ASK THE RABBI

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The melacha of boneh (building) classically applies to the ground and things attached to it, e.g., buildings and their walls, floors, etc. It includes acts of building that are not done strongly (Shabbat 102b). (Although “there is no boneh for movable objects” (see Beitza 22a), in some cases, it applies also to them – Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:1). A counter is attached to the house and therefore is subject to strict laws of boneh.

Attaching things, e.g., nails, screws, to a building is forbidden, although it is not a simple question whether it violates boneh or makeh b’patish (see Shabbat 102b; Mishna Berura 314:8). When putting something together is boneh, removing one from the other is under the melacha of soter (Shulchan Aruch ibid.). Yet the Terumat Hadeshen (I,64; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 314:12) in discussing removing a knife wedged in a wall, is concerned only with the possibility that in so doing, he will widen the hole. Why isn’t its removal from the wall soter? Also, the gemara (Shabbat 138a) says that one may hang a curtain on Shabbat. Since it must be attached to something that is attached to the house, why is it not boneh? These are among many indications that not every connection is forbidden.

We will look at three major factors in determining whether boneh/soter applies. 1) How firmly the addition is connected to the building – The Beit Yosef (OC 315, accepted by the Rama, OC 315:1 and Magen Avraham 315:1) says that the reason hanging curtains is permitted is that it can blow in the breeze, i.e., its attachment is weak. 2) How long it is to be connected – The Chazon Ish (OC 52:13), in arguing on the Beit Yosef’s claim that the curtain’s weak connection eliminates boneh, explains the gemara as referring to a case where the curtain will not remain for long. This distinction has a source in the gemara (Beitza 32b). It is unclear exactly how long the cutoff point is. 3) To what extent does the addition fit in as part of the edifice (stringent) or as a separate, albeit connected, entity with its own purpose (see Orchot Shabbat 8:(18); Piskei Teshuvot 313:4).

The way all the factors interact is complex. For example, something meant for a very short time or a very flimsily connection might be permitted by itself, whereas in more moderate cases, we might need and be able to combine multiple lenient factors (see Piskei Teshuvot ibid.).

Let us analyze your case. Contemporary poskim (Shemirat Shabbat K'hilchata 23:39; Orchot Shabbat 8:12) view suction cups as a moderately strong connector and as a candidate for it being forbidden to connect/remove. You use the divider to create a counter with separations; it has no independent utility. Therefore, grounds for leniency would have to be the length of its stay/ frequency of its removal. Even if your son takes it off frequently, the fact that this is not the intended use makes it likely that a Rabbinic extension of the prohibition, due to how the matter appears, applies (Mishna Berura 313:23).

Although a parent should not let a child who can be trained violate a halacha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 343:1), there is more room for leniency when he acts of his own volition and it is not fully clear it is forbidden. We have cited (see Living the Halachic Process II, C-13) the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (16:(53)) as being lenient about a child’s toy when we would not let an adult do so under similar circumstances. However, part of the leniency is that the Rabbis probably did not extend their prohibitions to toys, and your divider is not a toy.

In closing, you should not reattach the divider on Shabbat. Whether to allow your son to remove it depends on specifics whose permutations we cannot exhaust. If you want your son to have it, consider removing the divider, which you apparently do not need constantly, before Shabbat.

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The closest gemara on the subject says that pregnant and nursing women are required to fast on Tisha B’av (Pesachim 54b). Rishonim posit that this is because they are considered healthy, but that a woman within thirty days after childbirth and a person who is sick with a not-expected-to-be dangerous illness need not fast (see Ran, Ta’anit 10a of Rif’s pages; Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 554). Although such people must fast on Yom Kippur (see details in Shulchan Aruch, OC 617:4), Tisha B’av is different because it is not a Torah-level prohibition. Even though the non-dangerously sick may not eat a Rabbinically forbidden food (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 123:2), the Rabbis built into the institution of the fast of Tisha B’av that it does not apply to clearly sick/weak people (Ran, ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, OC 554:6).

How do we define sick in this regard? The leading definition regarding Shabbat leniencies is nafal l’mishkav – needing to spend serious time in bed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). That phrase is not found in the poskim here (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 554:7). Significant fever certainly qualifies, as well as conditions that fasting complicates (see Ohr L’tzion III, 29:(5)). Generally, a situation that prevents the average person from going to work is included. Remember, our sick person is equivalent to a woman in the first month after birth (the differences are that she can feel perfectly wonderful, but her body is known to have gone through a major trauma). Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV:114) says that one who is fasting particularly poorly counts as sick. It is very difficult to know where to draw the line on that (consider that fasting is usually difficult for pregnant and nursing mothers).

Regarding a woman after childbirth, the Rama (OC 554:6) says that despite the halachic exemption, the minhag is to fast (see Chayei Adam II, 135:2; Mishna Berura 554:13). Regarding a sick person, stringency is less encouraged (ibid. and ibid:16).

To what extent do we say the fast does not exist, as opposed to the situation of a dangerously sick person on Yom Kippur, to whom the fast exists but is compromised as needed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:7)? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 554:6) says it was not instituted for them – apparently, at all. Therefore, several poskim said that there is no need to limit eating (Kaf Hachayim, OC 554:31; Avnei Nezer, OC 540; Shevet Halevi IV:56).

It is also possible to say that a sick person should try to limit the amount of eating on Tisha B’av, but the specific size/time formula (shiurim) we find regarding Yom Kippur (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:8) is irrelevant. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 554:7) implies that shiurim are significant only concerning Torah-law prohibitions. There, they are important for the Torah punishment, which does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions like eating on Tisha B’av. This is not obvious because the gemara (Yoma 79a) bases the amounts for Yom Kippur on their effect on the experience of fasting, which can apply to Tisha B’av as well.

The difference between the approaches to why not to require shiurim is regarding other means of limiting the eating. The Chayei Adam (ibid.) says that one should try to fast part of the day (see Yoma 82a in regard to the partial fasting of children under bar/bat mitzva). Some explain that the delaying or minimizing of the eating does not indicate a partial existence of the fast per se, but is based on the idea of wanting to share with the general pain that everyone is experiencing (see Chut Shani III:93). There may be a distinction between someone who starts the day fully sick and someone who we do not want to fast because it likely will make him sick, in which case he should wait until it is necessary (see Dirshu 554:26). 

[Most people reading this are more likely to be more stringent on this matter than required, or even more than preferable, than to be too lenient; it is hard to blame them.]

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The child’s feelings are very important. After fleshing out the problem, we will search for halachic justification for leniency. The gemara (Yoma 70a) relates to an instance when it is permitted to read a Torah passage by heart (see Rishonim’s explanations, ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 139:3) rules that one may not lain even one letter by heart. For this reason, he disallows giving an aliya to a blind person, who cannot read the letters of the sefer Torah. The Rama (ibid.) accepts the minhag to let a blind person have an aliya, but that is based on the thesis that the ba’al korei’s reading is the critical one (Mishna Berura 139:12). When necessary, it is possible to read from a Megillat Esther scroll missing a large minority of text (Shulchan Aruch, OC 690:3). However, this is a leniency regarding Megilla, which is called an iggeret (see Mishna Berura 690:10), and probably not concerning laining from a sefer Torah. Still, we can allow the boy to read for a combination of reasons. We will start with mitigating opinions. The Rambam (Shut 294) posits that a shul without a kosher sefer Torah can read with berachot from a pasul one. In that discussion, he says that one can read with a beracha even by heart. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 143:3) does not rule this way, but “it is still a Rambam,” and the Rama (ad loc. 4) cites both opinions. In fact, the Rambam’s general thesis is accepted in a related case. If a p’sul in the sefer Torah was discovered in the midst of laining, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) says that after taking out a kosher sefer Torah, b’dieved we rely on what was read. In that context, the Mordechai (Megilla 392) writes that if one encounters missing words before he has read three p’sukim, he should read those words by heart and continue until a place one may stop. He argues that the problem with reading by heart is the prohibition (ed. note – see Orach Chayim 49; we tend to be very lenient on this) on reciting the Written Torah not from a text and that this does not apply here because the intention had been to read from a kosher sefer Torah. This bar mitzva boy also intends to read from the text, and we are just nervous about his success. It is a good question to what extent we accept the Mordechai (see Living the Halachic Process III, A-14), but it is not a dismissed opinion. Another mitigating opinion is admittedly a less accepted one. The Kolbo (cited in Beit Yosef, OC 142) states that if a ba’al korei makes a mistake in reading, we can rely on the oleh’s correct reading of the text. The above opinions along with significant embarrassment of a child whose disabilities disallow him doing what his peers do (see Rama, OC 139:3; Beit Yosef, OC 142), might suffice to be lenient. Now to fundamentals. As one who thinks a lot about Kri’at Hatorah, I assure you that if there were an absolute need for ba’alei kri’ah to fully read every letter, we would often not be yotzei. Experts will tell you that we standardly look at a word and recognize it based on key letters and context, without always actually processing every letter (that is why proofreading is difficult). Since we have the ability to read every letter (see Menachot 18b) and process the word by looking at it in a manner everyone calls reading, that reading relates to every letter. An expert on the reading of children with challenges confirmed that this child will, in all likelihood, not read by heart. Rather, his high familiarity with the text will help him read. While it may be somewhat different than the average person, it is considered reading from the sefer Torah. Therefore, this boy may lain. His teacher should train him, like all bar mitzva boys, to read from the text. If he can move the yad along properly, he is reading!!

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While these agreeable people, who have gone beyond halachic requirements (see below), can do whatever they agree on, it is an honor to discuss relevant general halachot.

A katan, who is not expected to be proficient at watching objects, and his parents, are exempt from payment for his deficiencies as a shomer (see Bava Kama 87a). However, our communities seem happier when children are encouraged to be careful and when their parents often pay for their failings.

It is common that when one damages or loses another’s item, he buys or pays for a new replacement. This is not always required, as the obligation is to pay the value of the lost object. Used items, including basketballs, are often worth less than their new replacement. (Paying more than one is required is not a problem of ribbit, as ribbit is forbidden when it is for delaying paying a loan or sometimes other obligations, not for paying more than obligated.)

Now, we get to your question about what to do with the balls. The mishna (Bava Metzia 33b) says that if a shomer pays for the theft of the object he was watching and later the thief was caught and has to pay double (kefel), the shomer gets the kefel. The gemara posits that since the shomer is nice enough to agree to pay, the owner transfers him rights to the kefel. In response to technical problems about the ability to transfer such a potential, amorphous asset, the gemara answers that an implied, earlier, conditional (should he pay) transfer of the object makes it possible for the shomer to get the kefel. The gemara continues that this transfer applies to a variety of external gains from the object (not just kefel), but notto an animal’s physical products, e.g., wool and offspring.

Tosafot (ad loc.) understands that the gemara refers to a literal transfer of the lost/stolen object, so that the shomer owns the object he paid for. According to this approach, once the Levis paid, the Cohens ceded ownership rights to the old basketball. If Reuven Cohen wants his old ball back, he would have to request a favor of the Levis (the reciprocation should be return of the money the Levis paid).

The Rambam (Sh’eila 8:1) describes how when an animal stolen from a shomer is found, it returns to the original owner with its wool and offspring. According to the standard explanation of the Rambam (see Maggid Mishneh, ad loc.; K’tzot Hachoshen 295:4) wool and offspring are not exceptions to the rule but are indicative of the fact that all stolen and lost objects remain owned by the original owner even after the shomer pays for their loss. According to this approach, Reuven Cohen keeps his basketball, and the payment is returned when it turns out there is no loss.

We generally assume like Tosafot’s approach (Pitchei Choshen, Pikadon 8:13). The Shach (CM 295:11) suggests that the Rambam agrees that the shomer keeps the object if he wants it, just that the Rambam discussed a case that he did not want it.

It appears that since the whole idea of getting rights in the animal is in appreciation for the shomer’s cooperation, Tosafot agrees that he can turn down receiving the object when it is found and can thereby be eligible to receive the money he gave. (See also Shulchan Aruch, CM 103:11 for a precedent of undoing a forced payment after the lost object was found.) In our case, that would seem to mean the Cohens would have two basketballs. However, it is very possible here that since, conceptually, the Levis gave a basketball (just that for technical reasons, the Cohens ordered it), the Cohens would give the Levis the new basketball.

We cannot address every permutation, but trust the friendly parties to “have a ball” continuing to cooperate. 

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It is an honor to learn Torah with people, all the more so with a soldier for whom Halacha is front and center. We will discuss principles and address some scenarios.

The gemara (Shabbat 19a) says that one may embark on a sea journey that will continue into Shabbat only if: A. He sails before the last three days of the week; OR B. His trip is for a mitzva. Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 248) present different possibilities about the relevant problem of being on the ship. These include: 1. Seasickness harms oneg Shabbat; 2. The violation of techum Shabbat. 3. The Rabbinic prohibition of sailing. 4. The Ba’al Hama’or (ad loc.) says that we presume that the danger will make it necessary to do melacha on Shabbat, and that it is forbidden to enter such a situation without a legitimate need at the time of the week that Shabbat should be on his mind. The Rivash (Shut 101), accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (OC 248:4), reasons that even those who explain the gemara differently, agree that there needs to be sufficient justification to put oneself into a situation that requires violation of Shabbat for pikuach nefesh.

Logically, making Shabbat early when the need to do melacha is expected during tosefet Shabbat is like setting up the need by entering the ship. It is unclear how high the chance of doing melacha needs to be for this to apply. In most cases, it depends if one has a shift or an operation at that time.

One pertinent question is why you are considering accepting Shabbat early. On a weekly basis, few men actively accept Shabbat early, in the way that [Ashkenazi] women do with candle lighting (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 263:10). Men do not accept Shabbat at that time (and must not if they need to daven Mincha). Some make a declaration of accepting Shabbat after Mincha, but this is not mainstream practice or required according to most poskim (see Yabia Omer VII, OC 34; Living the Halachic Process III, C-4). Rather, tosefet Shabbat is fulfilled by refraining from melacha at least a few minutes before bein hashemashot. It is detrimental to actively accept Shabbat when there is a good chance one would need to do melachot in those minutes.

The question is if soldiers want to accept Shabbat early to enable davening Ma’ariv (with a minyan), Kiddush, and/or a seuda before a shift? Based on the above, entering the situation requires that it includes facilitating a mitzva. What counts as a mitzva? The Tur (OC 248) cites Rabbeinu Tam that a business trip counts as a mitzva, whereas a pleasure trip is a non-mitzva. Many require a real mitzva, such as traveling to making aliya. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 248:4) rules like the stringent approach, but the Rama says that some follow Rabbeinu Tam, and they should not be criticized.

According to the approach that one needs a real mitzva, it is unclear whether doing the mitzvot of Shabbat during tosefet in a case that he can do the mitzvot in a non-optimal way (e.g., later, without a minyan, with cold food, while tired) counts. The policy of the IDF Rabbinate is that one should not accept Shabbat early if he can fulfill the mitzvot of the night after the shift. If not, one should eat his meal before the shift as a weekday meal and have a minor meal after returning from the shift. This reflects the correct general approach that one being exacting in avoiding melacha on Shabbat, even under extenuating circumstances, is more crucial than ideal fulfillment of the positive mitzvot of the day under such circumstances.

Such a general policy is for standard cases. Circumstances vary, both concerning halachic distinctions and practical concerns of the “army-on-Shabbat experience.” We would expect an expert army chaplain (as a high-ranking one told me) to weigh the specifics of a given case to determine if it fits the general guidelines or whether accepting Shabbat early might be worthwhile.

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Your question shows halachic acuity. We will start with a case where the fruit is orla.

Orla is forbidden in benefit (Orla 3:1; Pesachim 24b), and this is likely a full-fledged Torah-level prohibition in Eretz Yisrael even in our times, when many land-based prohibitions are Rabbinic (implication of Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 294:9; Mishneh Lamelech, Maachalot Assurot 10:11 argues). On the other hand, if a usage is abnormal for this species (likely true for fragrance for many fruit), some say it is only Rabbinically forbidden or even permitted (see discussion in Yalkut Yosef, Orla 2:10). Although orla applies only to edible fruit (Vayikra 19:23), the soap’s being unfit for a dog’s consumption (which is important regarding chametz) does not help regarding non-eating benefit, if the fruit became forbidden as orla when it grew (Yalkut Yosef ibid. 19).

The soap’s percentage of orla fruit can be important. While bitul of orla requires 200 to 1 of permitted substance (Orla 1:6), that is only for mixtures within the same species, but if fruit is mixed in with something else (e.g., soap), the normal rate of bitul of 60 applies (Pri Megadim, intro. to Hilchot Ta’arovot). If the fruit’s fragrance is clearly discernable (possibly, the main fragrance is chemical, and they put in a tiny amount of fruit as a marketing ploy), we have an interesting question. There is a machloket (see Acharonim on Rama, YD 102:1) whether there is bitul when the mixture’s forbidden part is small enough for bitul, but it is noticeable due to its color.  Arguably, the same bitul impediment could apply to the fruit’s noticeable fragrance (likely, only Rabbinically – see Badei Hashulchan 102:16).

The doubt about whether the fruit used in the soap are orla at all provides significant, possible grounds for leniency. Orla fruit are almost always a small percentage of the fruit market. The rule is that when there is an actual or virtual “market” of food, where the majority of the sources are kosher, if one encounters food of unknown origin away from the “market” (parish), we may assume is from the permitted majority. If one took the food from the market without noticing whether it was from a permitted or forbidden source (kavu’a), we treat the food’s status as a safek (Ketubot 15a). Since the consumer encounters the fruit in the soap away from its “market” ((sections of) orchards throughout the country), the majority chance is that the fruit was not orla. (We are describing a case in which the fruit in the package of soap comes from a limited number of trees. If the fruit element in each comes from a huge mixture coming from a wide amount and variety of locations, we must use different tools of analysis, relating to bitul. That is beyond our present scope, but likely brings a leniency-leaning outcome.)

However, there is a problem. According to the simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch (YD 110:3), if a Jew took or had the food taken, without taking note of its halachic status, from the origin to the place of the person asking the question, we treat the food as kavu’a and thereby as a safek whether it is kosher. Just as it was forbidden for the one who took it, so is it for the ones (e.g., stores, consumers) who got it from him. See Yabia Omer VI, YD 24 who brings many opinions on whether this stringency is correct regarding fruit at the grocer. His conclusion is that there are enough reasons for doubt (including those we have not mentioned) why a given fruit is not orla that we can permit fruit without an orla hashgacha. He praises the many who do seek certification, although it is accepted that for the majority of fruit species with a tiny percentage of orla, we can assume each fruit is kosher.

Considering all the above, we posit that you may freely use the soap in question without concern about orla.

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BB, which most batei knesset in Israel recite at the end of Shacharit and Ma’ariv (a minority of Ashkenazim do so abroad) grew out of the concept of poress al Shema (=paS), which is found already in a mishna (Megilla 24a). Barchu was instituted as an introduction to the berachot of Kri’at Shema, which leads into Shemoneh Esrei (see Rivash 334). PaS allows those who missed this process to join the tzibbur and salvage what they can. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 69:1) presents, as the classic case, those who davened without a minyan; paS enables them to take part in Kaddish, Barchu, and a repeat of the first beracha of Kri’at Shema, which, in the morning, includes a Kedusha. In contrast, the Rama points out that the mode of paS practiced in his time/place did not include the first beracha of Kri’at Shema. The Mishna Berura (69:1) cites important poskim who say that paS, even for just doing Barchu, is only for those who did not yet daven.    

BB is a few steps removed from the above. BB is done at the end of tefilla, whereas paS is not necessarily done then (see Mishna Berura, intro. to siman 69). A more major difference is what need triggers saying Barchu. Classic paS is when someone missed something, either by not hearing Barchu at all, or hearing it not before Birchot Kri’at Shema (which he is now up to). In contrast, BB is done even if no one is known to have missed, because it is possible that such a person is present (Rama, OC 131:1).

The origins of this minhag are not fully clear. Massechet Sofrim (10:6) speaks of saying Barchu right before or after Shemoneh Esrei because of concern for “those who come and those who leave.” The Rivash (Shut 334) sees this as a source for BB, while pointing out that the Rambam and Tur do not cite it and that there is opposition to it on the grounds that Barchu needs to be an introduction to a beracha. (The likely answer is that the response of “Baruch Hashem Hamevorach …” itself can be that beracha.) There are indications that various Rishonim had differing texts and/or understandings of Massechet Sofrim. The Rivash does not like doing BB when it is known that no one missed Barchu.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 133:1) is sensitive to the idea that one cannot say BB anytime, but only when it fits the need. He rules that one does not say BB after Shabbat morning davening because people are not expected to be late enough to justify it. This is either because they will not be up to Birchot Kri’at Shema when Mussaf is over (see Rivash) or because we expect that they heard Barchu in Kri’at Hatorah. The difference between the approaches is the minhag of Nusach Ashkenaz of Israel to omit it on Mondays/Thursdays because of Barchu in Kri’at Hatorah. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 133:1) explains the Sephardi minhag to do BB at every Shacharit and Ma’ariv based on Kabbala – the second Barchu supplements spiritual elements not covered by the first one.

The exact timing of BB is likely important. The Chazon Ish is cited as saying that since it is for latecomers, we should wait as long as possible (see application in Dirshu 133:1). However, it apparently must be connected to Shacharit or Ma’ariv (see Si’ach Tefilla 16:5 in Rav Elyashiv’s name). When does tefilla end when shuls say Tehillim due to the war after davening? Does Tehillim extend the tefilla, like Shir Shel Yom or Pitum Haketoret do? Or is it just a logical time to say Tehillim? My guess is the latter, and therefore one can logically say that we should not further expand the chiddush of BB when it has been delayed. We present two possible compromise ideas: 1. Do the standard BB after the Tehillim only if someone missed Barchu; 2. Add a Kaddish after the Tehillim, and then say Barchu (there are strong indications that BB is connected to Kaddish, including that one who said Kaddish does BB

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We have not found discussion of your interesting case, but an answer apparently emerges by analyzing the underlying principles and “listening to the silence.”

The topic begins with mishnayot (Chulin 103b & 104b) that rule that one must not eat meat at a table that has cheese on it, but may have these foods side-by-side on a table at which food is being prepared. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 88:1, based on Rambam, Ma’achalot Assurot 9:20) explains that the concern is that one might end up eating the two foods together. (Rashi ad loc. speaks about eating one after it is soiled by the other.) Another mishna (ibid. 107b, according to the gemara ibid.) says that two people who do not know each other may eat milchig and fleishig at the same table (implying that if they know each other, it is forbidden – Shulchan Aruch ibid. 2). The logic is that we do not suspect that one will eat the other’s food.

Your case falls between those of the mishnayot, as follows. 1. On the one hand, you are eating and not merely working with food, but on the other hand, the second food is not being eaten. 2. While in your case, there is no one else eating who may interest you in the other type of food, there is also no one eating the other food who may stop you from eating it.

According to the Shulchan Aruch’s reasoning (he may eat the other food), if he is eating and there is available food, the fact that the second food is not being eaten now (#1) does not seem to take away the temptation of eating it. Regarding the absence of a second person (#2), we find in poskim, including the Chochmat Adam (40:11), that the problem is at least as bad when one is eating alone.

Does intention take away the concern that he might eat anyway? Lack of explicit sources for such a distinction is a strong indicator that we cannot create one. Furthermore, in the regular forbidden case, a kashrut-observant person who is eating meat is not planning to eat milchig food for hours, and still Halacha forbids it to be on his table. The argument to reject this leniency is also strengthened by the gemara (ibid. 107b), which explicitly applies to this prohibition the concept of lo plug (we apply the Halacha broadly even to specific cases where the logic does not fully apply).

There are, though, acceptable leniencies found in the gemara and poskim regarding this halacha. The gemara (Chulin 107b) says that the prohibition is only when the two people are eating in one “tefisa.” Most Rishonim (see Tosafot ad loc.; Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 173) say that this means that if there is a noticeable separator (heker) between the two foods, it is permitted (we assume it applies even when a person is eating alone (see Chochmat Adam ibid.). This includes having one eating on a different surface (e.g., via a tablecloth or place mat) than the other (Rama, YD 88:2). Placing objects with some height that are not usually on the table also helps (see ibid., Taz ad loc. 4). Also, the Pitchei Teshuva (ad loc. 3) rules that it is permitted when the other food is far enough away that one cannot reach it without getting up.

There may be further leniency in a case where the other food is still packaged, as Rashi’s reason about food getting soiled would not apply. While Badei Hashulchan (88:6) is stringent, there is an opinion (Rashash, Chulin 103b) that it is permitted to eat one type of food when the other one is in a utensil (i.e., it is unlikely the foods will touch). If the food is on the table in a way that it is clear to all that it is not to be eaten now (e.g., it is in a supermarket bag along with other foods), then arguably the situation serves as a heker. However, since these are conjectures and the accepted solutions are easily accomplished, one should avail himself of the standard solutions.

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It is indeed worthwhile for people with hundreds of Kaddeishim in front of them to learn more about different facets of Kaddish, but we will actually start with Shemoneh Esrei.

The gemara (Yoma 53b) says that the correct way to show respect to Hashem before Whom one was praying is to take three steps back at the end of Shemoneh Esrei, give Shalom while turning to the sides, and not return to one’s place right away. While it is unclear what text was used in the gemara’s time to “give Shalom,” by the time of the Rishonim (see Mordechai, Berachot 111), it was clear that we employ some version of “Oseh shalom bimromav hu …” This is a request that Hashem bring peace to Israel as He brings peace between the different components of His heavenly abode. (The opening words come from the description of Hashem in Iyov 25:2).

We recite Oseh shalom bimromav … at or near the end of three important texts we recite: Shemoneh Esrei, Kaddish, and Birkat Hamazon. Peace is such an important value that we want to acknowledge Hashem’s part in it and request more of it at the end of these “interactions” with Him (see Tzitz Eliezer XIV:14). This is done at Shemoneh Esrei after taking three steps back. At Birkat Hamazon, we do not take any steps at any point, including when saying Oseh shalom bimromav. There is a major machloket among poskim and in Sephardi practice whether we take steps back after all Kaddeishim that end with Oseh shalom bimromav or only in Kaddish Titkabel (see opinions in Yabia Omer V, Orach Chayim 9).

The reason that Kaddish Titkabel may be different is that this Kaddish has a special kinship to Shemoneh Esrei. First, in content, the line that is unique to this Kaddish is the request that Hashem accept our prayers, and this usually refers to the Shemoneh Esrei and/or chazarat hashatz that the tzibbur recently recited. The connection finds expression in various halachot. For one, if Shemoneh Esrei/ chazarat hashatz began with a minyan that later dissipated, since they can finish up the units they began, they can recite the Kaddish Titkabel because it is the conclusion of chazarat hashatz (Rama, OC 55:3). Also, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 123:5, based on Terumat Hadeshen I:13) rules that a chazan does not need to take three steps back at the end of chazarat hashatz, because the steps at the end of Kaddish Titkabel count as the steps after chazarat hashatz (see Mishna Berura 123:18).

Now to your question. Rav Chaim Naeh (Sh’not Chaim 9:(47)) says that since Kaddish Titkabel is connected to chazarat hashatz, one should wait the amount of time it takes to walk four amot (2-3 seconds) before returning to his place (based on the model of the Rama, OC 123:2). Since there is apparently no one who explicitly disagrees, it is not surprising that contemporary sources, such as Ishei Yisrael (24:(152)) and Dirshu (124:21), cite and seem to accept him. However, he limits this requirement to Kaddish Titkabel (as opposed to Kaddish Yatom and D’Rabbanan, despite ending with Oseh shalom bimromav and even for those who take steps back). He also excludes Kaddish Titkabel of Ma’ariv (Mekor Chayim (Bachrach) to Rama, OC 123:2) disagrees) apparently because there is no chazarat hashatz to connect to and everyone took steps back after Shemoneh Esrei.

My strong impression is that few chazanim think about how long to wait before moving forward. (Kaddish reciters who are not chazanim may not even return to the place they started Kaddish). Possibly, many naturally wait close to the “required” time, but we still contend that the minhag is not to wait after any Kaddish. On the other hand, if you want to be machmir, this is not a problem, because presumably the tefilla would not be delayed by it. (We would not find it appropriate to follow the opinion (cited in Ishei Yisrael ibid.) that a Kaddish sayer should not say the ending Barchu until returning).

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The minhag of a Shalom Zachar is mentioned by a couple of Rishonim and may have a source in the gemara. The gemara (Bava Kama 80a) mentions an Amora going to a shavua haben or yeshua haben. While Rashi relates this to a pidyon haben, Tosafot cites an opinion that it was to celebrate the birth of the baby, who was safely extricated from his mother’s womb. The Terumat Hadeshen (I:269) connects it to the minhag that existed in his time and ours, to have a celebration with food on the night of the baby’s first full Shabbat. (The Orchot Chayim (Mila) says something similar.) The Rama (Yoreh Deah 265:12) cites this minhag as standard, and it is so for Ashkenazim to this day. (Sephardim have a similar observance the night before the brit called a Brit Yitzchak, and some Ashkenazim also do a practice called “vach nacht” that night). The question of whether it is better for the nuclear family to do it alone or for grandparents to have one with greater participation is a good one.

Several explanations are given for Shalom Zachar, and, at first glance, they influence the answer to your question. The Terumat Hadeshen (ibid.) relates it to celebration of the birth, which should include thanks to Hashem, which makes it a seudat mitzva. Anyone who feels connected can thank Hashem for that, but parents most so.

A midrash (Vayikra Rabba 27:10) tells that the timing of a brit mila significantly ensures that babies “experience” Shabbat before undergoing a brit mila. This makes the day significant in the baby’s life, but his presence should not be necessary. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II:202) similarly says that we find in a few contexts that the Shabbat before a major event captures some of its glory, which makes it fit for looking forward and, in this case, thanking Hashem. The parents are most connected to the baby and the father alone is obligated in the brit (Kiddushin 29a), but, again, anyone who cares about the baby can be connected. Certainly, grandparents, who are expected to have a special connection to the child’s spiritual future (see Shemot 10:2; Devarim 4:9; Rambam, Talmud Torah 1:2) are also significant.

The Derisha (YD 264:2) says that at the Shalom Zachar, we console the baby for the loss of the Torah he studied in his mother’s womb (based on Nida 30b). This could lead to the conclusion that the baby must be at the Shalom Zachar to be consoled (Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:202). The fact that it is often done even without the baby can be attributed to the other reasons (ibid.). Furthermore, even the consoling does not have practical impact (not meaning to insult the baby’s intellect), but is spiritual or perhaps symbolic. So it is possible that “consolation” can be gained when people gather in the baby’s honor and bless him in abstentia.

 Is the participation of people outside the nuclear family important? Many sources (including the early ones) refer to people coming. Considering there is no ceremony and the food served is minor (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 265:37), the visitation is apparently central to the event (see explanations in Osin B’simcha, Ma’amar 4).

Considering the above, it is fully appropriate for you to make a Shalom Zachar. This does not exclude the parents doing something low-key at the hospital, and they can “turn it into” a Shalom Zachar by eating traditional Shalom Zachar foods (e.g., chickpeas, almonds), thanking Hashem for the birth, and discussing the upcoming brit’s significance.

We are reluctant to pressure those dealing with the work that a new birth brings to quickly arrange multiple events. We understand that it may not always be feasible to do a “real Shalom Zachar” (it need not be extensive or fancy). However, a child’s birth is MAJOR in Judaism, and, when possible, the baby and Hashem deserve due regard according to our holy minhagim.