted before Havdala and sufficient for drinking from the cup of Sheva Berachot. If the one who bentched, the chatan, and the kallah each drank about an ounce, more opinions would be satisfied (see Mishna Berura 271:73). However, except for those who do well with taking careful steps to satisfy as many opinions as possible, it is perfectly acceptable for at least the three people mentioned to drink as usual from the cup(s) (Yabia Omer, ibid.).

[Two related reminders are in place. It is not a simple matter whether panim chadashot are needed at se’uda shlishit (see Even Ha’ezer 62:8). If Shabbat is the last day of Sheva Berachot, the berachot should probably not be made at night (see Ask the Rabbi, R’ei 5765).]

The Kolbo (87) cites the Maharam MiRutenberg, saying that one says tefillat haderech only once during the day even if he stops along the way for some time. The Kolbo infers that if one planned to stop overnight at that point and then changed his mind, he would recite it again. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 110:5) accepts both rulings. Thus, there is a concept that a trip, as originally planned, creates a unit regarding tefillat haderech.

However, several Acharonim (Bach, Taz ad loc.) infer from these sources that each day is also a relevant unit, and that one who continues his trip on a second day must recite tefillat haderech again. (The Pri Chadash (OC 110:5) says that a trip receives only one tefillat haderech even over several days; his opinion is not accepted). While this would seem to answer your question, there is discussion as to what constitutes a new day in this regard. The Radvaz (2176) is inclined to believe that since tefillat haderech is a stopgap replacement for tefilla, it is always appropriate when a new day of tefilla arrives. (The Piskei Teshuvot 110:6 attributes this opinion to the Bach and Taz, but this respondent feels that this is a misreading of the sources.) However, the Radvaz was not willing to rely on his position and said that if the traveler does not stop in a place of inhabitation, he would say tefillat haderech again only without an ending as a beracha.

Most poskim require some type of break in between days for the new day’s travel to be considered a new unit worthy of another beracha. The Bach and Perisha mention sleeping in an inn or in a city in order to require a new tefillat haderech the next day, as does the Mishna Berura (110:26). The latter points out (Sha’ar Hatziyun 110:26) that the passing of the day by itself should not suffice, as even regarding the daily Birkat Hatorah, if one did not sleep at all during the night, many say that he does not make a new Birkat Hatorah in the morning.

Not everyone agrees that sleep per se is the issue, but rather the breaking up of the trip that normally accompanies serious sleep. There is a machloket regarding those who sleep on the side of the road but in a serious manner. Rav S.Z. Orbach is cited as requiring a new beracha if he got out of the car (Halichot Shlomo 21:2), whereas Ishei Yisrael (50:4) says that one would have to sleep in a proper inn to say tefillat haderech as a beracha. The same machloket should apply to one who sleeps on an airport bench during a long stopover. When one sleeps in a boat or plane, where the trip fully continues as he sleeps, there is more agreement that a new tefillat haderech would not be needed.

The question of a new day versus a new leg of a trip also impacts on the timing of another tefillat haderech. The Biur Halacha (to 110:5) is unsure as to what to do if one breaks for the night in a hotel yet wakes up pre-dawn (alot hashachar is the beginning of the halachic day) for the next leg of the trip. Should he recite tefillat haderech immediately after leaving town or should he wait until the new day. He suggest to be cautious and wait, yet says that if the trip will finish before morning, then he should recite it while it is still night.

Let us point out that regarding this general issue, if one is unsure whether or not to say tefillat haderech, he can do so without its ending. As such, it is a non- beracha and not problematic even though the beginning also contains Hashem’s Name (in a tefilla, not a beracha context). Some also suggest incorporating this prayer for road safety into the beracha of Shema Koleinu in Shemoneh Esrei, where most any request can be inserted (Halichot Shlomo ibid; Shulchan Hatahor (Sender) 110:5.)

The gemara (Berachot 45b) says that if three eat together, one stops to answer for two who want to bentch, but two do not stop for one. Rashi explains that one should show proper manners to answer, implying that there is no halachic imperative that he must take a break in his eating to do so. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 200:1) rules like the Rishonim who say that it is halachically required for the third to answer, and even if he refuses to answer, the two (only) fulfill the requirement of zimun.

In order to answer your question, regarding two who want to use a third when there are more than three participants in the meal, we need to understand the reasoning behind the halacha above. Poskim explain that it is based on the concept of rov (majority) (Birkei Yosef, OC 200:5; Mishna Berura 200:2). The minority that is not yet ready to bentch has to follow the majority of the group that is interested. According to important poskim, this idea of rov can be extended to other groups. The Eliyah Rabba (OC 200:6), for example, says that six who want to do a zimun with Hashem’s Name also create a majority to force four to answer.

If the matter depends on rov, it does not appear that a minority of a group can force a majority or even two sub-groups of the same number of people cannot force one another to do a zimun. The Birkei Yosef (200:5) assumes simply that which the Eliyah Rabba implies: five cannot make five answer. One could claim that the important thing is to have a majority of the necessary quorum who are ready to bentch and then they can use whomever they want. Thus two could force any one they wanted, while five, which is only half way to the zimun of ten, could not. However, the language of the poskim implies that it is a matter of deciding when the most appropriate time is for the group to do the zimun. There is no reason to assume that two can select one from the main group and turn him into their minority.

The exact definition of what constitutes a rov in this regard is important for the following common case. One person wants to bentch, and a second is not yet finished but is interested in helping his friend and agrees to be the second. Can those two force the third? The Birkei Yosef (ibid.) (discussing five and five with one of the “non-bentchers” volunteering) leans toward the view that he cannot. The person who volunteers is still not an interested party who creates a rov who are bentching. On the other hand, Rav Kook (Orach Mishpat, OC 40) leans toward the approach that even when only one of the two is bentching now, the two can force the third. His impression is based on the following gemara (Berachot 45b). Rav Papa was eating with his son and a third person. Only his son was ready to bentch, and Rav Papa accommodated him. The gemara says that Rav Papa had gone beyond the letter of the law in agreeing. Rav Kook understands that once Rav Papa agreed, the third’s willingness was irrelevant. (One can deflect the proof and say that, given Rav Papa’s stature, it was clear that the third person would not object.) It seems that a majority of poskim accept the Birkei Yosef’s approach that only two who are actually bentching can force a third. In practice, most people do accommodate their friends anyway, which is good. (Vaya’an Avraham (OC 16) suggests the possibility that if the second agrees because he is halachically required to respect the person who wants to bentch, it would be considered a rov; he himself rejects the suggestion).

It is worthwhile to recall that, for Ashkenazim, when someone answers zimun before bentching, he must wait until the end of the first beracha before resuming eating (Rama, OC 200:2).

If the food in question were a kind of ice cream or whipped cream in which fruits are added to it, you would view the ice cream as the main entity and the fruit as secondary. The halachah therefore is that you should only recite a shehakol blessing on the ice cream, which is the main entity.

However, if you are talking about a fruit-flavored ice cream made from chopped fruit, in which pieces of fruit are added to it, you should take a piece of fruit and recite a borei pri ha’eitz blessing on it. In this manner, you would exempt the entire ice cream concoction. (This is similarly stated in Sefer VeZot HaBrachah, p. 103, according to the responsa of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l, in his Minchat Shlomo, volume 1, sif 91, ot 3).

We will start with a little bit of background. There are two sets of berachot that are recited under the chupa: the birkat eirusin, which corresponds to the betrothal (by giving the ring) and the birkot nisuin or birkot chatanim (what we call sheva berachot, which are actually six special berachot in addition to the beracha on the wine). Classical sources seem to indicate that, fundamentally, the chatan would recite at least the birkat eirusin before his mitzva of getting married (see Beit Yosef and commentaries on Even Ha’ezer 34). However, due to the following various concerns, the strong minhag has developed that other people recite both sets of berachot (although some concerns may apply more to one than to the other).

The Rambam is attributed (see beginning of Ma’ase Rokeach) to say that the berachot were made for the benefit of the chatan but to be recited by others about him. The Mordechai (Ketubot 131) says that it is haughty (yohara) for the chatan to claim the berachot for himself. Orchot Chayim (Kiddushin 21) says we are concerned that if chatanim will be in the practice of reciting the berachot, those who do not know how to do so will be embarrassed. The consensus is (see S’dei Chemed VII, p. 434; Hanisuim K’hilchatam 10:21) that if only the chatan is able to recite the berachot reasonably, he would make the berachot, as he fundamentally is able to do.

One of the differences between the reasons may be the following. Some of the berachot are general praises of Hashem and not specifically referring to the chatan. In theory, according to the Rambam’s reason, the chatan should be able to recite those. It seems that, classically, one person used to recite all of the berachot and in an “all or nothing” situation, we would have the chatan do nothing. Nowadays, when we split up the berachot, one could claim that the chatan could do the first few sheva berachot. Be this is at it may, the minhag is certainly that the chatan does not do any of the sheva berachot, which is correct according to the latter reasons and in general is just as well (the chatan has enough limelight). This is true under the chupa and during the week of sheva berachot celebrations.

The matter is less clear in regard to leading the bentching/zimun. Do the above concerns extend to it? On one hand, the leading of bentching is fundamentally the same at sheva berachot as at other times.  On the other hand, the sheva berachot are recited specifically at the end of the bentching and indeed the one who leads waits until the sheva berachot are finished to make the beracha and drink the wine and is even allowed to recite one of the sheva berachot in the meantime (Sova Semachot 6:21). “D’vai haser” and shehasimcha bim’ono are also added. Logically, the element of the berachot being made on the chatan’s behalf does not seem to apply. It is not clear if we need to be concerned that chatanim would feel pressure to lead bentching and be embarrassed if they did not know how to so properly. In theory, yohara would not apply to a chatan who led the zimun, which, again, is a normal task. Therefore, one can easily make the case that a chatan can lead bentching. In fact, Hanisuim K’hilchatam (14:109) even cites a minhag to specifically have the chatan do so at the sheva berachhot at seuda shlishit [related to issues of drinking- see ATR, Noach 5769].

All of this being said, since the very consistent practice is that chatanim do not bentch at their own sheva berachot (even if it might originally have come out of ignorance), it would be objectionable for one to do so without a specific reason. Not only is it a matter of changing minhagim, in general, but, under the circumstances, there would indeed be a problem of yohara, especially if it is connected to the claim that the chatan is the only talmid chacham present. Again, if no one else feels comfortable leading the bentching, that would be different.

Before addressing the heart of your question, let us guess your background. You must be an Ashkenazi, who usually makes a beracha each on the tefillin shel yad and the shel rosh. A Sephardi makes al mitzvat tefillin only when he talks in between putting on the two tefillin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 25:9) or when he can put on only the tefillin shel rosh (ibid. 26:2). He would not have made the mistake that you did, which is common for Ashkenazim, who make al mitzvat tefillin daily. We will see later why being Ashkenazi makes a difference.

The gemara (Menachot 36a) cites R. Yochanan who says that when fastening the shel yad, one makes the beracha of “l’haniach tefillin” and upon placing the shel rosh he recites al mitzvat. On the other hand, the gemara cites Rav Chisda that one makes a beracha on the shel rosh only if he talks in between the two tefillin. The gemara answers that if one is silent, he makes one beracha, and if he talks he makes two berachot. One approach in Rishonim (including Rashi, ad loc, accepted by Sephardim- see Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:6) is that the number is the total of berachot for the two tefillin. One is recited before fastening the shel yad. If he talks, a second one is said on the shel rosh instead of saying nothing then. According to Rabbeinu Tam (see Tosafot ad loc.), one always recites al mitzvat on the shel rosh. If he spoke, he also repeats then l’haniach. The Rama (OC 25:6) accepts and sets the minhag among Ashkenazim to follow this approach.

The Rosh (Pesachim 1:10), following Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, says that both berachot apply to both the shel yad and the shel rosh. However, Chazal preferred that we not recite two berachot on one mitzva. Therefore, they attached the beracha that is more appropriate for one who is about to start putting on tefillin (l’haniach) to the shel yad and the more general beracha of al mitzvat to the shel rosh, upon completion of the mitzva of tefillin. The Taz’s brother (in a teshuva found in the Taz, OC 25:6) says that al mitzvat applies to the remembrances that tefillin conjure up and l’haniach applies to the mitzva’s specific detailed actions.

The following halachic ramifications emerge from this generally accepted approach. Since both berachot go on both tefillin, if one recited al mitzvat at the time of putting on the shel yad and l’haniach when putting on the shel rosh, he fulfilled the berachot requirement despite the imperfect order. Therefore, says the Shaarei Teshuva (25:5, based on the Michtam L’Dovid), if one already said al mitzvat and completed fastening the shel yad, he recites the remaining beracha of l’haniach before putting on the shel rosh, and all is covered. Although some argue (see ibid.) this is the best solution (see B’er Moshe V, 10).

The matter would be different if you caught your mistake before fastening the shel yad. Since l’haniach was in fact instituted to precede the shel yad and covers the shel rosh as well, you should have recited l’haniach after al mitzvat and before fastening the shel yad. At this point, with both berachot already recited, you would not have made any beracha before putting on the shel rosh (Shaarei Teshuva, ibid.). If you had caught and corrected the mistake quickly enough by inserting the words “l’haniach tefillin” within around a second and a half of saying al mitzvat, then we could apply the regular rule that mistakes in berachot can be fixed toch k’dei dibbur (B’er Moshe ibid, in contradiction to the Kaf Hachayim’s (25:39) novel ruling; see Piskei Teshuvot 25:12).

If a Sephardi had for some reason recited al mitzvat when he makes his single beracha, he would have fulfilled the mitzva and would not make a beracha upon putting on the shel rosh (Michtam L’Dovid, ibid.).

It is a problem to involve oneself in holy things in proximity of excrement, as we will briefly discuss. Those who are not Jewish yet are not bound by those requirements, which are not included in the seven Noahide laws. However, your letter [shortened above] makes it clear that you want to follow the laws like a Jew. Therefore, we will present the laws for your whole group under your difficult circumstances (and this will serve as one of the study materials we will send).

One may not pray or make blessings in or opposite bathrooms (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 83:1). However, not necessarily is every room with a toilet a bathroom. Poskim (halachic authorities) have discussed to what extent rooms with a toilet that are used also for things such as washing hands, shaving, etc. have the status of a bathroom. In your case, the room is as multi-purpose as it gets, which gives grounds for leniency.

The very presence of a toilet, even a cleaned one that is outside a bathroom, raises problems. One may not recite things of sanctity within approximately six feet of a waste receptacle or any distance when one is facing it. There is a distinction regarding whether it is made out of an absorbent material. Absorbent materials that are coated with a glaze, like most modern toilets, are also the subject of dispute (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 87:1 and commentaries). However, this is of limited help when the utensil is used only for the “dirty” purpose (ibid. 83:5). However, if one can cover the toilet all around or get a 30 inch partition in front of it and smell does not emanate from it, this problem is solved (ibid. 76:1).

There is another reason for leniency in modern bathrooms in general. The Talmud (Berachot 26a) says that Persian bathrooms do not have a status of a bathroom because the hole is built on an incline so that excrement rolls down and away. Poskim compare and contrast our modern toilets, which of course, flush (as opposed to those in Talmudic times) to the Persian ones. On one hand, during most of the day, the toilet is (relatively) clean. On the other hand, the excrement stays put until one gets around to flushing. In general, under normal circumstances (hopefully when you and your friends will be out of prison), we would not allow one to make blessings or pray in such a room. However, under the circumstances, there is room for leniency, if there is not a bathroom smell where one is.

The Rama (the Ashkenazic counterpart of the Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 62:4) says that when one is in a place that is not totally clean, he can and should contemplate the words of the Shema (as an example of all holy texts), rather than to recite them. Although it is generally forbidden even to think of such things in an unclean place (Beit Yosef, OC 25), this is a good solution for borderline places.

Therefore, we suggest the following. When you have to recite a prayer or blessing while in your cell, try to get out of a six foot radius of the toilet (probably possible with the diagonal), face the other way and read the texts without uttering them with your lips. Your tallit is not a matter of holiness, although it is an important thing since it is used for prayer. Therefore, in your cell, which does not have a full status of a bathroom, you may wear it without making a blessing, or as mentioned, by contemplating the blessing.

This is a classic case of a practice that has changed from the manner it was originally intended, with splintered variations arising. Let us proceed through the development.

In all likelihood, a mezamen would not only introduce bentching with what we call zimun but would recite all of the Birkat Hamazon, while the others would listen and answer amen (see Bach, Orach Chayim 193; Mishna Berura 201:15). This most fully accomplishes the idea of praising Hashem together (see Berachot 45a). The minhag has developed for everyone to bentch himself, apparently out of concern that people will not listen well enough to the mezamen (see Beit Yosef, OC 183) or because one may have to understand the text he is hearing even if it is in Hebrew (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 193:1 and Mishna Berura 193:5).

What, if anything, is left to the idea of a joint bentching? When the Shulchan Aruch (OC 183:7) says that everyone bentches himself, he writes that they do so quietly. In this way, they can still hear the mezamen (Mishna Berura 183:27). The Rama (ad loc.) adds that the others should go ahead toward the end of the beracha to enable answering amen to the mezamen’s berachot (which one cannot do if he just finished the beracha himself, with not more than a few exceptions- see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 215:1). Many people practice the Rama’s idea (usually the mezamen waits for the others rather than their speeding up, but it’s the same idea).

The Mishna Berura (183:28) points out that in his time it was common for everyone to bentch out loud so that no one heard the mezamen (now it is more common for everyone, including the mezamen, to do so quietly). He says that it is important for all to hear the mezamen at least for the first beracha (until “hazan et hakol”) because of the idea that this is the end of the zimun. The main ramification of this idea is that those who interrupt their meal to answer zimun are supposed to wait until after that point before resuming their meal (Rama, OC 200:2). The matter depends on a machloket Amoraim in Berachot (46a) whether zimun ends at “hazan et hakol” or at “u’mituvo chayinu,” the addition to bentching that is inserted when there is a zimun. Sephardim follow the latter opinion (Shulchan Aruch, ad loc.). The Mishna Berura, ruling for Ashkenazim, posits that people must hear the mezamen until “hazan et hakol” for zimun to be done properly. The Magen Avraham (183:12) went a step further, saying that until that point, people should only listen to the mezamen and only afterward bentch themselves. The Mishna Berura (ibid.) says that only people who can concentrate on and understand the first beracha should follow the Magen Avraham.

As you observed, people do not always listen to the mezamen for even the first beracha. Because it is difficult to argue on a prevalent practice that has been followed by some knowledgeable people for a long time (see S’dei Chemed, cited in Kaf Hachayim, OC 183:38) different rationales for the leniency have been given. One is that, in regard to this manner, Ashkenazim rely on the Shulchan Aruch that zimun ends with “u’mituvo chayinu” (ibid.). The Tzitz Eliezer (XVI, 1) also cites an opinion that, generally, it is better to bentch separately. The Chazon Ish also points out that regarding a zimun of ten, where Hashem’s name is invoked in the first part of the zimun, it is not necessary to listen to the mezamen until “hazan et hakol” (see Mishna Berura 200:10).

In summary, we recommend following the Mishna Berura’s position where there is not a clear minhag to the contrary. However, we do not discredit the other systems you have seen.

First we will summarize the matter of an oleh reading along the regular kriat hatorah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 141:2) rules that it is critical for the oleh to read along because, if not, his beracha will not be connected to any reading of his and would be l’vatala. For the same reason, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 139:3) says that a blind man cannot have an aliya because he must read from the sefer Torah. The Rama (ad loc.) argues that now that the oleh only makes the berachot and does not read the Torah for the community to hear, the blind, as well as those who do not know how to read along, may get aliyot, as is the practice. The Rama does not dispute the requirement that the oleh read along. The Biur Halacha (to 141:2) presumes that regarding those who cannot read along, the Rama relied on the lenient opinion that reading along is not absolutely necessary to avoid the divisive situation where many people would be denied aliyot. However, he agrees that, normally, one should read along.

Are the halachic “dynamics” of haftara reading as strict as those for kriat hatorah? Some poskim approach the question in the opposite direction, as we will explain. The Rama (OC 284:4) says that one who received maftir should be the one who reads the haftara. Only if he cannot read the haftara, should someone else read the haftara. Why can’t the maftir just recite the berachot on the haftara and have someone else lain it? The Pri Megadim (284, EA 3) seems to say that just as regarding regular kriat hatorah, one cannot only recite the berachot without reading, so too for the haftara. Thus, he implies that just as we have the oleh read along quietly for regular laining, the same can be done for the haftara (The Minchat Yitzchak IX, 22 says that the Pri Megadim views this as a b’dieved situation, although he does not understand why; the Pri Megadim can be read differently.) The Mishna Berura (284:8) and Yaskil Avdi (VII, 14) also equate haftara to kriat hatorah regarding someone other than the oleh reading.

The Chayei Adam (31:40, accepted by the Mishna Berura, ibid.) says that the Gra instituted a change in minhag. Instead of having the oleh for maftir make the berachot and lain the haftara, he separated the two by insisting that a klaf be used, which can be read only by experts. This raises the next question: does the reading along need to be from the klaf, when it is used, or not? First, we should understand that the idea to require a klaf was raised by the Levush (against the prevalent minhag of his time, cited by the Mishna Berura 248:1), who assumed that the rules of what a haftara is read from is like that of a Torah or a megilla. Despite the fact that the Magen Avraham (284) and Taz (284:2) justified the old minhag (see Divrei Yatziv, OC 129 at great length), the use of klaf spread with the encouragement of later Acharonim. It is quite accepted that if people read along from a chumash, they are covered even if the maftir does not read from a klaf (see Biur Halacha to 284:5). Therefore, if the oleh for maftir reads along because he cannot make berachot without reading, even reading from a printed haftara suffices. If one feels that one must read from a klaf because it is no different from Torah reading, then just as a regular oleh must read from the Torah, so must the oleh for maftir/haftara read along from the klaf. The latter approach appears to be a chumra, but it is hard to track minhagim.

We suggest that if an oleh can easily read along with the lainer from the klaf he might as well do so. However, one need not insist on this, and it could be counterproductive for an oleh who cannot read effectively without punctuation.

We will focus on only a few of this question’s many permutations. We first assume that you refer to foods that are eaten as separate entities (e.g., a piece of cake and a piece of apple), not in a combined manner (e.g., a k’zayit of cake that has fruit filling).

The general rule is that one cannot fulfill the obligation of Me’ein Shalosh by reciting Borei Nefashot or vice versa, even b’dieved  (Mishna Berura 208:62). (An exception is that if one is already making an Al Ha’etz on fruit of the seven species, this exempts him from Borei Nefashot on fruit of trees that are not of the seven species- Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:13). Therefore, when one is not sure whether he should recite Me’ein Shalosh or Borei Nefashot, he is in a bind because if he guesses wrong, he will be making an inappropriate beracha (see Rama, Orach Chayim 208:18 and  Mishna Berura 208:80). We do not say that Borei Nefashot is a generic beracha (as its text may imply) that works b’dieved for any food as we do regarding Shehakol (Magen Avraham 208:26). Some Acharonim (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I, 74; Kaf Hachayim 202:79) argue at least partially and say that if it will be impossible (for halachic or technical reasons) to recite Me’ein Shalosh, then saying Borei Nefashot is not a beracha levatala and is better than saying nothing.

Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham (210:1) says that if one ate half a k’zayit of Me’ein Shalosh food and half a k’zayit of a Borei Nefashot food, he makes a Borei Nefashot. The Machatzit Hashekel explains that Borei Nefashot does apply on a basic level to all foods. If a food is of a higher level of importance, so that it receives a Me’ein Shalosh, Borei Nefashot becomes the wrong beracha, and one is not yotzei with it. However, if there are certainly not grounds for Me’ein Shalosh (i.e., he had less than a k’zayit of that type of food) then the basic applicability of Borei Nefashot can connect it to another food to warrant a joint Borei Nefashot. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (210:2) adds another justification for the Magen Avraham’s ruling. That is that some Rishonim say that just as one must make a beracha before eating any amount of food, so must one recite at least the simple beracha of Borei Nefashot after eating any amount of any food where a higher beracha acharona is not recited.

In order to recite Borei Nefashot on less than a shiur (the amount one needs to eat to require the beracha) of foods that join together to be a shiur, it is necessary that the two foods share a shiur. Therefore, half a k’zayit of a food and half a revi’it of a liquid do not join to require Borei Nefashot (Magen Avraham 210:1).

Regarding foods that combine two different ingredients (regarding beracha) in one food, there are different opinions and minhagim. Regarding a beracha rishona, as long as there is a significant amount of flour from the major grains, one makes Mezonot, but regarding beracha acharona one needs to have a k’zayit of the major grains without the help of other grains (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:9). The question is, though, if the flour is joined by only supplementary foods such as sugar and spices, whether one would make Al Hamichya only if there is a k’zayit of flour or even a k’zayit of cake is sufficient. (The Mishna Berura 208:48 takes the latter opinion, but some argue. Further discussion is beyond our present scope.)

The gemara (Berachot 60b) describes the morning berachot as being recited as one performs each action the berachot relate to (e.g., opening one’s eyes, putting on shoes, washing hands, putting on tzitzit, etc.). These days, we make the birkot hashachar, which praise Hashem for providing us with our physical needs, at one time, usually at the beginning of davening. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 46:2) provides two reasons for our present practice: our hands are dirty when we get up, making it improper to make a beracha; some people cannot make the berachot themselves, so in shul the chazan says it on their behalf. Your query revolves around the question whether the beracha on neya stays in its place, at the time of the washing, or also moves.

The Beit Yosef (OC 6) cites two approaches to the matter. The simpler one, which he accepts (Shulchan Aruch, OC 6:2) is, as you argued, that the beracha should be close to the mitzva. Admittedly, unlike other birkot hamitzva, the beracha on neya is recited after the mitzva, as before the washing, one’s hands are likely to be too dirty to make the beracha (see Tosafot, Pesachim 7b). However, it still can be done either before one wipes his hands or soon thereafter, as opposed to after a long break (see Mishbetzot Zahav, OC 6:4). However, the Beit Yosef justifies the minhag to make the beracha on neya in shul, which Ashkenazim accept (Rama, ad loc.), based on the Rashba’s approach to the reason for neya. He says that as one embarks on the day as a new creation, he must thank Hashem and wash his hands like a kohen in preparation for these thanks. As the washing is related to these birkot hashachar, just as they are done in shul, the beracha on neya is also done there. The Perisha (6:3) understands that this beracha is not a standard birkat hamitzva.

The Rosh (Berachot 9:23) says that neya and its beracha were instituted as a preparation for tefilla. Therefore, says the Chayei Adam (7,6), if one were to wash his hands when waking up and then went to the bathroom and washed his hands again before tefilla, it is the second washing that must receive the beracha. While he only seems to make an issue of this when one expects to use the facilities between neya and davening, the Gra (Maaseh Rav 3) says that the Rosh’s approach mandates making the beracha specifically in shul before tefilla (he appears not to require another neya if he does not use the facilities in between). However, the Gra is an extreme opinion in this matter, as he accepted the Rosh so much as to require neya with a beracha before Mincha and Maariv (ibid.), which we do not.

In these matters, we would suggest that Ashkenazim and Sephardim follow their respective minhagim. The question is when a lot of time passes between neya upon arising and tefilla. The Chayei Adam suggests that the person go to the bathroom again, making the beracha after the second time. However, the Biur Halacha (to 4:1) raises the issue that, according to the Rashba, the beracha will not relate to the neya that requires it, upon awakening. This appears to be an issue if a long time goes by, even if he did not use the facilities in between (see ibid.). The Rama (6:2) leans toward making the beracha earlier in this case, whereas the Biur Halacha leans toward the Chayei Adam. The safest thing, in the case of a long break, is to make to make the beracha on neya at home, followed by birkot hashachar, which is the beginning of davening (Mishna Berura 6:9). (Realize that, according to all opinions, a long time goes by between the beracha on neya and Shemoneh Esrei).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 165:1) deals with the problem of one who has just left the bathroom and is ready to eat. If he does netillat yadayim once for both needs, he will have a problem of whether he should first make the beracha of Asher Yatzar for doing his needs, or first make the beracha on the netillat yadayim followed by Hamotzi and only afterward recite Asher Yatzar. Either way, there are issues of hefsek (improper break) in between the time the second beracha became necessary and when it was recited. Therefore, the Shulchan Aruch says to wash two times, the first to be followed by Asher Yatzar, and the second one by Al Netillat Yadayim. So we see that the fact that the hands were just washed does not preclude doing another formal washing for eating bread.

Does that mean that a second netillat yadayim is a mitzva that requires a beracha even if it adds nothing practical, except that now it is done for a bread meal? That seems to be the subject of a machloket. The Beit Yosef (OC 158) understands from Tosafot's (Pesachim 116b) statement regarding the two washings that we do on seder night that if one does a lower level obligation netillat yadayim for non-breads dipped in liquids and then needs to do one for bread, the latter netillat yadayim is a full obligation. However, the Darkei Moshe (as the author rules in the Rama, OC 158:7) says that this is so only when a while passed in between washings so that we can assume that he took his mind off his hands. Otherwise, one would not make a beracha on the second netillat yadayim.

Similarly, in the former context, the Mishna Berura (165:2) cites Acharonim that the first washing done to enable reciting Asher Yatzar should be a washing of cleanliness, not one of a valid halachic nature. One way to do this is to not use a washing cup (and preferably not use the first spurt of water from the faucet- see Tzitz Eliezer VIII, 7), which is a requirement for netillat yadayim. If one touched a covered part of the body or some other "dirty" thing that makes netillat yadayim necessary in between the washings, the netilla would be necessary (I imagine that this would undo much of the hygienic gains you want to accomplish).

This leaves the matter of whether one should dry his hands in between the hygienic cleaning and the netillat yadayim. There is a similar case that is discussed by the poskim. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 162:2) talks about pouring some of the netillat yadayim water on the hands to remove dirt prior to the main netilla. The Biur Halacha (ad loc.) says that there is no mention of a need to dry the hands after doing this, which could be necessary if we said that the water becomes tameh (impure) in the process and would ruin the netilla. He says that this is either because this pre-washing is part of the netillat yadayim process, whereby water can become tameh and be removed by the second washing, or, to the contrary, that other than regarding poorly executed netilla, water that gets on the hands is not considered tameh (based on the Magen Avraham 162:10). While the Yalkut Yosef (OC 159:1) agrees with this approach, there are significant poskim, both Ashkenazi and Sephardi, who disagree (Ben Ish Chai, Shemini 11; Chazon Ish 24:20; K’tzot Hashulchan 33:4). They say that in that case, one should dry the hands from the questionable water before commencing the real netillat yadayim. Without getting into the intricacies, it would seem that our case is more lenient than the one these poskim discuss, and thus it would seem that drying the hands that were washed for hygienic reasons is not necessary. 

The gemara (Berachot 42a) discusses a category of food called pat haba’ah b’kisnin (phbbk), which is a baked grain-based food that shares qualities with bread but also is distinguished from normal bread. The gemara says that whether one recites Hamotzi or Mezonot on it depends on whether one is kovei’a seuda (sets a meal) on it. The Shulchan Aruch says that the other special halachot of bread apply to phbbk when one is kovei’a seuda, namely, that one recites Birkat Hamazon on it (Orach Chayim 168:6) and has to wash before eating it (ibid. 158:1). Let us now discuss pizza.

For something to be a candidate for bread status, it must be made from the five main grains and be baked or look like bread (corn bread and spaghetti are not treated like bread no matter how much one eats of them - see Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:10). Of foods that pass those tests, there are still characteristics that can make a food phbbk instead of bread. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) cites three opinions: it has a pocket of sweet filling; its dough contains significant amounts of ingredients such as sugar and oil, besides flour and water; it is thin and crisp. It is unclear whether these opinions are mutually exclusive or whether any significant non-bread characteristic makes it phbbk (see Biur Halacha to 168:8).

Pizza might be phbbk for one of the following reasons: 1) its dough may contain a lot of liquid other than water (e.g., oil, apple juice, milk); 2) it is baked together with pizza sauce and cheese, which make it similar to the pocket of filling above. However, it might not be phbbk. #1 requires that there to be a lot of other liquids (for Sephardim, enough to taste; for Ashkenazim, a majority of the non-flour element - Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 168). This is often not the case. Regarding #2, it is not clear that all fillings remove the bread status. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:16) says that a pashtida (knish-type food) filled with meat, fish, or cheese receives the beracha of Hamotzi on any amount. The Mishna Berura (ad loc.:94) explains that classic phbbk is made from sweet fillings that make it dessert-like (e.g., cake), as opposed to these that are more meal-like. The Taz (168:20) says that all fillings are the same, and the matter is usually treated like a doubt.

Furthermore, the Beit Yosef (OC 168; see also the Aruch Hashulchan, OC 168:25) says that phbbk is something that, because of its characteristics, one does not usually center a meal around. One can argue that people eat regular pizza as the main food for a meal, rather than as a minor part of the meal or as a snack between main meals. So, indeed, this respondent treats pizza like bread, for any amount (see Am Mordechai, Berachot 25). Many distinguish between water vs. fruit juice based dough or treat the matter as a doubt to be avoided (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 217).

In any case, according to the prevalent custom that pizza is phbbk, how much does one have to eat to require the halachot of bread? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 168:6) says that one has to eat the amount that most people consider having a meal. In another halachic context, the size of 3 or 4 eggs suffices. It is a question whether that suffices here or a full meal’s worth is needed (the Mishna Berura 168:24 leaves the matter open). There is also a question whether in the meal discussed the phbbk by itself is filling, or whether it is sufficient for it to be a filling meal that is centered around the phbbk (Mishna Berura ibid.) Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III, 32) goes a step further, saying that nowadays, when bread’s role in meals is less than it once was, even a small amount of phbbk in the midst of a meal would require washing, Hamotzi, and Birkat Hamazon. Nevertheless, the most famous practice is that only two or perhaps three slices of average sized pizza are treated like bread.

The gemara (Sota 38b) says that just as Aharon is described as blessing the people at the time of avoda (bringing of korbanot – Vayikra 9:22), so too kohanim should go up for bk at avoda (the beracha of R’tzei, in which we request that the service will return to Zion). The gemara continues to say that the kohanim do not need to actually go up to the duchan during R’tzei as long as they uprooted themselves (akar) from their place at that time. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:8) and many others put the main emphasis on akar, which is classically done at the beginning of R’tzei, but can be done until the end of that beracha (Mishna Berura 128:25). If he has not done it by then, then he may not do bk. (According to most poskim, if he “went up” anyway, he should go down, but if he was prevented from going on time due to an oness (extenuating circumstance), then if he went up, he may stay (see Radvaz I, 516)).

     Regarding a case where he went to wash during R’tzei and did not make it back toward the duchan by the end of R’tzei, the matter depends on a machloket. The Ateret Zekeinim (on the Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) says that only going toward the duchan counts. The Pri Megadim infers from the following Magen Avraham (128:10) that going to wash is considered like akar. The Radvaz said that if a kohen was on his way to shul during the time he should have been approaching the duchan, that is not considered like akar and he may not do bk. However, says the Magen Avraham, if he left his house that was close to shul (for the purpose of coming to do bk – Chayei Adam 32:13) but arrived after the end of R’tzei, that is considered akar. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) posits that the logic is that a movement, even if it is not one of approaching the duchan but of preparing to do bk, counts as akar. According to this approach then, he says, it is even clearer that going to wash one’s hands suffices. Thus, there is room for leniency to allow a kohen who went during R’tzei to wash to continue on for bk, especially if the way to wash is generally in the direction of the duchan (see something similar in the Mishna Berura 128:27). (Realize that the requirement to go on time is apparently rabbinic - see Mishneh Halachot VIII, 15). Under such circumstances, one should certainly not try to stop a kohen who assumes he may go up from doing so. (It might be worthwhile to educate him pleasantly to avoid the situation in the future.)

The other case you raise is more problematic. If he went to wash soon after Kedusha and subsequently lost track of time, there are two reasons to say that going to wash is less effective than above. Firstly, it is possible that akar works only after the chazan has started R’tzei (Kehunat Yitzchak, pg. 32), whereas here he went to wash well before R’tzei (Shevet Halevi VIII, 23 says it is preferable not to go early but that doing so is not disqualified after the fact). Secondly, washing likely works as akar only when it is followed directly by proceeding to the duchan. However, when one plans to and does go back to his own place, it turns out that the washing was quite preliminary. This possibility is particularly plausible considering that according to some opinions, one can rely on the washing that he did before coming to shul (see Shulchan Aruch 128:6 and Mishna Berura 128: 20). Therefore, it is important for the kohanim to leave their place to go toward the duchan before the end of R’tzei.

The truth is actually not simple. You will see that much of the difficulty is not halachic but culinary: why is it that many people prefer schnitzel (breaded cutlets) to cutlets that are not breaded?

Clearly, the ikar (main part) of schnitzel is the poultry inside. In general, we make a beracha on the ikar, which exempts us from a beracha on the less important ingredients (Berachot 44a), and this is usually determined by the majority (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:7). However, an exception to this rule is that if the minority is from the major grain species (which includes standard flour), we make Mezonot on the mixed food (Shulchan Aruch ibid.:2). This exception is on condition that the grain product has a significant role in the food’s character. A minority of Rishonim seem to understand that the grain rule is just an application of the assumption that grain usually shapes the character of the food even when it is a minority. According to this approach, in a case like ours where the poultry is clearly the main ingredient, the beracha should be Shehakol. However, the more accepted approach is that grains have a halachic precedence, because of which the beracha follows them even when it they certainly are not the main ingredient, but a significant one (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). The classic case where it is not considered significant is when the grain product is there to make the other food stick together (ibid.; Tosafot, Berachot 36b).

The question then is what contribution schnitzel’s coating makes. We have seen claims of all of the following elements (after each, we will write what beracha is appropriate if this is the factor): 1) The coating tastes good, as a nicely seasoned doughy food (Mezonot). 2) It captures the oil from the pan and gravy from the cutlet in one rich (albeit not so healthy) layer (the beracha can go either way, as the doughy part tastes good, but mainly because of what it absorbed; still, it would seem to indicate Mezonot). 3) It causes the spices that are placed on top of the cutlet to not slide away (Shehakol). 4) It keeps the cutlet from drying out (Shehakol). 5) It allows frying at a high temperature with a reduced chance of burning (Shehakol). Although a majority of these theories point toward Shehakol, it does not mean that that should be the end result. This is because if all of the above are true, then there are important food elements to the coating, which make Mezonot appropriate, irrespective of additional “Shehakol” benefits.

Regarding the bottom line, some important poskim say that one should make Mezonot on schnitzel when the coating is relatively thick and Shehekol when it is thin (see opinions in V’zot Haberacha, pp. 256-261). Some contemporary authorities differ if “standard” schnitzel has a thick or thin coating (ibid., Birkat Hashem III, 10:59). Rav M. Feinstein is cited as requiring berachot on each, as neither element is dominant enough to outweigh the other; others suggest first eating a little of each separately to avoid doubt. (This solution makes halachic sense, but we do not like mandating convoluted practices to avoid making halachic decisions). Of crucial importance is that the minhag is quite clearly to make Shehakol. Admittedly, such minhagim often develop because Shehakol is the safe beracha, as one always fulfills his obligation after the fact with Shehakol (Shulchan Aruch, OC 204:13). This makes particular sense since the ruling can change depending on the time, place, and piece of schnitzel. Although some say Mezonot is also a “catch-all” beracha for almost all foods (Biur Halacha 167:10), this is far less certain. Therefore, although we think that most schnitzels deserve Mezonot, there is not enough certainty in the matter to instruct people to change the standard practice of reciting just Shehakol.

The Ramah (426: 1) writes that one should only recite Kiddush HaChodesh at night when the moon is shining and while benefiting from its light.The Mishnah Berurah explains that this is when its light is recognizable on the ground.

If the moon is covered by clouds, one can recite the blessing if the cloud is thin and one could still see the moon and benefit from its light. (cf. Pri Chadash, sif katan 8, who cites the Chidah and Eliyahu Rabba who say that one shouldn’t recite the blessing if the moon is obstructed by any cloud, even a thin one). If the moon was obstructed in the middle of one's Bracha – the Mishnah Berurah cites the Magen Avraham who says that one should complete the blessing. However, if prior to his blessing one estimates that the size of the moon will become covered before completing the blessing, one shouldn’t begin reciting the blessing.

This Halakha applies to the actual blessing. It is unnecessary for the moon to be revealed during the recitation of the scriptural references and psalms that are recited after the blessing. The critical point at which it must be seen is prior to the Bracha, and not during the introductory psalm that precedes the blessing.

The Biur Halachah cites a leniency that was established by Rabbi Chaim Tzanzer. He says that the Bracha can be recited “toch kdei dibur” [the time span in which it takes to recite “Shalom Aleichem, Rabi u’Mori”, 4 seconds] of seeing the moon, even if the moon became covered during the blessing.

This idea of "toch kdei dibur" applies to the bracha on seeing thunder and lightning. The Biur Halachah debates over whether these brachot are comparable, since the blessing over thunder and lighting was affixed in appreciation of the natural occurrence. In contrast, the blessing over the moon is recited for the benefit from its light. He compares this to reciting the blessing of bread, which could only be recited during the meal, as long as he can still eat without reciting a new bracha, and not afterwards. This implies that one cannot recite the bracha after the benefiting is over, even “toch kdei dibur”.

It seems that the Rabbi Chaim Tzanzer held that the need for benefiting from the moonlight, as the Radvaz mentions in his responsa (volume 1, siman 341), isn’t like birkat nehenin [a blessing in which recites on the benefit that he receives]. This blessing too is in appreciation of the natural occurrence. Nevertheless, we only make brachot on what we can experience at the time(otherwise we'd be making all the different brachot all of the time!). In our case, that would be only when a person could benefit from the moonlight.

One thing that this matter depends on is whether women are obligated in Mincha. The Rambam (Tefilla 1:2) says that women are obligated by Torah law to daven daily. Since the Torah law is for any request once a day and the rabbinic idea that one daven twice or three times a day is time-based, women might not be obligated in the structure of Shacharit and Mincha as we know them. Many women follow this approach (Magen Avraham 106:2). The Mishna Berura (106:4) prefers the Ramban’s opinion that tefilla is entirely a rabbinic obligation but because of its importance as a request of mercy from Hashem, the Rabbis obligated men and women equally. According to this approach, women are obligated in at least the essentials of Shacharit and Mincha like men. The difference is in regard to Ma’ariv, which is essentially a voluntary tefilla (Berachot 27b). While men accepted it upon themselves as an obligation, women did not (Mishna Berura, ibid.). Another difference is that women who are especially busy, especially those responsible for the unpredictable needs of small children, may be exempt from Shacharit and Mincha, either by relying on the lenient opinion or because their involvement exempts them (see Ishei Yisrael 7:7).

You categorize yourself as one who davens Shacharit and Mincha but not Ma’ariv, and thus your situation is as follows. If you are obligated as men, you should do tashlumin (the makeup prayer) like them. However, tashlumin was instituted as a makeup tacked on to the set tefilla at the next tefilla slot (in this case, Ma’ariv). In fact, if one does something that shows that the first tefilla was the makeup, preceding the set one, he does not fulfill tashlumin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 108:1). Thus, if you do not daven Ma’ariv, you will not be able to do tashlumin; it cannot be done at Shacharit, as it must be done at the next tefilla period (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:(110) in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach). (One could raise the argument that for a woman, Shacharit is the next tefilla after Mincha, but Rav Auerbach rejects that logic). Even if you are not obligated in Ma’ariv, if you decided to daven it, you could then do tashlumin (see Mishna Berura 263:43). However, it is unclear whether you would be required to go so far as to daven Ma’ariv in order to make tashlumin possible (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, ibid.).

The following claim is incorrect. Between Mincha and Ma’ariv a woman is obligated in one tefilla, classically Mincha. If she davens Ma’ariv voluntarily, in effect she got to the correct number of tefillot. The above is incorrect because she had an obligation for Mincha that turned into one for tashlumin for it. A normal Ma’ariv is neither. In fact, once you would daven Ma’ariv, you would be required to do the tashlumin of Mincha (see Ishei Yisrael 36:(15)). Thus, while it is questionable whether you have to daven Ma’ariv, it is a question of two or nothing.

If one falls into the category of one who has not accepted upon herself the obligation to daven Mincha then she obviously cannot be obligated more in tashlumin than she is in the original tefilla. The question would only be if one tries to daven Mincha quite regularly except when she is quite busy, but on a given day she forgot without a real excuse. In this case, she presumably is not obligated since, in the final analysis, she does not treat Mincha as a full obligation.

Again, in your case, it is unclear whether you should say two Shemoneh Esrei’s at Ma’ariv.  While it is hard to outright require it, it can be worthwhile (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 13:8), especially if it makes you feel better or will help you remember about Mincha in the future.

The Acharonim have determined that even if the fruit or vegetable’s form changed, as long as it hasn’t been grinded, we wouldn’t declare that its form has changed.

In cases where the form of the fruit or vegetable has completely changed, one recites “Shehakol.”

Therefore, the blessing on cold cereals made from corn meal is “Shehakol.”

However, the blessing on cold cereals made from ungrounded corn is “HaAdamah.”

Chocolate made from cocoa beans, which has completely changed its form, or soy powder derived from soybeans, which have completely changed their form, require the blessing of “Shehakol.”

According to many authorities, halachically, papaya is not considered a fruit tree, and therefore its fruit may be eaten even in the first three years and the blessing said is "Boreh Pri Ha'adama" (Yechave Da'at 4, 42;Rav Mordechai Eliyahu, Techumin 7 page 88; Rav Pe'alim 2 Orach Chaim 30; Tzitz Eliezer 2, end of siman 15).

A number of reasons have been given for this:

1. It gives fruit within a year of its planting.

2. Its trunk is hollow.

3. Its fruit decline over the years.

4. The fruit grows each year in a different spot on the tree.

5. The leaves and the fruit grow directly from the trunk and not from branches.

The gemara (Arachin 4a) says that the Tannaic statement that kohanim and regular Jews can join together for zimun is obvious and posits that it is needed for a case where kohanim ate teruma (which is forbidden for a non-kohen) while the others ate regular food. The reason that they can join, says the gemara, is that the kohen can eat the food of the others.

Rishonim extend the concept to parallel cases, based on which the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 196:3) says that if the kohen ate something non-kohanim may not and the others ate a non-Jew’s bread, which the kohen is careful not to eat (a halachic question- see Yoreh Deah 112), they do not form a zimun. The Magen Avraham (196:1) raises the matter of dairy and meat and points out that they can join together because the one eating dairy can also eat meat. (Acharonim discuss what happens, according to the various opinions, regarding the necessary break between dairy and meat- see discussion in Piskei Teshuvot 196:10).

The Magen Avraham also raises your issue that when this group bentches, the dairy eater, who is the one who unites the individuals into a group for zimun, should “make the beracha to exempt the other.” One would have thought that the point is moot because the eating that creates the obligation of zimun is that of bread, which is classically pareve, and why should one care that the “side dishes” are meat and dairy, respectively. The Magen Avraham is sensitive to this and points out that the discussion applies to a case where the bread is “soiled” with meat and dairy. B’tzel Hachochma (IV, 169) points out that in a case (e.g., like at the seder), where one eats a k’zayit of bread, creating the zimun obligation, before meat is brought out, this matter does not apply. There is a machloket about a case where that which one ate was off limits to the other but bread which everyone can partake of is available (see Taz 196:2), but we assume that the matter is determined by what was eaten (see Hitorerut Teshuva III, 61).

It is not clear why, when they form a group for zimun, it makes a difference who leads the zimun (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 196:8), and indeed some Acharonim do not cite this ruling (see opinions in Sha’ar Hatziyun 196:12). Even those who cite it view it as a minhag, not an absolute requirement (Chayei Adam I, 48:19; Mishna Berura 196:9; Aruch Hashulchan, op. cit.). One can also point out that the Magen Avraham cites the practice regarding a case where the mezamen does the bentching and exempts the others, whereas current practice is that all bentch separately and the stakes regarding zimun are much lower.  Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Sha’ar Hatziyun (op. cit.) says that if one of the meat eaters is a kohen, the more established halacha of giving respect to kohanim trumps the preference of the dairy eater.

Regarding your case of four eating together, where there is a zimun anyway, the matter probably depends on the Magen Avraham’s reasoning, which is not spelled out. If we prefer the person who is most connected to everyone, it still pays to have the dairy eater do the zimun. If it serves as a reminder that who ate what can affect the viability of the zimun, then when the zimun does not depend on the dairy eater, it should not be necessary. However, one can raise counter arguments. In any case, the matter is of so little importance that it does not warrant worrying which possibility is more likely, and one can do as he likes.

(Our answer does not relate to the precautions one should take when some are eating dairy while others are eating meat (see Yoreh Deah 88)

Tefillat Haderech is an obligatory prayer for protection from danger, instituted in beracha form under certain set circumstances (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 110: 4-7). As such, there is strong reason to believe that it follows the basic rules for fulfilling the obligations of other berachot and prayers.

One of the most basic rules of being yotzei (fulfilling) an obligation by means of another person is that the latter must be obligated in the mitzva (Rosh Hashanah 29a). Even answering Amen requires one to hear the beracha from a person whose beracha is meaningful (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 215:3 regarding a small child’s beracha). Therefore, all agree that one is not yotzei and does not answer Amen to that which he hears on a recording, as he does not hear something being said now by a person.

Almost all poskim agree that one cannot fulfill the mitzva of hearing shofar via microphone or other electronic means because one must hear the direct sound of a man blowing a shofar (see Rosh Hashana 27b). The ruling regarding Megilla reading via microphone is less clear. Although one does not hear the actual voice of a valid ba’al koreh, it is better than a recording in two ways. First, the sound is produced directly based on the sound waves from the ba’al koreh, not by means of someone else pressing a button. Secondly, the reproduction is heard at the same time the ba’al koreh reads. Therefore, although most poskim believe one cannot fulfill the mitzva via microphone, the lenient position is somewhat tenable (see Tzitz Eliezer VIII, 11; Minchat Shlomo I, 9 in the name of the Chazon Ish; Igrot Moshe OC II, 108).

The gemara (Sukka 51b) minimizes the importance of hearing the voice of the person reciting, if one knows what is being said. It discusses a huge structure in Alexandria where the audience could not hear, and instead flags were waved to inform people when to answer Amen. However, Tosafot (ad loc.) limits this precedent to cases where participants were not attempting to fulfill any mitzva at the time. Nevertheless this does indicate that one can answer Amen without hearing the voice in a case where one knows what beracha it is and does not need to be yotzei (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 124:8).

The much stronger position is that one cannot be motzi others via microphone, including in Tefillat Haderech. On the other hand, while few Orthodox shuls use a microphone for Megilla, it is commonplace for people to say Tefillat Haderech over a microphone. Can the two practices be reconciled? The answer is: arguably yes. Firstly, it is generally assumed that the level of obligation of Tefillat Haderech is of a lower level than that of set tefillot, thus making leniency in a case of machloket easier. On a bus, there is often another reason for leniency. Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at III, 54) assumes that whoever could hear without the microphone can be yotzei even if he hears primarily the microphone. While one can take issue with this assumption, it is a reasonable one (see Bemareh Habazak, I, 26). Most times most people could hear without a microphone, just not so well or every word. (For Megilla, there is a need to hear every word.)

It seems halachically preferable for people to say (along) their own Tefillat Haderech, especially those who could not have heard without the microphone, although doing it noticeably when the group does not could cause problems of yohara (looking haughty). We note that regarding many drives, there is actually a machloket whether Tefillat Haderech should be said, at least with its beracha ending. One may answer Amen based on the Alexandria precedent and if the beracha should not have been made, an unjustified Amen is less severe than saying the beracha oneself. Therefore, having one be motzi others has a slight element of advantage, and we can find some support for the common practice (as is our usual preference).

The beracha is Boreh Pri Ha'adama.

Regarding foods made from the five types of grains there are four possible berachot:

1.      Shehakol – if it is eaten in a way usually considered inedible, such as eating dough.

2.      Ha'adama – if eaten in an edible fashion which is not the normal way of eating, such as eating the seeds ("koses chitim").

3.      Mezonot – if cooked.

4.      Hamotzi – if grinded to flour and then bread made from it.

"Koses Chitim" is when the seeds are eaten whole and the peel was not removed from them (Orach Chaim 208, 4). The Mishna Berurah (ibid 15) states that if the peel was removed, some say that one should bless mezonot and some say ha'adama. However, this is only if the seeds are whole. If they are not whole then the blessing is mezonot. Burgul (what the taboule is made from) is cracked wheat from which the peel was removed, and is soaked in hot water, and therefore is not "koses chitim" and thus the blessing is mezonot.

Most people would not eat raw cacoa beans, and therefore the beracha is Shehakol. That is part of the reason that on cooked chocolate we make Shehakol.

Let us start with some background. The beracha of Shehecheyanu is a proper response to the happiness of something enjoyable returning to our lives. Regarding produce, Shehecheyanu applies only when there are distinctive seasons during the course of the year (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 225:6). The Rama continues that for this reason we do not make Shehecheyanu on a vegetable, “for it stands in the ground all year.” He expounds elsewhere (Darchei Moshe, OC 225:2) that it is hard to discern which vegetable is from the old crop and which is new.

A common question regarding is what to do if, despite there being different growing seasons, they are available almost all year without interruption. This depends on how to understand the aforementioned Rama (“stands in the ground”). The Mishna Berura (ad loc.:18) points out that almost every vegetable has distinct growing seasons, making the Rama’s generalization about vegetables hard to understand. (Due to use of hothouses, it is now common for vegetables to be grown throughout the year.) One of his explanations is that the Rama was referring to vegetables stored in the ground for long periods. In other words, even if something does not grow all year long, if it is available throughout, we do not recite Shehecheyanu on it. When fresh produce is far superior to refrigerated produce, there is likely cause to make Shehecheyanu on the new fresh fruit (B’er Moshe V, 65). This is particularly understandable in light of the Rama’s stress that it must be noticeable whether a given fruit is from the new season or the old (see V’zot Haberacha, pg. 161).

Certainly, if a species is available only canned, one makes Shehecheyanu on new, fresh produce. Another situation where produce is available throughout the year is when it is imported from regions with different growing seasons, in which case, we do not make Shehecheyanu on either local or imported fruit. The determining factor is not the agricultural phenomenon of a new crop, but the consumers’ experience upon reaching a new season of availability.

Is the determining factor the individual consumers or general society? Regarding one who has not partaken for a long time in fruit that has been available, the Mishna Berura (225:16) says: “Although he did not eat it, others did.” Thus, it is not enough that it is new for certain individuals. You ask about the opposite case, where it is new in the society where you presently find yourself, but it is not personally new to you. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II, 151) and Halichot Shlomo (based on Rav S.Z. Auerbach’s writings) say that one who travels from a place where the season had already come to a place where there is a new season makes the beracha again in the new place. However, both require that thirty days of lack of access to the fruit must pass in the interim. In other words, there has to be a basic level of renewal both for the individual and for the society. If it has been available without a minimum interruption for either society or the individual, then the individual does not make Shehecheyanu.

The newcomer’s thirty days can be a combination of time in his place of origin and in the new place. It is not clear whether the individual’s break follows having eaten the fruit for thirty days or having access. (We should note that the original halacha is that the beracha is on seeing the fruit, but the minhag is to make it only upon eating it (Shulchan Aurch, OC 225:3)). Since we refrain from berachot out of doubt, we recommend that the traveler not make a beracha unless he spent a combination of thirty consecutive days without access to the fruit and the fruit should locally be one that is not widely available all year long. In your case, only if you spent thirty days in Israel before the avocado season should you make a beracha when it comes out.

The general consensus seems to be that one should indeed make a bracha on chewing gum. What follows is a brief summary of two of the central issues discussed (a fuller discussion, together with sources, we can send you in Hebrew if you wish):

1)     One does not recite a bracha on food unless one's palate enjoys it (eg. no bracha is made on tasteless food eaten for health purposes, water drunk only to clear one's throat, etc.). However, most chewing gums are indeed chewed (initially) for their taste and therefore they require a bracha.

2)     When eating a "main" food together with an "ancillary" food (eg. one eats a piece of bread solely to make it easier to eat a very salty or spicey food), one does not recite a bracha on the ancillary food (the bread). Some suggest that the gum's sugary taste is ancillary to the main rubbery gum base [which people want specifically for the (non- palate related) chewing], and therefore no bracha should be recited on the taste. However, others point out that the above rule only applies when one is making a bracha on the main food- in such a situation, the ancillary food's bracha is exempted by that of the main food. But since no bracha is being recited on the rubbery gum base, a bracha is indeed required for the sugary taste.

Regarding the issue of kashrut by gum:

The flavor can be non-kosher

The gum base is made with glycerine which can be from an animal source.

One may make Kiddush and fulfill the Mitzvah of four cups on the Seder night with wine mixed with water, so long as it is still considered wine, which is so long as its blessing is "Boreh Pri Hagafen"[1].

According the Shulchan Aruch (SA)[2] wine residue may be mixed with water and a "Boreh Pri Hagafen" may be said so long as the wine residue is at least 25%. However, this is only regarding the wine in the time of the Gemara which was very strong, but nowadays that the wine is less strong then one should follow the common practice as to mixing wine with water in his place.

Sefardic authorities[3] are of the opinion that according to the SA there is no distinction between wine residue and wine. Also, they claim that since nowadays the wine is weaker one should be stringent and not mix wine with more than 50% water (as many wines are already mixed with water, one should not add water unless one knows exactly what percentage of water was already added).

The Remma[4] rules that there is a difference between wine residue and wine, and wine may be mixed with water even if the wine will be a seventh of the mixture. However, this again is only regarding the strong wine which was common in the times of the Gemara, but by our wines one should follow the common practice as to mixing wine with water in his place[5]. According to this, several authorities[6] wrote that one should be stringent that there should not be a majority of water. Therefore, practically there is no difference between Sefardic and Ashkenazic authorities. However, some authorities wrote that one may bless "Boreh Pri Hagafen" even if the wine is only a seventh[7].

This question tests the primacy of the following competing halachic rules. One is that once one becomes obligated in one of the additions to Birkat Hamazon, he is to recite it even after the time that it normally applies. The other is that during times that can relate to the preceding period or the following period, we do not allow there to be an internal contradiction (tartei d’satrei) and apply it to both. Let us survey sources and applications of each rule before coming to an answer.

 The first rule is actually not unanimously held. The Rosh (Shut 22:6) says that if one starts seuda shlishit before sunset but bentches after the day is over, he does not recite R’tzei. To the contrary, if he ate a meal before Shabbat but recited Birkat Hamazon only on Shabbat, he would then recite R’tzei. The Tur (Orach Chayim 695) says that according to [his father] the Rosh, one who did not bentch on his Purim seuda until nightfall after Purim he would not recite Al Hanisim. In other words, we always follow the time that one is ready to make the pronouncement. However, we do not adopt the Rosh’s opinion as standard halacha. Rather, we follow the time that one ate and say that if he ate in a way that caused an obligation of a special pronouncement such as R’tzei or Al Hanisim, he is to make it even when its time ostensibly over (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 188:10). (An exception to this is Sheva Berachot that finish after the week is over, as one cannot make independent berachot after the time period- see Sha’arei Teshuva 188:8 based on the Ginat Veradim).

The next rule, that we avoid tartei d’satrei situations, has far too many applications to address, and we will stick to those close to our topic. One discussion is about one who started a seudat Purim on Erev Shabbat and continued it on Shabbat, making Kiddush in the middle. When he eventually bentches, there is reason to say both Al Hanisim, due to that which he ate during the day, and R’tzei, due to that which he ate after Kiddush. The Magen Avraham (695:9) says that one recites Al Hanisim, apparently in addition to R’tzei (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 695:19), whereas the Chayei Adam (155:32) says that you cannot say both Al Hanisim and R’tzei in the same Birkat Hamazon when the two relate to different days.

Another case where the issue of tartei d’satrei arises regarding R’tzei is when one starts eating on Shabbat and continues eating bread after night begins and Rosh Chodesh starts. There is a theoretical obligation to say both R’tzei and Ya’aleh V’yavoh but, again, the two belong to two different days. Here, the Magen Avraham (188:18) says that one cannot say both and since it is more clear that there is an obligation of Ya’aleh V’yavo than it is that there is an obligation of R’tzei, one says just Ya’aleh V’yavo (we will not deal with reconciling the Magen Avraham’s two rulings). The Taz (188:7) says that one may say both despite the apparent contradiction, and the Mishna Berura does not come to a clear distinction.

There is some logic to say that tartei d’satrei exists only when one has to say two contradictory things in the same context, e.g., within Birkat Hamazon. If so, since there is nothing in Birkat Hamazon that indicates that it is Motzaei Shabbat, saying R’tzei would not be a problem. However, the consensus of poskim is that davening Ma’ariv is such a strong indication of ending Shabbat that it is not possible to say R’tzei in bentching afterward (see implication of Beit Yosef, OC 188, Magen Avraham 188:17; Mishna Berura 188:32; Aruch Hashulchan 188:27). The loss of R’tzei is also not a critical matter. Because not all agree that one has to eat bread at seuda shlishit, if one forgets R’tzei at sedua shlishit, he does not repeat Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 8). What some major poskim (Magen Avraham 263:33; Rabbi Akiva Eiger to Magen Avraham 188:17) are unsure about is if one said Hamavdil but did not daven, whether that precludes saying R’tzei.

One has to wait until it is somewhat dark. Exactly how long after sunset is a good question and can depend a little bit on latitiude, but somewhere between 20-30 minutes (usually not reached at an early Shabbat minyan).

One of the korbanot the Torah describes is a Korban Todah (sacrifice of thanksgiving) (Vayikra 7:12). However, the Torah does not say when one offers it. The gemara (Berachot 54b), in the context of Birkat Hagomel (blessing after surviving dangerous situations), says that the “survivors” of four situations have to give thanks: a voyage at sea, traversal of the desert, illness, and captivity. The gemara demonstrates how each of these situations is described in Tehillim 107, the mizmor that deals with thanks after being saved from difficult situations. Even at the time of the Beit Hamikdash, it appears that people such as these were not obligated to bring a Korban Todah. Rather those are among the appropriate situations to volunteer one (see Rashi, Vayikra 7:12 and a thorough presentation in Nishmat Avraham, Orach Chayim 219:1).

Eating is a major element of the Korban Todah. This korban included 40 loaves of meal-offering, 36 of which were to be eaten. The Abarbanel and the Netziv (both on Vayikra 7) famously explain that the Torah required a lot of eating in a short amount of time to encourage the thankful person to bring together many people where he would hopefully give proper public thanks to Hashem.

What do we do without a Beit Hamikdash to bring a Korban Todah? The Rosh (Berachot 9:3) and the Tur (OC 219) say that Birkat Hagomel was instituted in place of the Korban Todah. While the simple reading is that Hagomel is an obligatory beracha, the Magen Avraham (beginning of 219; Pri Megadim, ad loc. disagrees) suggests that it might be optional. In any case, it provides a defined opportunity to thank Hashem publicly (it must be recited before a minyan, preferably including two distinguished people- Shulchan Aruch, OC 219:3).

Whether or not the Korban Todah or Birkat Hagomel is obligatory, a seudat hodaya for being saved from dangerous illness is certainly not obligatory. This may explain its absence from explicit discussion in most classical works (including the Shulchan Aruch). However, significant sources provide precedent and support for the idea of doing something more than saying Hagomel, including a seuda. The Mishna Berura (218:32, in the name of “Acharonim”) says that one who was saved from possible death (apparently even if the salvation was natural) should do the following. He should set aside money for tzedaka and say that he wants it to be considered as if he spent the money on a Korban Todah, donate things that help the public, and on every anniversary find a special setting to thank Hashem, be happy, and tell His praises. Certainly, a seudat hodaya is an appropriate setting for it, but it is not part of a set formula.

The gemara (Berachot 46a) tells that when Rabbi Zeira was sick, Rabbi Avahu promised that if he recovered, Rabbi Avahu would make a festive meal for the rabbis, which, baruch Hashem, occurred. Some say that not just the meal but the promise to make it is significant, as the promise of such an event if the sick person recovers is a segula (good omen) for the recovery (see Gilyonei Ephrayim, ad loc.). This would evidently only work if the seuda of that nature is desirable. The Chavot Yair (70; see also Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 444:9) in discussing different meals that are a seudat mitzva, mentions the seuda after being saved from danger. While some seudot mitzva are obligatory, many are not but are positive ways to give prominence to noteworthy events.

We will end off on a hashkafic note. Rav S.Z. Auerbach explained (see Mizmor L’todah (Travis) p. 185) that by eating in the context of thanksgiving to Hashem one expresses the following idea. A person should know and show that the goal of life and the physical world that he is enjoying after his recovery is to serve as a medium through which to further his spiritual life and give thanks to Hashem.

It is clear that a woman can make a beracha before foods to fulfill the obligation of men. To what extent this is a general practice that is advisable depends on many things including the nature of one's community and is difficult for us to decide regarding a specific case whose specifics we are not aware of. However, in general, the family and/or its spiritual advisors, should determine what the change from the traditional practice would be coming from and where it is likely to lead. If the involvement in this manner of the wife is done in order to increase the fear and love of Hashem in the family, it is a proper step. If it is done as a protest to a perceived male domination of religion, it is a negative thing.

If you are not at all thirsty and drink water for health reasons, you do not make a beracha.

If you are thirsty or are drinking some type of flavored drink, then you make a beracha.

According to the consensus of poskim and many (not all, and it may depend on the type of sensitivity) health experts, oats can be used as a wheat substitute for gluten-sensitive people, and the halachot are identical to those regarding the other major grains. While you look into the health feasibility, this answer is written for one who cannot eat anything that is Mezonot.

The gemara (Pesachim 101a) says that Kiddush must be done in the place where “a meal” will follow. On the other hand, it refers to “tasting” after Kiddush, implying that a full meal is unnecessary. While some say that this taste must include bread, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5) rules like the Geonim that wine can also be used. While there are opinions in either direction, the consensus is that a revi’it (approximately 3 fl. oz.) is needed and sufficient (see Mishna Berura 273:22, 27).

The Magen Avraham (273:11) reasons that if the Geonim can accept wine in this context, then it is true of anything made from the grains, which is more meal-like than wine (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5 regarding the laws of seuda shlishit). This is the source of the common practice of having cake for the post-Kiddush “meal.” Along these lines, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 273:11) permits dates for this purpose, based on the halacha that if one mistakenly made Birkat Hamazon on dates, it is valid after the fact, because dates are particularly filling (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:17). The Tosefet Shabbat argues, and most Acharonim say that one should not normally rely on dates for eating after Kiddush (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 273:42; Yabia Omer VII, OC 63).

While according to the spirit of the law, there may seem to be little difference between the Shehakol and Mezonot pastries, the former do not fit the halachic parameters for the eating after Kiddush. As we have seen, there are other alternatives. For cases where there are not viable alternatives, we mention two fringe leniencies. There is an opinion that in a case of need, any food can be used (Chayei Adam 6:22). There is also an opinion that Kiddush works for all assembled if one person eats the requisite amount (see B’tzel Hachochma IV:2). If one must rely on one of those opinions, it is proper for him to eat something that fulfills the spirit of the law.

We will now discuss a related context where the spirit of the law is important (and might fit the letter of the law also) – the full meal. One needs to have two loaves of bread/challa, eat a k’zayit, and recite Birkat Hamazon at the end of the meal, and these require halachic grain. It would be regrettable for a gluten-sensitive person to consider himself as incapable of fulfilling the mitzva of seuda, prompting some to do whatever they feel like. It is proper (we cannot create an outright obligation) to have two nice loaves of bread, of whatever flour one can use. There actually is halachic precedent of bread that is not subject to Hamotzi and Birkat Hamazon.  The halacha is that an eiruv chatzeirot must consist of bread, but the bread can be from rice or lentils (Shulchan Aruch, OC 366:8), because that is considered legitimate bread (Mishna Berura ad loc. 47). Notice also that the concept of loaves of bread is learned from the manna in the desert, and that was not made from normal grain. What is important is that this was their bread (see overlapping idea in Minchat Yitzchak III:113). For the gluten-intolerant, these are their breads. While we would not suggest such an approach if one has the opportunity to follow the regular rules (including using oat challa), one who is in such a situation should view his meal as a seudat Shabbat.

It is also worthwhile to drink enough wine, or eat dates or another relevant food, to enable the recitation of a long Beracha Acharona, which contains the basics of Birkat Hamazon and mentions Shabbat.

Reciting the beracha of Hamapil is mandated by the gemara (Berachot 60b) and codified as halacha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 239:1). We say it in conjunction with Kriat Shema prior to going to bed, which is also an obligation, and other p’sukim and texts that relate to our desire for divine protection while sleeping. There are different opinions as to the order of recitation, but the prevalent one is to say Kriat Shema, then Hamapil, and then the other p’sukim (see Mishna Berura 239:2). Hamapil’s main content is to thank Hashem for the benefits of sleep and request a pleasant sleep without fright or improper thoughts.

Your reference to Rav Shternbach is apparently a mistake. He just conjectures (in Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:131) why many individuals and some prominent groups do not say Hamapil (we will mention one of his ideas). In the final analysis, he says that the problems that may arise are overshadowed by the need to follow the gemara.

Let us see the extent of the problem to speak between Hamapil and falling asleep, which will help determine whether you made the right choice. The gemara says that one makes the beracha as he prepares to lie down in bed to sleep. The Rama (OC 239:1) says that one should not eat, drink, or talk between Kriat Shema and actually sleeping. Most assume that this applies as much or more to interruptions between Hamapil and sleeping.

A break could be particularly problematic after Hamapil for two reasons. First, if one made a break after Kriat Shema, he can repeat Kriat Shema upon returning to bed, whereas one cannot recite Hamapil, which is a beracha, at will (Mishna Berura 239:4). Furthermore, there is a fundamental question as to Hamapil’s function. The Chayei Adam (35:4) says that the beracha is a general thanks to Hashem for providing sleep, and it is appropriate to recite it at night, when people generally go to sleep. He says that the beracha was appropriate even if one did not end up falling asleep, because other people did sleep. This is similar to the idea of reciting Birkot Hashachar for things from which people benefit in the morning, even for one who did not benefit that day (Shulchan Aruch, OC 46:8). On the other hand, many cite the Seder Hayom, who says that Hamapil should be said very close to the time one falls asleep, as the beracha relates to one’s personal sleep. The Biur Halacha (239:1) strengthens this opinion by pointing out that Hamapil was composed in the first person, implying it refers to the sleep of the one reciting the beracha (see Shaarei Teshuva 46:12). Rav Shternbach (ibid.) understood that those who do not recite it reason that it must be said close to falling asleep and it is hard to determine when that will be.

The Biur Halacha is uncomfortable deciding between these two approaches and recommends not reciting Hamapil if one is not confident he will fall asleep. The Biur Halacha does not uproot the obligation out of concern that one will unexpectedly not fall sleep.

We will take a similar approach for you. If you have specific reason to believe you will be unable to refrain from speaking before falling asleep, then it may be safer to not make the beracha (even though we prefer the opinion that your intention at the time of the beracha is the critical factor- see Yechaveh Da’at IV:21). If you recite Hamapil and a long time passes before you fall asleep, it is unclear how great the need has to be to be allowed to speak or eat (see Ishei Yisrael 35:9 and Piskei Teshuvot 239:3). We believe that one can be lenient on the matter (see Tzitz Eliezer VII:27). However, if you want to avoid the situation of doubt of whether you can eat or talk for an extended period of time, you can wait until you are getting closer to falling asleep to recite Hamapil. If you fall asleep before reciting it, you are not to be blamed.

There is disagreement on the topic of alternative medicine. Like in most topics, extreme opinions are rarely right. It is clear that some treatments under the umbrella of alternative medicine are helpful, and it is clear that some are quackery and serve as a placebo at best. There is also a significant category of medicines and treatments (homeopathic or conventional) whose efficacy is unclear or varies greatly from person to person. We are not in the position to take a stand on the important question as to which treatments fall into which category.

These questions are relevant regarding cases where we want to do something which would otherwise be forbidden in order to heal the sick (see Orach Chayim 301, 328). However, your question does not depend on this matter. It is not that the status of medicine uproots the need for a beracha. Rather, berachot were instituted for the benefits of food (primarily, taste), not for medical benefits alone (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 204:8). If one receives both benefits, he must recite a beracha (ibid.). Therefore, if any medicine’s taste is good, a beracha would be required on it. If there is not a good taste, then even if there is no medicinal value either, there would be no beracha. (Indeed, there is no beracha on swallowing paper).

However, there is still a question about the beracha for anything taken for medicinal purposes that has additives that give it a somewhat positive taste. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (204:37) says that medicinal food does not need to have a particularly good taste; the main thing is that it does not have a bad one. One might claim that the classic sources discuss cases where the therapeutic agent has a reasonable taste but that if the medicine tastes bad and sweetener improves it, the sweetener is the medicine’s less important part and should not count regarding berachot (see Berachot 36a). However, the rule that the beracha follows a food’s more important ingredient for berachot applies only when the important part has a beracha, but if the medicinal part has no beracha, we should make a beracha on the sweetener (Pitchei Halacha, Berachot pg. 246; Yalkut Yosef, Berachot, pg. 442).

Yet, there still are cases where a beracha is doubtful. If one swallows a pill, it is not considered a manner of eating in regards to berachot even if it leaves a sweet taste on the tongue before swallowing (V’zot Haberacha pg. 311). Also, Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted by several as minimizing the cases in which a beracha is called for. Nishmat Avraham (IV, OC 204:8) quotes him as saying that if the sweetener is on the outside of a chewable pill and one enjoys the taste before getting to the medicinal part there is a beracha, but if the tastes are all mixed together, there should not  be a beracha. This is based on the assumption that the mixture does not have a taste which would interest anyone as a food. V’zot Haberacha (pg. 312) cites Rav Auerbach from a different angle. If the active ingredient’s taste is neither bad nor particularly good, the minor taste enjoyment suffices for a beracha. However, for an external taste to turn a non-food into a food, the medicinal mixture must have an actually good taste overall. Not all agree with Rav Auerbach (see ibid.), and it is logical to say that as long as one appreciates the positive element, the fact that the negative element neutralizes it somewhat does not take away from the beracha. However, it is hard to require a beracha against Rav Auerbach’s opinion. There also will be borderline cases regarding how they are to be considered according to the different opinions.  In a case of doubt, one should not make a beracha (one who wants, can eat something else first, having in mind to cover the medicine).

The halachot of aveilut (mourning) for a deceased relative and the national mourning over the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash, during the days/weeks before Tisha B’av are discussed in the gemara. The minhagim of national mourning over the death of Rabbi Akiva’s students are not found in the gemara. There are both overlap and differences in the details for these different time periods.

Regarding the aveilut of the Sefira period, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 493) cites prohibitions on marriages and hair cutting (and work after sunset –  which is not widely accepted). The Mishna Berura (493:3) mentions the minhag of not dancing, which many have applied to all forms of instrumental music (see Igrot Moshe, OC I:166). These standard sources make no mention of the things about which you inquired.

Let us look briefly at minhagim about Shehecheyanu, clothes, and work on the house, as they appear in regard to the period before Tisha B’av. One is to reduce certain activities before Tisha B’av, including building projects (Yevamot 43a), but according to the Shulchan Aruch (OC 551:2), this is only during the Nine Days and not the Three Weeks. There is also a recommendation, which not all accept (see opinions in Mishna Berura 551:98), not to recite Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 17). The logic is that Shehecheyanu expresses our gratefulness to have made it to “this time,” which may not be appropriate at a particularly sad time on the calendar.

While the standard sources do not mention these issues during the Sefira period, there are some sources that do, especially in regard to Shehecheyanu (see several opinions cited in Bein Pesach L’Shavuot 16:(2)). There is basis for this extension on two grounds. First, there is logic, as this is a nationwide sad period (as opposed to aveilut over a relative, which is personal- see Mishna Berura 551:98). Secondly, it is relatively easier to transfer minhagim when there is a model for such halachot, by doing, so to speak, “copy and paste” from one time to another.

However, the logic and the model are also reasons, paradoxically, to ignore the minority strict opinions and the practice of some to refrain from some or all of the matters you mentioned, for the following reason. People can get confused as to what practices apply when. They remember that there is a concept of not saying Shehecheyanu and not doing renovations during national mourning periods, and they may have heard of someone knowledgeable who says to act this way during Sefira. They then may start adopting the practice, not based on a decision with knowledge of the sources and indications and a desire to accept the stringency. Rather, they think these are the standard minhagim. This is called a minhag ta’ut. In such a case, even one who has already followed the stringent practice may suspend it without hatarat nedarim. 

Rav Ovadya Yosef has an interesting approach to these questions. First he explains (Yechaveh Da’at I:24) that one cannot call Sefira, which is actually the bridge between the joyous holidays of Pesach and Shavuot, a tragic period of time, as we call the period leading up to Tisha B’av. Therefore, he is against refraining from Shehecheyanu on fruit at that time. He is not against the stringency to avoid wearing new clothing that warrants Shehecheyanu, out of extra mourning. Regarding moving into a new home or doing work on an existing one, he simply permits the matter (ibid. III:30). The Tzitz Eliezer (XVIII:41) is perhaps more resolute in rejecting the appropriateness of stringency in these matters.

Poskim (see Yabia Omer, VIII, Yoreh Deah 32; B’er Moshe VIII:237) discuss the case of a woman who had been pregnant before marriage. Her husband did not know, so he assumed their firstborn boy required a pidyon haben. Could she allow him to do so, including two berachot l’vatala, to save embarrassment and possible repercussions to the marriage? The consensus is that considerations of k’vod hab’riyot (preserving human dignity- see Berachot 19b) allow her not to tell.

One factor of leniency is that most Rishonim hold that a beracha l’vatala is only a rabbinic prohibition (see Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 33a; Mishna Berura 215:20), and k’vod hab’riyot overcomes rabbinic laws (Berachot 19b). (The content of most berachot, e.g., Hashem commanded us, generally, in the mitzva of pidyon haben, is always true and positive.)  Also, the wife just did not stop her husband from making a mistake, and the Rosh (Kilaei Begadim 6) says that in such cases, k’vod hab’riyot supersedes even a Torah law.

This case is worse in a few ways. First, the father knowingly is making a non-mandated beracha. Granted, he can make Shehecheyanu over new clothing and mumble the beginning of the main beracha and not utter Hashem’s Names. Still, there is a problem that those assembled will answer Amen to what is not a valid beracha, which is forbidden (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 215:4 and a parallel case of answering a non-beracha in Minchat Shlomo I:9). One cannot invoke the aforementioned Rosh because the father is presenting a “beracha” to which it is forbidden to respond. This ostensibly violates the Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver – facilitating a person’s act of sin, certainly when one consciously causes others to do so unknowingly (see Dagul Meirevava to Shach, YD 151:6).

Yet there still may be grounds for leniency. It is forbidden to daven when one has to use the facilities, and if the need is acute, his tefillot and berachot are invalid (Shulchan Aruch, OC 92:1). Yet, the Biur Halacha (ad loc.) says that a chazan in that situation who will be very embarrassed to walk out in the middle may continue davening. Here one knowingly makes improper berachot to which people will answer Amen, and it is permitted due to k’vod hab’riyot. On the other hand, that case may be better, as the berachot are intrinsically valid, just that there is a side violation due to his physical state, one which k’vod haberiyot can lift. Here, the nonsensical nature of the beracha should make the amen problematic.

There are further reasons for leniency. According to some, Amen l’vatala is not nearly as severe as a beracha l’vatala (see Pri Megadin 215, Eshel Avraham 1.) Perhaps more fundamentally, saying Amen is not intrinsically problematic and much depends on context. Possibly, if from the perspective of the person who is saying it, there is every reason to believe the beracha was appropriate, then the responder did nothing wrong even if it was not a good beracha, (see Yabia Omer ibid. who cites those who use this logic even regarding a beracha). Additionally, a “non-beracha” that people considered a beracha may be better than a beracha l’vatala (see similar matter in Yechaveh Da’at II:68). Finally, since the exact parameters of lifnei iver are elusive, setting up such a situation may not be forbidden.

Nevertheless, it pays to encourage people not to make a fake pidyon haben when not necessary. Not always is the fact that a few close friends and relatives find out about a miscarriage as embarrassing as it seems. Furthermore, one can say the delivery was caesarian, which exempts from a pidyon haben (Yoreh Deah 305:24), or that the delivery was with forceps, which calls for a pidyon without berachot (Otzar Pidyon Haben 1:16). However, every case and every person are unique.

The beracha acharona of Al Ha’eitz, the Me’ein Shalosh (often colloquially called Al Hamichya) for fruit of the sevens species (olives, dates, grapes, figs, and pomegranates) is an interesting hybrid. It is similar to Birkat Hamazon in terms of content; it is a single beracha , similar to Borei Nefashot, yet it begins and ends with a beracha form, and is of a higher level (see below); it does not mention the specific fruit, unlike the beracha on wine.

With this background, let us answer your first question. One who ate both fruit of the seven species and other fruit should make Al Ha’eitz to fulfill all the obligations (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:13). Since Al Ha’eitz thanks Hashem for fruit generally, this stronger beracha can cover “lesser fruit” as well. The Mishna Berura (207:1) says that even if one recites Al Ha’eitz improperly (e.g., after eating only an apple), he still exempts himself from Borei Nefashot. Since the exemption is based on the language of Al Ha’eitz, it does not apply regarding fruit that does not grow on a tree, i.e., those fruit whose beracha is Borei Pri Ha’adama (Shulchan Aruch ibid.; Sha’ar Hatziyun 208:64). Admittedly some say that even “fruit of the ground” are included in tenuvat hasadeh and are exempted by Al Ha’eitz, and according to Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, V, OC 17), one who already recited it should not make Borei Nefashot (see below). The logic is stronger according to those who end off Al Ha’eitz with the words “al hapeirot,” as opposed to “al pri ha’eitz,” as the former refers to fruit generically and not to the fruit of the tree.

Regarding the order of the berachot acharonot, conceptually it is proper to recite the Me’ein Shalosh first because it is a higher level beracha than Borei Nefashot for one or more of the following reasons. According to some (see Beit Yosef, OC 209), it is actually a Torah-level obligation; it is longer and more extensive; it is more specific than Borei Nefashot (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 202:206; Be’ur Halacha 202:11). However, some say that because of the opinions above that Me’ein Shalosh fulfills the obligation for all sorts of fruit, it is preferable to make Borei Nefashot first, for if not, it will be unclear if he should or should not recite Borei Nefashot afterward. If the Borei Nefashot is needed for something that does not grow from the ground (e.g., meat, water) and according to many if one is drinking fruit juice (which lost its status of fruit regarding berachot –see Mishna Berura 208:63), this is not an issue (Yabia Omer ibid.), and it would be preferable to recite the Me’ein Shalosh first.

The Magen Avraham (202:26) is not concerned with the opinion that one should say Borei Nefashot first, and this is the accepted ruling and practice for Ashkenazim (see V’zot Haberacha p. 54). For Sephardim, it is hard to say. The Shulchan Aruch seems to not believe that “ha’adama fruits” can be included in Me’ein Shalosh. Furthermore, Ohr L’tzion (Rav Abba Shaul, II:14:24) employs very strong logic – one who plans to say Borei Nefashot after Me’ein Shalosh is considered like one who has in mind not to have the Al Ha’eitz cover the Borei Nefashot fruit, in which case there are ample sources that it is not effective for those foods. (One would do well to have this in mind explicitly.) On the other hand, the Kaf Hachayim (208:73) says it is better to avoid the situation and recite Borei Nefashot first (V’zot Haberacha cites Rav M. Eliyahu as agreeing). Rav Ovadia Yosef (ibid.), basing himself on the rule he champions to avoid doubtful berachot even when the Shulchan Aruch approves them, says that if one already said a Me’ein Shalosh, he should not make a Borei Nefashot . Given his authority, it is hard to tell a Sephardi to not follow his position, at least in regard to l’chatchila.  

Conceptually and historically there are different approaches to the issues of the function of the berachot under the chupa and to whom they relate. We will focus on birkat eirusin, the second beracha, “…asher kid’shanu b’mitzvotav v’tzivanu al ha’arayot...” There is what to say about the beracha on the wine, considering that usually the rabbi does not even take a sip from it, but that is a separate, albeit related, topic. The seven berachot at the end are apparently not the chatan’s responsibility (see Yabia Omer VII, EH 17).

The Rambam (Ishut 3:23) states that the chatan (or his agent, if he performs the kiddushin) makes the birkat eirusin. However, the practice has been for many hundreds of years that someone else (usually the mesader kiddushin) is the one who makes the berachot.

The Rama (Even Ha’ezer 34:1) cites the minhag that someone other than the chatan recites the beracha. The Derisha (EH 34:1) explains that the Rama is based on the Rosh’s (Ketubot 1:12) approach that kiddushin is not a mitzva per se. It follows, says the Rosh, that the beracha is not of the category of berachot on mitzvot but of berachot of praise to Hashem, in this case, for providing us with halachot and procedures to navigate them. Once the beracha is general and not connected directly to the performance of the mitzva, there is no reason why someone other than the chatan cannot recite it. According to some (see Tuv Ta’am Vada’at III, YD 98; Har Tzvi, YD 1), these two approaches also explain another machloket. The Rambam (ibid.) says that if the beracha was not said before the kiddushin, it cannot be said afterward, while the Ra’avad (ad loc.) says that it can. The Rambam is consistent, since the beracha, as one on the action of a mitzva, must be before the mitzva. In contrast, the Ra’avad can follow the Rosh’s approach that it is a beracha of praise, and, therefore, as long as it is connected to the marriage process, it is appropriate.

The Noda B’Yehuda (II, EH 1) follows the Rambam’s approach, yet understands that the Rambam allows for the minhag that the mesader kiddushin recites the beracha. It is simply based on the rule that one who is generally obligated in a mitzva, but practically not now, can make the beracha on behalf of someone who is presently obligated in it. The conditions are that the listener hears the reciter and each has the intention that the reciter is doing it on the listener’s behalf, either individually or as part of a group (see Rosh Hashana 29a).

So, then, we have one nafka mina (practical ramification) between the two approaches. According to the Rambam/ Noda B’Yehuda, the chatan and the rabbi should intend that the rabbi’s beracha covers the chatan, whereas according to the Rosh/Derisha such intention is not required. Another nafka mina is when the chatan and kalla are deaf, so that they cannot hear the rabbi’s beracha. In that case, the Noda B’Yehuda says that the rabbi cannot make the beracha on their behalf. (The Noda B’Yehuda raises a dilemma whether it would be enough for the kalla to be able to hear, as it is not clear whether a woman, who is not obligated in p’ru u’r’vu (procreation), has a mitzva to get married.) Rabbi Akiva Eiger (to Taz, YD 1:17) and the Tevuot Shor (YD 1:(59)) take the Rosh’s approach and say that the rabbi can make the beracha for a deaf couple.

Not only is it possible for someone other than the chatan to make the beracha, but it has also become customary that the chatan should not make it. The Mordechai (Ketubot 131) says that it would be seen as showing off for the chatan to do it. The Beit Shmuel (34:2) says that in order to avoid embarrassing to those chatanim who do not know how to recite the beracha properly, we do not let any chatanim do so.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 219:5) says regarding the timing of Birkat Hagomel: “If one delayed, he has as long as he wants, and it is correct not to delay three days.” Does the Shulchan Aruch really leave this totally open-ended? Considering that three days is not proper, maybe he did not extend it by months. The three day period comes from the opinions cited in the Beit Yosef (OC 219) that after three days, it is too late to make the beracha. Similarly, others give a five day deadline (the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 219:7) cites it as a minority opinion). It is clear from the Shita Mekubetzet and Ra’ah (Berachot 54b) that it can be recited more than a month after the obligation began, but how long?

For a long time, the prevalent minhag was that women did not recite Birkat Hagomel at all; nowadays it has become prevalent after birth, but it is rare for women to say Hagomel for other things, certainly not for a trip for which her husband recites it. The Magen Avraham (beginning of OC 219) explains the minhag based on the conjecture that it is generally an optional beracha. The Halachot Ketanot (II:161) says that according to the opinion that Hagomel cannot be done without ten men, it makes sense that women were excluded from the obligation due to tzniut issues. Har Tzvi (OC I:113) suggests an interesting reason for new mothers specifically not to say Hagomel, due to the language of “l’chayavim” – for the guilty. The danger a person was in could be a sign that he is guilty of something, whereas the danger of a woman giving birth stems simply from her participation in the most natural, wonderful mitzva.

Whatever the reason for exemption, why should a woman put herself in the position of a possibly improper beracha in which she is likely not obligated. Furthermore, there are “safer” alternatives. There was, for example, a minhag (see Torat Chayim, Sanhedrin 94a) that the husband would get an aliya the first time the woman returned to shul. When he blessed Hashem with “Borchu…” and she answered “Baruch Hashem …” they would have in mind to thereby thank Hashem. This avoids an extra, questionable beracha. She can also wait for a man who has to say Hagomel and have him make it for the two of them (see Living the Halachic Process II, B-7). However, while we are generally not opposed to finding ways to obviate questionable berachot, here we are confident that it is appropriate for your wife to recite Hagomel even months later, as we will explain.

The opinions about saying Hagomel within three or five days relate to Hagomel after a trip, as the Beit Yosef brings sources about how long is considered “after a trip.” There it makes sense that the next trip may be “around the corner.” In contrast, births (other than twins) are usually considerably more than a year apart. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 219:7), going on the Shulchan Aruch’s language of “as long as he wants,” excludes cases where so long has passed that the matter is forgotten. Halachically, the prominent cutoff time for remembering is twelve months (see Bava Metzia 24b; Berachot 54b; Shut Chatam Sofer, Even Haezer I, 119). Furthermore, while a trip is often forgotten relatively quickly, memories of a birth linger on for much longer. While the memories usually focus on the happy parts of the birth and the beracha relates to the danger, the two are related and thoughts of labor also linger for a long time. Additionally, the time to start saying Hagomel and thus its general time frame  is not clear. A sick person says Hagomel when he is fully recuperated (Mishna Berura 219:2). When does a woman recuperate from birth? There are halachic cutoffs after seven days (probably the most common, but not unanimous, position regarding Hagomel) and thirty days (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 330:4). A lot depends on the specific case.

In summation, a woman within twelve months of birth can and should be encouraged (barring a personal reason to the contrary) to recite Hagomel.

There are two basic halachic precedents and one major distinction for the halachot that apply here, with poskim offering differing opinions regarding in-between cases.  

The Rashba and others infer from Rav Pappa’s rules (Berachot 41b) about which foods need a beracha at different stages of a meal that foods that are brought to the table during the meal are generally covered by the original beracha. This serves the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 206) as a source that berachot generally cover foods that were not present at the time.

The Taz (ad loc. 7) rejects this broad application, as a meal has a special ability to subsume many foods. He and the Magen Avraham (ad loc. 7) prefer the precedent of a shochet who makes a beracha before shechting several animals and then other are brought. The Tur (Yoreh Deah 19) cites several opinions as to whether a new beracha is needed: it depends if the animals are of the same species (Itur); it depends if the new animals were brought while some original animals had still not been shechted (S’mak); it depends if one had in mind to cover animals that were not yet present (Tur). The Shulchan Aruch (YD 19:7) follows the S’mak’s distinction, and the Rama (YD 19:6) follows the Itur.

Yet, in the Laws of Berachot, these pillars of halacha do not make such distinctions. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 206:5) seems to say without distinction that one does not make a beracha on the newly brought food. The Rama (ad loc.), while not necessarily arguing, says that one should preferably have in mind that the beracha goes on all the food that will be brought, and Sephardi poskim agree that this is worthwhile, considering that the Beit Yosef cites differing opinions (Yalkut Yosef 206:21).

Let us now put things in perspective. All agree that if one had in mind to eat only certain foods or amounts of the foods (e.g., those with dietary goals), the beracha is limited to that (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 174:5). All agree that explicit intention for other foods works in all but exceptional cases. The machloket between the aforementioned Taz and Magen Avraham and the accepted reading of the Shulchan Aruch is in regard to cases where one did not give the matter thought or come to a conclusion.

Based primarily on distinctions found regarding shechita, Ashkenazi poskim say that a new beracha is needed on food upon which one did not have clear intention unless one of the following situations exists: 1) the food was before the person when he made the beracha (Mishna Berura (206:20); 2) the new food is of the exact same type as that upon which he made the beracha (ibid. 22); 3) he was not finished eating the original food when he decided to eat the new food (ibid.); 4) he sat down to eat a significant amount of this type of food (ibid.); 5) the person in question is dependent on others to determine what he will be offered to eat, e.g., a guest (Mishna Berura 179:17 – see V’zot Haberacha, p. 68).

The exceptions in which (some of) these factors do not help to exempt from a beracha include: 1) when the new food came from an unexpected place, e.g., a guest brought it after the beracha was made (Shulchan Aruch, OC 177:5); 2) if, according to the rules of order of berachot, the beracha should have been made on the second food, only explicit intention allows the first beracha to cover it (based on Rama 211:5). (For more details, see V’zot Haberacha pp. 65-67; Piskei Teshuvot 206:18).

Since the detailed halachot are hard to remember and many of them are based on machloket, it is best to follow the Rama and have clear intention to cover a wide variety of foods. If one does so on a regular basis, he should not need very clear intention each time (possibly not all agree with this – see V’zot Haberacha p. 65 – but this seems like the correct ruling).

Your first question is about the ability to come back to bentch where you ate. There is no question that you are able to come back; the major question is whether you are required to come back in order to bentch. Beit Shammai (Berachot 51b) said that if one forgot to bentch at the end of the meal and remembered when he was in a different place, he is required to return to bentch in the original place. Beit Hillel says that he is permitted to bentch where he remembered. The gemara (ibid. 53b) says that if he purposely left the place of eating without bentching, Beit Hillel agrees that he must return. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 184:1) cites two opinions among the Rishonim whether we accept Beit Shammai or Beit Hillel’s ruling regarding returning after forgetting to bentch and does not give a clear indication of which opinion he accepts. The Mishna Berura (184: 6,7) says that one should return if it is not difficult, and that in any case, it is better to return if he is willing to. If one has bread in the new place and is willing to eat even a small amount of it, he need not return to bentch the original place as the new place is also a place of eating (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 2).

As far as how long he has to bentch, there is no difference between whether he is in the same place or a different one. The mishna (Berachot 51b) says that one has until the “food has been digested in the intestines.” We accept the explanation that this means that a feeling of hunger has not begun to return (Berachot 53b; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5). This depends on how much one ate; it is also difficult to pinpoint the moment. Therefore, we usually work with the assumption is that one has, from the last eating, the amount of time it takes to walk four millin, which most hold is 72 minutes (Mishna Berura 184:20).

There are other significant questions regarding leaving the place of eating. One is when one continues eating upon his return. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 178: 1,2) rules that unless one left behind people who continue eating in the original place, there is a break between the returner’s two eating sessions and he has to first bentch for the first part and then recite a new beracha for the second installment. The Rama (ad loc.) rules that if the food one had eaten mandates a beracha acharona before he leaves, then the meal continues without additional berachot. It is a matter of debate what is included in that category of food (see Mishna Berura 178:44), but a bread meal certainly. Still, it is not proper to leave for any extended period from the place of the meal with the intention to return without first bentching without a pressing reason to do so, including the need to perform a mitzva elsewhere (Rama ibid.). Although Sephardim generally accept the Shulchan Aruch’s rulings over those of the Rama, this is an example of the counter rule that one does not recite a doubtfully justified beracha even if the Shulchan Aruch says to recite it (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 174:1; Yalkut Yosef, OC 178:(1)). For a Sephardi, though, it is even more important to leave with the intention to return and continue eating, as this creates a situation where he will not be able to comply with the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling to make new berachot (see V’zot Haberacha pp. 63, 142).

If one ate with others who remain, his connection to the original eating is certainly a strong one (one ramification is that the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) agrees that he does not require new berachot). There is no question that in such a case, where he had an obligation before he left to join his counterparts for a zimun, he can do so upon returning (see the related discussion in the Shulchan Aruch, OC 194:2).

The general halachic rule, which applies to you and to others, is that in cases of doubt regarding berachot, one does not make a beracha that might be a repeat. Technically, the exception to the rule would be Birkat Hamazon, but we would not want you to unnecessarily recite that more than once either. 

We would generally suggest that you take some combination of the following two courses of action, which will be helpful in regard to non-ritual activities as well. 

1) Get used to taking care of matters as soon as they become feasible - in this case, it would mean making berachot right away, e.g., right after washing one's hands after leaving the bathroom, right after finishing eating, etc. Then if the question arises later whether the berachot were made, one can say with greater confidence that they were and there is no need to repeat them. Indeed if you get used to that approach, the beracha will usually have been said.

2. Get used to having reminder systems - so many older people use the pill box method for making sure they are keeping to schedule with medications. One can have similar systems for berachot as well. One possible example - one has a place at the table where he puts a bentcher when he starts eating and another place where he puts it when he has finished bentching.

We do not mean that you have a halachic obligation to do X and Y. These are just general ideas that you can use to give you more of a sense of security regarding religious obligations, as you deserve as much security as you can for all elements of your life. See what works for you.

Again, though, the most basic rule regarding forgetting whether you made berachot, is not to make berachot out of doubt.

If one smells something just to identify it, he does not recite a beracha. The same thing is true if he tastes something to identify its ingredients or to decide if it needs more spicing - there is no beracha.

The advice you found on the Internet has complicated matters, not because it is illegitimate, but because it has a significant basis, as we will explain after viewing the background.

One is supposed to recite Hagomel in front of ten people including two scholars (Berachot 54b). What happens if there was not a minyan? The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 219:3) cites two opinions as to whether he fulfilled his obligation after the fact and concludes that in this situation of doubt, he should recite Hagomel without using Hashem’s names. As far as what one gains with such a declaration considering that berachot must include Hashem’s name, there are two main answers: 1. According to a minority opinion, one fulfills the beracha in this form (see Birkat Hashem, IV, p. 453 ); 2. There is a value to a non-beracha declaration in order to thank Hashem, even if it does not fulfill the formal obligation (Divrei Halacha (Weber) 214).

The idea you saw – having intention during the morning beracha to fulfill a doubtful Birkat Hagomel – seems to come from Halichot Shlomo 23:8 (put together from writings and teachings of Rav S.Z. Auerbach), as a “better alternative” to the Shulchan Aruch. The language of the beracha shares with the accepted beracha the word “hagomel” (who grants) and the root “tov” (goodness), but differences exist. However, Rav Auerbach noted that our text of the gemara (Berachot 54b) uses the words of the morning beracha, “gomel chasadim tovim,” for Birkat Hagomel. Although the Beit Yosef accepts the Rishonim who use our present text, Rav Auerbach reasons that the other text must be valid at least b’dieved. (There is flexibility in the language of Hagomel – see Berachot ibid.; Mishna Berura 219:4). If so, you were already yotzei and should certainly not say the standard text at this point.

On the other hand, there are a few problems. First, you said the text to yourself, and as mentioned, there is a doubt whether that works for Hagomel. Second, we did not find an earlier mention of Rav Auerbach’s idea. While it has logic and he does not need “permission” to present a good novel idea, there is something fundamentally missing in the language of the morning beracha. That is that there is no mention of a personal chesed that the blesser received but rather the general “good kindnesses to His nation Israel.” Perhaps even the text in the gemara assumes one would finish off with “for He has granted me all good.” Halichot Shlomo (ibid.) in fact suggests adding that phrase to the end of the morning beracha (was that mentioned on-line?).

Despite our doubts with your implementation of Rav Auerbach’s idea, we would not tell you to make another beracha considering that according to almost all poskim, the rule that one does not make berachot in cases of doubt applies to Hagomel (see S’dei Chemed, vol. VI, p. 315-7 for notable exceptions). Although you are not required to do anything further, the possibility of using the Shulchan Aruch’s approach of publicly reciting Hagomel without Hashem’s name certainly exists. A seemingly better and fully accepted option (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5), which may be more convenient for you considering you need not rush, is to have another new mother who makes Hagomel have you in mind.

Your idea to not say the beracha from the outset is based on the thesis that sefirat ha’omer is one long “all-or-nothing” mitzva; i.e., if you miss a day, you will not have fulfilled any mitzva, retroactively rendering your berachot l’vatala. We will build up this reasonable conclusion (before rejecting it).

Tosafot (Ketubot 72a) asks why a zava does not make a beracha upon counting seven days toward purification and answers that it is because “if she sees, the count will be undone.” In contrast, regarding sefirat ha’omer and beit din’s counting of 50 years toward yovel, there is nothing to stop the count. Some Acharonim infer from this that it is forbidden to make a beracha on a mitzva when there is real concern it will later turn out that it was irrelevant. In our context, the Chida (Avodat Hakodesh, Moreh B’etzba 217) warns people to take precautions not to forget a day of sefira, for if they do, their berachot will retroactively be l’vatala.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons to allow counting with a beracha until one misses, even if we were certain he will be unable to finish with a beracha. (B’tzel Hachochma V:45 discusses a man who was told he had only a few days to live; Shraga Hameir VI:31 discusses someone scheduled for surgery that would incapacitate him for an entire day.) First, we note that the ruling that one cannot continue with a beracha after missing a day (the Behag’s opinion) is far from unanimous (see Tur, Orach Chayim 489). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 489:8) accepts it only out of doubt and says that if one is not sure if he missed a day, he should continue with a beracha due to a double doubt (maybe he didn’t miss; maybe it does not disqualify the mitzva- Mishna Berura 489:38).

Second, even if one may not continue with a beracha, it does not necessarily mean the count was worthless. While some explain this approach as positing that the 49 countings constitute a single mitzva, this may be an overstatement. One indication (not a proof) is the fact that we make a berachot 49 times. Rav Soloveitchik (Mesorah, ed. III, p. 35) explains that the Behag agrees there is a mitzva every day, just that the counting must be consecutive in order to fulfill the mitzva. Therefore the mitzva ceases to be operative only after one misses a day.

Third, the Rav Pealim (III, OC 32) suggest that the fact that we recite the beracha on sefirat haomer without an assurance we will succeed in completing the mitzva shows that the value of a partial fulfillment of a mitzva prevents the berachot from being retroactively l’vatala. Why then does Tosafot say that concern of non-completion precludes a beracha on a zava’s count? Some say the Behag does not agree with Tosafot. Some distinguish between a nominal value of a partial sefirat ha’omer as opposed to no value for a suspended count for a zava. Still others say that a future problem does not retroactively invalidate berachot, and Tosafot was only explaining that the Rabbis chose not to institute a beracha for a mitzva that lends itself to suspension (see discussion in Yabia Omer I, YD 21).

There are also philosophical arguments to reject consideration of the assumptions in almost all scenarios. How can one decide he will not survive to the end of the count or when surgery will incapacitate him? Certainly, how can one not recite the beracha in which the Rabbis obligated him if nothing prevents from success (especially if he can adopt practices, e.g., davening with a minyan every night, that mitigate the concern)?

Practically, there is a clear consensus among poskim and in minhag for men (see Mishna Berura 489:3) to start saying sefirat haomer with a beracha. Even the Chida, the most prominent apparent naysayer, did not write to start without a beracha; he just warned not to miss a day (see B’tzel Hachochma ibid. who distinguishes).

We will first discuss the practice of many men to always use the beracha on their tallit to cover the tzitzit they put on earlier.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 8:10) says that one who puts on tzitzit when his hands are dirty from the night should recite their beracha only later – after purposely handling the tzitzit or when he puts on another pair of tzitzit. The Darchei Moshe (OC 8:3) relates the minhag to make a beracha only on the tallit he wears at Shacharit, which also covers the tzitzit. The Mishna Berura (8:24) cites various reasons for the Darchei Moshe’s practice. One is that it is wrong to make two interchangeable berachot in close proximity, as one could suffice (beracha she’eina tzricha). The Darchei Moshe (ibid.) was bothered by the possibility that the tzitzit garment will be to small to fulfill the mitzva and warrant a beracha. The Mishna Berura adds other factors that could make a beracha inappropriate for the tzitzit.

This practice does raise problems. Berachot are supposed to precede a mitzva’s fulfillment, whereas here the beracha on the tzitzit comes afterwards. Rabbeinu Yonah (see Beit Yosef, OC 8) says that it is sufficient that the beracha precedes part of the performance of the mitzva, i.e., the continuation of wearing them. The Taz (8:9) adds that when one cannot make the beracha right away because his hands were dirtied during the night, the delay is justified.

You have a different reason not to make a beracha when their time comes (app. 50 minutes before sunrise). The Shulchan Aruch and the Rama (ibid. 16) rule that one who wore tzitzit all night makes a new beracha on them in the morning (as they remain on him) because nighttime, which is not the time of tzitzit, is a break in the mitzva. However, many poskim argue based on Rishonim who posit that the mitzva continues and there is no need or justification for a new beracha. The accepted practice, at least for Ashekenazim (Yalkut Yosef, OC 8:49 cites both opinions), is to not make a separate beracha due to doubt (Mishna Berura 8:42; Tzitzit (Cohen), p. 66)). While there are other possible ways to deal with the doubt, the Mishna Berura recommends the system of using the beracha on the tallit. What is different in your case is that you do not have a tallit to make that beracha. On Shavuot night, when many people are together and with the phenomenon of certain berachot being said by one on behalf of others, someone usually says his beracha on the tallit out loud (those with their tallitot have no need to be yotzei with a central person).

In one way, there is actually an advantage to being yotzei with another’s tallit in comparison to the daily practice of many to having their own beracha on the tallit go on the tzitzit. One should have intention to include the tzitzit, which is easy to forget when preparing to put on the tallit. While some recommend solving by mentioning the tzitzit (Ben Ish Chai, I, Bereishit II) or handling them at that time (see opinion in Tzitzit, p. 42), few do so. There are strong grounds to say that b’di’eved, the intention for the tzitzit does not have to be cognitive when it is one’s standard practice (ibid., p. 43). In any case, in the ceremonious manner it is done by many on Shavuot morning, people are generally reminded that the recited beracha on one person’s tallit is for the tzitzit of all who need it.

Regarding timing, while one could argue to have a beracha made as soon as possible, it is easy to justify the minhag to wait until it is time to daven (Minchat Yitzchak II:4.1). If the daily minhag allowing one to actively put on tzitzit well before the beracha will be made is fine, one who just keeps them on has less problem waiting for the beracha (see Taamei Haminhagim, p. 8).

Your assumption that one’s relationship with Hashem should be personal and overflowing is poignantly and refreshingly correct. On the other hand, one does not have free reign to serve Hashem as he desires, as evident from such halachot as bal tosif (not adding on to the mitzvot) and beracha l’vatala (unwarranted beracha). Let us seek perspective and guidelines.

The gemara (Berachot 33a) says that one who fulfilled a beracha requirement and then made an unnecessary one violated the prohibition of saying Hashem’s Name in vain. Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33a) argues that uttering Hashem’s Name to praise Him cannot be in vain, but that it is a Rabbinic prohibition that “leans” on the pasuk. The Rambam (Berachot 1:15) seems to hold that beracha l’vatala is a Torah prohibition (Magen Avraham 215:6).

All agree that uttering Hashem’s Name without any purpose is an isur aseh (low-level Torah prohibition – Temura 4a). Yet, using Hashem’s Name in the context of praising Him is positive and permitted. In fact, the Rambam (Shvuot 12:11) says that if one mistakenly uttered the Name, he should immediately turn it into an appropriate praise of Hashem, and one of his suggested texts of spontaneous praise begins with “baruch.”

Where do we draw the line between appropriate praise and a beracha l’vatala? One approach is that the crucial factor is intention and context. If one intends to recite a required beracha when he is actually not required or if a mistake disqualifies the beracha, it is a beracha l’vatala. If the same words are said as an expression of personal gratitude, it is permitted (Chavat Da’at 110, Beit Hasafek 20; see Minchat Shlomo II:3). The Chavat Da’at cites a precedent for the distinction: one is allowed to repeat Shemoneh Esrei (which is comprised of berachot) with the intention it is voluntary, but not with an intention for an obligation (see Rosh, Berachot 3:15).

Others distinguish based on the text used, which is most severe when one utters a classic name of Hashem. Some say that if one recites the beracha in a language other than Hebrew so that the Name is equivalent only to a kinuy (a descriptive reference) of Hashem, it has the benefits of a beracha without the fear of beracha l’vatala (see opinions cited in Shut R. Akiva Eiger I:25, Pitchei Teshuva, YD 328:1, Piskei Teshuvot 209:7). R. Akiva Eiger (ibid.) and the Netziv (Ha’amek She’ala 53:2) argue that in the recognized, sensitive context of a beracha, even a kinuy or foreign language Name can be forbidden, as we find regarding an oath. The Netziv says that the problem is a Rabbinic issue of appearing to recite a beracha l’vatala. Therefore, the closer the text (and/or the context) is to that of a beracha, the more likely it is to be forbidden. The Minchat Shlomo (ibid.) explains that one should not act in a way that challenges the rules the Rabbis set. However, those rules were not set to forbid expression of personal thanks to Hashem.

We summarize as follows. Your desire to praise Hashem is commendable. Paradoxically, the more creative the text and style are, the clearer it is that it is permitted. Convention is that an individual should generally refrain from using Hashem’s main Names, which we leave primarily to Chazal and to great rabbis who have composed prayers and praises throughout history. Saying “Hashem,” “Hakadosh Baruch Hu,” “Ribbono Shel Olam,” or a Name not in Hebrew is safer and as profound. It is at least preferable not to recite anything that resembles a beracha of Chazal by content, by context (e.g., in Birkot Hashachar) and/or by regularity. That still leaves you with room for much self-expression.

(We will not discuss the beracha for beautiful animals, which the Mishna Berura (226:32) already said is not really in practice in our times). A baraita (Berachot 58b) says that when one sees an elephant, a monkey, or a kafof (the exact species is unclear), he recites the beracha “…meshaneh haberiyot” (who makes diverse creations). This beracha is also cited regarding abnormalities within humans. Matters of abnormalities are likely to involve an element of subjectivity, as we will mention later.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is cited as saying the beracha applies to any unusual animal (Halichot Shlomo 23:35). Others say that the list is a closed one (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 156), which can be true for a few reasons. Perhaps Chazal saw a unique characteristic in those animals (see Meiri, Berachot 58b). Even if it could theoretically apply to other animals, it is difficult to know what to consider unusual, and therefore it is best to recite such berachot only when we are sure. (I do not why we are sure what type of monkey Chazal were referring to – a gorilla looks quite different from a chimpanzee, or a mandrel, etc.)

There is also a question as to how often to make the beracha. Rav Auerbach is cited (Halichot Shlomo, ibid.) as instructing zoo-goers to recite the beracha on the first animal one finds definitely fascinating and intend to cover the other animals. This approach can be justified on several grounds. When one expects to have different occasions in close proximity where a certain beracha applies, it is often better to make one beracha for all of them (e.g., regarding eating; see Yoreh Deah 19 regarding shechita). It also removes doubt that will arise when it is not clear if a beracha is again necessary. There is also logic to view the trip to the zoo as one experience, as I will explain. Perhaps, it is not that each animal needs to have or be included in a beracha, as different foods do. Rather, seeing unusual animals makes one reflect on the wonder of creation, and the entire trip to the zoo is focused on that.

It seems that most religious Jews do not make a beracha on animals in the zoo, including elephants. Does this have any justification? First, it is far from clear that when the beracha is appropriate, it is obligatory (see a brief discussion in Yabia Omer IV, OC 20). Additionally, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 225:9) says that this beracha should be said only the first time in a lifetime for each unusual sight, when it has its greatest impact. If one neglected to make the beracha or was a child at the first opportunity, the beracha is not made up later (see Birkat Hashem, IV, 3:28). While the Rama (ad loc.) says that the clock is reset every thirty days, as is often the case regarding similar berachot, the Mishna Berura (225:30) suggests making the beracha without Hashem’s name.

More fundamentally, we must recall the beracha’s subjective nature and note that times have changed. Once upon a time, a person could go through a lifetime without seeing a monkey or even a picture of one, and the excitement of seeing one made a beracha more natural. Nowadays, people go to the zoo periodically and whenever they want, and they have seen images of elephants and exotic animals many times (all agree the beracha can only be said on seeing them in person). Therefore, the excitement is not the same. (Seeing one in its habitat is likely different.)

Therefore, those who do not make the beracha at the zoo do not need to begin doing so. However, those who do say or want to start, especially those who get excited by the animal kingdom with whom Hashem has us share the world, do not have to fear beracha l’vatala (see Yabia Omer, ibid.), at least on monkeys, elephants or astounding animals. One can certainly make the beracha without Hashem’s name and should certainly think of Him often during the visit.

In general one makes beracha rishona on dessert, but there are exceptions. One is cake, because it is possible that it is a form of bread, in which case it is included in the beracha on the meal. The cream part of the crembo gets a beracha of Shehakol. Regarding the biscuit, it is questionable whether it is clear that it is not at all bread like and gets a beracha, and out of doubt we would suggest not to make a beracha of mezonot.

There is no obligation to say birkat haoreach if you are eating your own food (see Mishna Berura 193:27 and 201:7 that the beracha is for the one who provides the food and is not dependent on where you are eating) 

We will not presently discuss soup with mezonot elements (e.g., croutons, noodles), which complicates matters.)

The gemara (Berachot 39a) says that the “water of boiled vegetables [has the same beracha] as the vegetables (i.e., Borei Pri Ha’adama).” Therefore, we would think that this clearly answers your question. However, the Rishonim are bothered by an apparent contradiction, as the gemara (ibid. 38a) says that the beracha of most fruit juices is Shehakol. The distinctions various opinions provide are crucial to answering your question.

The Rashba (Berachot 38a) says that the gemara refers to vegetables that are normally eaten cooked, whereas fruit are normally eaten whole and not as juice. The Rosh (Berachot 6:18) says that cooking provides more qualitative taste of the source food than squeezing.

Another factor is the focus on the vegetables vs. on the broth. The Rosh (Shut 4:15) says that the broth “deserves” Ha’adama when it is normal for most people to cook the vegetables to eat them. (The Mishna Berura (205:10) seemingly cites this opinion as requiring the individual to cook it with the intention to eat the vegetables). The Rambam (Berachot 8:4) puts the stress in the other direction – if one has in mind when cooking to drink the broth, the broth is important enough to merit Ha’adama. The simple reading of these Rishonim (V’zot Heberacha, p. 270 cites dissenters, but apparently overstates their strength) is that when one has in mind to both eat the cooked vegetables and drink the broth, Ha’adama is appropriate for both elements. (One beracha suffices when they are eaten together.) Thus, the classic ruling is that on soup that is based entirely on vegetables, which are normal to be used for making soup, the beracha is Ha’adama, even on the broth (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 205:2), and my recollection of the minhag where/when I grew up was like that.

On the other hand, several classical and contemporary Acharonim advise against this ruling, based on other opinions and possible distinctions, as follows. The Mordechai (cited by the Magen Avraham 205:6) says that only vegetable broth that is used for dipping foods warrants Ha’adama. The Ra’ah (cited, but rejected, by the Mishna Berura (Sha’ar Hatziyun 202:66)) and other important but minority Rishonim understand the gemara statement that water of boiled vegetables has the same beracha as the vegetables as just meaning that the beracha made on the soup’s vegetables covers the broth, but if the broth is eaten alone, one recites Shehakol. This was enough for some poskim, including the Kaf Hachayim (OC 205:11; see Birkat Hashem 7:20), to invoke the rule that we avoid “going out on a limb” regarding berachot. The common application is to refrain from a beracha when it is unclear if it is warranted. Here its application is that since Shehakol works after-the-fact for all foods, whereas Ha’adama is ineffective for a food whose beracha should be Shehakol, we recite Shehakol in a case of doubt between the two.

Important contemporary poskim (see V’zot Haberacha p. 270 in the name of Rav Auerbach; Rav Elyashiv reportedly agreed) claimed that the vegetables in today’s soup often do not provide discernible enough taste to make the majority water worthy of the beracha of Ha’adama. (Some cite the precedent that the beracha on beer is Shehakol rather than Mezonot.) Although I view most vegetable soups I have eaten as full of vegetable taste, these opinions push the direction of practice toward reciting the “safer” Shehakol on the broth of vegetable soup. (When one eats the soup’s vegetables as well (at least a significant amount of them – see V’zot Haberacha, p. 119) the consensus is that Ha’adama covers the broth too (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 205:66).) However, one whose practice has always been to recite Ha’adama on the broth is not wrong if he continues, as this is the fundamentally stronger opinion, which is still followed by significant authorities.

The mishna (Berachot 54a) says that one who builds a new house or buys new “utensils” recites Shehecheyanu. While the gemara (ibid. 59b-60a) cites an opinion that this beracha is only for the first such acquisition, which would exclude the possibility of a beracha on renovations, we follow the opinion that it applies even if one built a second house (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:3).    

But are renovations comparable to a new house? The gemara in Sota (mishna, 43a; gemara, 44a) discusses the halacha that one who builds a new house that he has not inaugurated returns from the battlefield. The first opinion identifies building projects on his property that do not qualify as building a house. Rabbi Yehuda says that even if one rebuilt the house on its previous site, he does not return from battle. However, the gemara posits that extending the house’s height does qualify. The Mishna Berura (223:12) says that this serves as a halachic precedent for Shehecheyanu as well. Contemporary poskim (see Halichot Shlomo 23:14 in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach and V’zot Haberacha, p. 166 in the name of Rav M. Eliyahu) assume the same is true for any significant extension of the house, even without acquiring new land. However, renovations that do not include expansion, but just improvement of the house’s appearance or functionality, are not comparable to building or buying and do not warrant a beracha (ibid.). The time for the beracha is when the new area is ready to be used, which coincides with the time for attaching a mezuza (V’zot Haberacha ibid.). (We are not relating to the new furniture that often accompanies renovations, which itself likely warrants a beracha.)

A few factors could raise questions about the beracha. The first is that there is a minhag cited by several Sephardi poskim to not make a beracha on a new house. It is hard to determine this minhag’s exact origin, reason, and extent. The Pri Megadim (223, Mishbetzot Zahav 4), who is Ashkenazi, suggest that there is a minhag to not make Shehechiyanu on clothes and utensils, and he suggests that these people must rely on the opinion that Shehechiyanu for such events is merely optional. The Ben Ish Chai (I, R’ei 5-6) is not impressed by this logic, but he confirms the minhag concerning a new house. He recommends solving the problem by following a different minhag. One makes a chanukat habayit upon entering the house, at which point he wears a new garment and recites Shehecheyanu with intention for the house in addition to the garment. I do not know if there is such a minhag of a chanukat habayit for renovations. However, those who want to follow the minhag, as opposed to the established halacha to make the beracha (Yalkut Yosef 223:2 and Birkat Hashem 2:57 do not believe the minhag should uproot it), can solve the issue with a new garment.

Rav Chayim Palagi and the Kaf Hachayim (OC 223:18) say that one who bought a house on credit does not make a beracha because of the trouble he may have paying up and the possibility he might have to return it to the seller. Besides the strong questions on the basic opinion (see Birkat Hashem 2:(250)), the situation is uncommon regarding renovations, as even one who takes loans for that purpose rarely is nervous about his ability to pay, and the renovations will not be “returned”.

Is Shecheyanu the correct beracha? The rule is that for acquisitions that benefit more than one person, Shehechyanu is replaced by Hatov V’hameitiv (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 5). The gemara talks about buying a house with a partner, but this also applies to family members (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. and Be’ur Halacha to 223:3). If there is a question of doubt between the two berachot, Shehecheyanu is the safer one, as it can work even when Hatov V’hameitiv is appropriate (Be’ur Halacha to 223:5). This is apparent from those (including above) who suggest using the beracha on new clothes to cover the beracha on a new house.

You will remember that according to most fundamental approaches, based on the gemara (Berachot 39a), the beracha on the clear broth of vegetable soup is Borei Pri Ha’adama. On the other hand, there are enough factors against saying Ha’adama to convince most contemporary poskim to prefer Shehakol. Pureed soup shares certain factors, but other factors point in different directions.

We dealt with an apparent contradiction with the gemara (ibid. 38a) that says that the beracha on most fruit juices is Shehakol. Another reason to not make Ha’adama on vegetable soup broth is the contention of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and others that these soups often lack sufficient vegetable taste to justify it. These issues do not apply to pureed soup because one is not consuming just the juice/broth but the whole essence and taste of the vegetables. 

However, in another way, the situation points more toward Shehakol than toward Ha’adama. We saw the Rosh (Shut 4:15) who says that the broth’s beracha is Ha’adama when and because it is normal for people to cook the vegetables to eat them. The broth is thus dependent on the vegetables, which generally exist even if one is eating only the broth. In this case, though, the vegetables cease to exist as a solid, clearly recognizable entity. V’zot Haberacha (p. 404) entertains the possibility that the beracha should be determined as Ha’adama when it was cooked, before it was pureed. However, he concludes that we follow the form in which it is eaten, certainly when the intention when cooking it was to puree it before eating. Since the soup is actually a semi-liquefied form of mashed vegetables, it is necessary to determine what the beracha is on mashed vegetables.

The gemara (Berachot 38a) says that when one takes dates and crushes them into terima, their beracha remains Borei Pri Ha’etz. What is terima? The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 202:7) say it is totally crushed to the point that it is “like dough,” and yet the beracha is unchanged. The same should apparently apply to a mashed vegetable. On the other hand, Rashi (ad loc.) says that terima is only partially crushed, and based on this, the Terumat Hadeshen (29) and Rama (OC 202:7) say that mashed fruit (and presumably vegetables) should get the safer beracha of Shehakol. This does not necessarily turn into a clear machloket between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, as the Rama says that if one recited the beracha of the fruit/vegetable he can assume he was yotzei. Sephardi poskim also disagree whether to follow the Shulchan Aruch or to also make the safer Shehakol in light of this machloket Rishonim (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 99, Birkat Hashem 7:26-29).

Based on the above, we should, on the practical level, distinguish between different levels of puree. If the vegetables are pulverized to the point that there are no or few pieces of discernable vegetables, even if the soup is thick, then the more accepted beracha is Shehakol. However, if the soup is lumpy, then the beracha should be Ha’adama (V’ten Beracha (Bodner), p. 434). This distinction is similar to what many say regarding types of apple sauce and peanut butter. Those who make Ha’adama even for smooth pureed soup have what to rely upon, especially considering the fact that the stronger fundamental opinion regarding mashed potatoes, even if this not usually suggested, is to recite Ha’adama (see Mishna Berura 202:42).

The gemara (Berachot 60b) mentions Hamapil for one “entering to sleep on his bed,” without noting time of day. However, the Rambam (Tefilla 7:1) writes “when one enters his bed to sleep at night.” Despite varied opinions of Rishonim (see Meiri, Berachot ad loc), this guideline is accepted (see Be’ur Halacha to 239:1; B’tzel Hachochma V:166). However, this position’s rationale impacts your question.

The above gemara continues with the berachot upon awaking, starting with Elokai Neshama, which some see as a bookend along with Hamapil (see B’tzel Hachochma ibid.). We recite these berachot only once a day. In both cases (although some distinguish), there are questions as to whether the berachot are only for those who sleep or they are general praises to Hashem related to sleep and awaking at the classic times.

Most poskim saying that one recites Hamapil only before a serious sleep (see gemara above). The connection to night is that this is the average person’s time of serious sleep, based on which the beracha was instituted (which is apparently the Rambam’s basis).

B’tzel Hachochma (ibid.) understands the element of night very formalistically – there is no obligation and thus no ability to say Hamapil before night, even if one is embarking on a full night’s sleep before nightfall. He compares Hamapil before night to a beracha on sitting in a sukka before Sukkot starts when one plans to remain there (a beracha is not made there).

However, there are sources and logic that night is a criterion for Hamapil on practical rather than fundamental grounds. The Chayei Adam (35:4) says that regarding day sleep we are concerned he will not fall asleep, it is improper to sleep, and/or it is not effective sleep. These reasons do not apply to the cases you raise of one who has a valid reason to start sleeping before nightfall (although sometimes we say lo plug- see ibid.).

Several poskim (see Teshurat Shai I:82; Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:198) explain why it might be proper to recite Hamapil before one’s major sleep after dawn when one did not sleep at night (e.g., Shavuot morning). One could add to the equation the opinion that one may recite a birkat hashevach (of praise) even when there is a doubt whether it is necessary because the content of such berachot are never inappropriate (Halachot Ketanot I:264). However, the consensus is that safek berachot l’hakel (in doubt, refrain) applies to there as well (Yabia Omer VII, OC 29).

However, in cases where the sleep is primarily at night, the argument to say Hamapil is much stronger. Notice that the Rambam (ibid.) talks about Hamapil preceding going to sleep at night. My reading is that the point is that sleep done at night defines it as justifying Hamapil, not that it is forbidden to recite Hamapil during the day. Thus, if the majority of one’s sleep will be during the night, the fact that it begins earlier need not preclude Hamapil.

Whether the case for reciting Hamapil is stronger or weaker if one goes to sleep soon before nightfall is interesting. Many halachot of night begin at plag hamincha, so perhaps one who sleeps then for the night is considered to be just extending slightly the time of night sleep, which in summer nights in northern latitudes is also common. Note that one who wakes up after midnight may recite the morning berachot including Elokai Neshama (Shulchan Aruch, OC47:13), presumably because morning regarding wake up is flexible. Perhaps the same is true in the evening. On the other hand, perhaps Chazal would not have extended a beracha for going to sleep for the night at a time when one cannot fulfill the mitzva of Kri’at Shema of the night.

The rules of practical p’sak point toward not risking reciting the beracha of Hamapil before nightfall, despite my inclination to the contrary. However, one who does so before his major sleep that extends well into the night has what to rely upon.

While this sounds like a Shemitta (whose halachot continue regarding fruit) question, it applies every year. It also applies to orchards sold through heter mechira.

We start with the main sources on the change of wording of the beracha. The gemara (Berachot 44a) cites both versions of the beracha and first says that in chutz la’aretz one says “peiroteha” (on its [the Land’s] fruit) and in Israel, “hapeirot” (the fruit – more generic). The gemara asks that it does not make sense that those who don’t eat Eretz Yisrael’s fruit are the ones who mention the connection of the fruit to the Land (“for the Land and its fruit”). The gemara concludes that it is the opposite – specifically in Eretz Yisrael one says peiroteha. Fruit that grew in the Land is worthy of more prominent mention (see Rabbeinu Yona, 32a of Rif’s pages to Berachot).

The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 208) cites a machloket between Rabbeinu Yona and the Rashba whether one says hapeirot or peiroteha on fruit grown in Israel but eaten in chutz la’aretz. The Rashba (accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:10) infers from the above gemara that that which one does not say peiroteha in chutz la’aretz is only when one is eating the fruit of chutz la’aretz. There is a minority opinion (Admat Kodesh I:3, rejected by Mishna Berura 208:52) that the deciding factor is whether the fruit is obligated in terumot and ma’asrot, which can sometimes apply to fruit grown in chutz la’aretz or in a non-Jew’s field (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 331:4, 12). However, the more accepted explanation is that peiroteha is only for the fruit grown in Eretz Yisrael. It is indeed a good question whether to view a non-Jew’s field in Eretz Yisrael as part of the Land in this regard.

There is a major machloket, raised most prominently in Gittin (47a), whether a non-Jew’s acquisition of land in Eretz Yisrael uproots the laws that apply to Eretz Yisrael. The halachic conclusion is not fully clear (see Rambam, Terumot 1:10). There are macholokot in different applications, including the one between Rav Yosef Karo (Avkat Rochel 24) and the Mabit (I:11) whether the fruit that grows under a non-Jew’s ownership has Shemitta status. The former’s opinion, that Shemitta status is removed, is the more accepted one (see Shabbat Ha’aretz (R. Kook), Mavo 15). One could then claim that such fruit is uprooted from Eretz Yisrael status regarding our question as well.

However, I have been unable to find a hint in classical texts or rulings in more recent sources that indicate a distinction within Eretz Yisrael between the fruit of Jewish-owned fields and non-Jewish fields. There are some opinions (see discussions in Birkei Yosef, OC 208:11 and Kaf Hachayim, OC 208:59) that on fruit from sections of Eretz Yisrael that lost kedushat ha’aretz with the Babylonian exile and were not restored to kedushat ha’aretz in the Second Temple, we do not say peiroteha. Not all agree. After all, these areas are still Eretz Yisrael regarding many spiritual matters (see Shabbat Haaretz ibid.). Hashem gave them to us, we will return, and, according to most, we still presently have a mitzva to live there (see Encyclopedia Talmudit, Yeshivat Eretz Yisrael, ftnt. 28-29). Our question is about areas with the kedusha from the time of the Second Temple, but an individual field was bought by a non-Jew. Such land, even according to those who say it loses some status, is fully part of Eretz Yisrael and its status is restored when a Jew buys it back (Rambam, ibid.). If the important part in our context is the practical use of the fruit, fruit that grows in either heter mechira fields or non-Jewish owned fields is regularly consumed by the community of Israeli Jews.

Yes, it is all inclusive of other fruits.

We must investigate different distinctions in the laws of hefsek. (Realize that many sources equate talking between a beracha and the food it goes on to talking between a beracha and the mitzva it goes on.) 1) Speaking is a more problematic break than silence. For example, a single word is a hefsek, while the time it takes to say a single word is not (Mishna Berura 206:12). 2) The most sensitive time is between the beracha and the start of the matter to which it pertains. For example, if one speaks a pasuk or more into an aliya, he does not have to make a new beracha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 140:2). If he spoke inappropriately in between the beracha and the beginning of the laining, he would have to repeat it (Mishna Berura 140:6). 3) A break that serves a purpose for that which the beracha relates to (e.g., one who asks for salt between the beracha on bread and eating it) does not necessitate repeating the beracha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 167:6).

In your question, waiting silently before the beginning of the aliya, there are two factors for leniency (silence, for a good reason) and one of stringency (before beginning the aliya). Let us consider the extent of the leniencies.

The Beit Yosef (OC 206) cites a Shibolei Haleket who says, based on his understanding of a Yerushalmi, that if one pauses between the beracha and its subject (regarding food and mitzvot), for more than k’dei dibbur (1-2 seconds), he must repeat the beracha. However, the Magen Avraham (206:3) paskens against this, at least regarding after the fact (i.e., not repeating the beracha), citing the following discussion in the Beit Yosef (OC 140). On Chanuka/Rosh Chodesh they opened the wrong Torah first and had to roll it to the right place (from Naso to Pinchas) after the opening beracha. Some argued that they should have made another beracha for two reasons: 1. The delay for rolling was too long. 2. The beracha was made with an intention for the wrong place. The Avudraham rejects reason #1 because a break of silence does not disqualify, and the Beit Yosef seems to agree. Regarding reason #2, the Beit Yosef is unsure (he cites both opinions in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 140:3)). Regarding #1, some learn from the fact we do not cut loaves of bread until after the beracha (Berachot 39b) that a moderate delay is not a problem (unless people took their mind off the fact the beracha was made (Mishna Berura 206:12)).

The Rama (206:3) does say not to wait more than k’dei dibbur between a beracha and the food. This is even for waiting silently but, on the other hand, this is only to be avoided l’chatchila – the wait does not necessitate repeating the beracha (see Mishna Berura 206:12; Mor Va’aholot OC 1).

The Rama (OC 167:6) says that one should avoid where possible talking even for a purpose related to the subject of the beracha. We see from the above discussion that according to the Shibolei Leket, a silent break is a problem even if one is involved in getting the mitzva done (e.g., rolling the sefer Torah). (Apparently, this is talking about time beyond normal transition time, as regarding laining and shofar, for example, it is very common to take a few seconds to find the right word or place the shofar at the right spot.) It is unclear if according to those who accept the Shibolei Leket only l’chatchila, we should avoid a silent break when the silence plays a productive role.

We summarize as follows. It is certainly preferable to wait for quiet before the berachot and if there is only a slight disturbance, to read at least one pasuk before stopping. If one is going to stop, it is best for it to be less than the amount of time to recite the birkat Hatorah (see Ritva, Megilla 21b) or at least the amount of time it takes to read the first three p’sukim (see discussion in Mor Va’aholot ibid). However, if the need to wait is acute, even a moderate break can be justified.

It actually depends which fruit you ate. We will start, though, with the Levush’s (Orach Chayim 208:17) overview of the various berachot acharonot and of one reciting the wrong one.

Birkat Hamazon is a Torah-level obligation (see Devarim 8:10), prescribed by the Torah for bread, which is filling and is the staple of a classic diet. The Rabbis modeled a Birkat Hamazon-style beracha (Me’ein Shalosh) for the seven foods that are mentioned in the p’sukim around the one on Birkat Hamazon. (There are opinions that this too is a Torah-level obligation.) Within the versions of Me’ein Shalosh, the highest level (and thus the first mentioned when one makes a beracha on multiple Me’ein Shalosh foods) is Al Hamichya because it is for grain-based foods, which are generally more filling than fruits. Afterward, wine (Al Hagefen) is more important, followed by Al Haeitz for grapes, figs, pomegranates, olives, and dates. The Levush explains that it is obvious that a lower-level or an inaccurate beracha is insufficient for that which requires a higher-level one. Additionally, a higher-level beracha does not cover foods which call for lesser praise because an exaggerated beracha is not of value. Thus, for example, reciting Birkat Hamazon for vegetables, as if it constituted a meal, is valueless, and Borei Nefashot must still be said.

Two exceptions to this rule are dates and wine. The gemara (Berachot 12a, as understood by Rishonim – see Beit Yosef, OC 208) says that if one recited Birkat Hamazon after eating dates, he fulfilled his obligation because dates are particularly filling. Another gemara (ibid. 35b) says similarly that wine is filling and would have required Birkat Hamazon if not for the fact that people rarely make it the basis of a meal. Therefore, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 208:17) rules that Birkat Hamazon is valid after-the-fact for dates and wine. All other foods that require Me’ein Shalosh are not exempted by Birkat Hamazon that was recited on them outside the framework of a meal with bread (ibid.).

What about when the mistake was to recite Al Hamichya instead of Al Haeitz (or Al Hagefen)? The Levush (ibid.) assumes that regarding dates and wine, if Birkat Hamazon is not too much of an exaggeration, then certainly Al Hamichya is not, and one would not have to repeat Me’ein Shalosh. The Taz (OC 208:16, see Pri Megadim ad loc.) disagrees. He argues that Birkat Hamazon contains the word zan (roughly, sustain), which is appropriate for dates and wine, whereas michya (roughly, food that gives life) is a different quality, which does not apply to them. The Malbushei Yom Tov (208:11) reasons that the fact that the halacha of fulfilling the beracha on dates with the wrong beracha acharona was said in regards to Birkat Hamazon implies that Al Hamichya is invalid even after-the-fact, and the Eliya Rabba (208:26) does not discount this possibility. However, the majority of Acharonim assume that after Al Hamichya for dates or wine, one does not need another beracha (see Minchat Shlomo 91, V’zot Haberacha p. 48). Since the general rule is that when is in doubt, he does not make another beracha, this is the proper ruling to adopt.

The question of Al Hamichya sufficing for dates and wine is much more complicated when one had both grains and dates or wine and mentioned “al hamichya” without the other elements. In that case, we assume that the person, when omitting the other elements, demonstrated that he did not remember the need to have the beracha cover them. Therefore, the stronger view in that case is to repeat Me’ein Shalosh with just the missing element (see discussion in Har Tzvi, OC I:108; Yalkut Yosef, OC 207:(2)).

The clear consensus is that one does not fulfill his beracha acharona obligation on grapes, figs, pomegranates, and olives with Birkat Hamazon or Al Hamichya (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:17).

I will give you a quick answer and implore you to find additional avenues (there is so much written and there are so many lectures available) to further your understanding of the topic generally, and regarding specific berachot.

There are two very different types of beracha that we use, often without realizing that, while they share elements, they are far from interchangeable.

1. Berachot that we find in our siddurim, etc. - these are statements of praise to Hashem, which follow a certain form (Baruch ata Hashem ...). These break into different categories depending on what we are thanking him for : 1. For giving us mitzvot, recited before doing the mitzvot. 2. General praise for things He provides, often said on a daily basis (e.g., Birkot Hashachar). 3. Birkot Hanehenin - berachot said before receiving benefit from the world Hashem created and sustained. 

2. Prayers, in which the subject of the blessing is another person - e.g.. I give you a beracha that you should have a long healthy life and understand berachot and other elements of Torah. Hashem is involved in it in that the one giving the beracha turns to Hashem in asking Him to carry out my desire that someone else will be well. This is the opposite of a curse. For some reason, when one makes the request for himself we call it a tefilla (prayer) and when we do it for others we call it a beracha. These are often made up on the spot by the person giving the blessing, although we certainly have set ones, most prominently the set berachot that the Kohanim give (daily in Israel, on holidays abroad). 

I would point out that the berachot of Shemoneh Esrei are an interesting combination of the two elements, as we praise Hashem for being the one who gives wisdom, salvation, sustenance, etc. in the midst of making requests for success in these matters for us (we say it in the plural).

I hope this very basic overview is helpful. 

If there is no interest in the bread crumbs, just that sometimes or even always they happen to be there because that is what happens, you ignore the bread crumbs regarding the Beracha.

Let us start with the bottom line. You should not make a beracha. You have identified some of the several doubts about the need for a beracha. One does not make a beracha unless there is a significantly better than even chance it is called for (safek berachot l’hakel), and that is not the case here. We will take a quick look at some of the indications on various doubts.

 There is a machloket Rishonim whether one ever makes a beracha on the mitzva of ma’akeh. The reasons against a beracha include the following: it is done to remove danger, rather than being a classic positive mitzva; it is mitzva that is rooted in natural logic; there is a concern that the one building the ma’akeh will not carry through. However, despite the principle of safek berachot l’hakel, there is enough consensus of Rishonim and Acharonim to generally justify a beracha (see Yalkut Yosef, Sova Semachot p. 676).

A non-Jew is not able to be a halachic agent, certainly including regarding doing mitzvot on behalf of a Jew (Kiddushin 41b). Therefore, your non-Jewish workers’ actions ostensibly cannot fulfill the mitzva on your behalf. It is not that the ma’akeh is invalid and needs to be redone, as it suffices that the danger was obverted. However, a beracha, as well as much of the positive mitzva opportunity would be missing (see Menachot 42b).

On the other hand, the Machaneh Ephrayim (Shluchin 11) says that if the non-Jew is your salaried worker, we apply the rule that a “the worker’s hand is like the employer’s hand” (Bava Metzia 10a). This enables the Jewish homeowner to fulfill his mitzva through his non-Jewish employees’ actions, and a beracha is appropriate. Many Acharonim reject the Machaneh Ephrayim’s thesis. Their main claim is that the rule that a worker is like his employer does not apply to a non-Jew’s performance of mitzvot on behalf of his Jewish employer, and this is the stronger position. Certainly there is enough doubt to eliminate a beracha in such a case (Yabia Omer IX, Choshen Mishpat 10). Furthermore, the Pitchei Teshuva (CM 427:1) says that the Machaneh Ephrayim applies only to salaried workers and not to contractors (which you are talking about).

You imply that there are other investors. The mitzva of ma’akeh applies even when the property is co-owned (Chulin 136a). However, not all agree that this is true when the partners include non-Jews, and Rav B. Zilber (Birur Halacha, p. 249) claims that this is enough reason to not make a beracha in such a case.

The fact that the fence will replace an existing one raises an interesting question. There is discussion on whether one who switches one mezuza scroll for another has to make a new beracha (see Yabia Omer II, Yoreh Deah 17), as well as similar discussions regarding tzitzit and tefillin. There are major similarities between the cases but also possible distinctions (see Avnei Shlomo (Bloch) p. 41). The matter may also depend on how long the interim period with no functioning ma’akeh will be or on whether the roof required a ma’akeh before renovations make the roof more accessible.

Finally, it appears that before you got involved, there were already people renting apartments in the building, in which case, the tenants were obligated in ma’akeh (Bava Metzia 101b). The Minchat Chinuch (#546) says that although renters are obligated, the landlord might also be obligated. However, others say that the Rabbis uprooted the mitzva from the landlord and gave it to the renters. According to them, although you could argue that the renters are making you an agent for making the ma’akeh, it is still not simple that, if there were a beracha, you would be the one to make it.

Clearly the most important beracha of Havdala is the final one of Hamavdil, which contains its basic content. The berachot on besamim and on fire are not crucial obligations (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 297:1; ibid. 298:1), and while they are preferably attached to Havdala, they can be said at other times as well (Rama, Orach Chayim 298:1). Thus, if one did not hear those berachot, it does not affect Havdala (Mishna Berura 298:3), but he should make the berachot when he is able to during the course of the night.

In contrast, the cup of wine that one uses for Havdala is part and parcel of the mitzva on a Rabbinic level. Realize that normally we have already fulfilled the Torah-level mitzva of Havdala previously, during Ma’ariv. We recite Havdala again in order that the second time it will be with wine. In your case, on the one hand, you heard the beracha of Havdala recited by one holding a cup of wine. On the other hand, you did not hear the beracha of Borei Pri Hagafen on that wine. Is that lacking enough to prevent you from fulfilling the mitzva of Havdala?

The Magen Avraham (296:10; see Pri Megadim ad loc.) discusses one who heard a complete Havdala but had in mind to include himself in the beracha of Hamavdil but not of Borei Pri Hagafen. He says that such a person fulfilled the mitzva of Havdala, just that he cannot drink the Havdala wine without making a new beracha. The Mishna Berura (296:33) explains that whereas Hamavdil is the essential beracha of Havdala, Borei Pri Hagafen is needed only to enable one to drink the wine.

Several Acharonim (including Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 172:(2); Igrot Moshe, OC III:45; Chelkat Yaakov I:91) demonstrate the extent of this distinction’s cogency by comparing the beracha structure to that of the parallel mitzva of a holy declaration performed on Shabbat over a cup of wine – Kiddush. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 271:4) posits that one who was in the midst of a meal in which he had already made a beracha on wine when Shabbat began makes Kiddush without reciting Borei Pri Hagafen. Admittedly, regarding Havdala during seuda shlishit that included wine, there are two opinions in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 299:3) whether one recites Borei Pri Hagafen. However, the stronger opinion is that he does not need to (see Mishna Berura ad loc. 10). In any case the issue is whether Havdala is considered part of the meal (ibid.), and not whether Havdala counts without Borei Pri Hagafen, which it clearly does.

Your case, when Borei Pri Hagafen was said but you did not hear it, is no worse. There is even a question whether Borei Pri Hagafen is crucial for the one who makes Havdala and is not in the midst of the meal. Rav Moshe Feinstein (ibid.), based on the rule learned from the aforementioned Shulchan Aruch that the beracha is only important to allow one to drink, posits that if one mistakenly recited Shehakol on Havdala wine, he fulfills Havdala, as he is able to drink. He further proposes that even if one forgot to make any beracha but already drank the Havdala wine, he fulfilled the mitzva. (If one did not drink a sufficient amount of wine, there is uncertainty about whether he has fulfilled Havdala (see Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 190:4; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 30:36)).

Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (vol. III, notes to 60:(91)) cites Rav Auerbach as saying that since one needs to drink the wine and needs the beracha for that, Borei Pri Hagafen is a part of Havdala that listeners need to take seriously. However, concerning after the fact for one who missed it, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (60:30) agrees that there is no need to hear Havdala again, and he cites several poskim who agree. This covers cases of one who came in after Borei Pri Hagafen was said, or he did not hear it or concentrate on it. While you would have needed a beracha before drinking the wine, there was, of course, no need for you to do so.

Continue counting with a beracha. Even if one was not to count at all one day, according to many Rishonim he may continue with a beracha afterward (even though the first day is the worst day to miss), so considering that according to most you fulfilled the mitzva even that day, you may say with a beracha.

In the future, we would suggest that you do the counting in Hebrew. Considering how short it is and how the declaration is so similar to the day before and even if you did not know a word of Hebrew, you would still know the basic content of what you are saying. It removes problems like this and it is good to do like the rest of the people throughout the world who are counting Omer. If you want afterward to read in the translation or read with your eyes first in English before reciting in Hebrew, that is also fine.

The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 273) deals with an apparent contradiction between the Bavli and Yerushalmi regarding making Kiddush in one place and eating in another. The Yerushalmi says that if this was his original intention, the Kiddush is valid, whereas the according to the Bavli, it is invalid. Rabbeinu Nissim (see Rosh, Pesachim 10:5) says that there is no machloket, as it depends on location. Under one roof, even in separate rooms and separate floors, intention to go from one to another connects the locations, whereas it does not help for different houses or from indoors to outdoors. The Ran says that there is a machloket, and we accept the Bavli that intention does not waive the requirement to eat in the room where he made Kiddush.

The Rama accepts Rabbeinu Nissim (OC 273:1) and, based on that, rules that one can make a beracha in one room or floor with the intention to exempt food he ate in a different one (OC 178:1). If you regularly move around the house, that counts as your standard intention (see Mishna Berura 206:20). If you normally eat in those other places, you do not need a new beracha if under the same roof (ibid.). If you usually eat only in one room and did not intend otherwise, you would need another beracha to eat in a different room not visible from the first (see Mishna Berura 178:12). However, going normally to other rooms does not obligate you in a new beracha upon return (Mishna Berura 178:3).

Although the Shulchan Aruch is non-committal about Rabbeinu Nissim regarding Kiddush (OC 273:1) and is silent on the matter in OC 178:1, the above seems true for Sephardim. Yalkut Yosef (OC 273:5) relies on Rabbeinu Nissim b’di’eved regarding Kiddush and rules like the Rama in OC 273:1 (ibid. 178:9), as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 178:3) implies.   

After seeing the beracha can extend, we should consider how to best time the berachot. We wrote about berachot strategy during sporadic drinking during a hike in Living the Halachic Process (II, B-4) and will summarize what we need to know to get started here. There are a couple of halachic doubts regarding breaks in drinking: If one does not continue before becoming thirsty again, does the beracha rishona’s efficacy cease? After how long should we assume one becomes thirsty? Should one make a beracha acharona when he finishes a round of drinking and the next round is not far away, and how does that affect the beracha rishona?

Regarding a hike, we distinguished between “frequent sippers” and “occasional gulpers.” Frequent sippers should make one beracha in the beginning and one beracha acharona at the end (if they drank a revi’it in one shot at some point). Occasional gulpers are to make a set of berachot for each drinking.

While indoors without exertion, one is likely to eat and/or drink less frequently, but on the other hand, he will probably not get as hungry/thirsty as quickly, which “extends the life” of the beracha rishona and allows one to wait for the beracha acharona. Assuming people will not eat or drink very often, the standard practice should be to make a set of berachot for each “unit” of eating and drinking. Despite this, one should train himself to expect to move around before finishing each food session and not make additional berachot necessary. Regarding cups of tea, coffee, or water, it is halachically preferable to drink a revii’it at one point so that he can make a beracha acharona at the end of a cup and thereby also solve any beracha rishona questions as well. If that does not suit his needs, it is usually best (except for “chain drinkers”) to have in mind that the beracha is effective for just one cup and then (plan to) not take another cup until at least a couple dozen of minutes pass, so that a new beracha is appropriate then.

If one drinks a revi'it (3-4 oz.) uninterrupted and the drinking was done under normal circumstances (not to swallow medicine or to get you to stop coughing), then one does recite Borei Nefashot. Since many people always sip and never drink a revi'it in a gulp or two, it has become popular for many to think that one DOES NOT make a beracha acharona (which, again, will be practically true for some people).

Based on a video of their production that we found online, it seems pretty clear it is mezonot. 

First, we must understand that there are two reasons not to speak external matters during a beracha: the disgrace to the beracha; it can render the beracha nonsensical.

Answering the main parts of Kaddish (Kadosh, Baruch k’vod) and Kedusha (aysr and amen to “…da’amiran b’alma”) are so important that one stops even in the midst of a perek of Kri’at Shema or its berachot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 66:3). This is based on the mishna (Berachot 13b) that one may respond to greetings extended by a distinguished person. Most Rishonim posit that answering these group praises of Hashem is no worse than responding nicely to a person. If this is true during Kri’at Shema and almost anything else but Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 104:7), then Asher Yatzar is certainly not too prominent to be interrupted without it being a disgrace.

The complication is regarding making the beracha nonsensical. The Kesef Mishneh (Tefilla 10:16), in one of his explanations for an unclear phrase in the Rambam, says that one does not answer “aysr” during birchot hanehenin (on food) and birchot hamitzva. He does not say what makes these berachot special, but Acharonim (including Chayei Adam 5:13) posit that these are examples of short berachot (see Tosafot, Ketubot 7b), as opposed to the berachot of Kri’at Shema, which are long.

Actually, it is not that short berachot are more important than long ones, but that they are more likely to be “messed up” by extraneous statements. As the Ben Ish Chai (I, Shemot 6) comments, reciting “Baruch ata … melech haolam kadosh kadosh …” does not make sense. It is not like interrupting one topic to go to another and then return. Rather, it makes the opening of the beracha worthless, which is a problem when it includes Hashem’s name in beracha form. We must not do that, even for the sake of answering Kedusha or Kaddish.

In truth, the distinction is not between long and short berachot per se, but on where in a beracha one is stopping. There are no good places to stop in a short beracha. A long one has some good places and some bad ones.  The Mishna Berura (51:2) discusses the second half of Baruch Sheamar (from “Baruch ata…”), which is a long beracha with a short “beracha ending” (baruch ata Hashem melech mehulal batishbachot). He rules that one cannot answer Kaddish and Kedusha from the “Hashem” until “batishbachot.” Ishei Yisrael (19:4) applies the logic to the beginning of long berachot, namely from “baruch ata Hashem” until one has said a coherent idea that gives the beracha significance that allows him to interject a response to Kaddish or Kedusha. Let’s apply these concepts to Asher Yatzar. After “Baruch … asher yatzar et haadam b’chochma,” (one could argue, until “…chalulim”) the beracha is significant, and one can answer until Hashem’s name at the beracha’s end.

What about stopping in the middle of a phrase in the midst of a long beracha? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 66:3) rules that one stops for Kaddish and Kedusha even in the middle of a pasuk of Kri’at Shema. There is a machloket whether this is only at a coherent stopping point in the pasuk (see Mishna Berura 66:10). While he urges planning, to avoid this situation, the Mishna Berura allows stopping anywhere but says that after answering, he should return to the beginning of the pasuk. So too, it is proper to be at a good place in mid-beracha to pause to answer, but if necessary, one can answer in the middle of a long beracha and then return to a place that makes the continuation coherent.

The gemara (Sota 39b) says that the congregation should not answer amen before the kohanim have completed each beracha. Is this halacha referring to all the kohanim completing the berachot or is a majority enough?

Let us check parallel contexts. Rav Chisda (Berachot 47a) says that while the one cutting the loaf of bread should wait until those present answer amen to his beracha, he does not wait for a minority who unnecessarily stretch out amen. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 124:9) rules that during chazarat hashatz, a chazan needs to wait only for the majority to answer amen and not for a minority that takes an unnecessarily long time. The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 38) says that an exception is in a context in which one is continuing with a beracha that each member of the congregation has a personal obligation to hear. In our case, although the congregation’s involvement may have importance (Sefer HaCharedim, Aseh 4:18), the kohen who is has not finished is apparently not deprived of any obligation. (On a practical note, the introductory beracha and the first two p’sukim end with a vowel, “ahava,” “v’yishmerecha,” and “viychuneka,” respectively, so that when it is stretched out, the last word is usually complete. The main problem is with the last beracha, where the “o” of shalom is stretched out before the “m” is pronounced.

Why must the congregation not answer amen to Birkat Kohanim too early? The B’er Sheva (Sota 39b) says that it is a simple application of a rule regarding berachot. The gemara (Berachot 47a) refers to an improper amen called amen chatufa, which some say is answering before the beracha is completed (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 124:8). This is probably worse than a chazan starting a new beracha before all have finished amen to the previous one, so perhaps a majority is not enough. However, it is hard to imagine that this would be a problem after most of the kohanim finished a beracha, as the amen is aimed on the beracha of the majority, who have finished.

The Halachot Ketanot (II:48, cited in Mishna Berura 55:4), regarding Kaddish, talks about answering different reciters who finish at different times. He says that if they finish within toch kdei dibbur (approximately, 1.5 seconds) of each other, one can choose to answer after the earlier or the later; if they are separated by more than that, one should answer both separately. The Birchot Horai (9:(9)) posits that the same is true for an unevenly finished Birkat Kohanim. He cites, without a source or explanation, Rav S.Z. Auerbach as preferring waiting until the later person is finished.

Should it make a difference that here there is a clear majority? We have seen that we follow the majority regarding the end of the recitation of amen for Hamotzi and in chazarat hashatz. However, that is apparently because of the assumption that the majority, not the minority, is doing things correctly, but if the majority is fast and the minority is at a nice pace, one should wait for the minority (Be’ur Halacha to 124:9). This is because of a specific issue with stretching out amen, which can distort the word (Tosafot, Berachot 47a; Mishna Berura 167:85), and it is unlikely this is a problem for the words of Birkat Kohanim. Therefore, on a basic level, it is better to wait for the last person.

The kohanim are expected to recite Birkat Kohanim in unison (see Tosafot, Sota 39b), although they are not angels, who can do things exactly. However, it is not ideal for one to stretch out words significantly longer than his friends. Therefore, the lack of conformity could arguably make the slower person’s recitation inappropriate and make it preferable to follow the majority. However, such a determination, especially with the potential for hard feelings it could cause, is not something we can make a call on from a distance. It is also not appropriate for an individual congregant to “take a stand” in a publicly discernable manner.

The gemara (Berachot 21a) cites the pasuk of “When I call out Hashem’s Name, give greatness to our G-d” (Devarim 32:3) as the source for Birkat HaTorah. Given the apparent Torah-level of Birkat HaTorah, most poskim (see Shaagat Aryeh 46) posit that although usually in the face of a doubt about whether one is obligated in a beracha we refrain from it, we require a Birkat HaTorah when there is doubt (see Mishna Berura 47:1). Some prominent opinions prefer not to make Birkat HaTorah when one suspects he might have already recited it, due to the opinions that Birkat HaTorah is Rabbinic (see ibid.). However, if there is no other option, one should recite only the second beracha (“… asher bachar banu”) (ibid.; Ishei Yisrael 6:10).

There are usually other options. The gemara (Berachot 11b) says that if one realized he did not recite Birkat HaTorah and it is now after davening, he is exempt because he fulfilled the mitzva by reciting Ahava Rabba (before Kri’at Shema), which expresses our appreciation of Torah study. It does not mention a need for special kavana to thereby fulfill Birkat HaTorah. Thus, since you are after davening, you would seem to have no problem. However, the Yerushalmi (cited by Tosafot, ad loc.) says that this works only if one learned “directly after” Ahava Rabba. Some say that Kri’at Shema, which are words of Torah, counts for this. Others require other words of Torah, although these can be recited right after davening (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 47:7-8). Unless you learned something not “davening-related” before you left, your status depends on this unresolved machloket.

It is agreed that women are expected to recite Birkat HaTorah (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 14). This is surprising considering that women are exempt from Torah study (Rambam, Talmud Torah 1:13) and Sephardi women do not recite a beracha for a mitzva in which they are not obligated (Shulchan Aruch, OC 589:6). The Beit Yosef (ad loc.) and Magen Avraham (47:14) explain that women need to make Birkat HaTorah because there they are required to learn how to perform the many halachot that apply to them and because there are Torah passages in their davening. The Gra (ad loc.) posits that women are not obligated in Birkat HaTorah, as they lack the normal obligation to learn Torah, but that they are still permitted and expected to recite it anyway. The Biur Halacha (to 47:14) says that one consequence of the various explanations is whether women can enable men to fulfill their obligation. According to the Beit Yosef/Magen Avraham they can because both are obligated in Birkat HaTorah. According to the Gra, a woman’s voluntary beracha cannot count for an obligated man (see Rosh Hashana 29a). So whether your wife’s beracha helped you once again depends on a machloket.  

There is another reason for leniency in your case. Your routine, which you took part in, includes Birkat HaTorah. Regarding someone who is not sure if he said the right rain-related matters in Shemoneh Esrei, we assume he followed his norm, which depends on how long has passed since the change to the present version (Shulchan Aruch, OC 114:8). This would indicate that you did recite Birkat HaTorah. Furthermore, the Mishna Berura (114:38) rules that if a person’s doubt whether he made a mistake arose only after davening is over, he can assume he did it right. You starting doubting yourself only after davening was over, well after the omission would have taken place. Therefore, you may assume you did things right (even if not with the greatest kavana) unless you have a conviction to the contrary.

Putting all the indications together, you are not required to look for someone else to recite Birkat HaTorah for you again and certainly should not do it yourself.

We can extend your excellent set of questions, based on your assumptions. Perhaps one should recite bHlo with the tzibbur even though he does not usually do so. If it is not justified to say bHlo, why isn’t responding amen a forbidden amen l’vatala (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 215:4), as you asked regarding tefillin, irrespective of hefsek?

Let us first look at the basis of bHlo. This set of 18 p’sukim, which are completed with a beracha, were instituted post-Talmudically because people were often afraid to stay for Ma’ariv at night. The 18 p’sukim were a reminder/replacement of sorts for Shemoneh Esrei they were missing; Kaddish was instituted to follow these p’sukim (Tur, OC 236). The question is whether this institution continued when people went back to staying for Ma’ariv, and there are indeed different opinions (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 236:2). Most Ashkenazim in chutz la’aretz recite it, as the Rama implies, whereas the universal practice in Eretz Yisrael is not to do so, likely due to the opinions of the Gra, the Shulchan Aruch Harav, and the Arizal (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 236:14).

In general, one whose place’s minhag is not to recite a certain beracha and is davening in a place where they recite it (e.g., Hallel in shul on Seder night) does not recite the beracha unless he is the chazan (see Igrot Moshe, OC II:94). BHlo is different in a couple of ways (see Mishneh Halachot V:29). On the one hand, the importance of reciting it is relatively low, and not all agree that it is necessary even abroad. On the other hand, all agree that it was once deemed proper, and many poskim who do not say it, do not consider it pointless, just insufficiently justified. As a reflection of these (and perhaps other) factors, the consensus is that one who is just visiting chutz la’aretz does not say it (assuming people will not notice his divergence (see Tefilla K’hilchata 19:(49)), whereas a chutz la’aretz person does not say it while in Israel, at least if davening with a minyan (Mishneh Halachot ibid.).

Regarding amen, the question is a little harder. While it is forbidden to answer amen to a beracha l’vatala, many poskim limit what is considered l’vatala in this regard. The Be’ur Halacha says that one is allowed to answer amen to a beracha, which according to the listener’s p’sak, is not called for. When someone praises Hashem appropriately, based on a legitimate opinion, it is fit to receive an amen (Pri Megadim, EA 215:1). Answering, though, is optional because the obligation to answer amen does not extend to a case in which it is only a doubt if the beracha and its amen are called for. The Har Tzvi (OCI:38) goes further, requiring to answer amen. Yabia Omer (IX, 38), regarding a Sephardi answering amen to a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh or to an Ashkenazi  woman’s beracha on a mitzva in which she is exempt, disagrees and rules not to answer. Your question about tefillin on Chol Hamo’ed (in chutz la’aretz, where there are two legitimate opinions as to whether to put them on) would seem to depend on this question, and the majority opinion is that he may answer amen.

Regarding bHlo, it would seem that, indeed, because of the problem of hefsek, it is better not to voluntarily answer amen. On the one hand, a hefsek between birchot Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei is less severe at night (see applications in Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:2; Mishna Berura 236:7 and elsewhere). However, since answering amen to bHlo is almost definitely not a requirement, it is better not say it (see similar idea in B’tzel Hachochma IV:25).

We start with the only source I found on the topic, which provides practical (intuitively logical) guidance without explanation. Then we will provide the background and critique the ruling. V’zot Haberacha (p. 132), basing himself on communication with Rav Auerbach, Rav Eliyahu, and Rav Scheinberg, gives the following compromise. Zimun can be done, led only by the Sephardi. If there are nine and a katan, the Ashkenazi should answer the zimun without Hashem’s Name.

The gemara (Berachot 48a) accepts Rav Nachman’s opinion that a child counts toward zimun if he knows to whom we bentch. So rule the Rif, Rambam (Berachot 5:7), and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 199:10), whether for a zimun of three or of ten. (Only one of the quorum can be a katan – Mishna Berura 199:25). You seem aware that this is the minhag among Sephardim. On the hand, the Rosh (Berachot 7:20) cites and accepts the implication of the Yerushalmi that only youngsters with two pubic hairs (the sign of basic physical maturity) count toward zimun; the Rama (OC 199:10) and Ashkenazi practice accept the Rosh. Indeed, then, we have a conflict between minhagim. In a mixed group, whose minhag should “win out”?

One thing to investigate is: how important is each side’s ruling to them? According to the Sephardi ruling, is there an obligation to do zimun or is it only optional? There is an opinion in the gemara (Berachot 45) that there is an optional zimun when two eat together. However, I did not find any indication in the poskim that a zimun including a child is deficient in any way. Therefore, the indications are that the Sephardi member of the group should feel a need to do zimun, for when a zimun is called for, it is forbidden to bentch without it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 193:1).

Is it forbidden (i.e., for an Ashkenazi) to do zimun which is not required? From the discussion of an optional zimun for two, we see that according to the opinion that it is not optional (which we accept), it is forbidden. What is problematic about a zimun’s words? The Shita Mekubetzet (Berachot 45b) says that even a zimun of three is a mini davar shebekedusha (something that requires ten), making it forbidden without its (reduced) quorum even without uttering Hashem’s Name. The Pnei Yehoshua (Berachot 45b) says that it is a disgrace to call out to a single counterpart to praise Hashem, as it is not sufficiently significant.

Is it better to err on the side of recitation or omission? Note that the stronger indications are that a katan counts for a zimun. The implication of the Mordechai (Berachot 172) and Rama (Darchei Moshe, OC 199:4) is that we refrain from zimun in order to be on the safe side. Thus, out of doubt, one would not do a zimun. So how can the poskim we cited expect an Ashkenazi to risk an improper zimun in order to afford his Sephardi friend a “less important” opportunity?

Apparently, the poskim reason that the main problem with an unwarranted zimun falls on the initiator (i.e., the mezamen). Once the Sephardi asks the Ashkenazi to praise Hashem, answering is less of a problem and actually it is a problem to refuse to praise Him. Using Hashem’s Name makes it beracha­-like, which is problematic even without initiating. We can appreciate, then, why the Ashkenazi should neither say the Name as part of ten nor lead the zimun.

This resembles the situation of a Sephardi who calls out Barchu at the end of Monday-Thursday davening in an Ashkenazi shul. The minhag is to answer, probably because once it is reasonable to call it out, how can one not respond. In some ways our case is worse. Regarding Barchu, even when there is not a need, the ten provide a tzura (form) of a proper recitation. In contrast, if a child does not count, the zimun is innately lacking.

In the final analysis, there is logic both to and against the poskim we cited. In the absence of contrary sources or compelling logic, we obviously accept their ruling.

We have writing several times that the main issue with the position of tefillin shel rosh is their likelihood to be too far down. But the lateral position also deserves a look. [This week we will focus on classical sources and basic possibilities; next week, we will get into details and practicality.] 

The Rambam (Tefillin 4:1) says that the bayit of the shel rosh is in the middle of the front of the head. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 27:10, mixing between the language of the Rambam and Tur) describes it more starkly: “The bayit should be lined up to the middle, so that it is opposite ‘between the eyes,’ and the knot should also be in the middle of the oref (posterior neck), and lo yiteh (should not be over (? difficult to translate)), not to this side or to that side.”

The requirement of the middle of the head is actually not obvious. While the Torah writes of tefillin “between the eyes,” the gemara (Menachot 37b) derives that this refers to the top of the head, based on a gezeira shava from the prohibition of a mourner pulling out hair. Tosafot (Kiddushin 36a) asks that accordingly we would expect that tefillin shel rosh would be in the same area – the entire part of the head in which hair grows (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 180:9). Yet, they and the Rambam (ibid.) posit that a vestige of the literal idea of “between the eyes” limits the area, with the Rambam reasoning that the middle is above the area of “between the eyes.”

The gemara describes the location of the shel yad and the front-back location of the shel rosh, not its lateral position, so what is the Rambam’s source? The Beit Yosef (OC 27) cites the gemara (Menachot 35b), which says that the back knot “faces the face.” Rashi explains: “opposite the oref (posterior neck) and not the side of the head.” The Beit Yosef surmises that this is the Rambam’s source: just as the knot is in the middle of the back of the head, so too the bayit should be in the middle. He adds in that this is anyway apparent from “between the eyes,” which the Rambam mentions (although he does not usually independently derive halachot from p’sukim).

What does in the middle mean? First, the middle of the head can refer to a line precisely in the middle, but the entire tefillin, which has width, cannot fit on a line! One logical possibility is that it suffices that any part of the bayit is on the line, giving us significant leeway, especially if we have big tefillin. Or it can mean that the middle of the tefillin must be in the middle of the head. But does that mean that the precise middle has to be on the precise middle?! As the Satmar Rebbe points out (Divrei Yoel I:4), we accept the opinion that man is incapable of being precise (see Gittin 78a), even with mirrors, not to mention that tefillin move slightly when we move our head. One possibility is raised by the Shulchan Aruch Harav (addendums to Hilchot Tefillin) based on an inference of a different gemara: two of the four parshiyot must be right of center and two left of center. This requires near perfection (in addition to the fact that the chambers for the parshiyot are not necessarily equidistant – see Mishna Berura 32:182), and it is shocking that earlier sources would not warn us!!

Another approach, which seems to be posited by most of the poskim, is that the middle is an area of the head (similar to the front-back and arm areas) within which the entire tefillin must be resting. It follows that if the tefillin’s edges are within this area, in makes no difference, other than zeh keili v’anveihu (doing mitzvot aesthetically) whether it is centered. The question then begs – how wide is this area? What are its borders? If we know the answer, each person will have to compare that area to the width of his tefillin and determine his leeway (accordingly, the smaller the tefillin, the better).

[Save this page to continue next week.]

The gemara (Berachot 59b) says that when one’s father dies and leaves an inheritance, he recites “Baruch … dayan ha’emet” and then a beracha for inheriting, (Hatov V’hameitiv for multiple inheritors; Shehecheyanu for a lone inheritor). The Rashba (Shut I:245) explains the shocking idea of employing an upbeat beracha due to a loved one’s death – these berachot are not for happiness, which should not exist no matter the inheritance’s size, but for practical gain. The Ktav Sofer (Yoreh Deah 123) explains that we view the death and the financial acquisition as separate, as only “by chance” were significant funds acquired due to a death.    

While the gemara is accepted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 223:2), its practical application has raised pertinent questions. Classical sources imply that these berachot are done right after witnessing or hearing of the death, which is usually when the son is an onen (one before his close relative’s funeral), who may not make berachot. So why does he make this beracha? The Gesher Hachayim (18:2.3) says that the beracha is indeed recited after the burial, but Rav Auerbach (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 64:(8)) is cited as disagreeing.

Another problem relates to the present minhag that people recite Dayan Ha’emet only soon before the burial. But it makes sense to recite the beracha on inheritance at the time it occurs halachically (the moment of death)! Several poskim (see ibid.; Shevet Halevi VIII:35) posit that it is unseemly for the first religious acknowledgment of a parent’s death to be upbeat; so even nowadays, Dayan Ha’emet must be first. But when? There are logic and textual indications (both beyond our present scope) that the two berachot were meant to go together, so that the inheritance beracha could be right after Dayan Ha’emet (at the funeral). But then it is not connected to any stage in inheritance (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.), and, worse, I have never heard (or heard of) anyone doing it at that time. Another alternative, with similar problems, is soon after starting aveilut at home (it is permitted during shiva – Mishna Berura 551:98).

Therefore, the P’ninei Halacha’s idea is appealing. One thereby distances the beracha from the death and pain, with emotional and maybe halachic gain (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:140). By waiting for a financially significant time, the beracha is linked to the inheritance.

However, while not arguing, we will point out problems with this approach. In the gemara’s time, the main inheritance, real estate (see Ketubot 91a), often took a while to be sorted out (divided up by the brothers), and yet the gemara implies that the beracha was made right away. Since according to most, Shehecheyanu of this type is not obligatory (see Mishna Berura 225:9), there is less need to say it if there is doubt. (If one makes the beracha when receiving personally, Shehecheyanu, which is anyway the safer beracha (Biur Halacha 223:5), not Hatov V’hameitiv, is correct even if he has brothers.). There is also a minority opinion (see Ba’er Heitev 223:7) that one makes the beracha only if he was surprised to find out that he was left an estate. Not always is it clear that the inheritance, especially after paying parents’ debts (see Chashukei Chemed, Ketubot 90b) bring enough happiness/benefit for a beracha. Above all, the minhag seems to be not to make the beracha. Although the minhag’s origins are not fully clear, we have seen enough reasons to consider it reasonable. While it is legitimate to follow the P’ninei Halacha’s recommendation or make the beracha earlier, one need not feel compelled to make the beracha. If he decides to make it, it is unjustified to do so on every installment. The first or largest expected installment would be the time.

Indeed, it is important to either know Al Hamichya very well or have access to its text in writing. But everyone makes mistakes sometimes, so let us see whether leaving out the words “al ha’aretz” (the Land) invalidates the beracha.  

Al Hamichya’s generic term is Me’ein Shalosh, which also covers the beracha acharona on prominent fruits of Eretz Yisrael and wine. The term means “similar to the three,” i.e., the three (main) berachot of Birkat Hamazon. A baraita (Berachot 48b) derives from the pasuk about Birkat Hamazon that the three berachot need to cover three elements: the food Hashem gives us; the Land He has given us; Jerusalem, for whose rebuilding we pray. Me’ein Shalosh, the abridged Birkat Hamazon, also includes these elements, with overlapping language. In Birkat Hamazon, if one missed an entire beracha or even a crucial element of one, he needs to repeat Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 188:3-4; see Mishna Berura 188:8). Does the same apply to your omission of Eretz Yisrael in Me’ein Shalosh?

The first thing to note is that it is likely that you referred to Eretz Yisrael earlier in the beracha (eretz chemdah tova u’rechava sheratzita …). Me’ein Shalosh is one of the berachot that ends with a short beracha that encapsules the whole beracha (see Berachot 11a). Since the Land is a focal point of the pasuk, of Birkat Hamazon, and of Me’ein Shalosh, it makes sense that if it is missing, the beracha is invalid. In general, the end of the beracha is critical, and very possibly more so than the rest of the beracha (the matter is complex – see Berachot 12a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 59:2 and Bi’ur Halacha ad loc.). In this case, it may also help that right before the end of the beracha we say “nevarechecha aleha …,” blessing over the Land. Realize also that while there is a beracha dedicated to Yerushalayim, it is not found at the end. In fact, it is problematic to end off a beracha on more than one theme. The gemara (Berachot 49a) therefore connects the Land and the food by saying that the land produces the food. Therefore, it should not be surprising if b’di’eved, leaving out “al ha’aretz” would not invalidate the beracha.

Indeed, the Magen Avraham says (208:17; the Mishna Berura 208:55 and others agree) that if one does not mention the Land at the end, he is yotzei. His proof is from Tosafot (Berachot 44a), who deals with two versions of the ending of Me’ein Shalosh for wine: some mention “gefen” and “pri hagefen” and others mention “ha’aretz” and “pri hagefen.” The Magen Avraham infers that the question is which is better, but that the first version would certainly be valid b’di’eved. It is possible to claim that he only refers to Me’ein Shalosh on wine, but most understand him to be talking generally (see V’ten Beracha 20:(56)).

It is likely that these lenient opinions are based on the fact that the Land was already mentioned. However, one can argue that, b’di’eved, Eretz Yisrael can be left out totally. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 17) says that if one recited the first beracha of Birkat Hamazon instead of Me’ein Shalosh for wine or dates (which are filling), he fulfilled his obligation. Since that beracha makes no mention of the Land whatsoever, we seem to see that it is not that critical to the beracha acharona. The Bi’ur Halacha (ad loc.) says that this is more understandable if Me’ein Shalosh is only a Rabbinically mandated beracha. On the other hand, the Chazon Ish (OC 34:4) says that what would work for a proper first beracha of Birkat Hamazon would not work for an improperly recited Me’ein Shalosh that omitted the Land or Yerushalayim (presumably he would agree with the Magen Avraham as presented above).

Even if you did not eat a fruit, what to do about Borei Nefashot on drinking over time is not simple. If you never drink a revi’it at one time, you are not obligated (due to doubt) in Borei Nefashot (Mishna Berura 210:1). It is inadvisable to go more than a half hour between one drink and another, as that may be enough of a break to detach the drinking from the beracha acharona and perhaps the beracha rishona. Those who drink large amounts with significant breaks should make a set of berachot each time (see Living the Halachic Process, II, B-4).          

We proceed to the impact of the fruit. One has at least a half hour and perhaps significantly more (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 50) from the end of eating fruit to recite Borei Nefashot; you can also leave a little fruit to eat many minutes later. Therefore, your question can usually be avoided.

Your question pertains if after eating the fruit, you will continue sporadic drinking for a long time (without leaving the vicinity). The first issue is whether Borei Nefashot’s efficacy on the fruit is extended by continued drinking without a long break. During a long meal in which 72 minutes pass between eating bread and bentching, the food one continues to eat extends the time (Magen Avraham 184:9). There are two ways to explain this halacha. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) suggests that continued eating slows digestion. The Mishna Berura (184:18) says that it is a halachic matter – Birkat Hamazon does not expire in the middle of a meal. The Shevet Halevi (VII, 27) posits that if the reason is physical, it applies to any eating/drinking, but if it is halachic, it likely only applies to a meal or other unified eating (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 191). Therefore, it is a machloket whether you may wait much more than a half hour after finishing the fruit to make Borei Nefashot.

The Har Tzvi (OC I:96) prefers the opinion that we do not extend the time for eating due to drinking, as the beracha on one is not covered by the beracha of the other. Therefore, it is improper to wait beyond the normal time for making a beracha on the fruit. (The Shevet Halevi concurs in practice).

How does reciting Borei Nefashot impact on the beracha on drinking? The Har Tzvi instructs to have in mind when saying Borei Nefashot that it not apply to the drinking, so he can continuing drinking based on the original beracha. He rules this way despite seeing the ability to affect the matter by intention as a machloket. The Pri Megadim (Peticha Kollelet, Berachot) says that for a beracha acharona (as opposed to a beracha rishona), when one beracha can apply to multiple foods, it does even if one did not have that intention. The Har Tzvi disagrees, with aid from the Rav Pe’alim (II, OC 32). Logic suggests that the Pri Megadim might actually agree that here one can limit the Borei Nefashot’s reach for the following reasons. The Pri Megadim’s apparent logic is that a beracha acharona is different because given the standing obligation to make the beracha, one cannot detach it from all the foods (see Rav Pe’alim ibid.). However, in our case, the time to make Borei Nefashot on the drink has not yet come, and in fact it would cause an unjustified new beracha. Therefore, it is illogical that the Borei Nefashot on the fruit should be forced onto it. Therefore, when there is reason to make a Borei Nefashot on the fruit but not the drink, one should recite it with intention just for the fruit.

On the other hand, it is often wise to purposely have Borei Nefashot on the fruit also “end the round” of drinking for the chance of several cases: 1. he will take too long a break in the drinking; 2. he will unwittingly leave the house; 3. he will forget Borei Nefashot at the end; 4. he drank in a way that it is a safek whether he requires Borei Nefashot.

Many early sources (Yerushalmi, Berachot 9:2; Sanhedrin 42a, in some texts; Rambam, Berachot 10:16; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 426:1) present the seeing of the moon as the presumed prompt for making the beracha, saying: “One who sees the moon …” This is despite the fact that we do not need testimony to know that it is there. If the beracha were a matter of the tzibbur, one could argue that if (most of) the minyan saw it, others could join the beracha if it began properly. However, Kiddush Levana is a beracha of the individual, and it is but a preference to do so among others (Be’ur Halacha to 426:2). Therefore, each individual needs the conditions to make the beracha. Usually, when it was seen moments before, it is likely to again be seen soon thereafter. However, there are still conceptual and practical matters to consider.

 Is it critical to be able to see the moon, even in a case in which it will not be visible before the end of the beracha’s period? The Radbaz (I:341) says that a beracha made while the moon is covered is levatala, modeling it after Borei Meorei Ha’esh at Havdala. The Terumat Hadeshen (I:35) instructs that one should wait until Motzaei Shabbat for Kiddush Levana only if it leaves enough days for there not be concern of constant cloud cover. This implies that it can absolutely not be done with cloud cover.

Yet, there is a minority opinion that if constant clouds will prevent doing Kiddush Levana that month, one can do it without seeing the moon (Adnei Paz, OC 426). Conceptually, this may depend on the nature of the beracha. If we thank Hashem for the new month (as the simple reading of the beracha suggests), represented by the new moon, then seeing it is perhaps less important. We do not need to see it when we daily bless Hashem for making the sun and the moon (Yotzer Hame’orot)!

A major source that minimizes the need to see the moon is the Shut Maharshal (47), who says that a blind person (suma) can make the beracha. Many accept this opinion (see Mishna Berura 426:1), although many disagree (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc., VIII, OC 22). In contrast, a suma does not make the beracha on light at Havdala (Shulchan Aruch, OC 298:13).

However, many sources posit that the beracha is on the light. The p’sukim on the creation of the sun and moon stress the moon’s light-giving attribute (see Bereishit 1:14-18). In fact, the Rama (OC 426:1) says we must do Kiddush Levana late enough to not only see the moon but also benefit from its light. Even the Maharshal, who obligates a suma, requires benefit in terms of time and possibly place, just that not each person needs to personally benefit directly.

A few questions may hinge on how fundamental to the beracha the light or the benefit from it is. If it is like other berachot on seeing elements of nature and praising Hashem for creation (which the Rambam ibid implies), it would not seem critical that if, subsequently, during the beracha, it is covered (compare to the beracha on thunder/lightning). If the beracha is on receiving benefit from the light, it is more likely to need to continue throughout (see two opinions in Be’ur Halacha to 426:1). The accepted opinion is that one should believe it will last throughout the main beracha (until … mechadesh chodashim), but if one started, he can continue. There is also a machloket in the other direction, when there is enough light to benefit, but the moon is not clearly visible (see Shut R. Yaakov MiLisa, OC 7).

Arguably, the beracha’s nature might impact on a variation of your case – if the one who saw the moon made the beracha also intending to do so on behalf of those who did not. The beracha was valid due to the sighting, but the benefit did not extend to the one who listened. (The possibility of someone making the beracha and including a suma in it may be instructive – see Yabia Omer IX, OC 94 – whether or not it is a proof is beyond our scope.)

Your question is related to a famous yearly practice. The gemara (Pesachim 115b) says that at the Seder, the first ny (for karpas) does not preclude a second one because, in the interim, one takes his mind off of his hands (hesech hada’at). Tosafot (ad loc.) asks why we need that reason, considering that the minor ny anyway should not exempt from ny on the matza, which is a full-fledged and different Rabbinic obligation. Tosafot answers that we might have thought that even a non-required ny precludes the need for a repeat when required.

 The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 158) understands from Tosafot that even if one does a lower-level-obligation ny for non-breads dipped in liquids, he still has a full obligation for ny (with a beracha) if he now wants to eat bread, and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 158:7) rules this way. The Rama (in the Darchei Moshe and on the Shulchan Aruch, both ad loc.) says that this is so only when he had hesech hada’at (or a long time passed – Biur Halacha ad loc.). Otherwise, one would not make a beracha on the bread. (The Biur Halacha ibid. posits that if there is no water for a second ny, one can rely on the first ny.)

There is a parallel discussion regarding one who leaves the bathroom right before a meal. If he does one ny for both needs, both the option of eating first and of reciting Asher Yatzar first raise problems (beyond our present scope). Therefore, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 165:1; the Rama does not object) rules to wash two times; the first is followed by Asher Yatzar, the second, by the beracha of Al Netilat Yadayim.

The Magen Avraham (165:2) asks why according to the Rama, is there a beracha on the second ny if it is so soon after another ny. His first answer is that the beracha can actually relate back to the first ny, as he knew he would eat bread. The second answer, which he prefers, is that the first washing should be done in a manner that is invalid for bread (e.g., without a cup), so that he can say Asher Yatzar without causing a problem with the beracha on a full-fledged halachic ny. Rabbi Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) rejects the Magen Avraham’s first answer because if the second ny added nothing, the beracha on ny has to relate to the first, significant ny, and therefore Asher Yatzar would cause a problem. The Mishna Berura (165:2) and many others (see Sha’ar Hatziyun ad loc.) accept the assumption of the Magen Avraham’s second answer – if nothing happens to the hands between two acts of ny in relative close proximity, there is no beracha on the second one, even if the first was not a ny with a beracha.

It might seem that before eating bread soon after washing for fruit, a Sephardi would make the beracha on the ny, following the Shulchan Aruch, and an Ashkenazi would not, based on the Rama. However, this is far from clear. The Yalkut Yosef (OC 158:19) rules that even a Sephardi does not make a beracha because Tosafot is based on an assumption (which we do not accept) that the netila before dipped foods is only for cleanliness. Ashkenazim also have to determine how long the effect of the first netila precludes a new ny with a beracha. The Biur Halacha (to 158:7) says that after a few hours, it is ineffective unless he originally intended it to last for a later eating and did not have hesech hada’at. We note that the Darchei Moshe (ibid.) assumed that the delay between karpas and motzi matza warrants a new ny with a beracha and that not everyone has an hours-long Maggid section.

During a meal, we do not assume hesech hada’at, but when one finishes it, we normally treat the situation as one where we assume it (see Mishna Berura 164:7). It is unclear how long after ny for fruit we should assume hesech hada’at. A trick to use for such a case of doubt is to touch parts of the body that are usually covered, making ny with a beracha a definite subsequent need (see Yaskil Avdi, II, OC 6).

The practice of saying “Hmum” before mitzvot, like many “extra” ritual recitations, can be traced to the Arizal (16^th century) and a small elite group of his disciples until it spread broadly especially among Sephardim and Hasidim. Some gedolim opposed this introduction to mitzvot (sometimes as part of the opposition to mystically-oriented Hasidic practices, although some detractors predated Hasidism– see Chok Yaakov 489:11 and the Maharshal he cites.)

The most prominent critic is the Noda B’yehuda (Yoreh Deah I, 93). His main concern was the recitation’s first line (“L’shem yichud…”), which relates to a difficult kabbalistic idea that we want the performance of the mitzva to “unite Hashem and His Presence.” The Noda B’yehuda argued that this concept is too deep and secret to share with the masses, which could be philosophically dangerous. He also reasons that it is unnecessary to verbalize such ideas, as the “unifying” power of mitzvot occurs by itself when one does the mitzva with the intention to serve Hashem.

Beyond l’shem yichud, hmum is a statement that we are doing the mitzva because Hashem commanded us to do so. The Noda B’yehuda does not see that as bad, but unnecessary. If one indeed is doing the mitzva because Hashem commanded it, he does not need to verbalize it. However, his own practice was to distinguish – he would state his intention to do a mitzva before mitzvot that do not have a beracha. When there are berachot, we can trust Chazal to compose them with all the worthwhile elements. Instituting a text that Chazal did not disturbed him.

The practice of hmum is much less polarizing now than it was 200 years ago. While the Mishna Berura does not mention it, the (non-Hasidic) Aruch Hashulchan (OC 489:6) does, noting the opposition to it and his viewpoint that at his time it was widespread and done positively. It has mainly become a matter of communal minhag and/or personal preference, which are fine in such a matter, as is reciting it sporadically. Hopefully, you had in mind not to do it as a practice that could bind you through neder.

It is interesting that many people recite hmum regularly before some mitzvot and not other mitzvot, and sefirat ha’omer is one of the more popular times. There is actually more opposition by some (see Yalkut Yosef, Sefirat Ha’omer 1; Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:247) to reciting the standard version for sefirat ha’omer – because of the mention of “mitzvat aseh” and “k’mo shekatuv baTorah” (a positive commandment, as it says in the Torah). Rishonim dispute whether sefirat ha’omer is a mitzva from the Torah in a time when there are no korban ha’omer and korban shtei halechem to count between (see Vayikra 23:15). While the Rambam (Temidin 7:22) says that it is still from the Torah, Tosafot (Menachot 66a) follows the opinion (ibid.) that it is Rabbinic, and the Beit Yosef (OC 489) views that as the primary opinion. When we ask after counting that Hashem should return us to service in the Beit Hamikdah, we infer that only then will sefira once again be from the Torah). The Rambam (Mamrim 2:9) says that presenting a Rabbinic law as one from the Torah violates bal tosif (adding on to the Torah). Our common text either relies on the possible reading that it is a Rabbinic positive mitzva and is thereby an extension of the p’sukim or on the fact that the Rambam’s contention that it is from the Torah might be correct (Halichot Shlomo, Moadim 11:2).

We will now conjecture why many recite hmum specifically for sefirat ha’omer: 1. There are other additional recitations that one may already be doing (see Magen Avraham 489:5); 2. The mystical elements of sefirat ha’omer might be stronger than for most mitzvot; 3. It has a catchy tune (which happens not to include “L’shem yichud…”) that people like to sing. In any case, there is little halachic importance whether one does or does not recites it.

The first halachic code that mentions the phrase Baruch hu u’varuch shemo (meaning that we “bless” Hashem and His Name) is the Tur in two places. It is not found in the gemara or the halachic works based on it (Rambam, Rif, Rosh). In Orach Chayim 124, the Tur cites an oral statement of his father (the Rosh) to recite the phrase upon hearing all berachot, in line with the statement that Moshe taught Bnei Yisrael to praise Hashem whenever he mentioned His Name (Yoma 37a based on Devarim 32:3). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 124:5) brings this as the halacha. (It is not a full obligation, and therefore it should not be said when it would harm a beracha - Mishna Berura 124:22.)

 The second place the Tur mentions Baruch hu u’varuch shemo is regarding zimun (OC 192), as part of his text at the end of the mezamen’s final recitation. The Maharshal (see Taz 192:1) considers it a misprint, and Rav Yosef Karo ignores it in both the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch. However, other of the Tur’s commentaries (Bach and Perisha) find earlier sources (Rokeach and Avudrohom (with a different text)).

We found three explanations for the rationale to recite Baruch hu u’varuch shemo in zimun. The Bach views it as an extension of the Rosh/Tur’s idea of blessing Hashem upon hearing His Name in a beracha. Therefore, he reasons, it applies only in a zimun of ten, when His Name (i.e., Elokeinu) is used. The Bach adds that this formulation is particularly appropriate here because the same pasuk (Devarim 32:3) is a source for saying Baruch hu u’varuch shemo and for the requirement of zimun in general (Berachot 45a).

The Darchei Moshe (OC 192:2) posits that the Tur intended that it create a desirable break between the zimun and Birkat Hamazon (the basic idea and different opinions about a short recitation between beracha groups is found in Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 215:1). The Eliya Rabba (192:2, see also Pri Megadim 192, MZ 1) connects this with a minhag which very few people practice today – that the zimun responders answer Amen to the mezamen’s “Baruch she’achalnu …” (see opinions in Magen Avraham, introduction to siman 192). Amen is their break; the mezamen’s break is Baruch hu u’varuch shemo. According to this, since we do not answer Amen, the responders might want to say Baruch hu u’varuch shemo as well.

The Perisha (OC 192:2) and the Maharal (Netivot Olam, Netiv Ha’avoda 18) connect Baruch hu u’varuch shemo to the idea of adding on to one’s counterpart’s blessing (see Taz, Yoreh Deah 242:5). Here, every time the response switches sides, something should be added – the responders add “… u’v’tuvo chayinu”; the mezamen adds “Baruch hu u’varuch shemo.” If so, of course it would be only the mezamen who recites it, as it sounds from the language of the Tur.

In addition to the Shulchan Aruch not bringing the minhag of saying Baruch hu u’varuch shemo, the Rama (despite his suggested explanation in Darchei Moshe) does not believe it is worthwhile, nor does the Taz (OC 192:1). The Magen Avraham (ibid.) and the Mishna Berura (192:4) cite both the practice of saying and of not saying, and view the former as more prevalent. It is hard for me to say which is more common today. For Sephardim, the Yalkut Yosef does not mention Baruch hu u’varuch shemo regarding zimun. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 192:8) discusses the counter indications and says that due to lack of clarity, it is better to refrain. The reason to not welcome additional nice words could be out of opposition to post-Talmudic additions. It is also possible that, between zimun and Birkat Hamazon, it is forbidden to break for unnecessary things (see dilemma of K’tzot Hashulchan 45:(35)).

This is a good question, conceptually. Concerning practice, we do not reject broadly followed minhagim, certainly when practiced by righteous and knowledgeable people. However, it is fine to inquire about the justification.

 First, let us see the basis for your question. The gemara (Ketubot 24b), in discussing whether the fact one does nesiat kapayim (BK) is proof that he is a kohen, posits that an issur aseh (prohibition derived from a positive statement) precludes a non-kohen from doing BK. Rashi learns this from, “So shall you bless Bnei Yisrael” (Bamidbar 6:23) – “you (kohanim) and not zarim.” On the other hand, a gemara (Shabbat 118b) tells of R. Yossi who said that even though he was not a kohen, he would listen to his friends if they told him to go up with the kohanim. Tosafot (ad loc.) comments that a zar does not seem prohibited to do BK, except for the matter of an unwarranted beracha.

The Rama/Darchei Moshe (Orach Chayim 128:1) suggests the following reconciliation between the sources. A zar may not do BK without kohanim but is permitted to join them. This approach is not widely accepted (Mishna Berura 128:6).

Acharonim (including Be’ur Halacha to 128:1) ask how may a zar bless his children or friends with the same words of BK, as you asked. We will survey the major answers given.

The Magen Avraham (128:1) and Taz (128:2) suggest another way to understand the derasha excluding non-kohanim – it is not that a zar may not give these blessings, but that he is not required to do so (the matter depends on two opinions in Ketubot 24b). The Pnei Yehoshua (Ketubot 24b) posits that a zar is forbidden to do BK only in the Beit Hamikdash. There are significant questions on this approach (see Keren L’David, OC 24)

Most of the answers recognize the potential of a problem but limit it. The Bach (OC 128) posits that BK is forbidden for a zar only if he raises his hands during it, as kohanim must do to fulfill BK (Sota 38a based on Vayikra 9:22). Otherwise, the zar is not acting like the kohen is supposed to. Is it then okay to bless our children with our hands extended to their heads? The Torah Temima (Bamidbar 6:131) relates that the Gra would only put one hand on the recipient of the beracha so as not to violate the prohibition for the zar, which is with two hands. Rav Yaakov Emden (Siddur Beit Yaakov, p. 153a) says that there is nothing wrong with using two hands. It is unclear if extending hands to the head of the recipient, which was done generally for blessing people (see Bereishit 48:14; Bamidbar 27:23), counts as nesiat kapayim (see Beit Baruch 32:8). 

Some say (see Dirshu 128:10) that since Birkat Kohanim is supposed to be done as part of tefilla (Sota 38b), there is no prohibition if zarim do it in a different context. The Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) does not believe that this helps. Since the prohibition for the zar is from the Torah and the requirement of tefilla for BK is only Rabbinic, the prohibition must exist independent of tefilla.

The Magen Gibborim (Shiltei Gibborim 128:2) says that a zar violates this prohibition only if he intends to do so as a fulfillment of the mitzva of BK, not if he does it because these are nice blessings to bestow on a child or friend. (This is more likely if one needs intent to fulfill a mitzva (Ktav Sofer, OC 14; Be’ur Halacha ibid.)). As long as the one blessing does not make a beracha prior to reciting the p’sukim of BK, it should be quite clear that he is doing it independent of the mitzva of BK, just wishing well to someone he cares about (Kaf Hachayim, OC 128:14).

One might want to be machmir and use one hand for blessing his child (there may be kabbalistic preferences one way or the other – beyond our scope) or have in mind explicitly that he is not doing it as a mitzva of BK. However, I plan to use two hands, like most fathers and as I have always received and given, and feel that my intention is clear enough.

We attribute great religious significance to berachot (see Bava Kama 30a), and therefore try to do things the best way, even though almost no “mistake” here would be a real problem. The competing values involved here make it necessary to appraise net gains and losses. Your system (not putting toppings until after eating) maximizes two values: 1. Making Hamotzi on a complete “loaf” (Berachot 39b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 167:1). 2. Minimizing any break between the beracha and the eating (Shulchan Aruch ibid.). Your friend’s system prioritizes #1 and: 3. The bread should be in an optimal form when taking the first bite (ibid. 5). Let us look at each rule and the interaction between them.

 When one chooses on what bread to make a beracha, its being “whole” is one of the most important factors (Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:1). Prioritizing this versus minimizing the break between the beracha and eating may be a machloket of Amoraim. Rabbi Chiya (Berachot 39a) says that one should break off from the loaf the piece of bread he will eat as he finishes the beracha to minimize the time lapse (Tzelach ad loc.), even though the beracha does not finish with a whole loaf. We pasken like Rava (ibid.), who instructs keeping it whole until the beracha is complete even though this requires a small break to sever the piece after the beracha. It is a worthwhile delay to put some salt or spread on the bread before eating (Shulchan Aruch, OC 167:5). If the bread is of low quality or seasoning, one should put on salt; if it is of a high level, this is unnecessary, but it is permitted (Mishna Berura 167:29) despite the short, food-related break.

This does not mean that we do not care about such breaks between the beracha and eating. Actually, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 1) instructs to cut the loaf partially before the beracha to save the extra time (I estimate 3-4 seconds) to cut the loaf to that point (Mishna Berura 167:4). In order to not lose the wholeness, semi-cut sections must be such that if one lifts the bread from the smaller part, the weight of the heavier part will not cause it to sever. This still somewhat compromises the completeness of the unit, as we see that on Shabbat, where the wholeness is a requirement of lechem mishneh, we do not cut to that extent (Rama, OC 167:1). Still this time-saving technique is deemed worthwhile. While these few seconds would not invalidate the beracha, it is best to avoid them.

While we have seen that improving the taste of the bread can justify a break, your friend expanded the rule in two ways: 1. By not sufficing with a little salt or sauce but adding all the bagel’s toppings you are planning to eat during the meal. 2. By extending the 3-4 second break to add salt to 20-30 seconds for cutting and spreading cream cheese and lox all over the bagel. I have not found a source nor see compelling logic to make these extensions at the expense of waiting. The Mishna Berura (167:27, 29) also implies not to allow such a break, as he mentions allowing a longer break only between netilat yadayim and the beracha. We thus reject your friend’s approach and see yours as the straightforward one.

One benefit that your friend’s approach offers relates to the preference to eat a reasonable amount of bread soon after the beracha (Mishna Berura 167:15). Some people initially have a tiny piece of bagel and then go to get lox and perhaps strike up a conversation before eating “for real.” But in this case, the solution with the benefits and no serious drawbacks is to top your bagel with it cut partially (see above) before the beracha. Then, the beracha is on a whole bagel, at its tastiest, and there is no break. But your way is fine too.

Although mature children generally recite berachot, the consensus of opinions is that a child does not recite Birkat Hagomel (Mishna Berura 219:3; Yalkut Yosef, Orach Chayim 219:3). The reason is not related to Hagomel’s minyan requirement, as a woman can recite Hagomel (see Mishna Berura ibid.; Living the Halachic Process ((=LTHP); V, B-8).  

The source of this halacha is the Maharam Mintz (Shut, 14), who says that since the language of the beracha is that one thanks Hashem for doing kindness (saving his life from danger) for those who deserve punishment (chayavim), it does not apply to children who cannot deserve punishment. Although it is possible that a potential harsh decree could come from his parents demerits, to call them chayavim would be a disgrace of the parents. He is also not in favor of the father making the beracha on the child’s account (see more in LTHP III, B-10).

Mahari Basan (Lachmei Todah 5), cited by many as a minority opinion (the Birkei Yosef 219:1 says that his local minhag did follow him), disagreed. He argues that if the capability of deserving death as divine punishment were a requirement, then adolescents until 20 would also not be able to recite Hagomel. He also points out that we are not supposed to say harsh things about our religious state (Berachot 19a). He claims that chayavim does not mean deserving of death but being in debt, i.e., we have received more from Hashem than we deserve. This can apply to children as well. As mentioned, we do not pasken like the Mahari Basan.

If the reason for children not making the beracha is that we cannot attribute the danger to them, then if one’s danger was over when he was a child, the beracha should not apply, and therefore your son, who will iy”H land safely before his bar mitzva should not make the beracha. It is true that R. Akiva Eiger (to OC 186:2) considers it plausible that one who ate a meal right before he turned bar mitzva and remains satiated after he became bar mitzva might become obligated in Birkat Hamazon on the level of Torah law. We might argue then that since the time of your son’s aliya would be the correct time to recite Hagomel and he should still be thankful, Hagomel should become an obligation. However, this is incorrect for two reasons. For one, R. Akiva Eiger is predicated on the possibility that Birkat Hamazon is fundamentally on the state of satiation, which remains in adulthood. In contrast, here the extrication from danger was over during childhood (Be’er Sarim V:2). Also, since the word chayavim relates to childhood, it is still problematic.

It is likely that the inability to say chayavim is not a mere technical impediment to the beracha. Consider that one can fulfill the mitzva without saying the word chayavim (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 219:4) which is not even in our text of the gemara (Berachot 60a). Rather, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham, intro. to 219) implies that considering the language usually used, Chazal decided not to institute it regarding children, unlike other berachot, and therefore it cannot be created after the event that generates the beracha passes.

Rav S.Z. Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo II, 60) goes further, leaning toward saying that even if the child’s recovery was completed after bar mitzva, he would not recite Hagomel if the time of danger was earlier. (Be’er Sarim (ibid.) goes even further, regarding sickness, but not regarding travel.

In conclusion, since there is solid logic for those who think children should recite Hagomel, plus the fact that he will be bar mitzva at the time one would normally make the beracha, if your son wants, the two of you can have in mind during your recitation of Hagomel that, if appropriate, it relate to him also (see LTHP, II, B-7).

Indeed Shehecheyanu is for important acquisitions; Hatov V’hameitiv is for those that also benefit others (Berachot 59b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:5). The question is how direct the others’ benefit must be.

The gemara (Berachot 59b) says that Hatov V’hameitiv applies to cases where the recipient has a partner, or that it is for him and a friend. The Yerushalmi (Berachot 9:3) says that an individual who receives a nice present recites Hatov V’hameitiv, and the Rosh (Berachot 9:16) explains that the gift giver also benefits, as it is nice to be able to give and to have it accepted. Tosafot (Berachot 59b) sees the two Talmudic sources as contradictory, as the Bavli requires joint ownership to make Hatov V’hameitiv, and the Yerushalmi views side benefit as sufficient. If that is the case, the rule is that we follow the Bavli, that Shehecheyanu would be said, not Hatov V’hameitiv. The Rosh (ibid.) and the Beit Yosef (OC 223:5), though, believe the two sources are compatible, explaining that the Bavli does not mean to require a literal partner but one who joins in the benefit. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) therefore rules that a gift recipient recites Hatov V’hameitiv, whereas many poskim say that Shehecheyanu is said (see Mishna Berura 223:21).

The Mishna Berura (ibid.) recommends resolving the issue in practice by doing Shehecheyanu. The Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) explains that this is the safer choice. First, even if the higher-level beracha of Hatov V’hameitiv is called for, one still fulfills the requirement with Shehecheyanu (similarly to Shehakol being a valid beracha after the fact for all foods). Additionally, there is a respected opinion that when Hatov V’hameitiv is called for, it means Hatov V’hameitiv in addition to Shehecheyanu. According to this opinion, Shehecheyanu is anyway warranted, and we would omit the second beracha of Hatov V’hameitiv due to doubt.

At first glance, your question depends on this machloket. After all, you are the one clear owner/user of the hearing aid who is benefitting directly. It is even possible that the Yerushalmi did not mean that Hatov V’hameitiv is said on all cases of indirect benefit.

Your excellent outlook causes you to assume that at least Shehecheyanu is called for. Those people who dread hearing aids certainly would not make a beracha even if they are very helpful (see Magen Avraham 223:10). It is less certain that people who value that which most people do not make a beracha (see Mishna Berura 223:24).

There is a machloket whether to recite Shehecheyanu on things which serve to rectify or alleviate an unfortunate problem. Avnei Yashfeh (V:41) says to do so for a wheel chair or glasses if they bring him joy. Be’er Moshe (VIII:67) says the same about dentures. He claims that there is a proof from the halacha that when one’s parent dies and he inherits, he makes a beracha on the inheritance despite the tragedy (Berachot 59b). One can deflect that proof, as inheritance is positive and not just rectifying a problem; therefore, it gets a beracha even if accompanies tragedy. This is different from a hearing aid, which just overcomes the ear’s malfunctioning. I have seen accounts of Rav SZ Auerbach (Berachos of Praise, p. 201) and Rav Mazouz (online) saying that one does not make a beracha on medical appliances. There is also an old, although dubious, minhag to make Shehecheyanu only on clothes and not other articles (see Magen Avraham 223:5)  

Your happiness/thankfulness should find expression with a beracha. It is safer to do it by making a Shehecheyanu on something that definitely warrants it and having the hearing aid in mind. However, there is a strong enough case to make Shehecheyanu (not Hatov V’hameitiv) independently if you like, all the more so regarding the latest hearing aids that have uses that go beyond fixing.   

We have to present as full a picture as possible to appreciate the nuances here.

What we call the week of “Sheva Berachot” (=SB) the gemara (Ketubot 4a) calls “the seven days of mishteh (feasting).” This period focuses on a state of simcha and of giving thanks to Hashem (see Ketubot 7a). The most basic part of the simcha is the chatan and kalla spending quality time together (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 64:1). However, the involvement of others in festive meals is also important. For one, a minyan and panim chadashot are required to recite the sheva berachot (=sb) at Birkat Hamazon (Ketubot 7b). More fundamentally, we see from the halacha that a chatan and his entourage are exempt from eating in a sukka throughout SB that having a nice amount of appropriate co-celebrants is a significant consideration, especially at the time of eating (Sukka 25b and Meiri ad loc.).

Poskim broadly assume that there is no full obligation to have sb every day of SB. Many quote Rav Pe’alim (IV, EH 6), and his main source is Ketubot 7b. The baraita states that the sb are recited with a minyan “all seven days,” but Rav Yehuda makes this conditional on the presence of panim chadashot. The Rav Pe’alim infers from the gemara that one is not responsible to bring panim chadashot to have a complete sb.

It is possible to argue that the existence of a nicely attended party (which provides the simcha) is a given, and the variable is whether the party needs the possibility of reciting the berachot. However, Acharonim generally understand that although when sb is held, it is a seudat mitzva, there is no halachic requirement to have sb every day of SB (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 640:14; Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin 83;3; Bemareh Habazak VII:96). The Aruch Hashulchan (late 19^th century, Eastern Europe) reports that it was standard to have only a few sb. He admits that this was not as Chazal’s envisioned SB but explains that the difficult national climate in a difficult exile has worn us out to the point that it is hard to celebrate too much. The Yam Shel Shlomo (Ketubot 1:12) provides similar comments hundreds of years earlier. He justifies halachically that since these meals are in the kalla’s honor, she may waive her right to them. The Nitei Gavriel (contemporary) says that in our times there is a minhag to try to have sheva berachot every day, except when this proves too difficult. Hanisuim K’hilchatam (15:7) relates to the matter similarly but slightly less forcefully. In Bemareh Habazak, we wrote similarly that there is no obligation but that we encourage doing a nice amount of sb.

We will demonstrate a nuanced difference with the help of Sukkot. The mitzva of sukka applies continually during the 168 hours of Sukkot. The more time in the sukka the better, and this applies more or less equally throughout the chag. Regarding lulav, it must be taken each day but Shabbat, but each day, once one finishes doing what needs to be done, there is thereafter little value in taking it more. Nitei Gavriel understands the present-day minhag/preference in terms of one each day, like lulav. In Bemareh Habazak, we talk of a nice amount of celebrating, without stressing if it covers each day. The minhag seems to be to try to align the sb by halachic day, but this is just a preference. Logically, having the most meaningful experience is more important, and one should not get carried away trying to conform to the each-day minhag.

There is an additional element besides our general belief in following minhag. While older sources discuss the chatan’s obligation to arrange his SB, now family and friends do it. Once an act to honor others becomes standard, one who receives sub-standard is likely to be insulted or disappointed. Therefore, while on the one hand, many couples appear to benefit from extra rest and privacy, it is still generally an expected chesed for their loved ones to make the standard amount of sb.

There are too many permutations to cover, but we will concentrate on the principles and the main cases and give you a few references to sources dealing with related complexities.

One of the major rules of berachot on food is that regarding foods with different berachot eaten “together” (which is hard to define in a phrase) we make the beracha of the “main” food (ikar) and are exempt from making the beracha on that which is subservient (tafel) to it (Berachot 41a). This is certainly true when the two foods are ingredients of one combined food, e.g., soups (ibid. 36a). It is far from trivial to determine what the main ingredient is in vegetable soups that have a majority of water, cooked vegetables (in a variety of forms), and sometimes, some chicken or meat (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. VI, B-2,3). We will assume for the purpose of this question that the beracha on the soup without the soup nuts is Borei Pri Ha’adama (=Ha’adama). We will also assume that the soup nuts are made from one the five main grains and that the way it is prepared, its individual beracha is Borei Minei Mezonot (=Mezonot) (V’zot Haberacha p. 397).

One of the major determining factors of what the ikar is that we follow the majority of the mixture (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:7). However, a sub-rule of the laws of ikar and tafel is that if one of the ingredients is from the five grains in the form that its beracha is Mezonot, then even if it is significantly less than a majority of the mixture, the berachot are Mezonot with an after-beracha of Al Hamichya (Berachot 36b; Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2). An exception to this sub-rule is when the purpose of the grain food is of an unimportant, technical nature, such as to make the other food stick together (ibid.; Mishna Berura 212:13) or to “stretch” the more expensive ingredients (e.g., bread crumbs in hamburgers). Therefore, the simple answer is that no matter what the nature of the soup is, if there are Mezonot soup nuts, then it apparently has some taste significance to the person who put them in, and the beracha on the soup is only Mezonot. This is true even if there may be spoonfuls of soup that happen not to have soup nuts in them, although one should be careful that the first spoonful, after making the beracha of the ikar, contain some of the ikar (Rama, OC 212:1 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 10).

The situation is different when the soup nuts play a very minor role in the eating, which would most commonly occur when there are only a small number of them, so that one would make Ha’adama on the soup, as it is not subservient to the soup nuts. This is all the more so regarding soup nuts (as opposed to kneidlach that are cooked in the soup, which is a more complicated question), which are put into the soup in the bowl, after the soup was cooked independently (see Dirshu 205:18). On the other hand, because the soup nuts are from the main grains, they cannot be ignored, and therefore Mezonot is also called for (Mishna Berura 205:11). In such a case, it is better to make the beracha first on the soup without eating any soup nuts right away (even though usually Mezonot has precedence) because if we were to make Mezonot first, we would have a doubt whether the Ha’adama is required for the soup (Mishna Berura 208:23). One can also get out of doubt and/or keep the regular order of berachot if he takes out each element from the bowl and eats them separately (ibid. 205:11). This is easier and more logical to do with kneidlach than with soup nuts or noodles. Regarding the beracha acharona, in a case in which neither is batel to the other, we would also make each beracha separately, if one ate a k’zayit of each within the requisite time (Mishna Berura ibid.).

It is agreed that if one had no interest in the soup nuts and some just happened to have fallen in, then they would be totally ignored (V’zot Haberacha, p. 117) and one would make just Ha’adama and Borei Nefashot on the soup.

It is good to have a set order of practices, which helps avoid the doubt, but these things happen. Regarding one with a doubt whether he recited BKHT, poskim assume that whether or not one has to recite it now depends if BKHT is a Torah-level obligation or a Rabbinic one (see Mishna Berura 47:1). The gemara (Berachot 21a) identifies this as the measuring stick regarding doubt about having recited Kri’at Shema and mentioning yetzi’at Mitzrayim. The same gemara cites p’sukim as sources for the obligations of Birkat Hamazon and BKHT, which many identify as the two berachot of Torah origin (Ramban, Shich’chat Aseh 15). Therefore, the Sha’agat Aryeh (24) and many others rule that one who is in doubt whether he needs to recite BKHT, should do so. He just says (ibid. 25) that since the mitzva from the Torah is fulfilled with one beracha, in a case of doubt we recite only “… asher bachar banu …” Some (Birkei Yosef, OC 47:8- see other opinions in the Mishna Berura ibid.) posit that BKHT is only Rabbinic and that we do not recite in a case of doubt (as we generally say, safek berachot l’hakel).

Although the stronger opinion is to recite BKHT when in doubt, the Mishna Berura (ibid.) suggests the alternative you mentioned – to fulfill the obligation with the beracha before Kri’at Shema – Ahava Raba. While this seems to follow the general halachic “sentiment” to keep things safe, it is not a foregone conclusion that this is fully safe. First, there is a major machloket whether it is permitted to recite P’sukei D’zimra, which consists of Torah texts that are recited as praise in tefilla, before BKHT (see opinions in the Shulchan Aruch, OC 46:9). Indeed, if one realizes in the midst of P’sukei D’zimra that he definitely did not recite BKHT, most rule that he should interrupt P’sukei D’zimra to recite it (Mishna Berura 51:10; Yabia Omer IV, OC 7; Tefilla K’hilchata 9:31).

Another drawback of using Ahava Raba is that it is unclear that it is always done correctly. The gemara (Berachot 11b) does say that after having said Ahava Raba, one no longer needs BKHT, but the Yerushalmi limits it to a case where one learned right afterward. Considering that Kri’at Shema, which comes from the Torah, follows Ahava Raba, wouldn’t this condition be trivial? One of the Beit Yosef’s (OC 47) answers posits that Kri’at Shema does not count, as it is not done for the purpose of learning and/or it is not clearly for that purpose. In the Shulchan Aruch (OC 47:7-8), he cites two opinions on whether one needs to learn something else right after davening and recommends stringency. Although one can wait until the end of Shacharit as long as he does not talk about matters not related to Torah or tefilla in the meantime (Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), the Shulchan Aruch considers it risky to rely on this system to fulfill BKHT.

Your plan to have in mind to fulfill the obligation with Ahava Raba during recitation, while worthwhile to strive for (Mishna Berura 47:1; see Be’ur Halacha to 47:8) is most likely not a requirement (Mishna Berura 47:14; see Be’ur Halacha ibid.). In a case like this of multiple sefeikot (maybe you said BKHT, maybe you had sufficient intent for Ahava Raba, maybe intent is not needed), it is easier to be lenient (see Ishei Yisrael 6:(33)).

The halachically simplest way to get out of doubt (but is not always practical or pleasant) is to find someone who has not yet made the beracha and have him do it for you with intention to include you (Mishna Berura 47:1). While women recite BKHT (Shulchan Aruch, OC 47:14), it is not agreed that she is obligated to do so or at least obligated in the same way as a man. Therefore, while it is plausible that a woman can be motzi a man (Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), one should not rely upon this (see Tzitz Eliezer XV:24).   

The dilemma of choosing the lesser of two evils arises in many cases.

The gemara (Shabbat 4a) rules that one who sticks dough to a hot oven’s wall on Shabbat should scrape it off (usually a Rabbinic prohibition) to save himself from the bigger aveira of chillul Shabbat, whether he placed it there purposely or by mistake (Mishna Berura 254:39). Thus, if beracha l’vatala is a bigger aveira than not waiting six hours between meat and milk, perhaps one should eat a little of the milchig food. (In Shabbat 4a, the baking is continuing during inaction.) The Rama (Orach Chayim 271:5) indeed rules that if one made a beracha on food before Havdala, he should eat.

On the other hand, if a kohen puts teruma into his mouth and finds out it is forbidden food, he must spit it out (Rambam, Terumot 10:13, based on mishna, Terumot 8:2). Some say it is referring even to cases in which the teruma is only Rabbinically forbidden and even when he made a beracha and did not eat yet (see Michtav L’chizkiyahu I:5, regarding one who accepted upon himself not to eat before learning and made a beracha). After all, it is difficult to mandate positively doing a forbidden action to fix a problematic action already done accidentally (Michtav L’chizkiyahu ibid.). We could then learn that one may not eat even a little of Rabbinically forbidden food to avoid a beracha l’vatala (ibid.).

How serious is a beracha l’vatala? The Rambam (Berachot 1:15, cited by the Shulchan Aruch, OC 215:4) describes it as a Torah prohibition of saying Hashem’s Name in vain. Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33a) posits that it is Rabbinic (praising Hashem any time, any way, is not in vain), and many concur. It is not, then, clear that beracha l’vatala is worse than the forbidden eating. Also, the Rama relates to a case where the food is permitted, just one must wait until after Kiddush or Havdala, which may make it more lenient (see Tosafot, Pesachim 106b). Milk after meat is tricky to define. On the one hand, the milchig food is permitted. On the other hand, the prohibition is based on treating it like eating milk and meat mixed together i.e., a forbidden food, (Yechaveh Da’at IV:41).

For another reason, eating some of the food might not help. One may not make a beracha on forbidden food (Shulchan Aruch, OC 196:1), so even if one ate the food, it may still be a beracha l’vatala. While the Rama felt it helped regarding eating before Havdala, the above distinction is relevant. Perhaps the beracha is not l’vatala on a permitted food before Havdala, but is l’vatala for Rabbinic meat-milk (Yechaveh Da’at ibid.). Even regarding a time-based minhag like fleishig food in the Nine Days, some opinions forbid eating even after the beracha was made (Yechaveh Da’at ibid.).

However, our case has mitigating factors. It is far from a Torah-level prohibition since the foods are not cooked together and especially if the fleishig is poultry. Even Rabbinically, eating milchig after fleishig is forbidden explicitly only at the same meal (Chulin 105a). The strongest reason to be lenient (see Yechaveh Da’at ibid.) is that after an hour has passed, we are not even sure eating milchig is forbidden at all (see Rama, Yoreh Deah 89:1). Note that while one may not feed forbidden food to small children, the consensus is that waiting an hour after meat is enough.

We found no one recommending using the beracha for a permitted food. Many rule that if one made a beracha on a food and it got lost before eating, he can use the beracha for another food, but only if it is the same type of food and it was before them during the beracha (Rama, OC 206:6; Mishna Berura 206:26). It is interesting that leniency on broadening the efficacy of the beracha is not the best alternative.

In conclusion, we recommend that if an hour passed from eating meat, one should eat a little of the milchig food; within an hour, one should just recite “Baruch shem …”

The gemara (Berachot 58b) says that upon seeing a friend after separation, after thirty days he recites Shehecheyanu and after twelve months, “… mechayei hameitim”. According to most opinions, if one recites the latter, he does not recite the former (Magen Avraham 225:2; Mishna Berura 225:4). The berachot are predicated on the assumption of significant joy over the reunion, making it logical that it is only for friends one is fond of (Tosafot 58b), and even very fond of (Shulchan Aruch, OC 225:1).

Shehecheyanu is a common, general beracha for a wide variety of happy experiences. Mechayei Hameitim is surprising for this context, as its daily usage relates to belief in Hashem literally resurrecting the dead, not reuniting with a live person. The Mishna Berura (ibid.) is among those who explain that since after twelve months, Rosh Hashana has passed, in which a person’s fate was decided, one can be happy that his friend survived. There is precedent for a celebratory beracha for another’s survival (Berachot 54b regarding Hagomel).

Mechayei Hameitim’s unique nature may help explain why people do not commonly recite it (as reported by the Ben Ish Chai (I, Eikev 13) and many others) in this context with the full formula, including Hashem’s Name, known as shem u’malchut. (People often say “baruch mechayei hameitim” as a half-joke upon seeing someone after a long absence). The Panim Meirot (I:65) says that since it is borrowed from Shemoneh Esrei, where it lacks the full formula, it is recited without Hashem’s Name. The Ben Ish Chai explains that it is because not everyone about whom it would be said appreciates the comparison.

Finally, in regard to your question, the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 225:2) says that since the beracha relates to resolving the doubt whether a friend is alive, if one communicated with him during the twelve months, he does not recite it. The Mishna Berura (ibid. 2) cites a machloket Acharonim about this and says not to make a beracha due to safek even regarding Shehecheyanu. However, Yechaveh Da’at (IV:17) takes issue with him because the logic (see Aruch Hashulchan ibid.) and sources (Halachot Ketanot I:120 gives a different explanation) on the matter apply only to Mechayei Hameitim.

Therefore, we cannot recommend reciting Mechayei Hameitim in your case. Shehecheyanu is a much more plausible option, for the happiness of seeing someone for the first time in [well over] thirty days, as Yechaveh Da’at ibid. and Yaskil Avdi (OC 25:3) recommend. Many poskim are against even Shehecheyanu and even if the two were not in touch, as not every friendship qualifies for the beracha. This approach is augmented by the opinion that such a Shehecheyanu is not mandatory (see Yechaveh Da’at ibid.). Although you seem close, Chesed La’alafim (OC 225:15) and Nimukei Orach Chayim (225:1) say that since if the beracha were commonplace in this context, people would be embarrassed not to recite Shehecheyanu for a friend even if they are not close, the minhag developed to stop saying it for friends. Perhaps for a close relative this is not a concern (ibid.). Regarding a child-in-law, the question is interesting. On the one hand, the relationship is often very close. On the other hand, it is not as emotionally intense, and since it varies greatly from family to family, it makes sense to be concerned about embarrassment and opt for a lo plug without a beracha. Also, while Zoom is not like seeing in person, it might reduce the excitement of subsequently seeing in person and precludes the beracha (see ibid.). The stronger claim is that it does not preclude excitement in person, so that the beracha is appropriate.

In summary, while Shehecheyanu is probably called far, those who opt for halachic caution can thank Hashem (important) informally (see Birkat Habayit 24:1).

Considering the need to react to a mistake, you got a lot of things right, which we will now review. We will start with your assumption that your recitation of Yotzer Ohr was valid, and later we will revisit that assumption and its ramifications.

While it is hard to quantify such matters, one should not have tefillin on when there is even a small/modest chance that he might release gas (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 37:3; Mishna Berura 30:4). The most important time to have tefillin on is for Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:4). After starting Baruch She’amar, when breaks are permitted only for important reasons, the best place to make important interruptions is between Yishtabach and Kaddish (with a minyan, other than for a chazan) or Yotzer Ohr (by oneself) (see Rama, OC 54:3). Even at this point (and certainly in your case), though, one should recite only the berachot and Baruch shem … and not the additional p’sukim (Ishei Yisrael 16:26*). While other possibilities exist, as we shall see (see also Mishna Berura 53:5), your plan makes great sense.

Finding yourself in the midst of putting on tefillin in the midst of one of birchot Kri’at Shema (Yotzer Ohr ends with “Yotzer Hame’orot”) indeed raises questions. One does not make a beracha on tefillin in the middle of a section/beracha, and unless it is during Kri’at Shema, one should wait until the next beracha break to put on the tefillin with the berachot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:2; Be’ur Halacha ad loc.; Mishna Berura ad loc. 15; Ishei Yisrael 19:13). There is a minority opinion (see Mishna Berura 54:13) that recommends putting on the tefillin at the first opportunity, even in the middle of a beracha, and making the beracha on them after touching them at the next break. You anyway had little to gain, with the tefillin already on (see opinions in Dirshu 66:5), by reciting L’haniach Tefillin before Yotzer Hame’orot, so waiting had logic.

In your case, though, there was another factor. One must not speak between the tefillin shel yad and tefillin shel rosh, which you did with the entire beracha of Yotzer Ohr. The severe issue (Sota 44b) is based on the fact that the break creates an artificial need for an extra beracha (Mishna Berura 25:28), but that did not apply to you. You did not make the beracha in the first place and should have recited the same L’haniach Tefillin (for the ongoing mitzva of the shel yad) and Al Mitzvat Tefillin (followed by Baruch shem k’vod … - Ishei Yisrael 19:13) for the shel rosh. There is no problem per se with having only one of the tefillin on for extended periods, and when necessary this is prescribed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 26:1). Nevertheless, it is relatively important to do the two in proximity to each other (Mishna Berura ibid.).

Therefore, we would have recommended to put on the shel rosh without berachot and make up both berachot after Yotzer Hame’orot. Although we generally want a mitzva’s berachot to precede the mitzva (Pesachim 7b), there are agreed precedents that the beracha on the tefillin will come later. One example is one who is traveling precariously before the time for tefillin (Shulchan Aruch, OC 30:3), and another is one whose tefillin arrive right between Ga’al Yisrael and Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:8). On the other hand, neither setup is perfect and neither is forbidden, and therefore what you did was also reasonable.

As promised, we will return to discuss the mistaken beracha next time.

[Last time we saw that in the midst of Birkat Yotzer Ohr, there were two reasonable ways to time putting on the shel rosh and making the berachot.]

Had you switched the beracha to L’hani’ach Tefillin within toch k’dei dibur (app. two seconds), you probably could have combined the beracha opening with the intended, preferable wording and ignored Yotzer Ohr (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 209:2). Having not done so, were you truly in the midst of the beracha of Yotzer Ohr and were correct in continuing with it or was the unintended beracha of Yotzer Ohr worthless?

It might seem to depend on the question (see Berachot 13a; Megilla 17a) of mitzvot tzrichot kavana (are mitzvot valid b’di’eved if the right action was done without intention to fulfill the mitzva?). While the ruling is not fully clear, especially concerning a Rabbinic mitzva, including almost all berachot, the main current is that one does not fulfill the mitzva (Shulchan Aruch, OC 60:4 and Mishna Berura 60:10). Also, it is possible that a beracha made with a different beracha in mind is worse (see Tosafot, Berachot 12a). Furthermore, arguably a “slip of the tongue” (you apparently went from Yishtabach to Yotzer Ohr on “auto pilot”) might be considered mitasek, which is worse than lack of intent (see Rosh Hashana 32b). On the other hand, this case might be better than classic mitasek, as you intended to praise Hashem with a beracha, albeit a different one.

Whether your Yotzer Ohr was valid might depend on how one learns a Magen Avraham (209:5). Writing about one who recites Malbish Arumim with Poke’ach Ivrim in mind and then immediately inserts Pokeiach Ivrim, the Magen Avraham is unsure which beracha he fulfills. If he had intended for Malbish Arumim and then tried to “erase” it in favor of Pokeiach Ivrim, he fulfilled Malbish Arumim. The Panim Meirot (I:58) changes the text in the Magen Avraham because one can correct a mistaken recitation immediately (Shulchan Aruch, OC 209:2 about one who recited Borei Pri Hagafen on water), and the Magen Avraham says that one who mistakenly recited, at Havdala, Borei Me’orei Ha’eish before Borei Minei Besamim can correct to Borei Minei Besamim. The Dagul Meirevava keeps our text and distinguishes as follows. In the case of water and of besamim, the object he held during the beracha proved he made a mistake, which enables him to switch to the correct beracha. In contrast, regarding Pokeiach Ivrim/Malbish Arumim, there is no physical indication the beracha was mistaken and therefore, it is unclear if he can change it. The Yad Ephrayim (ad loc.) makes a different distinction. Because Borei Pri Hagefen on water is nonsensical, moving on from Borei Pri Hagefen is natural, whereas regarding Malbish Arumim and Pokeiach Ivrim, which are both appropriate berachot, it might not be possible to switch, as the originally recitation takes effect. Our case contains a split between the distinctions. On the one hand, Yotzer Ohr and L’hani’ach Tefillin were both appropriate at that point, but being about to fasten the tefillin made it clear you did not intend then for Yotzer Ohr.

The above, though, is moot. Since Yotzer Ohr is a long beracha, even if lack of intention invalidates its beginning, the continuation of the beracha validated it. If you would have stopped for L’hani’ach Tefillin, you would have given up on the beracha you began, making it l’vatala, so it was good you continued. It might have been better to repeat “yotzer ohr…” (without “Baruch ata…), with kavana, but the beracha, as you did it, was valid b’di’eved.

There are two reasons for mzm to recite aloud parts of BHM.

The original institution of zimun was for only mzm to say BHM, with the others being yotzei by listening. The practice has developed that rarely is one person motzi others with reciting a text when not necessary. The reason is that being motzi is not easy, because it requires intention on both sides (Mishna Berura 8:13), concentration of the one listening (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 183), and likely also the latter’s understanding of the Hebrew text (Mishna Berura 183:28). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 183:7) says that although everyone should recite BHM, it is proper for the others to do so silently at the same pace that the mzm does it aloud, thus uniting them in a way that resembles full zimun (Mishna Berura 183:27).

The above is not a requirement, and the broad minhag is not to do so. Some explain the advantages. If they listen to mzm as they recite it, they may not concentrate well and might not have in mind to do be yotzei with their own recitation (see Avnei Yaakov 31). We do not recommend, in places it is unusual, for mzm to read the whole BHM aloud. Beyond the plusses and minuses, it is also likely to give the impression of “holier than thou.”

It is somewhat common to tone down the above by reciting only the ends of the berachot. While listening/responding to this is insufficient to be yotzei, there may be value in joining for BHM’s most important parts, and it gives people the z’chut of answering amen (see Shabbat 119b). It is positive to do this. If the responders do not keep pace with mzm, it is unclear if they should answer amen to mzm in the midst of a beracha (see Mishna Berura 183:30; Dirshu 183:24; Yeshuot Moshe III:19).

The other element of reading aloud applies only to the first beracha (“… hazan et hakol”). Rav Nachman (Berachot 46a) says that zimun ends before BHM’s first beracha; Rav Sheshet says that the first beracha is part of zimun. (It is not a full part of zimun, as we recite it even without one, but Rav Sheshet requires zimun to be connected to the beginning of BHM (Tosafot ad loc.).) One difference between the opinions is until what point one who stops eating to answer zimun has to wait before resuming eating (ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 200:2, based on the Rif and Rambam) rules like Rav Nachman. The Rama (ad loc.) paskens like Rav Sheshet, that one waits until hazan et hakol to resume eating. Likely, another difference between them is whether mzm recites the first beracha aloud (see Beit Yosef, OC 183).