ASK THE RABBI

Each of you has a reasonable claim. We will explore different factors, approaches and gray areas.

Classical libun involves using an agent (usually, water) to remove a substance that is embedded in a fabric. Cleaning that lacks either water or absorbed substance is apt to either only violate a Rabbinic prohibition or, often, be permitted.

One of the test cases is found in Shabbat 147a. The gemara says that one who shakes out his garment on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition. Rashi explains that this refers to shaking out dirt, and Tosafot says that this could not be libun (due to lack of water – Ritva) but rather it must be talking about shaking out dew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:1) rules like Tosafot, but the Rama cites Rashi’s position, which includes dirt in the prohibition. Sephardi poskim disagree about which opinion to follow (Ohr L’Tzion II:24:1 – stringent; Yalkut Yosef (OC 302:9) – lenient), but the consensus among Ashkenazi poskim is that libun could apply to shaking off dirt (Mishna Berura 302:6).

However, the gemara sets conditions for violating libun in this case: the clothes are black and new, and one is makpid on their cleanliness. This is because a non-classic cleaning is forbidden only when these factors make the cleaning significant enough. The Be’ur Halacha (to 302:1) posits that there are not fully three separate conditions. Rather, when it is black and new, particularness is assumed until it is clearly missing, whereas without those objective factors, only when one is particularly makpid is it forbidden.

Each of the factors needs clarification. Poskim say that black includes other dark colors (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 15:28-29). New also likely includes something that “looks new” (ibid.). These qualities are hard to quantify, but note that, generally, most people save their best-looking clothing for Shabbat. The degree of hakpada is also elusive. Orchot Shabbat (13:25) describes it as whether one will go out with it without cleaning (what level of alternative existing is unclear.) Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) differs slightly – he would not put it on dirty. Perhaps there is a machloket if he would not choose to wear it but he would not remove it once on. He adds that if one is makpid only because of Shabbat’s honor, that is not called makpid.

Another factor relates to the modes of cleaning. Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) says that even when it is permitted based on the above parameters, that is to bang it softly, not to shake vigorously or hit hard with a hand. In the context of removing a clump of mud (Shulchan Aruch, OC 302:7), the Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) says that it is permitted when a mark of dirt remains. He similarly argues (to 302:1) that the prohibition of shaking off dirt when one is makpid is only when it becomes totally clean. Some argue that in the standard case, a mark from dirt/dust will remain and yet it is still forbidden (see Dovev Meisharim I:61; Halichot Shabbat (Lintzer) VIII:11).

A factor that is difficult to decide is whether the threshold of hakdpada is different for the clothes’ owner and the person who is cleaning (i.e., your case). The Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) leaves it as an unanswered question whether that is considered makpid. It is also unclear if your husband is not personally makpid but defers to you – does that turn him into makpid?

In summary, there are many opinions and factors with gray areas, and so both your claim and your husband’s claim each have a reasonable basis. If you do this often, it is even possible that sometimes it is permitted and sometimes not. What your policy should be in the future is a good question that we cannot solve unequivocally.

Rav Yehuda (Bava Metzia 75b) forbids lending money without witnesses, as a violation of lifnei iver, causing the borrower to sin if he denies owing the money. Reish Lakish says that the lender brings curse upon himself, as people may suspect him of fabricating the loan. The Rambam (Malveh 2:7) and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 70:1) cite the prohibition and curse and apply them (based on a story in the gemara) even to a borrower who is a talmid chacham. They permit a loan only with witnesses, collateral, or, preferably, a contract. So, your understanding appears correct.

Your observation, that few good Jews are careful about this prohibition, is also documented for hundreds of years by Acharonim, some of whom offer explanations, which they admit do not fit well with the Rambam/Shulchan Aruch. Following are some unlikely reasons for leniency compiled in Tzitz Eliezer (VII:47) and Yabia Omer (VII, CM 7): 1. Nowadays we know whom we can trust; 2. The gemara discusses frequent lenders. 3. The gemara discusses a rich person, regarding whom borrowers may rationalize not paying. 4. It is permitted when the restriction impacts one’s business; 5. The oath instituted after Rav Yehuda’s time for one who denies a loan, prevents lying.

However, what I believe is the most important reason for leniency is that it is rare for classical problem of lifnei iver to exist here. A basic rule of lifnei iver is that it does not apply if there a good chance one’s counterpart will not sin as feared (Avoda Zara 15b). The gemara also says that people rarely simply deny borrowing money (Bava Metzia 3a; see Erech Shay to Shulchan Aruch ibid.). This helps explain the following opinions: 1. Lifnei iver applies here only on the level of midat chasidut (Ritva, Megilla 28a); 2. Reish Lakish holds there is only a curse (if the lender persists to claim after denial) and no lifnei iver (Pilpula Charifta to Bava Metzia 75b); 3. The lifnei iver element does not apply to people who are clearly honest (Bach, CM 70).

Even within the strict opinions, we find practical ideas to allow permission. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, without a known Talmudic source, allow lending based on collateral alone. The Maggid Mishneh says this solves the problem of not having witnesses. Since they do not state that the collateral must cover the entire loan principal, it follows that classical poskim suffice with a partial solution.

The case for leniency is bolstered by a factor that is probably more prevalent in recent times than in ancient ones. It is likely insulting to a borrower to require a loan contract for a moderate amount of money. If everyone followed the gemara, borrowers could hardly be insulted by the lender’s requiring contracts or witnesses. However, since in practice, borrowers rarely ask for them and given the mitzva to lend money while maintaining the borrower’s dignity (see Shemot 22:24), the mandates impinge on each other. (See Minchat Shlomo, I:35 regarding “collateral damage” from stringency on lifnei iver). On the other hand, it is difficult to allow one to ignore a codified halacha. We therefore suggest plans to keep the halacha while maintaining dignity.

If one lends a small amount of money, have in mind that if the borrower forgets about it, to turn the money into a present or tzedaka (see Ketubot 67b regarding about loans becoming presents). If the loan is too large to be willing to waive, in our times, it is standard to naturally have documentation, i.e., checks and bank transfers. According to most approaches (see Yabia Omer ibid.), witnesses did not fully prevent the borrower from refusing to pay, but were used to jog his memory or make it difficult not to pay. Checks and bank transfers should suffice for this end, especially if one writes “loan” on the memo line, which is not insulting.

We start with the possibility you ended off with “Baruch ata … al hamichya v’al hapeirot (peiroteha in Israel).” As a rule, the determinant of a beracha’s efficacy is how it is completed (Berachot 12a). Therefore, presumably with such an ending, you would have been yotzei. However, some poskim say that in this case, it is unclear if fixing this long beracha only at its end will remedy the lacking opening (see Ot Hi L’olam vol. I, p. 35a; Petach Had’vir 208:20). Almost all poskim rule (see ibid.; V’zot Haberacha, p. 47) that after the fact, one should assume he was yotzei due to the proper ending, and not make another beracha on what he left out from the first beracha’s opening, as it would be l’vatala if he was previously yotzei.

Because of the doubt involved, some poskim recommend your second option – obviate the question by sticking to a simple Al Hamichya, and do Al Ha’etz afterward (ibid.). It is true that one is required to incorporate both elements that require a beracha in one beracha acharona (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:12). Presumably, splitting them into two berachot acharonot without justification makes the second one a beracha she’eina tzricha. However, a major rule in beracha she’eina tzricha is that if the ostensibly extra beracha is needed to avoid a halachic doubt, it is no longer unnecessary (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 208:82). Still, though, if there is an easy alternative to obviate the need for an extra beracha, we should use it.

The Maharshag (I:53, cited and accepted by Piskei Teshuvot 208:19) indeed has the following simple solution, if caught in time. Go back to the place of the omission, fix it, and continue from there. Admittedly, after “… rachem na Hashem Elokeinu,” backing up means repeating Hashem’s Name. However, even unnecessarily saying Hashem’s Name in the midst of a long beracha is not nearly as problematic as saying Hashem’s Name in what turns out to be a beracha l’vatala. For example, even though it is not critical to say Al Hanisim, if one remembered before he finishes the beracha, he goes back to say it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 682:1), even though this means that he repeats part of the beracha, including Hashem’s Name.  (See also Ginot Veradim (I:28) regarding R’tzei in bentching at seuda shlishit after nightfall.) According to the Maharshag, it is too late to go back only if he has said Hashem’s Name at the beracha’s conclusion.

The Petach Had’vir (208:15, inspired by his understanding of the Magen Avraham 59:1) has a complicated explanation why it is too late to attach one’s addition of that which he left out to the opening of the beracha with Hashem’s Name. Therefore, he reasons that the best remaining option is to keep the me’ein shalosh focused on the cake and make later on the dates. While the Sdei Chemed (vol. VI, p. 319) and V’zot Haberacha (ibid.) endorse his basic approach, they discuss cases where he did not fix the beracha until close to the end of the beracha (confirmed by a phone call I had with the author of V’zot Haberacha), which might be what makes it improper to go back to the beginning. However, the Petach Had’vir’s opposition is even from the “middle” of the beracha.

While it is difficult for me to decide between the opinions in this machloket Acharonim, the Maharshag’s approach seems in line with more mainstream halachic rules. Therefore, I would recommend going back to the place of the omission unless he has said Hashem’s Name at the end of the beracha. Apparently, the Petach Had’vir does not consider this a hefsek, and he agrees that one can assume he was yotzei even if we only count the inclusion of al hapeirot at the end.             

You have a sharp grandchild, and it is a pleasure to see how well he did regarding the laws of Shabbat.

One can violate Shabbat by an animal performance of “chillul Shabbat” in two ways. If one causes an animal to do any melacha (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:2), he violates the prohibition of mechamer, as one of the p’sukim (Shemot 20:10) that forbids doing melacha mentions “and your animal” (Shabbat 153b). While your grandson’s (=gs) plan was close, it appears that this line was not crossed because gs only set up a situation in which the dog “decided” to lunge for something, and gs did not physically lead him or command him to do the melacha (see Orchot Shabbat 31:(8)).

The other violation is when one allows his own animal to do melacha even if he was not involved or even around when it happened (shevitat beheima = sb). This is likely derived from Shemot 23:12 – “in order that [your animal] will rest” (see Mechilta ad loc.). While most of the halachic sources deal with the common use of animals, carrying a load (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305), it applies to all melachot. So, we need to identify grounds for leniency.

If a person reached for something and accidentally switched off a light, it would be a case of “mitasek” in the melacha (he did not intend to do the physical action that came out), and is exempt from a korban (Kritot 19b). There is a broad discussion over the extent there was an act of violation of Shabbat with reduced consequences, or no act of melacha at all (see Shut R. Akiva Eiger, I:8), and so perhaps the dog did not do melacha. However, paradoxically, an animal is worse than a human here. Because an animal never acts with da’at (halachically recognized intent), there is no exemption of mitasek (see Yalkut Yosef XIV, p. 51; Na’ot Mordechai XIII, p. 63). The only consideration is when the human side of a shevitat beheima situation was mitasek (see ibid.), but here gs was aiming for the “melacha outcome.”

The possible grounds for leniency in gs’s trick relate to the rule that when an action is forbidden only Rabbinically, sb does not apply to it (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:4). Here, it may be Rabbinic for a few reasons. First, our orientation is that turning on and off all but incandescent lights is only a Rabbinic prohibition (analysis is beyond our scope). Second, shutting off a light is not positive benefit from the melacha (which exists when we extinguish to use the charcoal produced – see discussion in Yabia Omer, I, OC 31). Therefore, the situation is a melacha she’eina tzricha l’gufa (=mshetlg), which is forbidden only Rabbinically. On the other hand, some Rabbinic prohibitions are foirbidden in sb (see Mishna Berura 305:43). It is particularly likely that mshetlg, which is subjective and related to context more than the action itself, might not weaken the melacha enough to eliminate the prohibition of sb.

We mentioned that sb applies only to one’s own animal. It is possible that the dog is owned by gs’s father, not gs, even if the dog is for gs’ enjoyment (we will not get into the monetary law or the sociology behind this). If so, it would not be gs’ violation if the dog did forbidden melacha. On the other hand, if the father owns it, it is his responsibility to ensure that the dog does not do melacha. Therefore, if the kulot above do not work, the father is required to stop his son, whether immediately if he was there, or when he finds out about it, he must tell gs not to create an ongoing phenomenon

In short, there is a fair chance that gs did nothing wrong when he “choreographed” his dog shutting off a light, particularly if the light was not incandescent. We would not, though, recommend making a practice of using what we could call a “Shabbos dog.” At the least, it could lead to mistakes.

Your concern has some basis, but we will see that it is misplaced.

The general rule is that mitzvot of recitation, even those that can be done in any language (see list in mishna, Sota 32a), require the reciter to understand the language (Mishna Berura 62:3). However, if he is reciting in lashon hakodesh (biblical/rabbinic Hebrew), then one does not need to understand it (ibid.). Although one might thus think that your concern lacks merit, the Magen Avraham (489:2) says: “If he does not understand lashon hakodesh and counted in lashon hakodesh, he did not fulfill his mitzva, as he did not know what he counted, and this is not counting; so it seems to me.” The Mishna Berura (489:5) accepts this ruling.

Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor U’ketzia to Magen Avraham ibid.) disagrees, and his opinion is cited, with different levels of acceptance, by the Birkei Yosef (489:7), Sha’arei Teshuva (489:3), and Kaf Hachayim (489:20). He bases himself on Tosafot (Sota 32a), who implies that in the list of recitations in that mishna, they can be done in languages other than lashon hakodesh only if one understands them, implying that comprehension is not needed in lashon hakodesh. But the Mishna Berura (Sha’ar Hatziyun 489:6) argues that this misses the point, as sefirat ha’omer is not on the list, and the Magen Avraham was positing that it is a unique mitzva, as I will explain in my words. Sefirat ha’omer is not fundamentally a mitzva of recitation, but of cognitive counting, just with an additional condition of vocalization. If one parrots the words of the sefira, he has not fulfilled the spirit or the letter of the law. This dovetails with the opinions that one who is unsure of the day of omer cannot count multiple times to cover his bases (see Living the Halachic Process II, D-18); guessing is not counting.

If our explanation of the Magen Avraham is correct, it is unlikely there should be concern in your case. It is safe to assume that the chazan knows what day of the omer it is and that he is expressing that with the words he is saying, just that he might not know how the words correspond to the content. In that case, he is cognitively counting and regarding the recitation requirement, it is valid in lashon hakodesh even without specific understanding of the words. The Maharil Diskin (Kuntras Acharon 55) indeed assumes that the Magen Avraham agrees in such a case. Admittedly, apparently not all Acharonim make this distinction within the Magen Avraham (see Kaf Hachayim 489:20), and it is unclear what level of coordination between words and content is required. The Maharil Diskin also says that the matter is more complicated during the period of counting weeks also, as, if there are two countings, one might need to know with which words he is accomplishing each counting.

On a practical basis, your concern is based on the assumption that people are being yotzei their sefira through the chazan, which is actually not advisable. There is a machloket Acharonim whether one can fulfill sefirat ha’omer by listening to someone else’s count, and the minhag is not to rely on others (Mishna Berura 489:5). Even if one missed a day of counting and needs to rely on the “leader” due to the beracha, he should count himself, and is yotzei only with the other’s beracha preceding his counting. Regarding the beracha, the rule that it is valid in lashon hakodesh without understanding applies. Even if one does rely on the chazan for the whole thing, halachic logic dictates that if the listener understands the words, it should not matter that the reciter does not (beyond our scope).

So, while it is wonderful if a rabbi is able to help anyone whose lack of understanding endangers his fulfillment of sefirat ha’omer, it is not a specific issue if that person “leads the tzibbur.”

The gemara (Sanhedrin 47b) discusses the permissibility of using a grave and/or the material it was made of, for other purposes. In that context, the gemara distinguishes between a “grave that was built,” which becomes forbidden, and a “grave of earth itself,” which remains permitted, because one cannot make the ground forbidden. The Tur cites a machloket on the parameters of a built grave. R. Yeshaya reasons that since, generally, material that was detached from the ground and then becomes attached keeps the status of a detached object, the earth that was dug up and then placed back to form the grave is forbidden. The Rosh points out that the gemara implies that a standard grave, which is dug up from the ground, does not become forbidden, and he therefore reasons that the problem is only for mausoleum-type burial. One could understand that according to R. Yeshaya, it would be forbidden to reuse the gravesite, since much of it is soil was removed and returned, whereas the Rosh would permit it. It is not fully clear which opinion is primary as practical halacha (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Yoreh Deah 364:1; ibid. 363:3, 5; Da’at Kohen 207).

However, there are other grounds for leniency. The Rashba (Shut I:537) says that the prohibition on grave-related matters is on the benefit of those who are living, who are obligated in mitzvot, and that live people do not halachically benefit from the burial of the deceased.  While the burial itself is not benefit for live people, as the fulfillment of mitzvot (i.e., to bury a deceased) is not halachically considered forbidden benefit, Acharonim wrestle with the fact that money is usually involved in the process. Some see it as a problem for the cemetery owners to sell the used grave, and thereby receive money for it (see Gesher Hachayim II, 4:3). Rav Kook (Da’at Kohen 202) recommends having the sellers stipulate that they are selling the part of the land that was not dug up and returned, but it is not unanimous that this works (see Gesher Hachayim ibid.). Shevet Sofer (YD 104) says that in a situation in which the inheritors would have had to pay for a burial spot, if they would receive the already used grave for free, this saving of money would be forbidden benefit.

The above complications apply only to things that were brought from elsewhere (like bricks and boards), and perhaps even the earth that was taken off and returned (see Rama ibid.). Therefore, it is best not to reuse these materials when using the plot (i.e., that which is beneath and to the sides of the coffin) (Bemareh Habazak III:71).

The matter is arguably more lenient when those who were exhumed were buried there with the intention that this would occur, as then the burial might not cause permanent prohibitions after the deceased is removed (see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 363:6). However, the gemara (Sanhedrin 48a) implies that if preparations were made for the use of the deceased [after his death – Bemareh Habazak ibid.] then even if the burial itself was done with the intention for him to remain temporarily, the prohibition continues after the exhumation (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 364:1). Since it appears that you do know about the history of the burials, we will not get into further details on the matter.

There is also a monetary or quasi-monetary matter of making sure that the first “owner” of the grave has no outstanding issues with the cemetery. Gesher Hachayim (ibid.) demonstrates why the inheritors of the deceased have halachic authority to agree to end any claims to the ground that could cause a problem.

Wearing a kittel is associated, for Ashkenazim, with four very different events.

Historically, the first is burial (the details of overlap between shrouds and one’s own kittel differ according to communal minhag). In this context, part of the minhag relates to it being inexpensive material (Moed Katan 27b). The cleanliness/purity element of pure white and its connection to the kohanim’s service may also be involved (see Gesher Hachaim I:10).

Next, conceptually and historically, is Yom Kippur. The Rama (Orach Chayim 610:4) reports the minhag of wearing a kittel and attributes it to being reminiscent of angels and because its association with burial encourages feeling the need to “humble one’s heart.”

From these solemn moments, we pivot to joyous settings. Ashkenazi chatanim wear a kittel at the chupa. Some connect this to cognizance of one’s death and the need for teshuva at this crucial/serious, albeit joyous, moment (see Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 147:4). Others connect it to Yom Kippur’s optimistic side, as they are both days of forgiveness; some mention the hope that the couple are being joined until death (see Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin 15).

The Seder-kittel connection is not found in classical Rishonim and Shulchan Aruch/Rama, but early Acharonim were familiar with it. The Magen Avraham (472:2) and Taz (472:3, who implies that some but not all followed the minhag) disagree whether a mourner should wear a kittel at the Seder. The Magen Avraham assumes that the reason is to rein in a possibly over-joyous Seder participant and reasons that the mourner does not require further dampening of the spirit. The Taz considers the possibility that the kittel is to enhance the festive atmosphere, which would be reason for a mourner to avoid increasing already sufficient festivity. However, the Taz prefers the approach that it is to dampen festivity but adopts the opposite philosophical approach from the Magen Avraham. He suggests that it is proper for the mourner to indeed wear the kittel and thereby ensure appropriate somberness.

Rav Soloveitchik is cited (Batei Yosef, Haggada p. 90) as giving two additional reasons to wear a kittel at the Seder, both supplying positives. One (invoking the Netziv) focuses on a special element of the Seder. We put ourselves in the mind frame of those who are eating the Korban Pesach as a central part of the celebration, and a white cloak was the type of honorable clothes worn while eating a korban. Another reason, in his father’s name, is that it is one more surprising thing to stimulate a child’s curiosity.

The different approaches to the minhag have advantages and disadvantages. It is surprising that with the many mandated Talmudic practices to increase festivity (e.g., four cups of wine, reclining), a late minhag would come to subdue festivity! We do have a concept of the fast of Behab, after Pesach and Sukkot, out of concern that festiveness might have led to sin (Shulchan Aruch, OC 272:1; Mishna Berura ad loc. 1). However, we wait until after Nisan and Tishrei, respectively. On the other hand, the Magen Avraham’s reason connects the minhag more naturally to the other usages of the kittel. Those who do not follow the minhag can be comforted if they find the reasons for this relatively late and not critical minhag not along lines they relate to.

In your case, if you follow Ashkenazi minhag¸ you may feel free to choose your preference on whether to wear a kittel at the Seder, or experiment with how you like it (with a stipulation that it is bli neder). There are also various minhagim as to whether it is done only by the one who leads the Seder, or by all married males, which is also a matter with little compelling logic either way. Technical, psychological, philosophical, and sociological (e.g., your peer group’s practice) factors may play a role in your decision.

When considering involvement in “non-Shabbat-friendly” fields on Shabbat without a forbidden action per se, one has to look at four Shabbat prohibitions.

1. Hachana (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 323:6) – Doing something on Shabbat so that it does not need to be done after Shabbat, even if no melacha is needed after Shabbat. This issue does not apply to this case, because the opportunity that arose on Shabbat is unique and is not instead of something you would have had to do after Shabbat.

2. M’tzo cheftzecha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:1) – Taking steps to advance a specific melacha after Shabbat. Here, there is no specific melacha on the horizon, as your son would just be amassing information, with no actions related to it on the horizon.

3. Shitrei hedyotot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:13-16) – Reading matters that could cause problems on Shabbat. There is discussion in the gemara (Shabbat 149a) as to the exact concern, but the Rambam (Shabbat 23:19) and Rosh (Shabbat 23:1) both connect it broadly to weekday-like activity (see this column, Mishpatim 5784, dealing with newspapers. There is a consensus (see Dirshu 307:70) against reading commercial advertisements, even if one is not intending to thereby “shop.”) However, shitrei hedyotot does not apply to oral exchanges.

4. Daber davar (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:1) – Speaking about things that will need to get done that involve Shabbat prohibitions. Regarding the stock market, one does not violate daber davar per se if he does not discuss actual plans of buying or selling stocks.

Thus, just discussing the stock market generally avoids all of the above prohibitions. However, as a kind of composite of these issues, it is accepted among bnei Torah not to engage freely in nitty gritty economic discussion. This is in line with the halacha (Rambam, Shabbat 24:4; Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:1) that one should not speak at length about idle matters. Commerce matters are “worse” in this regard than many idle matters (see Mishna Berura 307:63). While most of the strict sources discuss reading commercial matters, not speaking, speech is worse than thought (Shabbat 113b).

It is too draconic and not in line with halacha to forbid a passing statement about the stock market or a business. Even regarding more serious discussion, like the people you mentioned, a conversation about stocks can be justifiable because the Rama (OC 307:1) says that one may talk at length about idle matters if he gets enjoyment from such discussion. For some people, discussing stock trends is enjoyable like for other people discussing the NBA playoffs is. However, we do not recommend to people (including your son) to center a discussion on Shabbat on the stock market.

1. Kiddush - The gemara (Pesachim 101a) teaches that we must make Kiddush in a place where a “meal” will follow. That discussion also refers to “tasting” after Kiddush, which implies less than a classic meal. Although some authorities require the tasting to include bread, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5) rules that wine satisfies this requirement. The Magen Avraham (273:11) reasons that if wine qualifies, then foods made from one of the “five grains,” which are more meal-like, certainly suffice (OC 273:11). The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) extends this to dates, but most poskim disagree (see Yabia Omer VII, OC 35).

Based on the above, one who cannot eat from the “five grains” (many gluten-sensitive people can eat specially cultivated oats) should drink a revi’it of wine or grape juice (Mishna Berura 273:22). When this is not feasible, two minority leniencies are sometimes cited: 1. In cases of need, any food can constitute a “Kiddush meal” (Chayei Adam II:6:22); 2. It suffices that one person involved in the Kiddush eat the requisite food/amount (see B’Tzel HaChochma IV:2). If relying on such positions, it is best to eat something filling/meal-like, which satisfies at least the “spirit of the law.”

2. Lechem Mishneh – Ordinarily, Shabbat meals require two loaves of bread made from halachic grain in a manner that requires Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 274:5). However, a gluten-sensitive person should view himself as fulfilling the mitzva of seuda in the best way he can.

It is appropriate (not halachically required) for him to use two gluten-free loaves of “bread.” Treating non-five-grain foods as bread has limited halachic precedent. An eiruv chatzeirot requires “bread,” yet that bread may be made from rice or lentils (Shulchan Aruch, OC 366:8). Moreover, the requirement of two loaves is derived from the manna, which was not grain-based, but was still the bread of Israel. Similarly, rice or potato bread can arguably be considered bread for gluten-free dieters (Mishna Berura ad loc. 47). It is also positive to eat or drink something that will have a beracha acharona of me’ein shalosh, which enables him to parallel Birkat HaMazon and mention Shabbat.

 3. Seuda shlishit – The gemara (Pesachim 105a) says that one who is eating as Shabbat enters must interrupt his eating to recite Kiddush. It suggests that similarly one who is eating as Shabbat ends would have to interrupt the meal for Havdala. However, the gemara concludes that Havdala does not interrupt eating, but only drinking. This gemara is the basis for the halacha that one who starts seuda shlishit before shki’a may continue (Shulchan Aruch, OC 299:1).

Can one continue if he is in the middle of a less than complete Shabbat meal (including bread and Birkat Hamazon)? The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 299:5) says he may not continue. The Shevet Halevi (VIII, 36), keying on the fact that there are legitimate opinions that one does not need to eat bread at seuda shlishit (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5), posits that whatever one uses for seuda shlishit will be important enough to allow you to continue.

Therefore, you definitely have whom to rely upon. Actually, non-gluten eaters are better off than others who have seuda shlishit without bread. The Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.), in explaining his stringent opinion, argues that the fact that one did not have bread shows he did not give the meal requisite weight. While one can argue that in contemporary society, where many people rarely eat bread, other serious eating would also count. Regarding health motivated non-gluten dieters, we would expect a near consensus that their regular seuda shlishit would allow them to continue after dark, as the lack of bread is not a sign of a less level meal.

The gemara (Pesachim 4a) decides that when one rents a house from another Jew before Pesach, the one who has access to it on the night of bc is obligated in bc. So, since you are coming a few hours before Pesach, the hotel is obligated to do bc.

The gemara continues with a question – can one who starts renting on erev Pesach assume that the landlord indeed did bc? We rule that one may assume he did bc (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 437:2), but the renter must ask the landlord if he is available. So, ostensibly, if the hotel did not report they did bc, you should inquire.

There are a few reasons, though, why this might not be necessary. Arguably, the hashgacha on the hotel includes an assurance that the rooms were properly checked. While this is true in some hotels, there are definitely arrangements where the mashgiach is responsible for the kitchen, whereas non-rabbis are responsible for other proper halachic operation of the hotel. Just like in the gemara’s case one needs to ask a fine landlord whether he did bc, perhaps here too you must ask. Therefore, it is difficult to give clear guidance about unspecified locations.

Another sometimes valid point of leniency is that at some hotels, you may have difficulty receiving a credible answer. Will the receptionist know? Will you be able to get hold of the relevant person on this hectic day? Therefore, it may be equivalent to what the gemara calls “he is not around to ask.” While it could be more practical to ask in advance whether the hotel does a halachic bc on the rooms, if he did not, perhaps one there can rely on the assumption they did.

The major question is if there was no formal bc done but the hotel can assure you that the room is clean, because a hotel’s job is to provide clean rooms all year long. This should fall under the general rule that a professional will not endanger his professional standing (see Shach, Yoreh Deah 155:3). While no hotel is perfect, a standard bc is not perfect either.

But can a chambermaid’s cleaning without a candle and perhaps not on the night of the 14^th of Nisan count in lieu of bc? If one checks without the halachically prescribed lighting, he does not have to redo the bc (Shulchan Aruch, OC 433:1 and Mishna Berura 433:6). Also, most of us rely on the serious cleaning we do in the days leading up to Pesach but not with the characteristics of bc, and then do only a cursory bc, which would not uncover most of the chametz if it still existed. This is based on effectively creating places that are assumed to be chametz free (see Living the Halachic Process III, D-15).

Remember, that the mitzva of bc was not supposed to fall upon you (outside the one you likely will do at your home – see Living the Halachic Process II:D-14). It is just that there is a possibility that your concern about chametz may make it necessary. The gemara (Pesachim 8a) posits that one does not need to check outdoor areas frequented by chametz-eating animals because he can assume there will not be chametz there. The birds do not fulfill the mitzva of bc for us; they create a place which is excluded from the need of bc. For our purposes, the chambermaid is no worse than the birds. Even if she is not Jewish and cannot be an agent to fulfill the mitzva, she can still eliminate the likelihood of chametz.