Shabbat Parashat Vayakhel| 5765
Vayakhel | | 02/01/2004
After all the preparations for the erection of the mishkan, the time came to actually erect it. We would have expected this holy task to belong to Aharon and his sons or the Levi’im, in general. Why does the Torah stress several times (see Shemot 40) that Moshe specifically was commanded to do so? What is even more puzzling is why Moshe, who was not a kohen, was also entrusted to bring the korbanot (sacrifices) at that time (ibid.:29).
Case: Two religious parties ran on a joint list for municipal elections. The first two spots on the list were from party A and the third spot from party B. However, an agreement was made that if the joint party would receive only two seats, that one of A’s representatives would resign. Indeed, the #1 person on the joint list (=X) signed a letter stating that he would resign immediately if it was “his turn” to do so based on coalition agreements. The joint list ended up getting two seats, but X refused to resign his seat, because he said that it was not his turn to do so since the #2 (=Y) should resign. Y had never signed that he was willing to resign. In addition to several politically related claims, party A claimed that the agreement was invalid because no halachically binding kinyan was made and the nature of the agreement also did not lend itself to such a kinyan. [Ed. note- according to Hemdat Yamim’s policies, we left out the name of the parties and the municipality and request that our readers not try to guess who is who. (You would probably guess wrong anyway.)]
Although Rav Frank’s principle is true (and can also be proved from Ketubot 3b), we must see if it applies to our specific rabbinic institution not to raise sheep in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer III, CM.7) asks on the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling that the institution did not apply in his time based on the rule that in order to uproot a rabbinic law, one requires a rabbinical assembly which is at least as great as the one which instituted it, even if the law’s original reasoning no longer applies.
Question: My car got a deep scratch in the door when it was parked. The offender drove on without leaving a note. Because it was expensive to fix, we decided to leave it. Some time later, a similar damage occurred, but this time, the damager left a note and is willing to pay to have it fixed, if he is obligated. Once the door is removed to be fixed, there is little difference in price between fixing one scratch or two. Can I make the second person pay for damage which is significant in its own right but, given the fact that the door was already scratched, did not change very much?
This edition of
A weekly divrei Torah leaflet: A Glimpse at the Parasha, Ask the Rabbi, From the writings of Harav Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook, zt”l, Pninat Mishpat (Jewish Monetary Law).