ASK THE RABBI

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First, we note that the only question is on the first day of Sukkot (regarding the second day in chutz la’aretz, see Be’ur Halacha to 649:5), regarding which the Torah (Vayikra 23:40) says that one must own the l&e he uses (Sukka 41b). Afterward, it must only not be stolen (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 649:2).

For mitzvot such as l&e, tzitzit, and kiddushin, where one can fulfill the mitzva only if he owns the relevant object, the owner can facilitate his friend’s mitzva if he gives it to him as a mamlh. Not only can this work, but if the owner effectively lends them for these purposes without discussing the halachic mechanism being employed, we generally assume the parties intend to apply the correct mechanism, i.e., mamlh (see Shulchan Aruch in: OC 658:5; OC 14:4; Even Haezer 28:19. Differences might exist between these areas of Halacha based on the natures of the need for ownership – see Taz, OC 14:5). Practically, lending and mamlh are almost identical. Halachically, though, the mechanism of lending keeps the basic ownership unchanged, and mamlh transfers ownership to the recipient, assuming he fulfilled the condition of returning the object properly (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 658:4). Language that ostensibly implies the use of a mechanism other than mamlh, could possibly prevent the recipient’s ability to fulfill the mitzva (see ibid. 3). Giving a l&e with the understanding that the recipient needs to own them to fulfill the mitzva, without saying anything can be better. The matter is questionable if the people (especially the owner) lack the knowledge that ownership is needed, in which case someone should explain what is needed. Details/opinions on the impact of lack of knowledge are beyond our scope (see Magen Avraham 678:3; Halichot Shlomo, Moadim II, 11:7; Dirshu 658:12). But again, silence and general intention work for semi-knowledgeable people.

From discussion of intention and speech we move to actions (i.e., a kinyan), which are required to acquire something. Regarding a present of a l&e, there are two candidates for the kinyan used: 1) Yad (the object’s presence in the recipient’s hand); 2) Hagbaha (lifting the object).

Relying on hagbaha has problems. An acquirer must lift the object either three tefachim or one tefach (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 198:2), and the recipient of the l&e does not always initially lift them at all! On the other hand, some say it suffices that one took it in the air when the object’s position is the requisite height above the floor or table (see opinions in Pitchei Choshen, Kinyanim 6:(18)). Also, one usually lifts the l&e while shaking them. On the other hand, it could be a problem that the recipient probably does not intend to acquire it at that time, and one could ask if the beracha, said before that time, was valid (see Mikraei Kodesh (Harari), Arba’at Haminim, p. 446 – we cannot go into further analysis). A problem with yad is that some say the whole object must be contained within the hand. On the other hand, many say that whatever is within the vertical line of the hand is acquired (see ibid., p. 449).

Others raise the question whether one needs to do two separate actions: an act of acquisition and a separate act of taking the l&e in the hand. Chazon Ovadia (Sukkot p. 420-3) brings opinions in both directions, but accepts the majority that one act of taking the l&e suffices. If one also does na’anuim, there are additional actions for the mitzva.

The minhag is indeed to just pass the l&e from one to the other without statements or formal actions; the minhag should remain. Only when someone is unaware of the need to transfer/acquire the l&e does it pay to make a point of identifying a process of kinyan before making the beracha.

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One can look at the religious perspective of a meal on Yom Kippur in two ways: 1. Yom Kippur is a Yom Tov, in which a proper meal could have been a mitzva if not for the greater importance of fasting, so that when one must eat, the mitzvot of a meal apply. 2. Since the broad rule is that we are forbidden to eat, the mitzvot associated with eating were not instituted at all.

Now we will see sources. The Tur (Orach Chayim 618; see Shut Maharam Rutenberg 71) says that one who cannot fast on Yom Kippur recites Ya’aleh V’yavo in Birkat Hamazon. The Taz (OC 618:10) disagrees with the Tur, inferring from a gemara (Shabbat 24b) that we do not mention a special day in berachot/tefillot if the day’s connection to what we are saying is coincidental. As you raised, there are other issues that depend on the correct approach (although each has unique factors also).

The Magen Avraham (618:10) rules that there is no Kiddush at a meal (regarding Kiddush in davening, see Har Tzvi, OC I:155) on Yom Kippur and cites a Shibolei Haleket saying that the prohibition to eat makes the day like a weekday, thus precluding Kiddush and Ya’aleh V’yavo.

Another issue in the poskim is whether to have lechem mishneh. The Magen Avraham (ibid.) cites a Knesset Hagedola who says that since the manna did not fall on Yom Kippur, one who needs a meal should use lechem mishneh. The Magen Avraham disagrees, arguing that lechem mishneh was not instituted for Yom Kippur and that we do not want to make a sick person trouble himself with lechem mishneh. The Machatzit Hashekel raises another issue – did a double portion of manna fall on Erev Yom Kippur?

There is not significant discussion in the poskim on whether, if lechem mishneh is not needed, one should eat bread in order to have a proper meal. Discussions (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:10) of what to say in bentching do imply that people are eating bread. However, this does not prove one is required to have bread, because classically bread was a natural staple of meals. In any case, we would add the following. While those who are unable to limit themselves to minimal, slow eating, are not instructed to be particularly careful to not eat more than absolutely necessary, it is halachically counter-productive to eat bread if it is less dietarily productive than other foods one could be eating.

Regarding halacha l’ma’aseh conclusions, most poskim treat this matter as some level of safek as to which general approach is correct (see Mateh Ephraim 618:17; Mishna Berura 618:29). Therefore, on the matter of Ya’aleh V’yavo, the approach is that the pros of doing them outweigh any cons. (Ya’aleh V’yavo, even if not called for, does not create a problematic enough break to endanger Birkat Hamazon’s validity – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:12; Machatzit Hashekel ibid.) In contrast, one should not do a full Kiddush, which is said in the day if it was not done at night (Rama, OC 271:8), because of the risk of a beracha l’vatala. Lechem mishneh is not required, and it is unclear whether to prefer it (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 39:31; Dirshu 618:54).

This year there is wrinkle in the matter. Since Yom Kippur falls on Shabbat, even if these mitzvot do not apply at all on Yom Kippur, they would seem to apply because it is Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (to Magen Avraham ibid.) believes it is likely that all should agree to make Kiddush this year. However, the Ohr Sameach (Avodat Yom Hakippurim 4:1) posits that Yom Kippur takes over the nature of Shabbat, so there is no mitzva to eat or make Kiddush even from the perspective of such a Shabbat. The silence of earlier poskim and the statements of recent Acharonim (see Har Tzvi, ibid; Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat I, 39; Yaskil Avdi VIII, OC 20.34) indicate that R. Akiva Eiger’s thesis is not widely accepted.

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Yom Kippur has a complex character in regard to crying. It is the most important day of teshuva, which includes crying (see Rambam, Teshuva 2:4 & 5:2), but it is also a wonderful day, in that we receive much kapara (atonement) (Vayikra 16:30). In fact, if fasting were not needed as part of the teshuva/kapara process, it would likely be a mitzva to have a feast on Yom Kippur to celebrate the positive (see Ritva, Rosh Hashana 9a).

Rosh Hashana is more complex. The Torah tells us little about the nature of the day, but it is presented as equivalent to the three regalim and Yom Kippur. Chazal tell us that mankind is judged on Rosh Hashana (Rosh Hashana 16a), and due to the real possibility of an unfavorable judgment, we do not recite Hallel on the Yamim Noraim (Arachin 10b). On the other hand, there are powerful, happy things going on, e.g., “coronating” Hashem, hopefully good judgment. The themes associated with the various shofar sounds also conjure up hopeful and foreboding thoughts.

How do these mixed indications of the day’s nature and mood factor into halachic practice? A pasuk in Nechemia (8:10), speaking about a powerful event that occurred on Rosh Hashana, instructs the people not to cry or be sad but to feast on that special day. We indeed pasken along these lines: “We eat and drink and are happy, and we do not fast on Rosh Hashana” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 597:1). The Shulchan Aruch does conclude that we should not to eat in a manner that causes lightheadedness, but we should maintain fear of Hashem.

The Gra (see Ma’aseh Rav 207) posits that the above pasuk is a precedent that one should not cry on Rosh Hashana, apparently even during davening. Rav Ovadia Yosef cites others who rule this way and concurs, although he justifies those whose emotions during tefilla bring them to tears (see Yabia Omer IX:51). It is not clear from Nechemia that at no point in Rosh Hashana, including some heart wrenching moments, is one allowed to cry. We note that while the Gra (ibid.) says not to say the powerful tefilla of Avinu Malkeinu, our minhag is to recite it on Rosh Hashana, except when it falls on Shabbat (Rama, OC 584:1).

Indeed, many Acharonim, including the Ba’er Heitev 584:3 and Mateh Ephrayim 582:28, cite the Arizal that one should cry on Rosh Hashana and that there is something wrong with the neshama of one who does not. Elef Hamagen (582:45) even cites those who say that one who has difficulty crying should at least make crying-like sounds. Some understand the Gra to oppose crying only out of fear and not of emotion due to the magnitude of the day and Hashem’s greatness (see citations in Dirshu 582:30).

Multiple sources confirm that the accepted practice is not like the Gra, and most seem to understand that the crying is out of fear of what could happen during the year. Granted, plenty of people do not cry, but realistically, few of those are holding themselves back due to the discipline the Gra promoted (the Gra was famously a highly demanding spiritual person). Rather, some people are not emotionally demonstrative, and some are apathetic to or skeptical about the idea of being judged for the year and how this is critical for their life, an approach that no poskim promote.

Therefore, we assume that those who cry at appropriate junctures enhance their Rosh Hashana and set a good tone for their environs. We strongly discourage faking or artificially amplifying his crying, which in our time and places, is likely and understandably to be scoffed at. Last Rosh Hashana, I was thinking how young people enjoying “smooth” lives have trouble feeling “fear of judgment.” Tragically, we have lost many dear people of all ages since then, and it should be easier to feel and demonstrate emotion this Rosh Hashana.

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There are many permutations to this question. We will deal with the basic understanding and some of the more practical and instructive cases.  

The gemara (Berachot 42a) cites varied opinions as to whether after reaching the end of a meal one is allowed to eat and concludes that only if one washes mayim acharonim must one proceed directly to Birkat Hamazon. The logic it provides for this conclusion is that we say: “Immediately after netilat yadayim (Rashi – i.e., mayim acharonim) must come a beracha (ibid. – Birkat Hamazon).” A different gemara (Pesachim 103a) says that if one says “Hav lan v’nivrich,” it becomes forbidden to drink because “they have taken their mind off” of eating. “Hav lan v’nivrich” means to bring wine to use for Birkat Hamazon but includes equivalent statements of imminent bentching (see Mishna Berura 179:3), but not preliminary statements like “It’s getting late; it’s time to bentch” (see Piskei Teshuvot 179:(4)). It must be said by someone who is “authorized” to end the meal, so that if there is a host, it must have been said by him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 179:2).

Rashi (ad loc.) says that after “Hav lan v’nivrich” he mustn’t eat until after Birkat Hamazon, while others (see Beit Yosef, OC 179) say that taking the mind off eating only makes it necessary to make a beracha rishona before continuing eating, but that this can be done before Birkat Hamazon. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 179:1) accepts the opinion that distinguishes between mayim acharonim and prompting Birkat Hamazon verbally. If one does mayim acharonim, he must bentch before eating any more. If he verbally announces Birkat Hamazon, he can eat before it, but he has to make a new beracha rishona beforehand. This might be true of a clear decision to not eat anymore before Birkat Hamazon (Mishna Berura 179:3; see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.).  

The problem in implementing these halachot (other than that of mayim acharonim) is that there are both machlokot and gray areas. First, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) cites a machloket whether the requirement of a new beracha is only for drinking or even for eating. It is not fully clear how the Acharonim decide the matter, and the matter is complicated by the rule of safek berachot l’hakel (Bi’ur Halacha ad loc.). In other words, there are enough opinions that an additional beracha is not needed for us to want to avoid the berachot. On the other hand, it is not a simple matter to eat without a beracha that is likely called for. Therefore, the most recommended thing to do is to refrain from eating additional foods from the time that is apparently considered hesech hada’at from the meal until after Birkat Hamazon. One might claim that this waiting until after Birkat Hamazon, when a beracha is definitely needed, creates a beracha she’eina tzricha (an appropriate beracha under the circumstances, but the situation was created artificially). However, it is a legitimate step to set up the situation to avoid a doubt on berachot, so that the beracha is fine (Pri Megadim, Pticha L’hilchot Berachot 10).

A decision to stop without action/verbalization is not only questionable halachically, but it is also difficult to determine when a decision is resolute (see Dirshu 179:6 in the name of Rav Elyashiv). Therefore, if one likes eating with discipline, he should avoid changing his mind, but it is wiser to train himself that his thought process is not binding until he bentches.

Arguably, reciting Shir Hama’alot is a clear sign of an imminent Birkat Hamazon. However, several poskim do not think Shir Hama’alot precludes eating without a new beracha (see B’tzel Hachochma VI:68; Dirshu 179:4). The fact that its recitation is a relatively recent minhag (see Mishna Berura 1:11) as opposed to a Talmudic pre-Birkat-Hamazon halacha of mayim acharonim, may strengthen the view that it is not a binding commitment to an immediate Birkat Hamazon.

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It is not a reason! Some sources compare the positions of a mezuza and a sefer Torah, but we should not overextend the comparison.

The gemara (Menachot 33a) says that if one places his mezuza like a nagar (bolt), it is invalid. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that the mezuza must be placed vertically, not horizontally. Rabbeinu Tam (cited in Tosafot ad loc.) brings sources about things that deserve respect (the sefer Torah in the Mikdash’s aron and buried bodies) are kept horizontally. He reasons that tefillin’s parshiyot should also lie horizontally in the batim. Rabbeinu Tam brings as proof for a horizontal mezuza the fact that the tzibbur does not sit when the sefer Torah is brought to the bima until it is put down (horizontally). Thus, Rabbeinu Tam connects the positions of a sefer Torah and a mezuza.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 289:6) rules like Rashi that mezuzot should be attached vertically. However, the Rama (ad loc.) says that in deference to Rabbeinu Tam, we follow the precedent of Rebbe (according to many to Menachot 33a), to put the mezuza diagonally, which all should agree is valid b’di’eved. Piskei Tosafot (Menachot 83) and the Bach (YD 289) posit that just like the Ashkenazi minhag regarding mezuzot, sifrei Torah in the aron kodesh should be put diagonally.

It appears Ashkenazim do not practice having diagonal sifrei Torah in the aron. According to many (see Maharil, Mezuza 3; discussion in Minchat Elazar I:36), diagonal means close to 45˚, which is uncommon for sifrei Torah. Rather, we lean the sifrei Torah on the aron’s walls mildly, apparently to prevent their falling. In fact, in shuls that have an apparatus to secure the sifrei Torah, they are generally erect.

Furthermore, the sources on sifrei Torah deal with their position when they are kept, not when reading from them. Even Rabbeinu Tam’s proof is not from the fact that we read from a horizontal sefer, but that we sit down only when it is put down for reading, which shows that previously, it was not in a natural position of rest. He does not imply that in Rashi’s shul, they read from a vertical sefer Torah. The Gra (YD 289:14) rules to put mezuzot vertically because we accept Rashi fully (several poskim agree), and to do the same with sifrei Torah. Do Gra followers (Ashkenazim) read from a vertical sefer Torah?! In any case, the angle of the bimot in Ashkenazi shuls is not due to deference to both Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam. First, the small slant does not resemble our mezuzot, where the minhag is anywhere from slightly off vertical to a maximum of 45˚ from it. Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim I:38) assumes that we read a sefer Torah when it is horizontal. Also, when there is a need to lain on a flat table, no one objects on halachic grounds. Consider that according to the linkage your question assumes, we would be relying on Rabbeinu Tam’s outlier position (the Noda B’yehuda II, OC 4 assumes this in explaining why even people who wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin do not have tefillin with horizontal parshiyot). So the linkage is not going to work for Ashkenazim.

One can argue that Sephardim prefer to read from an upright sefer Torah because they hold like Rashi. On the other hand, many Moroccan batei knesset whose sifrei Torah are without a case, lay them down, even though their mezuzot are like Rashi. It is likely that, given the sefer’s casing, the position is about practicality. That is what the Igrot Moshe assumes for Ashkenazim. Note that the slant resembles that of conference-hall lecterns around the world.

Even IF the minhag were to treat sifrei Torah like mezuzot, this would be as a matter of proper respect. Whereas the mezuza’s position is critical and could affect the mitzva’s efficacy, an unideal sefer Torah position could not logically endanger fulfilling the mitzva of kri’at haTorah (see Radbaz III:530).

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The gemara (Shabbat 155a) says that one may not “use,” including by leaning on, a tree, as well as something that is connected or supported by a tree (e.g., a nail, rope, ladder) on Shabbat. Therefore, it is forbidden to lie on a hammock if it is tied to the tree directly; it is permitted if the hammock is attached to something connected to the tree (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:13). (Many hammocks come with parts in a manner that it is not obvious if it is considered one apparatus connected to the tree, or that one piece is connected to the tree and the main part of the hammock is twice removed and permitted.) Also, the lying on the hammock must not make the tree(s) move (Mishna Berura 336:63).

Hanging a tree-attached hammock, even to something already attached to the tree, will be a violation. Lying in one hung before Shabbat will depend whether the hammock is tied to the tree, or to something attached to the tree, and on the strength of the tree and weight of the person. These issues are not a problem for a hammock that is attached to a frame.

Is hanging the hammock considered making an ohel? Since a hammock is mainly horizontal, it is a candidate for ohel, which can be forbidden to erect even if it does not connect to a vertical wall (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 315:1). However, it is permitted to erect a temporary horizontal structure if it is not done to protect that which is below it unless it connects to vertical walls/boards (ibid. 3; Rama ibid. 7). A hammock connected to mere trees/poles would not have that problem.

A net-style hammock may have another reason to not have a problem of ohel. It is permitted to hang a material that has more "air" than fabric (Tosafot, Eruvin 102a; see R. Akiva Eiger, OC 315:2). This may be the case with a net fabric for a hammock, while on the other hand, the fabric of some hammocks gathers together when no one is in the hammock. In the latter case, it might be more fabric than air.

Is putting a body or a cloth on a net-style hammock, creating an ohel? Surprisingly, the gemara (Eruvin 102a) says that if the strands are within three tefachim of each other, it is considered, for the sake of leniency, a case where the ohel pre-exists and one can add on to it (see also Shulchan Aruch, OC 315:2). (It also does not appear that the body of a person lying down can be a forbidden ohel.) Swinging in the hammock will not be forbidden as creating an ohel in a new place, as it is permitted to move an existing ohel to a new place (Piskei Teshuvot 315:2). (Why, then, it is forbidden to use an open umbrella is a good question beyond our scope.) In any case, we saw that due to the lack of vertical walls or need to protect that which is below, a hammock is not a forbidden ohel.

Still, we cannot give broad permission to hang hammocks on Shabbat because the potential of other problems exists. In some models, there is a need or a likelihood of tying forbidden knots. Attaching the hammock to different types of frames can potentially be forbidden due to boneh or tikkun kli (different forms of forbidden building). Various parameters determine when an attachment is forbidden, and some of the major factors are: the connection’s strength, the expected or standard duration of the connection, and whether it is attached to something that is attached to the ground (see our Ask the Rabbi column for Va’ethchanan 5784). These can depend on the model and on how an individual makes and uses it. We would therefore expect someone (unless he is capable of working out the halachic calculations of his specific case) to put up the hammock before Shabbat if he will want to use it. It will then be permitted to use it in most cases (as we explained above).

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Your flight (passing 11 time zones in a 13-hour flight) will not enter nighttime or morning. We need to review the halachot of the international date line (see Bemareh Habazak V:29). We must determine regarding regions far from Eretz Yisrael, whether their days begin before or after Israel’s. The Chazon Ish, based on the Ba’al Hamaor, says that the line is 90ﹾ east of Yerushalayim (in eastern China, but since the line must not break a land mass, it begins on Asia’s Pacific shore). Many posited that it is 180ﹾ from Yerushalayim (in the middle of the Pacific). A third approach (see Har Tzvi Orach Chayim I:138) reasons that it depends how the population considers themselves. According to the latter two approaches and the primary assumption of most (the biggest issues are Shabbat and Yom Tov, which we will not get into here), you indeed will arrive on “halachic Tuesday.”

You will be able to daven Mincha relatively soon after takeoff (check relevant apps), which we recommend you do. Without an astronomical nightfall or morning, there is no way to daven Ma’ariv or Shacharit, despite the long flight, so one can view it as your missing the first tefillot of Yom Shlishi. Do you daven Mincha upon arrival in Japan, considering that there it is Tuesday afternoon, whose Mincha you did not daven? Or can one not have a new obligation of Mincha, when he was not in a place in which halachic nightfall ushered in a new day since he last davened Mincha? (In the Polar Regions, there are no “sunrises and sunsets” for weeks on end but there are sun positions that are halachically equivalent (beyond our present scope) to nightfall and daybreak.)

A sefer on time-zone-related questions, Ta’arich Yisrael (siman 4) cites many contemporary poskim on our conceptual dilemma, regarding various mitzvot. Are mitzvot generated by the calendric day (in which case, Yom Shlishi deserves a Mincha despite the lack of a nightfall since your last one)? Alternatively, does the individual Jew’s (daily) mitzva depend on the day he experiences astronomically (in which case, your flight took only part of an afternoon, and you would not repeat Mincha)?

Both approaches are well represented. Rav Chaim Scheinberg and Rav Yechezkel Roth hold that one needs exactly one of each tefilla for each calendar day, in which case you need to daven Mincha on Japan’s Yom Shlishi. B’tzel Hachochma (V,103) and Rav Gestetner posit that daily mitzvot depend on the day the individual experiences. According to them, you do not need another Mincha (on the way back, you may have extra tefilla/ot on the same calendar date, due to the sun’s “fast movement”). One might invoke the Rambam’s opinion that there is a Torah-level mitzva to daven every day (and you will be missing Yom Shlishi’s Ma’ariv and Shacharit). However, these opinions disagree what that “day” means. (Also, for the Torah-level mitzva, any request of Hashem should suffice – see Magen Avraham 106:2.) I intuit that you are not obligated in another Mincha, and this is strengthened by the doubt (see above) of whether it is really Japan’s Yom Shlishi. Still, I agree with Ta’arich Yisrael’s contention that due to doubt, it is worthwhile to daven Mincha again, on condition that if it is unnecessarily, it counts as a voluntary Shemoneh Esrei (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 107:1). (This would not work for Shacharit’s and Ma’ariv’s other berachot).

You will not need tefillat tashlumin (makeup) for Shacharit because you will not have been obligated in it (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 341:2). Although Birchot Hashachar can be recited all day, you cannot do them voluntarily; therefore, doubt requires that you not recite them. It is proper to put on tefillin on Tuesday, as some say the mitzva goes by the day (see Pri Megadim, EA 77:2), and one can put them on with berachot multiple times a day, when separated by a break (Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:12).

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The melacha of boneh (building) classically applies to the ground and things attached to it, e.g., buildings and their walls, floors, etc. It includes acts of building that are not done strongly (Shabbat 102b). (Although “there is no boneh for movable objects” (see Beitza 22a), in some cases, it applies also to them – Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:1). A counter is attached to the house and therefore is subject to strict laws of boneh.

Attaching things, e.g., nails, screws, to a building is forbidden, although it is not a simple question whether it violates boneh or makeh b’patish (see Shabbat 102b; Mishna Berura 314:8). When putting something together is boneh, removing one from the other is under the melacha of soter (Shulchan Aruch ibid.). Yet the Terumat Hadeshen (I,64; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 314:12) in discussing removing a knife wedged in a wall, is concerned only with the possibility that in so doing, he will widen the hole. Why isn’t its removal from the wall soter? Also, the gemara (Shabbat 138a) says that one may hang a curtain on Shabbat. Since it must be attached to something that is attached to the house, why is it not boneh? These are among many indications that not every connection is forbidden.

We will look at three major factors in determining whether boneh/soter applies. 1) How firmly the addition is connected to the building – The Beit Yosef (OC 315, accepted by the Rama, OC 315:1 and Magen Avraham 315:1) says that the reason hanging curtains is permitted is that it can blow in the breeze, i.e., its attachment is weak. 2) How long it is to be connected – The Chazon Ish (OC 52:13), in arguing on the Beit Yosef’s claim that the curtain’s weak connection eliminates boneh, explains the gemara as referring to a case where the curtain will not remain for long. This distinction has a source in the gemara (Beitza 32b). It is unclear exactly how long the cutoff point is. 3) To what extent does the addition fit in as part of the edifice (stringent) or as a separate, albeit connected, entity with its own purpose (see Orchot Shabbat 8:(18); Piskei Teshuvot 313:4).

The way all the factors interact is complex. For example, something meant for a very short time or a very flimsily connection might be permitted by itself, whereas in more moderate cases, we might need and be able to combine multiple lenient factors (see Piskei Teshuvot ibid.).

Let us analyze your case. Contemporary poskim (Shemirat Shabbat K'hilchata 23:39; Orchot Shabbat 8:12) view suction cups as a moderately strong connector and as a candidate for it being forbidden to connect/remove. You use the divider to create a counter with separations; it has no independent utility. Therefore, grounds for leniency would have to be the length of its stay/ frequency of its removal. Even if your son takes it off frequently, the fact that this is not the intended use makes it likely that a Rabbinic extension of the prohibition, due to how the matter appears, applies (Mishna Berura 313:23).

Although a parent should not let a child who can be trained violate a halacha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 343:1), there is more room for leniency when he acts of his own volition and it is not fully clear it is forbidden. We have cited (see Living the Halachic Process II, C-13) the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (16:(53)) as being lenient about a child’s toy when we would not let an adult do so under similar circumstances. However, part of the leniency is that the Rabbis probably did not extend their prohibitions to toys, and your divider is not a toy.

In closing, you should not reattach the divider on Shabbat. Whether to allow your son to remove it depends on specifics whose permutations we cannot exhaust. If you want your son to have it, consider removing the divider, which you apparently do not need constantly, before Shabbat.

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The closest gemara on the subject says that pregnant and nursing women are required to fast on Tisha B’av (Pesachim 54b). Rishonim posit that this is because they are considered healthy, but that a woman within thirty days after childbirth and a person who is sick with a not-expected-to-be dangerous illness need not fast (see Ran, Ta’anit 10a of Rif’s pages; Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 554). Although such people must fast on Yom Kippur (see details in Shulchan Aruch, OC 617:4), Tisha B’av is different because it is not a Torah-level prohibition. Even though the non-dangerously sick may not eat a Rabbinically forbidden food (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 123:2), the Rabbis built into the institution of the fast of Tisha B’av that it does not apply to clearly sick/weak people (Ran, ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, OC 554:6).

How do we define sick in this regard? The leading definition regarding Shabbat leniencies is nafal l’mishkav – needing to spend serious time in bed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). That phrase is not found in the poskim here (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 554:7). Significant fever certainly qualifies, as well as conditions that fasting complicates (see Ohr L’tzion III, 29:(5)). Generally, a situation that prevents the average person from going to work is included. Remember, our sick person is equivalent to a woman in the first month after birth (the differences are that she can feel perfectly wonderful, but her body is known to have gone through a major trauma). Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV:114) says that one who is fasting particularly poorly counts as sick. It is very difficult to know where to draw the line on that (consider that fasting is usually difficult for pregnant and nursing mothers).

Regarding a woman after childbirth, the Rama (OC 554:6) says that despite the halachic exemption, the minhag is to fast (see Chayei Adam II, 135:2; Mishna Berura 554:13). Regarding a sick person, stringency is less encouraged (ibid. and ibid:16).

To what extent do we say the fast does not exist, as opposed to the situation of a dangerously sick person on Yom Kippur, to whom the fast exists but is compromised as needed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:7)? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 554:6) says it was not instituted for them – apparently, at all. Therefore, several poskim said that there is no need to limit eating (Kaf Hachayim, OC 554:31; Avnei Nezer, OC 540; Shevet Halevi IV:56).

It is also possible to say that a sick person should try to limit the amount of eating on Tisha B’av, but the specific size/time formula (shiurim) we find regarding Yom Kippur (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:8) is irrelevant. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 554:7) implies that shiurim are significant only concerning Torah-law prohibitions. There, they are important for the Torah punishment, which does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions like eating on Tisha B’av. This is not obvious because the gemara (Yoma 79a) bases the amounts for Yom Kippur on their effect on the experience of fasting, which can apply to Tisha B’av as well.

The difference between the approaches to why not to require shiurim is regarding other means of limiting the eating. The Chayei Adam (ibid.) says that one should try to fast part of the day (see Yoma 82a in regard to the partial fasting of children under bar/bat mitzva). Some explain that the delaying or minimizing of the eating does not indicate a partial existence of the fast per se, but is based on the idea of wanting to share with the general pain that everyone is experiencing (see Chut Shani III:93). There may be a distinction between someone who starts the day fully sick and someone who we do not want to fast because it likely will make him sick, in which case he should wait until it is necessary (see Dirshu 554:26). 

[Most people reading this are more likely to be more stringent on this matter than required, or even more than preferable, than to be too lenient; it is hard to blame them.]

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The child’s feelings are very important. After fleshing out the problem, we will search for halachic justification for leniency. The gemara (Yoma 70a) relates to an instance when it is permitted to read a Torah passage by heart (see Rishonim’s explanations, ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 139:3) rules that one may not lain even one letter by heart. For this reason, he disallows giving an aliya to a blind person, who cannot read the letters of the sefer Torah. The Rama (ibid.) accepts the minhag to let a blind person have an aliya, but that is based on the thesis that the ba’al korei’s reading is the critical one (Mishna Berura 139:12). When necessary, it is possible to read from a Megillat Esther scroll missing a large minority of text (Shulchan Aruch, OC 690:3). However, this is a leniency regarding Megilla, which is called an iggeret (see Mishna Berura 690:10), and probably not concerning laining from a sefer Torah. Still, we can allow the boy to read for a combination of reasons. We will start with mitigating opinions. The Rambam (Shut 294) posits that a shul without a kosher sefer Torah can read with berachot from a pasul one. In that discussion, he says that one can read with a beracha even by heart. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 143:3) does not rule this way, but “it is still a Rambam,” and the Rama (ad loc. 4) cites both opinions. In fact, the Rambam’s general thesis is accepted in a related case. If a p’sul in the sefer Torah was discovered in the midst of laining, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) says that after taking out a kosher sefer Torah, b’dieved we rely on what was read. In that context, the Mordechai (Megilla 392) writes that if one encounters missing words before he has read three p’sukim, he should read those words by heart and continue until a place one may stop. He argues that the problem with reading by heart is the prohibition (ed. note – see Orach Chayim 49; we tend to be very lenient on this) on reciting the Written Torah not from a text and that this does not apply here because the intention had been to read from a kosher sefer Torah. This bar mitzva boy also intends to read from the text, and we are just nervous about his success. It is a good question to what extent we accept the Mordechai (see Living the Halachic Process III, A-14), but it is not a dismissed opinion. Another mitigating opinion is admittedly a less accepted one. The Kolbo (cited in Beit Yosef, OC 142) states that if a ba’al korei makes a mistake in reading, we can rely on the oleh’s correct reading of the text. The above opinions along with significant embarrassment of a child whose disabilities disallow him doing what his peers do (see Rama, OC 139:3; Beit Yosef, OC 142), might suffice to be lenient. Now to fundamentals. As one who thinks a lot about Kri’at Hatorah, I assure you that if there were an absolute need for ba’alei kri’ah to fully read every letter, we would often not be yotzei. Experts will tell you that we standardly look at a word and recognize it based on key letters and context, without always actually processing every letter (that is why proofreading is difficult). Since we have the ability to read every letter (see Menachot 18b) and process the word by looking at it in a manner everyone calls reading, that reading relates to every letter. An expert on the reading of children with challenges confirmed that this child will, in all likelihood, not read by heart. Rather, his high familiarity with the text will help him read. While it may be somewhat different than the average person, it is considered reading from the sefer Torah. Therefore, this boy may lain. His teacher should train him, like all bar mitzva boys, to read from the text. If he can move the yad along properly, he is reading!!