ASK THE RABBI

The Torah, in describing the laws of teruma, refers only to grains, wine, and olive oil (Devarim 18:4). The Rambam (Terumot 2:1) says that these are only examples of vegetation that are eaten by people, but all edible species of vegetation which a field’s owner will protect require teruma to be taken. Rashi (Berachot 36a) and the Ra’avad (Ma’aser 1:8) say that other than the aforementioned foods, teruma on other fruits and vegetables is only rabbinic. In any case, fruits and vegetables that grow in the Jewish-owned ground of Eretz Yisrael require teruma on some level.

The question then is whether spices are foods in this regard. The gemara (Pesachim 44a), in distinguishing between different levels of teruma obligation, says that teruma on tavlin (spices) is rabbinic. Thus, it appears that it is not from the Torah but does have a practical requirement nonetheless. Indeed, there are there are many classical sources that indicate this. The mishna and gemara (Nidda 50a) equate between something being considered a food in regard to being susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity) and requiring teruma.

The gemara (Yoma 81b) says that one who chews the type of pepper that is used as a spice (pilpeli) on Yom Kippur does not fully violate the prohibition to eat. The gemara asks from sources that indicate that the prohibition of orlah applies to pilpeli and distinguishes between different types of pilpeli. The laws of orlah are ostensibly parallel in these regards to the laws of teruma, as each depends on the categorization as being fit for human consumption as a food. In order to reconcile the various different sources together, Tosafot makes the following distinction. There are two types of spices. There are some like onions that, while they can be used as a spice, are also eaten as a food (or the main element of a food – see Nidda 51b).

This approach seems to work well within the Rambam as well. On one hand, he does not mention as a rule that there is teruma for tavlin. On the other hand, he mentions it in the context of a few spices, including onions (see Tzufnat Pa’aneach, Terumot 2:2). In the laws of Ma’aser Sheni (7:9), he says that those things that are grown only for their color, their smell, or their taste cannot be bought with the money of ma’aser sheni, which have to be things that “are the food of humans” (ibid. 7:3 - the same requirement as for teruma.) The list of those non-foods includes the pilpeli we have mentioned before.

Several acharonim mention and seem to accept Tosafot’s distinction, including the Chatam Sofer (Chulin 6a), the Chazon Ish (Ma’asrot 1:21), Igrot Moshe (IV, 74.18), and Shevet Halevi (II, 196). Therefore, it appears that spices that are used only to give a taste and not to be eaten as a food do not require teruma. (Rav M. Eliyahu holds that if the spices are grown purposely to be used they require teruma in any case.) Specifically regarding mint, since it has begun to be used as a food, as it put in a salad, it appears that they do require teruma. (This response does not go into such factors as to whether the vegetation grows directly in the ground or in a pot and whether it is grown indoors or outdoors, which are beyond our present scope.)

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There is more literature on the topic and more variations of cases than we can deal with in this forum. For further source material and background, see Encyclopedia Hilchatit Refu’it (Steinberg) on Nituach Hamet.

A few Talmudic sources indicate that it is generally forbidden to perform autopsies yet may leave the door open for some forms of investigating the deceased’s body in certain cases. The gemara (Bava Batra 154a-b) discusses an adolescent who sold inherited property and died, and a dispute arose as to whether he had the physical signs of maturity necessary to make the sale binding. The gemara says that the body check is nivul (degrading) and his relatives were forbidden to carry it out, but it might be justified for the buyers, whose purchase was challenged, to have it done. The gemara (Chulin 11b) in discussing whether we can rely on probabilities, discusses the fact that we kill a murderer even though it is conceivable that the victim previously was a treifa (had a mortal physical flaw). The gemara suggests that we would be able to check the corpse to save the murderer despite the nivul involved. A final source is a gemara in Arachin (7a) that when a woman dies in advanced labor, a post-mortem cesarean may be done to extract the baby.

Besides the problem of nivul, there are also Torah-level issues of pushing off burial or not burying (parts of) the body, but we leave those issues to other forums. (See Rav Yisraeli’s thoughts in Amud Hay’mini, siman 34. [We have begun a series on it in this week’s Moreshet Shaul.])

Almost all agree that an autopsy may be performed if needed for pikuach nefesh (to save a life). However, it is questionable what constitutes pikuach nefesh, something that both poskim and the general medical ethics community have debated. The first responsum on the topic, the Noda B’Yehuda (II, Yoreh Deah 210), deals with doing an autopsy to learn from possible mistakes made during an operation to prevent their repeat in the future. He says that this is permitted if there is a sick person before us who can benefit from the information. A general hope that the information might someday be useful is insufficient. The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 208:7) stresses the element of the chances the information will save lives in the short-term, as if one considers any theoretical future need as pikuach nefesh, countless perceived needs would regularly push off Shabbat.

Other justifications of autopsies are controversial from a fundamental perspective. The aforementioned gemara in Bava Batra implies that one can cause some level of nivul in order to safeguard the monetary rights of non-relatives of the deceased. The Tzitz Eliezer (XIV, 83) uses this idea to allow a hospital that lent a costly pacemaker to a patient to posthumously cut his skin and remove it. However, this would be possible only because the deceased may have had an unfulfilled obligation (Binyan Tziyon 170). It may also be crucial if the deceased agreed in his lifetime to allow himself to be disgraced after death for a certain reason (ibid.). Consequently some rule that if the deceased acquired life insurance that will be paid only if an autopsy is performed, this can be done (see discussion in Encyclopedia Hilchatit Refu’it (Hebrew) vol. V, p. 623). Finding information for criminal investigations is another issue which is not clear-cut and depends on the case’s particulars (see ibid. p. 629)

We have not discussed all the issues or given clear practical guidelines. The general rule is that religious Jews do not allow autopsies and when a specific issue arises, “rabbis with broad shoulders” should be consulted. We do not want this abbreviated survey to change that reality.

We will explore three halachic issues, starting with lashon hara. If one sees Reuven wronging Shimon monetarily, he may take steps to protect Shimon’s rights at the expense of defaming Reuven if seven conditions are met (Chafetz Chayim, Lashon Hara 10). If you were sure of what you saw, the only questionable condition here is the need to rebuke the culprit in a soft manner before causing him embarrassment in order to give him the opportunity to rectify the matter without embarrassment (ibid. based on Rambam, De’ot 6:8). If that proves ineffective, you would not have to worry about lashon hara before approaching the driver and enabling him to rectify the situation.

The next question is whether it is permitted or required to take such steps. In general, there is a mitzva from the Torah to rebuke for a sin (Vayikra 19:17). It makes little difference whether one rebukes in order to encourage possible rectification or to cause remorse and a decision not to repeat the sin (like the steps of teshuva we know of from our preparations for Yom Kippur). This mitzva is strongly related to the responsibility of afrushei mei’isura, to distance our counterpart from sin. In your case, the youngsters continued to illegally make use of the bus apparently with no intention to pay. Yet, if one thinks about it, we have ample opportunities to rebuke people on the bus, and, for better or for worse, we rarely do so. For example, if we someone eating without a beracha or telling lashon hara, we have an, at least theoretical, obligation to rebuke him and/or prevent the continuation of the sin. Our general working assumption is that since our generation is not proficient at rebuking and receiving rebuke, respectively, we have more to lose than to gain by doing so. One could argue that a clear man-to-man sin such as sneaking onto a bus is one that everyone would admit is inexcusable and the rebuke would work. However, many, likely including the youngsters you saw, are able to rationalize away such activity or don’t care if it is wrong.

The final issue is hashavat aveida (returning something lost). Although the most famous discussions of hashavat aveida refer to physical objects, the mitzva refers to a variety of actions that need to be taken to prevent loss to our friend. For example, if one sees that his friend’s property is in danger of being damaged, he must protect it (Bava Metzia 31a). Furthermore, it appears that according to at least most poskim, one is required to take steps to enable his friend to receive the money he is owed. One example is that, in addition to the specific mitzva to testify on a friend’s behalf, several poskim say that the general mitzva of hashavat aveida also mandates testimony (Netivot Hamishpat 28:1; Sha’ar Mishpat 28:2; see Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 1:(63-65)). No matter how we classify the aveira of getting on a bus without paying (stealing for using property without permission, withholding fees due, etc.; analysis is beyond our present scope), Egged deserves to be paid and your action could have ostensibly enabled them to receive payment.

However, it is likely that you were still not required to do so. First of all, it is likely that even if the driver would have decided to confront the cheats, they would have gotten off the bus rather than pay, and thus the money would not have been gained. More fundamentally, though, one is not required to put himself in a situation of significant embarrassment in order to do hashavat aveida (Berachot 19b). Since asking the offender to pay and/or going to the bus driver to snitch is likely to be a very upsetting experience, you were likely exempt from doing it.

There is no problem in using the broken pieces of glass and making a mosaic with them.

The Talmud discusses which Torah portion is read on holidays and festivals. However, there isn’t any relationship mentioned regarding the Torah portion read on the Sabbath, neither their number nor the opening and closing dates of the Torah reading. The exception is the general principle that one should finish reading the admonitions mentioned in Bechukotai before Shavuot, and the reading of the admonitions in the Book of Devarim before Rosh Hashanah. It is probable that only towards the Amoraic period was there a consensus to begin the cycle of reading immediately at the end of the festival period in Tishrei.

1.                 No such consensus was made regarding the division of the Torah into weekly Sedrot and their arrangement on a calendar. Instead, every Sage in his town and country composed and divided the Torah portions according to how he saw fit. The ways of dividing the Torah portions was not a fixed halachah but rather a custom.

2.                 In Rav Amram Gaon’s Siddur are recommendations for “intermediate stops” – on Shabbat days in which everyone reads a particular Torah portion:

a.        One should read the portion of Tzav before Passover. Therefore, the completion of reading the Book of Shemot should take place on the Shabbat before Rosh Chodesh Nisan.

b.        One should read the portion of Bamidbar on the Shabbat before Shavuot. Therefore, the completion of the reading of the Book of Vayikrah should take place on the Shabbat prior to the eve of Rosh Chodesh Sivan.

c.        One should read the portion of V’etchanan after Tisha B’Av. One should complete the reading of the Book of Bamidbar no later than 2 Av.

d.        One should read the portion of Nitzavim prior to Rosh Hashanah.

3.                 Ashkenazi and northern French communities preserved the above rules. They thus divided the reading into 49 weekly portions, a division that is appropriate for a simple year (a year that doesn’t contain a leap month). Their division of the portions is identical to our division. However, the five portions of Metzorah, Kedoshim, Bechukotai, Masei, and Vayeilech are always combined with the previous week’s portions. (AchareiMot-Kedoshim, Behar Bechukotai, etc.) In a year that contains a leap month, an additional four to five Shabbats are added to the year. It follows that the portions read in an ordinary year during the month of Iyyar – Tetzaveh, Ki Tisa, Vayakhel, and Pekudei – were divided and are read individually on two Shabbats. The advantage of this method is apparent: Each portion has its set place throughout the year, and all the changes are concentrated during the two months of Adar.

4.                 Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon has a different method for arranging the Torah portions: there are 54 portions, like our division. In order to fit the number of Shabbats to the number of Torah portions, he offers to combine certain portions: Vayakhel-Pekudei, Tazriah-Metzorah, Acharei-Kedoshim, Bahar-Bechukotai, Netzavim-Vayeileich; by other portions, one reads three portions in two Shabbats (Korach and half of Balak, half of Balak and Pinchas). It isn’t completely linked to the four principles mentioned by Rav Amram Gaon. Generally speaking, it allows the community to decide among the above portions which they prefer to combine or keep separate. This contrasts with the Ashkenazi communities which adhere to [specific] rules. Therefore, they are obliged to divide the portions in the Book of Shemot.

5.                 Rabbi Avraham Bar Chiya HaNasi (RaBach, Spain, the 11^th and 12^th Centuries) combines the view of Rav Saadya Gaon and the method of the Ashkenazi communities: he accepts the four principles of Rav Saadya Gaon in simple years. However, in years with leap months, he adapts the first principle so that the portion of Metzorah will be read before Passover. In this manner, he succeeds in preserving the division of the Torah into 54 sections, in accordance with Rav Saadya Gaon – to combine the portions of Vayakhel-Pekudei, Tazriah-Metzorah, etc. However, in contrast to Rav Saadya Gaon, he doesn’t accept dividing the portion of Balak in half. Instead, he suggests combining the portions of Shelach with Korach or Matot with Masei. Due to the firmness in reading the portion of Metzorah in leap years, sometimes one is forced to divide one portion from the Book of Bereishit or Shemot, and to read it during two Shabbats (he mentions that some are accustomed to divide the portion of Mishpatim, some divide Ki Tisa, while others divide Vayeira).

6.                 Rabbeinu Tam, Rashi’s grandson, was accustomed to make changes in accordance with the method of Rabach. Rabbeinu Tam’s  method is popular and became the accepted and popular custom in our times, as well. According to Rabbeinu Tam, one shouldn’t divide portions at all, what would require a change in Rav Amram Gaon’s first principle: in simple years, one should read the portion of Tzav before Passover; in leap years, one should read Metzorah; and in some of the leap years, one should read Acharei Mot. In those years when Acharei Mot is read, one will be forced to deviate from the second principle, as well, and read the portion of Naso before Shavuot instead of reading the portion of Bamidbar. An additional change is that instead of combining Shelach with Korach, one should combine Chukat with Balak.

7.                 The principles to determine when to combine the portions and when to separate them:

a.        The portions of Vayakhel-Pekudei, Tazriah-Metzorah, Acharei-Kedoshim, Bahar-Bechukotei, Matot-Masei: in simple years, the portions are combined, except from a complete year in which Passover falls on Saturday night. In such a case, Vayakhel should be read separately from Pekudei. In Eretz Yisrael, one separates Bahar from Bechukotei when [the holiday of] Passover falls on Shabbat. In leap years, the portions are separated, except when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat or Passover falls on Thursday. In such cases, one combines Matot with Masei. In the Diaspora, one combines Matot with Masei, even when Passover falls on Shabbat.

b.        The portions of Chukat and Balak are combined in the Diaspora when Passover falls on Thursday.

c.        The portions of Nitzavim and Vayeilech are read separately when Rosh Hashanah falls on Monday or Tuesday.

The Rama (Yoreh Deah 265:11) cites from the Maharil (Mila 1, based on R. Peretz) and accepts the minhag not to have one person be the sandek for more than one child in a family.

The Maharil explains the matter as follows. The sandek, who holds the baby during the brit, is like one who offers the daily ketoret (incense) in the Beit Hamikdash. Regarding the ketoret service, the mishna (Yoma 26a) says that only a kohen who had never offered ketoret in the past was a candidate. The gemara (ad loc.) explains that this is because the bringing of the ketoret makes one rich. Thus, we “spread the wealth.” The same, say the Maharil and the Rama, is true of a sandek.

However, very important Acharonim question how authentic and binding this minhag is. The Noda B'Yehuda (I, YD 86) starts off by saying that there is no Talmudic source for it and that the rationale provided was not the source but helped justify post facto a custom that had developed. The Gra also questions its Talmudic logic. He asks that if the comparison to ketoret were true, then one should not be sandek twice, even for babies from different families, whereas the minhag allows it. He also argues that the lack of anecdotal evidence of a correlation between serving as a sandek and wealth raises questions about the sources. (Some respond that wealth can come in different forms.) The Gra, though, does not reject the minhag but says that the real source for it is the kabbalistic “Will of Rav Yehuda Hachasid.”

The Noda B’Yehuda also accepts the minhag and suggests the following midrash as a source for the comparison to ketoret. The midrash (Yalkut Shimoni, Lech Lecha) says that when Avraham’s household underwent mila, they piled up the foreskins. Hashem remarked that the resulting stench was as welcome before Him as ketoret. He notes (based on Yoma 26a) that ketoret’s enriching factor is the fact that it is a rare mitzva. On one hand, that does not apply to mila, which are abundant in K’lal Yisrael. On the other hand, though, since the pool of potential sandeks is so great, it is a rare occurrence for the individual to be a sandek, just as it is for a kohen to bring ketoret. In contrast, because the small number of mohelim each perform frequent britot, it is not enriching for them, and there is no need to limit a mohel to one per family. Despite his explanation, the Noda B’Yehuda claims that not all communities accept the minhag and mentions that some communities have the rabbi be sandek at all britot.

The Chatam Sofer (Shut OC 158) deflects some of the questions and finds his own midrashic source. He responds that the minhag of having the rabbi be sandek at all the britot does not weaken the minhag. Just as regarding ketoret, the kohen gadol can bring it as he desires, so too one community leader can be the permanent choice, whereas regular people would be limited to once.

This brings us to the matter of possible exceptions to the rule. There are minority opinions that: 1) relatives can be sandek more than once (Yad Shaul 265, cited in Yechave Da’at III, 77); 2) only during a single year should one not be a sandek twice (according to some, even for different families) (Birkei Yosef, citing the minhag of Solonika); 3) the father serving as sandek himself, who thus is not giving the honor to anyone, can do so for as many of his children as he likes (Torat Chayim (Zonnenfeld) 15) (however, it  is rare these days for the baby’s father be sandek even once).

In summary, those who do not have a kabbalistic orientation need not take this matter so seriously, and one need not intervene if another decides to ignore the minhag. However, except when there is a pressing need to reuse a sandek (e.g., in a remote location, where there are very few G-d fearing people), it makes most sense to follow the accepted minhag of one nuclear family having a different sandek for each child.        

We will not discuss potential claims of negligence in not ascertaining the customs’ rules, nor the question whether it is permitted to buy cigarettes for someone and how that could impact on the case. You have understandably not raised either issue, as you were a partner to both decisions. While it is plausible that the extra three cartons prompted customs to act, that is too theoretical a possibility to base oneself on.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 183:6, based on Bava Kama 99a) says that if a shaliach (agent) sold more property than he was authorized to, the sale is valid but only in regard to the amount he was authorized. As there is no reason to distinguish between buying and selling, we should say that the extra three cartons should be your roommate’s loss. (We would calculate your six cartons according to the price it would have cost, not two-thirds of the discount price.)  However, perhaps since he bought them on your behalf and assuming you would have accepted them had he made it safely through customs, it was, for all intents and purposes, your cigarettes that were confiscated.

The Shulchan Aruch (CM 183:5) says that if a shaliach bought barley instead of wheat, then, if there is gain from the change, the meshale’ach (the one who appointed the agent) gains and if there is loss, the agent loses. The Shach (ad loc.:9, citing the Mabit 179) says that the shaliach loses when the loss is from price fluctuations but if an oness (faultless circumstance) unrelated to the mistake caused the incorrectly obtained object to be lost, the meshale’ach absorbs the loss. The Mabit exempts the shali’ach in a case where bandits took merchandise, some of which was not requested. This is difficult because, until he agrees to accept that which was bought, the meshale’ach would seem to not own the merchandise. Some commentaries argue with the Mabit (see K’tzot Hachoshen 183:5) or apply his ruling to limited cases (Netivot Hamishpat 183:7). In any case, the Mabit will not help your roommate, as here the oness, would not have affected the three extra cartons had they not been purchased. Therefore, you have every right to reject the purchase, which ended up causing you a loss.

We might have suggested that since your roommate did you a favor, it is not morally proper to charge him for an honest mistake / reasonable decision he made with noble intentions. However, since you too were just doing a favor (and your three friends are, for whatever reason, not going to pay) and you are already incurring a significant loss, you may hold your roommate to the apparent halacha that he will have to absorb the loss between the price of six cartons and what he paid.

You are correct that the Torah associates the destruction of the First Temple with the sin of not observing the seventh Sabbatical year.  This connection is not only in the sources that you mentioned, but is in the Torah itself as well, see Vayikra (Leviticus) 26:43.  The Book of Daniel contains prophecies about the forthcoming destruction of the Second Temple, such as Daniel 9:25-26.  In addition, the Book of Daniel also makes reference to the intensity and duration of the upcoming exile, in the many references to the ferocity of the “Fourth Beast” or “Fourth Kingdom.”  For example see Daniel chapters 2 and 7. 

Regarding the reasons for the destruction of the Temple and exile, the Talmud offers several suggestions.  In Tractate Yomah 9b, the Rabbis suggest that the destruction was the result of baseless hatred between Jews.  In Tractate Gitin 55b-58a, the Rabbis bring a series of stories where someone’s wrongdoing hastened the destruction.  On a positive note, in Tractate Pesachim 87b, there is a suggestion that the current exile has been so long in order to provide an opportunity for converts to be absorbed into the Jewish people.

Regarding attending a stand-up comedy routine:

In attending such a performance, the main problem could be a situation of moshav leitzim, attending a session of scoffers. The Talmud, Avodah Zara 18b states: The Rabbis taught, “One who goes to stadiums [bullfights] or a siege around a city where one sees sorcerers, snake charmers and all types of levity is considered a session of scoffers, upon which the verse states (Tehillim 1: 1-2) “Happy is the man who… only went in the desire of Hashem’s Torah.” From this it is derived that these things bring a person to neglect his Torah.

It seems that there are two problems in this matter:

1.                Neglecting one’s Torah learning. This is deduced from the connection between the verses and from the Talmud’s emphasis from the passage that we cited. Nevertheless, it seems that there isn’t a problem here from the point of view of the actual time invested in this endeavor. [The problem is] rather that this brings a man to be idle from Torah – i.e., in addition to a man’s time investment in the matter, there is concern that involvement in such forms of frivolity and entertainment will bring him to a general weakening of his involvement in Torah learning (perhaps this is why the verse describes a man that will dwell in a session of scoffers, in which a situation contrary to the verse’s “in the desire of Hashem’s Torah will be created). Hence, this matter is related to the concept of scoffing that exists in the stated session of scoffers.

2.                The actual scoffing. The continuation of the passage in the Talmud Avodah Zara cites various concepts denigrating the act of scoffing and the scoffer. The Midrash Tehillim (Buber edition), Mizmor 101, states that a group of scoffers is one of the groups that doesn’t see the Face of the Divine Presence. This clarifies the problem of participating in a session of scoffers. The Talmud emphasizes that the type of scoffing is what the non-Jews were accustomed to do. Thus it is derived from the place in which it occurred – the stadiums, where shows of bulls attacking and causing injury to humans would take place, as the Talmud subsequently delineates.

This is likewise worded in the halachic rulings of the Rosh in which he states that it is forbid to go to any forms of frivolity of the idolaters [non-Jews] (and this likewise is derived from the Midrash, Ruth Rabba, Parsha 2, siman 23: “… It is not the way of the daughters of Israel to go to the theaters and circuses of the non-Jews”). However, the Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim, siman 307, sif katan 22) simply cites the above Talmudic ruling but doesn’t mention whether the prohibition is limited specifically to a non-Jewish venue. Indeed, it seems that the matter [form of entertainment] is the nature of the said scoffing. It seems that we are dealing with jokes and acts that cause ridicule of people (as derived from the Metzudat Tzion on the verse in Tehillim, and likewise the Maharasha’s Chidushei Agadot on the above Talmudic passage. The Talmud on daf 19a likewise cites the Philistines who said to call Shimshon to play with them as an example of forbidden scoffing).

Other examples are brought in order to grasp (as derived from the words of the Ran on the Rif in the Talmudic passage which compares a scoffer to one who has removed the yoke of Heaven [from himself]). One’s intentions is the difference between the actions and the type of humor that is allowed –  and even preferred, as implied from the Talmud Taanit 22a regarding those who were accustomed to cause people who were sad or fighting with another to laugh by means of jokes. The Talmud Shabbat 30b likewise relates that Rabba would start his lecture with a joke. What is the idea of these jokes? Rashi on Talmud Ta’anit (Ibid.) explains it as joy that is used to make others happy. The Meiri on Tractate Shabbat (Ibid.) likewise states “Although it is appropriate for a person to stand in submittance and humility, it is proper to make oneself happy in order to fulfill Hashem’s commandments… as the Divine Presence does not emanate within sadness…rather within the happiness of the heart to these temperaments. This was also the way of Sages in their yeshivot to start their lectures with a joke.

Thus, we have learned that the difference between scoffing that brings lightheadedness and making fun of others and between happiness – is an internal joy which is the opposite of sadness.

According to this point, there is room for comedy shows which are intended to make others happy. Indeed, various communities are accustomed to have a jester at weddings. Nevertheless, the show’s content must be intended to make people happy and offer a healthy dose of relief from tension and the daily grind, and not something that brings one to an atmosphere of scoffing or making fun of others, etc. However, this is difficult to guarantee unless the show will be performed by G-d-fearing people, in which the word of Hashem stands before their eyes. Shows performed by people who do not have these qualities, even if we were to know that no obscenities are in the show’s content (if it isn’t certain, it is simply forbidden to go to such a show), it seems that the atmosphere could still be within the framework of a session of scoffers.

Indeed, one should analyze whether [attending] such a show [would contravene] the concept of minimizing one’s joy in the aftermath of the Temple’s destruction and the expulsion of the Jewish People from Eretz Yisrael. Such a concept is also implied from the words of the Mishnah Berurah, siman 307.

Nevertheless, it seems that these shows are for the healthy purpose of letting off steam from life’s tensions by using humor. As long as they are done within the appropriate limits without drinking alcohol, etc., and as long as they don’t take up a central role in one’s life, there is room to allow attending these shows. This is comparable to one who is accustomed to listen to music in our times. The main idea is to conduct one’s actions for the sake of Heaven.

We base our answer on the situation as it appears to exist (based on our basic level research) at this time. The body scans enable security agents to view the exterior of the subject's body, including the private parts, as if his or her clothes were not on. However, the quality of the picture, which is more like a sketch than a photograph, is such that it is difficult to recognize the subject. The current system also seems to be that while one security guard takes the pictures at a portal, the agent(s) who views it is in a closed booth nearby, only informing other agents if something suspicious is detected.
Under these circumstances, the matter is permitted for the following reasons. There is a concept of b'avid'tei tarid (Bava Metzia 91a), that one who is preoccupied with his professional activities is not aroused by what he sees. This is commonly used to permit doctors to examine all different parts of a patient's body without special tzniut precautions (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah III, 54). The same applies to X-ray technicians who see parts of the body exposed that they should not normally see. Some other, albeit not universally accepted, applications are lifeguards and photographers, the matter depending on the context and the likelihood that they will not normally view their subjects in an inappropriate manner. Thus, the agent and, thereby, the traveler in our case do not have tzniut problems from these pictures. It is hard to believe that a normal person who would see these not particularly clear pictures would be aroused by what he saw. While one who sees such images on a one-time basis might find them suggestive, one who sees thousands of such images daily is not likely to be exposed to emotions other than boredom (or perhaps ridicule at someone's obesity or scars, which appears to be behind much of public objections).
There are further reasons for leniency. The gemara (Megilla 15a) says that whoever said the name Rachav would be aroused, but only if he knew her. Based on this, some say that the prohibition of hearing a woman's singing voice applies only when the one listening has seen the woman who is singing (Yabia Omer, I, Orach Chayim 6). In this case, where the guard does not know the person and would not recognize her based on what he saw, there is little cause for concern that he will be aroused.
Let us consider the possibility that some of the security men are the type to be aroused anyway. If such a security agent were to ask the halachic question, we would forbid him (as well as such a doctor, etc.) to take the job, given his unusual "sensitivity." However, this is not the unknowing traveler's concern. The gemara (Berachot 24a) says that it is forbidden for a man to look at a woman's finger to get enjoyment from it. Yet, since it is not the norm for this to happen, women may certainly keep their fingers and other permitted parts of the body uncovered, even if they can assume that from time to time someone will look at them improperly. That is the problem of the person who looks in an improper way, not the person who dresses reasonably.
If the security agent is a non-Jew, who may not engage in illicit relations but is not commanded to refrain from improper thought, the matter is even less problematic since there is no reason to believe that the situation could bring about contact that could cause sin. Although this leniency would not be of much help in Ben Gurion Airport, we have already seen ample grounds for leniency and conclude that this system is permitted. Note that the ultimate purpose of these checks is to save lives (although there are disagreements as to whether it is the most effective system). Note also that one of the major alternatives, to replace it with a full body search, is more problematic when it involves members of the different genders. 

Tapes and CDs can be discarded irresepctive of the electonic content on them (if there is a picture of a Torah text on the outside, that could be a problem). Electronic encoding is not considered a text but a means of producing an audio likeness.

The basic answer to the question is that he or she need not obey, as the Rama (Yoreh Deah 240:25) rules, based on the Maharik (166), and later poskim accept apparently unanimously. We will see the Maharik’s reasons and briefly consider if there are exceptions to the rule. If an actual case tragically arises, one should ask according to all the particulars.
The Maharik has three main reasons: 1) If a child does not have to give up his money for kibud av va’em (honoring his parents), he certainly does not have to accept the mental anguish pain of parting from the woman he wants to marry. 2) A parent may not tell his child to violate even a rabbinic prohibition. Since one may not marry a woman we have reason to fear he will not love (Kiddushin 41a), they cannot make him give up the woman he loves and possibly marry one he will resent. 3) The sacrifices one must make for his parents relate to things to benefit his parents, not things his parents want him to do for his welfare. The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:45) says that there is a general matter that a parent cannot force a child to perform a mitzva other than the way he sees fit. Most poskim seem to think that all of the reasons are valid individually, although it is difficult to determine that conclusively. This is an important point because in some cases, some reasons apply but not all of them. We do find different opinions in some of those cases.
           A minority opinion holds that a daughter has to obey her parents’ refusal of her choice of a husband, based on the (questionable) assumption that she does not have a mitzva to get married. However, the great majority of poskim reject this opinion (see Noda B’Yehuda II, EH 46; Yabia Omer VIII, YD 22). A more serious issue is when the parents not only disagree with the choice, but it will cause them disgrace. The Netziv (Meishiv Davar II, 50) says that this does impact them directly and that the disgrace overshadows the other considerations. The Tzitz Eliezer (XV, 34) asks from the fact that the Maharik discussed a woman about whom there were serious, publicly known questions of morality. He says that the Netziv’s distinction applies only in the case where the disgrace is recognized by Chazal or classical sources. Otherwise, the parents should try to make their viewpoint conform to their child’s choice, not vice versa. For example, parents’ bigotry toward a certain type of fine Jew should not be rewarded by being considered an objective disgrace.
           The Divrei Yatziv (EH 3) cites the Netivot Lashevet who says that if the choice of spouse will curtail the child’s ability to perform kibud av va’em (e.g., he will have to move away), then it affects the parents, and they can object. The former disagrees because the Maharik’s other reasons still apply. It seems, though, that those reasons apply only when a decision to marry has been or is almost made. However, if one is considering a “shidduch” idea (before there is an emotional connection) which will negatively impact his or her parents, their feelings or interests should be considered. This is not an absolute rule, as one should consider the child’s range of dating partners, age and dating history, and whether this is an unusually promising idea.
          We would also urge a child, who hopefully values his relationship with his parents, to not only be right but be smart and look at the “fifth Shulchan Aruch,” the ability to apply halacha wisely. Parents are very often right and when they try to protect their child from a horrible mistake, the child should not only consider their motive but also the possibility that parents have picked up on what he overlooked due to the excitement of the relationship. He or she would do well to discuss the matter with a wise advisor. That being said, the same reservations apply to the parents, who may make the moral or tactical mistake of their lives by getting improperly involved.

The Talmud Tractate Yoma 53a explains: “When a disciple departs from his rabbi, he shouldn’t turn his face away from him when going. He should instead turn his face to the side when going.” The Shulchan Aruch accordingly rules in Yoreh Deah 242: 16.

Regarding a synagogue, there is no  explicit source in the talmud. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 150: 5) rules that one is required to arrange the entrance to the synagogue so that one bows towards the Holy Ark. The Beit Yosef explains that the source of this ruling is in the Tosefta Megillah (chapter 3, halachah 14) and cited by the Rambam in his Mishnah Torah, (Hilchot Tefillah, ot 4).

Although the Kotel is like a synagogue, there isn’t any reason to bow at its entrance since the Holy Ark isn’t located within the Kotel plaza. Some say that the source for the custom to walk backwards when departing from the Kotel is found in the Rambam’s Mishna Torah (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah, 7: 4): “Anyone who has completed the service and is departing shouldn’t turn away from the sanctuary… all of this is done to revere the Beit HaMikdash.” Although his statement implies that this ruling is limited to the courtyard of the Temple, since the explanation of this ruling is “to revere the Beit HaMikdash,” and now due to our sins our Temple remains destroyed, we show our reverence by not turning away from the place that is the closest to the Temple.

When one is at the Kotel, perhaps there is room to apply an element of positive reverence, similar to departing from a synagogue. It is important to note that one’s dignity and reverence should be towards the place that is beyond the Western Wall, towards the site of our holy Temple. But according to this understanding, it doesn’t seem that it is forbidden to turn one’s back to the Kotel upon exiting the Kotel plaza. As stated above, it’s only considered disrespectful when one turns his back within the grounds of the Temple courtyard.

Since, if we understand correctly, the building that will be used is not, on a regular basis, a place of worship, it is permitted for Jewish students to attend classes in the building. The presence of crosses does not make the matter prohibited, just as a Jew may sit in the living room of a Catholic family which may have crosses or other religious symbols present. Some Jews, for cultural reasons, might feel uncomfortable being in such a setting, just as any non-Chrisitan might, and so if it does not insult anyone, while the building is being rented (it is not clear if it is just for certain times during the week, or on an ongoing basis), it might be wise to cover them. However, as far as a rabbinic ruling is concerned, our opinion is that it is permitted for Jewish students to attend.

The Torah commands us to show respect (kavod) to our parents (Shemot 20:12) and treat them with awe (morah) (Vayikra 19:3). The gemara (Kiddushin 31b), in delineating morah, includes not standing in their place or sitting in their place.

What is considered “their place”? Regarding standing, Rashi explains that it is referring to a communal place where some fathers congregate for people to seek their advice. He does not explain what the place of sitting is. The Ramah, cited by the Tur (Yoreh Deach 240) says that one should not sit in his parent’s seat (literally, place of lounging) at home. The Tur implies that Rashi felt that a seat at home lacks the importance for the prohibition to apply, but the Beit Yosef says that Rashi agrees with the Ramah. He says that sitting in a parent’s seat at home is obviously forbidden, and Rashi needed to explain where standing would be problematic, as such a formal place does not exist at home.

In any case, the Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) forbids sitting in a parent’s spot at home as well. The Beit Yosef (ibid.) and Shach (YD 240:1) say that it is permitted to stand where one’s parents usually sit, as this is not taking his or her place in a manner that equates the child’s importance to his parent’s. A contemporary posek (Hilchot Bein Adam Lachaveiro 5:79) says that it is also forbidden to sit in a parent’s physical chair if it is unique (special upholstery, arm rest, etc.) even if it is in an unusual location.

Most sources seem to indicate that the prohibition applies even if the parent is not present. However, there are some opinions that if the parent is not present and it is not a case where all have assumed their regular places except that the son has taken his father’s place, then it is okay (Rishon L’tzion, pg. 94). What several poskim discuss and a consensus permit is after the parent’s death (Chayim B’yad 125). The parent’s place is not holy, and to the contrary, inheritance is very much about taking over that which the parent left behind. (There are opinions that one should avoid sitting in a father’s place in shul during the year of aveilut.)

A parent can waive his right to honor (Kiddushin 32a) and so, with his permission, one can sit in his place. Although there is a machloket whether he may even allow his disgrace (see discussion in Yaskil Avdi 7:21), it seems clear that sitting in one’s place is rarely a disgrace (ibid.). In many cases, permission may be assumed. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:9) uses such an assumption to explain the standard practice that boys sit in their father’s seat in shul when the latter is not there. In general, it seems from the poskim that a practical, logical approach is called for. Rav Elyashiv is quoted (Bein Adam Lachaveriro 5:77) as saying that the prohibition does not apply to a parent’s bed, which is not a place of honor.

 It is possible, in many families, that there is a true parent’s “seat of honor” only at a Shabbat table and that at other times or in a different room things are not as set or viewed as seriously (it depends on the family). Certainly there is no need to create such a seat, and if a parent moves around often, for whatever reason, we would not grant the seat he sits in most frequently the status of his seat. In a similar vein, the Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.) said that while the halacha applies to a mother, it was less common in his time for a mother to have a set seat.

Regarding a guest, certainly the stakes are lower as we are not discussing the serious commandment of honoring a parent. However, it is worthwhile for a guest to ascertain whether there is a strongly defined set place for the head(s) of the family. If there is, it would be appropriate for him to respect it as well.

 This is a very hard question to answer, not just because it is hard to predict the likely potential scenarios, but because there is a conflict between values, as we will explain.

Hachnasat orchim (welcoming guests) is a rabbinically mandated application of the Torah command to love one’s counterpart (Rambam, Avel 14:1). It applies both to poor and rich guests and, in theory, can be accomplished even when taking money for expenses (food, telephone calls, etc.) by providing a warm, welcoming place to be (Ahavat Chesed 3:1). Thus, even if someone can afford to stay in a hotel, (and, maybe, from her perspective, should do that) if she asks to stay at one’s house or the situation is such that such an invitation is the normal nice thing to offer, the mitzva is normally a responsibility.

There is a general question about the obligation to fulfill a mitzva that has a large physical or emotional price, and this comes up in different contexts. In Living the Halachic Process (vol. II, D-15) we dealt with someone who can expect to have a moderate allergic reaction to eating matza on Pesach. The basic assumption is that one does not have to make himself sick in order to fulfill a mitzva, and while it is hard to do, one has to try to figure out what is a normal “price” one has to pay to fulfill a mitzva. In this case, when it is a matter of your needs against another person’s needs and feelings, the matter is certainly not easy to determine, but one should try to consider this in an idealistic but realistic manner. The availability of alternative arrangements is a factor in this context (see Ahavat Chesed 3:2)

There is another element to the complex nature of this question. Just as a host is urged and, to a great extent, commanded to extend himself to make the guest happy and welcome (ibid. 1) so is the guest required to not take advantage or overdo her welcome (Halichot Bein Adam Lachveiro 8:28). If she is outright damaging to her hosts, they are not required to keep her (ibid. 6, in the name of Sefer Chasidim). We would certainly say that if she were stealing from her host, presumably even if the host is willing to spend similar amounts of money to feed her), she can be asked to leave. You could make the claim that gezel sheina (deprivation of sleep) would be equivalent. On the other hand, it is hard to know where to draw the line on such a matter (otherwise, we would all be thieves at one time or another).

A final, related issue is that if your guest continues to grossly abuse her rights, she is seriously sinning. By letting her continue to do so, in some ways you are wrongly facilitating her sins. The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 205) says that rebuke, in addition to correcting “religious” sins and those affecting third persons, is intended for people who are being abused (as opposed to harboring resentment – see Vayikra 19:17). While we are cautious about the use of rebuke, having your guest continue to upset you is unlikely to be in her best interest.

All this being said, we think you should consider seriously the likelihood that your guest was not aware of how her behavior disturbed you. She is less likely to trip the alarm again, and you can probably unplug the phone or mention calmly how its ringing disturbs you greatly. Hopefully, your friend is a nice person who will be a much improved guest in the future. So, if you can put up with her for another night and see how it goes, you would probably be doing a big mitzva, even if you arguably can get out of it. Feel free to follow up as things develop.

The mishna (Mikvaot 10:1) says that if one puts a kli (utensil) into a mikveh upside down, it is an invalid tevilla. This is due to the air pocket that prevents water from coming in fully. While this seems to invalidate your tevilla, a further look shows that matters are not so simple.

The Kiryat Sefer (Mikvaot 3) is unsure whether the above problem is that the water must come over the entire kli, in which case there is a Torah-level problem. The other possibility is that the problem is chatzitza (something that separates between the water and the object that requires tevilla). Regarding chatzitza there are two main parameters: whether it covers most of the object; whether it is makpid (one does not want to leave the chatzitza there indefinitely). When both factors are stringent, there is a Torah-level problem; when one factor is stringent, there is a rabbinic problem (Eruvin 4b). If the problem is that an air pocket is a chatzitza, since water touches the whole outside and some of the inside, the problem is at worst rabbinic and one must assume that it is considered makpid.

First, let us see if it is possible to require that the water touches the whole kli. If so, how could a chatzitza on a minority of the kli be fine from the Torah and permitted if one leaves it there forever? One approach is that in such cases, the chatzitza is batel to (undistinguishable from) the body/object, and it is as if the water touches everything (Sidrei Tahara, Yoreh Deah 198:1). However, the more convincing approach is that the water is required to touch only the majority of the surface, as long as the whole object is submerged and thus enveloped in water, and one has to deal with the issue of chatzitza (Chazon Ish, YD 95:3; see Badei Hashulchan 198:27).

According to the second approach, one could ask if something as “ethereal” as air can be a chatzitza. There seems to be a machloket whether something porous is a chatzitza. On one hand, mishnayot (see Mikvaot, ch. 9) indicate that liquid objects on a surface are not a chatzitza, whereas their dried-up counterparts are. Yet, the mishna (Mikvaot 10:6) says that tevilla on a barrel full of a not water-like liquid is invalid, and thus liquid must be a chatzitza. Tosafot (Zevachim 78b) says that a little liquid (the former cases) is permeable, whereas a barrel full is not (see Biur Halacha to OC 161:1). Others say that thick liquids are not considered permeable, and the reason some liquids are not a problem is that they are not considered makpid (Shach, Yoreh Deah 198:19; see Rama, YD 198:14). If so, an air pocket, which is not permeable when the kli is at certain angles, seems problematic.

At this point, any way we understand the mishna opposing upside-down tovelling should render the tevilla in question invalid. Yet, the Shulchan Aruch (YD 202:6) says that if the kli is somewhat wide, the tevilla is valid because water gets to its bottom. The Bach and Taz (ad loc.) argue that even wide pots can have air pockets, which experimentation and scientific analysis (we did both) corroborate. Perhaps Rav Yosef Karo assumed the following. There is not a need for water on the entire surface, and air does not function like a chatzitza. It is just that a type of tevilla that is not close to getting water throughout is not a proper tevilla. However, with a great width to height ratio, even when the angle is slightly off totally upside-down, water comes in fully, and it is easier for the water to get to any given spot with minimal swiveling. Thus, in those cases, it is considered a reasonable tevilla, and this likely applies to your case.

Since the simple reading of the sources indicates the tevilla was invalid, we suggest you to do tevilla again, but without a beracha. If it is difficult, there is some room for leniency (including for reasons beyond our present scope).

This question has two elements, one specific to Even Haezer (laws related to marriage) and another that is classic Choshen Mishpat (monetary law).
The mishna (Bava Batra 146a) says that certain sivlonot (presents that a chatan gives to a kalla before their marriage) return to the chatan if they do not get married. The basic distinction is as follows. Those presents (including food stuffs) that were meant to be used up during the pre-wedding celebration were appropriately given even if the end goal of marriage was not met and need not be returned. However, presents that were to last into the future are deemed to be done on the condition of marriage and must be returned if they do not get married (see also, Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 50:3). Although usually we say that conditions that undo a transaction must be verbalized, when it is clear that a present is based on future expectation, it is deemed conditional. This is true even if the kalla is not at fault at all, including if one of the parties dies (ibid.). In fact, if the kalla backs out, then her side has to pay for the money the chatan wasted on the celebrations. (Similarly, a chatan is required to return the presents that he received from the kalla's side- ibid. 4). Thus, on the basic level, you are required to return the jewelry.
However, on the second level, your claims are likely to have merit. You spent a lot of non-refundable money on wedding preparations, which now, by his backing out, is a loss to you. It is likely somewhat complicated to figure out how much of the above the other side owes you, and it may depend on specific elements of agreements and the chain of event that we are unaware of. We will not express an opinion without hearing both sides, and it might require a formal beit din setting to determine an exact solution. However, since the other side has resisted dealing with the matter, the question is about taking the law into your own hands by withholding the jewelry.
Taking things of value in lieu of payment one believes he deserves is known as tefisa, and its laws are very complicated. The biggest limitations are against unilaterally taking something as collateral for a loan, which the Torah forbids (Devarim 24:11), causing damage during the tefisa, and when one takes something he cannot prove he deserves (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 4:1). However, the main problem is in the act of taking. If the other party had voluntarily given the object (as in this case), he can hold on to it as a guarantee until his rights have been properly addressed (whether by agreement, mediation, or arbitration) (see Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 3:5). While it is problematic to obtain the object through deception (K’tzot Hachoshen 4:1), that is certainly not the case here.
Legal tefisa can also be an advantage where it is unclear to a beit din which side is correct, as the one holding the object in hope of payment is no longer the only one trying to extract payment from the person in possession. (The details are too complex to discuss seriously in this context, but one can see Klalei Tefisa (CM 25), par. 7, 17).
All of this being said, it is extremely important from a personal, spiritual, and practical perspective to allow the painful matter of a broken engagement to heal with as good terms as possible. Extended recriminations and posturing can cause all sorts of problems for the chatan’s and the kalla’s futures. Therefore, one should make certain sacrifices to do what is smart, not just what is right.

The gemara (Shabbat 150a) tells of one who wanted to chop wood after Shabbat before Havdala and was allowed to do so only after reciting an informal Havdala (which we call Hamavdil). We accept the opinion that this declaration, that Hashem has distinguished between holy and mundane days, is recited without Hashem's Name (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 299:10). In any case, it is agreed that before some form of Havdala (full, in Ma’ariv, or Hamavdil) it is forbidden to do melacha. Therefore, you are, arguably, aiding one in transgressing, which is forbidden under the general category of lifnei iver (see Vayikra 19:14).

First we should note that the Rama (ad loc.) cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Yerucham that some melachot (e.g., lighting a flame and carrying) are permitted, and only more “complete” melachot are forbidden (e.g., weaving and writing). While the Rama prefers the stringent opinion, one would not be forbidden to enter a taxi if its driver is acting in a manner that is permitted according to a legitimate opinion. The Tzitz Eliezer (XI, 34) assumes that driving a car is the more serious type of work, which even Rabbeinu Yerucham forbids. This is not obvious, as the Taz (ad loc. 9) says that it depends if a person often will do it as a matter of course on Motzaei Shabbat, and many people drive on a regular basis after Shabbat (sometimes starting with returning from shul). Perhaps he is bothered by the taxi’s professional context.

The major discussion is about the nature of the prohibition of melacha before Havdala. Is it that the prohibitions of Shabbat continue until one ends them (similar to the fact that one can start Shabbat with a declaration on late Friday afternoon)? Or is it a separate matter that since there is a mitzva to honor Shabbat as it leaves with Havdala, it is wrong to commence work before doing so. Rashi (Shabbat 150a) and Rabbeinu Yerucham (see Taz, ibid.) seem to take the latter approach, and there are indications from the gemara that this is the correct outlook (see Divrei Yehoshua II, 108).

If it is a problem of postponing the mitzva and not transgressing a more standard aveira, then we have strong room for leniency. On a simple level, there are many sources that indicate that lifnei iver does not apply when the problem is somewhat weak or indirect (the gist of Shulchan Shlomo 299:15, in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach). Below we will cite a strengthened version of this idea. The Tzitz Eliezer adds an interesting twist. If the problem is the delay of the mitzva, then it does not apply to one who has no intention of doing the mitzva at all. He reasons that if we did not make that assumption, it would be forbidden at many times of day to feed non-daveners (even if they will make berachot) because it is forbidden to eat before tefilla. This observation could be reconciled according to Rav Auerbach’s observation as well.

Rav Shternbach (Teshuvot V'hanhagot II, 161) prefers the approach that there is a continued Shabbat prohibition. Yet, he says that lifnei iver does not apply because the taxi driver is continuing to do the same melachot that he was doing previously (this would not apply to a car service that works only when called). [Further development of the concept of lifnei iver on the Torah and rabbinic levels is beyond our scope]. The problem of the continued melacha approach may also be removed or mitigated by the practice of some (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, op. cit.) to get the driver to say “Shavua tov,” which might indicate his interest that Shabbat no longer be with him.

that it is permitted. We will discuss several explanations as to why.

For one or more of the reasons above, it should not be surprising that several poskim say (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 59:8) and standard practice is we think that one may call, hail, or get into a taxi with one who did not recite any form of Havdala.

The Shulchan Aruch didn’t render as halachah the custom that forbids eating kitniyot (legumes) on Passover. Even according to Ashkenazi practice to refrain from eating kitniyot (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 452: 1), the custom is relating to a case in which the legumes are by themselves, or when they’re the main component of a mixture. However, in the case of Diet Cola, even if the source of the sweetener is from legumes, it is not on its own, and therefore such a case was never accepted in the minhag (custom). Furthermore, the sweetener is a derivative of legumes, which was never part of the custom either, even on its own (cf. Ramah, Ibid.; Chok Yaakov, siman 453, sif katan 6).

For more detaosl see BeMareh HaBazak, volume 2, siman 51, p. 90.

1. Indeed, various minhagim are in practice. Regarding the minhagim of Kiddush, all agree that not keeping the minhag would not disqualify the mitzvah. It follows that if you don’t have a problem requesting the one who makes kiddush – in this case, the guest – to follow the accepted custom in your home, you should make such a request. However, if you feel uncomfortable making such a request, honor him by letting him fulfill his usual custom for that Shabbat and be extra scrupulous in the mitzvah of being hospitable to guests.

2. One who doesn’t feel well during Kiddush is permitted to do whatever is more comfortable for her, as you described above. According to all opinions, sitting or standing doesn’t impede performing the mitzvah of Kiddush. Nonetheless, her sitting down doesn’t have any bearing on whether the others should sit or stand.

 It sounds like you require a pidyon haben, as the mitzva does not expire. However, first we have to try to determine if you definitely require it, and then we can discuss how to do it in this situation.

First it pays to check if your father was right in planning the pidyon haben. The main exemptions are as follows: either of your parents is the child of a male kohen or levi; if your mother had a miscarriage prior to your birth; if you were born in a Caesarian delivery. Also ascertain from your father if, after all these years, he is sure that there was no pidyon haben. It is possible that the rabbi/kohen who was to have done the pidyon did so in a quick, halachic procedure that your father may have forgotten, while he remembers the fact that the party was cancelled. If there is uncertainty, get back to us, as we cannot give one blanket rule in advance.

Assuming that you need a pidyon haben, we have to deal with an interesting, relevant dispute among halachic authorities. A father is required to redeem his son. However, if he fails to do so, the son becomes obligated to redeem himself once he is bar mitzva (Kiddushin 29a). The question, though, is whether only the son is obligated at that point or whether the father’s obligation remains. If the grown son does the pidyon haben, the matter is certainly taken care of, but the difference among the opinions is in a situation where the father is now interested in doing the mitzva, which was delayed for whatever reason.

The Rashba (Shut II, 321) says that as the mitzva of pidyon haben creates a monetary obligation on the father’s property from the outset, there is nothing to remove the obligation, and the father remains obligated. The gemara (ibid.) says that if one has enough money to redeem only himself or his son, he should redeem himself, because the mitzva that relates directly to himself has precedence. The Rivash (Shut 131) infers from there that the son’s obligation to redeem himself is the primary obligation, and the father’s practical responsibility to redeem his baby is due only to the fact that a small child is incapable of performing the pidyon haben himself. When the child grows up, he alone is obligated. Many later authorities have debated the matter, and it is difficult to say that one approach is more accepted or acceptable than the other (see Pidyon Haben K’hilchato 1:(16)).

We would suggest as follows. As you know your father better than we do, try to determine if he would want to be involved in the pidyon haben or not. If you think that he wouldn’t mind, there is no problem doing it yourself. If he wants to do it, there is a way to devise a system whereby the right person will end up doing the mitzva. One such halachic method is as follows: Your father gives you the money and says that if the mitzva is his, you should be his agent to do the pidyon on his behalf (see Pidyon Haben K’hilchato regarding pidyon haben by means of an agent). You prepare another sum of your own money and physically give both sums to the kohen with the appropriate blessings and statements. You just state that it is being done on condition that the halachic redemption should relate to the person who should rightfully be doing it and to his money. Since few kohanim have done a pidyon haben in a case where a person is doing it for himself, you will anyway need a learned kohen and/or a rabbi to make the appropriate adjustments in the text of the blessings and statements and we would be happy to help with the process.

It is both important and not as complicated as it might sound to do the pidyon haben. While it is customary to have a minyan present at a pidyon, it can be done privately to avoid embarrassing your father.

Challa is supposed to be given to a kohen, in theory to eat, which is one of many ways it is related to the laws of teruma (see Rambam, Bikurim 5: 13-14). If teruma becomes tameh (impure), it may not be eaten. The gemara (Shabbat 25a) derives that just as tameh kodahsim (sacrifices) are to be burnt, so too tameh teruma is burnt, and this is true of tameh challa as well (see mishna, Challa 4:8). All challa is tameh in our days because we all are tameh. Although food does not become tameh before it is touched by one of seven liquids, challa, which is taken from dough, is always touched by water. Therefore, the Rama (Yoreh Deah 322:5) gives standard instructions to take off a k’zayit for challa and burn it.

Where would one burn the challa? Challa is forbidden for a non-kohen and, therefore, one would not think to burn it in her regular oven. The Rama (ibid.) says that one should make a separate fire, but for an unexpected reason: a non-kohen must not receive benefit from the heat it gives off. He continues that the minhag is to burn it in the oven before baking the bread. Ovens used to have a separate chamber with fuel and fire, and one could throw the challa in among the fuel. Nowadays, gas or electric ovens have one chamber where things bake and do not usually burn (unless one puts the temperature very high and/or leaves it for a long time).

Still most poskim seem to prefer burning the challa even in the oven. Why doesn’t baking this “treif” food create a kashrut problem? Indeed, whatever surface touches the hot but not yet burnt challa will need to be koshered and therefore one should have a treif tray to put it on. However, the challa vapors are not a problem. The Shulchan Aruch and Rama (YD 108:1) rule that reicha (odor) from non-kosher meat does not forbid kosher meat roasted in the same large oven b'dieved. The following situations improve matters further: the foods are not fatty, the two are not in the oven at the same time, one of them is covered with dough (helpful regarding milchig and fleishig as opposed to treif). May we set up this situation in the first place? The Shach (citing the Issur V’heter) says that it is permitted to bake rabbinically forbidden food together with kosher food. (Challa is a rabbinic law outside Israel, and even in Israel in our times- Shulchan Aruch, YD 322:2). Because not all agree, many suggest wrapping the challa in foil. Realize that it takes longer for it to burn that way and that the dough rises and may burst through its encasing before it burns. Many are concerned that the chance of mistake is great, as is the inconvenience. (Burning on the stovetop has some advantages, but the smell of burnt bread, and the (remote?) possibility of a fire are issues.)

Therefore, some say that one may dispose of the challa in the garbage, after wrapping it (some say double wrap, which seems to be a chumra) to avoid disgracing it. The major justification is based by on Rashi (Shabbat 25a; see Tosafot ad loc.) that it is not a mitzva to burn the challa per se, but there is a matter of removing the danger that someone will eat it. Therefore, throwing it out may be preferable to waiting for a chance to burn it (Minchat Yitzchak IV, 13, based on the Chazon Ish, Maasrot 7:13). We cannot do justice to the halachic analysis, but let us say that despite the fact that Rashi’s opinion is the minority and is difficult, this option has become increasingly common (including in kosher bakeries) and accepted by many rabbanim (some suggesting mitigating factors that are beyond our scope). Thus, if one finds it difficult to settle on a feasible and safe (physically and kashrut-wise) system of burning the challa, she should not feel guilty if she adopts the system of wrapping the challa and discarding it in the garbage.

The children may wait 3 hours. She should wait 6 hours. Of course if the mother decides to arrange the meals so that it is compatible for her and that affects them, this is no different then eating in a public setup (yeshiva, hotel) where the 3 hour people will in practice do a lot of waiting 6 hours.

You may use the wine, following the laws Otzar Beit Din. One can assume that the wine was in possession of the Beit Din (with the stores functioning as workers of the Beit Din) at the time of the Bi'ur and thus Bi'ur was not required. As to the issue of taking Otzar Beit Din outside of Israel, see our Responses in Bema'areh Habazaq (vol. 6 responses 98-99) where we clarified the permitted ways for this to be done, and even if this was not done in a permitted fashion, it still may be eaten outside of Israel (Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim volume 5 response 42).

Praying for Jews in “royal jails” is traditional, and is included in the prayer: “Acheinu …ha’omdim batzara u’vashivya …Hamakom yerachem aleihem v’yotzi’eim …” (our brethren …who are in trouble and in captivity …Hashem should have mercy on them and extricate them …). The assumption was usually that they were imprisoned on false or exaggerated charges.

The first question is whether in a place like America, with a much more fair judicial system than we had through most of our dispersion, our approach to a convict is different We certainly prefer even flawed governmental law enforcement to anarchy (Avot 3:2). One of the Noahide laws is to have a judicial system, at least to enforce Noahide laws (Rambam, Melachim 9:14), and likely to generally do justice (Ramban to Bereishit 34:13), and the law of the land applies to Jews also (Gittin 10b; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 369). The question is how we view punishments the courts mete out in excess of what halacha dictates for Jews. For example, how do we feel about a Jew being put into jail (often a cruel and dangerous place) for tax evasion, when Sanhedrin would not use such harsh punishment for a monetary crime? May/should a Jew inform the government when a fellow Jew is violating such a crime? Contemporary poskim argue the point, as presented cogently in an article by Rabbi Michael Broyde (www.jlaw.com/Articles/mesiralaw2.html.). The matter is too involved for our context.

Is it legitimate to pray on behalf of an accused or convicted Jew, assuming the act that he was caught for is a sin either due to the law of the land or even Torah law, which do overlap? There are sources about not praying for reshaim (evil people), but it seems that those discuss qualitatively more sinful people than the average white-collar criminal. We pray for the health and welfare of all sorts of people regardless of their level of piety, and this need not be an exception. As far as speaking on his behalf, it is not always practically useful but character references to influence the severity of the sentence are part of the US judicial system.

The biggest issue is public perception. We regret the existence of (religious) Jewish criminals, decry their actions, and lend our support to the judicial system that convicts them. We do not want to blur these stances in the eyes of our children and communities. Another obvious problem is chillul Hashem (desecration of Hashem’s name), which has a major halachic impact, including relations with the non-Jewish world (see Shulchan Aruch, CM 266:1). Exaggeratedly strong support can falsely portray a criminal as a Jewish hero, before and/or after his crime. Since countless Jews could use mass prayers for all sorts of difficulties, turning a convicted person into a national cause sends a wrong message. The matter is complicated when he really has earned the community’s appreciation for other matters.

Another way the public can see it (if not presented carefully or distorted by anti-Semites) is that the Jewish community questions the judicial system’s integrity, which can cause a chillul Hashem that can exacerbate anti-Semitism. Of course, it has happened that the totally innocent have been convicted, whether due to an honest mistake, belligerent anti-Semitism, or some combination thereof of the police, a judge, or a jury. Jewish people have also received disproportionately strict sentences. However, the overall system is a fair one, and we can unfortunately not assume that a convicted religious Jew must be innocent. In cases (such as Pollard’s) where there are demonstrable grounds for grievance, this is less of an issue, and American Jews do not always need to be silent when their own are abused. However, this is an issue for the local Jewish leadership to weigh in on. 

 There are two elements to this question. One is to what extent there is a mitzva to have a seuda (meal) in honor of a brit mila. The other is to what extent invited guests are required to take part in such a seuda.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 265:12) says: “We have the practice to make a seuda on the day of the mila.” The Rama adds: “and people have the practice to have a minyan for the seuda of a mila, and it is called a seudat mitzva.” There are several sources in Chazal to support this claim. Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer derives it from the brit that Avraham performed for Yitzchak. The Torah writes that Avraham made a big party on the day that “higamel Yitzchak” (Bereishit 21:8), whose simple translation is that he was weaned. The Orchot Chayim derives the idea from the word’s letters (the first two, based on numerical value), namely, 5+3 mal, i.e., on the eighth day he circumcised. This, thus, was the event that prompted a party. The gemara (Ketubot 8a) seems to assume that there is a special meal, comparable to that of sheva berachot, and therefore needs to point out the difference between the bentching at the two. Before Birkat Hamazon of sheva berachot one says “shehasimcha bem’ono” (that the joy is in His abode), whereas this is not recited before Birkat Hamazon at a brit mila due to the pain of the child.

One of the applications of the determination that the meal for a brit mila is a seudat mitzva is the fact that invitees to this meal may eat meat and drink wine even during the Nine Days (Rama, Orach Chayim 551:10). The Rama and his commentaries point out that one should not artificially include people who are not naturally part of the festivities to compromise the standard laws of the day.

There is a well known but apparently somewhat misapplied concept relating to the invitees to a brit mila. Let us start with the background. The gemara (Pesachim 113b) lists people with the regrettable distinction of being menudeh lashamayim (roughly, shunned in the Heaven) for what they do (or refrain from doing). One such person is one who does not recline (i.e., set himself to eat) with a group of mitzva. Tosafot (Pesachim 114a) says that this refers to one who does not eat in the seuda of a brit mila, which he says has the ability to save one from being judged to go to gehinom (purgatory). From this idea developed the practice of not inviting people to a brit mila (Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 265:18), so that people not be in the situation where they should be going and refrain from doing so. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim II, 95) explains that the matter is not so much that there is an obligation to take part in the mitzva of mila. After all, there are many mitzvot that one might miss, and the idea of menudeh lashamayim is not mentioned broadly. It has more to do, he says, with the lack of honor that one shows toward the father who is fulfilling the mitzva and trying to include others in it. It is told in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein that one discharges the minimum obligation by eating anything at the meal or smaller reception. One is not required to eat bread (which should be done by the core participants- see Sefer Habrit 165:161) or stay for the whole meal.

In any case, it is of note that many people know of the minhag not to invite but apparently do not do it correctly. First of all, many people just inform about the brit mila, but once people come to the mila itself, they invite all assembled to the meal, even they know that many will not be coming. As we have seen, the sources talk in terms of the meal. Secondly, some people make it very clear that they want and even expect a certain friend to come, just that they do not use the word “inviting.” In this case, it appears that the spirit of the invitation is the issue, and not there is nothing intrinsic about the use of the word “invite” if one transmits an expectation that friend or family attend.

While we do not know to identify a specific halachic source that requires fixing the mistake, it would seem that several negative things could come out of the existence of such a mistake in the future, including: causing confusion about the yartzeit; causing problems in establishing genealogy when the antecedent upon whom the family is relying (to, for instance, prove Judaism) does not seem to be the same one as in the legal papers, etc.

Therefore, we would strongly suggest that in the forseeable future, the mistake be fixed

The Sages warn against putting food under a bed (Pesachim 112a, Yerushalmi Terumot 8, 3). The Talmud (Pesachim ibid.) states that the reason is that it causes a "ruach ra'ah" (literally evil spirit) to descend upon the food, and thus even if the food is covered one should not place it under the bed. The Rambam states that the reason is lest something harmful fall into the food. According to his opinion, if the food is covered there is no problem (Beit Yosef Yoreh De'ah 116).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 116, 5) rules according to the reasoning of "ruach ra'ah," and therefore even if the food is covered it should not be placed under the bed (Shach ibid.).

Some authorities (see Darchei Teshuvah 116, 38) claim that the problem of "ruach ra'ah" exists only if someone is sleeping on the bed.

In any case, if food was placed under a bed, it is not prohibited and may be eaten (Pitchei Teshuvah Yoreh De'ah 116, 4)

The determining factor regarding Terumot & Maasrot is whether it is edible or not. If these body care items are not edible, and they probably are not, then there is no requirement of Terumot & Maasrot. If they are edible, then Terumot & Maasrot should be removed .

(Chazon Ish Demai 15, 1)  

This answer does not deal with the complex issue of sharing utensils with someone who is not consistent regarding basic halachic requirements.

The answer to this question contains a few surprises. You seem aware of the prohibition to eat food cooked in a forbidden manner on Shabbat. We accept the opinion that the prohibition is only due to a rabbinic injunction to penalize one who violated Shabbat (Ketubot 34a). Your excellent question is whether the prohibition extends to utensils.

Some connect this to the question of whether pots in which a non-Jew cooked kosher food (bishul akum) need to be kashered (see Shut Ktav Sofer, Orach Chayim 50). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 113:16) cites two opinions on that matter and slightly prefers the stringent opinion. However, there is more room for leniency regarding food that is cooked on Shabbat. Bishul akum is under the category of forbidden food, which usually requires kashering utensils. In contrast, the prohibition on the food cooked on Shabbat seems to be more generally to prevent benefit from a perpetrated prohibition (Nefesh Harav, p. 174, in the name of Rav Soloveitchik and his father). Two indications of this are the fact that the prohibition is not equal to all people (Ktav Sofer, ibid.) and the fact that the same prohibition applies to non-foods worked on during Shabbat. Since there is no real benefit from trace quantities that seep out of a utensil, it makes sense that the utensils do not become forbidden. After 24 hours have passed since the cooking, there is further reason for leniency because any taste that comes out is assumed to be spoiled to the point that it does not forbid the food cooked in the pot (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 253:39). Despite all of the above, the Magen Avraham (318:1) and the Mishna Berura (318:4) seem to require such pots to be kashered (see explanation in Minchat Shlomo I, 5).

The above, though, is likely irrelevant to you. After all, we accept Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that even if food was cooked intentionally on Shabbat, it is prohibited after Shabbat only for the person who violated Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 318:1). There is a question whether the food is forbidden also for the person on whose behalf the food was cooked (see ambiguous language in Magen Avraham 318:2). However, the consensus is to permit it (Mishna Berura 318:5). (If the Shabbat violator intended to profit by giving it to another person, e.g., a restaurant owner who cooked on Shabbat so he could sell the food after Shabbat, the matter is more severe (Ktav Sofer, ibid.).) In any case, while your roommate knew you would be using the pot later, presumably he cooked the food for his own use. Therefore, you should have no problem using the pot as is.

However, there is a twist. While you may use the pot, perhaps your roommate may not. If he mustn’t use the pot, then you may violate lifnei iver (putting a stumbling block before those who do not know better than to violate the Torah). On the other hand, we saw that there is much room for leniency in the matter even for your roommate, and the worst-case scenario is not that severe (as the food cooked in the pot will be permitted after-the fact). Therefore, the rules of lifnei iver are highly unlikely to apply (the rationale is beyond our scope).

In the final analysis, you are not required to kasher, and this is all the more so if doing so will send the wrong message to a roommate, who you want to love a Torah lifestyle, not resent it. On the other hand, kashering can also send an important message: you are disturbed by the chillul Shabbat that occurred in your apartment (by someone who pledged not to do so), and it affects your quality of life. Kashering, while being a big stringency here, is not a charade. It is your apartment and your relationship, and you can/must make the call.

It is fine. The Torah tells us which foods are forbidden to eat and which are also forbidden to benefit from.  Boar bristles are not forbidden in benefit. One is fully permitted to use boar bristle brushes or to throw or catch a football (made out of pig skin), etc. 

It is good that you are sensitive to both the ecological elements of recycling and the halachic propriety of what you take from where. This question requires research in one or two areas: monetary halacha and the attitudes of the people in charge of the recycling effort.

We start with halacha. Does the recycling company or authority acquire the bottles, making it necessary to receive their explicit or implicit permission? Is it possible to acquire the bottles before any employee touches them? The kinyan (act of acquisition) that works without the involvement of the acquiring party is chatzer, i.e., if an object is on the property of the acquirer, he can acquire it without his presence or knowledge (Bava Metzia 10a). A variation of kinyan chatzer is kli (utensil). If an object is placed in a utensil that is owned by the acquirer, he acquires it (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 200:3). While this does not usually work if the kli is in the public domain, that is because people do not have the right to leave their utensils in the public domain to use as they like. However, when they have permission to keep their kli in a given area, the kinyan works even in the public domain (see ibid.). Recycling cages are certainly put out with permission.

Another requirement for kinyan chatzer is that if the acquirer is not present, it must be put in a place that is guarded on behalf of the acquirer (Bava Metzia 11a). While there are various explanations, the basic idea is that in the acquirer’s absence, the chatzer has to serve as a shaliach (agent) of sorts, and to fit the role, it has to be a reliable guarantor that the object is not taken by any passerby (S’ma 200:1). On the other hand, many say that if someone is giving the object to the acquirer (as opposed to a lost or un-owned article) it is sufficient that the giver is watching it at the time he puts it in the utensil (Rama, CM 200:1). Furthermore, the Netivot Hamishpat (200:3) says that if the kinyan is done in a utensil with walls, then there is no further need for it to be guarded.

Since the bottles can be acquired in by the recycling authorities, you need to know that the people in charge allow you to take the bottles. (We imagine that even if there was a halachic deficiency in the kinyan, you would not want to do it against the recycling people’s will, but it is worthwhile to know the halacha for cases that you are not confident what they would say.)

The most important research on many “halachic” questions is to find out the facts. I contacted the recycling authority, who told me that these days (I cannot tell you about the past or the future), the municipality operates the collection efforts and owns the recycling cages. The municipality workers in charge of the collection told me that the Jerusalem municipality is not bothered at all if people take out bottles to reuse. In general, my research indicates that, these days, recycling is not particularly financially rewarding, but is done to alleviate the need for landfills or polluting through incineration. Thus, for someone to take the “usable garbage” home is not offensive to the authorities. One of the officials thought that it would be educational to have the children bring bottles themselves, but we leave that to your educational and logistical wisdom.

We do have a slight concern that, in certain settings, some people might view you as “raiding” the recycling bin and thus a chillul Hashem. However, in most cases, that need not be the case. We cannot give an absolute assurance that other municipalities, or in other times, the situation might not be different, but in Yerushalayim of the foreseeable future, you can take the bottles without fear of stealing.

We have to find the balance on the tricky matter of wedding spending. We will start with the reasons to spend significantly, and then temper that tendency with counter considerations.

The major expenses that Chazal foresaw (including a dowry) to enable a couple to get married have to do with the viability of building a comfortable home. The bride’s father was expected to set aside one tenth of his net worth for this purpose (see Ketubot 68-69). When parents are unable to properly equip their children, it is a great mitzva to help them and/or the young couple (see Sukka 49b).

Chazal also gave the wedding celebration great importance, including in comparison to other values. The term hachnasat kalla classically refers primarily to the procession of the bride from her father’s home to the home where the couple would live. The gemara (Ketubot 17a) says that Torah study is suspended for people (in addition to friends or family) to join the procession and that if the procession meets up with a funeral procession, the wedding party takes precedence.

The meal that follows is a seudat mitzva, which one is even allowed to plan on Shabbat (Ketubot 5a). Therefore, one can apply the rule that it is praiseworthy to go about it generously (see Bava Kama 9b). There are strong indications that the outlay of energy and expenses is assumed to be substantial. One of the explanations of the old custom that weddings take place on Wednesday is to make sure there are three days available (uninterrupted by Shabbat) to prepare the meal (Ketubot 2a). The following shocking halacha shows how challenging it is expected to be to have a materially appropriate wedding and how important it is to protect that goal.

If the father of the groom or the mother of the bride dies right before the wedding, the burial is pushed off until after the wedding ceremony and meal. Then the burial takes place, followed by a week of sheva berachot and finally a week of shiva (Ketubot 4a). Rashi (ad loc.) explains that the groom’s father and the bride’s mother are primarily responsible for the wedding’s material side and that if the wedding is pushed off after preparations were made, we are concerned that a future wedding will not be up to par. This is in significant contrast with Chazal’s view of burial expenses, which Rabban Gamliel reduced and standardized by example to ease the financial strain on families (see Ketubot 8b).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 64:4) says that if the groom is not interested in having a proper meal and the bride’s side is, the bride’s side can force him to make a feast “according to his and her honor.” This hints at one reason we cannot usually make an exact calculation of appropriate expenses: the matter depends on the two sides’ subjective standards. Someone who has fancy cars and a fancy house should have a relatively fancy wedding. Those who are more modest in means and spending can honor the event at a lesser expense.

The above is true, but is only one side of the coin. The other side is that a wedding should not single-handedly ruin a family’s financial situation or harm the couple’s prospect of getting their joint lives started with tranquility and reasonable provisions. Children should also not impose upon parents expenses that are beyond the parents’ responsibility, interest, and capability. On a communal level, there have been numerous examples of takanot (enforced guidelines) with rabbinic blessing or initiative to curb the spending even of people who want to pay for a lavish wedding (see sources in Hanisuim K’hilchatam 13:56). This could be needed during hard financial times or, during times of prosperity, when spending starts getting out of hand in a way that affects some individuals, or when weddings become so gaudy that they exceed Jewish good taste.

How an individual or a community is to know where to draw the line is, as they say, the $64,000 question (and we pray that weddings remain well below that price tag).

We will preface a few notes from the authorities regarding this issue.

From the Rif (Bava Metzia 13a) it appears that it is a mitzvah to deviate from the truth for the purpose of shalom.

The Tosfot Yeshanim (Yevamot 65b) state that one should not tell a complete lie, but only make a slight change which is not a complete lie (and they explain all the examples in the Gemara in this fashion). So too, the Rav Pealim (Choshen Mishpat 3, 1) quotes a few stories in the Gemara where lies were told and he explains that in all the cases an outward lie was not told but rather an ambiguous statement, which could be interpreted in a few ways, was made.

The Sefer Chasidim (126) states that only regarding a past event one is allowed to deviate from the truth, but regarding something which is happening now he should not lie. Therefore, he states that if one is asked to give a loan and he doesn't want to because he is afraid he won't be paid back, he shouldn't lie and say that he doesn't have money, as this is something that is occurring now and not something in the past.

Therefore, it is permitted and even required to deviate from the truth for the purpose of Shalom, but one should not say an outward lie but rather an ambiguous statement, which could be interpreted in a few ways.

The gemara in Chulin 97b implies that Chazal took some of the stronger foods that are likely to be forbidden and arrived at a number where with that ratio we can expect that the forbidden food will not be discernable.

There are a few reasons to bury parts of the human body, and we will have to look at each one and see whether it applies to the tooth of a, baruch Hashem, live person.

Regarding the mitzva of kevura (burial), there is a major question whether the obligation applies even to an individual limb of a deceased person (see Mishna Lamelech, Avel 14:21). (If the majority of the corpse is present, all agree that the mitzva applies to every part of it.) There are those who say that while there is a mitzva of burial for an individual part of the body, this applies only for a dead person, where it is a disgrace for part of his body to be unburied and not to one who goes on living without the part (compare Noda B’Yehuda I, YD 90 and ibid. II, YD 209). The Igrot Moshe (YD I, 231) tries to prove that there is an obligation of burial even for an individual limb or a sizable amount of flesh of a live person from the fact that the gemara (Nazir 43b) needs a pasuk to say that a kohen may not make himself tameh in order to bury a limb of his live father. In any case, it appears that the majority opinion is like the Noda B’Yehuda (see Ateret Paz III, CM 7).

Even if the mitzva of burial does not apply, there are additional issues that could put limitations on what to do with a part of the body. A limb of even a live person is tameh (ritually impure) (Rambam, Tumat Met 2:3). As such it is not proper to allow such a limb to be in the open, where a kohen can come in contact with it. Another issue that could create requirements for proper disposal is if it is forbidden to receive benefit from the body part (see Binyan Tzion 119).

Let us now look into the matter of a tooth. The gemara (Berachot 5b) tells that Rabbi Yochanan would walk around and show people a bone from his tenth son to have died (Tosafot- he did so to console others who were distraught over tragedy). Commentators are troubled how Rabbi Yochanan could have acted in this way, as he should have, ostensibly, buried it. Rashi says that it was a tiny bone, smaller than the size of a grain of barley. The Rashbam (Bava Batra 116a) says that the ‘bone’ was actually a tooth, which is not tameh. Indeed, it says in the mishna (Ohalot 3:3) that neither hair, nor nails, nor teeth that are separated from the human body are tameh. Although not everyone explains that it was a tooth that Rabbi Yochanan kept, we do not have a clear indication that there is a fundamental machloket on the matter. It is not clear whether a tooth from the deceased is permitted in benefit (see Ran, Chulin 122a; Yabia Omer, III, YD 21). However, the tooth of a live person is not forbidden in benefit. Therefore, we are not aware of a halachic source or strong reason to place restrictions on what can be done with an extracted tooth.

There is a venerable source that talks about what to do with extracted or fallen teeth, but apparently not one that follows halachic lines. The Chida (Yosef Ometz 30) wrote to someone who was upset that his tooth, which he had been saving to have buried with him, was lost. The Chida told him that although such a custom is mentioned in Ma’avar Yabok, it is not clear that he agreed with it and that it seems to contradict the story of Rabbi Yochanan. The Tzitz Eliezer (X, 5:8) seems to dismiss the practice. It is also interesting that even this uncommon minhag does not require burying the tooth right away, as many require for limbs, but specifically waiting with it until burial of the person. This actually seems to discount the potential halachic stringencies as above. Therefore, we see no reason to take any special measures in regard to a tooth that is removed or falls from a person. (The matter of disposing of cut nails is a totally technical matter (i.e., it could cause damage- see Moed Katan 18a) that does not apply here.)

There is a huge difference between the basic halacha and the practical application in this matter, and it is important to try arrive at a healthy perspective on the matter.

A cup used for netilat yadayim must hold and need not hold more than a revi’it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 159:1). There is a well known machloket how much a revi’it is, with Rav Chayim Na’eh saying that it is 86 cubic centimeters (approximately 3 oz.) and the Chazon Ish saying that it is 150 cc. (app. 5 oz.), and there are other notable opinions in between. While this is an important machloket regarding such matters as Kiddush, it is usually not crucial regarding the cup for netilat yadayim, as it is hard to find a cup that is smaller than that.

Regarding the water, one does not have to use the entire revi’it. However, we will see that there are advantages to using a revi’it. When one pours less than a revi’it on the hands, the water becomes tameh, and if the water goes beyond the area that needs washing and then returns, it makes the hands tameh again (Shulchan Aruch, OC 162:2). This requires one to keep his hands facing up the whole time so that that which falls will not return. When a revi’it is used at one time, even if it is one revi’it for the two hands together, the water does not become tameh and the whole matter is not a problem (ibid.). According to most opinions (ibid.), when a revi’it is used, there is not even a need to wash the hands twice (see Mishna Berura 162:21, who explains the advantages of our minhag to wash twice anyway).

However, water must reach the entire area that needs to be washed at one time (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 3). There is significant discussion as to how much of the hand this is. One opinion is that it is only the fingers, up to their connection to the palm of the hand. The other opinion, which is accepted practice under normal circumstances, is to wash the entire hand, until its connection to the wrist (ibid. 164:4). The Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) advises that since one washes the entire hand, “it is very good to be careful not to use an exact amount, but he should wash with an abundance [of water], for if he uses exactly the amount of a revi’it, it is very likely that part of the hand will remain unwashed.”

There is a famous story (which comes in many versions) of how Rav Yisrael Salanter was observed using a minimal amount of water for netilat yadayim because he did not want his preferred observance of the mitzva to come at the expense of someone else. This might support your suggestion that in our situation of limited water supply we should curtail our ritual use of water to the minimum amounts required. Under the correct circumstances (apparently Rav Salanter usually used a larger quantity) this is a very laudable approach. Using ridiculously large amounts of water (which, in public, usually means making people wait on line longer) is more likely a sign of OCD or ignorance than righteousness, but we should avoid being judgmental.

There is no prohibition to do so, but if it is an activity that has dangers then many people refrain during the nine days.

We will answer regarding meat, you can convert the answer automatically for dairy. The answer will be brief; you should the topic more methodologically in one of the many good books on the topic. The answer is assuming you are Ashkenazi. For Sephardim it is a little more lenient.
If the pot has been used for meat within 24 hours then the food should not be mixed with or eaten actually together with milk products. However, it can be put into dairy dishes and eaten at the same meal with dairy. If it has not been used within 24 hours, then it can even be mixed with dairy. However, that is after it has been cooked. It is proper to not cook it in a meat pot, even one not used within 24 hours with the intention to mix it with dairy.

The umbrella was probably purposely placed on the floor. You were right to leave it there initially, as the owner could return (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 260:9). However, after a while (security forbade one who left the stadium to return), it was fine to pick it up. If there were no siman (identifying sign), you could keep it (if we could assume the owner realized the umbrella was missing before you picked it up). However, between the name and the location (there were seat numbers), there are simanim. Therefore, at first glance, you would be required to effectively publicize your find, and if no one responded, keep it indefinitely (Shulchan Aruch, CM 267:15). (Yeiush after the object was picked up is not fully effective.)

One might argue that since people came from many different places, the owner would not believe he could retrieve it despite the simanim. It is a good question whether we would follow standard rules or accept such a claim (consider that in Talmudic times it was also difficult to retrieve lost objects- see Bava Metzia 28b). However, the claim is not clear in practice either. MetLife Stadium has a lost-and-found service and asks people to give found articles to a worker. (When that is the most practical system, one need not be concerned that workers don’t know the proper rules of returning lost objects- see Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 2:(53).) Also, the owner could have called a friend still at the stadium and asked him to retrieve it.

On the other hand, if one loses something in a public place with a majority of non-Jews, we assume the owner had yeiush (loss of hope). Here, it is a tricky question. The area was frequented by Jews at the time of the loss, so we might not assume yeiush (Shulchan Aruch, CM 259:3). On the other hand, if Jews only pass through but non-Jews who otherwise frequent it are more likely to notice the object than the Jews were, we assume yeiush (see Rama, CM 259:8). Were participants riveted to the event (see Nimukei Yosef to Bava Metzia 24a), or were they also looking to the floor for mitzvot (or free umbrellas)? Also, an umbrella on the floor was not initially a sign of a lost object, so Jews might not know to return it. On the other hand, the Rama (CM 259:7) says that when local law requires returning lost objects, one is obligated even when classical halacha does not require it. It is not clear to me what New Jersey law is in a case like this. In the final analysis you probably may keep the umbrella, but there is an element of beyond-the-letter-of-the-law to return it when feasible (see Bava Metzia 24b).  

Can you find the owner? Announcing the find in a local shul (Shulchan Aruch, CM 287:3) is futile. There is a tiny chance that MetLife would have details of someone looking for an umbrella from Aug. 1 (but e-mails are free). There is a website for reporting lost and/or found objects in Israel (www.ebood.co.il). This is a nice idea for Jewishly populous areas, but I was unable to find such a site for NY-NJ. We ask our readership to try to help you fulfill the mitzva (see bolded details above; we can be a go-between). If there are no results, feel even better about keeping it.

What if we could not assume initial yeiush, but you do not want a stash of objects waiting for Mashiach with unrealistic chances of returning them? Since an umbrella is readily replaceable, you could record its value and simanim to cover the remote possibility someone will step forward with simanim (Igrot Moshe, CM II:44; Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 7:(10)). It might be nobler to give it to someone in need so that the owner can receive some merit of tzedaka (Pitchei Choshen, ibid.).  

The gemara discusses the question whether mitzvot tzrichot kavana (= mtzk – a mitzva is valid only if performed with intention to fulfill a mitzva), including in the context of reading Kri’at Shema and blowing shofar without specific intent to perform the mitzva. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 60:4) rules that kavana is required, and there is significant discussion about whether this is true even regarding mitzvot  which are only rabbinically mandated (see Mishna Berura 60:10). Thus, one could claim that whether or not one fulfills yEY without kavana depends on whether the mitzva is from the Torah (Ramban) or is rabbinic (simple understanding of the Rambam (see Amud Hayemini 22).

However, there are several opinions that the question of mtzk does not apply to all mitzvot. The Ran (7b of Rif, Rosh Hashana) says that even the opinion that usually requires kavana, does not require it for mitzvot of eating. Some say that this applies to matters of physical enjoyment, a distinction we find regarding the obligation of a korban for an unintentional sin (see Kritot 20b). YEY apparently does not fit into this category, as the mitzva is fulfilled by the fact that he lives in the Land, not by a specific act of physical enjoyment. However, others (see Sdei Chemed, vol. IV, p. 305) understand that the above is true for any mitzva that is done through physical action (including the mitzva of lulav- ibid. p. 306), as opposed to a mitzva of speech, in which case it yEY would not require kavana.

A similar distinction is found in Kovetz Shiurim (II:23). He says that one fulfills mitzvot that that are conceptually result-oriented even without the intention; the important thing is that the result was reached. Examples he gives include repaying debts and pru u’revu (procreation). YEY is tricky, in that one does not reach a result, where he can say the mitzva is over. However, the mitzva is apparently to be in the state of living in the Land (the parameters are beyond our present scope). Thus it is a mitzva of an ongoing state/resultand according to this approach, too, YEY would not require kavana. Rav Asher Weiss (heard orally) explains this distinction as follows. Mtzk is an issue only for mitzvot that are significant only when done as service of Hashem, which requires intention. The result of having children is significant even without being performed as service of Hashem, and presumably so does yEY.

Despite the above, to a great extent, the question is moot. There are two elements to fulfilling a mitzva: 1. technical fulfillment, whose greatest ramification is that it exempts one from repeating the mitzva. 2. The reward one receives for fulfillment. The various halachic discussions focus on the first element – the operative one. What happens with reward?

A few things are clear. First, Hashem will not give the same reward to one who accidentally performed a mitzva or solely for self-interest as to one who did it for the right reasons (see Nazir 23a). The Imrei Binah (Orach Chayim 4) cites the Chochmat Adam’s author’s formulation. Even if and when one is credited with fulfillment of a specific mitzva without kavana, he fails to perform the general mitzva of “to serve Him with all your heart” (Devarim 11:13). There is no way for human beings to determine Hashem’s reward accounting in every case. Remember, in this regard that there are different reasons for not having kavana, including the following: lack of belief in Hashem; a Satmar ideology; not thinking about the mitzva, etc. These possibilities and many other variables impact on a person’s virtue and thus on his reward for the mitzva.

Regarding the element of fulfillment exempting from repeating the mitzva, the question is moot. One never completes the mitzva of yEY. Thus, whether or not he fulfilled the mitzva in the past, the mitzva continues, and it is certainly better to do it now with kavana.

The general principle is that anything eaten also raw, there is no prohibition of bishul akkum. Halva is made from sesame seeds which can be eaten raw, and therefore the more accepted opinion is that there is no prohibition of bishul akkum, although some are more stringent since they are mostly not eaten raw. As the prohibition of bishul akkum is rabbinic, one may be lenient in this matter.

Scallions are like onions regarding the halachot of sharpness.

Physical pain was always considered an acceptable way to train animals.

Tzar baalei chaim only applies to causing pain needlessly and out of cruelty. If it's done in a measured way, for training, it shouldn't be a problem.

There are no special laws for the production of a yad. It is an accessory of the mitzva to read the Torah, not a fundamental part of the mitzva. Therefore, there is no need for a Jew to produce it.

Based on maps that we saw, the Bay eventually connects to the ocean, and may be used for tevilat kelim.

The Malbim (Devarim 33:13) explains that kesut refers to an under garment, which covers the body itself, while levush refers to an upper garment. In another place (Yishaya 50:3) he explains that kesut refers to any clothing that covers someone, even if it was not tailored specifically for him/her, while levush is clothing made to fit the measurements of the wearer. He brings a proof text from the verse there, which compares fog to kesut and clouds to levush.  He explains that clouds "fit" the sky nicely, while fog is more amorphous. It appears from his commentaries that beged is a generic term for any kind of garment.  

It is permitted.

There are clear halachot in the gemara (Berachot 50b; 52b) and poskim (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 171, 180) regarding “respect” due to food in general and especially bread. Two related issues are involved: not causing food to be wasted; not degrading food.

First we shuld mention that if one plans things as he or she should, there should little waste of sizable pieces of bread (or other foods). Leftover bread can be frozen, used for breadcrumbs (while avoiding meat/milk issues), or left for birds. Where this is difficult is at semachot, where there can be half-eaten rolls, etc.

One is not allowed to involve food in non- eating, in a way that it is likely to become soiled and become unappetizing (Shulchan Aruch OC 171:1). It is forbidden to throw any food that could get soiled upon falling and to throw bread even if it will not become soiled, due to bread’s extra importance (ibid. - see Beit Yosef, ad loc.). The gemara (Berachot 52b) explains Beit Shammai’s opinion that one should clean the eating area before washing with mayim acharonim so that the water not fall on and ruin the food. Beit Hillel is not concerned because people will know to remove k’zayit-sized pieces of bread. We are not concerned about smaller pieces, as Rabbi Yochanan says these can be destroyed. Seemingly then, sizable pieces are due respect, while small ones are not, as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 180:3-4) assumes.

However, the matter is complicated. The gemara in Shabbat (143a) says in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that one may not destroy even pieces smaller than a k’zayit. The gemara in Chulin (105b) also says that not being careful with small pieces of leftover food makes one susceptible to poverty. Tosafot (Shabbat 143a) says that our text in Shabbat, which follows Rashi, is incorrect, as the gemara in Berachot says that one is not required to care for small pieces. On the other hand, Tosafot (Berachot 52b) says that even if there is no prohibition, disgracing small pieces could cause poverty. The Magen Avraham (180:3) distinguishes based on different types of lack of care. One is not required to preserve small pieces; however, he may not disgrace them, e.g., by having people trample them. Water falling on them and making them not usable is not a disgrace. Bigger pieces must not even get soiled by water. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) claims that according to the Rambam, there are no halachic limitations on small pieces, although perhaps there is a danger of poverty.

Even regarding big pieces, if one has decided not to eat them and there is no issue of not wasting them, what should one do with them? Presumably one should discard them without disgracing them, but what is considered a disgrace? Is putting them in the garbage, the normal place to discard things, a disgrace? Every written source I found on the topic (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 16; Etz Hasadeh 19:4; Rav E. Melamed - online) said (without classical sources) that one must put k’zayit -sized pieces in a bag before throwing them into the garbage, and many people, especially in Israel, are careful about this.

Is there any explanation for at least most of the American community within which I grew up, who are not careful about this? We have mentioned in the past (Beshalach 5768) that Rav Yisraeli’s ruled that one can put food with the sanctity of Shemitta in a bag before throwing in the garbage even together with foods without sanctity, as long as those other foods are not spoiled. Touching and even getting a little soiled by other foods before being thrown into the garbage dump may not be a disgrace. One could claim, then, that most kitchen garbage bins contain bags in which there are various leftover food and disposable matters; thus, putting bread in there may not be a disgrace. However, the easier position to justify, in regard to halacha and avoiding poverty, is to put bread leftovers (at least, bigger pieces) that cannot be salvaged, in a separate bag before putting it in the garbage.

The practice of standing up as the chatan/kalla walk past those who are seated is a relatively new phenomenon. The traditional approach to new practices in a religious setting is to be wary about them, for several reasons. One reason is that some new practices are against the spirit or even the letter of halacha or Jewish thought. Another is that it creates confusion, when it is difficult to distinguish between important minhagim from which one can learn and gain and between spiritually meaningless practices. A third dimension is a feeling many have that if this practice is a proper one, generations before us would have initiated it.  A related idea is that initiating a new minhag gives the impression of arrogance and dismissal, as if to say: “We know better than our predecessors.”

Let us analyze the practice in light of the above. It is hard to find anything significantly objectionable about standing up for a chatan/kalla. Maybe some people are irked by the tendency toward attributing them special powers (see scant sources regarding their power of prayer in Nitei Gavriel 9:15, indicating it is not a mainstream approach in non-Hassidic philosophy). However, there is a staggering amount of sources that support the idea being generally appropriate. We are commanded to stand for various people we are required to honor (see Kiddushin 32-33), and we find numerous sources about making a big deal of the chatan/kalla. These include such halachot as halting Torah study to escort the kalla and giving precedence to a wedding procession over a funeral procession (Ketubot 17a). One could claim that these represent a mitzva to make them happy rather than honoring them per se. However, numerous sources (including Tosafot ad loc. and the Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 360) refer to kavod (honor) and compare it to the kavod of others. 

In truth, there are different ways of showing kavod to different people. For example, a husband and wife should honor each other greatly (Rambam, Ishut 15:19-20). Yet, we do not find a halacha that they should stand up for each other. The main honor for a chatan and kalla is showing interest in and excitement about their marriage and future home. Certainly, it is more appropriate to sit in rapt attention than to rise but continue talking to a friend. However, standing would also seem to be a reasonable expression of honor.

People quote the concept of chatan domeh l’melech (a groom resembles a king) as grounds for standing. This phrase comes from Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer 16, along with examples of similarities: they both are praised for seven days; they wear nice clothing; they are involved in partying (regarding a chatan, it is for seven days, and some understand it to mean they may not go to work); they do not go in the street alone. The latter two are brought as halacha in the Rama (Even Haezer 64:1). The gemara (Moed Katan 28a) makes another interesting comparison: a chatan is like a kohen and, therefore, sits at the helm. We did not find a classical source requiring standing before chatan.  

There are semi-classical sources that speak about standing for the chatan as he goes to get an aliya during the week before and after the wedding (see Nitei Gavriel 2:7 and Chashukei Chemed, Gittin 62a, who are not overly impressed by the case for standing). The lack of a source about standing specifically on the way to the chupa should not be surprising – for hundreds of years, weddings were done outside and indications (including old paintings) are that seating was not the norm.

In summation, we find nothing compelling to require standing for the chatan/kalla but agree it has logic and is not intrinsically objectionable. Out of respect for our predecessors who did not do so, we would not have initiated the practice, but out of respect for present-day peers who do it (and perhaps chatanim/kallot who already expect it), we encourage joining along. 

We cannot relate to every pertinent factor or give full guidelines but will use halachic sources and logic to make certain recommendations. A psychologist must be careful (as always) and should consult a well-versed rabbi in some cases. We relate to cases of normal parents with shortcomings, not criminals or sadists.

In addition to doing positive things for a parent (kavod), one is to revere him (or her) by avoiding even things that would be appropriate toward others (mora). The gemara (Kiddushin 32a) says that a son should not disgrace his father even when the latter throws much money into the sea. The gemara seems to assume that according to the opinion that honoring parents is to be done with the parent’s money (as we pasken), silence is required only when the father throws his own money. Yet, the Rambam (Mamrim 6:7), extends it to a case in which the father discarded the son’s money. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 240) explains that while a son does not have to spend to honor his parent, he must give up all his money before disgracing him. The Ri (cited by the Tur, CM 240) says that a son does not have to let his father cause him financial damage. The Ramah (ibid.) says he can stop him before damage is done, even if the father is embarrassed; after the damage is done; he cannot scold the father –  but he can sue. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:8) accepts the Rambam’s application of mora to the son’s significant loss. The Rama rules like the opinions that a son can protect his rights. It is not clear how far one is expected to go to avoid the theoretical possibility of suing a parent and whether the Rambam could agree to such a possibility (see Birkei Yosef ad loc. and K’tav Sofer, YD 108). The machloket between the Shulchan Aruch and Rama seems to impact on our case – a child standing up for his psychological rights (which can be no less important than monetary rights), at the expense of upsetting a parent.

Another pertinent discussion is tochacha (rebuke)of a parent for his actions? The gemara (Kiddushin 32a) says that a son who sees his father violating the Torah should only hint to him that it is wrong. Yet, certain laws of tochacha are learned from Yonatan’s rebuke of Shaul (see Arachin 16b). Apparently, while being as soft as possible, a child does rebuke a parent under certain circumstances. Does tochacha extend to the parent’s sins against his child? The p’shat of the pasuk of tochacha (Vayikra 19:17- see Sefer Hachinuch 439) is that if one wrongs you, you should air your grievance rather than harbor hatred, and the Rambam (De’ot 6:6) paskens this application. However, the extent to which one can upset such an offender is limited (ibid. 8) and it is laudable to let the matter go if the victim can remove the enmity by himself (ibid. 9). It makes sense that when the offender is a parent, if the victim/child is permitted to say anything, it should be under great need and then with “kid gloves.” On the other hand, while disgracing parents is particularly severe (Devarim 27:16; Shulchan Aruch, YD 241:6), harboring hate them for them is also severe (Aruch Hashulchan, YD 240:8; see Chashukei Chemed, Sanhedrin 84b). Thus, if needed to fix a greatly strained relationship, it would seem that one can raise certain criticisms carefully.

To summarize, a psychologist can contemplate encouraging a patient (at the least, for Ashkenazim) to appropriately air grievances to his parent. Next time, we will continue with certain guidelines.

After seeing that there are times that a psychologist may encourage a child to “confront” his parent about harmful behavior, we will suggest some strategies, when possible, to minimize the halachic problem of disrespect to a parent. We refer to responsible, while flawed, parents.

The gemara (Kiddushin 31b) tells of Rav Assi’s mother who deteriorated to the point that she viewed her son romantically. Rav Assi left her to sever the relationship. The Rambam (Mamrim 6:10) rules that while one should try to tend to a parent whose mind has deteriorated, if their behavior is bad enough, he leaves the parent and instructs others to tend to him. The Ra’avad argues because he does not see an alternative to the child’s care. The Kesef Mishneh rejects the Ra’avad’s question because the Rambam is clearly based on the story of Rav Assi.

The Ra’avad seems to understand that the idea that the son leaves is permission because the task is not doable, and so he argues with the Rambam, saying there is no better alternative. The Radvaz (ad loc.) and Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 240:32) explain that the child specifically could not be the caregiver. Others can deal more forcefully (which may be necessary) in a manner that a child is forbidden to do. Thus, the child will get someone else to do what he is not allowed to despite the parent’s need for such treatment. We see, then, that even when a parent needs non-respectful behavior, the child should find someone else to do it. Therefore, in our case, it is best (if it does not undermine the therapeutic process) for someone other than the child (e.g., the psychologist) to raise the grievances with the parent. Then the parent can approach the child and they can focus on ways to improve things.

Another halachic advantage of the psychologist broaching the topic is that it gives the parent an opportunity to be mochel (waive) his honor before discussion with the child ensues. The gemara (Kiddushin 32a) says that a father’s relinquishing of rights to kavod is effective. Some say (Raavad, cited by Rivash 220, Beit Yosef, YD 334) that he can only waive his rights to honor but not to allow being disgraced. Some equate a parent allowing disgrace to a parent allowing being hit (Turei Even, Megilla 28a) and some distinguish between them (Pri Yitzchak 54). In any case, some level of negative interaction must be permitted based on the following story (Kiddushin 32a). A rabbi did something upsetting to his son to test his reaction. The gemara asks that he was (possibly) causing his son to violate honoring his father and answers that the father waived his honor (see Birkei Yosef, YD 240:14).

When the psychologist prepares his patient for a conversation with the parent, he will teach him to raise the issues in a way that heals, not creates feuds. I imagine he will say things like “I know you love me, but when you act in a certain way, it hurts me.” While not pleasant to hear, it is likely not considered the type of disgraceful behavior for which mechilla does not work.

In summary, a child should be encouraged to complain to his parent about their parenting only when truly necessary for the patient’s mental health and/or the parent/child relationship. Even then, it is better for the psychologist to relay some of the harsher criticism instead of the child. The parent’s willful participation in the process, which hopefully will not be overly disgraceful, is helpful not only psychologically but also halachically.

The rule is that whenever there is a reason to suspect that there may be shaatnez in the clothes, they need checking.  Historically, many clothes were sewn together with linen, so one who bought clothing from non-Jews needed to check.  The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah, end of siman 302) points out that already in his day this was not the case, and therefore there is no need to check.

Practically, anything that according to the label contains no wool, need not be checked.  If it contains wool, and there is a reason to suspect linen may also be present (eg. some jackets have linen in the lining), it should be checked.  Shaatnez has been found in certain brands of wool trousers (see 

http://www.jerusalemkoshernews.com/2013/10/shatnez-in-mens-pants/, and these brands should be checked).

Your question is very thoughtful, and the open communication with your cousins is fascinating.

We must distinguish between issues. The use of tinok shenishba stems from the Rambam, who distinguishes between people who left traditional Judaism and their children who were brought up with their parents’ viewpoints even if they are aware of the traditional system. The context is sanctions against those who undermine the accepted religious system, and he says they do not apply to the second generation. In addition to not being penalized, the Rambam says the sons should be peacefully engaged to enable possible return to traditional Judaism. Although he does not assume that successful outreach is ensured, the Rambam does not raise qualms that the outreach process, which must include elements of learning, suspends the tinok shenishba status. This is the standard approach in our times as well.

The more important question, which your cousins probably have in mind, is how Hashem views the individual who was largely not to blame for religious shortcomings due to lack of knowledge, and then begins to learn. However, employing tinok shenishba to this question is wrong on at least two counts.

On the one hand, it is largely too late. You know there is what to learn and what to observe. Just because you do not know all the details does not make you incapable of responsibility. Regarding the law of the land, for example, ignorance of the law is not an excuse (I spare you the Latin phrase), as one has the ability to find out. To decide not to learn the specifics and use it as an excuse to Hashem is like telling a policeman: “I didn’t know the speed limit because when I approached signs, I looked away.”

On the other hand, we must not minimize the extent to which Hashem factors in the difficulty of one from what you call a secular background from accepting observance. Sometimes, he is not philosophically convinced about the need to observe the way Orthodox Jews do. Secondly, it is difficult to be significantly more observant than one’s family and surroundings, and it rarely happens overnight. These difficulties exist even if he learns Torah. Realize that the idea of more education raising divine expectations is not just for a “tinok shenishba,” but for all Jews, who always have room to improve. If it paid to reduce Torah knowledge and inspiration to minimize culpability, Orthodox Jews should not provide their kids with a top education! Rather, we are expected to be realistically optimistic and give everyone the best chance at improving, no matter their starting point.

If one knows that an individual is sinning unknowingly and will not listen if corrected, it is better not to tell him. However, this is only in regard to limited details of observance and when the knowledge can be assumed not to help him. Not to give a person the opportunity to increase his connection with Hashem through Torah is unfair deprivation of one who lacked a fair chance. (Only one who is disrespectful or uses his studies to mock or fight against Torah should be excluded.)

One should use logic in choosing the “Torah curriculum”, putting more emphasis on ideas that do not conflict with practice at home or can be implemented at least partially in the short term. We wish you many opportunities to study Hashem’s Torah and maximize its wide variety of benefits. May your cousins be wise teachers and you enjoy being an active participant.

If it is possible to speak with the worker prior to speaking with the management, it is preferable to do so. However, if it is not possible or if it does not help then one may speak to the management, as his actions may clearly damage the business, and speaking with the management to protect the business from damage is not considered lashon hara.

We will survey halachic elements of the topic that relate to cases where it is readily understandable why a serious observant Jew would feel a need or a strong desire to have surgery. Needless surgery or, in the other direction, cases of gross malformations are, respectively, very different matters from a halachic and a philosophical perspective.

The fundamental issue that the poskim discuss is that of damaging oneself. The gemara (Bava Kama 91b) refers to a machloket among Tannaim whether one is allowed to damage himself, and the Rambam (Chovel U’mazik 5:1) and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 420:1) rule it is forbidden. The question is whether totally elective surgery done for an understandable reason is included in the prohibition. On the one hand, in the immediate stage, surgery includes cutting the body, and Tosafot (Bava Kama 91b) says that one may not damage himself even for gain. On the other hand, Chazal allowed cutting the skin for certain purposes, including bloodletting and removing splinters (Yevamot 72a; Sanhedrin 84b). Some say that a procedure done to correct a blemish, even if it is just a significant aesthetic one and not a classic medical problem, is considered healing and included in the doctor’s mandate to heal (Mishneh Halachot IV:266, based on Ketubot 74b). Others infer from the Rambam’s language that only violent damage to the body is forbidden, not constructive cutting done to improve it (Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 5:66; see Minchat Shlomo II:82 and Minchat Yitzchak VI;105). There is a difference between the two approaches to leniency in a case where the initial situation is not one of a blemish, while the surgery can still provide substantial and not frivolous improvement. Yabia Omer (VIII, CM 12) reasons that one should distinguish between different levels of gain.

Another issue is the potential danger to life from surgery, specifically one that requires general anesthetic. Objectively, in our times, the chance of death from simple surgery is tiny (assuming a responsible choice of medical practitioners). While we do not generally take stands on medical questions, one could say that the danger is roughly equivalent to that from driving a few hundred miles. While there have been poskim, at least decades ago (Minchat Yitzchak ibid., Aseh Lecha Rav IV:65), who have forbidden cosmetic surgery that requires anesthetic on those grounds, this is a difficult position to take (see Yabia Omer ibid.).

Some poskim suggest an interesting distinction between the genders. Cases in which men act with concern about their own appearance to a degree that is not normal for men raise questions of a prohibition of lo yilbash. While this literally refers to cross-dressing, Chazal apply it to several activities that are normal specifically for the opposite gender. One gemara (Shabbat 50b) says that it is permitted for a man to remove certain scabs from his face due to pain, but it is forbidden for beautification. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that the problem is lo yilbash. Tosafot (ad loc.) says that pain does not have to be physical but that if a man is embarrassed to be among people in that state, “there is no greater pain than that.” Therefore, while there is likely to be a difference between genders regarding the extent of blemish that justifies intervention, surgery can be permitted for a man whose aesthetic problems would be disturbing for the average man (Mishneh Halachot IV:267; Minchat Shlomo ibid.).

The Tzitz Eliezer (XI:41) claims that performing surgery to change one’s G-d-given appearance (excluding the results of illness or injury) is improper intervention in the way Hashem created the world. Most of his contemporaries reject or ignore this position regarding cases where patient’s feelings are understandable. However, it is worthwhile to add this philosophical point to the above halachic ones regarding cases where there is absolutely nothing wrong with a person’s appearance.

We will explore a few possible ways to exempt you from returning the items.

Let us assume that your neighbors are improperly taking advantage of you. Does that justify your stopping to retrieve their toys to get them to change their behavior? At first glance, this seems like nekama (revenge) – refusing to do for your counterpart a favor that you would normally do because of grievances against them (see Rambam, Deiot 7:7). On the other hand, several sources indicate that nekama applies when one is punishing another for past behavior, whereas it is permitted to take unpleasant steps to try to dissuade him from his improper behavior or for another positive, not spiteful, reason (see Rama, Choshen Mishpat 388:7; Mitzvot HaLevavot p. 32; Torat Ha’adam La’adam, from p. 172). Precedents for this rule include telling lashon hara to protect one’s legitimate rights (see Chafetz Chaim, Lashon Hara 10 where he also discusses the conditions) and steps that David Hamelech took against those who tried to harm him. In this realm, there is likely a distinction depending on the level of need and the steps contemplated and between refusing to do a favor and acting in a way which would normally violate a Torah law, e.g., hashavot aveida (see Torat Ha’adam La’adam ibid.). Therefore, it is important to determine if the mitzva of hashavat aveida is obligatory in this case.

There is a question as to what hashavat aveida requires of a person: return the object to the owner, or enable him to retrieve it (see discussion in Mishpat Ha’aveida, p. 21). The stronger position in our view, which is reportedly endorsed by Rav Moshe Feinstein and the Chazon Ish, is that the finder does not have to deliver the object (Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 7:(1); Torat Ha’aveida, p. 58). You imply that making them come pick up the toys would suffice, so there is a second reason to allow you to take that step.

Even if one wants to be stringent on the above issues, we should consider whether the pattern of behavior falls under the category of aveida mida’at (“intentional loss”). There are different levels of aveida mida’at. One is when the owner demonstrates he does not care if the object gets lost. In that case, there is even an opinion (Rama, CM 261:1; the Shulchan Aruch ad loc. disagrees) that one is allowed to take the object for himself. Your case does not fall into this category, as your neighbor wants the toys back and is not overly concerned about their being thrown from her home because she relies on you. However, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) assumes the owner is not mafkir the object and yet understands that by not taking precautions to protect its disappearance, he loses his right to require the finder to bother to return it. This seems to apply in your case, although she could argue that she tries to limit the children’s throwing of toys and that you cannot blame for lack of success and are required to help your counterpart, as hashavat aveida requires (even a hundred times – Bava Metzia 31a). Even so, it appears that in this case, there is no aveida because your neighbor always knows where to find her objects, and she has the responsibility to come get it. (This is better than the case where one informed the owner where his lost object is because there the mitzva took effect previously.) Thus, there is another reason to exempt you.

In summation, there are ample reasons to allow you to tell your neighbor that she will have to come collect the toys. That being said, we urge you (who know the dynamics) to consider whether the situation is acute enough to justify the steps and whether your idea is the wisest way to deal with the issue.

We start with an overview of the agricultural mitzvot of Shemitta along with a brief analysis of the significance of obtaining land ownership. 

The Rambam (Lo Ta’aseh 220-223) lists four such negative commandments, about: 1) working the land; 2) tending to the trees; 3) reaping the produce in the normal way; 4) harvesting fruit of the trees in the normal way. The prohibition of working the land applies even to one who does not own the land. There is a machloket whether there is a Torah prohibition on harvesting someone else’s field (Chazon Ish, Shvi’it 12:5 is lenient; Rav Auerbach, Ma’adanei Eretz 7:4 is stringent). In any case, the reward for refraining from aveirot is a function of the availability of and the temptation toward the aveira (see Kiddushin 39b with Rashi). One who owns a distant, small piece of land is not tempted to work it. Just as we would not suggest buying a donkey and bull to refrain from plowing with them together, the above is not a reason to obtain land before Shemitta.

The positive mitzvot are more pertinent. There is a machloket Rishonim whether the positive state of cessation from working the land (Rambam, Aseh 135) is a function of an individual’s work irrespective of ownership (Rambam Shvi’it 1:1) or whether it is a landowner’s responsibility to ensure his field is not worked (Ritva, Avoda Zara 15b). A third approach holds Jews responsible to save the land from being worked, including by redeeming it from non-Jews who may work it (Netziv, Vayikra 25:4). According to the Rambam, obtaining land is not a factor in creating this positive fulfillment (one who takes a sabbatical from his job as a farm worker would fulfill the mitzva). According to the Ritva, buying creates an opportunity to fulfill the mitzva. According to the Netziv (whose opinion is considered somewhat extreme), the mitzva entails obtaining land that would otherwise be worked.

There is also a mitzva to deal properly with the fruit of one’s field that were planted before Shemitta or grew on trees, including treating it as ownerless (Aseh 134). While according to Rav Auerbach (above), elements of this mitzva can also be fulfilled by non-landowners in Israel, buying a field certainly enables one to fulfill this mitzva.

Another gain of buying land is helping farmers keep Shemitta properly. Rav Kook (see his introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz) and all other poskim who supported the heter mechira, did not do so for those who were willing and able (without extreme financial hardship) to keep the mitzva. This is both in order to not uproot the mitzva and to avoid the great halachic problems involved in the heter mechira. Thus, helping interested farmers survive without selling their fields to non-Jews is similar to giving ma’ot chitim to one who cannot afford mehadrin Pesach provisions or donating to improve a mikveh according to the request of the local rabbi. (A member of the camp that rejects the heter mechira would view it as saving people from sin.)

If one purchases the field at its value (including the overhead of arranging the sale), he should not use ma’aser kesafim, as he should not for buying an etrog (see Tzedaka U’mishpat 6:1). A donation (without buying land or the part of the price that is beyond the purchase’s value) to an organization that helps farmers may be taken from ma’aser money (see ibid. 10).

We discovered that those who provide individuals with the land/mitzva opportunity include people who also plan to earn a lot of money (unfortunately, not all approbations of important rabbis relate to this element). Baruch Hashem, there are also those who are dedicated to helping farmers as well as providing a mitzva opportunity. While we will not rate groups publicly, we recommend to the wise mitzva consumer to check, not only the sale’s authenticity, but also the appropriateness of the price per area and the number of farmers who will be benefitting from the project.

Presumably, one with a Torah-based mindset will react negatively to such contests (with good reason). However, we do not believe in using words like “forbidden” without honestly weighing halachic issues.

We start with the issue you raised – bal tashchit (not destroying). This prohibition, beyond the Torah context of destroying trees, is hard to pin down. The Rambam (Melachim 6:10) describes it as applying not to wasting but to destroying things, including “me’abed ma’achalot derech hashchata” (destroying food in a destructive way). The stress of a destructive manner opens the door for allowing arguably wasteful usage of objects of value for such purposes as recreation (see Etz Hasadeh (Shtesman) 11:2). The fact that, after all, we are discussing eating makes it harder to claim the ingestion of the food is destructive. Rav Zilberstein (in Tzohar, 5758) claims that Rashi would consider stuffing oneself bal tashchit. In discussing one who is bloated eating more, the gemara (Yoma 80b) describes the action as “not eating” but “damaging,” and Rashi (ad loc.) says he damages the food and himself. If it is called damaging the food, it is likely bal tashchit. However, it would seem that since the context there is the parameters of forbidden eating (e.g., Yom Kippur, non-kosher food) and not bal tashchit, it is hard to know what Rashi would say in our context.

Another, related (see Rashi, Ta’anit 20b) issue is bizuy ochlin (disgrace of food). Halacha distinguishes between foods (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 171:1). Most foods are disgraced only when they are soiled and made unappetizing prior to eating. It is hard to apply that to eating, even if in a not natural way. Bread, though, may not be handled disrespectfully (e.g., throwing it) even when it is unaffected. Thus, while it is hard to consider over-eating an objective bizuy ochlin for most foods, it is reasonable to consider stuffing bread (including hot dog buns) down one’s throat in the context of extreme over-eating forbidden situational bizuy.

Safety concerns are also questionable. A small number of people have died (mainly from choking) at eating contests, and it is not wonderful for one’s digestive system. We find in Chazal particular concern for not eating in a dangerous or even not healthy manner (speaking while eating – Ta’anit 5b; eating standing – Gittin 70a). On the other hand, in addition to our reluctance to taking stands on medical matters, we do not want to be hypocritical by outright forbidding eating contests on health grounds when so many people eat very unhealthily.

There are a few semi-halachic, semi-philosophical areas about which people can argue, but we will skip to an issue that we believe at least eating contests of volume clearly violate – bal teshaktzu. A secondary application of Vayikra 11:43 is that one should not put his body in a situation in which he feels disgusted. Classic examples include holding in a strong need to eliminate and eating in a manner that disgusts him (Makkot 16b). It is true that poskim allow such situations for certain needs (e.g., one is in public without access to a bathroom – Mishna Berura 3:17; a sick person who needs to ingest a medicine that disgusts him – see Pri Megadim, Siftei Da’at 81:3). However, the anyway dubious practice of an eating contest is not adequate justification.

Regarding an eating “sprint” of three hot dogs, we lack the expertise to determine whether contestants necessarily disgust themselves or whether fast swallowing is just a technical skill of swallowing a normal amount of food unusually fast. The food can certainly be used by the body in a normal manner. Therefore, objections to such a contest would be based more on philosophical/ethical grounds than halachic ones.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3, 71) writes that a teacher of Torah must not give up on a student who doesn't learn properly, or even on one who doesn't act properly.  To support this he quotes the story of R' Preida, who taught every halcaha 400 times until he was able to understand it (Eruvin 54b).

If the student is a bad influence on others, Rav Moshe writes that he must be expelled.  However he stresses that these decisions must not be taken lightly, as they are similar to capital punishment.

If we understand correctly, the mugs you obtained are fully usable cups prior to their being decorated, and thus they were, in theory, in need of tevillat keilim before they were decorated. The decoration does not change the status of the utensil in this regard.

On the other hand, it is quite a stringency to do tevilla for earthenware mugs that are just glazed (and not actually glass-like). Not all Ashkenazim do it, and certainly a beracha should not be said on such a tevilla. If, on the other hand, this is the psak you have received, this is what you should do. 

You also have another issue regarding the children other than your own. Several poskim rule that tevilla is not effective before the obligation in practice begins and that is when the person who is going to use it receives it. They say, then, that neither a store owner nor one who obtained the utensil to give it as a present can do the tevilla (Tevillat Keilim (Cohen) 8:5-6). Thus, if in your community a sizable number of the people in the community do tevilla for ceramic utensils, you should, although it seems a little funny, attach a note that they were not tovelled. 

The gemara (Shabbat 119b, accepted by the Rambam, Shabbat 30:5 and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 300:1) says: “One should always set his table on Motzaei Shabbat, even if he needs only a k’zayit [of food].” Rashi explains that it is an honor to Shabbat to “escort” it as one escorts a king when he leaves. Various authorities add other, esoteric reasons. A crucial (including for techiyat hameitim) bone in the body is nourished by food eaten on Motzaei Shabbat (Beit Yosef, OC 300 in the name of ancient works). Another idea is that eating after Shabbat draws the sanctity of Shabbat meals onto weekday eating (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 300:2). Some say it is a segula for women for easy childbirth (see Kaf Hachayim 300:4). However, melaveh malka has a long history of not being kept by the masses, as acknowledged by authorities who nonetheless believed in adhering to it (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 300:3).

It is unclear to what extent melaveh malka is a weak but binding obligation, a proper practice (see Shulchan Aruch Harav OC 300:3; Mishna Berura 300:2), and/or a spiritual opportunity. It is also tricky to implement melaveh malka because there are many things mentioned by one or more poskim to enhance the practice (we will mention only some). The gemara, after the above quote, mentions both (hot) bread and meat, which some, like your husband, see as matters to be makpid about (see Maharsha Shabbat 119b; Mishna Berura 300:1).

The gemara implies (as the Taz, OC 300:1 understood) that the main factor is actually the setting of the table, and the food seems an afterthought (“even … a k’zayit”) or that which makes the table “the stage.” Many people who are machmir regarding eating ignore such elements mentioned by poskim as a nice tablecloth, place setting, and candles – matters of kavod modeled after Shabbat. On the other hand, some of the reasons given for melaveh malka do indeed focused on food, as does the ensuing passages of the gemara.

Some hiddurim mentioned are close to mutually exclusive. It is best to have melaveh malka soon after Shabbat; yet, it is best to cook for it after Shabbat. One idea is to eat something right away for melaveh malka, with Shabbat ambience, and have more serious eating later (Siddur Beit Yaakov (Emdin) p. 206b).

Is there room for leniency not to have a melaveh malka? Besides the possibility that it is not halachically required, there is a serious opinion (Eliya Rabba 300:1, quoted by many; see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 63:6) that any eating at seuda shlishit after nightfall (whose exact time is unclear) counts as a melaveh malka. The Tehilla L’Dovid’s (300:1) cogent argument that since we treat that time as Shabbat, it cannot count for melaveh malka does not delegitimize the lenient shita (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 63:6). Many poskim (including the Mishna Berura 300:1) say that one can fulfill melaveh malka without a full meal, even with fruit, as makes sense from the legitimacy of doing so for the greater obligation of seuda shlishit (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5).

Women do have some extra room for leniency because melaveh malka is ostensibly a time-based mitzva (see doubt of Pri Megadim 300, EA 1). On the other hand, we assume that women are obligated in such mitzvot when they relate to Shabbat, i.e., Havdala and seuda shlishit (Machatzit Hashekel ad loc., based on Magen Avraham 291:11), as all agree regarding Kiddush (Berachot 20b). Furthermore, many women will presumably desire and deserve their share of the aforementioned spiritual treasures (see Kaf Hachayim 300:2).

In summary, your husband’s practices are positive, although there is room for doing more or doing less. You do have incrementally more room for leniency than he. However, we recommend that you have at least some food in an honorable setting in honor of Shabbat after it has departed (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 63:3).

One may not erase the name of Hashem even if the intention is to fix it.  (Tshuvat Radvaz 1:77, implication of Tshuvat Rambam quoted by Beit Yosef Yoreh Deah 276).  However, if it is written in English it may be erased (Bemareh Habazak 7:75).

There is no prohibition of erasing on a computer screen.

We believe in the great significance of upstanding Jews’ common practices and in looking for halachic justification for them. However, there has to be a good fit between sources/logic and the practices.

The gemara (Kiddushin 31b) gives examples of kibbud (honoring) for parents and of mora (awe). While standing is not on either list, it is evident from gemarot that it is expected (see Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 240). This is logical considering the mitzva from the Torah (Yayikra 19:32) to stand before old people and scholars (Kiddushin 32b).

R. Yannai (ibid. 33b) says that a talmid chacham is not permitted to stand for his rebbe more than once in the morning and in the evening to avoid giving to him more honor than to Hashem. The Rif does not cite this ruling, and the Rosh (Kiddushin 1:56) explains (and agrees) that the gemara’s subsequent discussion indicates that his idea is rejected. The Rambam (Talmud Torah 6:8) does accept R. Yannai. The Shulchan Aruch (and, therefore, Sephardim- see Yalkut Yosef, Kibbud Av 4:8) rules like the Rif/Rosh.

The Rama (YD 242:16) accepts R. Yannai, but not according to its simple reading; one is not obligated more than twice a day, but he may do more (see Darchei Moshe YD 242:11; Semag, Aseh 13). Most Acharonim (see Chayei Adam 67:7; Shevet Halevi II:111; Yalkut Yosef ibid.) assume that the exemption applies to parents also. The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:24) suggests that the obligation to stand for one’s parent may exceed that toward his rebbe. (I believe, but cannot develop here, that according to the Rambam’s presentation of the case in which it is not permitted to stand more than twice a day, it does not apply to parents. Also note that the Rama rules that when one is among people who did not see him stand previously, he must stand again.)

It is difficult to demonstrate how the Rama’s opinion would justify the common practice of laxity about standing up for parents. After all, do people think about whether they already stood for their parent that day? The Rama can still help, depending on the following chakira about his opinion. Must one stand at the first opportunity of the day, after which there is an exemption, or should there just be a mode of behavior in which he is expected to stand roughly once in the morning and once at night? This might depend on if standing is part of the positive kibbud, making the exact timing less crucial, or the more negative mora, in which case without an exemption, remaining seated is an aveira (Yalkut Yosef ibid. is unsure to which category it applies). This, of course, helps only if the child stands with some regularity, which is not always be the case.

Another minimizing opinion found in the Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.) is that standing only applies when a parent comes in from outside the house, not when he moves from place to place in the home.

The most plausible explanation for the practice of laxity is the idea that a parent can be mochel (waive rights to) kibbud (Kiddushin 32a). (Regarding being mochel requirements of mora, see Living the Halachic Process III, G-4.) In our times, parents do not usually expect their children to stand up in their honor and often do not find it to even be positive. If that is the case in a specific household, then the child is indeed not required to stand.

Let us clarify a few things. Even after their mechila, it is a mitzva to stand for parents (Pitchei Teshuva, YD 240:16). Some say that one has to make some gesture of respectful acknowledgement (see Kiddushin 32b). If the reason parents are mochel starts from the children (i.e., the parents are so used to their not standing that they no longer demand or expect), this is not a good thing. Therefore, it is, in most cases, better for children (of all ages) who try to do things properly to stand for their parents more than is presently common.

The gemara (Megilla 26b) says that tashmishei mitzva (articles used to facilitate a mitzva) may be thrown away, as opposed to tashmishei kedusha (related to holy texts), which require geniza). The examples given for tashmishei mitzva are: sukka, lulav, shofar, and tzitzit.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 21) cites the Sh’iltot, that as long as tzitzit are still on the garment, they must be treated with respect and may not be used for non-mitzva purposes. Although they lack intrinsic sanctity, using them for other things while they are still slated for a mitzva is a bizuy (disgrace to the) mitzva.

Is there bizuy mitzva after one has finished using them? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 21:1) rules that tzitzit may be discarded in the garbage (although they may not be used for something disgraceful - see Mishna Berura 21:13). On the other hand, the Darchei Moshe (the Rama on the Tur) cites the Kolbo, who says that the gemara only means to exempt them from geniza, but one may not disgrace them, and the Rama (OC 21:1) says that throwing them out in a disgraceful place is included. He also cites the Maharil’s more stringent practice to do geniza as a preferable but not binding practice.

The arguably different levels of tashmishei mitzva, depending primarily on the level of connection to the mitzva, apparently adds complexity. For example, the Shulchan Aruch (21:2) says that although one many not disgrace a tallit, it (the garment part) does not require geniza but may be thrown into the garbage. Unlike regarding tzitzit, the Rama agrees regarding a tallit (understanding of the Mishna Berura 21:13; see practical complexity in Living the Halachic Process, II-G-5). This is because although tzitzit are meaningless without the garment, the tzitzit are the main part of the mitzva.

A similar distinction exists regarding a sukka. The Mishna Berura (21:6; 638:24) forbids throwing s’chach to a garbage dump or even a place where many are likely to trample them. Regarding the walls of the sukka, he cites the Pri Megadim as saying not to use them directly for something disgraceful (actually, in Mishbetzot Zahav 21:2 he is uncertain), but brings no limitations on throwing them out. Again, while walls are needed for a sukka and are set aside for its exclusive use during the chag (Shulchan Aruch, OC 638:1), the s’chach has a higher mitzva status, which may increase the care needed after the mitzva is over.

What is a netilat yadayim cup’s status in this regard? Our halachic intuition is that it is similar to a tallit and the walls of a sukka rather than to tzitzit and s’chach. After all, while a utensil (or a body of water) is required for netilat yadayim before a meal, the specific qualifications are very broad and general, and one does not need a special netilat yadayim cup (see Orach Chayim 159). While the mitzva of netilat yadayim always pertains, when one comes to retire a cup, it apparently can be disposed of like sukka walls.  

We will now relate to different situations. Simple netilat yadayim cups that are often used for other kitchen purposes besides netilat yadayim do not assume any halachic status. It is laudable to avoid putting special cups used exclusively for the mitzva, directly in a garbage, especially with identifying elements that link it to the mitzva (see this distinction in Ginzei Hakodesh 20:(9) in the name of Rav Chaim Kaniefsky). Putting it in an opaque bag first sufficiently removes bizuy. Placing it in a recycling bin (if feasible) is a cleaner and more dignified solution (see Shevet Hakehati IV:OC 10). Geniza is certainly not required, and keeping them “around,” without disgraceful use, is fine. Cups that are used primarily for negel vaser (upon awaking), after the bathroom, or before davening should be even more lenient, as there is not a real halachic requirement to use a cup for these (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 4:7).

On the yahrtzeit that completes the twelve months of aveilut for a parent, the full laws of the year’s aveilut apply (Rama, Yoreh Deah 395:3). In subsequent years, the laws of aveilut do not apply.

There is an old, recommended but not binding, minhag to fast on the day portion of a parent’s yahrtzeit (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 568:7, Rama, YD 376:4). The Rama (YD 391:3) says that that one should not take part in festive meals from the night that begins the Jewish day. The Levush (YD 402:12) argues based on how he views the fast’s logic. The yahrtzeit is a day of bad omens for the offspring, and the teshuva that accompanies the fast helps protect him. The Levush says that since it has nothing to do with aveilut, there are no restrictions on attending festivities the night before. The Shach (391:8) and others say that the minhag is like the Rama. These days, it is very common to not fast on a yahrtzeit. However, there is a stronger minhag to avoid or at least lessen one’s participation in weddings. The Taz (YD 395:3) posits that aveilut- type behavior is indeed part of the yahrtzeit experience.  

There are several grounds for leniency, besides the aforementioned Levush. Many (including Chochmat Adam 171:11) quote the Magen Avraham as saying that the aforementioned restrictions apply only on a yahrtzeit that ends the twelve months of aveilut. Additionally, the Pitchei Teshuva (YD 391:8) says that participation is forbidden only in a wedding, where the intensity of simcha activity exceeds that at other celebrations. Several poskim say that an avel is permitted to take part in a seudat mitzva such as a siyum (see Shach, YD 246:27). While the Shach (ibid.) cites the Maharil as not allowing a person to eat at a siyum on the yartzeit, that is when his minhag is to fast, and even then, the Maharam Shick (YD 369) rules that one who accepted the practice to fast can still eat at his own siyum.

What is the status of your self-created salvation holiday? The Chayei Adam (125:41) , who instituted one when his family survived a fire, says that it is a mitzva to keep such a day. While the Pri Chadash (496:14) says that the ability to institute semi-holidays ended with the retraction of megillat ta’anit, a clear majority of poskim disagree (see presentation in Yabia Omer X, OC 53). Therefore, all of the aforementioned reasons for leniency exist in your case, and it is fully reasonable to celebrate your salvation on the yahrtzeit.

However, it is apparent from your question [only partially presented here], that you are uncomfortable with the combination, as is very understandable. Therefore, we do not recommend that you move your celebratory day to the yahrtzeit. While the meal you have on this day is likely a seudat mitzva, one is not obligated to institute it. Admittedly, once instituted, it is not a simple matter to undo it (beyond our present scope), but this is not a problem for you. Perhaps min hashamayim, the day you have been celebrating does not cause you a conflict. There are no set rules as to when and how to do such a celebration. Even Purim, after which the concept is modeled, is not held on the day of salvation. Some known “family Purims” consisted of a fast day on the day of salvation and a feast on a different day. Thus, you can continue on the day you instituted it (or a different one), so that the celebration and the yahrtzeit do not cast a shadow on each other.

The good point you make is one we do take into account. You have prompted us to highlight for our readership the background and goals of this column.

The OU Ask the Rabbi service, in which Eretz Hemdah plays a major role, provides an address to a wide variety of people throughout the world to ask questions that, for whatever reason, they are not asking to a local rabbi. Some questions are “cookie-cutter” questions, with one answer that fits all, irrespective of venue, circumstances, level of need, or halachic orientation. Other questions have different legitimate answers and are apt to be affected by circumstances.

We have several goals in sharing some of our answers with the public. One is to inform the masses how to act when they encounter the same circumstances addressed. However, there are other important goals. We treasure teaching Torah lishma, including regarding issues and cases that few are likely to encounter.

We also strive to expose our readership to a multi-faceted and, we pray, balanced approach to rendering halachic decisions. We aim for an approach that is traditional on one hand, but with an openness for innovative problem solving. We aim for high halachic standards, but with a realization that an objective or even a subjective need often plays an important role even according to these high standards. We view implementation of this balance as one of the most exciting and important elements of p’sak halacha.

One case-in-point is a set of teshuvot (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II: 4, 5), in which Rav Moshe, in the course of a week, wrote ostensibly “contradictory” rulings to the same rabbi on the same case (a shochet who publicly did something that was chillul Shabbat according to almost all rabbanim). The rulings are not contradictory because Rav Moshe begins the second responsum: “if we will forbid him … it will negate all that you have fixed with toil in the kashrut and the peace in the city.” He follows with a novel leniency to allow the shochet to continue with certain provisions. It is fascinating that Rav Moshe was willing to publish (in 1973) the two responsa back-to-back without hiding his change of mind due to the circumstances. The first responsum remains the basic one. The second one demonstrates how he could “stretch” to be lenient when needed. It also teaches that when Rav Moshe ruled stringently even in the face of great need, it is not out of lack of effort.

We estimate that a clear majority of this column’s readers are solidly Orthodox English-speaking olim. As a rule, we would not consider (or allow our child) to be a waiter in an Israeli non-kosher restaurant. But Rav Ovadia allowed someone in great financial distress to be a cook in a non-kosher restaurant, until he could find another job, and published it (Yabia Omer, YD 6). Rav Moshe (ibid. YD I:51) allowed a delivery man in Europe (1929) to deliver pork. The Tzitz Eliezer (XVII:33) allowed a hospital nurse to freely serve/feed non-Jewish patients. Parallel circumstances that require analysis of the same issues/sources arise all around us.

We want our readership to enjoy the Torah’s richness and hone their halachic sophistication to know what to ask and how. We want them to know that while pas nisht should often preclude things, we subscribe to the approach of the many rabbis, from a variety of traditions, who search for solutions to “non-cookie cutter” cases. Sometimes such rulings should be kept quiet; sometimes they should be publicized. May Hashem protect us from mistakes.

As a practical question, this hinges on many issues that are beyond our strategic-political expertise. Although one’s first response is that one obviously may not do anything that would help murderers such as ISIS, that may be simplistic. Consider that one who follows that approach to its end would have to get rid of his car because ISIS is financed significantly by oil sales, and usage affects the market. Since we have no idea to what extent such ISIS Jewish artifact sales are an issue, this response is a theoretical analysis.

First we ask: is there a mitzva to save these artifacts?  There are two possible mitzva reasons to “redeem” them. One is to save holy articles from disgrace. Another is to save Torah information for the Jewish people. Often, people buy such things for a personal reason – the desire to own coveted Judaica – it is hard to consider that a mitzva.

Saving holy scrolls from disgrace is recognized as something for which it is worthwhile to pay a halachic price. It is permitted to violate certain Rabbinic laws of Shabbat in order to save holy writings with enough sanctity to require geniza, whether halachic sifrei Torah, remainders thereof, or even any Torah writings (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:12, Mishna Berura 334:39 and Rama, OC 334:17). On the other hand, we do not find sweeping leniencies or an obligation to seek out such items to save.

The element of saving vital information comes up in the following context. The mishna (Gittin 45a) says that despite the great mitzva of pidyon shvuyim (paying ransom to free captives), the Rabbis prohibited paying more than the captive’s “market value.” The apparently accepted explanation is that it encourages the taking of captives. Tosafot (ad loc.) asks how it was permitted for R. Yehoshua ben Chananya to pay an exorbitant price to free a youngster who showed great Torah promise (Gittiin 58a). One of Tosafot’s answers, which the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 252:4) accepts, is that it is permitted to pay a high price for someone with the potential to make great Torah contributions. The same logic should also apply to redeeming a valuable Torah work.

Yet, “redeeming” Torah works is apparently not included in formal pidyon shvuyim, which applies to alleviating human suffering (see Bava Batra 8b). In fact, one may sell a sefer Torah to afford pidyon shvuyim (Tosafot, ad loc.). In some ways, this may lessen the mitzva to redeem them. On the other hand, if sefarim are not within formal pidyon shvuyim, they are not within the formal Rabbinic prohibition of overpaying.  Thus, if one wanted to extend the prohibition to paying any especially dangerous “seizer of Torah scrolls,” we would say it formally does not apply either. The lack of a formal prohibition, though, does not mean that one should not use common moral sense.

Often, the price people are willing to pay for valuable Judaica has little to do with its practical importance for Torah information, but due to its historical, sentimental, or even artistic value. In the case of a terrorist organization, it seems inexcusable to pay even the “going rate” for them if it means helping an “organization” like ISIS, which perpetrates atrocities.

Let us put things in perspective. Sometimes the Rabbis forbade commerce which may be used to further sinful activity (see Avoda Zara 2a). On the other hand, the Rabbis were careful not to forbid more than society is able to handle, and there is a limit to how many things we can boycott (remember the comment about cars). In a case as stark as the one you raised, the spirit of the law suffices to preclude buying even important holy objects in a manner where there is a rational fear that it would put people in mortal danger. Only in exceptional cases might one contemplate that the cost-benefit comparison makes redemption moral.

The formal prohibition of lo taguru does not apply here for a few reasons. First it only applies to dayanim, as is evident not only from the context of the pasuk but also the context in which it comes up in classical sources (the Sefer Hachinuch #415 is explicit on this point; see Minchat Chinuch, ad loc.). There are some sources that extend lo taguru somewhat further (Sanhedrin 6b regarding assistants to dayanim; inference of the Meiri, Sanhedrin 89b regarding one who withholds prophecy out of fear). However, applying it to require a lawyer, who does not have a halachically formal part in the judicial process, to take a case is too much of a stretch. Secondly, even for a dayan, the prohibition applies only if he has heard the case to the extent that he has a feeling what the ruling should be (Sanhedrin 6b).

In general it is problematic to take sides in adjudication (Avot 1:8). While there is an opinion that this warning is only to a dayan (Shiltei Giborim, cited by Shach, CM 66:82), most poskim posit that no one should take sides without a reason (see Sha’ar Mishpat 17:5). What are grounds for taking sides? The gemara (Ketubot 86a) says that it is proper to advise a litigant if he is a relative, invoking a pasuk (Yeshaya 58:7), as long as the advisor is not an important person. The Maharshal (Shut 24) applies this approach to helping a widow who is a litigant. Logic dictates that this permission applies to fighting hardened criminals (see Yeshaya ibid:6), a task that a simple individual cannot handle alone.

In cases where giving advice is appropriate, is there an obligation or mitzva to help out as a lawyer? When the lawyer is (honestly) convinced that his client is correct, there should be a mitzva of hashavat aveida to help him win his case (see part of the breadth of the mitzva in Bava Kama 81b) and thus in the cases it is permitted to get involved, it should likewise be included in that mitzva.

However, the mitzva of hashavat aveida does not require one to put himself in a position of loss or hardship to save money for another (Bava Metzia 30a). This is all the more clear if there are any number of other people who can do the job, making the individual lawyer less specifically obligated than one who found a lost item (see one of many applications of this distinction in Bemareh Habazak I:32).

Returning to the case of the fearful dayan, the Shulchan Aruch (CM 12:1) rules that a dayan who has a set public role is required to hear the case when others would not. While the Radbaz (Sanhedrin 22:1) and Bach (CM 12) explain that it is because the public will help him, the Beit Yosef (ad loc.) seems to understand that one with responsibility cannot shirk it even in the face of reasonable concern. That logic would seem to apply to a lawyer with a role of district attorney, for example. We also find, in a parallel case, that the Tzitz Eliezer (IX:17) allows and encourages a doctor to expose himself to patients with infectious diseases as part of his job. That being said, the job description of an average lawyer does not necessarily include angering dangerous criminals, in which case he should not have to feel obligated to do so. When he decides he wants to, there is generally permission for someone to put himself into at least moderate danger as part of his pursuit of livelihood (Bava Metzia 112a).

In summary, a lawyer need not feel an obligation to take on a case in which he will have to go against a dangerous opposing litigant. He may choose to do so, preferably after discussing the matter with his family. This is a noble step if he has a unique opportunity to help someone who needs and deserves it.

Veterinary medical schools do extremely important work. The health of animals is important not only in respect to the prevention of "Tza'ar Ba'alei Chayim" (suffering of animals), but it also is a crucial factor in safeguarding the health of the general public both locally and internationally. A school of veterinary medicine which will be founded by God-fearing Jews will be able to serve as a model to be emulated, and could also bring forth a "Kiddush Hashem" both within Am Yisrael and beyond.

One of the important issues the veterinary world deals with is the issue of the natural increase of animals and the supervision over it. Animals and those caring for them, as opposed to humans, are certainly not included in the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply." Unsupervised increase in animals may cause damaged to the environment and people, and it may also cause "Tza'ar Ba'alei Chayim" to animals that will not be able to find sufficient food and proper living conditions. Therefore, Halacha recognizes the necessity to prevent "over population" in this respect. However, the Torah prohibits sterilization of animals in certain ways.

From this follows, that a veterinary medical school founded by observant Jews will provide a tremendous advantage. This school will teach its students how to prevent the unsupervised reproduction of animals in ways permitted according to Halacha, which will be immediately detailed.

The institute of higher learning which will take upon itself this endeavor will allow all students to complete their academic studies in this important field, through full observance of Halacha. This should be publicized to all students that the studies may be fulfilled with full observance of Halacha. In addition, the school should publicize in its bulletin that it does not support arbitrary sterilization and neutering of animals, but only the kind which is necessary and is permitted according to Jewish law.  

Following are the Halachic guidelines by which an institute of higher learning may found a veterinary medical school:

1.       Demonstration by Jewish lecturers or hands-on training by Jewish students of sterilization of animals is permitted regarding male animals only if it is done through medication which doesn't damage, even indirectly, the reproductive organs themselves, but just depresses the function of sexual hormones or reduces the quality of the semen, and as a result a female which will mate with this male will not become pregnant. It is preferable if the sterilization done in this context be effective only temporarily.

2.       In the above demonstration or training, in regards to a female animal, sterilization by medication is permitted even if it will have a permanent effect on the ability to reproduce.

3.       However, neutering or spaying, which damage the animal’s reproductive organs, is prohibited, both regarding males and females.

4.       In regards to a male, pharmacological treatment that causes permanent sterilization (and the effects can be seen on the external reproductive organs) is prohibited, and damage to the organs by chemical treatment, radiation, or stopping the blood flow, which causes a degeneration of the (external) reproductive system, is also prohibited.

5.       Surgery or any other form of prohibited sterilization is prohibited even if it can be rectified by further surgery.

6.       As mentioned above, the institute must allow the students to complete their studies without performing any of the prohibited forms of sterilization, and this must be advertized so as not to cause students to falter in this respect.

7.       Generally, these guidelines apply also to non-Jewish students or lecturers who act for the benefit of or by instruction of Jews.

8.       Regarding non-Jewish students or lecturers, pharmacological treatment that depresses the sexual hormones or damages the quality of the semen is permitted even if the sterilization is permanent. One may also be lenient regarding them and permit spaying a female, and also permit surgically damaging the semen tubes that are in the body of a male, not in the external organs. 

9.       So too, one may be lenient regarding non-Jewish students and lecturers in regards to indirect sterilization, such as one done by chemical treatment, radiation, or stopping the blood flow, thus causing the degeneration of the reproductive system, even if the sterilization is permanent and even regarding male animals.

10.   A non-Jewish lecturer may demonstrate a prohibited form of sterilization if the administration of the institute does not formally request it or even imply it (such as if one cannot receive a degree without it), even if Jewish students are watching and this benefits them, so long as the lecturer’s intent is not for the sole benefit of Jews but (also) for his own benefit, for example, if he is demonstrating on an animal (his own or of another non-Jew) which he wants to sterilize even regardless of the demonstration, or, if the majority of the students are not Jews, even for the students’ benefit.

If the Council for Higher Education demands the study of the prohibited forms of sterilization, a non-Jewish lecturer may organize a visit to a different place, which regardless of this request performs these forms of sterilization, and the students will be able to watch.

11.   A non-Jewish student may also perform such a sterilization, even if Jewish students are watching, since his intent is for his own benefit, for his studies.

You have to ask the hotel what their policy is and abide by it.

Besides house-related mitzvot like mezuza and ma’akeh (fence for roof), there are two practices regarding a new house.

The mishna (Berachot 54a) says that one who builds a new house or buys new clothes should recite Shehecheyanu (see also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:3). The same is true for purchasing an existing house (Mishna Berura 223:11). Yet, as we know and as has been reported for centuries, many people do not recite Shehecheyanu on a new house. It is hard to know to which halachic factor(s) to attribute this phenomenon (assuming it is not just lack of awareness), but we will mention a few.

Tosafot (Sukka 46a) cites (and is among many who argue on) Rav Shrira Gaon, who says we do not follow the mishna due to the rule that Shehecheyanu is only for cyclical events. Some suggest that worries about financing take away from the necessary simcha (see opinions in Yalkut Yosef, Sova Semachot I, p. 487). Timing may be an issue, as the mishna talks about reciting at the time of buying, but the house may then be unfit for inhabitance, either for pragmatic reasons or possibly if it is missing mezuzot (see R. Akiva Eiger, on Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). However, one should still be able to recite Shehecheyanu at the time he enters the house. The proper beracha is not clear, as there is a machloket whether Shehecheyanu or Hatov V’hameitiv (a variation, when there are multiple beneficiaries) is appropriate when a family unit acquires the house (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.). However, when in doubt between the two, Shehecheyanu works (ibid. 4).

There are also significant opinions that Shehecheyanu is a mitzva but not an obligatory beracha (see Magen Avraham 225:6). Therefore, one should not feel he is sinning if he follows the many who do not recite Shehecheyanu over their new home. Certainly, when several months have passed since moving in, it might even be too late for Shehecheyanu (although this is not certain – see Halichot Shlomo I:23:13). However, you can “cover your bases” by using the idea of making Shehecheyanu on a new garment with intention for the house as well (see Be’ur Halacha to OC 22:1).

You are apparently asking about the seudat hodaya (thanksgiving meal) in honor of the occasion, which we call a “chanukat habayit.” This is clearly a minhag rather than a halachic obligation, and it does not have explicit classical halachic sources. Yet, many sources give it basis and significance, including the following. The Torah (Devarim 20:5) instructs to send home from battle one who built a house and did not “inaugurate it.” We see that beginning to live in the house is a very significant event, and therefore many poskim consider it fitting enough for celebration for it to be a seudat mitzva. There are strong sources that both the war-time halacha (see Yerushalmi, Sota 8:4) and the importance of the seuda (see Magen Avraham 568:5) are only on houses in Israel. Indeed, among Ashkenazim, such seudot are far more prevalent in Israel than outside it. The more focus there is on Torah and thanks to Hashem, the more meaningful the seuda is (see Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 7:37), but there there is no specific necessary structure. If the main thing is to thank Hashem and no berachot are made at that time, there is no statute of limitations on the celebration. Although generally, diligence is a virtue, it is natural to wait for things to settle down and perhaps wait for key people to be around, and four months is not unusual.

There is a more Kabbalisitically-oriented approach, which is more prevalent for Sephardim. One makes the seuda on the day he moves into the house. While also having an element of thanksgiving, this is more focused on the right spiritual start to enhance the family’s success in the house. Some great rabbis, such as the Chida, composed set orders of things to do, learn, recite (see Chanukat Habayit (Mark)).

It is permitted, as the prohibition of wasting shmitta produce only applies to the parts of the fruit normally eaten by people.

(We will not distinguish between Biblical/historical Eretz Yisrael and the State of Israel’s borders, although the matter deserves discussion). This issue of leaving Eretz Yisrael has been written about in many contemporary works, since we have been blessed with the ability to live Eretz Yisrael in our own state. We will go from an introduction, to classical sources, to halachic indications.

There are three possible halachic issues with leaving Eretz Yisrael, which themselves can be explained in different ways: 1) Uprooting oneself from fulfillment of the mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael. 2) For a kohen, not being contaminated by the Rabbinic-level impurity of chutz la’aretz. 3. Violating an (apparently) lower-level prohibition of leaving. In some of the sources, it is not clear which issue is on the table.

The gemara in Ketubot (111a) both says that it is forbidden to “leave Eretz Yisrael for [even] Bavel” and tells of Rabbi Chanina telling someone not to leave to perform the mitzva of yibbum. However, these sources are likely referring to leaving permanently, which is worse not only cumulatively but because he uproots the mitzva of living in Eretz Yisrael, which by leaving for a short time likely one does not do. Rabbi Yochanan was reluctant to let Rav Assi go to greet his approaching mother (Kiddushin 32a). Eventually, he agreed, stressing that Rav Assi should return. It is possible that the issue was that Rav Assi was a kohen (see Mishpat Kohen 147). The gemara in Avoda Zara (13a), which explicitly addresses a kohen, says he may not go out without special justification. The examples given are to learn Torah in a qualitatively better way than in Eretz Yisrael, to get married, and to adjudicate with a non-Jew. Tosafot (ad loc.) says that only these mitzvot are important enough to justify leaving (the She’iltot disagrees) and that even so, the permission was only to leave temporarily. A final gemara (Moed Katan 14) we will cite is about  permission to shave on Chol Hamo’ed after returning from a trip to chutz la’aretz (according to the Ra’avad, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 531:4). Shaving is not permitted if the trip was improper. The guidelines are that it is permitted to go for livelihood and forbidden to go “lashut” (we translate as going for the sake of travel). There is a machloket if he went to make money that he did not need, and we rule leniently (ibid.). Apparently, a temporary trip (how long is unclear) can be wrong, but it is not very hard to justify it.

The most prominent post-Talmudic source is the Rambam (Melachim 5:9), who seems to take guidelines from several gemarot. He says that it is permitted to leave to marry, learn Torah, and adjudicate but he must return. Then he adds that one can also go temporarily to engage in commerce. While there are slight variations, the consensus among poskim of the contemporary era (including Rav Kook, Mishpat Kohen 147; Rav Yisraeli, Eretz Hemdah I:10; Yechaveh Da’at V:57; Shevel Halevi 5:173) is that it is permissible to go abroad for any significant reason (that is no less important than commerce). What this entails seems subjective and may depend on a posek’s philosophy. The Magen Avraham (531:7) mentions to see a friend, and presumably taking part in his significant simcha is at least as important. The Shevet Halevi says there is room to be lenient to see the wonders of Hashem’s work in nature, especially if one approaches that properly. Rav Lichtenstein (Har Etzion site) says that cultural enrichment is no less important than business opportunities. In Bemareh Habazak (IV:140, based on Rav Yisraeli), after stressing the feeling one should have for being in Israel, we gave, as examples of legitimate reasons, educational trips and family vacations that do not have a viable alternative in Israel.

While there are too many sources and scenarios to analyze exhaustively, we hope our survey is useful.

A roof requires a fence of 10 tefachim (approximately 80 cm.) (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 427:5), and any dangerous area (not just the roof the Torah refers to) requires a fence or covering, as appropriate (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 7). Thus, the balcony in question seem to require a proper ma’akeh.

Who is obligated – the landlord or the renter (you)? The gemara (Bava Metzia 101b), regarding the question of who is responsible for seeing to a variety of needs of the house, sets a rule that that which requires expert work is the landlord’s domain and simple work is the renter’s. Ma’akeh is given as an example of the renter’s responsibility. Although the Pitchei Teshuva (CM 427:2) brings two opinions, a renter’s obligation is apparently of Rabbinic origin, as according to Torah law, only an owner of a house is obligated. Some explain (see Yereim 234) that the obligation was given to the renter because he is more likely to fulfill his obligation promptly. On the other hand, the Pe’at Hashulchan (ibid.) has a novel claim that the landlord is obligated, and the gemara refers to a case where he erected one and it was damaged. The Rama (CM 314:2) can be read as saying that who is obligated in ma’akeh is impacted by local minhag. We believe the minhag is that a landlord should provide safeguards for an objectively unsafe balcony (the religious obligation of ma’akeh when it is anyway safe might not be included). In any case, if the landlord refuses to do so, you are likely obligated.

Will setting up a situation in which you will barely use the balcony help? The Rambam (Rotzeiach 11:1) says that a ma’akeh is required only for a house that is lived in somewhat normally. Some want to infer that if one goes to his roof infrequently, a ma’akeh is unnecessary. However, that approach is correctly rejected (see Pe’at Hashulchan 2:(27)). Only when the roof is not fit for use (e.g., it is steeply slanted) do we say that it is excluded from the obligation (see Aruch Hashulchan, CM 427:5). Making it physically inaccessible would exempt.

Your decision to not use the balcony probably might not help, as there are still likely to be occasional circumstances in which you will want/need to use it, which is enough in this regard. On the other hand, a distinction we made in Living the Halachic Process (I, H:8) may help. We substantiated a distinction between a ma’akeh for a roof and for other places, whereby a roof has a formal obligation for a formal ma’akeh even if one could effectively minimize the danger in another way. Other places are treated according to the reaching of the goal of safety. Thus it is possible that a decision to rarely use the mirpeset along with other factors could cause a situation where there is no real danger and you might be exempt. Of course, if it is practically not safe, halacha and common sense both dictate that one cannot leave the situation, and it might be easier to pressure the owner in a way he should understand.

The source of beracha is Hashem. One is not required to pay any person to give a beracha. Of course, giving donations to worthy causes, within the limits set by halacha, is always appropriate.

Cheating on a test is an example of geneivat da’at (deception) (Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat II:30), which is forbidden whether one fools a Jew or a non-Jew (Chulin 94a). Many consider this a Torah prohibition, under the rubric of stealing (Ritva ad loc.). It is highly destructive to one’s moral standing (Sha’arei Teshuva 3:184) and distances him from the path of He whose “seal is truth” (Shabbat 55a). We cannot but mention that the amount of cheating that occurs in far too many of our schools is tragic, and is sometimes done even by morally/religiously “quality students.” Your frustration is justified, but your suggestion is flawed on several important grounds. We will divide the discussion based on the motivations you mention.  

Geneivat da’at applies to such innocuous situations as making someone think you did him a bigger favor than you did (Chulin 94a). Rashi (ad loc.) explains that it is because he makes the recipient unnecessarily grateful. One can ask: is the deceptive act intrinsically forbidden, or is the prohibition dependent on the deceiver eventually receiving more than he deserves. While I cannot explain it succinctly, it is clear to me that the deception is intrinsic as long as he intends it to be impactful, even if that never comes to fruition (see Igrot Moshe ibid.). Thus, for example, every deceitful test answer is forbidden even if the examinee’s final grade (including F) was not improved by the cheating.

Based on the above, the cheater violates geneivat da’at even if you give him the wrong answer, meaning that you will violate lifnei iver (sometimes, by Torah law and sometimes Rabbinically) by facilitating his aveira by providing an answer other than his own. “Giving him what he deserves,” does not justify your lifnei iver of aiding in his aveira or in deceiving him even if it were moral (our next topic).

Ideally, you should rebuke the perpetrator, acting out of not only love of the mitzvot but also of the unfortunate sinner, who needs guidance (see Rambam, De’ot 6:7). Even if this is not feasible (see Yevamot 65b), you should not give the impression of agreeing with cheating, which may be a form of lifnei iver (see Shach, Yoreh Deah 151:6) and a chillul Hashem. Also, while there are cases it is justified to be deceitful with the deceitful (see Tehillim 18:27 and Yaakov-Lavan story), there seems to be little need/gain/justification for you to lie.

The matter of concern for your social standing, which can sometimes be a serious problem, makes a better question. The gemara (Berachot 19b) allows significant halachic leniency to avoid embarrassment. Just as we suggested that one is not required to snitch on fare-beaters to a bus driver (Living the Halachic Process III:I-8), your fear can be an excuse to not tell the proctor about the cheating. However, to take part in the cheating (even with the wrong answer) is more difficult. One might claim that if the cheater could cheat from someone else, you would only be violating a Rabbinic version of lifnei iver (see Shach ibid and that there are times that one may violate Rabbinic prohibitions to avoid extreme embarrassment (Berachot ibid.)). However, such leniencies apply when there is a conflict by chance between one’s dignity and a Rabbinic prohibition. Here, the embarrassment is that one will scorn your halachically mandated morality. Therefore, even if many peers tragically rationalize or otherwise fail to keep this halacha, you must stand your ground and refuse to take part. It is similar to one whose friends invite him to eat (even Rabbinically) non-kosher food and will ridicule him if he refuses. We expect him to stick to his principles, as obligated.

We wish you hatzlacha in protecting yourself from the moral corrosiveness of cheating and from the barbs of those who cheat – but in the right way.

The gemara (Nazir 58b-59a) forbids a man to shave his pubic and underarm hair with a razor. There are different versions on whether this ruling is a severe Rabbinic violation or a violation of the Torah law forbidding a man to do things of aesthetics that are considered feminine (“lo yilbash gever simlat isha” – see Devarim 22:5).

There is a machloket among the Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 182) whether there is any problem with hair removal from other parts of the body. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 182:1) rules that in these other places, it is forbidden only with a razor, whereas it is otherwise permitted even to cut short with scissors. Presumably, tweezing eyebrows falls under the category of being permitted.

The gemara (ibid.) tells of one whom Rav Ami gave a special dispensation when Rav Ami discovered he did not remove underarm hair. The Ran (Avoda Zara, 9b of the Rif’s pages) makes the following halachic observations. It must have occurred in a place where most men remove hair from there, so that we see that hair removal is then permitted, just that the pious still avoid it. This is how the Rama (YD 182:1) rules. The Rambam (Avoda Zara 12:9) says that in that case, it is not a severe Rabbinic violation, which warrants flogging, but, as the Beit Yosef (ibid.) understands the Rambam, it is still forbidden, as he rules in the Shulchan Aruch (YD 182:1). The Rav Pealim (III, YD 18), after declaring that Sephardim should rule like the Shulchan Aruch, justified the wide practice in Bagdad for men to remove hair from one of the problematic places using chemicals, given that women do it by razor.

While we find that changed practice can turn classically forbidden grooming into permitted, practice can also expand matters forbidden due to its feminine nature. The gemara (Makkot 20b) forbids removing individual hairs (from the head or the beard, which is generally permitted) if he is removing white hairs from among dark hairs, to make him look younger, as women do. Similarly, poskim of our era have generally assumed that grooming eyebrows is a feminine activity, and thus, as a rule, is forbidden for men.

Even so, fixing a unibrow is permitted according to rabbinic consensus (including Rav S.Z. Auerbach, cited in Nishmat  Avraham, YD, p. 140). While not meaning to put down anyone who is willing to keep it, many, including you, consider it an embarrassing blemish (in some cultures, it is desired). Just as the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) permits hair removal that would otherwise be forbidden when it is done to alleviate skin pain, so too it is permitted to remove emotional distress, even if it is not extreme. The main rationale is not that the need enables waiving minor prohibitions or relying on lenient opinions. Rather, the prohibition is based on the assumption that a man is acting with a degree of care for beautification that is generally reserved for women (see Igrot Moshe, YD II:61, in permitting coloring hair in order to get a job for which he looks too old). Removing a unibrow is not seen as acting to looking one’s absolute best, but just as avoiding sticking out negatively, and this is not within the prohibition’s parameters.

Regarding bushy eyebrows, the matter is less clear-cut and depends on time/place but likely also on the degree of grooming one is talking about. Extreme bushiness could reach the point of blemish. Regarding cases that are within the bounds of normal, we would say that a few decades ago, it was forbidden. However, it has become increasingly common for men to groom eyebrows (the norms of non-Jews are, according to many, relevant for determining these matters – Prisha, YD 282:5). Therefore, it is likely permitted these days in many places. We would just say that a man should do the grooming in the way men do it, if and assuming it is different from the way women do.

First, we urge the beit knesset to consider favorably stipulating that these commitments will not have the status of neder. Generally, we are to avoid nedarim (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 203:1-5). Although making a neder regarding Torah learning goals, among other mitzvot, is an exception (ibid. 6), it is different when there is particular concern he will not abide by the neder (see Kol Nidrei 3:2).

It is problematic to undo a neder to fulfill a mitzva in which one is anyway obligated, including accepting an amount of Torah learning (Aruch Hashulchan, YD 228:128-133). However, it can be done when there is enough need, and in certain cases of very great difficulty one may not even need hatarat nedarim (ibid.).

Is there is an added problem if there is a neder that was made as a means of acquiring something from his counterpart? According to the understanding of most Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, YD 228) the gemara (Nedarim 65a) says that such a neder can only be undone in the presence of and with the agreement of the counterpart (Rama, YD 228:20; the Shulchan Aruch apparently agrees- Shach and Taz ad loc.).

The gemara cites relevant stories from Tanach. Hashem told Moshe he required permission from Yitro to return to Egypt because of Moshe’s oath to stay with him, even though hatarat nedarim would have had obvious justification (i.e., to orchestrate yetziat Mitzrayim).  King Tzidkiyahu was punished for not keeping his oath to Nevuchadnetzar to keep an embarrassing secret quiet, even though he too had a good reason for hatarat nedarim.

Rishonim deal with many complicated questions, including whether the hatarat nedarim works b’dieved if done improperly. On the one hand, Tzidkiyahu was a righteous king, so he ostensibly would not have relied on an invalid hatarat nedarim. On the other hand, perhaps his punishment is a sign the hatarat nedarim did not work (see Ran ad loc. and two opinions in the Shulchan Aruch, YD 228:20).

In our case, it would seem clear that one needs permission as the noder (the one making the neder) did get something (the honor) because of his learning pledge. (While it is a complicated matter, we will work with the assumption that the pledge is considered a neder.) There is an opinion that if there is a mitzva need for the hatarat nedarim, it is permitted without permission (Tosafot, Nedarim ibid., cited by the Rama, YD 228:20). One example of mitzva need is when the load of learning the person accepted is taking away from his more important/appropriate service of Hashem. It is far from clear that this leniency is accepted, (see Taz 228:33, who denies the Rama meant to rely on it).

However, the Noda B’Yehuda (II, Orach Chayim 117, cited by Pitchei Teshuva, YD 228:13) says that when there is a mitzva and no one loses out by his not keeping the neder, all permit hatarat nedarim. The analysis of our case, in terms of a loss to others, is tricky. On the one hand, if people can receive kibbudim by making pledges they will not keep, the system will not work. Additionally, the one who would otherwise have received the honor might be considered to lose out retroactively. On the other hand, if the pledge was sincere and realistic at the time, and the circumstances changed, does anyone gain by holding him to it?

In practice, our standard halachic advice would be that if there is a serious need, the noder should ask permission from an appropriate representative of the congregation (preferably the rabbi). It also makes sense for him to change the pledge for which he won the kibbud to another one of parallel seriousness that he can still handle. However, the specifics of each case need to be considered. We again urge congregations to consider explicitly making such bidding bli neder.

You have to continue fasting, and you do not have to make it up with another day (Shulchan Aruch, OC 568:1).

On a certain level, tevilat keilim is a matter of purifying utensils we obtain from a non-Jew, but it is not classical purification but a mitzva act that models purification, i.e., putting in a mikveh (see Rambam, Ma’achalot Assurot 17:5). This can help explain some lenient halachot, such as that food placed or prepared in a non-toveled utensil is untainted after being removed (Avoda Zara 75b). However, in the context of your question, poskim seem to apply the concept to create a stringency, which we will see after additional background.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 120) cites a halacha from the Haghot Ashri that if one buys a knife to use for cutting parchment, not food preparation, and thus does not yet need tevila, one who borrows it from him does not have to do tevila even if he does use it for food. This is because a borrower is obligated in tevila only if the owner had an existing obligation. The Beit Yosef extends this logic to one who borrows a food-related utensil from one who bought it only to sell. Since the merchant was not obligated to do tevila, neither is the one who borrowed from him. Thus, using the “impure” utensil for food is not a problem if the grounds for an obligation of tevila did not materialize.  

The Taz (YD 120:10) is not certain whether the Hagahot Ashri and/or the Beit Yosef are correct (even though the Rama, YD 120:8 brings the former as halacha). He says a borrower for food use from a merchant should, therefore, do tevila before using it. He warns, though, that word should be gotten to the eventual buyer to not to tovel it with a beracha. Later Acharonim (apparently including Rav S.Z. Auerbach, cited in Tevilat Keilim (Cohen) p. 241) understand that the buyer must do tevila even though the borrower already did it. The reason is that according to the opinions that there was no obligation to do tevila, the tevila did not work (Chelkat Binyamin 120:66; Tevilat Keilim 8:(9)). This must be based on the idea we started out with – tevilat keilim is not a matter of removing tumah, which should work even if there was no obligation, but of doing a mitzva, which usually needs to be done only after the mitzva is in force. In this case, the Taz and later Acharonim assume that not only did the borrower doing the tevila not fulfill the mitzva, but no purity was achieved. Therefore, when someone would buy and want to use it with food, he would need a new tevila. (While this is a surprising idea to me and not well known, the Taz seems to assume it.)

Therefore, the simple answer to your question is that your tevila prior to giving the present will not spare or save the recipient. Rav Cohen (ibid.) suggests having someone acquire it on behalf of the recipient, so that it will be obligated in tevila (as he will presumably use it for food), and at which point your tevila works. Rav Auerbach (ibid.) counters that since it is not clear that the recipient will use it himself, it is not yet defined as a utensil that is obligated in tevila. (It is not clear if/why the tevila will not work for the more common case that he will use it himself.)

One can suggest a different idea. You can plan to (and carry out after the tevila), use the utensils briefly, and thus the tevila will be needed for you and thus will be valid. (While this seems tacky, the whole idea of opening the package and putting the utensils in a mikveh before giving them is not exactly standard etiquette.)

In summary, there are both halachic and social issues about toveling utensils you will give as a present. If the recipient is one who might tovel himself, you, in any case, would have to discuss the matter with him (so that if your tevila works, he will not do tevila with a beracha l’vatala). In doing so, you can already ask him if it would be helpful for you to acquire it on his behalf and do the tevila for him.

We are glad you are well, b’chasdei Hashem. We praise your spiritual instincts under pressure and your attitude now, which are signs of a yerei’at shamayim. Although generally we frown upon making nedarim, an eit tzara (time of acute need) is likely different (see Tosafot, Chulin 2b).

The Rama (Yoreh Deah 228:45) rules that one may not do hatarat nedarim on an oath taken with the hope of extricating himself from an eit tzara (not all agree – see Shut Maharam Mintz 79). He accepts (see Shut HaRama 103) the explanation of Shut Binyamin Ze’ev (266) that it is based on the rule that one must not do hatarat nedarim on a neder he made to receive a favor from another person (Rama, ibid. 20, which is the main issue in our recent article (Korach 5776)). In other words, one cannot ask someone for a favor with a promise to “pay” by a neder commitment and then back out after getting what he wants, including or especially if the someone is Hashem. (One could have argued that, as opposed to one’s friend, Hashem can always take back what He gave. Some indeed say that, irrespective of permitted/forbidden, it is dangerous to “play games” with Hashem by undoing such oaths – R. Yehuda Hachasid, quoted by Yam Shel Shlomo, Gittin 4:40 and others).

The Rama (ibid.) and others do permit hatarat nedarim on nidrei eit tzara when necessary to facilitate a mitzva or when there is great need. However, for most people, X does not qualify as either.

The major factor for leniency is that you apparently did not verbalize a neder but just thought about it. In most cases, nedarim are effective only when verbalized, with tzedaka being an exception according to many (Rama, YD 258:13). A strong majority of poskim say that thoughts do not create a neder obligation for other mitzvot (see Aruch Hashulchan, YD 258:39; Kol Nidrei 59:1). In your case, refraining from A and B is not a mitzva.

There is an opinion (Nishal David, YD 17) that a neder by thought takes effect during an eit tzara, based on a pasuk (Daniel 10:12) that Hashem already responds to a plea when it is in one’s heart. However, the opinion that it is not halachically binding until verbalization (Yehuda Ya’aleh I:333, also based on p’sukim) is more convincing. Even according to the stringent opinion, the thought must be clear and final (Aruch Hashulchan, ibid.). Most discussions of eit tzara refer to drawn out situations, like illness. In contrast, you, while faced by a dangerous mob, thought fleetingly about X but, given a moment to gather your thoughts, would have specified C. Therefore, all should agree that thought alone is not binding regarding X.

While there is room to be lenient fully, it seems the proper Jewish thing is to keep what you really intended – eliminate C, which you believed is right and appropriate when asking mercy from Hashem. If A and B are positive parts of your life, keep them. Hatarat nedarim on them is worthwhile (the Rama, YD 228:45 says it works even when it should not be done; the Shach 228:108 argues). Adding tangible thanks to Hashem, like accepting (bli neder) a different, practical good thing or giving extra tzedaka (see Kol Nidrei 7:12), is also positive.

May your prayers always be answered.

We believe that your assumption is correct. We have had this type of issue with banks for at least decades, although I do not know if there is a statement that I read. The matter resembles a Kinyan Odita, in which one admits that he previously owed money, which obligates himself. It is presented as a permitted thing to do even though it is technically a lie. It is basically saying that either what I say is true factually or, since it is obligating me, I mean that I obligate myself in the same way as if it were factually true. I imagine that this is the legal intention of the statement: "I had the opportunity to read it and I obligate myself to the provisions in a manner as binding as if I had read it."

First, let’s set ground rules for our answer. The army has the right to make rules of discipline, which we join them in expecting soldiers to obey just because the army is a place that requires discipline. We are not dealing with the real possibility the actions described are prohibited on those grounds (for that, you can inquire in the army). We are also answering theoretically based on the assumptions raised in the question and do not intend to rule about specific cases.  

All the objects in question were, at some point, fully owned by the army for the purpose of using them on their terms, and we are discussing objects that will end up in the garbage in a way that they will become hefker (ownerless). There are two justifications for using such objects before they are disposed of:

1. The owners give permission. It is a good question if permission has to be explicit or can even be assumed (see Machaneh Ephrayim, Gezeila 2). Presumably, if an owner says he does not give permission, then he does not give permission, even if one believes he is not losing anything (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 363:6). Granted, there is a concept of kofin al midat S’dom (we may force a person to allow someone to technically infringe on his ownership rights when failure to allow is immoral (Bava Batra 12b)). According to many, in a case the person can be forced, one who wants to use the object can take it on his own accord (see Rosh, Bava Kama 10:16). However, when there is any semi-plausible reason that the owner might lose out by his object being taken, it is forbidden to do so, even if it is only due to concern of what might possibly happen and even regarding indirect damage (see K’tzot Hachoshen 154:1). The reasons you cited suffice.

It is plausible that an entity such as the army might not give permission to others to take their food not because they really don’t give permission, but that it is a disclaimer in order to protect them from being sued if someone gets sick. That would change the picture, but we will not try to conjecture if that is the case here.

2. The object has become hefker (ownerless). In general, an owner needs to make an actual declaration in front of others in order for his property to become hefker (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 273:3,7). However, in a situation in which it is clear to the observer that the owner has no interest in keeping the object, no hefker procedure is necessary (see Pesachim 6b). This is on the assumption that the specific owner does not mind if someone takes it (ibid.). If, though, he does not let others take it, it is not hefker. One who sees a situation where the clear expectation of the objective observer is that the owner no longer is interested may take it and does not need to be concerned that this owner is different (S’fat Emet ad loc.). It is even possible that even if the owner, for some strange reason, does not want others to take it (yet), his strange outlook is not halachically significant, and one may treat it as hefker (ibid.). However, if in the case you talk about, there are rational reasons for him to not want others to take it, the objects are not hefker before some process of hefker has occurred.

We must determine an irrevocable trust’s halachic status. The trust enables your father (the settlor or grantor) to bequeath money to his children in what he views as a financially advantageous manner. He gives funds to (a) trustee(s) (the company), who legally owns the funds, which are explicitly earmarked for certain purposes, specifically to provide assets for the beneficiaries (you and siblings) at the trustee’s discretion. A major halachic question is whether the trust fund obviates the halachot of inheritance. This would be either because money (perhaps even for a revocable trust) has been given to a third party with instructions (beyond our scope) or because, especially for an irrevocable trust, the money no longer belongs to the grantor, so that the halachot of inheritance cannot take effect. The emerging consensus of poskim seems to be that yerusha does not apply to the contents of the trust (see Pitchei Choshen, Yerusha 4:(34)). (If the trust is a farce, and the grantor fully controls the money, the matter is more problematic).

Ribbit exists when Jewish owned money is lent to another Jew with interest. It does not help if a non-Jew carries out the transaction as a guardian, if the financial impact relates to the Jewish owner (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 168:24). However, in this case, assuming the trustee really controls the money, the halachic status likely accepts the legal one (based on dina d’malchuta and situmta) – that your father no longer owns the funds. It is even clearer that the beneficiaries, who never owned the money, do not own it yet. They have made no halachic kinyan, and the law does not recognize them as owners. When and how much they will receive depends on various consequences and the trustee’s decision. Their only legal right is the ability to sue the trustee for breach of fiduciary obligations. Thus, the trustee is not merely handling the funds; it is the owner, albeit with conditions attached.

Even if halacha were not to recognize the trustee’s ownership of property ceded to it, due to a lack of valid kinyan or because it is sometimes a farce, you probably still do not have a problem. After all, the trustee sets up a bank account which the grantor and beneficiaries cannot touch. Even if they were to sue the trustee in beit din and win, the trustee would owe money, but the value (theoretical not coins or property) in the account is likely the trustee’s. Therefore, the actual money you received as a loan, was the trustee’s.

What is the ribbit status of the trustee company? The great majority of poskim (see Torat Ribbit 17:52), say that the laws of ribbit apply to a lender who is a corporation. However, most poskim (see Brit Yehuda 30:16; Torat Ribbit 17:64) rule there are no ribbit problems if Jews own a minority share, irrespective of the workers who handle a given fund (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.). Therefore, if the company is mainly of non-Jewish ownership, you have no problems. If you are concerned with possibility of Jewish ownership, you can do a heter iska with them. This is slightly more complicated than usual because you need to convert an existing loan into an iska investment (see Brit Yehuda 40:23), and we are willing to guide you through the process. (Even if you avoid heterei iska when they obviate the spirit of the law, this case is unobjectionable.)

This is generally true. For large companies, it would also be a financial hardship, if one wanted to be stringent on the matter. However, if an individual in Israel (where the laws apply, albeit probably only on a Rabbinic level in these days) has his own garden and has to take off the tithes, it is a proper practice to give a tenth to an acquaintance who is presumed to be a Levi. What is different between Maaser Rishon and between most other tithes is that there is no religious prohibition of a regular Jew eating it, and rarely would a Levi really care if you gave it to him or ate it yourself. . 

Even those who argue with the Rambam, and forbid talking after netilas yadayim, do not require someone who talked to wash again. See Mishna Berura 166:6 .

Your understanding that a Shaliach Tzibbur should be an upright person is a correct one - to an extent (we will develop later). The Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 53 discusses it.

The assumption behind your question is inspiring - that is that it is crucial to come on time to shul. It would be wonderful if you always keep the resolve to take it seriously. However, I would not suggest to try to disqualify the shaliach tzibbur in question for several reasons.

1. Much of the need to have the most upright people deals with cases of a set shaliach tzibbur, not one who davens occasionally.

2. The big distinction between levels of religiosity required to be shaliach tzibbur is between all year and the Yamim Noraim, not between weekday and Shabbat.

3. Coming late is not necessarily a sign of not being an upstanding Jew. I know real tzaddikim and many very solid Jews who come late regularly. This can be for one or more of these or perhaps other reasons. They prioritize mitzvot and elements of mitzvot differently than perhaps you and me. They have factors that make it very difficult to come on time. They may have difficulties with time. Therefore, we should apply the rule, "Do not judge one until you reach his place". Since you likely (and certainly me) do not know exactly why he comes late, we should not judge him. 

4. It is the job of the rabbi or other leadership of a beit knesset to make judgment calls on many touchy questions, among which your question would fall, and we would not want to second guess those who are making these decisions, and we would urge people in general to follow that approach.

While we should be respectful of people in general and certainly older people, the specific mitzva regarding older people is standing for them. The Torah commands: “Stand up before seiva, and honor the presence of a zaken” (Vayikra 19:32). The gemara (Kiddushin 32b) brings opinions as to who these recipients of respect are. The first opinion is that it is a Torah scholar. Isi ben Yehuda says that seiva refers to an elderly person, even if he is devoid of other special qualities. The gemara (ibid. 33a) says we accept Isi ben Yehuda’s opinion, as does the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 244:1).

Who is old enough to deserve rising in their presence? The Rambam (Talmud Torah 6:9) writes that this is one who is “extreme in oldness,” without giving a specific age. The Rosh (Kiddushin 1:53) says it refers to a 70-year-old. Many point out that this is in line with the mishna in Avot (5:21) that lists characteristics of different ages and says that 70 is the age of seiva, the word the Torah uses for one deserving to be stood for. This is also the age that the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) writes, so your recollection is well-founded.

Yet, there are also sources that refer to 60. The Birkei Yosef (YD 244:4) cites the Arizal that we should stand for people above 60, and the Birkei Yosef says that this is based on Kabbalistic reasons. However, others provide more standard sources for the significance of 60. Unkelus translates the above pasuk so that “seiva” refers to a Torah scholar and “zaken” refers to an older person. The Rashbetz (commentary on Avot ibid.) says that according to Unkelus, that “zaken” refers to the elderly, the age is 60, as the mishna says that 60 is the age of zikna. As we have seen, the Shulchan Aruch accepts the age of 70. This makes sense because we halachically prefer the gemara to Unkelus and because it is possible that Unkelus agrees that the word for an older person is indeed “seiva” (see Ramban, Vayikra 19:32).

Despite the preponderance of standard halachic sources that the age for deserving to be stood up for is 70, there are a few reasons why it might be worthwhile to do so from 60. There are early sources, such as Tikkunei Hazohar, who say that seiva is from 60, and the Gra says that they argue on the mishna in Avot (see Yabia Omer III, YD 13). In any case, it may be laudable to follow the Arizal, whatever his reason is (see ibid.; Divrei Shalom, YD 93), or just to be more careful than required. There is also an interesting compromise that includes some 60-year-olds. Some Acharonim understood the classical sources as saying that to deserve honor just based on age, one must be 70, and to deserve it just based on scholarship, one needs to be a notable talmid chacham. However, a minor talmid chacham who is 60 deserves honor (see Tzemach Yehuda VI:35).

Nichum aveilim is on the Rambam’s (Avel 14:1) list of Rabbinic obligations that are fulfillments of the Torah commandment to love one’s friend like himself. The Rambam (ibid. 7) posits that it has precedence over another mitzva on that list, visiting the sick, in that it is an act of kindness both to the live (mourners) and the deceased. Many provide a source that it serves the deceased from the halacha that if one dies without relatives to sit shiva, ten people “sit in the place of the deceased” and are visited (Shabbat 152a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 276:3).

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:40) is among the consensus that nichum aveilim by phone does not impact on the deceased and thus cannot be as good as physically coming. Therefore, anyone who should be menachem avel (parameters beyond our present scope) must do so in person if he can (see also Pnei Baruch 11:12; Yalkut Yosef, Kitzur YD 26:9).

Even in regard to chesed for the mourner, coming personally has advantages. The Perisha (YD 393:3) in finding justification for those who only say the “nichum formula” when visiting, posits that “coming in and sitting down to honor is considered nichum aveilim.” While picking up the phone is worth something, it is not as demonstrative an act of honor and empathizing (speaking by phone to a chatan/kalla is not like being at the wedding).

Before expressing a preference between phone or email, we will analyze a halacha of shiva house protocol. Consolers may not speak until the mourner “opens,” as Iyov’s friends did (Moed Katan 28b). What is the logic of this halacha, which has not has been observed uniformly for centuries (which might be important)? The Levush (YD 276:1) explains that we wait to see that the mourner is in distress. Experience makes it difficult to imagine requiring an indication that the mourner is upset, and the Divrei Sofrim (376:2) suggests that our certainty can explain why many do not wait. The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 376:1) explains that nichum aveilim has to do with tzidduk hadin (accepting divine judgment), and the mourner should start the process, as Iyov did. Rav Y.M. Lau pointed out that we usually wait for the avel to say anything and suggests that it might suffice for the mourner to have done so once before all can then start speaking (see also a letter from the Tzitz Eliezer in P’nei Baruch. p. 472).

Presumably, this halacha is not a technical problem in our times when one calls or emails, especially since the avel speaks into the phone first and since pressing on an email is like inviting one to “speak.” However, extending the Levush’s approach, one wants to know not just that he should speak to the mourner but should pick up on how to do so best. The Chofetz Chaim (Ahavat Chesed III:5) says that while one nominally fulfills nichum aveilim by saying “Hamakom yenachem …,” it is intended to touch the heart and lessen pain. He stresses (see also Minchat Yitzchak II:84, in a parallel context) the words’ practical effectiveness. Sizing up the mourner’s mood by observing and listening enables the menachem to calibrate his own speech.

Phone has greater potential and risk than email. The positive – the interaction of conversation allows you to have a good guess of what to say. The negative – you do not see body language and do not know if your call has spoiled a good dynamic that menachemim are in the midst of, as it is difficult to time the call well. Email is usually shallower (barring a masterpiece), but it allows you to “drop the message off” after choosing the words carefully and have the avel choose when to read it (after shiva is also fine).

We propose with conviction that people who are close to an avel but cannot make it should call because their maximum potential is worth the disruption. People who are not close should use email instead (unless he knows there are few menachemim or can keep his call very short).     

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 244:8 - he need not fully stand but should do a hidur. Logic dictates that there is a difference between how a 70 year old acts toward a 90 year old and vice versa.  

The assumption has to be that a shul cares about the kavod haberiyot of Jews walking by and would be happy if they "wasted" a little of their water and/or toilet paper. It evens out, as the members of all shuls go from place to place.

There is a machloket in the gemara (Bava Metzia 32b) and poskim whether tza’ar baalei chayim is a Torah law or a Rabbinic one, and it is possible that it is a quasi-Torah law (see Encyclopedia HiIchatit Refuit, VI, p. 525). Many mitzvot in the Torah (at least according to some commentators) and Rabbinic laws are based on concern for animals and are to avoid cruelty to them. When and why can this be waived for human purposes?

The simple reading of Tosafot (Avoda Zara 11a) is that tza’ar baalei chayim can be waived only to facilitate an important mitzva. However, the halachic consensus is along the lines of the following Rama (Even Haezer 5:14, based on the Issur V’heter and Terumat Hadeshen): “Anything that is needed for medicine or for other things does not have a prohibition of tza’ar baalei chayim. Therefore, it is permitted to pluck feathers [for quills] from live geese, but the world is careful about that because of cruelty.”

There are at least two approaches to why the prohibition falls in the face of human need. One is that the prohibition is only for being needlessly insensitive. We find regarding bal tachshit (not destroying things) that “destroying” something for a positive reason is permitted because it is, in context, not destructive. Indeed the two mitzvot may be connected as the gemara (Chulin 7b) says – killing an animal for no good reason is ba’al tashchit; keeping it alive but in pain is tza’ar baalei chayim. Thus, if done for a good reason, it is not destructive/cruel.

A second, complimentary approach, is that the Torah teaches us, explicitly and implicitly, that animal rights do not compare to human needs. There are several Torah statements along the line of “Have dominion over the fish … birds …” (Bereishit 1:28). Furthermore, we are permitted to take an animal’s life simply because we desire to eat meat. We may enslave animals to do hard labor, with some restrictions (not Shabbat, muzzled).

There are a few important possible distinctions. Permissibility may depend on the level of pain to which the animal is subjected. Normal agricultural work is not torturous and is permitted. However, the Rama above calls plucking feathers from a live bird cruelty, and says we do not do such things (see Shvut Yaakov III:71). The level of need is also a variable. Some rule that earning extra money is not an excuse (see opinions cited in Minchat Yitzchak VI:145), and while most authorities say that it is a valid reason, it may depend on how painful it will be for the animal (ibid.).

Rav Yaakov Emden (Sheilat Yaavetz I:110) says that tza’ar baalei chayim applies only to animals with which man works (e.g., cattle, horses, donkeys) or perhaps relatively highly cognitive animals (dogs, cats), but not to “lower creatures,” who experience pain differently. According to these opinions, it does not apply to insects, and likely not to rodents.

Looking for cures and treatments for human illnesses is certainly a very valid reason to allow animal experimentation. As several poskim point out, real efforts should be made to ensure the importance of the experimentation, limit the number of animals used, and minimize pain (including using lower species). Suffering animals should be euthanized as promptly as possible. Thankfully many countries have rules to monitor such things, and unfortunately few do a good enough job.

Personally, if you are involved for a short time, it is appropriate to feel somewhat uncomfortable, even if the practice is right (see a scary story about Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi – Bava Metzia 85a). A professional researcher can’t be expected to constantly live with guilt, but it is appropriate to seek ways to heighten sensitivity, emulating Hashem, whose mercy is on all of His creations (see Tehillim 145:9). 

We will first take a look at the “halachic” element, and then, likely more importantly, try to put things in perspective.

The gemara (Chulin 27a) sees in a pasuk (Yechezkel 41:22) that mentions both the mizbeach (altar) and the shulchan (table) the following idea: “At the time of the Beit Hamikdash, a person would bring a sacrifice and be atoned, but now one’s table brings him atonement.” The primary explanation is that the atonement power comes from the mitzva of feeding those in need (see Tosafot ad loc.) – a practical, not mystical, concept. Nevertheless, there are several (semi-) accepted halachot that are learned from a spiritual concept of “a table is like an altar,” which may reflect another level of this gemara.

Several Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 180) learn from this concept that one should cover metal knives that are on the table at the time of bentching, as metal is kept away from the mizbeach because the latter lengthens life and the former shortens it. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 180:5) paskens this way. The Rama (OC 167:5) recommends to put salt on the table, just as salt was put on the korbanot brought on the mizbeach. The Magen Avraham (167:13) cites the Sefer Chasidim (102), that one must not kill insects on a table upon which people eat, just as he would not do so on the mizbeach, again, for the above reason. As usual, when the Magen Avraham states an opinion, most Acharonim follow suit (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 167:26; Kaf Hachayim, OC 167:41). The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 167:12) extends this to anything that is unseemly, with other Acharonim mentioning some specific examples, such as not allowing children to walk on top of the table (see Piskei Teshuvot 167:6). All indications are that this matter of respect for the table applies all the time, not just during a meal.

It seems clear to most anyone that changing a diaper is included in what the Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.) calls unseemly things, and he would thus forbid it. Actually, most people would refrain from doing so on health and aesthetic grounds, certainly in the presence of guests and soon before a meal.

On the other hand, I would not have said anything to the new parents, unless I felt that due to our relationship and/or their personality, they would take my comments in a positive spirit without significant embarrassment or resentment. While those who cite this halacha use the word assur, it is hard to view this post-Talmudic prohibition as a classical Rabbinic prohibition of the type from which we should try to protect our counterparts. (It is also unclear if all accept the Aruch Hashulchan’s extension to all unseemly things).

It is healthy to be melamed z’chut and see a little logic and even some beauty in the couple’s behavior. First, the halachot of excrement do not apply, for the most part, to such young babies (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 81:1 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 2). Indeed, the smell is also less oppressive (for most) and apparently somewhat less unhygienic (especially for nursing babies). What is more interesting, though, is the attitude of these parents, who, I would guess, are first-time parents. Their days (and some sleep-deprived nights) revolve around that little bundle of joy, and he or she occupies their thoughts and actions. With such a frame of mind, they probably see taking care of the baby’s needs as the most natural and beautiful thing, and it did not dawn on them that others might be taken aback. I would also predict that in a few weeks, they will “land” a little bit and stop doing this practice, not due to halachic realization, but due to a return to normalcy, in which they would “know better.” In the meantime, I would excuse their lack of tact and try to focus on its endearing element.

If it is something done with professionals who know how to stay safe we do not see any Halachic problem with going on the tour. 

If it is not respectable clothing which one would wear outside it is not included in the prohibition of new clothing and is similar to undergarments.

One who needs the help of a psychologist is not fundamentally different, regarding emunah, to one who needs the help of an orthopedist. Each can probably live in pain without help, by why should he? He should absolutely go. While some people feel it is embarrassing to go and look for excuses to avoid it, that is not wise. 

The cases in which there are lashon hara problems are too rare to try to discuss any cases that might be exceptions. Telling about hurtful relationships in that context is considered therapy rather than lashon hara, as the Chofetz Chaim writes. A psychologist knows to keep the stories in his or her office and will not convey the stories to others or confront the subject of the stories (e.g., he will not say: "are you the person I was told about?")

About the identity of the psychologist, this is a difficult question. The first thing is that he must be a qualified professional. The second is that there should be a good fit of styles/personalities. Because of the deep emotions that are exposed and the values judgments that are part of the therapy process, it can be problematic to go to a non-religious person or one who is of the opposite gender. We would not say as an outright rule that is forbidden to use the above, but it is at least a strong factor to consider in a manner that is different from case to case. It also therefore depends on availability of a qualified religious psychologist of the same gender.

The mitzva to return a lost object (hashavat aveida) applies generally to saving people from loss of money (Bava Kama 81b). However, in regards to one who has no specific obligation toward the object that was damaged due to his inactivity (as opposed to a watchman), he does not have an obligation to pay. Therefore, if, for example, someone did not pick up rocks from the street, and someone's tires were punctured by the rocks, the first person does not have to pay for damages.

A mango pit is not edible and therefore, it is not counted toward calculating terumot and maasrot (one can fairly assume that the proportion of flesh to pit is similar from mango to mango). One certainly cannot use the pit for the hafrasha.

There are crucial but obvious halachic and/or social issues in the forefront of rabbinic and community discussion. We do not consider this the correct forum to “throw our hat into the ring.” However, there are many “harmless” new or expanded religious practices that are a sign of trends with common roots. Identifying those roots and considering a basic strategy toward them (there are different legitimate ones) help the community and the individual react deliberately to practices that have and will arise.   

We will focus on the types of practices that have begun to arise by those who strive for healthy (not extreme) religious excellence. One trend is the use and pursuit of segulot. For example, over the last 10-20 years, the chatan, kalla and sandek have become among those before whom one is expected to line up to receive berachot like a Chassidishe Rebbe. (Previously, we simple people would bless the chatan and kalla.) Tzedaka organizations encourage donations because THE right holy people will daven THE best tefilla at The best place at THE best time for us. (Almost forgotten are the mitzva, the important cause, the steps to prevent needless overhead, etc.)

Another trend (which is not new, but is in some ways is intensified) is the focus on the individual. We are not talking about selfish people, as many are true ba’alei chesed and work for the community, who just want to do the “best thing.” Here are a few examples of such practices that are new, picking up steam, or expanding to new communities: Breaking up a minyan so two aveilim can be chazan; a chazan using his own nusach in a shul with a set different nusach; asking for haftara semi-regularly during the year of aveilut; minyanim in which people come late, daven at their own speed without skipping, and thereby there is a questionable quorum for Shemoneh Esrei and chazarat hashatz.

Without going into the details of such specific issues, we see overlap between the trends. “I believe my nusach is better (for me), so the tzibbur should accommodate me.” “I need to provide my parent with the most effective illuy neshama, so the shul should sacrifice to accommodate aveilim in ways not traditionally prescribed.” “The Beit Yosef’s angel said that skipping is detrimental, so we no longer follow the Shulchan Aruch’s rules meant for a minyan to be a cohesive communal davening.”

Our approach is that while proper balance is always important, the rule is that the needs and preferences of the tzibbur come before those of the individual (see Living the Halachic Process, I:H-3). In matters where diverging from community norms can cause discord, even when that outcome it is not obvious, the sugyot of the 4^th perek of Pesachim are strictly against an individual’s divergence. This is often even at the cost of religious preferences for the individual (see Mishna Berura 468:23). Furthermore, we believe (as often expressed beautifully by Rav Kook, including in Ein Ayah, Berachot 1:89) that the individual’s avodat Hashem should be focused on improving the community’s spiritual state. While the ultimate level of community is of Klal Yisrael, in one’s personal life, his local community represents his klal. It is true that a community should be concerned about the feeling of fulfillment of individuals. However, it is more fundamental that the individual not allow the fine points of his personal quest, even for the apparent spiritual advantage of his departed parents, to compromise what is healthiest for the community. Some segulot are positive … but when they do not impinge upon others.

Pursuing real Torah values, as set out by halacha, should define our practices. Of course, every issue that arises should be handled in a manner that seeks to avoid machloket. The community should remember this, but halacha says that the obligation to avoid machloket makes greater demands on the individual.

It is only necessary if they want to use the contents of the bottle for Kiddush.

If we are talking about the level of makeup that is common for a man in that situation, it is not a problem. That can apply to actors and certainly to burn victims, as one is not doing it to look feminine in any manner.

If parents have psychological problems, then they need even more care, which includes respect. Respect does not necessarily mean that one thinks that they are the most accomplished and impressive people. It means to treat them kindly and nicely and to treat them carefully as someone of a much higher station in life due to the relationship. 

If parents are particularly abusive to children, this may make it unreasonable to expect the children to be as attentive to them. If it is because of clear psychological problems, then the parents are less responsible for their actions, and the child becomes less likely to have an exemption. On the other hand, a situation could exist whereby the parent is so abusive that even if the child knows why, he is still unable to handle it. Such a tragic situation should be dealt with by a rabbi who is involved in their lives.

The main prohibition regarding tree grafting is the act of grafting – (inserting the branch (scion) of one tree into the wood (rootstock) of another tree). Actually, this prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, but Chazal (Kiddushin 39a) derived it from the proximity between crossbreeding of animals and crossbreeding in one’s field. The derivation is presumed to be of a Torah-level law (Rosh, Kilayim 3), and because it is derived from crossbreeding animals, which is not a land-based prohibition, it applies even outside Eretz Yisrael (Kiddushin 39a).   

It is forbidden not only to plant kilayim (a mixture of species) but even to allow it to remain in one’s field (Rambam, Kilayim 1:3), and this extends to grafting trees as well (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 295:7). Although one may not leave the trees intact, one may eat or benefit from the fruit that grows there (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 1:4; Rambam, Kilayim 1:7). Exceptions to this rule are when grape orchards are involved and that the offspring of crossbred animals are invalid for a korban (Chulin 115a).

It is unclear whether leaving the grafted tree intact is a Torah-level prohibition or a Rabbinic one (see Tosafot, Bava Kama 81a), and it could depend if one is passive in the matter or active (see Shut Chatam Sofer II:288). In any case, the stronger opinion is seemingly that it is only Rabbinic (Derech Emuna, Kilayim 1:41).

The Chatam Sofer (ibid., cited by the Pitchei Teshuva, YD 295:4) was bothered by the practice in his time of many observant Jews (outside Israel) to buy orchards containing grafted trees. He explained that since the source for the prohibition and its extension to chutz la’aretz is from crossbreeding animals, the prohibition in chutz la’aretz is only when one is active in joining them together. Thus, claims the Chatam Sofer, their practice, even if it was not ideal, could be justified, especially if non-Jews control the doings in the orchard. The Chazon Ish (Kilayim 2:11) critiqued this leniency strongly. Thus, at first glance, it is quite problematic to keep and cultivate a grafted fruit tree even though its fruit are permitted.

In practice, you probably have no problem. Grafting trees is forbidden only when the scion is of a different species than the rootstock (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 295:6). Actually, nectarines are simply a variety of peaches; they are not (at least not usually) grafted onto a plum tree, as many think. Thus, it is permitted to graft a nectarine branch onto a nectarine or a peach tree. (Why would one graft if he does not want to mix species? Apparently, the main idea is almost like cloning. If you grow trees from seeds, fruit will only grow if there is cross pollination from another tree and then you don’t know their exact genetic makeup. By grafting, the scion will turn from a simple branch into, in effect, the beginning of a new tree with the old tree’s properties.)

One forbidden form of geneivat da’at (deceiving someone) is when one sells a defective item, even when the buyer does not lose money from it (Chulin 94a). However, the same gemara includes several cases where Reuven makes Shimon think he is intending to give him something, when in fact he did not have that intention. One case is when Reuven urges Shimon to eat with him when he knows Shimon will not eat. Another is when he brings to his friend a utensil in a way that looks like he is bringing something of value, but he is not. Furthermore, the gemara forbids opening before a guest a barrel of wine most of which was already earmarked for sale. (Because the wine of newly open barrels tastes better than those open for a while, opening a new barrel looks like a big gesture to the guest.) Rather, says the gemara, you have to inform them that you would have had to open the barrel soon anyway.

Therefore, at first glance, it is problem to make your in-laws believe you gave a present. However, for one or more reasons, you are not required to tell them. First, we look at the reasoning behind the prohibition of this type of geneivat da’at. Rashi explains that the deceiver causes the recipient to feel that he owes him more reciprocally than he does. Had the recipient of the favor/gesture realized the situation, he would not be as generous in return. Thus, if there is no reason to expect any change in reciprocity due to the act, it is likely permitted to present a more positive picture than exists, and parents (in-law) usually give their children unrelated to little gifts their kids give them. (We do not usually make such distinctions regarding prohibitions, but a prohibition whose action is fine and the whole problem is situational is likely different.)

The following story (gemara, ibid. b) is very instructive. Two rabbis happened to be traveling in the opposite direction of a third rabbi. When they met, the third rabbi expressed his appreciation that they came to greet him. One of the two nicely corrected his mistake to avoid deceiving the third. The second one told the first he was mistaken in disappointing the third and that deception was not a problem because he had “deceived himself.” The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:6) rules like the second rabbi, that if the “recipient” should have realized that he actually did not receive a favor, the “giver” does not have to correct him. We can learn a stringency and perhaps also a leniency from this ruling. One might need to correct a misimpression even if he did not purposely do anything to create it if it turns out that he created the error. The leniency is that if he “should not” have jumped to the erroneous conclusion, the “giver” does not have to correct it. You would know better than we can how this idea applies to your case.

Another leniency is that it is permitted to give the wrong impression if the motivation of the “deception” is not to win favor but for the honor of the recipient (gemara and Shulchan Aruch ibid). In this case, it might be embarrassing to tell your in-laws that they made a mistake, although one could argue that it is not embarrassing, as it was your mistake not to tell them the item was coming for you.

Another difference is that, by letting them keep the item, you are, in truth, actually giving them a present. It turns out that they do have reason to be grateful. When one gives an actual present, whose degree is understood correctly (as opposed to the case of opening the wine), we do not find an obligation to divulge all the circumstances under which you gave it. For example, if you gave a nice present, you are not required to say the idea came from your sister-in-law. So too, you do not have to admit the idea of the present came from your in-laws’ mistake.

The notion you raise is a popularly-held notion. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are not sources of there being a hard-and-fast rule on the matter. 

Rather, a balanced approach should be applied as to when to open and close the window. In some regards, open windows can be healthier for the tzibbur as well as more comfortable. 

If you know of sources that support your assumption, we would be happy to see them. This respondent has looked for them unsuccessfully in the past, and I am actually the type who feels more comfortable when it is warmer.

I imagine your question is about how to explain the phenomenon that we spend time raising children that we could be spending on various mitzvot. The fact that all normal Jewish (and non-Jewish) families will continue toiling over their children is a given. Your question presents a wonderful opportunity to (telegraphically) discuss basic principles of avodat Hashem before looking at the specific sources you seek.

Mitzvot are the highlights of our life, into which we need to learn how to incorporate undeniable realities, both mundane and special. Hashem made the world in such a way that we must eat, sleep, go to the bathroom, bathe, etc. These are not mitzvot in the classic sense, but Hashem certainly wants us to partake in them. They are so obviously a part of our life that they do not need to be commanded.

Let us illustrate with a famous pasuk – the source of the mitzva to recite Birkat Hamazon. “You shall eat and you shall be satiated, and you shall bless Hashem your G-d for the good land He gave you” (Devarim 8:10). The pasuk contains three grammatically identical verbs. Why did Chazal not derive a mitzva to eat and one to be satiated? The answer is that we eat enough food because that is normal for a person, which Hashem created us to be. If we need confirmation that Hashem wants us to do this and not be ascetics, note the p’sukim from the second section of Kri’at Shema (Devarim 11:13-15). We keep the mitzvot of the Torah, Hashem brings rain, and our crops grow and are harvested. This section describing the ideal situation ends with “you shall eat and be satiated.” Similarly, when one is busy with work, another proper non-mitzva, he is exempt from constant involvement in mitzvot, whether learning Torah, visiting the sick, etc. (see Orach Chayim 156).

What is the Torah perspective on supporting children? A father (not mother) is required Rabbinically (not by Torah law) to support his children when they are small (see Ketubot 65b; Rambam, Ishut 12:14). So until the Rabbinical institution, did the average father not support his family? Consider the Torah-derived law (see Rashi, Shemot 21:3) that an eved ivri’s master must support his slave’s wife and children, obviously because the father/family breadwinner is at work all day for the master. But why should the master be required by Torah law to support them in lieu of the father when the father is only obligated Rabbinically? The answer is that the Torah left it to fathers to support their families because they are normal human fathers, and the Torah trusted that this would be the rule. The Torah expects a mother, who is technically not obligated, to provide food for her children if they do not have a father doing so. In the animal kingdom, they do this based on instinct; in humanity, the instinct is augmented by basic G-d-given morality.

The Torah expects parents to be involved with their children’s various needs, which is nobler and harder to delay than other needs. This justifies taking care of children before even such mitzvot before which it is forbidden to eat or work (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3; we do not find such limitations regarding caring for children). It justifies not pursuing other mitzvot that are not clearly incumbent upon us. (We hopefully learn a proper balance from our wonderful parents’ example.) Only if one has earned a deep relationship with his children can he expect success in raising them with a Torah lifestyle, which is the Jewish way since Avraham Avinu (see Bereishit 18:19). How the responsibilities of providing all of a child’s material, educational, and emotional needs are broken up between two parents, sometimes with help from their families and the community, depends on the time, place, and the individuals’ circumstances.

[Last time we saw that even if taking care of one’s children were not a mitzva, it would be a proper, central reality of life, to be done even when it takes away from one’s ability to perform certain mitzvot and delays others. Now we will see sources that indicate that it is a mitzva in its own way.]

The gemara (Ketubot 50a) states: “‘Praiseworthy is one who guards justice, who does tzedaka every moment’ (Tehillim 106:3). Is it possible to do tzedaka every moment? Our rabbis in Yavneh said that it refers to one who supports his sons and daughters when they are young.” Let us consider two difficulties in this gemara: 1. Why is supporting one’s own children considered tzedaka? (The gemara’s next opinion attributes the pasuk to raising orphans). 2. How is supporting one’s children “every moment”? Rashi answers both questions: 1. It is talking about an age at which there is no full obligation to support. The support of close family members actually has tzedaka precedence over others, unless there is a halachic obligation (e.g., a husband to a wife) (Shulchan Aruch, YD 251:3). 2. “Always, day and night, they are his responsibility.” I understand “day and night” that it is not just giving money, which one can do in a moment, but that whatever needs arise can and often do fall upon him.

The gemara (Makkot 8a) says that a father is exempt from the consequences of injuring his son while disciplining him because it is a mitzva. It does not make sense that discipline is a mitzva and positive elements of child-rearing are not. Thus, we have another indication of a mitzva to raise children.

However, one will not find this mitzva in one of the “lists of mitzvot,” as it is not a free-standing mitzva. The Rambam (Avel 14:1) lists several acts of kindness as Rabbinic positive mitzvot, including visiting the sick, comforting mourners, involvement in a funeral, and escorting a guest, among other acts. He concludes: “Although all of these mitzvot are of Rabbinic origin, they are included in ‘v’ahavta l’reiacha kamocha’ (You shall love your friend like yourself) (Vayikra 19:18).” This formulation is paradoxical. On the one hand, if these mitzvot are Rabbinic, they are not from the Torah, but on the other hand, they are included in a mitzva of the Torah! This apparently means the following. The Torah requires one to do his fair share of acts of kindness. One person could fill his whole kindness quota on, say, visiting the sick, and never take part in funerals or have guests. Therefore, the Rabbis instituted an independent obligation in each of the matters listed.

Actions of raising children are not on the list above although the Rambam does mention applications elsewhere in his work (Matanot Ani’im 10:16 for one). It is possible the list is not exhaustive. It is also possible (see part I) that not only the Torah but even the Rabbis left these matters for a person to do voluntarily, in principle, even though practically, from a human perspective, they are activities that are incumbent upon him. Indeed, if one is not able (for various reasons) to do a lot of the caring for children, he/she can arrange for others (e.g., pre-school, day care) to take major parts in providing the child’s physical, educational, and emotional needs. However, when a mother or father acts normally, which includes a tremendous amount of work raising his children, this is a fulfillment of “v’ahavta l’reiacha kamocha.” This fundamentally applies equally to men and women; in practice, reason and practicality should guide a family how to share these responsibilities. It is unlikely that a father will have to miss putting on tefillin one day because he is too busy tending to his children. But he might legitimately put them on later and miss minyan because a child is sick.

[People often ask whether our questions are sent in or whether I make them up. Actually, the great majority are sent in. However, this question is one I asked myself for myself. Also, I did not answer it in our usual style. A little background: after deciding I wanted to donate a kidney, I asked my posek this question. His conviction is that while one is not required to donate, it is a very big mitzva to exceed one’s chesed obligation and do so. He also ruled that if I donate, I am obligated to share this fact with as many people as possible to encourage others (very healthy middle-aged men and women) to consider it. I have decided that after a very brief discussion of the halachic issues, I will share a unique Torah-based approach (not ruling) that motivated me (intellectually).]

The Radbaz (III:627) was asked whether one who can save a Jew’s life by agreeing to sacrifice a limb should do so. He responded that one is not required to make such a life-altering sacrifice but that doing so would be an “act of chasidut.” He continues that if giving the limb endangers his life (as he assumes), only a “chasid shoteh (crazy)” would agree. There seem to be differing opinions within Chazal about endangering oneself to save someone in great danger (see S’ma 426:2).

There are decades-old teshuvot (Minchat Yitzchak VI:103; Tzitz Eliezer IX:45) that discourage kidney donation due to perceived dangers. However, the present consensus encourages it, as Rav Yisraeli did decades ago (Chavot Binyamin 109). All surgery has some danger, but these days it is negligible for healthy people. There are slight disadvantages to having one kidney. It can be life-threatening, but uncommonly so for those who pass the rigorous pre-donation testing. However, it is unclear, based on what we have learned (so far) in the last few decades, whether the Radbaz would consider a donor a chasid shoteh. Poskim (see Pitchei Teshuva, CM 426:2; Mishna Berura 329:19) and the Radbaz elsewhere (see Chavot Binyamin ibid.) urge people not to exaggerate self-concern when others need saving.

When there is a communal danger from attackers, Jews are expected to come, even on Shabbat with weapons, to defend their counterparts (Eruvin 45a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 329:6-7). Considering that there must be some danger to the defenders, doesn’t this contradict the Radbaz?

The following approach is based on the way I was taught at Eretz Hemdah and by Rav Yisraeli to view communal needs, especially in the State of Israel. Members of Israeli society face many dangers – hostile countries, criminals, national disasters, etc. People (soldiers, policeman, firefighters, etc.) risk their lives to protect society. Nationally, we are far better off with an apparatus of protection than to have everyone fend for themselves. But who should risk his life? We draft, appeal to, and/or provide incentives for people to take these positions. I believe that no posek would forbid being an Israeli soldier or policeman based on the Radbaz.

Similarly, if society, as guided by doctors, lawmakers, and poskim, has to decide whether to encourage healthy people to accept difficulties and minor risks to save recipients from extended dialysis and/or death, the logical answer is, “Yes!” It is just a matter of finding the right number and profiles of donors. The government provides incentives (including modest “financial gratitude”), the most important being that the donor’s family goes to the top of the list of future recipients if needed. It also ensures careful screening. When organizations (e.g., Matnat Chaim), rabbis, and others (I am hereby trying) succeed in presenting the matter to the public eye, our philanthropically-minded nation will respond appropriately. We’re getting closer to providing the desired number of donors but need more work. If Israel is not the world leader yet, let us be soon!

The Rashba (Shut III:282) believes that the laws of chatzitza  do not apply to the tefillin shel rosh. However, the accepted opinion is that chatzitzot are a problem, although possibly only for the bayit and not the retzuot (straps) (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 27:4 and Mishna Berura 27:16).

Many poskim (including Igrot Moshe, OC IV:40.18; Aseh Lecha Rav III:3; Yalkut Yosef, OC 27:14) posit that a removable toupee is a chatzitza. However, Rav Moshe posits that transplanted hair is not a chatzitza since it is a permanent, desired part of his body. Furthermore, he writes that is also true for a permanently glued-on toupee. Is a toupee that is glued down for a matter of months a temporary or permanent appendage to the body?

Matters of chatzitza on appendages that remain for an extended period are discussed regarding items such as removable stitches and temporary fillings for women going to the mikveh. In that context, many poskim (see opinions in Badei Hashulchan 198:179 and The Laws of Nidda (Forst), vol. II, p.313-4) are lenient to allow tevilla. One of the lenient factors (see Igrot Moshe, YD I:97) is that the ostensible chatzitza is something that is specifically needed for medical reasons for a significant amount of time. This factor is missing in our case. However, several poskim are lenient in a case of aesthetic need to allow a married woman to have braces on her teeth (see The Laws of Nidda ibid.), and that is parallel to our case. Our case is also better than braces in that people want to remove the braces as soon as possible, whereas you would want to keep the toupee as long as you can.

There are various opinions regarding how long the item needs to remain on the body: six months; a month; a week (see ibid.). Finally, if, for example, the required time is a month, then according to some opinions, the appendage becomes a chatzitza a month before it will be removed; others say that if it is on for a month, it is okay until it is removed (see ibid.).  Your situation is better if the toupee is being removed to be re-glued rather than replaced. A woman who wants to follow the stringent opinion can accordingly synchronize going to the mikveh and removing the appendage; a man who has to put on tefillin every day cannot.

Let us halachically contrast tevilla and tefillin. On the one hand, tevilla is needed to remove a more stringent halachic matter than tefillin. Also, we saw an opinion that chatzitza is not a problem for the tefillin shel rosh. Yet, in other ways, your case is more severe. A chatzitza on a minority of the body (as in the cases above) is no worse than a Rabbinic disqualification (Nidda 67b). In contrast, the entire area of the tefillin is covered by a toupee, and there is thus the potential for a Torah-level disqualification (see Ran to Rif, Sukka 13b). Some even argue that the parameters of chatzitza for tefillin are broader than for tevilla (see Rivevot Ephrayim III;38), and some claim that even one’s own hair that is under the tefillin in an unnatural way is a chatzitza (Machatzit Hashekel 27:4). A toupee should be no better than that.

Usually discussion of kedusha of the Land’s produce relates to land-based mitzvot. Without going into detail, we posit that most land-based mitzvot apply on a Rabbinic level rather than a Torah-level after the Beit Hamikdash’s destruction. However, the parameters regarding your question may be different.

Actually, Eretz Yisrael’s special qualities exist at all times, as we find in many statements of Chazal from the post-Temple period (see Ketubot 110-112). True, there were elements that were greater at the time of the Beit Hamikdash (see Sota 48a regarding the special taste of fruit) or will be greater when Mashiach comes (see Ketubot ibid.). The success of the fruit of the Land is also a harbinger of the advent of the era of Mashiach (Sanhedrin 98a). But even in destruction, Eretz Yisrael is wonderful, and one should feel a special love for everything connected to it (Ketubot 112a-b). Indeed, the great majority of poskim posit that the mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael applies now (see Ramban, Mitzvat Aseh 4; Pitchei Teshuva, Even Haezer 75:6).

Does the Land’s innate kedusha create a preference to eat its fruit? The gemara (Sota 14a) wonders why Moshe so strongly desired to enter the Land. It dismisses the possibility that he was interested in eating its fruit and says that he wanted to fulfill the mitzvot of the Land. Based on this approach, there are Rishonim (see Tur, Orach Chayim 208) who say that we should not say, as part of the beracha acharona on fruit, “v’nochal mipirya” (we shall eat of its fruit), as this is unimportant. While the poskim do not come to a consensus on the matter (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 208:51), all our texts include the phrase. Yet the Beit Yosef explains the phrase’s relevance as follows. Since the beracha is thanking Hashem for food, focus on food is appropriate. He seems to agree that overall it is not particularly important. On the other hand, the Bach (ad loc.) argues that while for Moshe eating the fruit was not important, for us, when things are proper, the fruit of Eretz Yisrael connects us to a world of spirituality.

There are other indications of the fruit’s special status. The gemara (Berachot 44a) says (as the Rashba ad loc. and Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:10 understand) that if one eats fruits that grew in Eretz Yisrael, his beracha acharona includes “… v’al peiroteha” (on its fruit), instead of just say “v’al hapeirot” (on fruit). This stresses the significance of the fruit coming from the Land.

The seven species of produce for which Eretz Yisrael is praised have a high priority regarding what fruit to eat right after one’s beracha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 211:4). Logically, produce that is actually from Eretz Yisrael should have prominence in this regard, as V’zot Haberacha (p. 124) says in the name of Rav Mordechai Eliyahu. Others point out (see Mishpetei Uziel I, OC 24; Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:188) that there is not support for this outlook in classical sources. (One could explain that until recently, the fruit of bnei Eretz Yisrael was always from the Land and Jews living abroad did not have access to the fruit of Eretz Yisrael. Since few had a choice between them, the topic is not discussed.) In any case, we note that we do not find a preference to eat the seven species, just that, if we do, it has precedence for the beracha. In other words, prominence does not necessarily mean one should go out of his way to eat it.

We put things together as follows. There is no halachic obligation or clear preference to eat the fruit of Eretz Yisrael. However, since one is supposed to love the Land and matters connected to it (see above), wanting to connect to Hashem and His Land by eating its fruit is displaying and likely fostering a healthy outlook, which gives it added value. (To the extent that eating such fruit helps Israeli Jewish farmers and thereby helps strengthen our hold on the Land, this is valuable (see Gittin 8b).) 

As we have written (see Living the Halachic Process III, D-21), we believe in the legitimacy of the various minhagim for which days of sefira to observe and that one may choose different ones on different years according to needs. Certainly, then, one should respect someone else’s choice. True, it is proper for a community to have set practices that all conform to, including in this matter (Rama, Orach Chayim 493:3). However, in the great majority of contemporary Jewish communities, there is a great mix of people from various places of origin and backgrounds. While in certain areas of halacha, community consensuses have developed, the poskim recognize sefirat ha’omer as one in which diversity still exists (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I:159).

One can ask, though: considering the different opinions, is it okay to make a wedding at a time that puts people in a situation of choosing to do things that are ostensibly forbidden for them? The Minchat Yitzchak (IV:84) deals with a wedding of Sephardi boy and an Ashkenazi girl in Buenos Aires which needed to be around Lag Ba’omer. Ashkenazim (in that place, at least) can have weddings on Lag Ba’omer but not after; Sephardim can have weddings after Lag Ba’omer but (probably) not on it. Although the Minchat Yitzchak arrived at a way of doing it which could work for everyone, he posited that participants could not take part in a wedding seuda that would go against their minhag of sefira (the ceremony without lively music would be permitted). The simple reading of the Chatam Sofer (I:142) is similar.

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC I:159) posits that everyone can take part freely in the wedding during such times. His rationale is that once a marriage has taken place, it creates simcha obligations that break normal rules. For example, a couple who get married at the end of Nisan are allowed to continue with sheva berachot festivities, which should have been forbidden for the other participants. Rav Moshe even claims, based on the end of the Chatam Sofer’s teshuva, that the latter agrees that people can take part in the wedding.

Rav S.Z. Auerbach (as cited in Halichot Shlomo, Moadim 11:19) similarly posits as a simple matter that if a couple is celebrating a wedding, invitees can take part. (He and Rav Moshe seem to disagree whether one could take part in the celebration if they got married at a time that was not appropriate for their own minhag.) It is possible that the Minchat Yitzchak would agree that given the practice that people do get married at times that do not fit all, one could take part b’di’eved.

In any case, we prefer the approach of Rabbis Feinstein and Auerbach for several reasons: the approach makes sense; those poskim are among those who most impact on our rulings; it is proper to be lenient on sefira questions (Chok Yaakov 493:2; Chatam Sofer ibid.). Imagine that we would be limited by the chumrot of all the sefira opinions and consider the not so distant three weeks with no weddings. It turns out that 4 months of weddings are squeezed into just over a month, which in many communities causes problems of hall availability and conflict that can be very stressful (and/or expensive) to couples and their families.

There is one further reason to allow full participation (see Halichot Shlomo ibid.). Seudot mitzva create all sorts of dispensations regarding national mourning. We know about eating meat at siyumim during the Nine Days. For a closer example, according to many (see Dirshu 493:8), there can be dancing at a hachnasat sefer Torah during sefira. Therefore, music/dancing at a wedding might not be forbidden, as it is an important part of an important seudat mitzva (see Rama, OC 338:2). In fact, according to some, the main reason not to get married is that it is a bad omen to get married at such a time (see Shvut Yaakov II:35). Thus, there is an additional reason for dancing at the seudat mitzva being fine.

First, let us consider what a kohen could do with teruma he received. It is forbidden to eat teruma when either the eater (Rambam, Terumot 7:1) or the teruma (ibid. 2:14) is tameh. We assume that all kohanim in our times are tameh even after going to a mikveh because we lack ash from a para aduma required to remove tuma from a human corpse. (Poskim assume that kohanim have been exposed to corpses at some time despite the prohibition to do so.) Therefore, a kohen would not be able to eat the teruma.

Not all teruma is tameh because solid foods become tameh only after they have been muchshar l’kabel tumah, i.e., prepared to become tameh by being touched by one of seven liquids (usually, water) to the owner’s satisfaction (Vayikra 11:38, Rambam, Tumat Ochalin 1:1-2). This occurs only sometimes.

A kohen may feed teruma that is pure to his animal (Rambam, Terumot 6:1). A great amount of teruma removed centrally is given to the zoo and safari after animals have been transferred to a kohen’s ownership. Fundamentally, teruma that is fit for human consumption may not be given to animals, but authorities are lenient because kohanim will anyway not eat it (see Derech Emuna, ad loc. 10). If teruma is tameh, it should be burnt, and a kohen may benefit from its burning (Rambam, ibid. 2:14). Thus, olive oil teruma is of use to a kohen for lighting.

Apparently, your question is not about the kohanim’s welfare, but about your mitzva to give the teruma to a kohen even if he does not particularly want it. But is there really a mitzva? Not necessarily. The Rambam and Ramban (Sefer Hamitzvot, shoresh 12) dispute whether hafrashat (removal of) teruma and giving it to a kohen are two parts of one mitzva or two independent mitzvot. While each implies it is a mitzva to give it to a kohen, the Netivot Hamishpat (243:8) states that one is not required to do so physically. Rather, one sets aside part of the produce as teruma, and Hashem has determined that it belongs to the kohanim, with the owner deciding which one can come and get it. The Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 61:1) suggests that this is the reason there is no beracha if and when one does actually give it. There is also an opinion that there is a mitzva (see opinions in Derech Emuna, Terumot 2:(361)).

Despite the existence of opinions that it is a mitzva, many poskim say that one should not give teruma in our days to a kohen. There is a major question whether we should rely on the kohanim’s presumption of being valid kohanim (see discussion in Shach, YD 322:9). The Chazon Ish (Shemitta 5:12) argues that since we no longer have a beit din that interrogates to confirm the authenticity of kohanim’s claims, we do not have grounds to trust that they are allowed to receive teruma. He reasons that it is therefore wrong to give them the teruma. The Rama (Orach Chayim 457:2) brings two opinions on whether one gives them challa, which is parallel to teruma, in chutz la’aretz, where it can be eaten by a kohen who is a tameh meit if he is too young to have tumah coming from his body. The Mishna Berura (457:22) explains the opinion that one does not as being due to insufficient pedigree. The Maharit (I:85) is among those who does trust a kohen’s pedigree sufficiently to give them teruma, for example, tameh oil that he can use for burning, as the Rama in Yoreh Deah (331:19) rules.

 Another reason to not give teruma to a kohen is that one should remove it from human access someone mistakenly eats it (see Pesachim 33b). Although the Rama (ibid.) is lenient that kohanim will not make a mistake, he refers to a case where there the kohen can benefit from the gift, not to a nominal giving for the giver to perform a (possible) mitzva, only for the kohen to dispose of it.

In summary, the standard practice of not giving teruma to a kohen (except for organized donations to animals) is likely halachically indicated and not a matter of laziness.

[What follows are some halachic thoughts, not a formal ruling or legal advice.]

It seems that the use of the wall is more a symptom of the problem, which is the congregating in front of the house, than the problem itself. People of any age and style may congregate on the sidewalk in front of anyone’s house. On the other hand, they do not have a right to make noise that is inappropriate for the time and place in question or leave litter. One may call the police if norms are ignored; it is their job to find the balance between the interests of the various parties. 

Your neighbor is performing what Chazal called “avid inish dina l’nafshei” (taking the law into his own hands), which is permitted rather than suing in beit din in certain cases (see Bava Kama 28a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 4:1). While it is normally forbidden to hit someone (Devarim 25:3; see Sefer Hachinuch 595) or damage his property (Tur, CM 378), it can be permitted in the context of avid inish dina l’nafshei (Bava Kama ibid.). Is your neighbor acting within halachic limits?

A victim is allowed to take physical actions against a trespasser, even when the latter is not causing specific acute damage (Bava Kama ibid.). However, this is only when he cannot succeed in stopping the infraction without damaging the perpetrator (ibid.). Your neighbor should not just put on the grease without first warning trespassers (a clear sign is possible) to stop before having steps taken against them. Also, the rationale and consequently the limitations for this extraordinary permission are important. The Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kama 3:9) explains that it is predicated on the fact that the perpetrator is in the midst of violating a clear aveira and ignores the victim’s protest, so that the victim can do afrushei me’issura (preventing another from sinning). If the violators are not made aware that they are actually sinning, these steps are inappropriate (see also Imrei Bina, Dayanim 9).

Your neighbor appears to be wrong on other grounds. By putting not easily seen grease on the wall, “innocent people” can be affected. This can include passersby who get too close to the wall and become dirty. It also impacts the people of the building. It apparently stains the wall, neighbors can be dirtied themselves, or they just don’t want a reputation of being “from the mean building.” In general, in matters of joint property, the rules of engagement are usually that the majority decides (sometimes there are nationwide or municipal rules or accepted practices).

Regarding another factor, we lack sufficient information. When a wall separates between private property and public domain, it is not always clear on whose property it sits. It is then possible that the wall-sitters are not trespassing. The contractor who built the building ostensibly built the wall on behalf of the homeowners. However, it is quite accepted for people who want to do so, to lean and even sit on such a low wall, and permission is assumed. There are even precedents in Halacha to make such things a right that the public can demand (see Bava Batra 12a; Bava Kama 81b) except when it is hurting the owners (e.g., the wall is getting weak). Considering that it is the assembling of noisemakers/litterers that it is the real problem, it is not clear that the building, if they agree, could legally make sitting on the wall forbidden per se.

We have good news and bad news. The bad news is that we were not able to find any classical or semi-classical sources that there is a mitzva for every 4 amot one walks in Israel. The good news is that there are bigger and better ways to get that effect, which those of us who live here do naturally. On to the sources!

The gemara (end of Ketubot) attributes many wonderful benefits to Eretz Yisrael. One who lives there “dwells without sin” (Ketubot 111a). Being buried there is like “being buried under the altar” (ibid.). Rabbi Yochanan adds: “Whoever walks 4 amot in Eretz Yisrael is assured to be one who receives the World to Come.” Thus, walking in Eretz Yisrael has a powerful spiritual merit!

The Rambam (Melachim 5:11) paraphrases this gemara. However, his language indicates that this source may not be relevant to your question. The Rambam starts with the great merit of living in Eretz Yisrael and then continues: “… even if one walked in it 4 amot, he will merit the World to Come.” Thus, someone who lived in chutz la’aretz, took one trip to Israel, landed at Ben Gurion, walked a few steps, and took the next plane out gets this merit. He presents it as (obviously) a (significantly) lower fulfillment of connection to the Land than living there. The question is: if one is living in Israel and meriting extreme spiritual benefits (and has already walked hundreds of thousands of amot), does he get an additional mitzva for walking another four?

HaRav Yehuda Shaviv (Techumin (XXIII, p.)) and HaRav Shlomo Aviner (cited in Shut Eretz Yisrael, 44) assume that a tiyul in Eretz Yisrael is a matter of mitzva and between them cite a few sources: the above gemara/Rambam; a letter by HaRav Tzvi Yehuda Kook; and Mishneh Halachot (III:189). The latter source is dealing with a different question. Is it a mitzva for a ben chutz la’aretz to visit Israel? Some prominent sources posit it is not. The Maharit (II:28) says that if one made a neder to visit Eretz Yisrael, it can be nullified according to the rules for a non-mitzva vow, for there is a mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael, not to visit it. Also, one is allowed to embark on a voyage by sea on Friday only for a mitzva, and there is a difference of opinions if visiting Eretz Yisrael counts (see Magen Avraham 248:15; Mishna Berura 248:28). The mainstream opinion to reconcile the “non-mitzva” sources with the gemara granting importance to even a “4 amot visit” is that it is not a mitzva per se, but it is nonetheless very worthwhile.

So there is a great spiritual jump when one who had no physical connection came and walked in the Land. But there are two ways to learn the gemara regarding one who already has a great connection by living in Israel (or, to a lesser degree, being in the midst of an extended stay). It is possible that walking more furthers it (1000+1>1000). The other approach is that 0 to 1 is a great jump, but that for one who lives every (or most) breathing moment of his life in Israel (and hopefully contributes to its flourishing), caring about a few more steps is missing the point. (Compare to one who wins a huge lottery and cares about the cents at the end of the multi-digit number.) While one can argue that approach #1 is correct, it is hard to claim that the gemara proves it.

Even according to approach #2, traveling in the Land is significant. Appreciating Eretz Yisrael is important (see Ketubot 111a-b) and may even be connected to the mitzva to live in it (Eretz Hemdah I,1). Seeing sacred, beautiful, … parts of the country promotes appreciation, and the more, the better. This is what Rav Tzvi Yehuda and others refer to. But it should make no difference if this enhanced connection/appreciation came on foot, by car, by going somewhere new, repeating an old visit, or thanking Hashem for Israel when you go to bed. The sources do not seem to indicate that walking per se is a mitzva.

There are several issues, which we will only be able to touch upon, that lack a consensus among classical poskim.

Two overlapping but distinct halachic elements of the Sheva Berachot period (usually a week) are pertinent to our question. One is an obligation of simcha (a week if it is a first marriage for the kalla, three days if she was previously married), in which the chatan must not work but focus on making the kalla happy. The other is that during these days, sheva berachot are to be recited when applicable.

A minyan is required to recite sheva berachot (Ketubot 8a). It is done specifically following Birkat Hamazon of a meal done in celebration of the marriage (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 62:4). There are different opinions as to how many of the participants have to have eaten bread, which necessitates the Birkat Hamazon after the meal – the most prevalent opinion is seven (see Yabia Omer III, EH 11; Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin 102:2).

Does the couple have to be among those who had a full halachic meal? Several Acharonim discuss the matter. Rav Shlomo Kluger (Haelef Lecha Shlomo, Orach Chayim 93) posits that even at the wedding, if the chatan does not bentch with the others, sheva berachot cannot be recited. The logic is that the celebration (including the seudat mitzva) must include the chatan for the berachot to be relevant. This is not unanimously held. The Radbaz (Shut IV:249) justifies a minhag that the chatan would not eat during the wedding, but would do so with the waiters after the wedding and that sheva berachot would be recited at both meals. Nevertheless, most Acharonim (see Tzitz Eliezer XIII:99) accept Rav Shlomo Kluger’s ruling.

What is not as clear is whether this applies to the kalla as well. Rav Kluger (and the Tzitz Eliezer ibid. and Hillel Omer, OC 63, who cite him) writes not to make a beracha if the chatan did not eat bread, but does not mention if the kalla’s not eating would cause the same result. If the kalla is equivalent, we can still ask: is one eating enough or are both required? Let us search elsewhere.

The couple’s presence is needed, even if eating is not. The Ritva (Ketubot 8a) says that chatan/kalla must both be present at the celebration to recite sheva berachot. The Ran (Sukka 25b) writes that it suffices for the chatan or the kalla to be present at the place where the sheva berachot are recited. Neither distinguishes between the chatan and kalla. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer ibid.) assumes there is no reason to distinguish and posits that it is critical for both of them to eat bread (Nitei Gavriel ibid. 5; Hanisuin K’hilchatam 14:86 concur). The Maharam Shick (EH 90) does distinguish, saying that the berachot relate to the mitzva of marriage, which is incumbent specifically on the chatan. Note that while the simcha element is for the kalla’s benefit (see Rama, EH 64:2; Chelkat Mechokek 64:1), the sheva berachot relate more to the chatan (ibid.).

It is our opinion that the government (Health Ministry) who should set proper and effective penalties on people who do not vaccinate in those cases in which it endangers others. It is a dangerous precedent for individuals to take the right to resort to shaming, which, as we know, can be used for a variety of reasons, even if in a case like this, the rationale is noble (saving lives). On the other hand, individuals and groups have every right to distance danger from themselves. Thus, one can turn down an invitation to someone's house or not invite someone he normally would have if there is some at risk for exposure to the disease (e.g., children under the age of a year). A shul can decide to tell people who(se children) are not vaccinated that they should not come to shul. This, though, should be done without going out of one's way to shame, as the Rambam (Hilchot Deot 6:8) writes about rebuke. 

[Presumably, some readers will find our response offensively strong and others will find it vexingly weak – this is often a sign of reasonable balance.]

Let us first summarize the medical consensus. (We do not give medical advice when there is not a consensus). Measles is a highly contagious disease that is at least unpleasant but more importantly can cause severe long-term health problems, and occasionally death. Immunization includes an extremely low chance of severe problems and normally only causes mild discomfort. It is recommended by virtually all doctors. Although the vaccination is not foolproof, its success rate in preventing contracting measles is well above 90 percent. Therefore, when almost the entire population is vaccinated, there are only a handful of cases of measles a year, and such a disease has a chance of being eradicated. When many are not vaccinated, an outbreak can occur, as has happened in Jerusalem. Then, while each individual vaccinated person is unlikely to contract measles, a certain percentage of the many exposed to it will. Children before their second dose are slightly more susceptible, and babies under a year old, who are too young to be vaccinated, are at great risk.

Halacha believes in following the instructions of doctors, whether Jewish or not, to the extent that their orders to save lives are sufficient grounds to violate Torah-level Shabbat violations (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 328:10). When there is disagreement between doctors, weight is given to both the number and the level of expertise on the various sides (see Biur Halacha ad loc.). The obligation to protect one’s health is a more severe matter than avoiding aveirot (Chulin 10a). Therefore, it is not surprising that poskim rule that one who refuses to follow doctor’s life-saving orders can be coerced to do so (Magen Avraham 328:6). The matter is even clearer when one not only endangers himself but is endangering others. If vaccination was being done almost universally, one might have the right to listen to his medical advisor (non-standard doctor or rabbi or “guru”), as the risk raised by a small number of not vaccinated people is small. But when it becomes a trend, it is dangerous, and when an area is in the midst of an outbreak (because of the prevalence of such people), the situation is grave, as is unfortunately the case in Jerusalem at the time I am writing.

In theory, then, it is justified to take steps to pressure people to vaccinate. Despite this, we at Eretz Hemdah oppose individuals taking the matter into their own hands by shaming (whether the old-fashioned ways or through social media). The precedent of condoning such behavior is extremely dangerous to society. One will shame over a medical matter; another over something religious; another for a political cause, etc. Do realize that when rebuking people for doing aveirot, one must not do so by means of shaming a person, especially publicly (Rambam, De’ot 6:8)

We are believers in steps being taken by those with responsibility and authority. In this case, public health officials, in cooperation with other government arms, should take the steps their experts deem appropriate. In many cases, intense public education is more effective than attempts at coercion, but they have the prerogative and even responsibility to the public to take punitive steps if deemed necessary.

What an individual and an “unauthorized” group may do is take steps focused on protecting themselves. At a time of an outbreak, it is legitimate to avoid contact with friends or relatives who do not vaccinate, even when it is insulting. A shul, by decision of its rabbi and officers, may decide that the danger at a given time warrants demanding of such people not to come/bring their children to shul. But intentional shaming is not the way to go about it.

We are unsure if the question is coming from the concerns of Yeshiva A’s administration, the laudable conscience of the rebbe, or a third party. We will give a general approach to the topic, while stressing that we do not know how it relates to the specifics of a case we know little about.

Most of the answer is based on logical analysis of the morality of the situation, but we will start with a source. Jewish workers/employers are not allowed to build relationships that resemble slavery (we are servants only to Hashem – see Bava Metzia 10a). Included in this halacha is that a worker may quit his job without being financially penalized (ibid. 77a – see Rashi ad loc.).

Therefore, a worker (including a dedicated teacher) may quit his job, and under normal circumstances is fully permitted to take a job with a rival of the first employer. If someone could not work in the same type of field and region, this would be restricting his livelihood and thus penalizing him significantly.

What about using “resources” he acquired in the first job? Part of the fringe benefits of many jobs are the skills, experience, and contacts acquired. Your question focuses on using the contacts. There is nothing wrong with doing so in a normal fashion. One does not steal anything from the first job. Everyone develops friends and contacts over the years, and one does not have to “erase” them upon leaving a job where some were cultivated.

In some ways, the matter is even clearer for rabbeim, for the following reason. Part of a rebbe’s job is to develop real, lasting relationships with his students. Real relationships are real relationships. Let’s say that ten years after teaching a student, the student sought out guidance or emotional support from his rebbe due to a life crisis. Imagine if the rebbe said: “I don’t work anymore in the yeshiva where I taught you; I have no time for you.” Imagine if his new employer said: “You may not help students from your past; they are a drain on your allegiance to us.” My words of criticism for one who would utter either statement are best to remain unwritten. (We are referring to cases in which time spent with old talmidim does not prevent the rebbe from fulfilling his present responsibilities competently.) A rebbe’s responsibility for life stems not from his employment by a yeshiva but from Hashem who entrusted him to teach His Torah to children and students (=children; see Rambam, Talmud Torah 1:2; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 245).

Talmidim also have responsibilities toward their teachers (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 242). While a rebbe should consider carefully how to “use” their respect and gratitude, others do not have a right to intervene. This is more so when the help is requested for a good cause. All have a responsibility to help good causes and those to whom they owe a debt of gratitude, whether monetarily or with their time, talents and energy. A tzedaka recipient cannot prevent another from asking for tzedaka from his benefactor because it may cause him to receive less. The donor makes his own choices. Similarly, if the rebbe asks his students for help in new projects, they can be trusted to decide how much to help Yeshiva B and Yeshiva A, and hopefully many other good causes.

A former employee should be particularly careful not to bad-mouth his former employer. He should also not take private information which he was privy to as an employee, (e.g., a detailed donor list of Yeshiva A). Working on a future job while still employed at the old one raises many questions and gray areas.

Let me strengthen this insightful question. We find sources that positive minhagim are more identifiable than minhagim of refraining. The gemara (Pesachim 55a) deals with the possibility that refraining, for religious purposes, from something in front of others who believe it is permitted is yohara (haughtiness). The gemara says, though, that when one whose minhag is to not work on Tisha B’Av refrains from work in front of those who do, no one takes offense because onlookers will say that he is idle because he happens to not have work to do. Similarly, when one, for example, refrains from eating a certain food due to kashrut concerns, the “non-act” of not eating is not like a clear, noticeable, countable religious practice. Can one count three occurrences of not doing something?

This being argued, there is a concept of those who are bound to a practice of refraining from action and that this is an extension of the concept of neder (Nedarim 15a). This is likely a Rabbinic obligation (Tosafot ad loc.), although significant opinions hold it is a Torah law (see presentation in Kol Nidrei 72:5).

Your reference to three times is arguably a popularly held mistake. The classical Rishonim and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 214:1) do not mention a need for three times to be binding. On the other hand, besides mention of the text of Hatarat Nedarim, many Acharonim mention three times. The standard way of dealing with the apparent contradiction is as follows. If one intends the practice to be binding, it becomes so even after one time. If he did not have clear intention as to whether or not it be permanent, then three occurrences make it the norm, and therefore automatically binding (Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 468:17; Kaf Hachayim, OC 417:25).

Now to get to your question – how does doing an inaction (whether three times or once) become binding? I did not find this question discussed where one might expect it. We must determine what this dearth of sources means here (see Living the Halachic Process, V, G-1). Apparently, refraining from something for religious reasons does not need special requirements to be halachically significant. Let us consider that a neder is a matter between a person and Hashem and that since Halacha extends it to occurring without verbalization, it does not need to be clear to others what he was thinking. So if one was in a situation that he would have done X and he did not do so for a religious reason, this is equivalent in our context to actually performing a mitzva.

This same concept is behind the fulfillment of negative commandments in general. Every moment one does not sin is not a mitzva of refraining for which he receives reward but is neutral. However, if he is tempted to do an aveira (e.g., eat non-kosher food, drive somewhere on Shabbat.) but is refraining because of the mitzva to do so, he does receive reward (Kiddushin 39b). In such a case, refraining, beyond the letter of the law, from something one wants, creates a neder.

What is a little trickier is the following. Sometimes a person refrains from something, not out of a full decision, but because of “why not?” Let’s say that when he goes to a store and there is chalav Yisrael milk and regular milk, he purposely picks the chalav Yisrael. If he thought that he will henceforth only have chalav Yisrael, this should be binding.  But it could also be that if he were in a place that the only milk is regular, he would buy that as well. Is that considered refraining from something? While it is hard to know where to draw the line, there might be a difference between three positive acts and three acts of refraining that are not necessarily indicative of his future plans. 

The broadest of the Torah prohibitions against lying (even without language of oaths) is “mid’var sheker tirchak” (distance yourself from a matter of falsehood) (Shemot 23:7). Philosophically, we abhor dishonesty. We are to emulate Hashem, about Whom it is said: “Hashem’s signet is truth” (Sanhedrin 64a).   

Yet, gemarot spell out cases in which one may and/or even should lie. One gemara (Yevamot 65b) says that one may lie to preserve peace. One precedent it cites is that Hashem inaccurately related to Avraham what Sarah had said about their chance of having a baby at an advanced age. Another (Bava Metzia 23b) lists three things about which it is appropriate for a scholar to lie. The third example is not to publicize that one’s host was very welcoming, if it will cause unwanted guests to flock to him (see Rashi ad loc.).

In all of these cases, the untruth was said to protect someone else, unlike in your question. However, the above sources include cases of self-protection. The first gemara also gives the example of Yosef’s brothers trying to ward off his enmity with a lie. Another example in Bava Metzia is lying about what one is learning/has learned. Rashi explains it as minimizing one’s scholarship out of humility; the Lechem Mishneh’s understands the Rambam (Aveida 14:13) as avoiding people testing him on a weak topic to avoid embarrassment. This last source is equivalent to your question. But even Rashi’s case makes us think why one can do an ostensible aveira for humility’s sake!

The simplest answer is that the prohibition of lying refers to different types of cases. The pasuk’s context is beit din proceedings, in which the pursuit of truth is at a premium. The Yereim (mitzva 235), while extending the mitzva somewhat, limits it to lies which harm someone. This matter seems to depend on the machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (Ketubot 17a). Beit Hillel encourages singing the praises of a bride, even when they are untrue. Beit Shammai argues that this violates “midevar sheker tirchak.” Beit Hillel makes a moral argument based on concern for the feelings of others, but, how does that sentiment dispose of Beit Shammai’s pasuk? Apparently, the argument is whether the Yereim is correct, and we pasken like Beit Hillel (see Rav Perlow on Rasag’s Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 22). The other possibility is that even if lying about something innocuous is forbidden from the Torah, Chazal understood, perhaps based on the precedents in Tanach, that in the case of important counter-factors, it is waived.

We have dealt (Living the Halachic Process V, H-2) with poskim’s permission to stage a fake pidyon haben if needed to save a couple from embarrassment about the wife previous pregnancy. K’vod haberiyot (human dignity) justifies significant halachic leniency (Berachot 19b), which far exceed some of the factors that, we have seen, justify lying.

We begin with what can be learned from classical sources about privacy norms in beit din.

Several sources in Chazal indicate that beit din proceedings were at least often open to the public. Gemarot (including Shvuot 31a; see Rambam, Sanhedrin 22:3) describe the situation of students following the proceedings of their teachers who were dayanim.

There was a strong rationale for at least the results of the proceedings to be known to the broad public. Chazal assumed that a divorce would be known to the public, as it was important for people to know their change in status for several reasons (see Gittin 81a).

  Knowledge of transactions and adjudication about ownership and monetary obligations was critical to the public especially in regard to land acquisition. If someone wants to buy land, he needs to know whether the seller’s ownership is accepted. He also needs to know if the seller is a debtor, as this often creates a lien on all of his land. Now the land registry (in Israel, Tabu) clarifies ownership and allows notations about liens, adjudication, etc. At a time when formal registries did not exist, common public knowledge was critical. Therefore, witnesses to loan contracts who told people about the documents’ content were not gossipers but doing a civic duty (see Bava Batra 175b). This was also true of awareness of legal proceedings. This is why the gemara assumes that the public found out about monetary legal processes before beit din almost instantaneously (see Gittin 18a). Again, this allowed a potential buyer or a lender to perform due diligence. Secrecy often damaged social welfare.

Sources also discuss the idea that as a result of a dispute going to beit din, witnesses unknown to a litigant could hear of the dispute and come forward to testify (see Tosafot, Ketubot 2a). Since people would invite others to witness agreements, contracts, etc., if someone was caught doing something unethical that invalidated him as a witness, beit din had a process to inform the public not rely on him (Shulchan Aruch, CM 34:23).

At least one element of the beit din process required secrecy. When dayanim disagree on a ruling, none of them may divulge who agreed with which side (Sanhedrin 29a).

There are differences between set and ad hoc batei din accepted by the litigants of their own will. The main differences involve jurisdictional questions (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat siman 13&14). We do not find major differences in the manner in which the hearings and rulings are carried out, including secrecy.

That being said, litigants can agree to significantly change the rules of adjudication. They can accept a dayan or a witness who should have been disqualified to serve in their case (ibid. 22:1). They can transfer the need to make an oath from one side to the other (ibid. 3). They also have the ability to agree that the process should be private (at least when it does not directly contradict the need of the public to know). This is less likely to cause problems to the public in our days. The Law of Arbitration makes it possible for one to have non-governmental options available for adjudication, and when there is a requirement to have an arbitration agreement to make the decisions legally binding, it makes sense that they include rules that look out for the welfare of the litigants. In most cases, litigants prefer secrecy, and therefore a beit din like ours is happy to protect their privacy. However, had the law required public transparency for adjudication in a beit din operating according to arbitration law, Halacha would have been fine with that.

Tevilat keilim for the six metals mentioned in the Torah (Bamidbar 31:22) is, according to many, from the Torah (see Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 120). For glass, it is indeed Rabbinic (Avoda Zara 75b). Let us work with your assumptions.

There are several halachic discussions about using Rabbinic fulfillments for Torah-level obligations, and we will mention a couple: making Kiddush when it is only Shabbat on a Rabbinic level; a bar mitzva boy doing sefirat haomer for adults when he became bar mitzva in the middle of the omer (see Mikraei Kodesh (Frank) Sukkot II, 13).

However, the issue does not apply here for two reasons. Tevilat Keilim ((Cohen) 9:(22)) points out that even when tevila is on a Torah level, the beracha is only a Rabbinic obligation. Therefore, he argues, the beracha of one doing tevila on glass can be used for one toveling metal. In truth, though, even regarding Birkat Hamazon, one who ate only enough for a Rabbinic obligation can be motzi (when there is a need) one who ate enough for a Torah-level Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 197:4). Furthermore, in your case, the beracha applies to all of the utensils that were slated for you to tovel, not just the first one (see parallel application of this concept in Shulchan Aruch, YD 19:7). We even find that one can make a beracha directly before something that may not be a mitzva, and it can go on that which follows. An example is that while we do not know which set of tekiot are the correct one, we make the beracha before the first set and it works even if the second or third set is correct.

We can still ask whether there is at least a preference, had you thought of the issue, to have immersed the metal first, right after the beracha. We do find in regard to berachot before food that the gemara (Berachot 41a) brings rules of kedimut (precedence) – which berachot are made first, and which food should be eaten first after a given beracha. Even if one does not follow the proper order, the beracha takes effect (Magen Avraham 211:11), but we do like to do things correctly. Here, though, it is a different type of beracha – not a birkat hanehenin (on benefit, primarily food), but a beracha on a mitzva. So really the question is whether one mitzva has precedence over another.

The gemara (Zevachim 90b) does address order in mitzvot. Tadir (a more common mitzva) has priority over a less common one. Also, mekudash (a more holy mitzva) has precedence over others. What about a mitzva from the Torah over a Rabbinic one? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel (Berachot 51b) disagree whether the beracha on wine comes before or after the beracha of Kiddush. The Sha’agat Aryeh (22) claims that the fact that pieces of logic including tadir are raised and the matter that Kiddush is essentially a mitzva from the Torah whereas the beracha over wine is not is not raised, shows that that Torah/Rabbinic obligation must not cause kedimut. On the other hand, R. Akiva Eiger (to Orach Chayim 7:1) assumes that being from the Torah is like being mekudash. The P’nei Yeshoshua (Berachot ibid.) also assumes that being from the Torah gives mitzva precedence, and explains that Kiddush over wine is usually only Rabbinic. Yabia Omer (IX, OC 100) bring several others who concur. However, I have not succeeded to find, in our context of tevillat keilim, that the utensil one puts in the mikveh first should be one that is obligated by Torah law.

We will address the two main issues regarding activities during the Nine Days and/or the Three Weeks: danger and too much simcha.

Danger: The midrash (Eicha Rabba 1:29) relates the pasuk “All her pursuers caught up with her between the walls” (Eicha 1:3) to the dangers lurking for Jews during the Three Weeks. One of the examples, which the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 451:18) codifies, is going out alone (at certain times of day). It is hard to apply this concern practically. Since safety should always concern us, what should we add? Generally speaking, certain water activities, e.g., a beach or canoeing, are candidates of things to avoid during the Three Weeks. (We are not dealing with issues of swimming for Ashkenazim throughout the Nine Days, which requires its own discussion – see Rama, OC 551:16.)

Simcha: The mishna (Ta’anit 26b) states that we limit enjoyment from the beginning of the month of Av. Details of what this might entail are scattered throughout Talmudic and post-Talmudic rulings and minhagim. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention trips; the Rama (OC 553:1) opposes tiyulim on Erev Tisha B’Av, implying that it is permitted before that. However, the Rama apparently refers to strolling in simple places, not going to tourist attractions, which barely existed in his time. On the other hand, since nowadays people (especially children on vacation) regularly partake in recreational activities that did not exist hundreds of years ago, we would not forbid every moderately enjoyable activity during the Nine Days.

Given the above, it is not surprising that some sefarim, including Torat Hamoadim (R. David Yosef) mention a prohibition on tiyul only on Erev Tisha B’Av. On the other extreme, some cite Rav Chaim Palagi's (Masa Chaim 4:3) statement that it was decided to not go to gardens, orchards and the coast throughout the Three Weeks. The common approach among contemporary poskim is to forbid (or at least discourage) significant vacationing specifically during the Nine Day. We would put it this way – these days are not the time for the type of recreational activities that one rarely partakes in (see Aseh Lecha Rav II:35; P’ninei Halacha, Zemanim 8:6).

Do these halachot apply to children under bar mitzva but old enough to understand the basics of practices of mourning? Children under bar mitzva are not obligated in the laws of mourning for relatives (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 396:3). Yet, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 551:14) says that we do not cut the hair or launder children’s clothes before Tisha B’Av, and the Magen Avraham (ad loc. 38) explains that children of chinuch age are obligated in pre-Tisha B’Av mourning. To reconcile the sources, he posits that we are stricter about communal mourning (see also Igrot Moshe, YD I, 224). The Ktav Sofer (YD 172) says that chinuch does not apply to personal mourning because it is an irregular situation. According to this, since we have been mourning the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash for millennia, this is regular mourning that applies to children (Tal Livracha II:71).

Nevertheless, age can still play a role. First, there is a machloket whether children are restricted throughout the Nine Days/Three Weeks or only during the week of Tisha B’Av (see Mishna Berura 551:82). Also, there is more room for leniency for children in borderline cases. More fundamentally, children need more recreation than adults, and on matters not included in a defined prohibition but of a more subjective nature (i.e., too much simcha), an activity might be appropriate for a child and not for an adult. Nevertheless, it is important to educate children that the Nine Days is a more solemn time, and this should play a role in the choice of activities. So, there should not be trips during the week of Tisha B’Av (not applicable this year), and good judgment should be used throughout the Nine Days.

Before we get to the excellent conceptual question, we must briefly raise some points that can, under certain circumstances, make the question moot in this scenario.

First, purchasing the house and taking the gold are halachically unrelated. Generally, the movable objects within a house are not sold along with the house. So, if between selling the house and vacating it, Reuven found and took the coins, Shimon could not have complaints or void the sale, as the house was given over as stipulated. Similarly, if Reuven did not take the money and finds out later, he can (try to – see below) complain about the money, as it was not included in the sale.      

Secondly, it is far from clear that Reuven owns the gold coins. If he does not know about them, he apparently did not put them there. Whoever did, or his inheritor, is likely still the owner, and Shimon might have to return them, not keep them. Even if the money became ownerless, if it is hidden in a manner that Reuven was likely to never find it, he did not acquire the treasure with the house. Thus, Shimon is like one who knows where an ancient treasure is found and waits for others to leave the area and then digs it up. He would not be taking Reuven’s coins. See further details and sources in Living the Halachic Process, III, I-16.

So, we will present the fundamental question with a different scenario. A petroleum exploration company discovered vast deposits in a certain region and sent people to secretly buy up as much land as possible from unknowing sellers.

There are generally two grounds to void a sale after the fact. 1. Mekach ta’ut – the object was flawed in such a way that we can assume that the buyer would not have agreed to the purchase had he known. 2. Ona’ah (mispricing) – while the sides would have agreed to the sale, the price was far enough from the going rate to make it grossly unfair to one side.

The gemara (Ketubot 97a) tells of people who sold real estate to buy grain during a famine, without knowing that a large shipment was about to arrive. Rav Nachman said that they could back out of the sales because it was based on a mistake about grain’s availability. Kinyan Torah Bahalacha (I:14) applies this concept to a case of one who sold land that had been slated for agriculture when a governmental decision to allow home building had been made but not publicized. He says that if the seller would not have sold it had he known, he can back out. If he would have sold it anyway but at a much higher price, then we get into the issue that the laws of ona’ah do not generally apply to real estate (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 227:29). On the other hand, the Rama (ad loc.) states that if the price was double (or half) of the going rate, the laws do apply. Also, according to most poskim, although the laws of ona’ah (returning money, nulling sales) do not apply to real estate, there is still a prohibition to buy or sell at an unfair price (R. Akiva Eiger ad loc. based on Ramban; S’ma 227:51).

Certain poskim raise other distinctions. The general rule is that proper pricing follows what is prevalent at the time and place involved (see Pitchei Choshen, Ona’ah 11:7). The Imrei Yosher (II, 155) says that if information changes the price, it depends if it is known to a majority of the population. Also, the gemara (ibid.) indicates that there is a difference between a situation that is about to be revealed and one that may remain unknown for an indefinite amount of time. The Kesef Hakodashim (CM 227:(9)) posits that even when a situation is about to be known, that only makes a difference when the issue is lack of interest in the transaction had the information been known. If, though, it is about price propriety, the going rate at that time/place based on the publicly available information is the determinant.  

It is unclear whether this question is theoretical or practical. In any case, our answer is general.

The Torah laws of inheritance are set monetary rights that are not affected by the righteousness or sins of inheritors. In that way, it resembles the fact that the Torah does not confiscate a sinner’s property. On the other hand, a person is capable of taking steps during his lifetime to effectively obviate inheritance laws. See our survey of some details in Living the Halachic Process IV, I-9.

The main question is whether it is proper to exclude an inheritor due to his moral level. Rashbag (Bava Batra 133b) says that it is a positive thing for a father to transfer his assets to others if his sons act improperly. However, the gemara concludes that others disagree and cites Shmuel’s statement that it is wrong to transfer one’s property even from a “bad son” to a “good son.” Shmuel goes beyond Rashbag, as presented. He rejects not only giving to a non-inheritor but even to one son at the expense of another and states that neither the badness of one inheritor nor the goodness of another is a satisfactory reason. The Shulchan Aruch (CM 282:1) paskens like Shmuel.

There is discussion as to whether this rule is a Torah-level law (difficult), a Rabbinic binding law, or Rabbinical guidance (see S’dei Chemed, vo. IV, p. 27). One reason given for it is that we cannot know what will be with the offspring down the line (Ketubot 53a). The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 282) gives another reason – it causes jealousy and ill-feeling within the family. These are apparently not the primary reasons behind the halacha but the secondary ones, as we will explain. On the basic level, the Torah says that the proper thing is to give as the Torah prescribes (Aruch Hashulchan, CM 282:2). Inheritance is one of the tools of Divine Providence as to a person’s financial resources. A person may ask: “If I can halachically and (ostensibly) morally devise systems that seem more equitable in this specific case than Hashem’s general system, shouldn’t I do that?” The answers are: you cannot know what is truly equitable, as Hashem knows what will happen down the line, and you do not; you have to consider the negative of your plan (i.e., jealousy).

Poskim discuss different cases where it is arguable that the indications for “playing favorites” may be compelling. There is a machloket whether the halacha applies to one whose behavior and the way he raises his children is antithetical to Torah Judaism (see Pitchei Choshen, Yerusha 4:(4)). It is not simple if one must give a full inheritance to one who mistreats his parents (Rambam, Nachalot 6:11 seems to indicate that he should still receive) or tried to oust his siblings from inheritance (see S’dei Chemed, IV p. 34). There is also a machloket if he can keep everyone as an inheritor and only give more to one than to another (see Rashbam, Bava Batra ibid.; Sdei Chemed, IV p. 33).

While the Rambam (ibid. 13) urges to give children equal financial treatment throughout life and the gemara (Ketubot 53a) indicates that large gifts to one of the children during his lifetime could be wrong, one must put things in perspective. One may use his money during to his lifetime for any reasonable need, desire, or mitzva cause, as long as it is not exaggerated in a way that fundamentally alters inheritance (see our column, Mishpatim 5779). Therefore, a parent may give somewhat more to some children based on need. He can also earmark money in a way that benefits those with similar values to the parents (e.g., pay for grandchildren’s day school education), and if a child chooses not to take advantage of such resources (e.g., sends to public school) that is his decision.

This is not a ruling about a specific case but a discussion of the general scenario. We start with the question of a halachic requirement to pay.

This is an example of a person causing damage without doing something that is direct damage (nezek). It is difficult to consider not buckling direct damage one person does (adam hamazik) or to compare it to one of the other Torah-described categories of damage (i.e., damages done by one’s animal, fire, and pit, or matters derived from them – see ch. #1 of Bava Kama). There are another two categories of one causing damage to another. One, called garmi, can be described as semi-direct damage; we pasken that the causer is obligated to pay (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 386:1). The other, gerama, is less direct causation. There is no enforceable compensation for gerama (Bava Kama 60a), but it is prohibited to cause loss in that way (Bava Batra 22b), and there is often a moral obligation to pay (see ibid. 55b). How to determine what is gerama and what is garmi is one of the most complicated questions in Halacha. Factors that may play a role include: whether he did so purposely or accidentally (see Shach, CM 386:6), especially when the damage came from an external source (see Pitchei Choshen, Nezikin 4:(23)); how likely it is that the action will cause damage (Rosh, Bava Kama 9:13); how immediate was the damage (see Sha’ar Mishpat 386:1). 

In this case, many factors favor the passenger if the situation was in a “normal” (although we strongly urge wearing seatbelts) manner. He did not intend to cause damage. The chances of getting caught are small. The damage probably happened well after he got in the car (one can argue that every moment of not putting on the belt is a new affront and view being caught as immediate).

However, there is a stronger reason to exempt the passenger from outright obligation. There are two traffic violations involved here; the policeman could have given two tickets! One (#6706) is by the passenger for not putting on the seatbelt; another (#6705) is by the driver for driving when someone is not buckled in. The “damage” comes based on the “law of the land,” which enables authorities to fine those whom they want to deter from dangerous activities that hurt society. Two people did something illegal – the passenger and the driver. The authorities are interested in teaching both a lesson – BUCKLE UP to save lives or pay money. Your friend directly failed in doing what the law demands of drivers – demanding that people put on their belts. If so, the passenger did not cause the damage, as defined by the law. In some ways, it is like someone getting a ticket for tailgating an improperly slow driver. It is hard to claim that the slow driver is legally responsible for the tailgater dealing with the situation in the wrong way. Here too, the driver could have and did not demand to buckle up.

If the driver did make the demand and the passenger deceived him, he purposely and immorally (as a guest in someone else’s property) endangered the driver. In such a case, if the police knew what happened, they would presumably have penalized only the passenger. It might still not be certain that this is garmi, but many a dayan would obligate the passenger, based on his behavior, and the driver could make that demand.

Although they are sometimes discussed interchangeably, there are two distinct, albeit closely related, mitzvot in which non-principals at a wedding should try to take part.  

The gemara (Ketubot 17a) discusses the mitzva of hachnasat kalla – joyously escorting the kalla from her father’s house to the place of the “chupa.” A large part of the townspeople were expected to join in, and this is important enough to warrant suspending Torah study and gaining right of way over a funeral procession (ibid.). It is a sign of kavod (see Tosafot ad loc.) for the participants in the important institution of marriage (there is a machloket whether marriage is a formal mitzva). While we no longer escort the kalla through the streets, poskim identify parallel events in today’s wedding ceremony in which one can fulfills this (see Taz, Even Haezer 65:2).

Presumably, one who is a full participant in a wedding ceremony fulfills this element of showing respect. There is not much precedent for a formal mitzva to watch the performance of mitzvot (while appreciation of mitzvot is generally a nice thing). However, if the chupa is not well attended or people are not attentive or are talkative (I have seen both), it is a zilzul to the institution of marriage, the chatan/kalla, and the families, who rightfully expect interest in the momentous moments.

Chazal held the celebratory seuda after the chupa in very hard regard. Regarding the provisions, significant time should be used to prepare for it (Ketubot 2a) and a burial of a parent can be pushed off so that the provisions are not wasted (ibid. 4a). The music is seen as deserving of far-reaching leniencies (see Rama, Orach Chayim 338:2; Igrot Moshe, OC II:95). Regarding participants’ mandate to be mesame’ach (bring joy), we find great rabbis praised for compromising their honor (Ketubot 17a) and relaxing the standard level of tzniut in dancing before the kalla and praising her (ibid.), including the controversial Chassidic minhag (with earlier sources – see Beit Shmuel 21:11) of the mitzva tantz. The gemara (Berachot 6b) warns of Hashem’s disapproval of one who “benefits from the feast of a chatan and is not mesame’ach him” and praises those who are mesame’ach. The Perisha (Even Haezer 65:2) limits this obligation to one who benefits from the meal. The Beit Shmuel (65:1) says that one should go to the wedding in order to be mesame’ach. The Tiv Kiddushin (EH 65:1) suggests that all can agree on a middle position – there is a mitzva to go, but only one who benefits and is not mesame’ach is criticized.

How each individual is mesame’ach is subjective (Ezer Mikodesh to EH 65:1), but it can include appropriate words, presents, dancing, or the very presence of an important person (ibid.). If one has a relationship only with the couple’s parents, one can presumably be mesame’ach the couple vicariously.

Let us return to the question of preferences. Regarding a brit mila, the famous idea of not inviting actually refers to the seuda, not the brit itself (Tosafot, Pesachim 114a; Rama, Yoreh Deah 265:12). The Rama cites this idea of angering Hashem by failing to take part only regarding a brit, as we generally assume, but Tosafot also applies it to the seuda of a wedding of a talmid chacham. This points to the prominence of participation in the seuda. On the other hand, the Tiv Kiddushim (ibid. 3) says that the idea of suspending Torah study is for the escort, not the meal. Perhaps, though, that is because escorting when the procession passes one’s place was likely not very time-consuming.

We will peruse some sources in Chazal and later authorities and try to arrive at a balanced approach.

It is a basic Jewish belief (see Rambam’s principles of faith) that a person’s soul exists after death. While basically static, receiving reward and punishment (see Ramban’s Sha’ar Hagemul), the soul is impacted by the actions of relatives and those doing good things to elevate their souls.

There are old Kabbalistic and other sources that visiting a loved one’s grave brings the deceased some sort of positive feeling (see Gesher Hachayim I, 29:1). Various texts (hashkava, certain pirkei Tehillim) are recommended; we have not found sources that talking to the deceased increases his nachat. There is an old minhag, followed by some and not others (we respect both groups) of placing a written invitation and/or orally notifying a deceased of an upcoming marriage of a close relative. This is a form of communication, but it is not a pillar of faith to believe or not believe that this makes the deceased happy or more likely to “attend” the wedding.

There is a halacha (Yoma 87a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 606:2) that seems to include “communication” with a deceased. If one (seriously) insulted someone who subsequently died, he should take ten people to the grave to beg forgiveness. One might claim that this proves that the deceased is aware of the request. However, the recommended language is: “I have sinned to Hashem, and to Ploni, whom I damaged.” It is unclear whether the deceased or Hashem is the one/One who needs to listen, or whether just making an admission in the deceased’s “presence” is the important thing.

The sugya to which you refer contains ostensibly instructive elements. The gemara contemplates whether the dead are aware of what is happening in the world and tries to prove it from stories in which live people found out information from the deceased during interactions with them. (The Beit Yosef, YD 179 deals with what separates these cases from forbidden practices of attempted communication with the dead, a topic we are not broaching here). This gemara, though, is not a proof that one can talk effectively to the deceased. Some commentaries (see Maharasha) understand that the living did not communicate but received information in dreams. Also, “sprinkled” through Rabbinic writings are stories of supernatural events, dealt with differently by various commentaries. In any case, we know not to treat something that happened once as something that happens all the time, so we cannot learn from such gemarot of what to expect in our experiences. To the extent that the deceased are able to understand those who visit, it does not necessarily mean that one needs to verbalize to get the message across (their ears do not work, and we are not experts as to the tools their souls use).

What to consider a Name of Hashem is significant in several areas of Halacha, and the answer needs not be uniform.

The Torah prohibition of erasing Hashem’s Name (Makkot 22a) applies only to the seven principle Names (Rambam, Yesodei Hatorah 6:2); poskim posit that Hashem’s Name in different languages (= la’az) would not be included. Yet the Rambam (Shvuot 2:1-2) says that an oath, which must invoke Hashem, is binding in any language. There is a machloket Rishonim (see Bemareh Habazak VII:75) whether even the Name can be in a different language or only the rest of the oath. Another question is whether it is forbidden to utter a Name in la’az in a meaningless way or in an unnecessary beracha (see Shut R. Akiva Eiger I:25). It turns out that the prohibition on erasing might be more limited than some other applications. The Shach (Yoreh Deah 179:11) rules that the Name in la’az is not a halachic Name. On the other hand, the Netivot Hamishpat (27:1) and Urim (27:2) posit that is fully considered a holy Name.

Although he says it is permitted to erase “God,” the Mishna Berura (85:10) forbids disgracing that Name by uttering it in a dirty place, e.g., a bathroom. Therefore, even those who are not fully stringent about a Name in la’az may forbid disgracing a written version (see Ginzei Hakodesh 7:12). In Bemareh Habazak (ibid.) we dealt with the question of bringing dollar bills (which include, “In God we trust”) into a bathroom uncovered. We permitted it because of several possible mitigating factors, including that it is printed without intention for something holy.

Many observant Jewish English speakers write Hashem’s Name normally and many insert a dash. An individual’s writing is, in some ways, more stringent than dollar bills because he is writing it himself, especially if it is in the context of divrei Torah or serious references to Hashem (not, a flippant “OMG”). On the other hand, does an individual, at the time he wants to write about Hashem, have to be concerned it will be disgraced later? Although different contexts are different, the gemara (Rosh Hashana 18b), regarding writing a Name in documents, says we are supposed to look ahead. The Netivot and Urim (ibid.) spoke strongly against writing “adieu” (literally “with Hashem” in French) because of the prospect the paper will “lie in garbage dumps.” Rav Soloveitchik dismissed these concerns because he was convinced that “God” is not a Name. Thus, both practices have sources and logic to stand on.

Does the dash help? Rav Soloveitchik posited that it did not because if there a problem with what Names in la’az represents, then “G-d” also represents Hashem. However, this contention is not fully convincing. First, the Achiezer (III:32) presented, as a simple policy solution for a Yiddish paper, to put a dash between the Gimmel and Tet of the Yiddish Name. The Rama (YD 276:10) deals with abbreviations or written substitutes of the seven Names (in Hebrew). He says that one may erase “yud yud” written in place of Hashem’s main Name, but only in the case of need (the Gra ad loc. views this as a chumra). The Minchat Yitzchak (IX:62) equates the dashes separating between the letters of a Hebrew Name to the Rama’s case. The Avnei Nezer (YD 365) posits that dashes actually indicate that the separated letters form one word and thus dashes do not help. However, it is likely that they agree if the dash is in place of a missing letter. (Google-search “G-d” and see if it is obvious in English that it refers to Hashem.) While the Rama is “a little machmir” regarding “yud yud,” that is a hint to a Hebrew Name, not what the Achiezer and we are referring to.

In summary then, while it might be fine to write “God,” for those who prefer to be machmir, “G-d” offers a marked improvement.

We will first survey the point of netilat yadayim in various cases including yours.

When one becomes tameh on the level of Torah law in a manner that he needs rechitza (washing) to remove the tumah (e.g., due to bodily emissions or contact with dead animals), this consists of immersing his whole body in a mikveh (see Eiruvin 4b). This does not suffice for one who came in contact with a dead human; a process that involves para aduma ashes is also needed. There are times that exposure to tumah does not make a person tameh according to Torah law, but Chazal decreed tumah on his hands, such that if they touch something holy (e.g., teruma), they render it tameh (see Rambam, Avot Hatumah 8:2). As an extension of the Rabbinic tumah for teruma foods, Chazal required netilat yadayim with a beracha before eating bread, irrespective of known contact with any tumah; it may also be connected to the need for cleanliness (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 158).

There is another standard netilat yadayim with a beracha – in between when one wakes up in the morning and davens. There are different opinions among the Rishonim if this is because the hands became dirty during sleep or because one is like a new creature who needs sanctification (see Mishna Berura 4:1).

Another reason for washing hands is the prospect of ruach ra’ah (literally, a bad spirit) that cling to the hands in various situations. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 4:18) has a list of situations in which one should wash his hands (without a beracha), including, upon leaving a bathroom, after cutting nails, and after touching sweaty parts of the body. Some of them are because of cleanliness, especially if one is to partake in something holy, and others are because of ruach ra’ah (e.g., leaving the bathroom – Mishna Berura 4:40).

The Shulchan Aruch cites as “some say” (see Mordechai, Berachot 192) that one washes after being among the dead (i.e., in a cemetery – Mishna Berura ad loc. 42, based on Shut Maharil 42). In Yoreh Deah (376:4) he says unequivocally that one washes after a funeral. Actually, the Tur (YD 376) cites a Gaon who views such a minhag as baseless. The reason given for doing it is the ruach ra’ah, not the laws of tumah. The latter is not an issue because washing the hands (or even going to the mikveh) will not remove the tumah, but it helps (at least partially) regarding ruach ra’ah, as we saw above.

The question, then, is what type of setting of contact with to the dead warrants washing? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 4:18) mentions that after touching the dead, one should wash. The Magen Avraham (4:21) infers that if one is in the proximity of a single corpse without touching it, he does not need to wash. However, he continues that it is customary to wash even if he “comes into [the place of] one corpse, as well as one who escorts it.”

While I lack the understanding of how ruach ra’ah works, the sources seem to imply that the intricate laws of tumah, especially of ohel (roughly, being “under the same roof”) are not the factor, as they are for a kohen in a hospital. One can escort the deceased and not become tameh, and yet there is washing. (The Aruch Hashulchan (4:21) cites the minhag that it depends if he is within four amot of the deceased; while there is a Rabbinic concept of tumah within four amot of a corpse (Sota 44a), the problem might still be the proximity rather than the Rabbinic tumah.) In the other direction, if one is somewhere in a large hospital when a corpse is taken out through the basement, while this could be crucial for a kohen, who is bound by the Torah laws of tumah, it need not create a connection and corresponding ruach ra’ah that would require washing.

Since I have not found a source to say that there is a need to wash after leaving a hospital in which someone has died and the minhag is clearly to not do so, we can assume that this is correct. Our explanation is likely correct.   

As a “student of the history of the halachic process,” I find breathtaking the difference in the tools available in reaching halachic rulings and sharing them in today’s society from 200 years ago and even 20 years ago. Let me share my perspective after 2-3 months of observing and sharing in Eretz Hemdah’s participation in the process.

 On the most basic level, “There is nothing new under the sun.” The halachic rules of pikuach nefesh have been discussed in depth for centuries. So have the principles of ruling on standard topics (e.g., Pesach, Shabbat, tefilla) in the face of extenuating circumstances. Our medical emergency and related technical difficulties are only examples of many such circumstances.

However, there were real differences in the process. The local rabbi had almost immediate access to the most updated medical guidelines and insights (although, based on the “surprises” Hashem sent us, much science proved inaccurate only days later – not uncommon for novel viruses). This was crucial when having to apply the halachic rules and Jewish values to specific cases. While a rabbi could and often must ask experts about specific cases that arise, the rabbi/posek’s level of scientific sophistication, both regarding general background and keeping current (or a step ahead when being machmir in pikuach nefesh) concerning COVID-19, is important. If we all made many small but critical decisions about safety in our own houses – when to be health stringent and when it was necessary to “cut a little slack,” a rabbi had a heightened need to be ready for that communally.

The phenomenon of instant collegial contact between large groups of rabbis in which Eretz Hemdah took part (our thanks to Rav R. Taragin) was a powerful tool. A rabbi with a classic “corona question” would present it on a rabbinic group and be sent the latest ruling of Rav Asher Weiss, Rav Rimon, the Chief Rabbinate, etc. within minutes. Pressing questions of this genre (e.g., how to bury a Covid-19 victim, Pesach leniencies, when one can go to the mikveh with which precautions) were presented to such poskim as Rav Schachter and Rav Willig. Rabbis from different areas deliberated in real-time as to whether and then when to follow the bold, life-saving step of the R.C. of Bergen County to close shuls before public authorities mandated it. Many, led by Rabbi Dr. Aaron Glatt, shared insights of their local health authorities. With an understanding of both the shared danger and the unique circumstances of each community, rabbis had both the obligation to follow the consensus when appropriate and seek unique solutions when the nuances of one’s community mandated it.

Of course, as is generally true of information technology, the power contains risks, and raised questions. Will a local rabbi’s authority be undermined when his congregants can find (and disseminate) dissenting (or ostensibly so) opinions online or from a different shul’s electronic bulletin? Might our article in English about strategies for laining as Israeli minyanim opened embolden some distant readers to buck their local guidelines, where even “mirpeset minyanim” were forbidden? Or could discussion of the scenario be used incorrectly if matters took a change for the worse in the same place? Broadly speaking, the danger of Torah guidance being misapplied has always existed, but gains outweigh losses when done properly. Accuracy and sensitivity to nuance in writing are important in helping, but not eliminating, the problem.

Clearly, in terms of health, employment, and psychological and social stability, technological advances have been very beneficial during the lockdowns and social distancing that were forced upon us. We have briefly illustrated that regarding implementing timeless halachic principles, we can also say that, to an extent, Hashem has “brought a [partial] treatment before the affliction.”

You are wise to seek information and perspective to overcome natural feelings, which the gemara (Sanhedrin 94a) foresaw for some descendants of gerim to have about their identity for generations. (Mentors should ensure that conversion candidates consider such things). However, objectively, this ignores the 98+% “full part of the cup.”

 The Torah commands 36 times to treat a ger with love and not harm him (Bava Metzia 59b). This is partly because the average ger has social obstacles to overcome, after leaving family and needing to “learn the ropes.” It is also an expression of Hashem’s affection for one who choses to embrace a challenging path to serving Him to the fullest. A midrash (Shochar Tov 146:9) describes it beautifully with a mashal of a king who had special love for a deer that would follow his flock to their pen even though it is naturally undomesticated.

Potentially offensive sources are centered in two areas. Rav Yehuda Halevi (The Kuzari) speaks of certain special spiritual qualities that come from a Jew’s lineage, as a descendant of the forefathers. Not all agree. Some (Rav Soloveitchik, Al Hateshuva, p. 136; Rav Kook) posit that a ger receives all he needs, including connection to the forefathers, by joining the Jewish people through conversion (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 53:19). Some posit that gerim have Jewish-typical “neshamot,” just that they entered the world in a manner that required them to find their way back (Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael 1). The gemara (Shabbat 146a) indeed says that converts’ souls were present at Sinai and were thus awarded the relevant spiritual gains. (It is unnecessary to be as genetically Jewish as you, but it does not hurt.)

The Kuzari (I:115) says that while a ger draws close to Hashem, he will not be a prophet (the Rambam disagrees; the gemara, Sanhderin 39b, says the prophet Ovadia was a ger). The Kuzari posits that a ger cannot make it to the highest pinnacle. But we do not even have prophets now, and there have only been a few handfuls of prophets! Should I feel lacking that I can never have the kedusha of a kohen?! By exceeding expectations, a sincere, observant convert likely reaches a higher level than a (clear) majority of born-Jews. (Of course, the whole premise of the Kuzari is highly pro-geirut!)

A ger has limitations on positions of power (especially, being king – Kiddushin 76b). While one could attribute this halacha to the Kuzari approach, there are indications of other reasons (see Yevamot 102a): Given a percentage of insincere converts (see Rambam, Issurei Biah 13:18), we are to protect ourselves from giving too much power before we can confirm a newcomer’s loyalty (note, the US Constitution disallows a naturalized citizen to be president; the Jews suffered from such kings in the Second Temple). Also, there is likely, due to poor middot, to be fall-out from a convert exerting dominion over a born-Jew (see Sota 43a). This is not only hurtful, but can also include aspersions on the ger’s motives (see Yevamot 24b).

In all regards, when a ger marries into Jewish society, no limitations apply to his offspring (Kiddushin 76b). Actually, King David did not come from the giyoret Ruth by chance; this was a crucial part of the divine plan (see Bava Kama 38b; Assufot Ma’arachot, Bereishit I, p. 204.) Unkelos was a ger; Shmaya and Avtalion came from gerim, ... (Gittin 57b). A sincere convert’s expectation should be: Hashem and upstanding Jews will love and revere you greatly – you deserve it. But expect time for adjustment in some aspects of life. Members of the next generation should and usually do feel on equal footing with their peers. This is the mainstream Torah approach, consistent with Halacha and basic sources.

The Torah (Vayikra 21:8) writes about a kohen “v’kidashto” (you shall sanctify him), from which Chazal learn to treat a kohen as an honored person (Gittin 59b). Examples include giving a kohen the first aliya or first choice of food being served. The Yerushalmi (Berachot 8:5) writes: “One who uses a kohen is like one who misappropriates objects in the Beit Hamikdash.” Having a kohen serve another in various ways seems to contradict his elevated status. While here there is only a positive commandment to honor, this is reminiscent of the mitzva of respect for parents (see Kiddushin 31b), which has a positive element of kavod and an avoidance of disrespect (mora).

 There are indications that sometimes a kohen may “serve” others. The Hagahot Mordechai (Gittin, 461) tells a story of a kohen pouring water on Rabbeinu Tam’s hands (a classic act of reverence/subservience – see Melachim II, 3:11). Upon being questioned, Rabbeinu Tam explained that kohanim nowadays lack the kedusha they had when they served in the Beit Hamikdash (see Zevachim 17b). It is left unanswered how he reconciled the clear fact that the halachot of a kohen still apply. Rabbeinu Peter (ibid.) answered that it was permitted because the kohen was mochel (relinquished his rights to) his kavod. Another proof of leeway is the gemara (Kiddushin 21b) that assumes a kohen can be an eved ivri (the Semag, Aseh 83, explains that the kohen is not restricted when he acts with a financial incentive).

The Sefer Hachinuch (mitzva 269) does not allow a kohen to be mochel on his kavod, because Hashem’s honor is at stake, as He chose the kohanim to serve Him in the Temple. The Taz (OC 128:39) argues that it is no different from other elements of the kohen’s sanctity (e.g., not marrying a divorcee) that he may not waive. The Levush (OC 128:45) sees it differently – honoring the kohen is the kohen’s counterparts’ responsibility, not the kohen’s, so nothing stops the kohen from waiving his honor, and when he decides to serve others, there is no problem for others to be beneficiaries.

Another factor that could have impacted the Rabbeinu Tam story is that since it is also a mitzva for someone to honor his rebbe (Avot 4:12) or a great rabbi who is revered by all, it is appropriate for the kohen to serve him (see Yabia Omer, VI, Orach Chayim 22). Similarly, the Taz (ibid.) says that it must have been “enjoyable” for the kohen to wash Rabbeinu Tam’s hands, in which case, no mechila was needed.

The Rama (OC 128:45) forbids “using” a kohen even in our days, but says that mechila solves the issue. The Mishna Berura (128:175) does cite the opinion that mechila does not help and concludes that it is good to be machmir if one can and that one certainly should not use a kohen for disgraceful matters.

Let us look at your situation. It is healthy for you to prefer normal treatment other than privileges regarding aliyot, zimun, etc. The fact that your mechila is sincere and complete bodes well for others. On the other hand, those who want to “spare you” are supported by some sources. Additionally, even when mechila works, if one gives the honor anyway, he receives a mitzva (compare to Ketubot 67b). While even if you prevail, he gets credit for trying to honor you (see Kiddushin 40a), he might get more if you refrained from serving him.

Many of us grew up with the good societal norm that all people are created equal. That is not precise in Judaism. Like it or not (Korach did not, but we should), Hashem selected kohanim to be special, and it is correct for us to give this expression. If I were a kohen, I would also be embarrassed if I were treated too specially and would be wary of negative reaction. However, when someone sincerely wants to respect your beloved “tribe” (likely, more than you, personally) it is positive to try to accommodate him in moderation.

[The answer (written on Jan. 15, 2021) is a short, general, fundamental one and should not be seen as giving the whole picture regarding claims in a specific case. It also can be impacted significantly by local law and health policies, which may differ by location and by changes in the situation and scientists’ knowledge on the subject. Our general instruction is for all to follow public health guidelines and consensus (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:10). At this point (with 30 million given worldwide), vaccination appears safe and effective and enjoys medical consensus.]

Regarding the morality of requiring a theoretically risky action, many jobs include risk, e.g., exposure to contagion, chemicals, extensive driving. It is legitimate for an employer to put his worker in necessary, responsibly assumed risk (Bava Metzia 112a). If, based on scientific consensus (which in many workplaces worldwide appears likely), the workplace will be safer overall if all members vaccinate, it is morally prudent to protect the staff as a whole. Should the other worker’s be forced into working with people who are endangering them?! Would the unvaccinated worker agree to be sued if he causes death or serious harm to a co-worker whom he infected (some 5% of the vaccinated are presently expected to be vulnerable)?!   

We now turn to the efficacy of the waiver. The rule is that conditions on monetary obligations are binding (Ketubot 56a), and written commitments are a strong way of formalizing commitment (see Ketubot 101b; Rama, Choshen Mishpat 12:7). Sometimes a conditional agreement is not binding because the one committing may not have believed the situation would occur (asmachta – see at length in Shulchan Aruch, CM 207). This is apparently not a problem here (analysis is beyond our scope).

On the other hand, one who is coerced into a one-sided commitment (e.g., waiving damage claims) is not bound to it if either he made a moda’ah (a formal statement nullifying the step taken due to another’s coercion) or he has proof of coercion (Shulchan Aruch, CM 242:1). It would not be coercion if the employer had the legal/moral right to force the worker to take a vaccine if he wanted to be or remain employed. (This can depend on too many factors to discuss here, including governmental regulations employed to deal with the health crisis, which fall under dina d’malchuta powers (see Rama, CM 369:11).) When the employer has the right, it is worker’s decision whether he wants the job enough to accept dictates he opposes, and a decision based on a difficult situation rather than coercion initiated by a person is not halachic coercion (see Bava Batra 47b).

There is some chance of late-emerging bad news on coronavirus vaccine safety, and a given person can end up being the “one in a million” with a serious reaction. However, our mentor, Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg z.t.l., taught an important idea about medical malpractice (see Techumin vol. XIX, p. 320). The discussion of malpractice applies only when there was a mistake, considering the situation. When a doctor recommends/performs a procedure that is correct based on benefits vs. risks, and it failed based on no clear mistake, there is no basis to sue. Claims must be based on p’shi’ah (negligence). When a patient is part of the minority of people for whom the risks come to fruition, the one giving the medical advice is not culpable. Therefore, in our case, the waiver is unnecessary, as the boss should not be culpable. If the waiver makes the boss feel good or protects him from a non-halachic legal suit, so be it. If the FDA and its counterparts turn out, chas v’shalom, to have done their job poorly, suits can be made against governments.

First we will discuss bal tashchit, the prohibition to destroy things that should be used. The classical formulation (Rambam, Melachim 6:10) is of a destructive action, but cases of wasting a usable resource, e.g., throwing out a salvageable cup of wine (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 170:22) are included. But the halacha, even regarding the most severe case of bal tashchit, cutting down fruit trees, is very balanced and practical – certain things are just not worthwhile to keep (see Bava Kama 91b; Living the Halachic Process VI, G-13).

It is inappropriate and arguably forbidden to make ridiculous amounts of food and throw out the leftovers at meal’s end. However, making a little extra on purpose (appropriate for a mother or hostess) and sometimes having more leftovers than expected so that you do not succeed in finishing it, is not wasteful or forbidden. (Feeling compelled to finish to the point of eating unhealthily is certainly misguided.) Norms in society or segments therein and circumstances likely impact on what is considered illegitimately wasteful. Therefore while some view it is bal tashchit for a caterer to throw out large amounts of food at the end of an affair (Shevet Halevi IV:225), we agree with the approach that when there is no reasonably easy alternative (we encourage positive planning), it is not forbidden (Etz Hasadeh 35:(14) in the name of Rav Elyashiv).

 It is standard practice to protect “foods” with kedusha before placing them in a garbage. Examples include: teruma (see Derech Emunah, Terumot 2:(399)); hafrashat challa (see Minchat Yitzchak IV:13; kedushat shvi’it (see Yalkut Yosef, Shvi’it 15:13). Regular foods do not have “kedusha.” K’zayit-sized pieces of bread do not have kedusha per se, but their “higher status” makes it forbidden to “disgrace it” even if it does not cause “damage,” which does not apply to other foods (Berachot 50b).

Some claim that throwing food in the garbage is doing something active to make it unfit to eat, and therefore one should not do so even if he will clearly anyway not be eating it or giving to another. In some ways, it is more stringent than teruma or challa, where we have an interest in prompt disposal to prevent someone from mistakenly eating it. Here it is possible to wait for it to deteriorate until it is inedible. (Indeed, Mishneh Halachot 15:64 says that putting food in a bag is not enough because the bag will not hold up in the garbage truck.) But this is not the minhag.

Etz Hasadeh (35:(13)) cites a few contemporary poskim who require or recommend putting the food in a bag before throwing it into the garbage. But this too would be a new stringent practice, representing a big jump from arrangements to avoid marginal bizuy, which in the past were reserved for holy objects. It is best if we can provide logic and precedent to support the very broad minhag to throw leftovers directly into a garbage. The main idea is that normal practices of civilized people are not a disgrace. For example, while it is a disgrace to rub food on the skin instead of eating it, when it is normal (e.g., olive oil), it is permitted (Be’ur Halacha to 171:1). It is not that the need overcomes the problem, but that the fact that it is normal precludes its being disgraceful (ibid.). Also, we do put bags in our kitchen garbages, and the contents are mainly leftover food and used disposables, which are removed before decomposing occurs. Therefore, when there are not unseemly things inside, it is quite redundant (and a waste of non-biodegradable bags) to put each set of leftovers in a separate bag.

You, however, received a p’sak with a basis (even though we view it as overly machmir), and you are bound by it (Rama, Yoreh Deah 242:31).

We will attempt a partial overview of the concept marit ayin, focusing on elements that help understand the phenomenon that troubles you.

 The laws of marit [ha]ayin forbid “Reuven” from doing otherwise permitted action A when people may think he did the similar B, when B is forbidden. Marit ayin is based on two concerns: 1. People who know B is forbidden may suspect that Reuven sinned. One must avoid chashad (people believing he sinned), as the Torah says: “You shall be “clean” [in the eyes] of Hashem and Israel” (Bamidbar 32:22, as understood by mishna, Shekalim 3:2). 2. People will think that if Reuven did B, it must be permitted. Rashi in some places (including Keritut 21b) cites #1 as the reason and in others (including Avoda Zara 12a) cites #2.

Rashi’s dichotomy is among the indications that the two reasons complement each other. In some cases, Chazal may have felt that one of the reasons did not apply but the other did. For example, people do not often suspect a large group of people of openly sinning (see Rosh Hashana 24b). Regarding a marit ayin prohibition on something that looks like bowing down to an idol (Avoda Zara 12a), it is unlikely someone would think it is permitted to do so.

So when should we say marit ayin? If one thinks it is very likely his actions will be misunderstood, creating violations or chashad, he should refrain from the action. However, what if there is only a modest chance? For such cases, we look to Chazal and poskim for guidance. Chazal forbade a few dozen cases due to marit ayin. Subsequently, it remains forbidden even when in a particular case the chance of mistake and/or chashad is small (e.g., one lives in a very religious, knowledgeable, and trusting community). If the whole basis for the prohibition disappears, we generally suspend the prohibition. For example, the gemara (Avoda Zara 20b) says that one must not rent out his bathhouse to a non-Jew to operate on Shabbat because usually a bathhouse’s workers were wage-earning employees (forbidden on Shabbat). However, in a society in which they are commonly profit-sharers, it is permitted (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 243:2). A minority of poskim equate marit ayin more closely to other Rabbinic prohibitions in regard to the prohibition continuing after the reason no longer applies (Pleiti 12:2).

There is a fundamental machloket, crucial to your question, as to whether post-Talmudic poskim can create a marit ayin prohibition in the type of case in which Chazal likely would have. The Kneset Hagedola forbids using matza meal to coat food because it looks like it is made with flour (he knew of a case of incorrect “copying”). The Pri Chadash (OC 461:2) argues that we cannot make our own Rabbinical prohibitions (and that isolated mistakes cannot be avoided).

We do find some post-Talmudic marit ayin prohibitions, but many of them follow a common construct. The gemara (Kritut 21b) forbids eating collected fish “blood” because it resembles forbidden (animal) blood. The Rashba (III:257) extends this concept (as opposed to creating a new marit ayin prohibition) to not combining mother’s milk with meat. Poskim extend the idea of confusing types of food to not putting “almond milk” into meat (see Rama YD 87:3 and Shach ad loc. 6 about whether it applies to poultry, which is only “Rabbinic meat”). Regarding these extensions of a Talmudic marit ayin prohibition, we care about what is and is not confusing in our times/places. Therefore, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer VI, YD 8) says that synthetic milk is common enough for it not to be suspicious to serve it with coffee after a meat meal; we do the same with pareve ice cream.

In summary, the main reason marit ayin is not always applied according to our logic is because we usually do so by comparison to Talmudic precedents and not just contemporary society.