ASK THE RABBI

It is not possible to answer this crucial question unequivocally. Let us see basic sources and distinctions. We will indeed assume that taking public transportation is a less severe violation of Shabbat than driving, although the extent to which this is true could depend on different factors (eiruv, type of car, etc.).

The most direct source in favor of trying to lighten the level of violation is the gemara in Sota (48a). The gemara says that one type of male/female joint singing is worse than another and that this is notable because of “cancelling this in place of that” (l’v’tulei ha …). Rashi explains that if we can only convince them to stop one, we should stop the more problematic one. Some understand Rashi as not allowing a rabbi to recommend replacing the bigger aveira with the smaller but just choosing on which to focus the criticism. But major poskim understand Rashi more broadly (see Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I:53 and Yabia Omer VI, YD 3 regarding hashgachot that do not prevent “minor” kashrut problems but cover the main halachic issues when without the hashgacha people will eat full-fledged kashrut violations). Rabbeinu Yona (Berachot, 21b in the Rif’s pages) is a Rishon who explicitly allows a rabbi to allow the more lenient violation to prevent the bigger violation.

Another focal gemara is Chagiga 16a. It says that if someone is not able to control his yetzer hara, he should go to a distant place, dress in black, and sin privately rather than desecrate Hashem’s Name in public. Tosafot (ad loc.) offers two explanations whether this is the gemara’s advice to the would-be sinner (lessen the aveira’s damage) or whether it is giving a plan how to avoid the aveira totally.

On the other hand, a gemara )Shabbat 4a) could be grounds for a counterargument – we do not tell someone to do a small aveira in order to save another from a bigger aveira. Very likely, “encouraging” the smaller aveira is itself an aveira (see Yabia Omer ibid.).  

There are different “currents” in Rishonim on whether to apply l’v’tulei ha, and while there could be some machloket, some discrepancies can be explained by distinctions. One is that l’v’tulei ha is more likely when it involves an individual or small group as opposed to a large group (see Sha’arei Chayim (Rotter) 42). Another is that it should not look as if the rabbi is permitting the small aveira, but only that it is better to choose the lesser evil (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV:35). Another major factor is that allowing the smaller violation should not cause people who keep mitzvot to mistakenly sin (see Meishiv Davar 42-43; Igrot Moshe, YD I:53). It is also better if the allowance is temporary, not an ongoing rule (see Rav Asher Sabag in Hama’ayan #246, p. 85). We will leave for now some other possible distinctions.

If you word things correctly, you will not tell him it is permitted to go by bus or that he may use it as a permanent practice, but that he should know that it is preferable. If so, your case comes up on the right side of these distinctions. On the other hand, as poskim point out (see Meishiv Davar ibid.), one should be very careful about if, when, and how to employ l’v’tulei ha. When you are talking about someone whose concepts of Halacha are very limited, to say that some things are important and some are less so, within the same aveira of violating Shabbat, you raise the possibility of confusing him and giving him the wrong impression (e.g., there is no need to do things correctly, as long as it is not “too far off”). You, as the rabbi, can also get into serious communal problems if you think it is a good idea for one and not for another; what often happens is that community members compare notes.

The gemara (Megilla 32a) states that one loses his mitzva if he holds a sefer Torah “naked.” Chazal even instituted that a Torah scroll makes one’s hands tameh so that one should not touch it with his hands (Shabbat 14a). This can be a matter of honor (Levush, Orach Chayim 147:1) or protection for the Torah scroll (Rambam’s commentary to Yadayim 4:6). This creates tension with the halacha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 139:11; Mishna Berura ad loc. 35) that one should hold the sefer Torah during the aliya. One answer is that it depends if his hands are considered freshly washed (see Beit Yosef and Bach, OC 147), although most assume that even washed hands may not touch it (Rama, OC 147:1).   

Most poskim (see Mishna Berura 147:2) assume that the prohibition of touching applies only to the klaf, not the etz chaim. Logic indeed dictates that this special treatment is a function of the innate kedusha of a Torah scroll, not the etz chaim, which is only a tashmish kedusha (Taz, OC 147:1). Nevertheless, some assume that as a connected extension of the sefer Torah, one should not touch the etz chaim with bare hands (Bach ibid.). The Magen Avraham (intro. to siman 147) sees in the Rambam’s ruling that the etz chaim makes the hands tameh, an indication that in matters of touching, an etz chaim is like the klaf. Others contend that one cannot extrapolate from the formal halachot of tuma, which equate connected parts of an object, to the halacha of not touching, which logically applies only to the klaf (see Eliya Rabba 147:1). The Maharit (Shut I:136) says that when the Torah is uncovered one should not touch the etz chaim without a separation, because of concern that he will touch the klaf.

Your question implies that you follow the great majority who hold the etz chaim without separation. (Note that the Mishna Berura agrees with the Noda B’yehuda (I, OC 136) that one who wants to be machmir must be discreet to avoid a problem of yohara (“holier than thou”).) So, if we accept the opinion that only the klaf is a problem, your friend seems wrong.

One can argue for your friend’s chumra with the following chakira. Why do we not accept the stringency? If it is because they decided the Taz is fundamentally right, then the whole etz chaim is a tashmish kedusha and can be held directly. However, if the reason is that it is too difficult to expect a fabric between one’s hand and the etz chaim, then arguably it is feasible to ask the oleh to not get his hand closer to the sefer Torah than necessary (see Maharit above). From a technical perspective, when you hold the top of the disc, nothing separates your hands and the klaf (for your friend’s system, the disc does) and depending on the thickness of the roll on that week, the distance could be millimeters. This being said, to create a halachic distinction between parts of the same object, logic is not enough; you need an explicit or at least arguable source. Since we found no source that the disc is different, we reject for your friend’s chumra on halachic grounds.

However, we must note that the great majority of olim to the Torah hold the handle of the etz chaim, not the disc. (Perhaps this is natural because the handle was made for hands, whereas the disc was made to protect the klaf from sliding.) So why would you want to be in the small minority in a manner that fares less well with the spirit of the law? If you are convinced that your practice is an actual family minhag, one can justify it. The Magen Avraham (139:13; see Mishna Berura 139:35) brings a little-known practice – holding the rolled klaf on both sides of the Torah, separated with fabric. This may imply that “the closer to the klaf the better,” provided you do not violate a halacha. Theoretically, your minhag could be based on that approach, in which case it makes sense to preserve it.

This discussion is for those for whom AI is already part of their practical, intellectual, and/or professional lifestyle. What follows is in line with the broad consensus amongst rabbanim in our communities. Hopefully the presentation will clarify somewhat and highlight distinctions and nuances.

A futuristic possibility – Someday, machines might surpass humans in sheer memory, analysis, and application of Halacha (if they do, it will happen later than for most other intellectual endeavors). We must distinguish between halachic information and p’sak halacha. When a halacha is clearly established and a non-expert does not remember facts or know how to “connect clear dots,” the future AI will be trusted. For time immemorial, we do not ask our posek such questions, but ask a more knowledgeable acquaintance. However, when a new question or a unique dilemma including conflicting factors or personal sensitives arises, this requires a p’sak halacha. The process that the Torah describes for deciding such matters (Devarim 17:8-11) involves human talmidei chachamim, which outweighs even a divine omen (Bava Metzia 59b). There is also something to be said for siyata d’shmaya of a yarei shamayim toiling over an answer.

Current AI capabilities – As many know, while AI does certain things in the realm of Torah impressively, its level of reliable scholarship pales in comparison to even a basic-level talmid chacham. AI summarizes straightforward, basic halachic text well. (One AI model retrieved for me my positions on a variety of topics quickly and impressively.) Some of its most impressive feats are plagiarism – summarizing articles by talmidei chachamim without citing them. It can follow Talmudic and halachic logic and notice distinctions. One can get a broad, brilliant answer on a halachic question.

However, it is totally unreliable. It can “quote” non-existent sources. It can “miss” a part of the question and apply an answer in its “grasp” about a similar case; i.e., the answer is wrong for the actual case. It can give an answer based on one source it understood correctly, but fail to realize that most opinions disagree. I compare it to having an absolutely brilliant chavruta who is new to the world of Torah. When it gets something right, it can be breathtaking. However, when that lack of proper background causes it to err, it can say things that sound great but are totally off. My impression is that on “cookie-cutter” clear matters, where there is little complexity and no machloket, it usually gets things right. The chances are higher when one knows how to ask AI in the right way. Moments ago, I asked three AI models the berachot on 7 foods (quite straightforward). They all were accurate about the foods that have one correct answer. The answers for foods upon which there are machlokot differed from model to model, as did the level of accuracy.

Here is my practical summary. A talmid chacham who lacks encyclopedic knowledge, but knows how to check everything before believing anything, can, if he desires, use AI to get to opinions and approaches. He can be aided faster and sometimes more efficiently than by using a Google search to find and read articles or reading through classical sources, which he might find “the old way” or with the help of Bar Ilan Responsa, Otzar Hachochma, etc. It serves more like a halachic anthology sefer with an “automatic index” when you don’t look up the sources cited in footnotes. The researcher must avoid the danger of falling into the horrible habit of believing too much, which already exists regarding some anthology sefarim; it certainly exists for AI. To quote one AI model’s disclaimer: “XXX is AI and can make mistakes. Please double-check cited sources.”

For those who are not talmidei chachamim, using AI to get Torah information is usually highly irresponsible. (This is true for non-experts regarding other intellectual or professional fields.)

The gemara (Bava Metzia 101b) does say that the obligation of putting up mezuzot on rental property is on the renter, implying not on the landlord (see also Avoda Zara 21a). While this is practical for a lengthy rental, a tzimmer owner could not expect that vacationers will bring mezuzot with them. Actually, though, the vacationers do not need them.  True, in Eretz Yisrael, a renter is required to affix mezuzot right away, as opposed to in chutz la’aretz, where there is a 30-day “grace” period (Menachot 44a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:22). However, even in Eretz Yisrael, one who stays in a pundak (an inn for travelers – Rashi ad loc.) is exempt from mezuza (ibid.). This applies to hotels and tzimmers as well (Chovat Hadar 3:5), at least for 30 days (see S’dei Chemed vol. V, p. 63; Mishneh Halachot IV:134).

Then, the question becomes – if your guests are exempt, does that mean you are obligated? This depends on the rationale of the gemara (Bava Metzia 101a) that mezuza is the obligation of the dar (the renter who is living there). Some posit that if one owns a house but does not live in it (i.e., the landlord) he is fundamentally exempt from mezuza (Tosafot, Avoda Zara 21a). If so, if you never use the tzimmer as part of your “living quarters,” you should not be obligated. On the other hand, Rav Yehonatan (cited in Shita Mekubetzet, Bava Metzia 101b) posits that according to Torah law, the landlord is obligated in mezuza, but they obligated the renter because he is the one who benefits from the mezuza’s protection. According to this latter approach, if the guests are not obligated during their insufficiently significant stint, the owner would be obligated.

Even if a permanent landlord is not obligated on any level in attaching mezuzot, you might be obligated. One possibility is that the fact that you are dealing with the tzimmer commercially, to make money, on an ongoing basis rather than on a one-time basis, makes it considered a use of the money maker (see Torat Hamezuzah p. 104). This is enhanced if, as proprietor, you often have to go in and take care of the tzimmer (see Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, 141). Also, the Shevet Halevi (II:156) says that even if hospital patients do not require a mezuza on their room (due to the nature of the stay), a Jewish hospital would require mezuzot on all its doors. This is not only because the Jewish staff frequent the rooms, but also because of the Jewish ownership. (He does not discuss whether they are affixed with a  beracha.)

The approach that the owner does not need to live there like a home depends on the question of mezuzot for the workplace (which we discussed in Living the Halachic Process, I:G-4). The Rambam (Mezuza 6:9, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, YD 286:11) says that a store in a marketplace does not require mezuzot seems to imply that mezuza requires domestic living. However, some attribute the Rambam’s exemption to other factors – it is used only in the daytime; the market was only on certain days. Still, most poskim suggest not making a beracha on attaching the mezuza to a commercial space due to doubt about the requirement (see LTHP ibid.).

The simplest advice is to affix the mezuzot without a beracha. If you want to find a way to make a beracha appropriate, you can use the tzimmer for personal needs either before turning it commercial or even afterwards, if you do so from time to time. This includes having close family and friends being semi-frequent occupants, as many consider the living use of such people like your own (see Torat Hamezuza ibid.). Note common practice is that one who moves into a house that has a room set aside as a guest room affixes a mezuza on it without a beracha, even if the guests are not constant!

The gemara (Ta’anit 30a) says that all mitzvot of aveilut during shiva apply to us all on Tisha B’av. As we know (although the sources on this are complicated – see Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 387), an avel does not sit on a regular chair, and therefore the same should be true on Tisha B’av. However, when the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Orach Chayim 559:3) codify this practice for Tisha B’av, they say that it is only for part of the day.

Some explain that the time limitation stems from the fact that sitting low on Tisha B’av is apparently a chumra, as there are no explicit Talmudic sources about sitting low, and so we are lenient (see Mishbetzot Zahav 559:4). The Taz (OC 559:4) says that it is a full-fledged halacha, but that the gemara, by presenting a broad rule that equates between shiva and Tisha B’av but leaves sitting low off the list of examples, hints at a compromise regarding its duration.

The Bach (OC 559) argues that one’s sitting on Tisha B’av should not be derived from aveilut because the comparison is only for negative commandments. The Taz (ibid.) responds that sitting low is indeed a negative commandment (not to sit regularly), not a positive one (to sit low). He therefore posits that standing is fine, because only improper sitting is forbidden. According to him, standing or lying down is neutral. Even if there is a positive mitzva to sit low, it is hard to imagine one being required to remain seated the whole time. Rather, there should be a significant amount of sitting low, and the whole time this applies, it is forbidden to sit normally.

There is a lack of clarity as to how low this should be. Rishonim, including the Ramban (Torat Ha’adam, Aveilut 63) and the Tur (OC 559) speak of sitting on the ground, and this has a basis in the gemara and even Tanach (see Iyov 2:13). However, it is permitted (and perhaps preferred – see Nitei Gavriel, Bein Hametzarim 2) to put something between him and the ground (Mishna Berura 559:11). When it is difficult to sit that low, one can sit on a low chair/bench (ibid.). While many assume the cutoff point is three tefachim, others say it is enough that it is noticeably lower than normal (see opinions in Dirshu 559:13). Certainly, whatever is acceptable during shiva is permitted on Tisha B’av.

Regarding your discomfort, on the one hand, the practice is supposed to make it uncomfortable. On the other hand, it is not intended to cause someone qualitatively more pain than the average person. If a low chair will work for you, it behooves you to obtain one, and if you decide not to bother and it is not damaging to you, it was your decision to handle the discomfort and/or stand part of the time. Since even by aveilut it is accepted that those for whom it is truly difficult may sit on a normal chair (Aruch Hashulchan, YD 387:3), if it becomes truly difficult you may sit as you need to. In summary, the order would be: using a low chair, certainly if it is less than three tefachim; standing as much as you need; and finally, sitting on a regular chair when it is necessary.

Regarding the timing, while there are sources about staying seated low until finishing Shacharit/Kinnot is over (see complex language of the Rama, OC 559:3). Important sources, including the Magen Avraham (559:3) and Pri Megadim (559, MZ 4) mention chatzot specifically. Nitei Gavriel (ibid. 68:13) posits that the proper position for Kinnot is sitting, even after chatzot, but his support for this claim is weak.  So, while those who are machmir while Kinnot continue have basis, even one who is often machmir need not do so if it is difficult.

A mishna (Ta’anit 26b) forbids haircutting during shavua shechal bo Tisha B’av. Ashkenazi minhag extends this to the entire Three Weeks (Rama, Orach Chayim 551:4).

For your son, there are two grounds to consider for leniency. One is that if he gets it before his halachic birthday, he is then a katan. Although we do not normally allow haircutting for ketanim (Shulchan Aruch, OC 551:14), the Mishna Berura (ad loc. 82) cites without a clear preference two opinions if this applies during the Three Weeks where the whole prohibition is just a disputed minhag. It seems that people are usually machmir on this.

Your main question is probably whether the simcha of a bar mitzva celebration permits haircuts/shaving. The Rama (OC 551:1) allows the principals to a brit mila to wear Shabbat clothes to the brit right up until Tisha B’av. Acharonim debate whether or not this leniency applies to haircutting as well, which is more stringent than wearing nice clothes (see Eliya Rabba 551:28; Sha’arei Teshuva 551:1). As we have seen, the Talmudic prohibition is only on shavua shechal bo, so that there is extra room for leniency earlier in the Nine Days, and certainly during the Three Weeks.

How does a bar mitzva boy’s halachic level of simcha compare to the principals of a brit mila. The Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kama 7:37) proves from the following gemara that we can call a bar mitzva a mitzva celebration. The gemara (Kiddushun 31a) tells of the blind sage, Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said that if he would be convinced that the blind are obligated in mitzvot, he would make a celebration because one who is commanded in mitzvot receives more reward for their fulfillment. If a celebration is in place for one finding out that he has always been obligated, it is certainly appropriate (he does not call it an obligation) when a bar mitzva becomes obligated in the mitzvot. The Magen Avraham (225:4) and Mishna Berura (225:6) accept this Yam Shel Shlomo. While the bar mitzva seuda is not mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch/Rama, it is at least as important as a siyum, where we allow eating meat and drinking wine in the Nine Days (Rama, OC 551:10). On the other hand, we do not find people making a siyum getting haircuts in the Nine Days. Therefore, poskim are not confident about allowing haircuts for a bar mitzva boy (see Nitei Gavriel, Bein Hametzarim 20:6; Mishneh Halachot (VI:45) regarding a bar mitzva during sefira, which is a somewhat weaker level of aveilut than the Three Weeks).

In your case, there is also little practical need for a Three Week haircut, as it is generally assumed that a male’s hair looks its best several days after the haircut. Therefore, we would recommend doing your son’s haircut before the Three Weeks, but if you forgot to do so and he does not look his best, we have seen enough room for leniency for a bar mitzva boy during the Three Weeks (see Nitei Gavriel ibid.).

Regarding your shaving, fundamentally, when haircuts are forbidden, that includes shaving (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 389:1). Rav Soloveitchik is among those who say that those for whom nowadays shaving is no longer done periodically but is daily upkeep, may shave during the Three Weeks. Unless you have a significant beard, shaving before the Three Weeks will not be of much help. We can acknowledge, that you too are likely somewhat of a principal to the bar mitzva (see language of Magen Avraham ibid. and notice that you also recite “Baruch shepetarani …” (Rama, OC 225:2). Rav Mordechai Willig (Am Mordechai, Berachot 29) explains that the father is celebrating the completion of the fulfillment of the formal mitzva to educate his son. Therefore, although you imply you do not shave during the Three Weeks, if you rely on the leniency for a moderately important need (e.g., Shabbat, an important business meeting), it is appropriate to do so for the bar mitzva as well.

There are two approaches to the halachic logic of ma’aser kesafim. Minchat Asher (Devarim 22) discusses whether ma’aser kesafim is an extension of ma’asrot on agricultural produce, or a recommended way of fulfilling one’s tzedaka obligations. The latter seems to be the mainstream approach (see Rambam, Matnot Aniyim 7:5; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 249:1).

There are also two main benefits from the mitzva of tzedaka: 1. Making funds available to the needy; 2. Involving the giver in an act of generosity. At times, there is tension between the optimization of these gains. For example, because of #2, it is better to give small amounts of tzedaka many times (Rambam to Avot 3:15), but this can be practically inefficient for organizations (see our attempt at a balanced approach in Living the Halachic Process II, F-3). We do not want to take a stand on the question of efficiency in giving small contributions to individual collectors who already traveled to your shul (their major overhead), and the impact of the difficulty of vetting them. It is, though, both spiritually regrettable and halachically questionable to turn down a poor person without giving him a small donation (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 247:1; Rama, YD 249:4). Your system is therefore understandable, balanced and common.

The short answer to your question is that you may deduct what you give in shul from your ma’aser ledger. Tzedaka is tzedaka, whether it is to an organization or to an individual. Where there is a machloket is whether the tzedaka you give when you have an empty ma’aser account and obligation can later be deducted from future ma’aser kesafim (see Ahavat Chesed II:18:2), and even there we are lenient (Tzedaka U’mishpat 5:11). But it is clear that if you have a ma’aser “pushka” at home and are approached by a collector on the street, you can give him “pocket money,” and then reimburse yourself from the pushka. In the same vein, you may write down the contributions and take out money from the tzedaka account or give less next time you replenish your account.

The question is whether you should want to. There is a kabbalistic approach that it is better to give 10% than more than that (Shiyarei Knesset Hagedola, Tur YD 249:1). However, we clearly hold that giving more is laudable (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 249:1). It therefore makes a lot of sense to use the bank account for the 10% and give as you determine appropriate beyond that (if you can afford it). This works well in countering a “problem” with the ma’aser kesafim” system – it “only” requires discipline to calculate and take off the money. However, the actual donations to not include generosity – one gives to Reuven not from his own pocket but by depleting available funds earmarked for the community of the needy. This compromises gain #2 above. If for certain contributions you make you do not seek reimbursement from the ma’aser ledger, those actions (which can be many in certain shuls) is a better fulfillment of the Rambam’s multiple small contributions idea.

This is not to criticize the pure ma’aser system, which in most cases, probably has caused its followers to give more than they otherwise would have (we cannot prove this contention). It is true that indications are that the regular use of such an accounting was not prevalent in Talmudic times (see Tosafot, Ta’anit 9a; Bava Kama 56b; I cannot explain further in this forum). However, there was an analogous system that was prevalent in Talmudic times – an enforced appraisal by the local tzedaka committee (see Bava Batra 8b), after which people were not expected to give additional tzedaka (see ibid. 43a). Apparently, while that system limited flexing the generosity muscles, it helped keep the poor of many communities alive and reasonably taken care of.

There are several points of machloket/safek that impact this topic.

The concept of mentioning me’ein hameora (=mehm – about the special day) in a beracha acharona (classically, in Birkat Hamazon) after the day is over because one started the meal during the day is the subject of a machloket Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 188). The Shulchan Aruch has an apparent contradiction on the matter (see OC 188:10; OC 271:6), and the strongest explanation is that out of doubt, it is appropriate to say mehm based on either the beginning of the meal or the time of the bentching (Magen Avraham 271:14). How bad it is to mention something from a wrong day is complicated (see Ginat V’radim OC, I:28, Mishna Berura 108:38).

There are two explanations of why to follow the beginning of the eating on Shabbat. One is that when one ate on Shabbat, he became obligated in mehm, and that obligation does not cease (see Mishna Berura 188:32). Another is that even though Shabbat is over, it is still a time that could be Shabbat if he had laudably extended it further (Magen Avraham 188:18 in the name of the Shelah). The second idea, related to extending the day, does not apply to Rosh Chodesh. The first idea does apply, but the comparison is imperfect because the obligation of mehm on Rosh Chodesh is weaker, as there is no obligation to eat and therefore one who skips Ya’a’leh V’yavo, does not have to repeat Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, OC 188:7). Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 10) rules that one who started a meal during Rosh Chodesh mentions mehm when bentching at night.

Does this concept also apply to Al Hamichya? Mehm is less important in Al Hamichya, as we rule that if one forgot it, even on Shabbat and Yom Tov, he need not repeat Al Hamichya (Mishna Berura 208:58). There are few reasons why not. For one, it is not unanimous that one ever has to do mehm in Al Hamichya (Sha’ar Hatziyun 208:60). Also, this type of non-bread eating does not typically fulfill required eating (ibid.). Finally, mehm might have been instituted only as a preferable recitation (ibid.). Therefore, the case for there being a need to say it after the day is weaker. Shevet Hakehati (V:42) argues that only important eating on a special day enables mehm to extend to the night and therefore eating that gets only Al Hamichya does not warrant it. There is room to disagree, as one way or the other, there was an obligation or expectation to recite mehm in this beracha acharona. As mentioned above, erring on the side of saying is not a major problem, as we say mehm when there is a safek, and in Al Hamichya it contains only a few “innocuous words,” which are not a beracha (see Ginat Veradim ibid.) and do not even include Hashem’s Name.

In your specific case, there was a reason to specifically not have added mehm (even if it had been a bread meal) – the fact that you already davened Ma’ariv, officially ushering in the new day. The Magen Avraham (188:17) says that fundamentally after eating makes one obligated in Birkat Hamazon with mehm, whenever you bentch, the special day should be mentioned. But once ushering in the new day with Ma’ariv, it looks like a contradiction if one makes a recitation that is a throwback to the previous day. Contradictions are problematic, not just unnecessary. There is significant logic to say that this only applies to day changes that have significant halachic consequence, like when Shabbat enters or ends, and not to the end of the day of Rosh Chodesh (see Machatzit Hashekel to 188:17). On the other hand, davening Ma’ariv any day has some halachic significance regarding ending halachot of the previous day (see Rama, Yoreh Deah 196:1). In any case, the Mishna Berura (188:34) clearly states that Ma’ariv of the evening after Rosh Chodesh precludes saying mehm of Rosh Chodesh.

The main halachic issue here is that one is not supposed to look at the kohanim during Birkat Kohanim. The sources begin with the mishna (Megilla 24b) that a kohen with blemishes on his hands must not do Birkat Kohanim because it can cause people to stare at the kohen’s hands. The Yerushalmi (Megilla 4:8) says that this shows that it is forbidden for the congregation to look, irrespective of whether the kohanim have blemishes, because it can cause them to not properly concentrate on the berachot. This is codified by the Rambam (Tefilla 14:7) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:23). (This concern is best understood according to the opinion that the tzibbur has a mitzva to accept the kohanim’s beracha; see Be’ur Halacha to 128:1; Dvar Avraham I:31.) The Mishna Berura (128:89) says, that since concentration is the problem, one should not be looking anywhere, and that the halacha only precludes extended looking, as only this would impair one’s concentration.

The explanation that most people think of is that it is disrespectful and potentially dangerous to look at a kohen’s hands during Birkat Kohanim because of a special Divine Presence (Shechina) that exists there. Indeed, the gemara (Chagiga 16a) says that doing so could damage one’s vision. The Beit Yosef (OC 128) points out that the Shechina is on the hands only in the Beit Hamikdash, where they would use the Shem Hameforash during Birkat Kohanim, and so our present-day practice of not looking relates only to concentration. (Some kabbalistically oriented sources say that the danger effect still exists – see Da’at Torah to the Shulchan Aruch ibid.) Although we have seen that it should thus be permitted to look casually, the Mishna Berura (ibid.) comments that the minhag is to not look at all as a remembrance of the care taken in the Beit Hamikdash.

In fact, some take further precautions. The Beit Yosef (ibid.) reports a minhag, which is indeed followed broadly today, for each kohen to pull their tallit over his head and even his hands. This prevents the kohanim from being distracted by the people, and the people from being distracted by the kohanim. By the same token, it also prevents seeing the hands, with the Shechina implications.

If this is not enough, there is the minhag you ask about, which is mentioned and encouraged by the Kaf Hachayim (OC 128:142), that members of the tzibbur also cover their heads with a tallit. He says that if one does not cover his eyes with a tallit, he at least should shut his eyes. Some mention (see Piskei Teshuvot 128:55) covering children with a tallit. This is probably more logical if the problem is the Shechina issue as opposed to concentration, as the latter is unlikely to be important for a child. At some point, apparently quite recently and as a grass roots idea, some fathers started putting their hands on their child’s head, as some sort of conduit for the beracha of the kohanim to land well on the children. It could be that this was borrowed from the practice of fathers to put their hands on their children’s heads when blessing them (including with Birkat Kohanim) on Friday night.

We have seen how the minhag you experienced in chutz la’aretz, was an extension of an extension of an extension. It could be that it just did not spread to Israeli communities here as much as abroad. The explanation could be that when Birkat Kohanim is a rare, highly anticipated event, people are more inclined to seek every possible enhancement, but not in Israel, where its frequency fosters a more basic approach.

Now that you live in Eretz Yisrael, we suggest to follow the local practice. However, especially since people do not look around at this time, you may, if you prefer, cover your head during Birkat Kohanim, as this is not divisive.

While the best option (someone else lighting) is unavailable, both of your options are supported by significant but minority opinions.

The gemara (Shabbat 23b) says that one should not light Shabbat candles too early, because it is not clear that it is being done for Shabbat (Rashi ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:4) rules that this is problematic even after plhm if she does not accept Shabbat at that time and that it cannot be before plhm, which is too early to accept Shabbat (Magen Avraham 261:10). Therefore, the standard assumption of poskim is that it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva of candle lighting before plhm (see Be’ur Halacha to 263:4; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:12: Orchot Shabbat 33:35).

However, it is possible to question this assumption. Firstly, on a certain level, avoiding lighting “too early” may be only l’chatchila (Mishna Berura 263:20 regarding after plhm but well before sunset without accepting Shabbat). While many apply this only after plhm, others say that plhm is a strict cutoff only for ushering in a new day early, not for candle lighting done for Shabbat use (Eretz Tzvi I:103, based on R. Akiva Eiger on Rama, OC 263:4). Second, some Rishonim and poskim allow lighting two hours before nightfall (see Be’ur Halacha ibid.). On the other hand, Orchot Shabbat (35:(83)) says that this is said only within Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion that nightfall is very late.

We can logically add that if the problem before plhm is that it is too early to connect a lighting to Shabbat the situation is different in the summer in places where it is common to accept Shabbat soon after plhm. Would anyone watching you light candles and run to Mincha, followed by Kabbalat Shabbat, think that you did not light for Shabbat?! This is strengthened by the fact that you, as a man, do not accept Shabbat for around a half hour after lighting candles, all year. Furthermore, nowadays virtually the only reason to light candles is for Shabbat. Despite these arguments, I cannot recommend relying on and certainly not making a beracha on a lighting that the consensus of poskim says is ineffective for the formal mitzva.

Your idea of making a beracha later touches on how we view the mitzva of lighting candles. The main purpose of the mitzva is apparently to make a nicer Shabbat atmosphere (see Shabbat 23b; Living the Halachic Process VI, C-17). It is less clear if its halachic nature is the act of lighting the candles with the purpose in mind (see ibid.; compare to Chanuka, based on Shabbat 23a), or the mitzva fulfillment is in receiving the benefit on Shabbat, with technical grounds dictating that one lights earlier. If the latter is correct, then making the beracha at the time one is experiencing the benefit can work (see Divrei Malkiel IV:5; Rambam, Berachot 11:5).

Indeed, a venerable opinion says that one who will be out of the house at the time of lighting can light before leaving and make the beracha upon returning. Most poskim reject the idea (Magen Avraham 263:11; Mishna Berura 263:21) of making a beracha on a light that was already lit, but the opinion is not fully rejected (see Be’ur Halacha to 263:5).

In short, each of your ideas is reasonable from a halachic perspective. On the other hand, as practical Halacha, neither is recommended. My recommendation is to daven Mincha earlier, light candles at plhm, and proceed immediately to Kabbalat Shabbat, where you need not be more than a couple of minutes late. However, if a rav with whom you confer recommends one of your approaches, I have no qualms.