ASK THE RABBI

The first question, whether the mirpeset requires a mezuza in its own right, has two parts. The gemara (Yoma 11b) derives that only “houses made for living” require a mezuza. There are different indications as to whether what Chazal called mirpeset requires (see ibid. and Menachot 33b), and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 286:7) rules that it depends if there is an entrance from a house to the mirpeset. However, that is not talking about a balcony. Most poskim posit that our mirpesot require mezuzot (see Chovat Hadar 2:5) because stepping out for air etc. is a normal way of using one’s house. Although a house needs a roof to require a mezuza (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 14), it is normal for a balcony to not have a (full) roof, and lack of one does not necessarily exempt (see Sha’arei Hamezuza 2:(11)). According to some opinions, and possibly depending on certain parameters, one would affix the mezuza to a mirpeset without a beracha (see ibid. (12)).

The balcony’s size is an important factor. The minimum size for a house is 4 amot (around 2 meters or a little more) by 4 amot, regarding several halachot including mezuza (Sukka 3a). The Rosh (ibid. 16) posits that both its length and width must be 4 amot. Most early sources understand the Rambam (ibid. 2) as saying that it suffices that the room’s area be 16 sq. amot, even if one of its dimensions is less than 4 amot, and the Shach (286:23) treats the matter as a doubt. According to these rules, it is a doubt whether your mirpeset (around 20 sq. amot, but not 4 amot wide) is big enough to require a mezuza. The Pitchei Teshuva (YD 286:11) cites an opinion that a room whose size is viable for its living purposes requires a mezuza even if it is “undersized.” While this is a respected opinion (see Minchat Yitzchak I:8), it is unclear to what extent we accept it (see Chovat Hadar 4:(16)).

The indications are, then, that it is a doubt whether your balcony deserves, from “its sake,” a mezuza, and in which case, affixing it on the right going out without a beracha on it could make sense. However, even according to the possibility that the mirpeset does not have its own mezuza obligation, its connection to the living room may affect matters.

We put the mezuza on the right side going into a house, but when going from room A to room B within it, we must decide which room we are considered entering from which, to determine which side is “the right.” The major factors are: 1) which room is used more significantly; 2) into which room does the door open; 3) most importantly, when one can only enter room B by means of room A, we view it that we are going into the “dead end” (Taz, YD 289:4; Pitchei Shearim 289:67). Your mirpeset is such a dead end, ostensibly indicating to affix the mezuza on the right side going out to the balcony. (A minority opinion holds that since the mirpeset is subservient to the house, one always puts it in the direction of entering the main house (Chazon Ish, YD 168:5).)

However, if the mirpeset does not deserve a mezuza, it may enable the following possibility. Just like an entrance from a non-mezuza-entity into a house requires a mezuza, so does a non-mezuza-entity mirpeset need one going into the house. Then, you would need a mezuza going into the house, on the right side (see R. Akiva Eiger to YD 186:13).

In summation, there are many indications in different directions. We would be tempted to suggest a mezuza on each side, but we must not do that (see our column, Kedoshim 5774). We recommend affixing it on the right coming into the living room, doing so along with a mezuza for a definitely required location, so one can “share” the berachot.

As is often appropriate in complex kashrut questions, we will first explain why there could be a problem, introduce indications for leniency, and see if they suffice.

The rule is that there is no transfer between a solid and a liquid that are sitting in/alongside each other unless the contact is for 24 hours, in which case we say kavush k’mevushal (soaking is like cooking) (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 105:1). However, if the liquid is sharp, there is assumed to be full transfer of taste in “k’dei sheyartiach,” the amount of time it takes to put a liquid on the fire and have it heat up to a boil. (There is a transfer of a “k’dei klipa” (a peel’s worth) in less time (ibid.).) This is assumed to be around 18 minutes or possibly less than that (see Darchei Teshuva 105:42). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) lists vinegar as such a sharp liquid.

Vinegar being a davar charif also ostensibly knocks out two broad leniencies. Fleishig (or milchig) taste that enters a utensil and then is expelled and absorbed into a pareve food (called nat bar nat) is too weak to be the building block of a forbidden mixture of basar b’chalav (Shulchan Aruch, YD 95:2). (Whether this applies here seems to be a machloket between the Shulchan Aruch and Rama, ibid.3). Forbidden (or fleishig and milchig) particles that sat in the walls of a utensil for 24 hours deteriorate to the point that whatever taste it adds to another food is negative and therefore not halachically significant (ibid. 103:5). Neither of these leniencies apply when the food absorbing the taste is a davar charif, as it tends to give prominence to weak and/or negative tastes (ibid. 96:1).

On the other hand, the Shach (ad loc. 2) says that vinegar does not cause quick transfer of taste. There is an apparent contradiction in the Mishna Berura on whether he agrees with the Shulchan Aruch that vinegar speeds up transfer (Mishna Berura 648:54) or the Shach (Mishna Berura 447:71). He hints at the following way to reconcile the approaches (in Sha’ar Hatziyun 648:60, based on Magen Avraham 447:28). Strong vinegar causes quick absorption; vinegar that is not strong is treated like regular liquid (i.e., 24-hour cutoff).

Our case has a further level of leniency in that the solid object is not a food but a utensil, which is less absorbent. While most poskim say that a utensil in contact with a liquid davar charif is treated the same as a solid food, some are more lenient regarding transfer of taste between a liquid davar charif and a utensil (see Mishbetzot Zahav, YD 105:1; Chochmat Adam 57:10; The Laws of Kashrus (Forst) p. 329-330).

An additional, strong, reason for leniency is that after several minutes of spicing cucumber salad, a significant amount of liquid (mainly water) starts oozing out of the cucumbers, into the pool of vinegar (can you confirm it happened in your case?). As we have seen, the level of sharpness can be impactful, so dilution is significant. We also find that water specifically can counteract a davar charif’s effect (see similar idea in Mishna Berura 447:43).

Other points of leniency relate to the fact that some of assumptions of the initial indication of a problem are not unanimous. There are some opinions that only that which appears in the gemara as a davar charif has that status (see Beit Yosef, YD 96). There is also an opinion that the halacha that a davar charif makes a negative taste impactful does not apply to a liquid davar charif (see Misbetzot Zahav, YD 96:1).

We find different starting times for mitzvot of the night/next halachic day. The time for evening Kri’at Shema is tzeit hakochavim (=tzhk; the emergence of three stars) (Berachot 2a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 235:1). The main mitzvot of Seder night are also from tzhk (Rosh, Pesachim 10:2). In contrast, one may make Kiddush on Shabbat from plag hamincha, well before sunset (Shulchan Aruch, OC 267:2), and according to many, can also daven Ma’ariv then (Berachot 27a; Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 233:1).

Regarding sefirat ha’omer, the Rashba (Shut I:154) posits that counting while it is still daytime is worthless, because the number day counted is wrong, and one must repeat it at night. He and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 489:2) say that “those who are careful” count after tzhk.

However, there are halachic indications for leeway. The Avudraham (see Beit Yosef, OC 489), says that one who davens in a minyan for Ma’ariv before the end of the day, counts with them without a beracha and should plan to repeat the counting at night with a beracha. He explains that he should do this with intention that if he forgets to repeat it later, the earlier counting can be of some value. The Beit Yosef is skeptical of this condition’s efficacy, but he cites the halacha anyway (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 3). The assumption, though, is that we do not want to rely on the early sefira.

However, regarding bein hashemashot (=bhsh), between sunset and tzhk, there is significant room for leniency, especially because it is likely that sefirat ha’omer in our times, when no korban ha’omer is brought, is only a Rabbinic obligation (see Tosafot, Menachot 66a; the Rambam, Temidin 7:24 posits it is still from the Torah.) The Magen Avraham (489:6) says one who counted during bhsh fulfills the mitzva. The Mishna Berura (489:14) explains that since bhsh is a safek of whether it is night or day and since we assume the mitzva is Rabbinic, leniency is understandable.

However, many poskim frown upon counting during bhsh. Some warn against dismissing the Rambam’s opinion that the mitzva is still from the Torah (see Eliya Rabba 489:10). Others point out that we avoid relying on doubts regarding Rabbinic mitzvot when we can do them without doubt; this is especially so when a beracha is involved and when one night of invalid sefira can disqualify future nights’ sefira and their berachot (see Divrei Yatziv, OC 214).

The exact time of your shul’s sefira can be impactful. The earliest time that might be tzhk is 13.5 minutes after sunset (there are different opinions, by a few minutes, of when sunset is in hilly regions); many posit that tzeit is approximately 20 minutes after sunset. On the other hand, according to Rabbeinu Tam’s approach (albeit our communities mainly do not factor it in to their decisions), bhsh starts only around an hour after sunset.

Because this is a joke and not a practical case, we do not have to analyze all of the potentially impactful details. I guess what makes the story funny is the implication that Shimon only thought of paying at that time and place because he hoped that the loss of the holdup would fall on Reuven. Apparently, though, the circumstances are more important than the intention.

The basic principle is that if a borrower wants to pay and the lender does not want to receive, the lender can be forced to receive. If he does not, and the means of payment that the borrower leaves for him is lost or stolen, the lender does not have a claim to the borrower to replace it (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 120:2). This does not mean, though, that the borrower can always force the lender into unfavorable payment scenarios. Halacha balances the two sides’ rights and concerns in the following areas.

Mode of payment: If the borrower has available cash, he must pay with cash, but if he does not have cash, he can give the lender movable objects of the borrower’s choice (Shulchan Aruch, CM 101:1-2). The lender can delay repayment to wait for a time at which the borrower will have cash to give (ibid. 4). If payment is in real estate, average quality land is the basic standard (see ibid. 102:1). This element is not the issue in your case.

 Timing of payment: The time that the debt is due is primarily for the benefit of the borrower, i.e., the lender cannot demand return of the money before the time set. Therefore, if the borrower wants to pay early, he has the right to do so (ibid. 74:2). However, since it is somewhat suspicious that one wants to pay early, if there are signs that the early payment may cause a loss to the lender, the lender can refuse to receive the money at that time (ibid.). Some examples are when the currency of payment is soon to be devalued or the tax collector is about to appraise taxes based on money on hand (ibid.). When the time to pay has come, we are to assume that the time of payment is fair for all, and we will not readily allow the lender to refuse to receive it then (ibid.). However, if it can be demonstrated that there is a significant and immediate disadvantage to receiving it then, it is likely that the lender can refuse (see S’ma ad loc. 5; Shach ad loc. 10). We then treat that timing like the following scenario regarding place.

Place of payment: The mishna (Bava Kama 118a) rules that if one borrowed money from his counterpart in an inhabited area, the borrower cannot force the lender to accept payment in a desert, because of the lender’s expected difficulty to preserve that which he received (Rashi ad loc.). If the borrower wants to return the loan to the lender in an inhabited area, but the borrower will have to go through a desert to get home, he may return it if it is on time but not if it is early (Shulchan Aruch, CM 74:1). The Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 1) says that in that case, the theft danger of going through the desert is minimal because he can arrange to go with a protected caravan. This indicates that that the important thing is not the place’s geographic category but the question whether the payment will be safe there.

Your case is a mix between a bad time and a bad place. In other words, the place may be fine except when this robber is there and the time may be fine in almost any place, but the combination of the two makes it a damaging time/place, at which Reuven does not have to accept payment. To conclude with a joke with a hint of halachic insight, we might suggest to Reuven to respond: “I would be happy to receive payment from you … in just a moment. As soon as our new friend (i.e., the thug) finishes his business, give me the money.”

There is no individual mitzva to eat five k’zeitim of matza. Rather, the fact that matza “wears different hats” makes it necessary to eat multiple k’zeitim – between three and five to be “less exact.”

The first two “hats” come at what we call “motzi, matza.” The Seder is a Yom Tov meal, which, Rabbinically, requires bread, which must be matza rather than chametz. At this time (according to most Rishonim – see below), we also want to fulfill the mitzva from the Torah to eat matza (Pesachim 120a). The interaction between the two requirements causes complication. We usually have two full loaves (lechem mishneh) for Shabbat/Yom Tov meals (Berachot 39b). On Pesach, we use a broken “loaf” of matza, based on the idea of lechem oni (ibid.). One machloket Rishonim is whether we need lechem mishneh plus a broken matza or that one of the two loaves should be broken (see Rosh, Pesachim 10:30). We pasken the former approach (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 475:1).

Another machloket Rishonim (see Tosafot, Berachot 39b) is whether the same matza can be used for the two elements. One approach is that if one uses one matza despite the two berachot (and elements), it violates the rule to not do “mitzvot in bunches.” A second approach is that it is enough to eat from one matza because there is one classic mitzva (eating matza). The beracha of Hamotzi is just a regular beracha on food, not a separate act of mitzva or a sign of one. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 475:1) rules that we must eat from separate matzot and adds that one requires a k’zayit from each. This is the “second k’zayit.”

Some question why we would need a full k’zayit from the “matza of Hamotzi,” considering that we make Hamotzi on any amount of bread. The Pri Chadash (ad loc., cited by the Mishna Berura 475:9) says it is because of a machloket whether the whole matza is for Hamotzi and the broken one is for the mitzva of matza, or vice versa. This causes us to treat each matza as if it is the one for the mitzva of matza, so that we need a k’zayit of each. Some say that this chumra is anachronistic. Since nowadays participants only receive a small amount from the “whole” and “broken” matzot held by the leader of the Seder, there is little purpose for more than a second full k’zayit (see Dirshu 474:8; Halichot Shlomo, Moadim I:9:40). Others try to uphold the minhag of two k’zeitim on various grounds (see Piskei Teshuvot 475:5). In any case, all major requirements are fulfilled by eating one k’zayit from any matza (Mishna Berura 575:11).

The next k’zayit is for korech, which is a remembrance of the way Hillel instructed people to eat matza and maror together when having a Seder with a Korban Pesach. For this, all agree that one k’zayit suffices.

The final eating is the afikoman. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 477:1) suffices with one k’zayit, but Acharonim bring a minhag to have two k’zeitim. Some Rishonim (see Rashi, Pesachim 119b) say afikoman is intended to be the main fulfillment of eating matza, but that does not explain two k’zeitim since there is no new beracha of Hamotzi on it. The Magen Avraham (477:1) says that since the afikoman is a remembrance of the Korban Pesach, (Rosh, Pesachim 10:34), we have one k’zayit to represent the korban and one representing the matza eaten with it. The Taz (477:1) says that we eat an especially big amount because the mitzva is dear to us. Either way, this minhag is a chumra, which is no more than preferable (Mishna Berura 477:1; Yalkut Yosef, Tzafun 1).

The stakes between the different opinions are small. Poskim agree that for the “second k’zayit” each time, one can follow a lenient opinion on the size of a k’zayit, and most of us will eat a much bigger shiur if we assume only k’zayit (see Ohr L’tziyon III:15:12). So our big k’zayit will come at least close to covering a basic two k’zeitim.

The Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:1) forbids eating matza on Erev Pesach, comparing it to having relations with one’s fiancée before their wedding. One explanation is that when eating matza is about to be a mitzva, one should wait to eat it as a mitzva as opposed to personal desire (see Levush, OC 471:2; Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I:155). The Rambam (Chametz U’matza 6:12) says that it is to make the mitzva of matza recognizable. There is a machloket among Rishonim whether this restriction is only at the time of day when it is already forbidden to eat chametz (Rosh, Pesachim 3:7) or is all day (Ramban, Pesachim 15b of Rif’s pages, accepted by the Rama, Orach Chayim 471:2). Poskim disagree regarding the night before (see opinions in Dirshu 471:7). (This is important when Erev Pesach is on Shabbat – see Living the Halachic Process IV, D-15). Before this time, no one forbids eating matza on standard halachic grounds.

The expansion to well before Pesach comes at the time of early Acharonim. The Sheyarei Knesset Hagedola (471, HBY 3, quoted as an option by several Acharonim) cites a minhag in Constantinople to refrain from eating matza from Rosh Chodesh Nisan. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe ibid.) explains the logic as follows. Once one is already supposed to be thinking about Pesach, there is logic to avoid eating matza before it is a mitzva. The earliest time is 30 days before Pesach (see Pesachim 6a), which is too early to expect of most people, but it is positive if righteous people accept it upon themselves from Rosh Chodesh or even 30 days.

The Sheyarei Knesset Hagedola seems to understand the rationale differently. He connects the minhag to a minhag the Rama (ibid.) brings to eat a minimum amount of matza on the first day of Pesach in chutz la’aretz to help go into the second Seder with an appetite for more matza. This stresses the “experiential” rather than the matza’s halachic status.

Even on Erev Pesach, a few leniencies might apply to your case. It is agreed that it is only for the type of matza one can use for the Seder, which excludes at least matza ashira (egg matzas) (Shulchan Aruch, OC 471:2). It is a good question whether it applies to matzot whose physical qualities are like matzot for Pesach but were not prepared with the halachot of matzot for Pesach. The Rivash (Shut 402), stressing the halachic side, forbids to eat such matza on Erev Pesach because of the opinions that permit them for the Seder if proper matzot are not available. The experiential approach helps us understand the lenient opinion regarding the “extension time” that those who always eat hand-matzot at the Seder may eat machine matzot before, because they taste different (Piskei Teshuvot 471:4 based on unnamed poskim).

Based on regular halachic rules, there is no need to be machmir on an optional extension of a Rabbinic halacha in the face of important health considerations. (Even if you can find dietary alternatives, few people are good at effectively changing a system that is working.) The problem is that you have been refraining even from matza that is not for Pesach. While a family minhag is weaker than the minhag of a place (Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 214:5), since you have been following it as an adult (ibid.) and especially if it has been in your family for generations (see Kol Nidrei 75:8), it should be binding on you.

You might draw on the Divrei Yatziv’s (OC 188) logic – it should be permitted to eat matza due to sickness, because it is not giving in to desires. Even if we will not rely on that logic, we usually assume an originally optional family minhag does not apply when a special strong need exists to not follow it (see Chayei Adam II:127:6). However, it is best to also do hatarat nedarim on the minhag (see Kol Nidrei 76:3).  

There are no major issues, but there are a few that are worthwhile to raise.

Normally, it is forbidden to eat a half hour before the time for Megilla reading (Mishna Berura 692:15; see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 235:2), which is tzeit hakochavim. However, since seuda shlishit is a mitzva and it freezes, in some ways, the coming of the next day, one may continue to eat until tzeit hakochavim (Mikraei Kodesh (Harari), Purim 4:5 in the name of Rav Mordechai Eliyahu). Using one’s standard assumption of when tzeit hakochavim is (not including the extra time for ending Shabbat), he might have to finish slightly before usual. There may be also be a slight advantage to finishing eating bread by sunset or at least tzeit hakochavim to avoid the question about whether he should be saying Al Hanissim in Birkat Hamazon (see Mishna Berua 188:33). In any case, one should not recite Al Hanissim even if he bentches after tzeit hakochavim (ibid.).

It is generally forbidden to prepare (hachana) on Shabbat for Motzaei Shabbat, even for a purpose of an after-Shabbat mitzva (see Mishna Berura 667:5). However, one may prepare the laining on Shabbat even from a Megilla scroll (it is therefore not muktzeh – Mishna Berura 688:18). It is forbidden to bring the Megilla to shul on Shabbat, even if there is an eiruv, due to hachana (Chayei Adam II:155:10), unless he will read/learn from it before Shabbat ends (Sha’arei Teshuva 693:2; see Machazei Eliyahu 58).

Rishonim debate whether to read Megillat Esther in shul before or after Havdala (see Darchei Moshe, OC 693:2). The opinion accepted both by Ashkenazim (Rama, OC 693:1) and Sephardim (see Chazon Ovadia, Purim p. 68) is to read the Megilla before Havdala. The Levush and Gra (to OC 693:1) say the reason is to delay the exit of Shabbat (based on Pesachim 105b) despite the preference that we usually do the more common mitzva first. This is one of the factors in the machloket whether to light Chanuka candles before or after Havdala (see Mishna Berura 681:3 and Be’ur Halacha ad loc.). Some say that the matters are fully equivalent, and in both areas, in shul one does Havdala after the present mitzva, whereas at home there is more reason to do Havdala first (Da’at Torah to 693:1). Some say that Megilla reading has a special status of pirsumei nisa that exceeds even that of Chanuka candles (Imrei Esh, OC 53).

Another machloket is, given that Havdala is done after the Megilla, whether one should at least make the beracha on fire before that. The Kolbo’s (41) first opinion is that we should thank Hashem for light before benefitting from it during the reading, and this is the minhag of most Sephardim (Chazon Ovadia ibid. p. 67). Ashkenazim follow the Kolbo’s second opinion, that there is no problem with using light before the beracha, as that requirement is fulfilled every morning, and here it is a general praise for Hashem’s introducing fire to Adam (Pri Megadim, MZ 693:1, based on Maharsh Halevi, OC 28).

There is an apparently relatively recent practice, with significant upside in many communities – to hold Ma’ariv on Motzaei Shabbat/Purim well after its regular time. This gives families the time to prepare for Megilla reading (including driving, getting kids’ costumes on, etc.). It is possible to make Havdala before Ma’ariv, including the Havdala candle, after making a declaration of ending Shabbat, at the proper time (see Mishna Berura 294:1). Under these circumstances that many people will be doing significant melacha before Ma’ariv, it is likely also worthwhile to do full Havdala (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:10). There is no problem here doing Havdala before Megilla reading, considering that the communal reading is not ready to be done yet (one should not eat other than drinking the “Havdala wine”). In shuls that never do Havdala on Motzaei Shabbat, there should be no need on Purim. For those shuls that recite Havdala, it is best that one who has not yet recited Havdala do so.

The gemara (Berachot 42a) says that for pat haba’ah b’kisnin (=phbbk), food that shares qualities with bread but is not normal bread, whether one recites Hamotzi or Mezonot on it depends on whether one is koveia seuda (sets a meal) on it. When phbbk gets Hamotzi, one also recites BHM on it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 168:6) and washes on it (ibid. 158:1).

To be a candidate for bread status, food must be made from “the five grains” and be baked or look like bread. (Spaghetti is not phbbk or treated like bread no matter how much of it one eats – see ibid. 168:10). Various characteristics determine whether foods that pass these tests are bread or phbbk (ibid. 7).

A k’zayit of bread suffices to require BHM, (ibid. 9), but if one eats less, phbbk cannot take it over that threshold, because objects with different shiurim do not join together to reach the shiur (see Shabbat 76a). However, if one was slightly short of the shiur needed for phbbk, the bread, with its smaller shiur, can complete the bigger shiur needed for phbbk (ibid.). Different types of bread combine for a k’zayit and types of phbbk combine for kevi’at seuda. (Arguably, elevating phbbk to bread status must focus on one food, but I have not found sufficient basis for this in the sources.)

The Magen Avraham (=MA) went much further in combining things, claiming that it is enough that the meal with phbbk is a real meal. He writes: “If he set his meal on [phbbk], even though he ate with it meat and other things and if he had eaten [that amount he had of] it by itself he would not have been satiated from it, he still recites Hamotzi and BHM.” His approach emanates from the gemara (ibid.) and Rishonim who describe eating of these semi-breads as that which is done at a normal meal. After all, a normal meal includes foods other than bread. So while no amount of cooked or fried grain-based food could get Hamotzi, oatmeal that you mentioned and many other things one has as part of a meal with, say, a boreka, can, according to the MA, change the boreka’s beracha to Hamotzi.

I must warn you, though, that it is very difficult to apply the matter of being koveia seuda on phbbk. First, there is a machloket whether the amount of kevi’at seuda to eat depends on the individual’s satiation or how much most people eat (see opinions in Rosh, Berachot 6:30). Another regarded approach sets the amount at the size (weight/volume?) of three or four eggs. This is a cutoff point regarding certain halachot of serious eating, even though it does not satiate most people (see Mishna Berura 168:24).

There is also a machloket whether we accept the MA to include other foods eaten at the meal to reach kevi’at seuda – the Mishna Berura (ibid.) accepts him; the Birkei Yosef (OC 168:6) and Aruch Hashulchan (OC 168:17) disagree. There are also several permutations and opinions about how broadly to apply the MA. Is it only for foods that are eaten with the mezonot, e.g., crackers and cheese, a sandwich on a “mezonot roll” (see discussions in V’zot Haberacha 4:3; Netivot Haberacha 57)? Is it only when the mezonot and other foods are eaten at the same time (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 54:(132) in the name of Rav Auerbach)? Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC II, 32) has an expansive approach. While the MA assumes the phbbk must play a major part of the meal, Rav Moshe reasons that today’s trend to eat less bread at meals than was once standard lowers the amount of phbbk needed as well.

Many poskim assume there is a difference between l’chatchila and b’di’eved, i.e., avoid meals with significant phbbk and no bread due to the huge gray area. Nevertheless, common practice is to eat non-bread meals without Hamotzi/BHM (see Avnei Yashfeh II, OC 20; Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:182).  

We wish you good and improved health and suggest contemplating happier things. Regarding these questions, halacha is totally “on your side” for several reasons. We take the opportunity to investigate various categories of unintentional “violations” in general terms.

Even if one purposely moves a muktzeh object with parts of the body people do not usually use to move things (i.e., everything but the hands), most say that the standard (Rabbinic) prohibitions of muktzeh, such as moving something to protect it, do not apply (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 311:8; Mishna Berura 311:30). Although some are stringent if one directly moves muktzeh with any part of the body, especially for no good reason (see Chazon Ish, OC 47:12; Dirshu 311:33), all agree there is no problem if one incidentally moves it as he walks (Chazon Ish ibid.).

Let us now imagine one accidentally banging into something that activates a Shabbat violation. Did he mistakenly violate Shabbat? The most severe category of unintentional Shabbat violation is shogeg – one intends to, for example, light a candle, just that he forgot it was Shabbat or that lighting a candle is forbidden on Shabbat. This person requires the atonement of a korban chatot (sometimes multiple korbanot – see Rambam, Shegagot 7:2-4).

A significantly lower level of blame exists regarding cases of mitasek – a person who did not intend to do the forbidden action/result. This comes in different forms. A) He did not mean to do the action that ended up; B) He intended to do the action to an object in a manner that would have been permitted. Mitasek is exempt from a korban in various prohibitions, except those involving physical enjoyment (Kritot 19b). There is an additional level of exemption for Shabbat (melechet machashevet – one planned to do the melacha, but it came out differently than planned (Rambam, Shabbat 1:9)).

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shut I:8) posits that there is a qualitative difference between the exemption of mitasek for Shabbat as opposed to other non-enjoyment prohibitions. Regarding the latter, there is a violation, just that it is insufficient to obligate a korban. One ramification is that if one is aware that his friend is about to violate one of these aveirot as a mitasek, he must act to stop the violation. However, a mitasek does not violate Shabbat and a friend does not have to stop him (at least from the fundamental, Torah-level perspective). The Oneg Yom Tov (20) assumes that even a mitasek of Shabbat is considered violating Shabbat and needs to be told to stop. Some level of regret also explains the halacha that one should check his pockets before Shabbat to make sure he does not have muktzeh and/or will not carry in a place that does not have an eiruv (Shabbat 12a).

The above, though, is likely when one has some idea of what he is doing, even if not all the details. After all, if one is planning to do permitted action A and knows that unintended forbidden result B might possibly occur, he may do action A because of “davar she’eino mitkaven.” It cannot be that after acting with permission, if it came out that result B occurred, that he needs to have regrets for what he did, given that the rabbis knew it was likely and still permitted it (see He’arot of Rav Elyashiv, Ketubot 5b). Since we would definitely let a wobbly person walk in a crowded room, we will not say he violated Shabbat by banging into something.

In the sad case of the heart attack, it is not even considered that he did an action. When someone falls down, it is gravity that is acting upon him (see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 74b).

The gemara (Menachot 36a) states that one makes one beracha on tefillin but makes two if he talks between putting on the shel yad and shel rosh. One approach in Rishonim, accepted by Sephardim (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 25:6) is that these numbers are total berachot for the two tefillin. One normally recites only l’haniach before fastening the shel yad. If he talks, al mitzvat tefillin is added for the shel rosh. The opinion that Ashkenazim accept (see Rama ad loc.) is that one always recites al mitzvat on the shel rosh. One who spoke also repeats l’haniach before the shel rosh.

Therefore, if saying bskmlv when you did is a full hefsek, you should have recited both berachot on the shel rosh (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 9). The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 32) adds that one should move the shel yad from its place and back and tighten the strap right before reciting l’haniach.

The Mishna Berura (25:21) cautions not to recite bskmlv before securing the shel rosh in its proper position and says that reciting it early creates a beracha l’vatala, requiring repeating the beracha. As he treats bskmlv at the wrong time as a hefsek even b’di’eved, it follows that you, as an Ashkenazi, should have made the two berachot before putting on the shel rosh.

A few things trouble me about this Mishna Berura’s contention (Rav Y.S. Klein (not famous) also raised these issues.) 1. If the early bskmlv is like talking, both berachot should be repeated, yet his language implies that only al mitzvat tefillin is repeated! If he means only one beracha, why, and what would it mean for our case? 2. The Mishna Berura’s source (Pri Megadim, EA 25:10) says that early bskmlv is a hefsek, but he does not say whether one must repeat the beracha. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 167:6) says that although one should not say anything between Hamotzi and eating the bread, if it was related to improving the meal, the beracha need not be repeated. One would think that bskmlv said a little early is related enough to not disqualify!

There are other reasons why a mistimed bskmlv might not disqualify. The reason for bskmlv after al mitzvat tefillin is the possibility that it is l’vatala (see Magen Avraham 25:10). This is based on the Yerushalmi (Berachot 6:1, accepted by Shulchan Aruch, OC 206:6) that the affront of desecrating Hashem’s Name with a beracha l’vatala is mitigated by using the beracha as a prompt for bskmlv. This makes it similar to saying baruch hu u’varuch shmo (= bhuvsh; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 124:5) after hearing His Name in a beracha. There is a machloket (see Mishna Berura 124:21) whether the beracha of one who says bhuvsh when he should not have is disqualified. Ma’aseh Rokeiach (Berachot 1:11) assumes that even if the one making the beracha inserts bhuvsh into his beracha, it is not l’vatala. It makes sense that a misplaced bskmlv would be subject to the same machloket.

There is logic that reciting something one thought was appropriate for the beracha but was mistaken (like here) is not a hefsek b’di’eved. It even seems to have a clear source – if one recites on whiskey, “… melech ha’olam borei pri hagafen shehakol n’hiya b’dvaro,” the mistaken words are not a hefsek b’di’eved (Shulchan Aruch, OC 209:2). Rav Preil (Rav of Elizabeth; Hamaor, vol. I, 12) says it is because the mistaken part was said with the intention of it being right (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata  47:(218)). Rav Kook (Orach Mishpat 127) argued, saying it is because he “erased” the mistaken words.

In summary, I am torn between “pulls” – 1. Follow the Mishna Berura’s apparent opinion to make two berachot on the shel rosh. 2. Consider the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling (to which the Rama is sensitive) that after talking, one makes one beracha plus our suggestion that bskmlv is better than talking and apply safek berachot l’hakel.