ASK THE RABBI

We were unable to find direct discussion of this matter¸ for which there is apparently no one clear answer, in the poskim. Let us explain why.
A brit milah may be performed throughout the daylight period. Since “the diligent do mitzvot early” (zrizin makdimin l’mitzvot - Pesachim 4a), it is proper to do it in the morning, which has been the broad minhag for centuries. (What is an exception to the rule that justifies a delay is an important question that is beyond our scope - see Yabia Omer II, YD 18). For this reason, there is little discussion of milah at Mincha time.
The reason why Shacharit is prayed before a brit may be instructive. One reason given is that tadir kodem (more frequently performed mitzvot are performed before less common ones) (Aruch Hashulchan, YD 262:9). This would seem to apply also to Mincha. However, perhaps it is the mitzva of Kriat Shema within Shacharit, which like milah is from the Torah, that is significantly tadir (see ibid. and Yechave Daat III, 15). Other explanations are given, including that we are afraid that a delayed Shacharit will be davened after its time or that Shacharit is a morning mitzva while milah is a daylight mitzva. The latter reasons do not apply to Mincha, whose latest time is the same as a brit’s.
Why shouldn’t the factor of tadir suffice to cause Mincha to precede a brit? The gemara (Berachot 28a) says that if one has not davened Musaf by the time one can daven Mincha, he should daven Mincha first because of tadir. However, Tosafot (ad loc.) claims that this is so only when one will be davening Musaf and Mincha in succession, for example, if he will partake in a meal that cannot be eaten before Mincha. Otherwise, one davens Musaf first and Mincha at its normal time. Likewise, we must see if there is a need to daven Mincha around the time of the brit.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (OC 286:4) seems to prefer the opinion that Mincha precedes Musaf even when could daven Mincha later, we need to understand how far to take this. Certainly, one who wants to make Shehecheyanu on a fruit (a non-tadir mitzva) does not have to daven Mincha first. Rather, something must make the tadir mitzva “come to mind” now. In the gemara’s case, the fact that one wants to daven naturally raises the question of which tefilla is appropriate. Likewise, when one gets up on the day of a brit, both Shacharit and milah are things he ordinarily wants to do as soon as possible. In contrast, Mincha is not something that is normally done as soon in the afternoon as possible.
One reason to require Mincha is the halachic problem of having a “big meal,” including a brit meal prior to Mincha (Rama, OC 232:2). Without getting into all the details, that issue does not apply to everyone, perhaps including those who are in a situation that they will be reminded to daven (see Ishei Yisrael 27:13). Furthermore, there could be and sometimes is a long break between the brit and the festive meal, so Mincha need not be incumbent at the time of the brit itself.
It is conceivable to distinguish between cases. Where the “schedule” of the brit includes Mincha, it makes sense to do Mincha first because it is tadir, and this is usually what happens. If Mincha is arranged by guests of the brit, then there should no halachic question. Neither the mitzva of milah nor that to take part in the meal (assuming it must be preceded by Mincha) are obligations that are incumbent upon guests then; thus they need not decide whether it precedes Mincha.
Realize that there are other factors such as availability of the mohel (to name one) that may not be able to be ignored. Thus, in any case, no rule or ruling in this regard will be able to be applied definitively across-the-board.

These are important questions, as many people do not know what to do or find it hard to follow these halachot, which are a little counterintuitive to some of us.

The gemara (Berachot 23a) takes the matter of preparing the body for a clean and respectable tefilla very seriously. Accordingly, if one davens when he is unable to hold in his need to eliminate (regarding urination the matter is unclear – see Biur Halacha to 92:1) for 72 minutes his tefilla is considered an abomination, is disqualified, and needs to be repeated (see Rambam, Tefilla 4:10). Even when one can wait 72 minutes, he should properly take care of his needs before davening if he feels any real urge to go to the bathroom even if, as a result, he will be unable to daven along with the congregation (Mishna Berura 92:5).

If one started when it was forbidden and then thinks the matter over again, he must stop right away no matter where he is in the tefilla. However, if he started when he did not need the facilities and then his situation “deteriorated” unusually quickly, the matter depends on where he is in tefilla and the severity of the urge. In Shemoneh Esrei, where it is forbidden to move under all but the most severe circumstances, he must continue until the end and then go to the bathroom even if he will miss Kedusha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 92:2 and Mishna Berura 92:8). Only if he reaches the point where restraining himself is considered difficult to the point of being degrading would one be able to leave his place in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei (Rama, Orach Chayim 92:2 and Mishna Berura 92:11). Even in that case, if he is davening publicly and walking out in the middle will be of significant embarrassment, he may decide to continue davening (Mishna Berura, ibid.). Regarding Kri’at Shema, he may go to the bathroom if he likes or continue if he likes (Mishna Berura 92:9). However, since he may not start Shemoneh Esrei in that state, it is best to find one of the relative breaks in Kri’at Shema to go to the bathroom (ibid.). Regarding P’sukei D’zimra, one may go to the bathroom between any of the sections of psalms or before Yishtabach. He should not wait until after Barchu, which begins the next section of tefilla (ibid.).

As long as one stopped properly, he can continue upon return to the place in the tefilla that he was up to. Even if he should have stopped earlier, that which he said in any part of tefilla other than Shemoneh Esrei is valid after the fact and therefore he can continue from where he was (ibid.:6). The only issue is that if he spent more time in the bathroom than it takes for him to recite the entire section he is in, he must return to the beginning of the section (Biur Halacha to 92:2). If he started Shemoneh Esrei when he could not have waited 72 minutes, the tefilla was valueless and therefore he must go back to its beginning.

Regarding reciting Asher Yatzar upon exiting the bathroom, the matter depends on the place in tefilla one finds himself. If he was in the middle of P’sukei D’zimra, he would optimally make the beracha at the first break between “paragraphs” of P’sukei D’zimra (see Mishna Berura 51:8; Ishei Yisrael 16:6). If he went to the bathroom during Kriat Shema or its berachot he should wait to recite Asher Yatzar until after Shemoneh Esrei (ibid. 66:23) (assuming he will not have felt a new urge to go to the bathroom by the time he has the chance to recite it). During Shemoneh Esrei certainly one would not be able to recite Asher Yatzar and must wait under all circumstances.

The phenomenon of Me’ein Sheva (=MS) is interesting. It is like a shortened chazarat hashatz (repetition of Shemoneh Esrei), which is surprising at Ma’ariv, which does not usually have a chazarat hashatz. The gemara (Shabbat 24b) says that we recite it because many shuls were in dangerous places, so the Rabbis wanted to stretch out the davening to give latecomers time to finish before everyone else finished and left.

Because of the unusual nature of the institution of MS, it is not surprising that Rishonim limit it to circumstances that resemble the original situation. The Ra’avya (see Tur, Orach Chayim 268) says that the danger the gemara discussed is no longer prevalent and that although we continue the practice, we only do so with a minyan. The Beit Yosef (ad loc.) and Rivash (40) say that it does not apply to makeshift minyanim, as it is not as likely for people to come from all over to daven and for one to come late. This approach is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (OC 268:10).

What is considered close enough to a regular shul, which warrants the saying of MS? The Taz (268:8) seems to have a relatively broad definition, as he says that when a group goes to an area and sets aside a place to daven for a few days, they do recite MS. This is more set than the cases of a minyan formed in a home where sheva berachot or a shiva period is held, where the Shulchan Aruch says not to recite it. There is some disagreement as to whether the few days have to be consecutive days or could be on weekends only (see opinions in Minchat Yitzchak X, 21), as is likely the case in the hotel in question. The Eliyahu Rabba (268:19), in bringing this Taz, adds the necessity that a sefer Torah be present (possibly because he did not feel it was likely that they would go without one), and the Mishna Berura (268:24) also adds this as a requirement. On the other hand, some poskim say that the presence of a sefer Torah suffices without other requirements (see opinions in Yabia Omer II, OC 29). It is also possible that if the area is part of the same complex as the hotel’s main shul, it is considered an extension of it and would thus be considered a set beit knesset (see a similar idea in D’var Moshe, cited, Minchat Yitzchak, ibid.). On the other hand, there is logic to say as follows. The main distinction should have to do with the nature of the group that assembled more than with the history of the place in which they meet (unless it is a full-fledged shul). In this case, the bar mitzva group is a one-time thing and MS should not be recited.

In the final analysis, your case is one of a safek (doubt) as to which definition to accept. What does one do in such a case? Firstly, some rule (based on kabalistic sources) that once instituted, MS is to be said at any minyan; this appears to be the minhag in Yerushalayim (Rav Pe’alim III, OC 23; Har Tzvi OC I, 152). Secondly, the Magen Avraham (268:14) says that even in a case where the indications are that one should not recite MS, one need not correct those who are doing so. It is possible that even if not required, it may not be a problem for a minyan to recite it anyway, as they are close enough to the institution to make it acceptable. However, the Pri Megadim (MZ 268:8) raises the possibility that those who recite MS out of doubt run the risk of a beracha l’vatala (in vain). Thus, in the final analysis, it is safer to rule that one should not have recited MS, but if they did (which I guess most groups do) there was insufficient reason to try to dissuade them.

The general concept you refer to exists, but we have to refine some details.

The mishna (Megilla 4:3) lists parts of tefilla that require a minyan, including Kaddish/Barchu and chazarat hashatz (repetition of Shemoneh Esrei). The Yerushalmi (ad loc.:4) comments that for each, if a minyan was present at the section’s beginning, they can continue with it even after some have left. (It reprimands those who leave in a manner that leaves the rest without a quorum, even though the remaining people may continue). The Rashba (Shut I, 95) extends the matter a step, saying that if a group started chazarat hashatz with a minyan and someone left, they recite even Kedusha (which is in chazarat hashatz), even though they started Kedusha without a minyan. The Terumat Hadeshen (I, 15) goes even further. If a minyan was in the midst of chazarat hashatz when some left, they can even say the full Kaddish that follows U’va L’tziyon without ten. The rationale is that the key addition to that Kaddish (“Titkabel tzlot’hon…”), the request that Hashem accept the completed tefilla of Shemoneh Esrei, demonstrates that all of the tefilla until this point was a continuation of Shemoneh Esrei. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 55:2-3) codifies the above concept and the applications mentioned. So indeed that which you remember learning is correct.

There is further leniency than you remember regarding the number of people who can be missing. The Ran (Megilla, ad loc.), reasoning that a significant part of the minyan must remain for the group to continue as if there were still a minyan, sets the minimum at a simple majority of six (including the chazzan). This too is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.).

However, this concept has limitations. The group can continue only with sections that are directly connected to the davar shebekedusha (section of the tefilla that requires a minyan) that began with a minyan. The Yerushalmi (ibid.) posits that each of the sections mentioned separately in the mishna is a separate section. Therefore, having a minyan for Kaddish/Barchu does not entitle them to do chazarat hashatz without one. A minyan that disbanded during chazarat hashatz would have to skip over nesi’at kapayim (the kohanim’s duchenin, daily in Israel and on holidays abroad). They would not be allowed to do kri’at hatorah (laining) without a minyan even though the Shemoneh Esrei unit continues until after the Torah is normally returned (see above).

There are too many permutations to mention in this forum, but we will mention a few interesting ones. At Ma’ariv, if there was a minyan for the opening Barchu, the group can recite the Kaddish before Shemoneh Esrei because Barchu is the beginning of the berachot of Kri’at Shema, which concludes with Kaddish (Mishna Berura 55:22). However, since the Kaddish at the end of Ma’ariv relates to Shemoneh Esrei, one would need a minyan for Shemoneh Esrei. While it is sufficient to have a minyan for Shemoneh Esrei of Ma’ariv in order to recite Kaddish after it, at Shacharit and Mincha, chazarat hashatz, not Shemoneh Esrei is necessary. This is because that Kaddish was composed primarily for chazarat hashatz, with the exception being at Ma’ariv, where there is no chazarat hashatz, where it relates to the silent Shemoneh Esrei. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 124:4) speaks about the critical need to have nine people listening to all of chazarat hashatz. However, based on the concept at hand, if there are nine listening in the beginning and three stop listening, the chazzan can continue, just that it is as if they physically left without leaving a minyan, which, we mentioned, is criticized (Igrot Moshe, OC IV 19; see Derisha, OC 124:1).

The Mishnah Berurah and Maaseh Rav state that one should say Yitgadeil v’Yitkadeis with a tzeira since the words are Hebrew. However, many have doubts regarding this claim. Even if the words are Hebrew, it is still possible to pronounce them with a Patach [as Yitkadal v’Yitkadash and Titkabal].

There are therefore many who are accustomed to pronounce the above words with a Patach (and not like the Mishnah Berurah). One may conduct himself either way, as long as his intentions are for the sake of Heaven.

Regarding "titkabel" it appears that it is in Aramaic and therefore should be said with a Patach.

The two practices are based on different sets of sources and, apparently, logic.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 127:1) rules, based on the Yerushalmi (Berachot 1:5), that when the chazan gets up to Modim, the congregation should also bow. The gemara (Sota 40a) discusses the different possible texts people should recite at that time, out of which has arisen the text we use. The classical sources do not talk about standing at that point (although many require or suggest it throughout chazarat hashatz- see Rama, OC 124:4). However, Acharonim (Yechaveh Da’at V, 11; Ishei Yisrael 24:38) point out that since it is required to bow, it becomes necessary to stand to make that possible. We see the connection between standing and bowing regarding the halacha of one who is unable to stand for tefilla, who should try to stand at least at the places that he needs to bow (Shulchan Aruch, OC 94:5).

Regarding what part of Modim D’Rabbanan requires bowing, there are multiple opinions and minhagim. These are primarily: at the beginning, at the beginning and end, and throughout (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 127:1). Based on the above, the time that one should be standing would correspond to the opinions on the bowing.

The next question is then whether semi-standing is considered standing. Regarding Shemoneh Esrei, where one certainly should stand, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 94:8) says that one should not even lean on a lectern or another person. The Mishna Berura (94:22) points out that, in general, standing while leaning is not considered standing if the person would be unable to continue standing in that position if the object were removed. Depending on how high off the chair one lifts himself, it is questionable whether the average person would be able to keep himself suspended if the chair were removed after what you call a semi-rise. Can we, then, justify the practice you describe?

It appears that one can find some justification in significant, albeit minority sources. The Rambam (Tefilla 9:4) says about the bowing at Modim D’Rabbanan: “All of the people bow down a little, and they should not bow too much.” This basic idea is found in the Yerushalmi (ibid.), but there is much discussion as to whether this is specific to Modim or whether not bowing too much is a general guideline (see Beit Yosef, OC 127). In any case, the Bach explains the Rambam that there should be a less than usual bow by Modim D’Rabbanan for the following reason. Since the people have already davened Shemoneh Esrei and bowed at Modim, they shouldn’t need to do so again. The reason they do is to avoid looking as if they disagree with the enthusiastic praise of Hashem the chazan is involved in. (For this reason, one who is in the midst of his own Shemoneh Esrei at that time bows along with the others– Mishna Berura 109:10). Therefore, it is best to suffice with a small bow. It is very possible that according to this approach, it is also unnecessary to stand fully. Although the Magen Avraham (127:1) and Mishna Berura (127:2) do not pasken like the Bach, it still could explain the minhag.

The matter of partially standing up for a talmid chacham is based on the following. The gemara (Kiddushin 32) discusses whether a rav can be mochel (relinquish) the honor coming to him, which we rule that he can (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 242:32). The gemara tells of a rav who seemed to be mochel yet was slighted when someone did not move from his chair in his proximity. It explains that he should have at least done a hidur, which Rashi explains as a slight movement to show that he would like to stand up. This compromise semi-rising is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.).

Is it better to daven without a minyan before work or do some work first and daven with a minyan later (at a halachically acceptable time)?

Answer: Work is one of the things that one should not do before davening once alot hashachar (some 72 minutes before sunrise) has come (Berachot 14a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3). Work, in this regard, is not limited to the place one goes to earn money but includes a wide variety of household tasks of even moderate time duration. The logic is that when one gets up in the morning, addressing his Maker should be the first concern. Therefore, there are significant similarities in logic and halachic parameters between this restriction and those of not traveling, eating, or greeting people before davening (Berachot ibid. and 10b; various places in OC 89).

Generally, if the activity one is involved in is mitzva-related and cannot wait until after tefilla, it is permitted because it is not considered an affront to Hashem (Mishna Berura 89:36). In such cases, one should first recite Kri’at Shema, which is a mitzva from the Torah, (and probably Birkot Hashachar- see below and Ishei Yisrael 13:(61)) before doing the work (Mishna Berura 250:1). Sometimes steps still need to be taken to reduce the concern that one may get carried away and miss davening on time altogether (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:6 regarding learning).

The obvious first reaction to your question is that it is better to daven with a minyan before working. However, in cases of significant need, the pre-davening restrictions can be waved. One of the classic examples is going on the road before davening when the caravan will not wait until after one davens (see Mishna Berura 89:20). One should consider whether such a trip is justified (but such distinctions as between a potential loss of money and an opportunity to gain money (see Mishna Berura 90:29) are beyond our present scope). The Ishei Yisrael (13:(47)) says that under similar circumstances of need one could also do work before davening. These circumstances are certainly grounds for missing a minyan (see Mishna Berura, ibid.).  

Assuming that the fact is that you will not be able to both daven with a minyan and before starting work, the question is which factor should take precedence. There do not appear to be many sources on the matter but the consensus is that it is better to daven before work than to start working in order to get a minyan later (Ishei Yisrael 12:13 and Riv’vot Ephrayim  I, 66 in the name of Rav Hadaya). The ruling is readily understandable. It is forbidden to work before davening. In contrast, it is not forbidden to daven without a minyan. Rather, davening with a minyan is an important element of tefilla, which also makes it more effective (Berachot 8a- see also Living the Halachic Process A-5). Since a serious inconvenience is grounds to miss a minyan (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 90:16 and Mishna Berura 90:52), avoiding a prohibition is also grounds.

That being said, the case for always davening first alone is not iron-clad. Firstly, the Rama (Orach Chayim 89:3) cites and does not totally reject the opinion that after saying Birkot Hashachar one may do work. Although we would not normally condone this, when it “buys time” to allow someone to daven with a minyan, it is not unreasonable. Secondly, those who have to daven so early may be saying Shemoneh Esrei before sunrise, which is permitted only under pressing circumstances (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:8). Thus, if the minyan alternative would also have the benefit of being at or after sunrise, this might tip the scale. Finally, if the quality of the davening, from a practical or even psychological perspective, is enhanced at the minyan (see Mishna Berura 89:39), this too is a major factor. Therefore, we suggest that you discuss the different considerations and options with a rabbi who knows you and your situation well.

Under normal circumstances, it is preferable to have one nusach for all of the tefillot but given that the circumstances are such that your minyan is not doing so, switching between P'sukei D'zimra and Yishtabach is not a problem.

The Beit Yosef[i] cites the Maharik, who maintains that since the prayers correspond to the temidin,[ii] which must be funded by the community, a chazan must be acceptable to everyone in the community. The logic is that it is improper to appoint a shaliach (agent) who is unwanted. Based on this, the Shulchan Aruch[iii] rules that an individual’s protest against a potential chazan is accepted, as long as it is made prior to the chazan’s appointment. The Rama[iv] adds that this refers to a case in which the protestor can convince the communal leadership that he has sufficient cause and rules that hatred between people qualifies as sufficient cause.[v] Thus, your inclination to disallow the functionary in question ostensibly has a basis.

However, Acharonim distinguish between the aforementioned sources and the most common modern applications. The Magen Avraham[vi] and Mishna Berura[vii] write that the Maharik’s logic applies only when one needs to rely on the chazan to fulfill his own prayer obligation, i.e., when people would listen to the chazan’s repetition of Shemoneh Esrei instead of reciting it themselves. However, nowadays, the chazan only leads the congregation in certain sections and provides cantorial flourishes for parts of tefilla, while each person himself recites all that he needs to. Consequently, we revert to the regular rule that the majority has the authority to make appointments to various communal tasks, and individuals lack veto power.

Realize also that many of the qualifications for a chazan (found in Orach Chayim 53) concern the position of the shul’s main chazan.[viii] In that case, the most appropriate person should be chosen, which may exclude one with any serious blemish. The Aruch HaShulchan[ix] indicates that animosity is reason to invalidate only such a permanent chazan, but not one who will be serving sporadically. As he mentions, we cannot possibly tolerate an “endless” process of disqualifications.

Irrespective of the fact that not everyone needs or deserves the special privilege of being the chazan, the issue of embarrassing someone and depriving him of the honor of occasionally being the chazan should not be taken lightly. Almost all those who are capable of leading services have done so at some time. Although a particular chazan may be a flawed individual (which we cannot judge from afar), many flawed people lead services. That some individual congregant may be unable to concentrate is not a significant factor. For any number of reasons, one may be bothered by another person’s davening, and it is not feasible to grant veto power purely on subjective grounds.

On the other hand, when it comes to a chazan for the tefillot of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, we do seek a higher level of qualification, and his relationships with members of the community play more of a role.[x] This is especially true regarding blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashana, which resembles the classic case in which an individual can object. The shofar blower enables others to fulfill their mitzva of hearing the sounds of the shofar, not everyone receives the honor of being the ba’al tokeiah, and the claim can be made that each year is considered a new appointment.[xi] Therefore, if there are viable options to replace him with someone who is similarly capable and gets along with everyone, it is reasonable to alert the local rabbi/leadership. They would have to weigh the obviously not black-and-white matter on its merits.[xii] However, we cannot stress enough that it is much more appropriate that the effort be made to reduce tension and defuse the issue than to replace the person and undoubtedly raise the conflict to new, more regrettable levels.

Before discussing the machloket between the Gra and the MA, let us see what is agreed upon. Daytime begins at alot hashachar (=alot), over an hour before sunrise (henetz hachama = netz); night and the new halachic day begin at tzeit hakochavim (=tzeit; when the stars come out) (Megilla 20b). In Talmudic times, daytime hours were counted from 1 to 12, as people determined the time by looking at the sun’s angle. In the middle of those 12 hours, the sun is directly above head (on the east-west axis) (Pesachim 11b), meaning there must be astronomical symmetry between the beginning and end points of the count. The gemara (Pesachim 94a) says that there are 4 mil (the time it takes to walk app. 4 kilometers) in between alot and netz and also between shki’at hachama (= shki’a - sunset) and tzeit.

The basic difference between the opinions is as follows. The MA (see 58:1; 233:2) starts and ends all calculation from the halachic bookends of day and night, alot and tzeit, which adds 4 mil on either end of sunrise-sunset. Therefore, szks (= the end of the 3^rd hour of the day), is well before the sun is at 45 degrees above the horizon (1/4 of the time the sun is visible). The Gra calculates from sunrise to sunset, and therefore szks is at 45 degrees. It is indeed astronomically logical that people did not count the progress of the sun from or until a time when it was well beneath the horizon.

While each approach has advantages and disadvantages, it cannot be decided in a vacuum because the machloket is linked to an even more important one (see Am Mordechai, Berachot 2). Days (including Shabbat) lasts until sheki’a, enter a period of halachic doubt known as bein hashemashot, followed by definite night at tzeit (Shabbat 34a). We rule that bein hashemashot is 3/4 of a mil (appr. 15 minutes) long (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 261:2). Since daytime begins 4 mil before netz, there is a lack of symmetry (of 3 1/4 mil) between the beginning and end of daytime in relation to the appearance and disappearance of the sun. Rabbeinu Tam (Shabbat 35a) explains that “sheki’a” is not what we call sunset but is around an hour later, until which time it is still definitely day. (His idea of the sun finishing travelling the “thickness of the earth” fits an ancient astronomical conception but certainly not a modern one). Thus Shabbat does not begin or end until more than an hour after sunset. The Gra (OC 261) posits that sheki’a is the visible sunset and after around a quarter of an hour (in Talmudic latitudes) it is definite night. This machloket is linked to the aforementioned MA (who accepts Rabbeinu Tam) and Gra as follows. According to the MA, sunset, like sunrise, is not a halachic time. According to the Gra, tzeit cannot be a bookend, because it does not mirror alot hashachar and thus we use neitz and sheki’a.

Whose opinion is accepted? The gemara (Shabbat 35a) says that Shabbat is fully over by the time three medium stars are visible (without “light pollution”). Thus, the Gra’s argument that keeping Shabbat at least 72 minutes after sunset is “contradicted by our sight” is powerful. The Gra’s impact (as well as the Rambam and the Ba’al Hatanya) on the greater “Lithuanian” world, the difficulty (including scientific evidence) of Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, and the difficulty of finishing Shabbat so late in northern latitudes probably contributed to the fact that historically most communities accepted the Gra’s basic approach regarding the night. (See a variation in Igrot Moshe, OC I, 24.) This is despite the fact that the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) and most Rishonim agree with Rabbeinu Tam (see sources in Yabia Omer II, OC 21).

Some people have decided to adopt the MA for szks, which is not so difficult; others keep Shabbat until late due to its severity (not all are aware of the linkage). All of these practices are legitimate.

Both minhag Ashkenaz and Sepharad do one Kaddish Yatom at the end of Mincha;
the question is only: where? Thus, while I don’t like the word "criticized", if people disagree with you, we would agree with them that you should not say a second Kaddish.

One may answer amein while in the middle of saying a pasuk from Korbanot, as long as the interruption divides the pasuk into intelligible parts.  This is not a problem of reciting a partial verse, since, according to many opinions, this prohibition does not exist when one intends on completing the pasuk after the interruption[1].

In general, one should follow, when possible, local practice (including the davening of the shul one attends) regarding things that are noticeable to the public (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim II, 23). Let us start by exploring why Ashkenazim do not do nk daily in chutz la’aretz.

According to the original halacha, nk is said every day, but at least 700 years ago, the minhag developed in most Diaspora communities not to do it during weekdays but only on Yom Tov (and, perhaps, Shabbat). The Shulchan Aruch (see Beit Yosef, end of Orach Chayim 128) rejected this minhag, explaining the prevalent (not universal) Sephardic practice, but the Rama (OC 128:44) and Ashkenazim embrace it. Many explanations have been given to explain the minhag’s logic, often a sign that no reason is particularly convincing. We will mention a few conjectures.

The Rama mentions that one should make the blessings in a good mood, which is more common on Yom Tov. The Maharil and Agur (176) cite concern that the time spent on nk causes difficulty for people who need to get to work to “grind out” a living. Also, a practice arose that one must be pure to do nk and since it is not always practical for kohanim to go to the mikveh, especially during the winter, it made more sense to not do nk. The Beit Yosef (ibid.) reacted that it is illogical to institute a post-Talmudic stringency to require purification and then use that as a reason to uproot the mitzva. The Beit Yosef does concede that the absolute obligation to do nk applies only when the kohanim are called by the congregation, which does not occur according to the minhag. However, he still thinks it is wrong to obviate the mitzva that is supposed to arise.

The Beit Ephrayim (OC 6) says that since exile weakened the reliability of a kohen’s genealogical tradition, we minimize the practice of nk to avoid the prohibitions involved in a non-kohen performing the mitzva. (If they didn’t do nk at all, kohanim would stop being careful about a kohen’s restrictions). The Chatam Sofer (OC 23) says that we often lack the proper level of concentration during davening, without which nk cannot be done. Additional reasons are advanced, but this will have to suffice for this forum (see Tzitz Eliezer, VII, 6; Minchat Yitzchak VIII, 1; Piskei Teshuvot 128:(413)).

Several Ashkenazi poskim (most prominently, the Gra) yearned to return to the daily practice of nk and didn’t think any of the reasons justified its uprooting, but the idea of changing this old minhag is problematic. (See some scary stories of failed attempts in Minchat Yitzchak ibid. and the Aruch Hashulchan’s (128:64) reaction that the Heavens apparently do not want us to change.) However, regarding communities that have always followed the standard halacha of doing nk, we have seen no qualms. We note also that the minhag is that even groups of people from chutz la’aretz do nk daily when they are in Israel, against the original Ashkenazi practice. 

Some of the explanations we have seen apply primarily to a community not doing nk and do not preclude an individual from joining an existing nesiat kapayim. Of supreme importance is that once a kohen is present during a communal call to the kohanim, he has a Torah obligation to take part. (We do not feel it is justified to tell an Ashkenazi not to daven with Sephardim.) The solution, if it were necessary, is for the Ashkenazi kohen to step out beforehand. However, any public step to separate oneself from what the shul is doing is very problematic. For example, Chayim Sha’al allowed a Sephardi to recite a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh for that reason (see the grounds under which Rav O. Yosef in Yechaveh Da’at IV, 31 differed), and the Divrei Yatziv (OC 248) writes similarly regarding haftara at Mincha of a fast day. Therefore, we feel that it is proper for an Ashkenazi kohen to do nk along with the other kohanim at a Sephardi minyan.

In the general case one does not have to get out of the car and stand up. Likewise, in the average case, where one feels self-conscious stopping the car, he can continue driving, assuming he knows Tefilat Haderech well enough to say it with reasonable kavanah without making the driving dangerous. If someone other than the driver recites it, all the better (sources: Orach Chayim 1110:4 with Mishna Berura;Ishei Yisrael 50:2).

The idea of going up for Birkat Kohanim in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei exists, and we will explain it before discussing its limitations.

The Radvaz (IV, 293) says that if there is no other kohen who will be doing Birkat Kohanim, then a kohen who is still in Shemoneh Esrei should stop to go up and do it. He says that since Birkat Kohanim is from the Torah, while any specific tefilla is only rabbinic, the kohen should make sure that Birkat Kohanim is done. The precedent for that is the halacha that when a kohen serves as a chazan, if he is able to return to his tefilla afterward, he can stop for Birkat Kohanim (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 128:20). If, on the other hand, there are other kohanim, there is no need to disrupt Shemoneh Esrei, and although a kohen has a personal obligation to duchen, that is activated only when he is called to do so (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.:4). The Radvaz assumes that when someone calls out to the kohanim, he does so with the intention that only those who are available should come up. The Magen Avraham (128:40) says that if an individual kohen still davening was specifically told to go, his obligation would be activated and he would have to stop his tefilla and fulfill it in any case. One requirement is that the kohen at least started slightly to move in the direction of the place of Birkat Kohanim during the beracha of R’tzei, which he may do (Shulchan Aruch ibid.:8).

The Mishna Berura (128:106), after citing the Magen Avraham, cites significant opinions that say that the strictness with which Chazal treated Shemoneh Esrei precludes interrupting it even if he is the only kohen and even if he is called. Only if he is up to the same part of Shemoneh Esrei as the chazan at the time of Birkat Kohanim would he be allowed to proceed. In that case, neither walking to the front of shul nor reciting Birkat Kohanim at its appointed place in Shemoneh Esrei is a significant break. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 128:56) also paskens this way.

When he may not go up, the kohen does not leave shul. The matter of leaving is either to avoid being called, which we saw does not apply, or is a non-crucial step so people will not think he is pasul (Terumat Hadeshen II, 22), which is not justified here.

If you are already up to Elokai Netzor, you can skip or shorten it, as is suggested regarding answering Kedusha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 122:1). If you are not able to take the steps back in time, you can go up during Elokai Netzor, as we have seen that this is no worse a break than answering Kedusha, which is permitted in that situation (ibid.). In these cases, you should remember to take a minimal step toward the duchan during R’tzei and make sure to keep your hands clean as of the last time you washed, which according to most, can even be the morning washing (Va’ani Avarcheim p. 165; see Yalkut Yosef, OC 128:(11)).

It is obviously not an optimal situation to have to possibly miss Birkat Kohanim or to have to deal with timing matters, which, among other things, is probably disturbing to one’s concentration. If you feel that it is easy to speed up your tefilla with little to no concentration loss, we suggest doing so, especially if we are talking about missing by a matter of seconds. Another possibility discussed by the poskim is to start Shemoneh Esrei somewhat early and thus finish at a workable time. Although it is good to start Shemoneh Esrei with everyone else, many permit starting a little early if there are significant gains by doing so (see Yabia Omer II, OC 7; Ishei Yisrael 33:(25)). While you are certainly not required to do so, if it puts you more at ease in your Shemoneh Esrei, you may do so.

Although tefilla is a rabbinic mitzva, since one can add tefillot, it is correct to daven again. Only on Shabbat when one cannot do voluntary tefillot, one should not do it again (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 107:1).

The reading the Haftarah was originally established for a congregation. Therefore, when one reads the Haftarah on his own he may not recite the Brachot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 272: 1, in the Ramah). Despite this, It is important for one who missed the Haftarah to make it up in order to encourage himself not to miss it in the future. It is important to be aware that there is no proper Halakhic obligation.

One may recite Avinu Malkeinu in private, and not only in public, therefore it  seems that one who prayed in a minyan in which Avinu Malkeinu wasn’t recited during the prayer service should say it on his own later (Mateh Ephraim, 182: 14; Eliyahu Raba, sif katan 5. Nevertheless, he also brought support to the opinion that states not to recite it without a congregation. However, the main viewpoint is as written above).

1.                 Must one go to an Ashkenazi minyan to hear the haftarah reading after praying in a Sephardi minyan where the haftarah wasn’t recited?

Regarding hearing the Torah reading in public when one prays alone:

The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (25: 14) writes that the individual must make-up the Torah reading from a Chumash. Responsa Binyan Shlomo, siman 35, argues with this. He claims that the Torah reading is incumbent on the congregation, and not on any particular individual. If there weren’t ten people who didn’t hear, there is absolutely no requirement. Yalkut Yosef, volume 2, pp. 22-26, seems to agree with him, and therefore states that one isn’t required to make-up the Torah reading from a Chumash.

Regarding the haftarah portion, it seems more probable that it was established for reading in a congregation.

Therefore, even if one prayed with a minyan but they didn’t recite the haftarah, there is no reason for him to search for another minyan, since by the congregation is obligated, and not the individual. Since he participated in a congregation which doesn’t have the custom to recite the haftarah, he isn’t obligated himself. The individual’s obligation is to pray with a congregation. If he happens to be in a congregation that doesn’t see itself as obligated to read the Haftarah – neither is he.

2.                 Is it correct for an Ashkenazi to avoid attending a Sephardi minyan during Minchah of a public fast since the Sephardim don’t recite the haftarah in this prayer?

It is appropriate for a person to conduct himself according to the custom of his forebears and pray in a minyan in which the prayers are recited in the customary way of his forebears – primarily in a place in which there is a significant difference, like the case in discussion.

Nevertheless, a person could also fulfill his obligation of praying in a minyan with a different nusach, and the case discussed only regards the recitation of the haftarah, which is the congregation’s responsibility. As we wrote above, a person isn’t obligated to look for a place in which the haftarah will be read. If it is too taxing for him to pray in an Ashkenazi minyan, he may pray in a Sephardi minyan.

Let us first note that Kedusha is a series of three important p’sukim (Kadosh, Baruch k’vod, and Yimloch), each preceded by an introductory passage (Nekadesh, or Nakdishach for Sephard, Le’umatam, and U’vidivrei), with additions for Shabbat. Many hummers are concerned that it is forbidden to say the words along with the chazan.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 125:1, based on Shut Harosh 4:19) says that no one but the chazan should recite Nakdishach at all. The Machatzit Hashekel (to Magen Avraham 125:1) and Mishna Berura (125:1) explain that this passage was instituted for the chazan, as shaliach tzibbur (representative of the congregation) to prompt the congregation, who would respond with the p’sukim alone. The Beit Yosef is uncertain as to whether this idea applies to the other introductory passages as well. In practice, we do say Nekadesh (and Sefardim often sing it together- see Yabia Omer, VII, OC 14). This can be attributed to a few things: 1) The Taz (125:1) questions what the issue could be about saying these passages, especially as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 109:2) rules that one who starts Shemoneh Esrei along with the chazan’s chazarat hashatz says Kedusha with him word for word. 2) The Ari (cited in Ba’er Heitev 125:1) says that one should recite all of Kedusha along with the chazan silently. 3) The minhag is to say Nekadesh. (The Aruch Hashulchan 125:2 says that the minhag is to say only Nekadesh and not Le’umatam and U’vidivrei; on Shabbat, the minhag is to say the long additions).

What about repeating these words a second time? The Rama (OC 125:1) says that one should not speak during Kedusha. The Magen Avraham (125:1) says that one should not even learn without speaking but should listen to the chazan. However, he says that this restriction does not apply when the chazan is singing tunes without words or during the extended passages for Shabbat, which are not critical to Kedusha. If so, restrictions on saying extraneous things or usurping the chazan’s role at that point are also not likely an issue. Although the poskim advise not to talk until the end of the beracha after Kedusha (see Mishna Berura 125:9, in the name of the Maharil), it appears that the issue is of disrespect to Kedusha. The poskim on the above issue do not say that unnecessary recitation is a hefsek (formal interruption). Only when words are repeated nonsensically to fit in with a musical piece is that an issue (see Yabia Omer, VII, OC 14; Igrot Moshe, OC II, 22). Singing the words of Mimkocmcha, for example, should not have that problem.

There is an issue when, with religious/musical fervor, the congregation drowns out the chazan. One problem, disgrace to the words, should apply to all of Kedusha (as above). This should not be such a problem when people say the appropriate words, albeit not in the classical manner of the chazan alone being audible, but in a way many feel inspiring. Presumably, it is a problem when people are “stringent” to hum, but so loudly that the words are not heard clearly from anyone. Another problem is that those who are in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei need to hear Kedusha, as they cannot recite it. It is a machloket (Az Niddbaru II, 60 - yes; Igrot Moshe, OC III, 4 - no;) whether they can fulfill this by hearing people other than the chazan say the words, considering that they do not have in mind to do it on the davener’s behalf. However, this applies specifically to the p’sukim of Kedusha (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 8:38), which are less commonly sung.

The following is our advice. During Kadosh and Baruch k’vod (and perhaps the final words of L’umatam and U’vidivrei), the chazan should be heard clearly, and the congregation should do no more than hum quietly. During the longer Shabbat additions, people may sing along as they like, and if this competes with the chazan’s voice, they should recite the words. (If one plans to do this, it is preferable to refrain from saying it while the chazan is waiting).

 Chazarat hashatz is a logical time to take care of planning the aliyot (as the Torah is being taken out is better but is often not enough time). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 124:7) speaks sternly about one who speaks “mundane talk” during chazarat hashatz, which implies that matters that are of an appropriate nature are permitted. Granted, it is not simple to allow other positive things, like learning, during that time, and, as a rule, people should listen, be careful to answer Amen to the berachot, and not ruin the discipline of others in shul (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.:4 and Mishna Berura 124:17). However, everyone should understand that a gabbai has little choice but to use that time for his basic tasks. (It is unfortunate that some gabbaim take the opportunity for unnecessary schmoozing.) Exceptions during chazarat hashatz are when there may not be ten people (actually, nine plus the chazan) answering besides the gabbai and the person he is speaking to (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid. and Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 19) and during Kedusha (see Rama, OC 125:2) and Modim D’rabbanan.

Speaking during Kaddish is more severe than during chazarat hashatz (see Mishna Berura 56:1) and can and should be avoided at almost all costs.

The big question is in regard to various parts of Kri’at Hatorah (laining). The gemara (Sota 39a) says: “Once the sefer Torah is opened, it is forbidden to speak even in matters of halacha.” In order to reconcile this gemara with the gemara in Berachot (8a), which mentions that Rav Sheshet learned during Kri’at Hatorah, Rishonim make different distinctions regarding who the learner is and his circumstances are (see Tur, OC 146). However, according to at least most of them, it is forbidden for a gabbai to speak during the actual laining. This could be because it is disrespectful, disruptive (Rashi), or he is missing words that he needs to hear (Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 40.5; see opinions in Yabia Omer, IV, YD 31). Only in a situation where there is no choice would it be permitted (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 146:2).

In general, there is a machloket whether it is permitted (Bach, OC 146) or forbidden (Beit Yosef, OC 146) to speak divrei Torah in between aliyot (bein gavra l’gavra = bglg). The Beit Yosef’s main objection is a concern that one who begins to speak might not stop speaking in time for the next aliya. It doesn’t make sense to apply this strictly to a gabbai on duty for two reasons: he needs some latitude to do his job; the laining will generally not commence while he is still at work.

The remaining question, then, is how to view the beracha after each aliya: is it part of the laining, to which everyone must listen, or is it part of bglg? The Ritva (Megilla 21b) says that the reason that this beracha begins with “Baruch” and is not a “continuation beracha” is that it is permitted to talk before it.  Regarding the halacha that one may leave shul bglg, the Pri Chadash (146:1) says that after the reading but before the beracha is already considered bglg. Some had the minhag to deliver a derasha before the beracha (see Yechaveh Da’at V, 17).There is significant discussion as to whether the berachot are an obligation of the whole congregation or just of the oleh and whether it is important for ten people to hear them (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot I, 143). After weighing the factors, it makes sense that assuming all the following – ten people hear the beracha, the gabbai can do it without distracting the oleh, and it will save time for the congregation (which halacha deems as precious) –  the gabbai may speak for the needs of his job before or during the ending beracha. Others should listen to the beracha intently.

The only primary source we found on the matter is the Tzitz Eliezer (X, 20), who infers from classical sources that Kri’at Hatorah and even U’va L’tzion must be at the proper time for Mincha. He is cited by Tefilla K’hilchata (21:90) and Ishei Yisrael (36:90) without a machloket. (Ishei Yisrael also relates a less conclusive oral ruling from Rav Chayim Kaniefsky to try to avoid doing so.) Although the Tzitz Eliezer does not prove there is an issue with Ashrei, he assumes one should wait for it as well.

Let us analyze the matter ourselves. Kri’at Hatorah was instituted “at Mincha” of Shabbat due to yoshvei keranot (Bava Kama 82a). Rashi explains that these are businessmen who don’t hear Kri’at Hatorah on Monday and Thursday, and so this is their additional reading. The Shita Mekubetzet (ad loc.) says that it has to do with the fact that many people get drunk during the day and we set a time for Kri’at Hatorah along with Mincha, which is a time of good will, to show that we are different. For some reason, the Tzitz Eliezer assumes that that would have to be at a time when one can daven Mincha. He also cites the mishna (Megilla 31a), which, after listing the various Torah readings, says that each one should be at its time.

It is not clear, though, to all poskim that this short Shabbat Kri’at Hatorah has to be directly at Mincha. The Eshel Avraham (Butchatch, 292) raises a doubt whether, at least fundamentally, one can do the Kri’at Hatorah in a manner that is not related to davening Mincha. See also Yaskil Avdi (VIII, OC 38), who says that one can lain after people privately davened Mincha, and even after sunset. It is a valid question whether the relating of this reading to Mincha tells us to (at least preferably) attach the reading to the tefilla of Mincha or whether it was instituted at the time of Mincha. If the former is correct, it makes sense that if it is done minutes before the time of Mincha, it should be fine. After all, P’sukei D’zimra is meant to lead into Shacharit, and it can be done earlier than Shemoneh Esrei can (see Ishei Yisrael 16:15). If Kri’at Hatorah is to be at the time of Mincha, it should probably not be earlier.

We have been assuming that the time in our calendars is absolute. The gemara (Yoma 28b) says that while Mincha is modeled after the afternoon sacrifice, which was brought half an hour after chatzot (astronomical midday), Avraham would daven right after midday. Tosafot (Nidda 63b) and the Magen Avraham (458:1) are among those who say that conceptually Mincha is at chatzot, just that we are concerned we may do it too early. It is not so simple that the same concern applies to Kri’at Hatorah or Ashrei / U’va L’tzion. Furthermore, the Mishna Berura (233:2) suggests that after the fact, one who davened Mincha in the half hour after chatzot fulfills the mitzva, which makes the case for leniency stronger, as starting a few minutes before the time is certainly after chatzot. There is also some question (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 233:8) how to calculate the half hour (30 minutes or one twenty-fourth of daylight). Thus, during certain times of the year, it might be possible to daven a little earlier than the time on most calendars.

The Tzitz Eliezer relies strongly on kabbalistic sources that the spiritually appropriate time for U’va L’tzion and Kri’at Hatorah is the afternoon (Mincha time). Besides the question whether we are bound by such sources, since we are talking about after chatzot (thus, afternoon) why should that half hour not be appropriate?

We lack the conviction to rule against the important stringent ruling cited without clear sources for leniency. However, we feel that since there are few sources and not compelling logic for stringency, one should not protest a minyan’s practice to start Mincha a few minutes “early.”   

The halachot of being within someone's 4 amot do not apply to the side (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 102:4). If one is in a not allowed place, he can move in the direction of distancing himself.

The gemara (Berachot 14b) says that one who says Kri’at Shema without tefillin is like one who says false testimony about himself. Rabbeinu Yona (8a of Rif to Berachot) explains that since he reads in Kri’at Shema the commandment to lay tefillin, it looks bad to read it and not put on tefillin. There are several sources that say that, for positive and/or to avoid negative issues, it is important to have tefillin on during Shemoneh Esrei also (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 25:4; Tosafot, Berachot 14b; see China D’chayei 30). Therefore, people do not give up their tefillin until at least after Shemoneh Esrei and indeed usually not until after Kedusha. So, as you ask, the person waiting will have to choose between davening without tefillin and davening Shemoneh Esrei without a minyan. (Davening at a later minyan that makes the crucial times of tefilla is, of course, best.)

There is close to a contradiction on the matter between critical sources on your question and the standard practice concerning a related one. Many people who go to a late minyan “solve” the problem of missing sof z’man Kri’at Shema by reciting it before shul. Yet, several poskim are bothered by the fact that these people usually do so without tefillin (during the week), which, as we have seen, is a problem. Rav Ovadya Yosef (I, OC 4) justifies the practice by citing those who say that it is not false testimony if one will be putting on tefillin later in the day. (Rav Shlomo Kluger (Ha’elef Lecha Shlomo 47) says that it is legitimate to rely on putting on tefillin later only if that will be during the recitation of Kri’at Shema at the right time.) One can add to the picture the opinion of the Meiri that Kri’at Shema without tefillin is a problem only when it is done in a manner that shows disregard for tefillin and the fact that the whole issue is only rabbinic. Standard practice, thus, is to not be overly concerned about the false testimony when tefillin will be put on later.

In apparent contradiction, the Magen Avraham (66:12) says that if one has to choose between davening Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan and Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei with tefillin, we choose the tefillin. His main source is reminiscent of the transitive property of inequality. If one comes into Shacharit when the congregation is about to start Shemoneh Esrei, he does not skip straight to Shemoneh Esrei because the importance of tefilla following the mention of geula (redemption) is greater than that of Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 111:3). Yet, if one’s tefillin arrive right between geula and tefilla he stops to put them on despite the break (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:8). Thus, tefillin must certainly be more important than Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan. This proof is suspect because putting on tefillin between geula and tefilla is not necessarily a full break (Maharsham III, 359). We can actually use similar logic in the opposite direction. One can say Kri’at Shema without tefillin in order to do so like vatikin even though many hold that tefilla with a minyan is greater than vatikin (see discussion in Yabia Omer, op. cit.). Thus, there is significant halachic logic to say that one should daven normally and put on the tefillin during chazarat hashatz (see Minchat Yitzchak II, 107, who connects the matter of Kri’at Shema before davening and our question). Yet, it is hard to rule against the Magen Avraham, who is accepted by the Mishna Berura (66:40).

Assuming that one is going to follow the Magen Avraham, some suggest that he should wait until after Yishtabach, which is reasonable since the Rama (OC 54:3) says that one may put on tefillin at that time. However the poskim do not see this as an optimum time and considering that this person is anyway not reciting the critical passages of Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan, it is preferable to wait before starting Baruch She’amar.

 There are many sources on the idea of connecting one’s tefilla to that of the tzibbur (congregation). Not only do important sections of tefilla require a minyan and it is more respectful to Hashem to join a group when turning to Him (the larger the better- Mishna Berura 90:28), it is also more conducive to the tefilla being accepted favorably (Berachot 6a). The matter of davening at the time the tzibbur davens comes up within the latter context. The gemara (Berachot 7b) tells that Rav Nachman told Rav Yitzchak that he had been too weak to come to shul. Rav Yitzchak asked why he did not have someone tell him when the tzibbur was up to tefilla (apparently Shemoneh Esrei) so that he could benefit from the eit ratzon (time of good will) at that time to help his tefillot. Tosafot (Avoda Zara 4b) says that there are different levels of advantage: together with the tzibbur, one’s tefillot are “heard”; at the same time in different places, they are “not pushed away.” These levels of acceptance probably depend on other factors, and we are not able to comprehend such Divine matters’ exact meanings.

In any case, following this guideline is not a full halachic requirement but something one should try to avail himself of (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 90:9.). It is related to the idea of davening in a shul even if one cannot do so together with a minyan (ibid.). The latter matter is a double-edged sword, as the one real prohibition in this regard is davening in a shul ahead of the tzibbur (Berachot 28b).

Let us now address your question. The closest source we have found in the Rishonim is in the Semag (Aseh 19, p. 102a, cited by the Rama, OC 90:9), who says that if there is no local minyan, one should follow the time that “communities of Israel” daven. This implies that, ideally, one follows the local minyan but that there could be some type of official average time. We do not know the extent to which there was a uniform time in his days, but we cannot identify such a time nowadays. (There is a general preference for vatikin, but if the Semag had that time in mind, he would have said it.)

The Mishna Berura (90:31) seems to say that in places where there are many minyanim, all times are good. However, he and his source, the Chayei Adam (16:3), is talking about refraining from davening before the right time, and says that it does not apply when there are many minyanim. One can still ask whether there is something to do if one specifically wants to avail himself of the positive element. Ishei Yisrael (8:(32)) seems to say that all times are good. Avnei Yashfe says in the “name” of an unnamed gadol that in such a case there is no preference (sounding like nothing is particularly good). However, we prefer the following compromise approach. Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted as saying that the gemara implies that this matter requires one to focus on a specific minyan (Ishei Yisrael, op. cit.). While it is not clear to us where Rav Auerbach saw this in the gemara, it leads in the logical direction of his disciple, Rav Neuwirth (cited ibid.). If one usually davens with a specific minyan but cannot make it on a certain day, he gets the positive element of davening when he davens at the same time as they do even if there are many other minyanim in town. (This makes particular sense if this matter depends more on psychology than on mysticism.) Rav Neuwirth brings an interesting precedent from the Sha’ar Hatziyun (551:56) that if one is eating fleishig at seuda shlishit during the Nine Days, he should stop when his regular shul has davened Ma’ariv. If one is not connected to a specific minyan and there are many minyanim in town, then there is apparently neither anything positive nor any requirement to try to correspond to some random minyan.

While a major part of the concept of makom kavu’ah is to be consistent about davening in one’s normal minyan (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 90:19), one may certainly normally decide for himself when he is justified to daven elsewhere. Yet, there is precedent for one’s counterparts to prevent him from leaving them without a minyan.

Firstly, after stressing the importance of davening with a minyan, the gemara (Berachot 8a) says that one who does not daven with the community is a bad neighbor. Partially based on this source, the Rivash (518, accepted by the Rama, OC 54:22) says that when there is a problem putting together a minyan, the community can fine those who do not regularly take part in the minyan. The Mishna Berura (54:73) cites the Eliya Rabba who says that even those who learn and daven in a beit midrash (which is better for their learning and normally for their davening) should come to the local shul to make sure they have a minyan. The Peulat Tzaddik (Salah, I, 178) goes as far as to say that even if the local beit knesset does not have a sefer Torah, if the majority of the minyan does not plan to go to the next town, one should stay to keep the minyan going.

What if there are other shuls in town? The Aruch Hashulchan (54:26) says that in that case, people do not need to go out of their way to insure the viability of a minyan at a specific shul. However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III, 16) says that the minyan at all shuls is worthy of preservation. His main source is from the aforementioned Eliya Rabba, instructing “learners” from the beit midrash to come to the shul. Since even learners should normally daven with a minyan (see Rama, OC 90:18), it must be talking about a case where there is a minyan in the beit midrash and still they are to leave their place to make sure that the town’s shul has a minyan. Since there is a preference for one to daven in his own beit midrash over a local shul (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:18), we also see that keeping an existing minyan justifies giving up a religious preference, which is extremely instructive for our case.

Contemporary poskim agree with Rav Feinstein’s approach. Shevet Halevi (X, 9) told yeshiva students in a town that did not have a stable minyan in the local shul to go to ensure their minyan (and considered it educational). Rav Shternbach (Teshuvot V’hanhagot II, 62) speaks of one who wants to daven in a slow minyan in the city instead of the fast minyan in the suburb where he lives, and told him to stay.

The extent to which one should go to preserve an existing shul when there are others may be related to the halacha that one does not knock down an existing shul until a new one is in place (Shulchan Aruch, OC 152:1). The Taz (152:1) says that this does not apply if there is another proper shul in town with room for the displaced, whereas the Magen Avraham (152:5) says that even when there is another shul in town one cannot take a shul out of use without a ready replacement.

All of the aforementioned poskim discuss cases where without the minyan continuing, there will be people who will not find or agree to take part in an alternative minyan. If, in your case, everyone or almost everyone has little problem davening elsewhere for the day, it is not reasonable to “hold people hostage” and never allow them to miss once even for a good reason. It is reasonable to ask them to look for someone to replace them (a parallel to the Shulchan Aruch’s mention of hiring a replacement).

Let us start our discussion from the main sources before moving on to practical considerations.

The gemara (Pesachim 56a) mentions a number of practices of the people of Yericho. One which was criticized is that they would not pause properly during the recitation of Shema. Rabbeinu Yona (Berachot, 8b of the Rif’s pages) explains that they did not read it calmly “with its te’amim,” which the Tur (Orach Chayim 61) understood as its trop, thus indicating that it is proper to do Kri’at Shema with trop. The Beit Yosef (ad loc.) questions whether the Tur understood Rabbeinu Yona correctly, considering also that few people in his time read Kri’at Shema with trop, and suggests that it just means to be careful to pause at the right places so that the text is properly comprehensible. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (OC 61:24), he accepts the Tur/ Rabbeinu Yona’s idea of using the Torah trop as a requirement. It is clear that b’dieved one fulfills the mitzva without it. (It is interesting to note that it is a matter of machloket whether trop is of Torah origin or whether it was added at some later time (Nedarim 37b)).

On the Ashkenazi side, the Rama also discusses the matter with slight differences between his two major works. In the Darkei Moshe (OC 61:8) he says that reciting Kri’at Shema with trop is liable, for many people who try to do so, to take away from their concentration. He also reports that the minhag anyway is not to use trop. He is supportive of the practice only for those who are confident that they are able to concentrate at the same time on the content and the trop. In his glosses on the Shulchan Aruch, he is a little bit less selective, saying: “In our countries this is not the minhag. However, those who are exacting are stringent on the matter.”

Is there anything other than concentration that one may lose by using the trop? The Ishei Yisrael (21:(2)) implies that if one makes a mistake in trop then it is liable to change the meaning of the pasuk, which requires one to go back and do it correctly, just like regarding Kri’at Hatorah (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 142:1 and Bi’ur Halacha, ad loc.). Whether this concern applies equally without trop seems to depend on the person. If one reads Shema at a totally uniform pace, then while not stressing the correct meaning, one is also not reinforcing the wrong meaning, unless one does not pause at all at major stopping places (classically, where there is a sof pasuk or an atnachta). Reasonably accurate leining is likely to improve much of the comprehensibility, but mistakes could sometimes make things worse than a uniform pace.

Other issues emerge when one is audible when reading with the trop. One issue is yohara, i.e., that one’s community will view it as haughty if an individual reads in a manner that he considers a “better way” than the local minhag. The other is that leining has a tendency of disturbing the concentration of people around the leiner. While the major application of this issue of disturbing others is during Shemoneh Esrei (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 101:2), when people are silent and need total concentration, the issue could apply here (as Michtam L’David, OC 10 says regarding those who sing Kri’at Shema on Shabbat).

Some have a reasonable practice of using trop for some of Kri’at Shema but not for all. There is some logic to be more careful for the first parasha, which according to some is the only part whose obligation is from the Torah (see Beit Yosef, OC 63). On the other hand, the first pasuk, which in some ways may be most important (see ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, OC 60:5), may not be the place to use trop, as its pace is meant to be uneven (Shulchan Aruch, OC 61:6) and it is sometimes done at a slow speed or great intensity (ibid. 4) that do not fit naturally with trop.

The gemara (Berachot 10b) cites and explains two p’sukim relating to not eating before davening: “Do not eat on the blood” (Vayikra 19:26), meaning, do not eat before you have prayed for your blood (life). “You thrust me after gavecha” (Melachim I, 14:9) – read as geiecha (your haughtiness) – in other words, only after haughty [involvement in pleasures] did the person accept ohl malchut shamayim (the yoke of Heavenly Kingdom).

The most convincing approach as to the interrelationship between the two derivations is that the second clarifies the first. In other words, there is not a formal prohibition to eat, but rather one should not eat in a manner of haughtiness. Therefore, one may drink water (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3), a “drink of humility.” Also, the Pri Chadash (89:3) says that when one needs to eat for medical reasons (even real food - Mishna Berura 89:24), he may do so before davening even if he can wait.

At this point, we would posit that since davening with a minyan is a real advantage and eating in your circumstances is totally permitted, it is better to eat first than give up on minyan. However, the Leket Hakemach (cited by the Baer Heitev (89:11), the Biur Halacha (to 89:3), and recent poskim (including Yalkut Yosef 89:29 and Ishei Yisrael 13:27)) says it is better to daven first without a minyan than to eat before davening. (The omission of this opinion by such important codes as Chayei Adam, Shulchan Aruch Harav, and Aruch Hashulchan may imply that they do not accept it). There are two approaches one can take to explain the Leket Hakemach. 1) The serious (perhaps Torah-level) problem of eating before davening overrides the preference or lesser obligation of davening with a minyan (Ohr L’Tziyon II, 7:8). 2) The service of Hashem involved in davening first despite one’s need to eat lends the tefilla a strong positive force (see Eretz Hatzvi (Frimer) II, 2).

Nevertheless, we believe, for the following reasons, that you may decide which of the options is more appropriate for you. In addition to the absence of the Leket Hakemach’s opinion in early sources, all the sources that mention it talk about it being a preference, not a requirement (see also Magen Avraham 90:21). Also, in your case the option of eating first and then davening with a minyan later is stronger than in the Leket Hakemach’s case for the following reasons. He spoke about someone whose weakness made it difficult to hold out until after davening but did not address medically required eating, which in your case may make it less problematic. He also spoke primarily about the long Shabbat davening, where it is too long to wait, so the solution is to shorten the first part of davening. In contrast, in your case the standing medical orders are to eat as soon as possible, after which it is time for normal davening. Furthermore, your situation would regularly preclude your davening with a minyan. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 109:5), discussing the case of one who davens slowly enough that he consistently has to choose between davening with others and answering to Kedusha, rules that davening with others has precedence (even though he rules differently for a one-time basis such as coming late). He reasons that you cannot deprive someone of full tefilla b’tzibbur on a regular basis.

If you follow the standard rule that those who must eat should say the early parts of davening including Kri’at Shema first (see details in Ishei Yisrael 13:27), you anyway avoid the full problem the gemara referred to. After all, you will have first fulfilled a minimal but basic mitzva of tefilla (see Magen Avraham 106:2) and accepted ohl malchut shamayim (see Biur Halacha ibid. and Keren L’Dovid (Greenwald), OC 21). This might suffice even for healthy people according a minority opinion (see Rama, OC 89:3). Therefore, it is legitimate for you to make the call, and even factor in what improves your davening, embarrassment, etc. 

When an individual davens, he is standing before Hashem and should be dressed respectably (Shabbat 10a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) says that this includes covering one’s legs when this is how people dress before important people. The Mishna Berura (91:12) adds that one should wear a hat, explaining that this is the way people dress publicly. (In some circles, this is still true; in others, this does not apply at all). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 98:4) says that since davening corresponds to bringing korbanot, one should have nice clothing for it, as a kohen does for his service.

The mishna (Megilla 24a) says that a pocheiach (one who is inappropriately dressed) may call others to answer his Kaddish and Barchu but cannot do Kri’at Hatorah, be chazan, or perform Birkat Kohanim (duchen). Most poskim understand that these standards are binding and enforceable for a chazan, whereas for an individual it is more a matter of propriety.

When is one a pocheiach? The Rambam (Tefilla 8:12) says that it is when one’s shoulders are exposed. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 53:13) says it is when the clothes are torn so that his arms are exposed. This ruling generated discussion regarding being a chazan with a short-sleeved shirt (see Yechaveh Da’at IV, 8; Yitzchak Yeranen I, OC 18). We accept the approach that it depends whether one would dress that way before an important person (whom he sees regularly), and in most of our communities short sleeves are fine (see Ishei Yisrael 14:(27)). (No sleeves is difficult to permit.)

However, the broad consensus of poskim (which fits with the societal norms of our communities) is that wearing shorts is considered underdressed for any semi-formal setting and is unacceptable for a chazan (Yechaveh Da’at ibid.; see Sha’ar Shimon Echad II, 26). Therefore, your community and you, as their agent, have every right to choose as chazan only those who are wearing long pants. Of course, it is crucial to present the matter sensitively, but people have a responsibility to respect the practices of a community, all the more so when this is the standard halachic indication. The mishna does distinguish between different parts of tefilla, so it might be permitted and wise to let such a person be chazan for P’sukei D’zimra.

What if the community wants to allow chazanim wearing shorts? Rashi (Megilla 24a) says that the problem of pocheiach (explicitly, in regard to duchening, but probably also for a chazan) is the matter of k’vod hatzibbur (the honor of the community). One can then claim that if the community waives any complaints, it is permitted. However, the Tiferet Yisrael (Megilla 4:45) says that it is not a matter of showing respect to the community but of the community as a group showing respect to Hashem. Let us realize what public tefilla is. Instead of going about approaching Hashem ourselves, we join together. The halachot of choosing a representative to lead the delegation are quite exacting (see Orach Chayim 53). This is because our choice of a representative should send the right message, and his being dressed in a manner that is at least presentable in the higher echelons of society is a factor in this.

Regarding a more serious shortcoming of a chazan, we presented an argument that when the whole group shares a common shortcoming, having a chazan with the same shortcoming does not send the wrong message (see Bemareh Habazak III, 6). The same argument can be made here. If (almost) the whole group is dressed in shorts (not infrequently, in camp or on a trip), then even if society as a whole does not view this as respectfully dressed, in that context, the chazan might be allowed to wear shorts, as this is the standard dress for this group in this circumstance.

The Torah does not require one to recite the third parasha of Kri’at Shema (Parashat Tzitzit) at all. It is one way to fulfill the mitzva of mentioning yetzi’at Mitzrayim (liberation from Egypt = yM) daily (see Berachot 12b), which can also be accomplished in other ways (see Berachot 21a) and, ostensibly, at different times.

However, the gemara (Berachot 13b) tells a story that complicates the matter. Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi would teach Torah publicly from early morning in a manner that did not give him an opportunity to first daven or recite Kri’at Shema. During his teaching, he would cover his face and recite the first pasuk of Kri’at Shema to fulfill Kri’at Shema in a minimalistic manner without disturbing his teaching. The gemara continues that he also would teach a halacha in which he could mention yM “at its time,” i.e., the time of Kri’at Shema (Rashi, ad loc). So we seem to have an indication that mentioning yetzi’at Mitzrayim, which we fulfill with Parashat Tzitzit, should also be done before szKS.

On the other hand, there are indications that one does not have to recite Parashat Tzitzit before szKS. During the recitation of Korbanot in the beginning of Shacharit, we recite the first pasuk of Shema. The Rama (Orach Chayim 46:9) recommends the minhag to say “Baruch shem k’vod …” following the pasuk. This indicates our interest that it serve as a fulfillment of Kri’at Shema, since sometimes szKS passes before we reach Kri’at Shema in davening. Some recommend reciting the entire first parasha, as it might all be required for the Torah-level mitzva (Mishna Berura 46:31). There is no similar arrangement for mentioning yM (it is mentioned early in P’sukei D’Zimra- Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 46:9). However, that is what is done to deal with the chance that one will miss szKS. When one expects to miss it, he should say all three parshiyot of Shema (Pri Chadash (OC 46:9), Chayei Adam (8:7), and Mishna Berura (46:31)). While Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi had a special reason to be minimalistic, we should do Kri’at Shema in as close to the rabbinically mandated manner as we can.

Interestingly, while there are different sources for reading each of the three parshiyot, the Rambam (Kri’at Shema 1:2) writes about them as one unit. The mishna (Berachot 13a), in discussing the order of the parshiyot, also seems to treat them as one unit. The Be’ur Halacha (66:5) infers from the Rashba that when reciting the three parshiyot without being sandwiched between birkot Kri’at Shema one should not speak even between the parshiyot.

Fulfilling Kri’at Shema at its time in this way is deficient in several ways, some of which can be remedied without waking up much earlier. It is not ideal when the Kri’at Shema one says before Shemoneh Esrei is not the one with which he is fulfilling the mitzva of Kri’at Shema (Mishna Berura 46:31), and certainly if it is too late to do so. One may not learn before saying Birkot HaTorah. It is debatable whether reciting Kri’at Shema to fulfill that mitzva(ot) counts as learning (see Rama, OC 46:9 and B’tzel Hachochma I, 1). It is thus preferable to say Birkot Hatorah beforehand. It is generally problematic to recite the full text of Kri’at Shema, including the words referring to tefillin without having them on (Berachot 14b). If one does not have time to put on tefillin and make it to Kri’at Shema on time, he can recite Kri’at Shema anyway (Mishna Berura 48:5; see Yechave Da’at VI, 2). Yet, it is preferable to do so while wearing tefillin. Therefore, if one is able to start davening before szKS but will not get to Kri’at Shema on time, he should put on the tefillin before reciting Kri’at Shema. (There is discussion whether one who is unsure whether he will get to Kri’at Shema on time can recite it first with a condition; this is beyond our present scope.)

The Tzitz Eliezer (vol. 14 siman 17) discusses this issue, and he offers several possible explanations for those who whisper, one being that we want to make it clear that the chazzan is just prompting the Kohanim, and not blessing the congregation. However, his conclusion is that this is not the proper custom but rather one should prompt them out loud. So states the Shevet Halevi (vol. 3 siman 15) as well. Therefore, if one is asked about this issue, the answer is that it better to prompt out loud, but if someone does otherwise we would recommend not making a fuss over it.

I don't think there is one authoratative answer.

Our suggestion is as follows. Once the person seems clear of cancer (to the extent that we are capable of knowing), do not daven in Refaeinu, which is for pressing cases, not cautionary ones. As far as during Shema Koleinu or before or during Elokai Netzor and certainly in a separate saying of Tehillim (the Yehi Ratzon can be said whenever the request is not frivilous, which this certainly is not), there is nothing wrong with saying it. If it is someone close enough to you, you may want to continue for some time or at some level.

There are a few things that one is to avoid before davening. The main ones are eating, drinking, doing work, traveling (ibid.), and greeting people (ibid. 2). Each one has its rules and exceptions, either because of need (e.g., someone is weak) or because a certain activity is not a significant activity (e.g., drinking water). It seems, though, that regarding traveling, the rule is intrinsically more limited. If we understood the prohibition too broadly, the halachot would end up being inconsistent, as we shall explain.

How bad is to travel before davening? If one has two shuls in town, there is a preference to go to the one that is farther away so that he can get reward for the extra traveling (Mishna Berura 90:37). Furthermore, consider the following. If one has a shul within eighteen minutes from his house, he is expected to go there to daven with a minyan, but he is not required to do so if it is farther away than that (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:16). We have never heard that, if the shul is more than eighteen minutes away, it is required or even preferable to daven at home because of the prohibition to travel before davening. So it would seem that your traveling to shul, even if in a different town or part of town, is permitted.

One might claim that there is a distinction: it is fine to travel if the point of the traveling is to go to shul, but if the traveling is intended to get to the place one wants to go, just that there is also a shul there, then it is a problem. If so, we would have to consider how to categorize our case. On one hand, you need to travel to the area irrespective of davening. On the other hand, the reason that you would travel at that time is in order to get a minyan.

One can ostensibly prove that in this complex scenario, the traveling is not a problem. We mentioned that one only has to travel eighteen minutes to be able to daven with a minyan. However, if the minyan is located along a path one is traveling anyway, then he has to travel up to 72 minutes for the minyan (ibid.). So we see that an hour-plus of traveling before davening is preferable to davening first without a minyan, even though one is traveling along a route that is necessary for his personal, non-davening purposes. According to Ohr L’tziyon (II:7:6) one might be able to deflect the proof, as he says that the problem of traveling is only for trips of more than 72 minutes. However, assuming your commute is less than that, he would permit and likely require you to travel to the minyan in any case.

Therefore, our analysis indicates that traveling to another area before Shacharit so that one will be able to join a minyan is permitted and proper even if that is not the only reason he is traveling. This is also the practice of many.

The only authoritative source we found on a similar case is the Shevet Halevi (VIII:19). He discusses a case where one can daven with a minyan near his home, but he is concerned that if he travels later, he will have significantly more traffic. In that case, he recommends first reciting Birchot Hashachar before traveling, as the Rama (OC 89:3) brings an opinion that the prohibition on travel does not apply after doing so. Although the Rama says that it is “good to act stringently in the matter,” the Shevet Halevi reasons that one can be lenient in a case of need. In our case, the ability to daven with a minyan would certainly be a valid need. While we argued that in our case (where there is no option of a minyan before traveling), one should be able to be lenient on fundamental grounds, it does not hurt to recite Birchot Hashachar before going, and, therefore, there is a slight preference to do so.

The Mateh Ephraim (582:1) explains that the reason to add the "heh" to "hashalom" is because, by doing so, the gematriah will be the same as "Safriel" the angel in charge of entering the righteous into the Book of Life.

The link to the Mateh Ephraim is below:

http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=38909&st=&pgnum=36&hilite= .

There are those who say "hashalom" in birkat hamazon as well (Luach Heichal Shlomo).  Many people do not say "hashalom" in birkat hamazon, and the Nitaei Gavriel (4:11 footnote 16) offers several suggestions as to why not:

-Birkat hamazon is meant to give praise to Hashem, and therefore a mention of Aseret Yimei Teshuva would be out of place.

- Birkat hamazon must be said with joy, and the joy would be diminished if the  Aseret Yimei Teshuva  were mentioned.

-Or, since many people have the custom to fast during the  Aseret Yimei Teshuva, they did not want to make a change in birkat hamazon in order to stress that it is preferable to be fasting.

If you can find a way that your friend will accept it in the good spirit you intend, tell him that next time he should not skip straight to Shemoneh Esrei. Most of the berachot, which can be said after davening, can be skipped in order to say Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan, including almost all of Birkot Hashachar (see Rama, Orach Chayim 52:1; Yechaveh Da’at V:5; Ishei Yisrael 5:9). The exceptions are Elokai Neshama and Birkot Hatorah, due to a doubt under what circumstances they are fulfilled during davening (Mechayei Hameitim and Ahava Rabba, respectively).

Sephardim follow the opinion that one can indeed skip P’sukei D’zimra to be able to say Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 52:1; Yechaveh Da’at V:5). Ashkenazim follow the opinion that one can greatly shorten Psukei D’zimra to catch up, but at least the berachot (Baruch She’amar and Yishtabach) along with at least one zimra (Ashrei- see Berachot 4b) may not be skipped (Mishna Berura 52:6; Ishei Yisrael 16:21).

All agree that one may not skip Kri’at Shema  and its berachot and have Shemoneh Esrei precede them (Shulchan Aruch, OC 111:3
). This is because of the great importance of semichat geula l’tefilla, which means the following. Birkot Kri’at Shema end with the beracha of Ga’al Yisrael (He who liberated Israel), and it is important that this beracha, being a classically poignant praise of Hashem, lead into Shemoneh Esrei, which is the main part of tefilla. Having this proximity is more important than davening Shemoneh Esrei with a minyan. At Ma’ariv, where semichat geula l’tefilla is less crucial, one who comes late actually should skip to Shemoneh Esrei to start with the minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:3).

Now let us move to your case, where one already recited Shemoneh Esrei without having first done P’sukei D’zimra and Kri’at Shema and its berachot. P’sukei D’zimra is a set of psalms and other p’sukim, sandwiched between opening (Baruch She’amar) and closing (Yishtabach) berachot. While P’sukei D’zimra existed at the time of the gemara (see Shabbat 118b), both the historical development of this section of tefilla and its exact function are not fully clear. However, it likely has to do with the idea of organizing one’s praise of Hashem before davening, as expressed in Avoda Zara 7b. This seems to be the reason that Rav Notrai Gaon (see Tur, OC 52) says that after Shemoneh Esrei has been said, it is no longer proper to recite P’sukei D’zimra. Although some say that it can be made up after Shemoneh Esrei (see ibid.), the Shulchan Aruch (OC 52:1) accepts Rav Notrai’s approach as halacha, but only in regard to the berachot. However, he says that one may and should recite the p’sukim that he skipped (as there is no problem of beracha l’vatala). There is a kabbalistically inclined approach that even reciting the p’sukim is problematic after Shemoneh Esrei. However, the more accepted view is that one may recite the p’sukim, but it is not obligatory to do so (see Yechaveh Da’at ibid.; Tefilla K’hilchata 10:39).

While it is important to go from the berachot of Kri’at Shema into Shemoneh Esrei, this does not mean that these berachot serve only as an introduction. Rather, there is a mitzva to recite the Torah’s p’sukim of Kri’at Shema, and Chazal created and attached berachot that share overlapping themes to Kri’at Shema. Thus, just as after Shemoneh Esrei there is still a mitzva of Kri’at Shema, so there is a mitzva to recite its berachot at that time (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 67:1; see aforementioned Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:3 regarding Ma’ariv).

Therefore, your friend should have said Kri’at Shema with its berachot and could have recited P’sukei D’zimra without its berachot.

If eight people plus the chazan had finished Shemoneh Esrei, they could have started without you. The main source for that assertion is the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 55:6, in the context of Kaddish), who says that someone who is sleeping or is in the midst of Shmoneh Esrei and cannot answer can count as one of the ten people needed for a minyan. This comes from the Hagahot Maimoniot (Tefilla 8:9), who is based on opinions in the gemara that are lenient regarding the qualifications of the tenth person for a minyan.

There is not unanimity on two related points. Some Acharonim (see Eliya Rabba 55:7, Aruch Hashulchan, OC 55:13) say that while we can count only one sleeping person, we can use more people who are reciting Shemoneh Esrei, as they are involved in sanctifying Hashem and can stop their tefilla to at least listen. Only six people (including the chazan) have to be actively involved in the Kaddish. The Mishna Berura (55:32) is inconclusive on the matter. Another matter is that the Shulchan Aruch Harav (OC 55:7) says that for chazarat hashatz we require nine people to actually answer and cannot even use one who is sleeping or davening. In Living the Halachic Process, vol. I, A-10, we took the middle approach – we can use one person in Shemoneh Esrei toward the minyan for chazarat hashatz (see Tzitz Eliezer XII:9).

Does someone who is starting with the chazan count as one who is involved in chazarat hashatz or is he like anyone else who is in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei? It is brought in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach Halichot Shlomo (Tefilla 9:2) and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yalkut Yosef, Tefilla 10) that one who is reading along word for word with the chazan counts fully toward the minyan, as doing so is no worse than listening and answering Amen. Assuming others will finish Shemoneh Esrei by Kedusha, you would no longer need the daveners to be reading along word by word.

There is a classical source that one who is reading along counts like one who is answering Amen. One is not supposed to start Shemoneh Esrei if he will not be able to answer Kedusha and Amen to a few critical berachot (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 109:1). However, he may recite these passages along with the chazan (ibid. 2). This is because reciting the beracha along with the chazan is like saying Amen (Beit Yosef, ad loc.).

Following this logic, it would seem that you could use more than one such person toward the minyan. Could you say that all can be davening for the first time along with the chazan? We do have a similar practice in heiche kedusha (see Rama, OC 124:2), but that is conceptually different. In heiche kedusha there is actually no chazarat hashatz, as the chazan himself is not repeating Shemoneh Esrei but saying it for the first time. Here, we probably need a majority of a minyan to make chazarat hashatz meaningful, and the people who are reading along make it considered that a full minyan are related to do it.

It is not crucial to have nine people answering Amen. While the Rosh (Shut 4:19), who is the main source that nine people have to be listening, says that all should answer Amen, in regard to b’dieved he is bothered only if others are not following along. In general, saying Amen is an important mitzva but is not required to be credited with the beracha (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 213:2). (In the context of heiche kedusha, the Rama says that there should be at least one answering.)

In general one should not suck a candy during davening as the mouth is supposed to be dedicated to speaking to Hashem in the most respectful manner. It should also not be eaten before Kiddush. If there is a medicinal or semi-medicinal need for the candy, please write back to us with the specifics.

The gemara (Sota 39b) indeed says that kohanim should not turn around until the chazan begins Sim Shalom. Therefore, it seems that you should have waited until he actually started Sim Shalom, as an introductory tune does not have halachic standing. However, the matter deserves a better look.

Rashi (ad loc.) describes the end of Birkat Kohanim as follows: the congregation finishes saying Amen to the last beracha, the kohanim turn around and close their hands, the chazan starts Sim Shalom, and the kohanim start reciting “Ribono shel olam.” His order places turning around after Amen but before Sim Shalom (i.e., in your case, you did not have to wait). How could Rashi contradict an explicit gemara? The Maharshal (ad loc.), based on Rashi, says that the gemara means that the time for Sim Shalom must have come, i.e., the congregation must have completed answering Amen.

While Tosafot (Sota 39a) and the Ran (Megilla, 16a of the Rif’s pages) quote Rashi without comment, the Rambam (Tefilla 14:6) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:15) bring the halacha with the simple reading of the gemara – when the chazan starts Sim Shalom. There is no indication from their wording or the sources that the Beit Yosef and commentaries cite that their intention is the Rashi/Maharshal approach.

Let us see if there is halachic logic to have to wait literally for the beginning of Sim Shalom. The apparent logic for the kohanim not to turn around immediately is that they should not rush to finish their job before Birkat Kohanim is totally finished, perhaps thereby showing disrespect  to the blessings and the blessed (see Birkot Horai 12:(1)). Perhaps, then, Sim Shalom is not necessary, as long as Birkat Kohanim is over.

Does one need to start a new beracha to finish the previous section? This point seems to be at the heart of another halachic discussion. If one did not mention rain in the winter in the second beracha of Shemoneh Esrei until after the beracha, he needs to return to the beginning of Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 114:4). However, the beracha is not considered over in this regard until he begins the next beracha; before this, he can insert the mention of rain where he is up to (ibid. 6). This provides a precedent for the end of one section (e.g., Birkat Kohanim) depending on the beginning of the next (e.g., Sim Shalom).

One might deflect this proof because: 1) Not everyone agrees with that Shulchan Aruch (see Biur Halacha ad loc.). 2) The Mishna Berura (114:31) says that one should start mentioning rain within k’dei dibbur (1-1/2 – 2 seconds) of the beracha’s end. To this, we respond: 1) Not only is the Shulchan Aruch ultimately accepted, but even some dissenters do not say that it is like one started the next beracha but that at that point the mistake is viewed as a nonretractable. 2. The Mishna Berura (based on Derech Hachayim 33:34) only says it is preferable to mention rain right away.

There are also strong indications (based on Megilla 18a) that Sim Shalom is the natural continuation of Birkat Kohanim and may serve as confirmation of the blessing (see Rav Nota Greenblatt in Afikei Torah, pg. 131) and is the appropriate time for the kohanim to commence the second stage of their blessing (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 128:15). Therefore, it makes sense that the gemara means that only after Sim Shalom actually begins should kohanim turn around and say Ribbono Shel Olam.

Kohanim should follow the consensus of poskim (see Magen Avraham 128:28; Mishna Berura 128:70) to not turn around until Sim Shalom starts. Chazanim should not procrastinate or chant before Sim Shalom, which confuses the kohanim and the congregation (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 23).

It is not a tefillat shav to daven for one for whom there is no known cure. It is a logical request even if it would require a medical miracle. It is different from the prayers in Berachot 54, which are either illogical (praying for something that is already determined) or requires something which is a change in nature (a female fetus turning into a male fetus). There is nothing illogical about praying that the conditions of autism of an individual will cease until the person is normal, whether by divine means or the discovery of a treatment which is no yet known but may be. It is even more plausible for the person to improve if not be rid of the condition, and refuah is not all or nothing.

Halachot like these involving clothes tend to be subjective. However, one needs to start with the halachic philosophy and standard situations. We wrote (Eikev 5771) about wearing shorts, with a focus on a chazan, and we refer you there for additional sources.

When one davens, he stands before Hashem and should be dressed respectably (Shabbat 10a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) says that this includes covering one’s legs, when this is how people dress before important people. The Mishna Berura (91:12) adds that one should wear a hat, explaining that this is the way people dress publicly. (In some circles, this is still true; in others, it does not apply at all).

Even in surroundings where one should cover his legs, there are limits to the severity of the matter. One’s tefilla is invalid after the fact only if his private parts are uncovered (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91:1) or there is no separation between his heart and private parts (Biur Halacha ad loc.). There is some question as to whether it is better to daven or to skip davening if he is not able to cover his chest (ibid.). Regarding other “improper attire,” including one who has only shorts, he may daven. However, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 5) writes that when it is possible, one must be properly dressed.

Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at IV:8 – see also the dissenters he cites) says that in places (e.g., kibbutzim) and for people (children during the summer) where shorts are commonplace, it is permitted to daven in shorts (not as a chazan). We accept that approach, which leads to the challenge of determining whether short pants are commonplace enough in a give venue.

Does Shabbat change anything? Actually, shorts on Shabbat, not just at the time of davening deserves a similar discussion to the above, as one is supposed to wear nice clothing on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 262:2). This is not a matter of oneg (enjoyment) but of kavod (honoring Shabbat), and this applies even when one is by himself (Mishna Berura 262:6) or prefers more casual clothes. Here, too, societal factors are crucial in determining what types of clothes are necessary, praiseworthy, and appropriate. (The Biur Halacha to 262:3 discusses whether wearing white clothes is showing off. In some circles, the same question could be raised about wearing a black hat, while in others a hat or even a shtreimel are expected). Factors such as age, weather, venue (vacation resort, camp) may also play a role.

Logic dictates that since we are taking a practical, subjective approach, there is every reason to combine factors. On average, people dress more formally at tefilla on Shabbat than they do either at tefilla during the week or on Shabbat outside of shul. The same is true regarding standing before important people, the model for attire for davening. One is likely to dress more formally at a formal setting with an important person than at a casual setting with him. We also find the honor of Shabbat elevating the prominence of other halachic matters. For example, a Shabbat meal warrants Sheva Berachot even without panim chadashot (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 62:8); even minor eating (ara’i) is forbidden on Shabbat before taking ma’aser  (Rambam, Ma’aser 3:4).

In summation, if it is rare for people to come to shul in your community with shorts on Shabbat, we would certainly agree with the content of the person who spoke to you (hopefully, in an appropriate way, which is not always easily done). If it is not uncommon, one needs to know where to draw the line, which is best done by local rabbis with a finger on the pulse of the community. In general, though, it is appropriate for the norm to be to wear long pants.

We will start with a brief overview of the question of saying v’ten tal u’matar outside Israel during this time period (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. II, A-11) before relating to your specific question.

The Rabbis instituted saying vtul according to the needs for rain of the time’s major Jewish communities. The entire Diaspora follows the needs of Bavel, starting 60 days after the beginning of Tekufat Tishrei (Dec. 4 or 5). The Rosh (Shut 4:10) rules that countries that require rain at other times of the year can insert the request accordingly. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 117:2) agrees with the Rosh in principle, but not in practice because of the minhag, and he treats the case of one who said it at that time as a doubt, so that he repeats Shemoneh Esrei as a voluntary prayer. The Rama (ad loc.) does not require repeating Shemoneh Esrei.

The Mishna Berura (117:5) cites two opinions on whether one who resides in Israel but is abroad on and after 7 Cheshvan follows the Israeli schedule or that of the place where he is. The rationale to follow Israel’s needs is more convincing if he will benefit from Israel’s rain, either if his family is there (Baer Heiteiv 117:4 in the name of Maharikash) or he plans to return during the year (ibid., in the name of the Pri Chadash).

Because of the doubt that surrounds this matter, major poskim (Rav S.Z. Orbach and Rav Elyashiv, quoted in Yom Tov Sheni K’Hilchato 10:2; Yalkut Yosef, Kitzur 117:15) suggest to says vtul in Shomeia Tefilla during the questionable period and is safe according to all opinions. This works because it is permitted to ask for rain during the summer in the beracha of Shomeia Tefilla, and it is sufficient b’di’eved to do so during the winter. Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC II:102) implies that Israelis visiting countries where rain is desirable at that time should recite vtul in its regular place. However, the former opinion is preferable, especially for Sephardim (see Birkei Yosef, OC 117:5; Kaf HaChayim, OC 117:11).

We now move to your question. The Chida (Birkei Yosef, OC 117:6) says that one who started saying vtul in Israel and left with plans to return should continue to recite it normally. He explains that it is like a farce to begin saying it and then stop. There is a similar concept in the gemara (Taanit 4b-5a) regarding the discussion how to introduce “mashiv haruach …” in chutz la’aretz, where we treat two days like the possible end of Sukkot. Some say we should start saying “mashiv haruach” on the first day and then stop for some tefillot before resuming it on the second day. The gemara concludes that once we start, we do not stop. This, though, is not a halachic proof to the Chida’s concept, as commentaries explain the ruling differently (see Ritva, Turei Even ad loc.). Also, there is logic to distinguish between how the Rabbis institute the matter in the first place and what one does in the special situation of visiting a place with a different practice.

In any case, the Chida’s ruling that avoiding the “farce” of stopping what one started overcomes the rule to follows the practices of a host community – during the silent Shemoneh Esrei is the accepted one (see Ishei Yisrael 23:38). According to most authorities, an Israeli in chutz la’aretz at this time can be a chazan, in which case he says vtul in his silent Shemoneh Esrei but omits it during chazarat hashatz (ibid. 39).

The logic of continuing what one started does not suffice for one who has a fundamental reason to stop asking for rain. Therefore, an Israeli who is moving permanently abroad during this time and a ben chutz la’aretz who started saying vtul while visiting Israel in deference to local practice cease doing so when they leave Israel (Yein Hatov, OC 35; B’tzel Hochochma I:62).

The separation between men and women is a feature of a shul (as you hint, "particularly in shul"), for which a bus (as well as a plane) does not qualify. Individuals (men or women) are not forbidden to daven in the presence of the presence of the opposite gender. A man has a problem if he is facing parts of a woman's body that are supposed to be covered.

Of course, all things being equal, there are many reasons for a woman to try to daven at home, but far far be it from us to judge the time pressures of women, many of whom work in the home and out of it incredibly hard.

A name is the title we give to someone to identify him by. For example, we add president to a person's title so that people will recognize him as president.
We cannot comprehend the true nature and existence of God. We can only recognize him in the way that he is revealed to man, by his creations and his actions.Therefore we only address and bless his name, the way we recognize him, and the way his kingship is revealed to us, as we cannot address God himself.
Source: Rav Saadia Gaon in Emunot Ve'Deot end of Maamar 2.

We will start with a discussion that connects to your cases. If one forgot to daven Mincha, he davens Ma’ariv twice. If Mincha was Rosh Chodesh and Ma’ariv is after Rosh Chodesh, both of the Ma’ariv Shemoneh Esreis are without YVY, and the second still makes up for the missed Mincha (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 108:9). However, regarding whether one who omitted YVY at Mincha of Rosh Chodesh recites a second Shemoneh Esrei at Ma’ariv (without YVY) to make up for the lacking Mincha, the Tur (OC 108) cites a machloket Rishonim. He and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 108:11) rule that due to the doubt of which opinion to follow, one says the second tefilla with the intention that, if it is not called for, it should be considered a tefillat nedava (voluntary prayer) (see Mishna Berura 108:33). If this occurred on Shabbat eve, one does not do a “double tefilla” because there are no tefillot nedava on Shabbat (Mishna Berura 108:36).

The conceptual question behind this machloket applies to your questions: when one leaves out a necessary section of Shemoneh Esrei, is it considered a valid tefilla that was missing an element, or is it considered an invalid tefilla? Rav Frank (Har Tzvi, OC I:54) connects the machloket to your first cases, of alternatingly missing vttum and YVY, without distinguishing between them. According to the opinion that a tefilla missing something is a tefilla, but one repeats it to provide a framework to insert the omission, in this case, between the two tefillot, he said everything. If the lacking Shemoneh Esrei is not a tefilla at all, then each of the attempts was useless and a third Shemoneh Esrei is necessary. Contemporary seforim argue whether a tefillat nedava is called for (Ishei Yisrael 39:30), discretionary (Tefilla K’hilchata 22:(25)), or better avoided (Piskei Teshuvot 108:12). (The order of presentation reflect our preference.)

Rav Chaim of Brisk is widely cited as distinguishing between forgetting YVY and forgetting vttum – YVY is an addition whereas vttum is part and parcel of the tefilla’s set format. Even so, the order of omission should not make a difference because either way, according to Rav Chaim, the tefilla missing vttum was worthless and cannot validate the YVY said at that time.

According to Rav Chaim, if one forgot vttum on Friday Mincha (your third case), he would do a double tefilla of Ma’ariv even on Shabbat, when there are no voluntary tefillot (see Har Tzvi ibid.). However, there are strong questions on the application of Rav Chaim’s distinction. First, if vttum is central to its beracha, why can one who forgot it make it up in Shomeiah Tefilla (see Berachot 29a)? Also, the opinion that one does not recite two tefillot at Ma’ariv when he cannot insert the missed element was said even for a case where one davened a weekday Mincha on Shabbat (Tosafot, Berachot 26b; Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). Although leaving out the beracha of Shabbat is certainly central to the tefilla, Rishonim say the tefilla is suffices so that there would not be a double Ma’ariv. Missing vttum is not worse than that. While there are probably answers for Rav Chaim, poskim (including the Har Tzvi ibid. and Kaf Hachayim 117:33 – see Ishei Yisrael 30:(57)) assume not like him regarding your third case. Therefore, in the cases where making up Shemoneh Esrei without vttum would not add anything new, one repeats only during the week, when a tefillat nedava is possible.

You raise a fascinating question: do obligations in mitzvot apply to a person while he is sleeping? This issue is at the heart of questions of what others should do when observing a sleeping person in a halachically problematic situation. However, that point is not necessary to answer your practical question.

While certain sources indicate that when a person is sleeping, the laws of the Torah fundamentally do not apply to him, there are several and stronger sources that prove that mitzvot do apply at least on some level. If rain forces one to sleep inside his house on Sukkot and the rain stops during the night, he does not have to go then to the sukka (Sukka 29a). The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 639; see also Mishna Berura 639:43) says that a major part of this discussion is about the people of the household not being required to wake the sleeping person. The simple implication of the sources (compare Shulchan Aruch, OC 639:6 and 7) is that this is a specific exemption from sukka for someone who will be unusually bothered to be in the sukka under those circumstances. The classical commentaries do not speak of a sweeping rule that mitzvot do not apply to those sleeping, implying that there is no such rule. On the other hand, Rav S.Z. Auerbach said that one is not obligated in sukka when he is sleeping and therefore it is (theoretically) permitted to remove a sleeping person from the sukka (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla, pp.335-337). Another important source involves someone who died in the room where a kohen is sleeping. The Rama (Yoreh Deah 372:1) says that people should wake the kohen so he can leave the premises.

Playing out the different approaches to a case of one who sees his friend sleeping as the end time for reciting Kri’at Shema approaches, Rav Auerbach’s camp would not require waking him, while others would (see Halichot Shlomo ibid.). There is logic to distinguish between mitzvot andowH aveirot in two directions. In some ways, being physically involved in a situation of aveira while sleeping may be more problematic than simply not doing a mitzva at that point (ibid.; see also Shut R. Akiva Eiger I:8). In the opposite direction, even if one is exempt from a mitzva when sleeping, if he does not perform it, he will not be credited for what he did not do; therefore, there is certainly what to gain by waking him. In short, there is room for other distinctions: whether a Torah-level mitzva, e.g., Kri’at Shema, or a Rabbinic one, e.g., Shacharit, is at stake (see Keren L’Dovid, OC 18; Shach, YD 372:3); whether the specific person would want to be woken (see Keren L’Dovid ibid.; Halichot Shlomo ibid.); whether the person went to sleep with a realization that the problem would arise while he would be sleeping (ibid.).

This last distinction brings us to the crucial practical point regarding your question. It is forbidden for one to go to sleep in a manner that will likely bring him to miss a mitzva. In several cases, there are Rabbinical prohibitions about eating or sleeping before doing a mitzva even when his plan is to perform the mitzva within its proper time (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 692:4 and Mishna Berura 692:15). This prohibition sometimes begins even before the mitzva applies (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 235:2 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 17). While Chazal obviously do not forbid going to sleep at night out of fear one will wake up too late for Kri’at Shema  and Shacharit, they had harsh things to say about those who are not careful to wake up in time (see Avot D’Rabbi Natan 21; Pirkei Avot 3:10 with Bartenura). Therefore, whatever one’s fundamental approach to obligations while one sleeps, before going to sleep, one must have a good plan to ensure he will perform the mitzva when it becomes incumbent (see Halichot Shlomo ibid.).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 52:1), based on Geonim and Rishonim, rules that one should shorten PDZ in order to catch up to the tzibbur and details the order of precedence. The Shulchan Aruch allows skipping all of PDZ if needed for that purpose (Yalkut Yosef (PDZ 24) concurs), while most Ashkenazi poskim require a minimal PDZ (Mishna Berura 52:6). (Some say it is important to finish Yishtabach with the tzibbur (see Avnei Yashfeh, OC I:10), but starting SE together is the main issue (Mishna Berura ibid.).)  

Discussion was awoken by a passage in the Maggid Meisharim (quoted in Ba’er Heitev 52:1) in which Rav Yosef Karo’s angel warned him to come to shul early because skipping parts of PDZ is like “fiddling with the pipes.” The Ba’er Heitiv continues that many pious people thus do not shorten PDZ even if they come late.

There are few reasons to stick by the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling despite the story involving its author. First, the maggid’s instruction was to come early to shul, which actually implies that if he did not come early, he should skip parts of PDZ (Eliya Rabba 52:4). Furthermore, we do not follow kabbalistic sources against a halachic consensus (Chacham Tzvi 36). It may be different for people who follow all kabbalistic practices (see Ma’amar Mordechai 52:1), [few of whom read our column]. While significant halachic authorities follow the Ba’er Heitev’s understanding of Maggid Meisharim, the pillars of contemporary halacha do not (see Mishna Berura ibid.; Igrot Moshe OC, IV:91; Yechaveh Da’at V:5; Halichot Shlomo 8:41).

Cases that the classical sources did not discuss explicitly are riper for machloket. The Sha’arei Teshuva (52:1) says that if one davens too slowly to keep up with the tzibbur, he is allowed (apparently not required – see Ishei Yisrael 12:22) to say everything at his own pace and miss SE with the tzibbur. The implication is that he is not required to start davening early to “build up a lead” (ibid.). (He should, though, have his tallit and tefillin on and have recited Birkot Hashachar by the time the tzibbur starts PDZ.)

The Eshel Avraham (Butchatch- 52) says that it suffices to join the tzibbur at chazarat hashatz, and one should not skip PDZ to start the silent SE together. This depends on a broad question of if or to what extent chazarat hashatz counts as tefilla b’tzibbur (see Yabia Omer II, OC 7; our column, Tazria 5766); the Pri Megadim (EA 52:1) says it does not. This question has an opposite ramification in a different case in our issue – does one shorten PDZ to make it on time to chazarat hashatz when he anyway will miss silent SE? Each fundamental approach has a strong basis, but we prefer the approach that davening along with the chazarat hashatz fulfills a lower level element of tefilla b’tzibbur, but that regarding our context the crucial point is only the beginning of silent SE (Mishna Berura 52:6; Halichot Shlomo 8:41 (citing Rav S.Z. Auerbach)). (It is very difficult to read the classical sources any other way.) Starting SE significantly late but while the tzibbur is still davening is probably a similar level as that of joining chazarat shatz, and it is also permitted only if one will finish his SE by Kedusha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 109:1; Pri Megadim 109, EA 2; see B’tzel Hachochma IV:3).

In summary, we recommend to skip as much of PDZ as needed to give one a good chance to start silent SE (and, in most cases, Barchu) together. We respect other legitimate opinions, especially under certain consequences (see above).  Having a shul start SE without a large percentage of the tzibbur joining together is regrettable. While it is proper to slow down to the average participant’s davening speed, “holding back” those who come on time to accommodate latecomers is also problematic.  

The answers are basically evident if one understands the roles of KT and Barchu.

The main reason to recite Barchu again at the end of tefilla is for the sake of latecomers who missed the main one (Rama, Orach Chayim 133:1). For that reason, Nusach Ashkenaz does not repeat Barchu on Monday, Thursday, and Shabbat, due to the assumption that latecomers answered Barchu at the aliyot of Kri’at HaTorah (see Rama ibid.;). While it is customary in Israel to insert Barchu after Ein Keilokeinu, Barchu meets its purpose earlier or later in tefilla at least b’di’eved, as happens in Kriat HaTorah or in communities which do not recite Ein Keilokeinu daily. This should be so even according to Nusach Sephard/Eidot Hamizrach and in regard to the Motzaei Shabbat mistake, as this is still a Barchu at the end of davening, even if it moved up one Kaddish. (Since Kabbalistic considerations are behind the minhag to repeat Barchu every day (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 133:1) we cannot rule out the possibility that it should be repeated if not said at the exact right place, but we doubt that.)     

Different Kaddeishim have different functions. The unique part of the Kaddish Shalem known as KT is the request that Hashem accept our joint prayers favorably. This relates to the joint Shemoneh Esrei, whether the silent one at Maariv or chazarat hashatz at the other tefillot (see Rama, OC 55:3 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 22). Therefore, it seems evident that KT is effective b’di’eved any time after Shemoneh Esrei, and there is no need or justification to repeat it.

However, there might be a significant dissenter regarding KT before V’ata Kadosh. Chief Rabbi Y. Yosef writes (Yalkut Yosef 132:8) that if one recited KT before before Ashrei/U’va L’tzion (the morning version of V’ata Kadosh), he should repeat it after U’va L’tzion. This is based on the assumption that Titkabel applies not only to Shemoneh Esrei but also to U’va L’tzion, to the extent that if KT preceded U’va L’tzion, another KT is needed. Indeed we do find Titkabel for a non-Shemoneh Esrei prayer – Selichot. On the other hand, his proof that Uva L’tzion warrants its own KT seems to actually be a disproof, as we will now see. He cites the Eliya Rabba (OC 693:5) who says that at Ma’ariv of Purim, KT is said twice, before Megilla reading to cover Shemoneh Esrei, and after the Megilla for V’ata Kadosh. The problem with this proof is that while the Mishna Berura (693:1) does cite the Eliya Rabba, he also cites the Magen Avraham, who says that Titkabel is said only in the Kaddish that precedes the Megilla, and the minhag of the great majority of communities is like the latter. In other words, we see that KT before V’ata Kadosh/U’va L’tzion suffices.

Perhaps Rav Yosef would agree not to repeat KT when it was done before V’yehi Noam/V’ata Kadosh of Motzaei Shabbat, due to the unique nature of those tefillot. They are recited to push off the end of davening in order to delay the return of souls to gehinom after Shabbat (see Tur, OC 295). The simple implication is that the point of return is after KT ends our tefilla. If so, if one prematurely said KT before those tefillot, there might be no reason to say them. While our intuition suggests that once the tefillot were instituted, they should be said anyway, its recitation is likely not important enough in that case to warrant a repeat of KT for its sake.

We posit then if one mistakenly recited KT on Motzaei Shabbat before the special tefillot, which include sections from Tehillim and elsewhere and requests, they would be followed by Kaddish Yatom. If no one wants to say Kaddish Yatom, the tefilla continues with Aleinu.

It is possible to say Shemoneh Esrei later, and the shul should not have to wait for him. There is some discussion whether he is capable of saying Kaddish Titkabel since he has not said a fully valid Shemone Esrei, but the stronger opinion is that he is able to do so. (See Ishei Yisrael 24:60; Rivevot Ephrayim1:177). Therefore, he should finish his job as Shaliach Tzibur and afterward repeat Shemone Esrei with yaaleh veyavo.

This question is not found in classical sources, but there is much to learn from similar cases that are discussed.

Rashi (Sukka 38b) says that one who is in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei when the tzibbur is up to Kedusha or Kaddish should listen without speech to them and thereby fulfill the mitzvot of answering these passages. Tosafot (Berachot 21b) forbids this since listening to fulfill these mitzvot is equivalent to reciting them, which is forbidden during Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 104:6). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) rules like Rashi, that one may listen. Thus, we seem to assume that listening to things during Shemoneh Esrei is not a fundamental problem, and listening to laining is ostensibly the same.

Arguably, listening is more justifiable for laining. Perhaps, Tosafot objects to listening only to things like Kedusha, which needs to count like speaking in order to fulfill the mitzva. For laining, listening alone suffices, and it should thus not be equated to speaking (Az Nidberu XIV:29; see Lev Avraham (Weinfeld) I:26). Indeed, Az Nidberu allowed a yeshiva in which many talmidim took a very long time for Shemoneh Esrei to continue their practice of stopping to listen to laining.

On the other hand, there are several reasons against listening to laining during Shemoneh Esrei. First, the need to listen to Kaddish and Kedusha may be more pressing than to laining, as there are serious opinions that the obligation of Torah reading is on the tzibbur, not the individual (see Ran, Megilla 3a of Rif’s pages; Yabia Omer VIII, OC 54). Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 146:2) cites some opinions that exempt individuals from listening to laining in various circumstances. While not discussed in that context, a desire to not take a long pause in Shemoneh Esrei is at least as important a reason not to listen to the laining.

Why do we interrupt Shemoneh Esrei even for Kaddish and Kedusha, considering that “one who is occupied with a mitzva is exempt from another mitzva” (Sukka 26a)? Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II:70) says that divorcing oneself from the praise of Hashem going on around him is like disgracing Him; he posits that this logic does not apply to not listening to laining. Lev Avraham (ibid.) suggest that since Kaddish and Kedusha are also forms of tefilla, the mitzva of Shemoneh Esrei does not “knock off” its “brother mitzva.” Another distinction is based on the halacha that we do stop mitzva #1to perform mitzva #2 when it is not difficult to do so (see Rama, OC 38:8). Arguably, stopping for the shorter, less confusing Kedusha and Kaddish is easier than for a series of aliyot of laining. Finally, since part of the reason to rule like Rashi regarding Kedusha is minhag (see Tosafot ibid.; Be’ur Halacha to OC 104:7), the minhag might not exist for laining.

In summary, it is not forbidden to listen to laining during Shemoneh Esrei (compare to Yabia Omer VII, OC 12), but it is likely inadvisable (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 12:4). There are different accounts of the practices of important rabbanim (see Dirshu notes 104:36; Ishei Yisrael 32:(56)), but probably a lot has to do with the halachic common sense of the circumstances (see Az Nidberu ibid.). Being very late to tefilla may be different from davening much slower than one’s surroundings (although the latter is not always a good idea) and in the former case, perhaps one does not deserve to fulfill laining in such a strange manner.

If one is unsure if he remembered to cease saying Mashiv haruach …(=Mashiv), we assume for the first 30 days that he continued the now incorrect recitation (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 114:8, based on Yerushalmi). However, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 9) accepts the Maharam M’Rotenberg’s (see Tur, OC 114) remedy of reciting the correct version 90 times, after which we assume he got it right. The source that concentrated change is effective like a change over time is the opinion that an ox which gores three times on one day changes its status like one who gored three days (Bava Kama 24a). While many question the comparison’s aptness (see Taz 114:13), this is the accepted practice (see Biur Halacha ad loc.). The Mishna Berura (114:40) says that reciting the new version 90 times is applicable for Vten as well

There are also technical questions about this system. The Rama (Darchei Moshe, OC 114:2) points that 90 times seems an inexact substitute for 30 days, as Mashiv is said more than 90 times (due to Mussaf) in 30 days and Vten (absent on Shabbatot) is said fewer. He says that 30 days is just the average time, but the important thing is the 90 recitations, however long each one takes. (The Rama’s opinion in the Shulchan Aruch is unclear (see OC 114:8 and Mishna Berura 114:37)). The Chatam Sofer (OC 20) posits that often 30 days has 101 sayings of Mashiv, and 101 is known to be a number of repetitions which makes a text absorbed (see Chagiga 9b). The Gra (ad loc.) is among those who say that it is the passage of 30 days that creates the change, even though there are more than 90 Mashivs and fewer Vtens during this time.

The accepted opinion is that one who does not do extra repetitions determines whether to assume that he said the correct text based on a cut-off of 30 days. Yet, the practice of those who do “artificial repetitions” is to do the ostensibly contradictory 90 recitations. The Mishna Berura (114:37) says we accept the lenient opinion in both major questions because of the concept of safek berachot l’hakel. In other words, if we are not sure whether there is a need to make additional berachot, in this case by repeating Shemoneh Esrei or parts of it, we refrain from doing so. (Admittedly, there are cases (e.g., Mashiv slightly before 30 days) when we could have been more lenient than the standard practice.) Most (see Mishna Berura 114:42; Ishei Yisrael 23:(137)) assume that one can mix and match, achieving confidence about the transition by an appropriate mixture of days and repetitions (e.g., 10 days and 60 repetitions).

Some suggest that it is preferable to avoid the artificial 90 repetition system (see Shulchan Aruch Harav OC 114:11; Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 8:26). The logic is that since it is unclear whether it sufficiently removes doubt that one said the wrong thing, (i.e., it might still be correct to repeat), it is better to leave things with the accepted 30-day guideline. (Rav Yaakov Emdin has a technical issue with the repetitions, as he assumed it required saying Hashem’s Name in vain. However, our practice has us start the recitation after the Name). However, this claim is very surprising. First of all, when not using this system, there are also plenty of doubts (e.g., after 30 days of Vten, which do not include 90 recitations; if one missed some tefillot or made mistakes in some). More significantly, since the repetition, if done with moderate concentration, certainly helps significantly to get things right faster, we are saving a lot of unnecessary berachot by getting ourselves accustomed. It would seem that the approach that one should avoid the repetitions makes sense only for those who rarely make these mistakes anyway.

In summary, doing 90 “artificial repetitions” for Vten and Mashiv, which the Shulchan Aruch/Mishna Berura and minhag ha’olam endorse, is valid and worthwhile (but not obligatory).

There are two matters to discuss: whether the davener may do what he is doing; what you should do about it. The former is straightforward; the latter is difficult.

The gemara (Berachot 31a) learns from Chana (Shmuel I:1:13) that tefilla (referring at least mainly to Shemoneh Esrei) should not just be contemplated but that words should be formed by the movement of the lips, but in a manner that is not audible. The gemara (Berachot 24b) even refers to one who recites tefilla aloud as one who does not believe Hashem will hear him otherwise and to one who raises his voice as an idol worshipper. There is a machloket, from Talmudic times and on, whether it is proper to pronounce the words loudly enough to hear them himself (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 101). While Kabbalistic sources oppose being able to hear, standard halachic ones recommend being able to hear (Shulchan Aruch, OC 101:2, but see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.).

The gemara (ibid.) assumes that the main problem of saying tefilla audibly is contextual and that he may do so if he needs to for his kavana (concentration). The Taz (OC 101:1) posits that it is justified even to improve his otherwise reasonable kavana (the Be’ur Halacha, concerned for the Kabbalistic opinions that audibility disqualifies tefilla, objects). However, the gemara says that even one who needs to recite aloud for his kavana may not do so in a communal setting because it disturbs others. The Mishna Berura (101:6) posits that this problem exists even if he disturbs only his closest neighbor(s) in shul. This indeed seems obvious. If the proper thing is to be quiet and this is waived to help kavana, why would we bend the rule if it hurts another while helping him?

It is difficult to apply these rules like an exact science. Most people cannot make themselves hear and still be certain that those next to them do not hear at all. It is also difficult to know when a quiet undertone will disturb others. And what if the words are not audible, but a low hum still disturbs someone? If it is his neighbor’s over-sensitivity, then it is arguably his problem, and the neighbor should deal with it or find a different place to sit.

These are issues that are hard to quantify and their practical application are often the type of things that separate average people from those with sterling middot. One optimally should make sure that he is not disturbing others. On the other hand, the person being disturbed should try to be understanding and give the davener leeway in borderline cases.

I often recall the general concept that I heard from my Rosh Yeshiva decades ago. There is, for example, a pasuk (Shemot 22:24) that it is forbidden to harass a borrower who is having difficulty paying back. There are also severe words for a borrower who does not pay back (Tehillim 37:21). The problem is when the borrower is all too familiar with the pasuk for the lender to know, and the lender is all too familiar with the borrower’s pasuk.

Even if one may ask the audible davener to conform to the halacha, it is not always clear if and how he should do this practically. The Chazon Ish (YD 2:21) made famous the opinion that in our days we do not know how to give rebuke. I would add that our generation is particularly unsuccessful (not that it was ever easy) in accepting not only rebuke but corrections. So you must think (and/or discuss with someone who knows him better than you) how your co-worshipper will react. This may depend on how he is told – directly, with a carefully worded (anonymous?) letter, having the rabbi speak to him directly or perhaps discuss the halachot with the community. Depending on the prospects, it might be better to put up with the situation or move your seat discreetly. [For readers who practice (possibly) audible davening, please discuss the matter with someone whom you respect and avoid disturbing others and having someone approach you.]

Let us trace where what you heard about saying Aleinu with the tzibbur comes from and then try to apply it properly.

The gemara (Berachot 20b) says that the reason the mishna instructs one who is impure and may not recite Kri’at Shema to “think about it” when others are reciting it is “so he should not be idle” at such a time. The Rosh (Berachot 3:14) says that the Behag says that for the same reason one who already recited Kri’at Shema and entered a shul in which they are reciting it should recite it again. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 65:2) rules this way, explaining that “he should not look as if he does not want to accept the yoke of the Heavenly Kingdom with his friends.”

The Magen Avraham (ad loc. 3) expands significantly on this idea, saying: “the same is true of other things that the tzibbur recites, e.g., Tehilla L’David (Ashrei), that he reads with them, for this is derech eretz.” A few things are not clear in this Magen Avraham. What is it about Ashrei specifically that makes it something that the tzibbur says (was it said aloud or in unison in his time?)? What else meets this criterion? What does he mean by derech eretz (is that the same as looking like not accepting)?

While it is unclear how he would answer the above questions, the Machatzit Hashekel (ad loc.), cited by the Mishna Berura (65:9) without dissent, says that the same is true of Aleinu.  Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe OC III:89), without discussing Aleinu, gives guidelines for saying parts of tefilla along with the tzibbur. It is an obligation to answer devarim sheb’kedusha (things that require a minyan) that do not have a set amount of times per day to say them. The derech eretz applies only to sections of praise of Hashem, not to sections that are supplication.

The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 65:6) says that the minhag in his time was not to be careful to recite Ashrei or Aleinu with the tzibbur but just to bow with the tzibbur at the appropriate point of Aleinu. He does mention that some recite all of Aleinu with the tzibbur. While Ashrei has a very central place in davening (see Berachot 4b) and is recited three times a day, the thrice-recited Aleinu, instituted by Yehoshua Bin Nun, is very prominent as well, including in that we stand during its recitation (see Rama, OC 132:2, and Baer Heitev, ad loc. 3; Ishei Yisrael 26:(34)).

The fact that reciting Aleinu with the tzibbur comes from relatively late sources, is not unanimously held, and is described as derech eretz rather than an obligation, has an impact. There is a machloket whether the practice of reciting Kri’at Shema with the tzibbur justifies interrupting P’sukei D’zimra (opinions cited by Mishna Berura 65:11) or not (Shulchan Aruch, OC 65:2). Regarding Aleinu, which is of a lower level, halachic logic indicates that one should not stop during P’sukei D’zimra and certainly not during Shemoneh Esrei and Kri’at Shema and its berachot (see Ishei Yisrael 26:14).

We, therefore, summarize as follows. If one is in the last parts of davening, he should interrupt what he is reciting, preferably at a good place to stop, to say Aleinu with the tzibbur. (If he is not up to the post- U’va L’tzion section of his tefila, he should repeat Aleinu when he gets up to its normal place – Tefilla K’hilchata 17:16.) If one is davening with a minyan that says Aleinu in a different spot than he is used to, he should say it as the tzibbur does (Ishei Yisrael ibid., despite some opinions to the contrary in Tefilla K’hilchata 17:(31)). If he is in a place in davening at which he may not stop, it suffices to bow like others at “… va’anachnu korim…” According to the aforementioned Aruch Hashulchan, this is always enough, and this is parallel to bowing when the chazan gets up to Modim and one is not in able to say Modim D’Rabbanan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 109:1).

Most of the halachot of tziruf (joining together) for a minyan involve people in adjoining rooms or courtyards or some people being inside and some outside. There the main factor is whether they are in the same domain (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 55:13, ibid. 18), although other factors can cause tziruf (see ibid. 14, 15).

Regarding the tziruf for zimun in Birkat Hamazon, visual contact between the people connects them even if they are in different domains (Shulchan Aruch, OC 195:1). A major question is whether visual contact combines people for the apparently stricter matter of a minyan for tefilla, as well. The Rashba (Shut I:96) was asked why a chazan standing on a bima that is a halachically separate domain joins up with the others. He gives two answers: 1. A bima is made to serve as an integral part of the shul; 2. If some people in one domain see people in the other one, they constitute one unit. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 55:19) cites only the Rashba’s first answer as halacha regarding tziruf for a minyan. There is a major machloket among Acharonim whether one can also rely upon visual contact for tefilla (see Sha’arei Teshuva 55:15). The Mishna Berura (55:48, 52) cites both opinions and seems to prefer the lenient one. The Kaf Hachayim (ad loc. 70) accepts the stringent opinion.

What should be the determining factor when all the people are outside? Mishneh Sachir (I:12) and Minchat Yitzchak (II:44) say that if they can see and hear each other, this creates tziruf. These conditions were fulfilled in your case. However, you likely failed another condition. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 195:1) cites an opinion that a public path that separates between the parts of the group prevents tziruf for zimun, even if they see each other and/or are served by a common waiter (Mishna Berura 195:8). The Taz (195:2) says that even a minor private path separates. (See Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:163 for an extremely strict approach on what is considered a path, but even assuming we reject it, it is unclear what the cut-off point is). You do not describe, other than the insignificant low wall, what was in between your group and the kohen, but it is likely that within 50 meters in a cemetery there are pathways, and the Mishneh Sachir and Minchat Yitzchak say this prevents tziruf.

We can suggest that if the cemetery is fenced in, internal minor paths do not separate people. There is also logic to accept lenient opinions in our context. For one, it is emotionally important for people to be able to say Kaddish for their loved ones. Secondly, a possibly unauthorized Kaddish is not comparable to a possibly unauthorized beracha (l’vatala). A beracha l’vatala includes saying Hashem’s name improperly, which is either a Torah-level or at least a serious Rabbinic violation (see Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 33a). In contrast, we find poskim who say that one can be lenient in questionable cases of Kaddish (see Mahrashag II:40, regarding leniency to count a child as a tenth person for a minyan for Kaddish.)

The fact that the kohen was forbidden to come to where the majority of you were standing is not an issue. First, we are unaware of a source that a problem exists in this context. We do find a parallel application of your logic. If three people eat together in a manner that each may not, for halachic reasons, eat from the other’s food, there is no tziruf for zimun (Shulchan Aruch, OC 196:3). However, it is enough that Reuven can eat from Shimon’s food, even if Shimon cannot eat from Reuven’s. In your case, you could have gone to where the kohen is. Actually, you probably should have gone to where the kohen was, as Kaddish does not have to be said right next to the grave of the deceased you want credited.

The answer to the first question is clear for a few reasons. First, we accept the opinion that while by Torah law, one may recite Kri’at Shema until the morning, the Rabbis instructed us to do so by chatzot (Berachot 2a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 235:3), whereas not all agree whether Maariv has to be said by chatzot, as we will discuss. Second, Kri’at Shema at night is a mitzva from the Torah, whereas Maariv is at best a Rabbinic mitzva (see Rambam, Tefilla 1:1), and we rule that it is an originally optional tefilla that became accepted (ibid. 6). Third, while there are times it is justified to say Shemoneh Esrei before Kri’at Shema and its berachot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:3), we prefer not switching the accepted order (ibid. 2). Therefore, if it is close to chatzot, start with Kri’at Shema even if Shemoneh Esrei turns out to be after chatzot.

The more serious question is the relative importance of davening all of Maariv by chatzot vs. davening with a minyan. (Certainly, one should recite Kri’at Shema without its berachot before chatzot, even if means coming late or missing a post-chatzot minyan, as a minyan does not override even Rabbinic obligations. The question is whether he should go to a minyan and repeat Kri’at Shema within Maariv.)

The mishna (Berachot 26a) says that there is no set time of night for Maariv, and the Rambam (ibid. 6) mentions having all night for it without distinguishing between before and after chatzot. The Levush (108:3) is perhaps the earliest source to imply otherwise, as follows. One can do tashlumin (makeup) for a missed tefilla only during the next tefilla time slot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:4). The Levush comments that one who missed Mincha makes it up during Maariv time, but not the whole night. While the Malbushei Yom Tov argues with the Levush, one suggestion of the Eliya Rabba (108:4) is that the Levush limits the makeup time until chatzot, as it makes sense that the time of Maariv is limited like that of Kri’at Shema, which is a component of Maariv. The Pri Megadim (108, MZ 3) prefers the Eliya Rabba’s other suggestion, that the Levush only meant to say Maariv by alot hashachar (dawn), even though the night arguably continues beyond that. The Mishna Berura (108:15) cites both opinions without a clear preference.

The Tzelach (Berachot 26a) understood from the silence of the early poskim that there is no chatzot limit and wonders why not. After all, the reason regarding Kri’at Shema, that we want to avoid situations where people will forget, should apply to tefilla as well! He gives two main answers: 1. Tefilla is modeled after placing certain korban parts on the altar, which can be done all night. 2. Since Maariv is not a full obligation, they were less concerned about mistakes.

Because there are significant opinions who say that one should say Shemoneh Esrei by chatzot, we find contemporary poskim who say that Maariv by chatzot takes precedence over a minyan (Ishei Yisrael 28:15; Ohr L’Tzion II:15:9). This makes a good deal of sense from a purist perspective. However, not all agree (see Tefilla K’hilchata 3:53). Since all agree that one may daven after chatzot and the question is whether it should, l’chatchila, be done by chatzot, it is logical to let the individual decide which setting is better for his tefilla. Consider that these matters are not just about fulfilling obligations, which is accomplished in any case, but of having the best tefilla. Time plays a role, but so do other things. Realize that a minyan is impactful in having the tefilla accepted, by joining with other Jews (see sources in Living the Halachic Process II:A-5).

[We will not answer the question you did not ask: nowadays, when traveling in relatively built up areas, whether Tefillat Haderech is called for when traveling from point X to Y.]

 The gemara (Berachot 30a) asks when one begins to recite Tefillat Haderech and until when, and answers “from the time he seizes the road” (there are different texts and it is hard to translate literally) and up to a parsa (approximately 4 km.), respectively. It is unclear from the Rishonim when one is considered on the road. The Magen Avraham (110:14) says it is after he leaves the city, and in fact comes to a place where there has been 70 amot without houses outside the city. (The determination on each road out of a city and whether rules for the city limits are the same as for eiruv techumin are beyond our present scope – see Machatzit Hashekel 110:14).

 The Taz (110:7) says that there is no source for waiting until after leaving the city, as the gemara about seizing the road means just that one must be certain he is embarking on the journey. The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 110:6) cite the practice of the Maharam MiRutenberg to connect Tefillat Haderech to Birkot Hashachar (since Tefillat Haderech starts as an open beracha, which is fitting to follow a previous beracha). The Taz understands that this is done during Shacharit and thus before leaving the city. Others, including the Eliya Rabba (110:14), counter that the Maharam did this when he davened on the way. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 230:1) connects Tefillat Haderech to the beracha said for leaving the city one was visiting. The Pri Megadim (OC, Mishbetzot Zahav 110:7) sees that as a sign that he holds that it is recited right after leaving the city, even if there are still houses.

You are likely right that sometimes people recited Tefillat Haderech too early. However, b’di’eved (after the fact), this is not so bad. First, almost all Acharonim agree that b’di’eved one fulfills the obligation when reciting once he was preparing to leave (Eliya Rabba ibid., Mishna Berura 110:29). Therefore, the beracha is not l’vatala and you may and should answer Amen (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 215:2). Also, In our times, it may make more sense to say Tefillat Haderech earlier. In the past, the main concerns were bandits and animals, who were more prevalent outside the city, whereas nowadays our primary concern, car accidents, can happen anywhere (see an application in Shevet Halevi X:21). On the other hand, it is hard to change halachic rules based on such a factor.

One could argue that it would be best for you to answer Amen but have in mind not to be yotzei, and say it later yourself at the better time. However, besides possible awkwardness, you can lose out. One advantage of saying it relatively early is that Rashi (Berachot ibid.) understands that you must say Tefillat Haderech within the first parsa after leaving (the Rama OC 110:7 cites as l’chatchila), and, if the Taz is right or if you do not act quickly, you can miss. So simply being yotzei with everyone else is proper.

The matter of not saying the addition for the return trip is not an issue. The phrase (different siddurim have variations), is mentioned for all trips by certain Rishonim (Rosh, Berachot 4:18) and not by others (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 110:13). It is only some Acharonim and contemporary practice who set it aside for cases where you are returning the same day. Therefore, there is no good reason to be concerned that the validity of the beracha is affected by omitting it (Ishei Yisrael 50:(3)).

There are certain set factors that Chazal used for precedence, such as tadir (the one which is more regular) and mekudash (the one that has more sanctity). On these grounds, there is what to discuss regarding Musaf and Hallel (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim III:70). However, the subject is somewhat complicated to delve into in this context, and so we will leave those elements as inconclusive.

You had a few reasons to give the preference to Musaf over Hallel. One is their relative importance for women. There is a machloket whether women are obligated in Musaf. The Tzelach (Berachot 26a) says that the opinions that women are obligated in davening similarly to men do not apply to Musaf. The reason to obligate them, despite it being a time-based mitzva is that it is critical since it is a request of mercy (Berachot 20b). However, since Musaf is a special tefila added in connection to the service in the Beit Hamikdash and does not have to do with requesting mercy, women are not obligated. There are a few reasons to claim they are obligated (see Elef Hamagen 106:4), with perhaps the strongest one being that we do not easily distinguish between one tefilla and another (see opinions in Halichot Beita 6:(8)). The Mishna Berura (106:4) cites both opinions without expressing a preference.

In contrast, women are clearly exempt from reciting Hallel, which is a time-based mitzva, and at least on Rosh Chodesh, there are no special reasons to obligate them (Tosafot, Sukka 38a; Magen Avraham 422:5). While some women (perhaps including you) accept upon themselves an obligation to recite Hallel (see Be’ur Halacha to Orach Chayim 422:2), one would still give preference to the part of davening in which they are more likely to be innately obligated (Musaf). To this we add the fact that Hallel on Rosh Chodesh is only a minhag even for men (Tosafot, Berachot 14a).

Another factor favoring Musaf relates to the firmness of the deadline. You are working with the assumption that Musaf and Hallel (and presumably Mincha) must be done before sunset, which makes sense for non-Chassidic Ashkenazim. However, there may be room to recite Mincha several minutes thereafter (see Ishei Yisrael 27:6), based on one or more of the following factors. 1) According to Rabbeinu Tam and others, the day does not end until well after what we call sunset. 2) Even after sunset, it is not definite night, but bein hashemashot, which is treated as a doubt whether it is day or night. 3) If a certain moment during bein hashemashot is too late for Mincha, then it is time for Maariv, and therefore one can make a condition that the tefilla count for whichever is appropriate (see development of this idea in Be’ur Halacha 233:1).

#3 does not apply to Musaf, which is uncalled for if it is night, and therefore davening Musaf after sunset, with all the questionable berachot involved, is very problematic. However, Hallel is different in this regard. Granted, the time for Hallel is only during the day (Megilla 20b), but that primarily relates to fulfilling the mitzva. There does not appear to be a prohibition to recite Hallel at night. You can, then, recite Hallel right after finishing Musaf, even if it turns out that you will not finish it by sunset, as long as you do so without a beracha. This way, you have a decent chance of fulfilling the mitzva. (It is not a problem to recite Hallel without a beracha, which is always Sephardic practice on Rosh Chodesh, based on several Rishonim.) Although one may not recite Hallel freely (Shabbat 118b), doing so on a one-time basis when it is possibly still the time for it should be fine. You could not do this for Musaf if you did Hallel first.

Therefore, we would have recommended doing Musaf first, followed by Hallel, without a beracha if it was after sunset.

Once one lights candles, she should normally not daven Mincha, because (at least for Ashkenazim; it is a machloket among Sephardim), lighting candles is considered accepting Shabbat, which precludes things like Mincha, that are matters of Friday day (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 263:10 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 43). On the other hand, it is possible in a case of special need to light candles but make a condition that this week she is not accepting Shabbat with the lighting (Rama ad loc.). Recent poskim say that the ability to daven Mincha justifies making such a condition (see Dirshu footnote 263:53). 

In practical terms we say the following. Find out how much before sunset candle lighting is where you live. If you have time to finish Mincha with 10 minutes left before sunset, daven Mincha before candle lighting, even though it will be later than it says on your calendar. If there will be less than 10 minutes left, light first with a condition that you are not accepting Shabbat with the lighting, then daven Mincha promptly, then accept Shabbat fully. If when you finish lighting you will not have time to finish Mincha before sunset, then light candles without a condition and daven Maariv twice, with the second one being as a makeup for Mincha (even though it is the text of Shabbat).  

Kedusha consists of three introductory statements, each followed by a pasuk (from Yeshaya, Yechezkel, and Tehillim) used by the angels and us to sanctify Hashem’s Name. There is a machloket and different practices whether only the chazan (Tur, Orach Chayim 125) says the introductory passage(s) or even the tzibbur (Taz, OC 125:1). The minhag is to say the longer introductory passages of Shabbat/Yom Tov (Mishna Berura125:1).

The Be’ur Halacha (125:1) deals with the dilemma of how the chazan should say the p’sukim of Kedusha. If he waits for the tzibbur to finish, he is reciting them “without a minyan.” However, he needs to recite them out loud so that those in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei can be yotzei with him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 104:7). Some say that the chazan can accomplish both by starting each pasuk before the tzibbur finishes reciting it (see Be’ur Halacha, ibid.). Some say that the fact that those in Shemoneh Esrei (ibid.) or the tzibbur (Emek Beracha, cited by Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:111) are listening to him makes him considered part of a minyan. One could even claim that the tzibbur’s present minhag to sing along actually creates a minyan (even though they just finished reciting it, one may answer Kedusha multiple times).

Regarding weekdays, practice is set, for whichever of the reasons provided. Shabbat davening, though, is a test case. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (ibid.) argues that since the long introductory passage is not an essential part of Kedusha, by the time the chazan starts Kadosh, he cannot connect himself to the tzibbur’s recitation. Therefore, he prefers that the chazan say Kadosh immediately along with the tzibbur, loud enough for those in need to hear him. (Igrot Moshe, OC III:4 does not like the prospect of trying to hear the chazan over multiple voices; it is unclear if he is talking about Shabbat.) One can also start Kadosh soon after the tzibbur, who can get used to being silent for Kadosh and singing K’vodo along with the chazan. While these may be the best ideas from a purist perspective, our average shul is not the place for purists to go against standard practice when there are reasonable alternatives.

Some have the practice, which is not new (see Ktzot Hashulchan 83:(22)), that on Shabbat the chazan says Kadosh along with the tzibbur quietly and starts aloud only from K’vodo. The K’tzot Hashulchan surmises that this is based on the assumption that on Shabbat, everyone has finished Shemoneh Esrei by the time of Kedusha. If indeed no one need to be yotzei, this works well, but this is not the case in many shuls.

There is enough to rely upon for the standard minhag for the chazan to say Kadosh, with or without the tzibbur singing, after the tzibbur finishes everything. It is true that from a purist perspective, it does not make sense for the tzibbur to sing Kadosh after introducing the next piece. However, while one may not speak during Kedusha (Rama, OC 125:1), considering that all of Kedusha is interrelated, it is hard to consider the tzibbur repeating Kadosh along with the chazan a hefsek. The idea of the tune not making it look like Kadosh is part of the same unit as K’vodo is a nice one l’chatchila. Therefore, there is logic for you, as a talented, learned chazan [ed. note - I know him], to start your repertoire of songs from K’vodo. (There is something nice about “good-old nusach” being heard more often). However, we would not deem joint singing of Kadosh illegitimate or the reason many people do not understand Kedusha’s structure.

[We will divide our discussion into two. This week we will analyze the main sources and logic of the competing positions.]

There are two classical sources that are cited as the source that six men reciting Shemoneh Esrei in the presence of another four men in the room is considered tefilla b’tzibbur (davening with a minyan). The Rambam (Tefilla 8:4) describes chazarat hashatz, with everyone listening to a chazan, as the main element of tefilla b’tzibbur and then says that it is sufficient for six of the participants to be people who have not yet davened. We apply the rule of following the majority to set the character of the whole, and thus this is considered a minyan. Many see this as evidence that the Rambam holds that six people davening in the presence of ten is tefilla b’tzibbur (see Yechaveh Da’at V:7).

The Magen Avraham (69:4) says that while chazarat hashatz can be done for even one person who has not davened, it is preceded by a silent Shemoneh Esrei only if six men are presently davening. Several Acharonim (including Minchat Yitzchak IX:6, based on Shulchan Aruch Harav 69:5, and Mishna Berura 69:8) understand that the reason the silent Shemoneh Esrei before chazarat hashatz is justified is because it is considered tefilla b’tzibbur. Again, we ostensibly see that six is enough in this regard.

Apparently supporting the other camp, the Chayei Adam (19:1) says that the main element of tefilla b’tzibbur is having ten men davening Shemoneh Esrei together, as opposed to the misconception that a minyan for Kaddish, Kedusha, and Barchu suffices. This seems to indicate that six daveners plus four others present is not a fulfillment of tefilla b’tzibbur. Perplexingly, the Mishna Berura cites without comment both the Magen Avraham/Shulchan Aruch Harav (69:8) and the Chayei Adam (90:28). Members of the “lenient camp” explain the Chayei Adam as stressing that Kaddish/Kedusha/Barchu is not enough; by ten, he meant a majority of the ten men davening in the presence of the others.

The stringent camp is perhaps best represented by a compelling (in my humble opinion) set of arguments by Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I:28-30). We start with halachic logic. The idea of six counting as a minyan, based on a majority, makes sense when there is a full quorum involved in the matter at hand, but a minority is lacking in some regard (e.g., they already fulfilled their obligation). Then we say that since the majority of the group is valid, the missing element can be overlooked. We turn to the prototype of following majority, in a court, as an example. While when three dayanim arrive at different decisions, we follow the two, when there are only two dayanim or one of the three dayanim is unable to arrive at any decision, majority cannot be used. So too, when six people are davening Shemoneh Esrei and four are taking off their tefillin after the early minyan, there is no minyan involved in tefilla and thus no tefilla b’tzibbur.

Rav Moshe (ibid. 28) points out that the Rambam is not relevant to our discussion, as he refers to chazarat hashatz in which all ten are actively involved. After all, listening to the chazan constitutes full participating in chazarat hashatz. Following the majority just solves the issue of the weaker connection of those who already davened. (Shulchan Aruch, OC 124:4 supports this distinction.) The Magen Avraham (/Mishna Berura) can be understood as being based on the quality of chazarat hashatz. If six obligated plus four others are doing so, it is complete enough to justify it being preceded by a preparatory silent Shemoneh Esrei, even though its participants are not credited with tefilla b’tzibbur.

Next week we will put things into halachic and philosophical perspective and give basic recommendations.

[Last week we saw the main sources and arguments of the sides on this matter.]

Several important poskim say that six davening in the presence of another four (= 6+4) is considered tefilla b’tzibbur, based on their understanding of the Rambam and Magen Avraham. This includes Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at V:7), Minchat Yitzchak (IX:6,7), Shevet Halevi (XI:20), Beit Baruch (19:3), and B’tzel Hachocma IV:135). Several also report this to be common practice.

The stringent camp includes (in addition to Rav M. Feinstein, see last week) Halichot Shlomo (8:5, in the name of Rav Auerbach), Teshuvot V’hanhagot (I:102, also citing the Brisker Rav), and Rav Y.C. Zonnenfeld (Salmat Chayim, OC 52). The contemporary Ishei Yisrael (12:7) and Tefilla K’hilchata (8:71) treat it as a machloket with a slight leaning toward stringency.

The primary disagreement between the two sides may be more conceptual (is it called tefilla b’tzibbur?) than practical (may one daven in that manner?). For example, the Minchat Yitzchak (IX:7), a member of the lenient camp, says that ten starting together is preferable to 6+4. On the other side, Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim III:16) relates to 6+4 as a reasonable option in some cases. After all, tefilla b’tzibbur is not an absolute obligation and requires the investment of only moderate efforts (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:16). There are many questions discussed (including in this column) of preference between full tefilla b’tzibbur and other tefilla enhancers. 

There are also levels of connection between tefilla and tzibbur. It is best to start Shemoneh Esrei exactly with the minyan, but starting later is also significant (see differences between Igrot Moshe, OV III:4 and B’tzel Hachochma IV:3). Starting Shemoneh Esrei as chazarat hashatz begins has value but may not be full tefilla b’tzibbur (see this column, Vaeira 5773). Davening even in an empty shul has value, as does davening at home at the time of davening in shul. 6+4 may also have a status of significant but incomplete value. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (ibid.) calls 6+4 tefilla b’tzibbur and ten together tefillat hatzibbur. Igrot Moshe (ibid. 29) says that the presence of ten men draws the Divine Presence (see Berachot 6a), but only with ten davening together are the tefillot accepted in the best way (see ibid. 8a).

The Rambam (see last week) seems to view 6+4 for chazarat hashatz as ideal tefilla b’tzibbur because chazarat hashatz’s importance exceeds that of a minyan for silent Shemoneh Esrei. The Chatam Sofer (Kovetz 4) holds this, whereas Igrot Moshe (OC III:9) denies such an opinion. The Rambam thus can agree that 6+4 counts only for chazarat hashatz but say this suffices. If so, for the majority, who prefer silent Shemoneh Esrei to chazarat hashatz, the Rambam is not a proof. It might also work only with a full nine people answering every beracha and only for those who answer (see Kinyan Torah Ba’halacha IV:5). It also would not help at Maariv.

So, there is relative value in being stringent, but at what price?

Philosophically, approaching prayer united with the community is crucial (see Ein Ayah, Berachot 1:48,89). While it is hard to prove that ten starting Shemoneh Esrei together are a condition for unity, the Talmudic sources stress maximizing these elements. Therefore we urge the following. A minyan that has time for a complete tefilla experience (e.g., a yeshiva), should wait as long as necessary for ten to start together. Waiting can also remind individuals to come early enough and/or learn the halachot of skipping. A minyan that needs to stick to schedule (e.g., people must be on time to work) and/or is harder to educate may rely on the lenient opinions rather than tack on minutes. (One should try to internalize his responsibility for a minyan’s existence/proper functioning (see Rama, OC 55:22).)

A relatively close case to those you ask about is what is called poress al Shema. This is when people who do not have a minyan for all of davening want to join with others, including those who finished davening, to enable them to take part in Kaddish (relating to P’sukei D’zimra) and Barchu. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 69:1) says that while it is good if there are six who have yet to take part in these devarim sheb’kedusha, it can even be done for one such person. Furthermore, if need be, even one who already took part in a minyan can lead the recitation.

Similarly, the Taz (55:3) infers from several sources that in order to say Kaddish, which relates to a previous text(s) that was recited, it suffices for the minyan to be assembled at the time Kaddish is recited, even if they were not there for the matters to which the Kaddish relates. The Magen Avraham, regarding the Kaddish after learning Torah (69:4) and after Ashrei at Mincha (234:1), says that the minyan must already have been present for the recitations that precede the Kaddish. The Pri Megadim (MZ 55:3) says that the Magen Avraham agrees to the Taz’s leniency regarding the Kaddish following P’sukei D’zimra because P’sukei D’zimra/Kaddish is a requirement. In other words, in cases like poress al Shema, where there is a real need for these things to be said, the minyan enables the recitation of Kaddish whenever it becomes possible. In contrast, regarding less critical recitations, we say that the need for Kaddish is created only by a minyan present at the previous activity.

Even where the Magen Avraham applies, he only requires the ten to be present during learning to justify Kaddish afterward, but does not require all to participate in the learning (ibid. 69:4). In this regard, the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 55:9) is even more stringent, saying that since Kaddish after learning is optional, the ten people must have learned together.

The best way to avoid machloket in such cases is for the learners to include the minyan in a classic Kaddish-trigger statement, such as the famous statement of Rav Chananya ben Akashya. Similarly, at the end of P’sukei D’zimra, the chazan can read out loud three p’sukim for the whole minyan to hear (see Mishna Berura 55:2).  Regarding Pitum Haketoret at the end of davening, if there are not ten davening, it is worthwhile for the chazan to say “Talmidei chachamim…” or the last three p’sukim out loud. If this is difficult, one can rely on the majority opinion (see also Mishna Berura 54:9) that you do not need even a majority of the minyan to be learning before Kaddish D’Rabbanan. Furthermore, the Aruch Hashulchan probably agrees that presence of ten is enough for Pitum Haketoret because it is a set part of tefilla for those who recite it and/or because having one Kaddish D’Rabbanan at Shacharit is important (see Living the Halachic Process vol. I, A-6).

Regarding someone not involved in that which the Kaddish is related to reciting it, we saw that this is possible regarding poress al Shema. The Mishna Berura (54:9) assumes that this is true also for Kaddish after learning, and there is no reason to think that this would not apply to the Kaddish after Aleinu or Shir Shel Yom. The Chelkat Yaakov (OC 20) says it is always permitted to just join others who are anyway saying Kaddish, as it is no worse than answering Amen to a beracha one knows has just been completed. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, YD IV, 61.8) says that it is permitted as long as the matter that Kaddish is going on is part of the tefilla or part of a learning session that is done as part of a tzibbur.

The idea of a chazan starting chazarat hashatz without silent Shemoneh Esrei is discussed in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 124:2), based on the Kol Bo (127). In short, it can be done, but it is not ideal. Understanding why it is not ideal helps guide people what to do in different circumstances.

The Mishna Berura (124:4) assumes that the Shulchan Aruch allows the chazan to do chazarat hashatz without silent Shemoneh Esrei in a case where no one else is capable of being chazan. He does not, though, state why it should not be done otherwise. The Kol Bo identified two issues that need addressing.

1) If this chazan is reciting Shemoneh Esrei for others (the tzibbur and/or one who cannot daven himself), how does he fulfill his own personal obligation? The Kol Bo says that if his tefilla helps others, it certainly works for himself; therefore, he does not need to repeat Shemoneh Esrei after his chazarat hashatz. Despite the strong logic, the Mishna Berura may imply that this is true only after the fact, but that it is better for him to do his own Shemoneh Esrei for himself, independent of chazarat hashatz.

2) How can that which is also serving  as a personal Shemoneh Esrei be done out loud, which is usually forbidden because it makes the davener look like one who does not believe Hashem hears silent prayers (see Berachot 24b)? The Kol Bo says this is not a problem here because he is doing so due to pressing circumstances. The Eliya Rabba (OC 124:3) says that due to this issue, one with better alternatives should not make his chazarat hashatz his first Shemoneh Esrei.

The Magen Avraham (124:3; see Machatzit Hashekel ad loc.) says that the main problem is based on the gemara in Rosh Hashana (34b). The gemara says that the reason to have a silent Shemoneh Esrei even though people can fulfill the mitzva with chazarat hashatz is to give the chazan an opportunity to familiarize himself with what he will be reciting. While this is not crucial during a standard tefilla (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 100:1), it is still a reason to prefer that the chazan does not start with chazarat hashatz.

Is switching to the late-coming chazan justified because he is an avel? We did not find classical sources on this. Among less-known Acharonim, Birkat Habayit (Einhorn 42:2) allows within shloshim and on a yahrtzeit, but not the rest of the year. Ishei Yisrael (24:31) says that any chiyuv of aveilut suffices.

Who gets to decide which opinion to follow? According to the Eliya Rabba, it is a matter of a proper tefilla for the chazan, and thus up to him (/his posek). According to the Magen Avraham, the issue is the chazarat hashatz’s quality, which is the minyan’s call (see interesting application in Igrot Moshe, OC IV:33). Certainly on a matter that is about no more than preferability, this is not the type of thing to fight about (which, we hope people have learned, we are never fond of).

Question: Am I correct that l’chatchila, it is proper to start Mincha early enough to finish before shekiah? If so, what are the key sources on the matter?

Answer: There are two opinions in the gemara (Berachot 27a) about the end time for Mincha – until plag haMincha or the erev (evening). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 233:1) says that the latter opinion, which most people now regularly follow, is until layla (night), which for the Shulchan Aruch (see Mishna Berura 261:20) is around an hour after sunset. (There are two major approaches in the poskim whether what the gemara calls shekiah, which is the first part of the break-off point between day and night, is what we call sunset or is when the sun is well under the horizon. This machloket has many direct and indirect halachic implications, and this is one of them.) The great majority of us (except those who follow the much later opinion for the end of Shabbat and the time to start Ma’ariv known as Rabbeinu Tam/Magen Avraham) follow the opinion (often called the Gra’s opinion) that halachic shekiah is sunset. The Rama (ad loc.) is more specific, saying that this means tzeit hakochavim (stars coming out).  

The Mishna Berura (233:14) points out that they do not mean full night, i.e., tzeit hakochavim. Rather, the intention is for approximately a quarter hour before, when bein hashemashot starts and it is a doubt whether it is night or day. Furthermore, he contends that many disagree with the Shulchan Aruch and follow sunset like the Gra. Therefore, indeed shekiah is the presumed cut-off point. Because there are opinions that later is sufficient, there is room for leniency in times of great need (Mishna Berura, ibid), especially within the first thirteen and a half minutes, which is no later than bein hashemashot (see also Shevet Halevi IX:48).

Does one only have to start or also finish in time? Most poskim posit that, as a rule, things must be finished by their time limit, and this rule also applies to Mincha (Mishna Berura ibid., Ishei Yisrael 27:6). A minority say the beginning is enough (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 110:5; see sources in Ishei Yisrael 27:(12)). Therefore, many poskim (Mishna Berura ibid., Ishei Yisrael 27:6) say that it is better to daven without a minyan before shekiah than to finish it after shekiah with a minyan (ibid.). One could claim that given the minority opinions above and here, there is more reason for leniency if one starts soon before and ends soon after sunset (see Piskei Teshuvot 233:7). This, though, is not simple for those who do not heed Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion at all.

Fundamentally, there is little difference between Shemoneh Esrei and chazarat hashatz, which, after all, is supposed to be Shemoneh Esrei for certain individuals and/or the tzibbur. On the other hand, if everyone already got in their own Shemoneh Esrei, the stakes regarding chazarat hashatz are lower. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that there is a machloket among Acharonim whether it is better to do a shortened chazarat hashatz (heiche Kedusha) or to finish chazarat hashatz after shekiah (see Ishei Yisrael 27:40). Thus, it is quite important to finish chazarat hashatz in time. However, several poskim say that if one is in a shul in which chazarat hashatz is being done after shekiah, even one who does not accept that approach may answer Amen (see Maharam Shick, OC 91; Shevet Halevi IX:20; Tefilla K’hilchata 18:33).

Your shul-mate was correct to skip parts of P’sukei D’zimra in order to daven with the tzibbur, preferably finishing Yishtabach together and, more crucially, starting Shemoneh Esrei together (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 52:1). For Sephardim, one may even skip all of P’sukei D’zimra, including Baruch She’amar and Yishtabach (ibid.), whereas Ashkenazim should say at least those berachot and Ashrei (Mishna Berura 52:6).

However, it was wrong to say parts of P’sukei D’zimra during pauses in Birchot Shema, during which one may not speak non-crucial things. There are two sets of rules of speech at that time: in between berachot and sections of Kri’at Shema (bein haperakim), and in their midst (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:1). Actually, most of the “pauses,” i.e., when we wait for the chazan, are in the midst of berachot of Kri’at Shema or other times when it is particularly bad to speak, even for mitzva purposes. (The exception is after “…yotzer hame’orot.”)

Even bein haperakim, the list of permitted recitations is very limited. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) rules that one who did not put on tallit and tefillin previously may do so with a beracha during bein haperakim. However, the Rama cites an opinion that one does not recite the beracha until later, even though putting on tefillin at that time is important (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:4), and rules this way regarding tzitzit/tallit. The Mishna Berura (66:15) explains that since having a tallit on at that time is only desirable and not a real requirement, the beracha is an unjustified interruption during the Kri’at Shema section.

How critical is P’sukei D’zimra at that point? For one who skipped all of P’sukei D’zimra (see above), arguably, if he now realizes that he can fit it in bein haperakim, it might be important enough to do. After all, according to the Shulchan Aruch, a make-up P’sukei D’zimra will be without Baruch She’amar/Yishtabach. We find a machloket whether a passing opportunity to make a non-critical beracha (see Mishna Berura 66:19 regarding the beracha on lightening) justifies recitation bein haperakim. However, assuming the person said a shortened P’sukei D’zimra, why recite individual mizmorim at this sensitive point? After all, there already was a basic pre-tefilla praise of Hashem (P’sukei D’zimra’s main function), and the fact that one may shorten it shows the rest is not critical. Whatever he recited was out of its normal framework (i.e., between Baruch She’amar and Yishtabach), and the mizmorim can and should be done after tefilla. There is a better idea, for one who hopes to get in more of P’sukei D’zimra than if he just skips to Yishtabach and knows he davens faster than the chazan. He can continue P’sukei D’zimra, answering Kaddish and Barchu while in its midst, and then catch up to the tzibbur during Birchot Kri’at Shema (Mishna Berura 52:6).

Most of the discussion about walking is found in regard to Shemoneh Esrei, and we will start with that.

Your shul-mate may be remembering (incorrectly) the following mishna (Berachot 30b). During Shemoneh Esrei, “even if a snake is wrapped around his leg (parallel to war), he should not stop.” However, the gemara (ad loc. 33a) says that this is only when it does not appear that the snake presents real danger. Furthermore, the stop (hefsek) referred to is speaking, e.g., calling someone to save him. One actually is allowed to walk to another place to protect himself from even a moderately precarious situation, as walking is not a real hefsek (Mishna Berura 104:10).

Of course, one should not walk for no good reason during Shemoneh Esrei, as it is a low-level hefsek. We find the following priority list for one who must take care of something during Shemoneh Esrei (Mishna Berura 104:1), from best to worst: 1) hinting to someone to help without talking or moving; 2) walking somewhere without speaking; 3) speaking, which is permitted under only extraordinary circumstances.

In comparison to Shemoneh Esrei, the position of one’s body is less important during Kedusha. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 95:1) says one is required to have his feet together during Shemoneh Esrei, to “imitate” angels in service of Hashem. In contrast, regarding Kedusha he writes (ibid. 4) that it is good (i.e., less critical than for Shemoneh Esrei) for one’s feet to be together. Again, one does not walk for no reason, but legitimate concern for a special needs child’s physical (or emotional) safety is fully justified. The additional liturgy for Shabbat within Kedusha is not even considered a full-fledged part of Kedusha (see Mishna Berura 125:1) and arguably it is even less problematic to walk then. Furthermore, one who is not davening has a lower-level obligation to join Kedusha, to not look like he does not endorse what is being said. This would seem to not apply to one whose pressing preoccupation is clear to all. So halachically, you are clearly fine.

We continue with a conjecture about your shul-mate’s reaction. Although he said he was motivated by concern for your Kedusha obligations, it is likely that he was bothered by something else. Having a child running wildly through a shul with or without an adult chasing after him is not ideal for the atmosphere of a shul or davening. Those with certain personality types are particularly disturbed by such a situation. Some people properly care greatly about decorum and quiet in shul. The situation may make others just feel nervous. You may not think in such terms, because you are, laudably, concerned with the welfare and happiness of the child.

It can be a good idea to discuss such a situation (presumably, the father) with the rabbi or other leadership. The job of any true leader is to strike a proper balance between the needs of the general community and the unique needs of individuals. We cannot be of help from here, as only someone intimately familiar with the setting and the people involved can do it justice. Obviously, no reasonable rabbis would ignore the needs of a special needs child. However, it is plausible to arrive at an arrangement using discretion as to when the child will spend time in shul. But again, the feelings of the man you refer to (even though he is wrong in what he said and seemingly how he said it) and perhaps other people is a possible issue, not the halachot of Kedusha.

The mishna (Shabbat 9b) lists activities in which one must not partake before Mincha; one is eating. (see details in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 232:2.) However, if he did, he does not stop in the middle for Mincha. There are different versions in the mishna regarding stopping for Kri’at Shema, and the gemara (Shabbat 11a) discusses elements relating to it.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 235:2) rules that one may not eat a meal within a half hour of the beginning time of the night’s Kri’at Shema, and that if he did, he must stop to recite Kri’at Shema, without its berachot or davening Ma’ariv. The Ran (Rif’s pages, Shabbat 4a) derives this from Sukka 38a, regarding stopping a meal to take a lulav, which distinguishes between Torah-level and Rabbinic mitzvot.

The Ran (ibid.), and Mordechai (Shabbat 224) say that one must stop a meal for Torah mitzvot e.g., Kri’at Shema, only if he started eating improperly (for Rabbinic laws, e.g., tefilla, one may continue even if he started improperly – see Tosafot, Shabbat 9b). This is how the Mishna Berura (325:23) paskens. (These poskim may disagree regarding one who improperly started eating within a half hour of z’man Kri’at Shema, but before its proper actual time.) Your practice of reciting Kri’at Shema during the meal is therefore not required, if you start the meal early enough. (Actually, not everyone who davens at an “early minyan” starts the meal early enough, especially when he davens at a minyan that keeps the same time all summer.)

But is your practice a positive, negative, or “pareve” chumra? There is a concept that one who does something from which he is exempt is called a hedyot. The source is a Yerushalmi on our general topic (Shabbat 1:2), which is probably the logic behind what your guest told you. The Yerushalmi told of rabbanim who were eating together; one stopped to daven Mincha and was criticized by a colleague as above. It is very hard to determine when to apply this rule, as many respected sources have written “one who is machmir shall receive beracha.” Understanding the reason behind the rule, about which there are various opinions, helps. These include: the stringency looks like he is adding on to the Torah; yohara (haughtiness/ holier-than-thou); casting aspersions on those who are not machmir (see more in the entry on this topic in Encyclopedia Talmudit, vol. XXVIII).

It seems to be a small jump from the Yerushalmi to your question. However, some (Sh’vut Yaakov II:30) understand that the Bavli disagrees (see Shabbat 9b). Furthermore, Kri’at Shema, being a Torah-level mitzva is stricter (see above). Indeed, the Rambam (Kri’at Shema 2:6; see also Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 70:5) says that even when one started eating at a permitted time and is not required to stop for Kri’at Shema, doing so is praiseworthy. The Rambam actually hints at a reason for this ruling, which may help us apply the matter to our case, as he describes one who is concerned that he might not recite Kri’at Shema within its time limit. Therefore, if one recites Kri’at Shema during the meal because he has reason (e.g., based on past experience) for concern that he will not remember after the meal to recite it again, it does not make sense to consider him a hedyot. Many participants in early Shabbat meals forget to recite Kri’at Shema after the meal, so machmir based on such grounds is not inappropriate, even if one is allowed to be optimistic.

While all agree that semichat geula l’tefilla (connecting the beracha of “Ga’al Yisrael” to Shemoneh Esrei) is important at Shacharit, not all agree regarding Ma’ariv (see Berachot 9b). Since the conclusion is that it does apply at Ma’ariv, one may not talk before Shemoneh Esrei of Ma’ariv (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 236:2).

Nevertheless, the Rashba (Shut I, 293) justified a minhag to call out “Rosh Chodesh” before Shemoneh Esrei at night. He reasons that talking for the needs of tefilla is not considered a hefsek and that the fact that Ma’ariv is an optional prayer reduces the severity of such a break. Indeed we rule that pertinent announcements are permitted at Ma’ariv (Shulchan Aruch ibid.), but not at Shacharit (Taz, OC 114:2).

The Maharashal (see Bach, OC 236) disagrees with the Rashba. He argues that the only speech permitted between geula and tefilla is reciting things instituted by the Rabbis (such as Hashkiveinu and Baruch Hashem L’Olam). He posits that Ma’ariv is no longer optional because Klal Yisrael accepted it as binding, and that in any case, in the midst of tefilla, even if it were optional, one may not make a break. The Mishna Berura is among those who bring no dissenters on the Shulchan Aruch’s permission to announce YVY at Ma’ariv, and this is the standard approach presented by contemporary Ashkenazi tefilla compendiums (see Ishei Yisrael 28:24; Tefilla K’hilchata 19:20).

Some poskim, though, cite minhagim which do not permit calling out “YVY.” The K’tzot Hashulchan (27:5) cites the Ba’al Hatanya’s siddur as forbidding it; the Kaf Hachayim (OC 236:17) says that the minhag in Yerushalayim was against it, and the Yalkut Yosef (OC 422:2) rules this way. One explanation (see Kaf Hachayim ibid.) of these counter minhagim is that they are concerned that the Maharashal, not the Rashba, is right. It is perhaps more likely that it is a shame to allow speaking when there are effective, preferable alternatives.

As you mentioned, many suffice with simple banging, as in many shuls everyone understands what they are hinting at. Producing sounds, like other forms of non-speech hints, is not a hefsek in davening except for in Shemoneh Esrei and the first parasha of Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 653:6; Mishna Berura 104:1). It is likely that the minhag of banging developed not as a rejection of the possibility of announcing, but out of a realization that, in some shuls, it is unnecessary.

Another alternative (see Magen Avraham 114:2, in a related context; Kaf Hachayim ibid.) is for one who gets up to YVY in Shemoneh Esrei to remind others by saying those words out loud. While one generally should not daven Shemoneh Esrei out loud, it is permitted for one davening at home when there is a reason for it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 101:2). In shul we are concerned that this will disturb others (ibid.). However, it is hard to have such an objection when one person is saying two words to help the tzibbur. An advantage of this system is that the reminder comes closer to the time people recite YVY, and is in that way more effective. Do note that some consider saying words of Shemoneh Esrei out loud to be disrespectful (see opinions in Dirshu 422:2), at least if not done by someone appropriate like a gabbai or the chazan (Halichot Shlomo, Mo’adim p. 1). There is often a technical problem – if the one saying out loud does not start early or daven faster than others, many will get to YVY before him.

In summary, there are three legitimate ways to remind people to recite YVY, each with advantages and disadvantages, some of which depend on the shul (e.g., if people understand the bang). Since people have seen each system, many shuls develop a hodgepodge of practices, which is neither great nor terrible. If the rav has not set a policy, any alternative is fine.

The mishna (Berachot 13a) cites two opinions about when it is permitted to greet people during Kri’at Shema and its berachot. The factors are: whether the speaking is in the midst of a beracha or section of Kri’at Shema or between units; how important is the person one is greeting; whether one initiates or responds. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 66:1) rules that between units, one may initiate greetings to any respected person and respond to anyone. Within units, one can only initiate to one’s father, rebbe, or a great scholar, as well as someone who can cause him harm; he can respond to anyone who is respected. Responding to Kaddish, Kedusha, and Barchu is important enough to do even in the midst of a unit (ibid. 3).           

The gemara (Berachot 14a) inquires whether one may be as lenient regarding when he may speak during Hallel as during Kri’at Shema. It considers that on the one hand, Kri’at Shema may be more stringent because the mitzva to recite it is a Torah law. On the other hand, Hallel might be more severe, since it is an act of publicizing Hashem’s greatness. The gemara posits that Hallel is not more severe. The gemara then distinguishes between days in which “Full Hallel” is recited (e.g., Yom Tov, Chanuka), in which case one may interrupt only in between units, and days in which “Half Hallel” is recited (Rosh Chodesh, Chol Hamoed Pesach), in which case one may interrupt even within a unit. (Hallel’s units are the mizmorim which constitute it; these correspond to the “chapter numbers” that are usually used.)

Sephardim have a clear reason to distinguish between the two types of Hallel recitations: Full Hallel has berachot before and after it, which Half Hallel lacks (Shulchan Aruch, OC 422:2). The juxtaposition between berachot makes it problematic to talk (see Tosafot, Berachot 14a). However, even Ashkenazim, who make berachot before and after both types of Hallel, accept the above distinction. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that only on the days of Full Hallel is there a real obligation to recite; when there is no obligation, interruptions are less problematic.

We cannot go through all the permutations that can arise, but we will address some. The basic difference is that the same respected person whom one may greet only between the units of Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:1), one may greet during Half Hallel even in the midst of mizmorim (ibid. 422:4).

Nowadays, most people do not view the need to greet others as seriously as Chazal did. Therefore, the poskim have assumed for quite some time that it is no longer appropriate to greet others during Kri’at Shema (Mishna Berura 66:2). Since one cannot speak at any time during Hallel without a special reason (Shulchan Aruch, OC 422:4), the same is true for Hallel, and we do not greet people even during Half Hallel (Dirshu, 422:25). What remains permitted to talk about is mainly matters of mitzva that need to be recited, and we will give a few examples. Answering Kaddish, Kedusha, and Barchu can be done even in the middle of a unit of Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:3) and therefore certainly during Hallel. Regarding one who is called up to the Torah when he is still in Kri’at Shema, there are several opinions (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:4), but the standard one is that he does go up but should try to make it to a unit break before he starts the aliya (Mishna Berura 66:26; see details of how to handle the aliya). If this was during a Half Hallel, it would not be necessary to make it to a unit break. If one has to go to the bathroom, he should not recite Asher Yatzar until after Shemoneh Esrei (Mishna Berura 66:23) and in this case after Hallel because it can wait. The poskim dispute whether one may recite the beracha on thunder because it cannot be done later, and the more accepted opinion is to do so only if it is between units of Kri’at Shema (Mishna Berura 66:19). During Half Hallel, it would be permitted at any point.

Reciting the beracha of Hamapil is mandated by the gemara (Berachot 60b) and codified as halacha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 239:1). We say it in conjunction with Kri’at Shema prior to going to bed, which is also an obligation (Berachot 4b; Shulchan Aruch ibid.), and there are other p’sukim and texts relating to our desire for divine protection during sleep.

The gemara says that one makes the beracha as he prepares to lie down in bed to sleep. The Rama (OC 239:1) says that one should not eat, drink, or talk between Kri’at Shema and actually sleeping. Most assume that this applies as much or more to interruptions between Hamapil and sleeping.

A break could be particularly problematic after Hamapil for two reasons. First, if one made a break after Kri’at Shema, he can repeat Kri’at Shema as much as he likes (according to Rama ibid., the more the better). In contrast, one may not recite Hamapil, which is a beracha, at will (Mishna Berura 239:4). Furthermore, there is a fundamental question as to Hamapil’s function. The Chayei Adam (35:4) says that the beracha is a general thanks to Hashem for providing sleep, and it is appropriate to recite it at night, when people generally sleep. He says that the beracha remains appropriate even if one did not end up falling asleep, because other people did sleep. This is similar to the idea of one reciting Birchot Hashachar for things from which people benefit in the morning, even if he did not personally benefit that day from those things (Shulchan Aruch, OC 46:8). On the other hand, many cite the Seder Hayom, who says that Hamapil should be said very close to the time one falls asleep, as the beracha relates to one’s personal sleep. The Biur Halacha (239:1) strengthens this opinion by pointing out that Hamapil was composed in the first person, implying it refers to the sleep of the one reciting the beracha (see Sha’arei Teshuva 46:12).

The question then is whether reading is a hefsek (a halachic break) between Kri’at Shema/Hamapil and sleeping. Reading with one’s eyes (without moving his lips) is halachically considered hirhur, i.e., thinking about something (see Mishna Berura 47:8). Although the gemara cites a dispute on the status of hirhur, the consensus is that it does not generally count as speaking (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 62:3; 47:4). Therefore, when only a full hefsek is forbidden, reading is not forbidden (see Yabia Omer, II, OC 4 regarding learning between Yishtabach and Kaddish). After Kri’at Shema/Hamapil is not a particularly strict time. On the other hand, we have seen that the ideal is to do the recitations as close as possible to going to sleep.

In practice, the best advice depends on the way your reading and sleeping interact. If the reading is relatively short and a part of how you fall asleep, then you can do the recitations before reading; the reading can be considered a part of the process of going to sleep (similar to adjusting the blanket, or at least like setting an alarm that you forgot to do before). If you read at that time because it is a convenient/pleasant time to do so and then put down the book and make the final preparations for sleep, Kri’at Shema/Hamapil should be part of those final preparations. If the reading is something in between, where you sometimes finish reading and then get ready for bed and sometimes fall asleep while you are reading, then you should read until you feel yourself getting close to sleep. At that point, you should do the recitations and either put the book down or continue the final minute(s) of reading. If you accidentally fall asleep before reciting Hamapil, you are not to be blamed. Only if it is likely that you will fall asleep soundly without enough warning is it better to recite Hamapil/Kri’at Shema first.

The matter of not davening in front of a mirror is not a Talmudically mandated halacha, but it is modeled after, an extension, or perhaps even an application of one or more halachot of Chazal.

The Radbaz (IV,107), in discussing davening facing the image of a lion, says that since we forbid davening in front of a mirror because it looks like he is bowing to himself, it is certainly forbidden to daven in front of an image of a lion (which is found in the kisei hakavod). He connects this to the halacha of not davening behind one’s rebbe (Berachot 27b), which, he posits, is in order not to look like he is bowing to him (as one suggestion in Tosafot ad loc. has it). Although he mentions looking like “bowing,” which we do only during Shemoneh Esrei, it likely applies throughout davening (see Machatzit Hashekel 90:37).

Others connect this practice to a different halacha. The gemara (Berachot 5b) says that one should not have a break between himself and the wall when he is davening. The poskim understand that it has to do with creating a distraction (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 90) and posit that it is likewise improper to have colorful pictures or wall hangings in front of him (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:23). The Machatzit Hashekel (ibid.) says that this is an additional reason not to daven in front of a mirror. (Da’at Torah, OC 90 suggests that only the latter concern is correct.) This problem can be solved by closing one’s eyes or looking only at one’s siddur (Mishna Berura 90:63), which will not work for looking like bowing (Mishna Berura 90:71).

There is some logic for a reason that combines the two (admittedly, this does not seem to be the Radbaz’s intention). When one looks at himself when davening, we view this self-absorption as antithetical to the mindset one should have in davening. While this is not literally bowing to himself, there is an element of it, figuratively.  

This “prohibition” is not mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Rav Yosef Karo met the Radbaz late in life (in Safed) but apparently did not have access to his scholarship when writing his sefarim). However, many of the classical commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch and related works cite it as a halachic fact (see Mishna Berura ibid.). Therefore, while it may not have the full force of a formal Rabbinical prohibition, it is an accepted minhag related to full halachot, which we do not consider a chumra.

This status makes it more reasonable to look for leniency in cases that are close but not identical to the classic case, when logic so dictates. Several Acharonim are lenient when one can see his image but not in a mirror per se. The Shevet Halevi (IX, 21) justifies the minhag to daven before reflective objects when that is not the object’s purpose (he discusses a “Shiviti Hashem l’negdi tamid” sign situated in front of the chazan). Ohr L’tzion (II, 7:11) says that it is permitted to daven in front of a window, even if the lighting makes his image clearly visible, as long as he closes his eyes or angles himself so he does not see it. The apparent logic is that fear of looking like davening to himself only applies when he puts himself in front of a mirror, which makes him look interested in looking at himself as he davens. However, when the ability to see is incidental, no one will think that one is davening to himself. Admittedly, some poskim are machmir even in the case of davening before a window at night (see Ishei Yisrael 9:(66)).

It would seem that one difference of this not being a full-out Talmudic prohibition could be in a rare case where the only way to daven is opposite a mirror. If it were a full-fledged prohibition based on the first reason, it might be better not to daven at all. Although I did not find sources on the matter, it would seem that indeed it would be better to daven (although he should certainly not look) than not to daven at all, if this is his only option.

Dealing with skipping berachot of Shemoneh Esrei is the subject of a machloket between Amora’im and apparently Rishonim. Rav Huna (Berachot 34a) says that when one makes a significant mistake during any of the sections of Shemoneh Esrei (first three; next thirteen; final three), he returns to the beginning of the section. Rav Asi agrees regarding the first and last sections, but regarding the middle one, he does not require going back to the beginning (Ata Chonen). He expresses his opinion as follows: “The middle ones have no order,” and the Rishonim accept the opinion of Rav Asi. (In your case, either way he had to return to Ata Chonen, which is the one he skipped).

Rashi (ad loc.) seems to take the gemara’s language quite literally, and says that since the middle berachot do not have an order, if one skipped a beracha, he can make it up at whatever point he catches the mistake. In other words, after saying the beracha that he missed, he continues with the next beracha that he had been up to before his realization. For example, if he skipped #6 and realized after #8, he would recite #6 after #8 and then jump back to #9, without repeating #7-8. In your case, the chazan went from #3 (Ata Kadosh) to #7 (R’ei). Therefore, Rashi would have him make up #4-6 and then skip over #7 to continue with #8. (A minority of Acharonim learn Rashi differently.) This is exactly what the chazan did, when he skipped R’ei because he had already recited it.

Tosafot (ad loc.) disagrees, and says that after going back to the beracha he skipped, he continues straight from there, even though it means that he will repeat whatever he recited between making the mistake and discovering it. In the example above, after going back to #6, he continues with #7 and continues forward, thereby reciting #7 and #8 twice. Tosafot posits that the importance of saying the berachot in order is important enough to justify repeating berachot. We are used to repeating berachot when something was done wrong the first time. If one forgot something, for example, Ya’aleh V’yavo, he goes back to R’tzei and continues straight. In your case, the chazan should have recited R’ei another time.

Tosafot deals with the language of the gemara by saying that the lack of order is only in comparison to the halacha found regarding the first and last berachot. While there, one has to go back to the beginning of the set, this is not necessary in the middle ones (rather, one starts with the one he skipped). Tosafot bring a strong proof that the order of all the berachot is important. The mishna (Megilla 17a) says that if one read Megillat Esther out of order, he does not fulfill that mitzva; the gemara says that the same is true for Hallel, Kri’at Shema, and tefilla. This indicates that this is an absolute requirement even b’dieved and therefore justifies repetition to get the order back in synch. (One does not have to go back to the beginning of Shemoneh Esrei, but rather ignores the berachot already recited out of order.) Indeed, the gemara (Megilla 17b) says that Anshei Knesset Hagedola instituted eighteen berachot “al haseder” (according to an order). The gemara then goes on to bring p’sukim to show the logic of each beracha following the one before it. There are other sets of berachot regarding which the order is not critical, such as most of the sheva berachot (see Ba’er Heitev, Even Ha’ezer 62:1) and Birchot Hashachar (Mishna Berura 46:20).

There is a machloket Tannaim (Berachot 26a) whether the last time to daven Shacharit is chatzot (astronomical midday) or the end of four “proportional hours,” some two hours before. The earlier opinion is accepted (ibid. 27a). Only if one failed to daven by that time may he b’di’eved daven until chatzot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:1). Thus the tefilla was not bizmana (at its time).

Tefilla bizmana is important enough to trump several tefilla preferences. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 90:10) discusses the prohibition to recite Shemoneh Esrei in shul before the tzibbur does. However, if the tzibbur will not be getting up to Shemoneh Esrei bizmana, one should go ahead of them. (If he can, he should do so outside shul– Mishna Berura ad loc. 36.) This ruling assumes not only that davening bizmana overcomes the problem of davening before the tzibbur, but that davening without a minyan at the right time is preferable to davening with a minyan not bizmana. There is an opinion (Leket Hakemach (Katz) 89:11) that the Shulchan Aruch refers to a case where they are before chatzot, after which one cannot daven at all, but that it is better to daven with a minyan after the fourth hour than alone bizmana. However, that is a difficult reading, and the accepted ruling is that tefilla before the end of the fourth hour is preferable to a minyan (see Mishna Berura 46:32; Ishei Yisrael 13:10; Tefilla K’hilchata 3:(80)).

How important is it to follow this preference? Does waiting cause special problems? If one did not recite Kri’at Shema bizmana (by the end of the third hour), he recites it with its berachot during the next hour (Shulchan Aruch, OC 58:6). There is a machloket whether this applies after the fourth hour. The Rambam (Kri’at Shema 1:13) says that the berachot can be recited with Kri’at Shema all day; the Rosh (Berachot 1:10) allows the berachot only during the fourth hour, when the full effect of tefilla is present. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) rules like the Rosh. On the other hand, the Biur Halacha cites some Acharonim who accept the Rambam’s opinion, particularly if the delay was due to extenuating circumstances (see Living the Halachic Process, I:A-9).

One might argue that on Shabbat the matter is much more problematic. The gemara’s (Berachot 26a) discussion of davening after zmana and davening tashlumin (a make-up for a missed tefilla during the next tefilla period) can be read to equate the two. Tashlumin is not done if one purposely, without an excuse, missed the tefilla (Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:7), and if one wants to make it up, the make-up Shemoneh Esrei must be done as a nedava (voluntary tefilla). Combining the two, some say that one who purposely waited to do Shacharit until after the fourth hour should intend that if a later Shacharit it is not called for, it should be a nedava (Mishna Berura 89:6). Since tefillot nedava cannot be done on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 107:1), one could argue that it is forbidden to purposely daven Shacharit on Shabbat after the fourth hour. However, this is apparently not true. The main opinion allows davening until chatzot even when the conditions for tashlumin are missing – the idea of intending for a nedava if necessary was just a stringency when possible (Ishei Yisrael 13:(15)). Secondly, in this case, you and others davening at that time believed it was okay, and one who misses a tefilla by mistake can do tashlumin (Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:1).

There are two similar halachot having to do with the 4 amot around one who is davening Shemoneh Esrei, which people often confuse, but their parameters and reasoning could be important here. One is not walking in front of one who is davening Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 102:4-5). The other is our issue of sitting within the 4 amot of one who is davening Shemoneh Esrei (ibid. 1-3).  

The source of the latter halacha is the gemara (Berachot 31b), which in discussing how Eili Hakohen was near Chana who was standing in prayer, derives that he was not sitting too close to her. The main reasons given for this halacha are: 1. It looks as if the one who is sitting does not relate respectfully and thus believe in the davening around him (Tur, OC 102). 2. When one davens, he creates “holy ground” around him, and it is forbidden to take that area lightly by sitting down in it. (Taz, OC 102:3). This differs from the way most explain the former halacha – that walking in front of one who is davening disturbs his concentration.

There are two areas in which to consider leniency. One is based on the difficulty or inappropriateness of standing up. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 102:2) says that if the davener’s neighbor is weak, he may sit. The Mishna Berura (102:10) explains that the logic of looking like one does not agree does not apply when people can tell he is weak. Similarly, since, due to needs of comfort and safety, people avoid standing on a bus, the same leniency applies. Also, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 3) says that if one is sitting before his friend starts davening next to him, he is not responsible to get up, at least when the setting is not a shul (Mishna Berura 102:13). However, this latter point is not too helpful in your case. The reason one does not have to get up is because we blame the davener, who should have picked a different place (ibid. 12). Especially here, where the matter is less on the negative impact on the davener but in disgracing Hashem, that would mean that your wife would be at fault for the situation, which you do not want.

Another point is that perhaps it is not problematic to sit next to someone davening if they themselves are sitting. While the K’tzot Hashulchan (20:(26) posits simply that there is no difference, some suggest (see Tzitz Eliezer IX:7) that if the halacha is based on not looking like he respects, it is not a problem if they are both sitting. If it has to do with “holy ground,” then it should not make a difference. While the gemara does not hint at a distinction, the Rambam (Tefilla 5:6) can be read as limiting the halacha to the case of a standing davener. The Meiri, who says that the reason not to sit is to not disturb the davener, is clearer that it applies only when the davener is standing. The Tzitz Eliezer (ibid.) suggests another idea. Sitting for Shemoneh Esrei is on a lower level than standing, to the extent that the Shulchan Aruch (OC 94:9) says that if one had to daven sitting and then has the opportunity to stand, he should daven again. Although we do not follow this (Mishna Berura 94:27), the basic premise is agreed upon. Therefore, maybe the level of holy ground is missing if one sits.

While it is not great to daven on a bus (for the above reason and others), many women are so time-pressed, so that there is little choice but to do so. It seems weird to suggest that such a woman’s husband should not sit next to her, stand, or move away. It is anyway likely that someone will just take his place. As we have seen, there are strong grounds for leniency. There is, though, a win-win idea for a husband in this situation. Some say that if the davener’s neighbor is learning Torah during his Shemoneh Esrei, he does not have to stand (Shulchan Aruch, OC 102:1). So learning would be a good thing, on multiple levels, to do at that time.

Those who listen to the rabbi do Kri’at Shema on time. They also repeat Kri’at Shema, and can say the berachot, based on the gemara (Berachot 10b). So the system of reciting Kri’at Shema before davening is responsible (see Rama, Orach Chayim 46:9). However, several Acharonim point out that the recital of Kri’at Shema that is used to fulfill the mitzva is best done along with its berachot (see Mishna Berura 46:31).

But there are two ways to understand that preference: 1. Like there is a full requirement to finish Kri’at Shema by szKS, so there is a preference to recite its accompanying berachot by then. 2. A complete Kri’at Shema requires being sandwiched by its berachot. Your practice’s advisability depends on this question. After doing Kri’at Shema at its time, you complete it with its final beracha only a few minutes later, so according to #2, you are fine. According to #1, you did not finish the last beracha in time. Another test case is if one recites Kri’at Shema before davening but the second time and its berachot end up being on time. The Acharonim (ibid.) say that it is still best to not have had intention to fulfill the mitzva the first time; this proves that #2 was their intention.

But could #1 also be true – that the berachot are best when done before szKS? Consider the machloket whether one has one more hour to recite the berachot, until chatzot, or all day (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 58). Rav Hai Gaon, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (OC 58:6) takes the strict opinion. If the berachot need not be by szKS, why can’t they be all day? Many answer that it is parallel to the end time of tefilla (Mishna Berura 58:25), and very likely because the berachot are not as linked to Kri’at Shema as they are to tefilla (ibid.), whose time ends a (halachic) hour after Kri’at Shema’s (Shulchan Aruch, OC 89:1). If this is the whole story, your system solves the problem because you finish the berachot before the end time of tefilla. Yet one can still argue (as there are indications) that there are two elements of birchot Kri’at Shema – it is related both to Kri’at Shema and to tefilla. One can then argue that while one can say the berachot after szKS, this is because of tefilla, but the Kri’at Shema element has been lost.

The Levush (OC 58:6) explains Rav Hai Gaon’s requirement by the end of the fourth hour by saying that it is somewhat the time of waking (which is the rationale for szKS). The Malbushei Yom Tov (ad loc.) argues that there is no source for a later “semi-wakeup” time. We suggest the following to explain the Levush. When saying that szKS, which is a Torah-level law, is when the last people wake up, we need to give those people time to do all they need to get up to Kri’at Shema, which now includes much of Shacharit, on time. Perhaps the Levush meant that Chazal wanted everything related to Kri’at Shema to be in the direct post-wakeup-time, but with Kri’at Shema already out of the way, the fourth hour is “spillover time” in this regard. Thus, even if we relate birchot Kri’at Shema’s time to Kri’at Shema’s, we can still say that the fourth hour is l’chatchila because it is in spillover time.

Your system is recommended, in certain circumstances, by a few Acharonim (see Tefilla K’hilchata 3:24). Considering that I did not find in those or other sources that one should try to finish Ga’al Yisrael by szKS, your system is fine in this regard. (The system requires sophistication and planning to: get ahead, be at a good place during Kaddish/Barchu, wait without hefsek after Kri’at Shema. Thus, this is not for everyone. Acting differently from your surroundings can also be an issue. So you might want to discuss with your rabbi if and how to use your system.)

We will have to understand the laws of enunciation of Kri’at Shema to deal with your scientific revelation (to people like me, who were not aware). There is a machloket among Tannaim about whether Kri’at Shema must include sound that is audible to one’s own ear (Berachot 15a). We rule like Rabbanan’s middle approach in between the stringent Rabbi Yossi and lenient Rabbi Meir: L’chatchila one should recite Kri’at Shema audibly, but b’di’eved he fulfills the mitzva even if he did not, as long as he moved his mouth, lips, and tongue (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 62:3; the same is likely true for davening – see Mishna Berura 101:5).

It turns out scientifically that not all letters can be differentiated in a whisper, and certainly when no sound comes out. Your good question about whispering, which is not a major discussion in halachic sources, applies equally to totally non-audible speech, which is discussed. Since the clear halacha is that one does fulfill the mitzva, the question is only: why? (If there were a halachic difference between whispering and quiet talking, some poskim would have mentioned it.)

It seems implausible that the letters in question are close enough in sound that it does not make a difference if one says s instead of z or v instead of f, since they can create different words with different meanings. The answer is based on the following observation. (Almost) every Jewish subgroup pronounces certain things wrong. For example, Ashkenazim pronounce ayin like alef and chet like chaf. Sephardim do not distinguish between kamatz and patach. Some of these regrettable (see Megilla 24b) inaccuracies can change the meaning. Yet, one with a speech impediment fulfills mitzvot of speech with a theoretically confusing lack of differentiation, and when it is standard for one’s society, it is not considered a problem (see Mishna Berura 53:37).

Why? Hashem knows whether we mean. While thought is not enough (see above), the one only has to enunciate to the extent that he can be expected to based on circumstances (ability, minhag (?)). Hashem can handle homonyms. The same is apparently true of whispering. While one technically cannot tell if someone whispered “zonim” or “sonim,” but Hashem knows what one meant, and since whispering is a legitimate form of speech, the best he can do is enough.

One can ask on this approach: why does Halacha makes instruct us to stress the zayin of “tizkeru,” so as not to sound like tiskeru (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 61:17) if anyway it is indistinguishable when done inaudibly or with whispering? One can answer by saying that stressing the zayin is only l’chatchila (Mishna Berura 62:1), and vocalizing so the speaker can hear himself, is anyway required l’chatchila. So indeed, if you follow the l’chatchila of vocalizing, stressing the zayin becomes relevant. But this works out only if the l’chatchila of making audible to the ear can be done only through regular speech and not whispering, an opinion I have not found.

Emailing and other forms of electronic communication have two broad purposes – social interaction; technical/business-related. Each can be a problem before davening, but their parameters differ somewhat. We will deal with them separately before touching on “policy.” (We leave out the important issue of such activity causing one to be late for tefilla.)

The gemara (Berachot 14a) forbids greeting people with “Shalom” before Shacharit but clarifies that the problem is when you go to another’s place to greet. Rashi (ad loc.; also, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:2) describes the permitted case as “meeting him along the way.” Contemporary Acharonim discuss, in this context, calling by phone. Ishei Yisrael 13:(40) cites Rav B. Stern and Az Nidberu, who say that this is not like going to another’s house. Rav Elyashiv (P’ninei Tefilla, p. 59) considers it like going to his house, which makes it forbidden if the call’s purpose was the greeting. It likely depends if one views the problem as giving a special standing to your friend (before giving to Hashem) by going to his house to greet him or that initiating greetings is a problem. (See also our Ask the Rabbi, Vayishlach 5779). Rav Melamed’s compromise, that it is permitted when there is a real need, is logical.

Some electronic communication has advantages over a phone – specifically, those where one does not engage in direct conversation, giving a person prominence, but leaves a message for him/them to see at some time. Also, for written messages, halacha does not always equate writing with speaking (also, beyond our scope). Responding to a message is arguably like responding to a greeting, which is permitted (Shulchan Aruch ibid.). However, there is a difference because, as opposed to normal greeting, it is usually unnecessary to answer messages immediately (i.e., before davening). In short, this element is not a major problem, especially if one first says Birchot Hashachar and avoids the word “Shalom.”

Personal needs: One must not “deal with his needs” before Shacharit (ibid. 3), which some of the activity in question may be. If needed for a mitzva (e.g., helping parents), this is “Hashem’s needs” and permitted (Mishna Berura 89:36). How major an undertaking is considered “dealing with needs” (or melacha, which poskim discuss – see Tosafot, Berachot 5b)? The Eshel Avraham (Butchatch, to 89:3) permits simple things one may do on Chol Hamo’ed. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 2) assumes one may “go to see some eisek”; the Mishna Berura clarifies: “to see but not to be really involved.” Tefilla K’hilchata (6:(36)) cites Rav S.Z. Auerbach as permitting a quick look at a newspaper or throwing clothes into a washing machine. A quick session with an electronic communication tool to take in some information or send out an instruction to a colleague, etc. need not be forbidden on these grounds. Steps to keep the process short are important (see Mishna Berura 89:16).

Personal Policy: The following is clear from various halachot (see OC 89 & 93). When one wakes up, he should focus on encountering Hashem at Shacharit. Things that show that a different priority, misdirect his mind frame, or might make him forget, unduly delay, or rush his tefilla are against the spirit and/or letter of the law. Initiating unnecessary interaction before davening is far from ideal for the average person. Many people are involved in pressing matters that can change overnight and some “cannot wait” until after davening. Doing the minimum necessary is the proper thing. Some people are regrettably so worried/curious before “checking in” that it hinders their kavana. But many are unnecessarily and unhealthily attached to their devices and refuse to go a waking hour off social media, which sometimes includes during davening. Avoiding such devices until after davening is part of weaning themselves or taking steps not to deteriorate and is a great step in their avodat Hashem and personal wellbeing.

Dedicated in memory of Marc Weinberg.

We will focus mainly on your assumption – that one may add personal thanks in Modim. There is little in the poskim on this specific question, but we can learn from many general relevant sources (find article by R. Chanan Ariel).

Gemarot say that one may add personal requests in Shemoneh Esrei’s middle berachot, especially Shema Koleinu (Avoda Zara 8a; see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 119:1) but not during the first three and last three berachot (Berachot 34a; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 112:1). The latter are reserved for praise and thanks, respectively. This implies that it is fine to add praises and thanks in those places. In fact, in allowing making communal requests during the berachot, Rabbeinu Tam (cited by Tur, OC 112) says that asking for the needs of the masses is a praise to Hashem, which implies that actual praise is certainly fine.  

However, praises also require caution. The gemara (Berachot 34b; see Shulchan Aruch, OC 113:9) criticizes those who go beyond the set praises of Hashem because they imply that they have mentioned all of Hashem’s greatness. It seems implausible that it could always be forbidden to praise and/or thank Hashem, so when is it? The Beit Yosef (OC 113) cites the Ra’ah and Rabbeinu Yona as saying that one may not add adjectives describing Hashem but may add mention of good things He did. Rabbeinu Yona also distinguishes between things said at the end of berachot and those in the middle of berachot. The latter stand alone and are permitted. It is unclear from the corresponding Shulchan Aruch if he accepts these distinctions.

There is a machloket in the sources and minhagim about adding piyutim to tefilla at certain times. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 68:1) opposes it, apparently because it is an interruption, changes the berachot’s length, and encourages talking (see Tur ad loc.). The Rama supports it, but the minhag nowadays is to do so only on Yamim Noraim. There was also controversy about Aseret Y’mei Teshuva additions (Zochreinu, etc.) to tefilla (see Beit Yosef, OC 112), and there the minhag is to say them. One might distinguish, though, between set sayings that are accepted by Klal Yisrael and personal ones.

We have written (Living the Halachic Process, vol. II, A-1) that it is permitted and positive to thank Hashem but that it can be problematic to do so in a manner that makes it appear like a set beracha. Attaching appropriate statements to an existing beracha, on the one hand, makes it unlikely for there to be an issue of beracha l’vatatala (see Mishna Berura 108:38). On the other hand, changes in the content can be more problematic (See Berachot 40b; Shut HaRambam 254).

We summarize and suggest as follows. Since the lack of sources and apparent minhag is to not add personal thanks during Modim, then even though it is probably halachically permitted, we do not suggest it when other options exist. Before Elokai Netzor and during Shema Koleinu, one can say anything appropriate, and while that is classically for requests, it should be fine to thank Hashem as well. Realize that even the middle, “request” berachot include praise. Therefore, the following example of an addition would seem ideal: “Bless my grandchild, for whose birth I am so grateful to You, with a wonderful life.” (See a similar idea in Yaskil Avdi, vol. VIII, p. 169.)

Regarding Shabbat, there are two reasons for requests, such as the middle berachot of Shemoneh Esrei. The Yerushalmi (Shabbat 15:3) says that one should not make personal requests on a day that one must not be focused on his needs. The gemara (Berachot 21b) says that we do not want the toil of a long tefilla. Apparently, some combination of the two ideas is true. [We will discuss the issue next week.] If you want to give only thanks in Modim or before Elokai Netzor, this is not a problem on Shabbat. Incorporating a request (see above) is likely inappropriate on Shabbat.

A mishna (Berachot 34a) states that a kohen serving as chazan should not duchen even if he is the only available kohen unless he is confident that he will be able to return to his place in chazarat hashatz without undue confusion. The Tur (Orach Chayim 128) cites the Maharam MiRuttenburg as saying that the ability to not get confused does not erase the problem totally but only allows duchening when the chazan is the only available kohen. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 128:20) and the Rama (ad loc.) follow this ruling. The logic is that the slight endangering of the quality of the public tefilla is warranted only if it is needed to ensure Birkat Kohanim will take place at all.  

Some later poskim present ways of coming to a different policy. The Pri Chadash (ad loc.) reads the mishna differently. In practice, whether or not there are other kohanim makes no difference. The mishna starts by saying that even if there is no other kohen, a chazan who might have a concentration problem may not duchen. Once it introduces that this problem depends on the person, there is no reason for any capable kohen to forgo his mitzva of Birkat Kohanim.

The Magen Avraham (ad loc. 31) tries to explain a minhag he was aware of for a chazan to duchen even if there are others based on a societal change since the time of the gemara that many note. Nowadays, the chazan uses a siddur, in which case we can assume that he will be able to continue chazarat hashatz properly. While according to the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, this broad confidence in today’s chazanim is only enough to justify duchening when he is the only kohen, one can argue that it removes any effect of the problem and allows duchening in all cases. The Magen Avraham disagrees with this approach, because the poskim during hundreds of years of siddurim use did not write that the halacha had changed. However, he reasons that it is legitimate to follow it if this is the local minhag. The Mishna Berura (128:76 and Sha’ar Hatziyun 64) takes a similar approach to that of the Magen Avraham. This is also the practice of most Sephardi communities (see Ohr L’tzion II, 8:5; Yalkut Yosef, OC 128:62). However, the majority of Ashkenazim in Israel (especially, in Yerushalayim) follow the Pri Chadash and allow the chazan to duchen even if there are others who are doing so (see Dirshu 128:(84)). (Az Nidberu XIII:34 advocates a compromise. A kohen who is serving as chazan when there is only one other kohen should also do Birkat Kohanim, because many hold that Birkat Kohanim is a mitzva from the Torah only when there are two kohanim. However, he was unable to find a previous posek to explicitly make such a distinction.)

There are times when one whose minhag is to not duchen should do so. The Rama (ibid.) says that if someone calls him to duchen, which turns him into one who is obligated from the Torah to duchen, the obligation overpowers concerns of confusion. Poskim explain (see Yalkut Yosef ibid.) that generally when the kohanim are called, they do not intend for the chazan. One can argue that in shuls with the minhag that the chazan does duchen, the kohen chazan will thus be bound based on the Rama. However, in our shuls, the kohen is called too late, as a kohen who has not begun to approach the duchan before Modim may not do Birkat Kohanim (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8). Nevertheless, just the fact that you are in a shul which has the minhag for the chazan to duchen is enough to follow the minhag. This is ostensibly so even for someone who has not joined the community in a manner that he should personally adopt all of their minhagim. Still, it would be best for someone like you to avoid being chazan at tefillot that have Birkat Kohanim, which is anyway a practice that many suggest for any kohen (see Birchot Horai 10:7).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 131:1) says that one must not speak between Shemoneh Esrei and Tachanun, based on “students of the Rashba’s” (see Beit Yosef, OC 131) comment on the following gemara (Bava Metzia 59b). After Rabbi Eliezer’s major dispute with his brother-in-law, Rabban Gamliel, the former’s wife was afraid that the intensity of his Tachanun could cause harm to her brother, so she always interrupted him when it was time for Tachanun. The Rashba reasons that she could not have prevented him from saying Tachanun all day, but just made him stop and/or speak at the right time, to lower its efficacy. This taught the Shulchan Aruch and others of the danger of interruptions at that time.

What does the above teach us about the required level of connection between Shemoneh Esrei and Tachanun? The conviction that a break makes Tachanun less effective does not necessarily mean that Tachanun need not or should not be said after such a break or that it lacks value. The Rashba/Shulchan Aruch’s understanding of the story of Rabbi Eliezer strongly implies that R. Eliezer recited Tachanun after the break. The Rivash (412) claimed that his wife bothered him until he forgot to say it, also implying he would have said it later. Thus, at this point, we would say: “Better late than never.”

The Taz (OC 131:10, which seems to contradict Taz, Yoreh Deah 376:2) complicates the matter. He discusses whether non-mourners who daven at an avel’s house, where Tachanun is omitted because the presence of “strict judgment” makes it not worthwhile to recite Tachanun there, should make it up when they get home. He says not to do so based on the halacha that Tachanun should come without an interruption after Shemoneh Esrei. It is unclear if that means it is not required or wrong (there are kabbalistic sources for such a possibility – see Shulchan Hatahor 131:16), unnecessary, or somewhere in between. This seemingly indicates that you would not say Tachanun, in your case, at the end of tefilla. (Change of place does not seem to be the issue – see Magen Avraham 131:1).

However, the Taz’s claim is surprising, considering the indications from the gemara and the p’sak (Mishna Berura 131:2) that b’di’eved, if one made a break, he says Tachanun anyway. How could the gemara’s case be a model for a ruling not to say Tachanun at all? The L’horot Natan (VI:7) raises the possibility that continuing tefilla is worse than talking, and in the Taz’s case (and ours), it could be too late for Tachanun, not just of reduced value. However, he posits that this is not so and that the Taz would agree in our case to say Tachanun. Here, at the time of Tachanun, there was an obligation to recite it, which was pushed off on technical grounds (the chazan’s mistake). The Taz spoke only about a case that at the correct time, there was no obligation (albeit based on the circumstances). What he says is that it is not created later at an unnatural time (which, in turn, we learn from the halacha that it is important not to break).

The Derech Hachayim (42:(7)) implies that the Taz would not say Tachanun after any break. However, the Derech Hachayim (42:1) and Eliya Rabba (OC 131:1), who are accepted by the Mishna Berura (131:2), reject this view. Rav SZ Auerbach is also cited (Halichot Shlomo 11:2) as instructing to say Tachanun if it was accidentally skipped, even after laining, and presumably also after davening.

Some contemporary poskim (Ishei Yisrael 26:(1); Dirshu 131:3) cite an account about the Chazon Ish and a very cryptic reaction of Rav Chaim Kaniefsky which may indicate to not say Tachanun once Chatzi Kaddish was said. While the stakes are low (see Rivash ibid.) in both directions, we recommend saying Tachanun if it was skipped by mistake, as this approach has a stronger basis in the sources/logic.

To start with, we at Eretz Hemdah basically agree with you. We wrote a teshuva (Bemareh Habazak VII:2) about whether it is proper to say a Kaddish at all after An’im Zemirot in a place where the minhag was not to but an avel wanted them to change the minhag, which he claimed was wrong. In footnote 4, we accepted the thesis to which you subscribe, that it is the p’sukim added (they were not in the original) to the end of the piyut that justify the saying of Kaddish.

In general, it is problematic to recite an unauthorized Kaddish. The Mishna Berura (55:1) compares saying too many Kaddishes to reciting too many berachot. However, we do not generally find in poskim discussing doubts about Kaddish indications of the same severity of an unnecessary Kaddish as we do regarding a questionable beracha.

Therefore, while we generally agree with you, we are hesitant to state as a simple fact that your shul’s (and we understand others as well) minhag is wrong. Therefore, we will see if we can be melamed z’chut on those who skip the p’sukim and recite the Kaddish.

We found a teshuva by Chief Rabbi David Lau in which he questions the thesis that the p’sukim recited at the end are there to justify the Kaddish. He points to the standard sources (see Mishna Berura 55:2) that state that for p’sukim to justify Kaddish there must be three p’sukim and that, after An’im Zemirot, only two p’sukim are recited. One can add to the apparent incongruence according to the Sha’arei Ephrayim (10:44 in a footnote) that the p’sukim need to be continuous (the ones after An’im Zemirot are from Divrei Hayamim and Tehillim, respectively). Therefore, Rav Lau posits that the reason for the Kaddish is that a major part of An’im Zemirot is based on adapted or reworded p’sukim.

One can claim there is a precedent for saying Kaddish after a shir without added p’sukim in Aleinu. Siddurim cite p’sukim there as well, yet the very broad minhag is to ignore them and recite Kaddish anyway, and perhaps a shir of this type is deserving of Kaddish in and of itself.

However, one can argue with these attempts to break the linkage between p’sukim recited after a shir and Kaddish. First, there are opinions that two p’sukim is enough (Beit David (Saloniki) 30); Bemareh Habazak ibid.; see Ishei Yisrael 15:(98)). The claim that the p’sukim must be consecutive is apparently not accepted. Regarding Aleinu, the Mishna Berura (132:10) points out that it has p’sukim mixed into it (three, albeit from different places in Tanach and interspersed in Aleinu). Therefore, it seems very likely that the p’sukim at the end of An’im Zemirot were intended to justify the Kaddish.

There is another factor which can work (at least if orchestrated well), even according to your assumption, in shuls that do not jointly recite “Lecha Hashem … .” What if, as is likely, some people in the shul do say the p’sukim even if the chazan does not? We have written about whether Kaddish can be recited after Pitum Haketoret when there are not ten people who recite it. The basic sources seem to indicate that six reciters justify Kaddish, even if the chazan did not recite the critical sections (see parallel case in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 69:1). While even one suffices when the Kaddish is classically required (see ibid.; Pri Megadim, OC, MZ 55:3), there is a machloket (see Magen Avraham 54:9; Aruch Hashulchan 55:9) whether a minority of a minyan suffices when the Kaddish is optional (as the one after An’im Zemirot is). So perhaps someone like you and another one or two who still recite the p’sukim before Kaddish suffice to justify the Kaddish.

So while the sources indicate that it is proper for shuls to recite the p’sukim after An’im Zemirot, shuls that do not make a point of reciting them also have whom and what to rely upon.

We are not discussing one with special physical/medical needs.

It is forbidden to eat before davening Shacharit (Berachot 10b), as derived (although it is probably Rabbinic) from “Do not eat on the blood” (Vayikra 19:26) – i.e., before you have prayed for your blood (=life). It is considered haughty to indulge in food before addressing Hashem, and therefore drinking water, which is not indulging, is permitted (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3). Many Acharonim permit drinking coffee and tea, specifically when one needs it to concentrate on davening; adding flavor enhancers is questionable (see Mishna Berura 89:22).

Tefilla is supposed to be done with reverence and awe. Many halachot govern how one’s body, clothes, and surroundings must be at that time (see Shulchan Aruch, OC simanim 97-99). The height of tefilla is considered “standing before the shechina” (Rambam, Tefilla 4:16). Eating and drinking when in close contact with Hashem is considered a big chutzpa (see Shemot 24:11). Since this is antithetical to tefilla and a beit knesset is set aside for tefilla, it is forbidden to eat there (Shulchan Aruch, OC 151:1). The incongruity between eating and davening is behind the halacha of not eating even before davening. It seems obvious that eating in the midst of davening is worse than eating before. Therefore, even if one davens in a place where he may eat, e.g., at home, in a beit midrash (Rama ad loc.) or he follows the lenient minhag (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), he should not drink during davening.

One can deflect these conclusions. If drinking coffee is permitted before davening, then it is not halachic eating, and who says the halacha is stricter during davening than before? (The counter-argument is that it is only permitted before due to need, and if one can drink before davening, why let him drink during it?) Also, assuming it is forbidden during Shemoneh Esrei, who says P’sukei D’zimra’s lesser level of “meeting Hashem,” as a preparatory/introductory stage, carries the same weight (Rama, OC 89:3 may equate them)? Indeed, many of the halachot of tefilla refer only to Shemoneh Esrei (see Mishna Berura 97:3).

What do the sources say? There are many sources on drinking before davening; I did not find classical sources on this question. Why would there not be much discussion of the matter? It is either because: A) It is obvious that it shares the same halacha as eating before davening; B) It is obviously permitted; C) It is obviously forbidden; or D) Few people were interested in doing such a thing, for sociological or convenience reasons. Intuitively, I find A and B implausible. C seems logical (Chevel Nachalato 17:3 cites Rav Y. Ariel as saying it is forbidden). D is a possibility. It is very possible to combine C and D. Perhaps there is not a full-fledged issur, but sensitivity to shul and tefilla made it taboo. I spoke to many (Ashkenazi) decades-long shul attenders, none of whom can recall until recently healthy people drinking during P’sukei D’zimra and later. Those who need coffee, drink before davening. Then they enter shul, put on tefillin, and DAVEN ONLY. That is a very appropriate minhag even IF arguably not fully required. There are signs that some in the new generation view things differently. While they can be wonderful Jews and daveners, they would be pulling things in the wrong direction, according to several rabbanim (and non-rabbanim) I have discussed the topic with. Drinking while davening degrades the atmosphere of the shul in our eyes.

That is a noble approach (see Living the Halachic Process II, A-5 on whether vatikin or a minyan has a greater impact). The gemara (Berachot 9b, see Tosafot ad loc.) considered it a rare feat to do vatikin precisely. While we have clocks and sunrise tables, it is still difficult because: most round to the minute; there are machlokot how to determine sunrise when there are topographical differences between one’s locale and the horizon or between his location and the one in the city used for the table. For this reason, Rav Moshe Feinstein (cited by Tefilla K’hilchata 3:(34)) prefers tefilla with a minyan to an attempted tefilla k’vatikin.

There are many levels of preference for morning Kri’at Shema (=KS) and SE. The consensus of poskim (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 58:1) is that vatikin as practiced is an ideal way to daven and succeeding in being precise is a bonus (see above). (It is unclear what is considered precise and close enough to be vatikin, respectively.) Beyond that, the gradations are, for KS (from best to worst) – after misheyakir (50-60 minutes before netz) (Shulchan Aruch, OC 58:1-3); between netz and sof z’man KS; soon after alot hashachar. Regarding tefilla – clearly after netz before sof z’man tefilla; clearly before netz; soon after alot hashachar; after four hours into the day.

Ostensibly, if one tries for vatikin and misses by a few minutes, this will make KS or SE, respectively not of the highest non-vatikin level. Which is our main goal and/or concern?

The gemara (Berachot 9b) praises vatikin because “they would finish [KS and its berachot] with sunrise, so that they would have the beracha of geula next to tefilla and their tefilla ends up in the day.” It continues that this fulfills “they will fear You with the sun” (Tehillim 72:5). Most commentaries (including Rabbeinu Yona) understand that this puts stress on tefilla being soon after the sun appears, and this is the main reason to finish KS at that time. Furthermore, the gemara in Yoma (37a) tells that when the sun made the chandelier in the Beit Hamikdash courtyard sparkle, the masses of people knew it was time for KS. Tosafot (Berachot 9b) says that this refers to those who did not know how to time vatikin. Rabbeinu Tam (Tosafot, Yoma 37b), though, learns from here that the best time for KS is actually right after netz, to be followed by SE, and that “vatikin” is less preferred. He views the pasuk in Tehillim as going on KS. We do not pasken like Rabbeinu Tam. Tosafot (ibid.) posits that it is better for one who cannot implement vatikin to do KS and SE after netz, as vatikin’s proponents agree that KS is fully acceptable then.

Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 89:8) views SE before netz as before its time and not justified without a good reason (see Be’ur Halacha to 89:1). The Pri Chadash (ad loc.) argues that if one misses the special level of vatikin, there is no difference between tefilla before and after netz. The Shulchan Aruch’s opinion is more accepted, and there is much discussion as to whether it is better do daven with a minyan before netz or without one after netz (see Piskei Teshuvot 89:4).

Finally, while there may be some value in reciting birchot KS at the time of KS (see Mishna Berura 58:1), it is not critical (see Rama, OC 46:9; Mishna Berura 46:31). This is especially so if one has almost finished them and is waiting near “… ga’al Yisrael,” which connects to SE (see Tefilla K’hilchata 3:24; Yisrael V’hazemanim II, 7). Therefore, if you are just a couple minutes late, KS was said at its best time.  

Based on the above, when one has a choice, it is better to be off by being late than earlier than the precise vatikin. However, the minhag is to follow one’s best information without worrying that it might be an inexact vatikin, which likely counts as vatikin.

The Behag (cited in Tosafot, Menachot 66a) is the source of the idea that one may not continue with a beracha if he missed a day of counting. He argues that missing a day makes it impossible to fulfill the command of temimot (seven full weeks). Most Rishonim disagree. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 489:8) basically accepts the Behag, but only due to doubt – since he might be correct, we do not make a beracha. However, if one is unsure if he counted, he makes a beracha on subsequent days because of a positive double doubt, i.e., if either he did not miss a day or the Behag is incorrect, a beracha is warranted (Mishna Berura 489:38). The Terumat Hadeshen (I:37) says that although it is unclear if one can fulfill the mitzva with a daytime count, if one did so, he recites with a beracha on subsequent days. Most understand that this too is based on a positive double doubt (Sha’ar Hatziyun 489:45). The Mishna Berura (489:38) presents a broad rule – after a questionable count, which requires redoing but without a beracha, if one did not repeat, he maintains the ability to count with a beracha in the future, due to double doubt.

Does your case of answering a question, i.e., a proper statement in a non-mitzva context, create a double doubt? The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) rules to avoid answering completely because such a statement compromises the beracha on that day’s count. Thus it seems to meet the Mishna Berura’s criterion for allowing a beracha on subsequent days. On the other hand, the Taz (489:7) contends that because the answerer clearly does not intend to fulfill the mitzva, it is inconsequential, and it is just a stringency to avoid an exact answer; even if he answered, he would make the beracha that night. The main response to the Taz is that many hold that sefira is Rabbinic nowadays, and Rabbinic mitzvot may not need intention for the mitzva (see Pri Megadim, 489, EA 10). According to the Taz’s view of your case, it will not help to save the beracha in the future.

However, even those who reject the Taz are unlikely to accept your idea. An onen avoids doing sefira because according to most Rishonim, he is not only exempt but forbidden to do mitzvot – so rules the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 341:1. Therefore, if your statement fulfills the mitzva, it is ostensibly forbidden for an onen! If it is not a mitzva, then it will not help going forward (see Noda B’Yehuda II, OC 27)! Also, in this case, most poskim should agree with the Taz – if an onen knows he is forbidden to do the mitzva, then his intention specifically not to fulfill the mitzva disqualifies it (see Mishna Berura 60:9).

The Noda B’Yehuda (ibid.) actually says that if one will be an onen for a whole day, he is probably obligated in sefira, so that aninut should not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva even after aninut is over. Since even if he is not obligated, some allow an onen to do a mitzva when it does not affect funeral preparations, he can count without a beracha. Many (see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 341:6; R. Akiva Eiger, OC 489:7) accept the Noda B’Yehuda; a minority (Birchei Yosef, OC 489:20) do not.

The poskim do not suggest your idea, which is like the Noda B’Yehuda in action but different in intention, because most assume that negative intention ruins its efficacy. It might work (the calculation is beyond our scope) according to the approach of some Acharonim (including Rav Soloveitchik, see Mesora III, p. 35) that there is no need to fulfill the mitzva to allow continuing with a beracha, just to do an act of counting to keep an uninterrupted count. However, since your plan contradicts the Noda B’Yehuda’s quite accepted idea of counting with positive intent, we do not recommend it.

The gemara (Sota 40a) lists various recitations of praise to Hashem, proposed by different Amoraim, for the tzibbur to say as the chazan recites Modim (the Yerushalmi Berachot 1:5 has different proposals). The gemara concludes with the idea that we therefore say all of them. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 127) posits that it is called Modim D’Rabbanan because it combines sayings of several rabbis. The idea of the recitation, along with the unique practice of bowing along with the chazan (see how the Yerushalmi ibid. connects it to the recitation) is that at the moment of the main praise of Hashem, the tzibbur must be actively involved to show their agreement and not imply disagreement (see Aruch Hashulchan,OC 127:1; Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:60).

The first nine words of the regular Modim and Modim D’Rabannan are identical. According to the original, short versions, the tzibbur would miss no more than a very little of Modim by reciting it, and it would serve like a long amen. In fact, several Acharonim assume that if the chazan or even one saying the silent amida recited Modim D’Rabbanan, he would not have to go back because they did the right beginning and end of the beracha and the middle is similar enough (see Eliya Rabba, OC 127:1; Halichot Shlomo 8:28; Yechaveh Da’at (Chazan) III:17). You (and others) are bothered with missing part of Modim, which deserves a minyan. Indeed, some Acharonim, starting with the Eliya Rabba (ibid.) and including more recent authorities (some are cited in Ishei Yisrael 24:(124)), instruct the chazan to say the first (joint) words slowly or wait for the tzibbur to finish. There is another minhag (cited ibid. 125) that the chazan says the beginning of Modim quietly, as there is no point in saying it out loud if no one will be listening.

However, these are not the more accepted opinions. The Mishna Berura (127:3) rules like earlier Acharonim and the simple reading of the gemara that the chazan continues Modim despite the tzibbur’s recital of Modim D’Rabbanan and that he should do so out loud (ibid. 124:41). The Mishna Berura provides two reasons for the latter: 1) Chazarat hashatz was instituted for those who do not know how to daven on their own, and they would be listening to the chazan rather than saying Modim D’Rabbanan; 2) Ten people need to hear the chazan. The Mishna Berura does not explain how #2 can be accomplished if people are reciting something else. Halichot Shlomo (8:(40)) suggests that one can speak and listen at the same time to two similar things. This seem to work better on a halachic rather than a practical level. If one is saying the same basic thing as the chazan, he is considered part of the minyan. (We substantiated this elsewhere – soon to appear as Living the Halachic Process VI, A-6, regarding one who starts Shemoneh Esrei with the tzibbbur’s chazarat hashatz. Admittedly, it is easier to make this claim when they are saying the same words.)

According to what we laid out above, this approach sits well with the historical and logical development of the practice of Modim D’Rabbanan. Chazal saw it not as an independent recitation (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot ibid.) that ends up competing with chazarat hashatz but as a natural accompaniment of this crucial part of chazarat hashatz. Due to this understanding, the Rabbanan did not have a problem extending a few-word response into a longer piece and did not see it as stopping the flow of chazarat hashatz. Because this caused a perception that the tzibbur is not involved in all of chazarat hashatz, practices arose to either give up on the middle of Modim as a joint matter and have the chazan recite it silently or, in the other direction, wait to have everyone listen. But the main minhag accepted by most poskim is that the chazan and tzibbur say different words and still form one unit.

In normal times (for which we yearn), we likely would take the whole minyan and the particular “path blockers” to task for gross inconsideration. However, it is scientifically/statistically clear that the existence of outdoor minyanim with proper spacing has, nationally, saved lives. While people can argue whether it is better for people whose only safe place for a minyan disturbs others should daven at home, Jewish society is expected to make certain special allowances for shuls (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 156:3). In the “old days,” people would debate the pros and cons of minyanim on (El Al) planes. But nowadays, without ideal options, some (including high risk men) would end up davening in unsafe and/or illegal minyanim. Especially since you are not complaining, we will be melamed z’chut and assume that the minyan overall finds the right balance of meeting needs and focus on your dilemma about passing through.

The first issue we will dispatch of is whether a woman may be in close proximity to men davening. Our community does not require mechitzot for even a minyan in places that are not set for tefilla, including shiva homes and airplanes (see Living the Halachic Process, V, A-9; Rav Moshe Feinstein, cited ibid., distinguishes between places that are open or closed to the public). It is unclear how long a minyan must operate in a makeshift location to qualify as set. However, even when a mechitza is needed, a woman may pass through, if necessary. Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC V:12) reports that individual women have always been allowed to enter to, for example, collect tzedaka. While he says this should be done only on an ad hoc basis, your situation is especially valid case.

Whether there is or is not a mechitza, men may not daven or learn aloud if a woman not dressed according to the halachot of tzniut is in their sight (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 75). We do not feel a need to review for you what this entails, and this need not be a problem at all.

Finally, we address the halacha of not walking in front of someone who is davening Shmoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC102:4-5). (During chazarat hashatz, it is only an issue regarding the chazan). Most agree that the issue of walking in front of a davener concerns harming his concentration. What if he does not mind? Just as the davener may not do things to harm his own kavana, so too he may not allow others to do so to him (see similar idea in Bava Kama 91b). However, there are a few grounds for leniency. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 102:4) rules that one may pass near someone from the side, and the Mishna Berura (ad loc. 16) is inconclusive on whether passing diagonally in front is a problem. In a case of need, one can rely on the lenient opinion. Here, there are multiple levels of need. You need to pass by for your need. If we would not allow you and your neighbors to do so, then it would be unreasonable to have the minyan there, which we are assuming is important.

On a more fundamental level, the Da’at Torah (to OC 102:5) says that if a davener blocks a “thoroughfare” (even in shul), it is comparable to one who was buried in a public area, and therefore he allows people to walk by. One certainly cannot create an off-limits zone that prevents from entering or exiting their own building. Therefore, what you did was absolutely justified. (Whether people may daven in such a location given that others may walk by is beyond our present scope). Your normal attempt to not disturb is an act of tzidkut; people helping others with their practical and spiritual needs is crucial in navigating this crisis.

The gemara (Berachot 4b) cites R. Yochanan as instructing to recite the pasuk “Hashem sefatai tiftach ...” (=HST) (Tehillim 51:17) in the beginning of SE and “Yehiyu l’ratzon …” (ibid. 19:15) at its end. The former asks for divine assistance in davening effectively, and the latter requests that Hashem receive the tefilla favorably. While this was apparently instituted well after Shemoneh Esrei was composed (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim V:24), it, to at least some degree, has become incorporated with SE. The gemara (ibid.) asks why HST does not create a break between “Ga’al Yisrael” and SE and answers that SE with the pasuk has become “similar to a long tefilla.”

 To the extent that YL and HST are equivalent bookends, we would expect YL to come right after SE, like HST comes right before SE (note that one may not say “Ki shem Hashem ekra …” after YL- Mishna Berura 111:1). Indeed, some Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, OC 122 in the name of Rabbeinu Yona and the Ra’avad) say that YL should be said right after SE, before any other tachanunim (special requests) are said, and this is how the Shulchan Aruch (OC 122:2) rules.

However, this approach is not clear cut for a few reasons. For one, adding tachanunim to SE is important and connected enough to SE to be permitted even in the midst of SE (Shulchan Aruch, OC 119:1). Actually, Rabbeinu Yona (above) says this is a reason that it is only recommended and not crucial for YL to be before tachanunim, as we see the requests are not totally like moving on from SE  and therefore not a serious break before YL.

Also, the presumed fact that YL is a step in finishing SE may weaken subsequent requests. Additionally, if YL is first, then when do we ask Hashem to accept the tachanunim favorably? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 122:2) answers the latter claim – one may say YL a second time after the tachanunim.

An instructive source is the gemara (Berachot 29b) regarding one who left out Ya’aleh V’yavo. If he is still in the midst of SE, he goes back to R’tzei; if he finished SE, he must go back to the beginning of SE. The gemara says that someone who has finished SE proper but usually recites tachanunim afterward is not considered finished until after the tachanunim. Rabbeinu Yona (ibid.) asks why the gemara doesn’t use YL as the marker of the end of SE and concludes that it is because YL is recited before tachanunim. However, this gemara also can teach us the extent to which tachanunim, when recited, are an integral part of SE. This motivated the Gra (cited by many Acharonim, including Ishei Yisrael 23:208) to conclude that one should not recite YL before tachanunim.

We should point out that tachanunim include two different things in our experience. Although we generally view EN as a set part of the end of SE, this is a misnomer. The gemara (Berachot 16b-17a) cites personal prayers that various Amoraim used to say at the end of their SE. EN happens to be one of them (approximately). This may explain why EN, as well as HST and YL are in singular, as they are personal, as opposed to SE proper which is in plural. Practice has developed to choose EN as standard (albeit not required – see Mishna Berura 122:6) tachanunim. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 122:8) says that while reciting the prayers of all of the Amoraim would be wrong, separating YL too far from SE, it is appropriate to say one. Alternatively or additionally we can all recite our own personal requests (Shulchan Aruch, OC 119:1). There is not a fundamental difference between the two.

The Aruch Hashulchan also suggests (ibid. 6) that a reason that EN was chosen is that it actually concludes with YL. This brings us to perhaps the most common practice and recommended Acharonim (see Mishna Berura 122:3) practice (although not the only legitimate one – see Darchei Moshe, OC 122:2). One recites YL twice: 1) right after SE; 2) at the end of EN, which anyway is the way the original EN concluded.

First, I am proud to be in the same nation as a person as sincere as you. The Bach (on Orach Chayim 91), an early Acharon, is the first major source to raise a problem of wearing gloves during davening. The Magen Avraham (91:5) and Mishna Berura (91:12) cite the Bach without opposition, so your question has merit,

A look into the root of this ruling will help us apply it to your case. The Bach’s statement is cryptic and he cites a harsh pasuk as applying to wearing gloves during davening. Most tefilla/clothing rules relate to the body being insufficiently covered (Shulchan Aruch, OC 91:1, 3-5). It is unusual that covering too much could be a problem.

Some understand (see Halichot Shlomo 2:18) that the Bach viewed wearing gloves during davening as haughty, which fits the cited pasuk. This is surprising, considering that “dressing up” is usually desired for davening (Mishna Berura 91:12). However, it is possible that some types of over-dressing go beyond nice and are haughty.

The Netah Sorek (OC 6) connects the Bach to a gemara (Pesachim 57a) that roundly criticized the kohen gadol, Yissachar Ish Kfar Barkai, for wearing gloves while working with korbanot. This was forbidden due to chatzitza (a disqualifying break) but also was a sign of haughtiness (Rashi ad loc.). There is clear room to distinguish between the contexts. A kohen’s mitzva includes serving with his hands, and for it to be beneath his dignity to touch things is disgraceful. Tefilla is carried out with one’s mind, heart, and mouth. Is it necessarily a disgrace if, at the same time, his “handwear” is haughty? His logic is apparently that since clothing for tefilla is important, just as insufficient is offensive, so too excessive fanciness can set the wrong balance when approaching Hashem.

Several Acharonim make the simple argument that if one wears gloves because of the cold, there is no haughtiness (Be’er Moshe IV, 39; Halichot Shlomo ibid.). While the Neta Sorek (ibid.) agrees to the concept, he argues that it is only permitted regarding gloves that are clearly worn due to cold (which I have to believe is your case).

The Magen Avraham (ibid.) presents the Bach’s problem with gloves as their being clothes that travelers wear, and Kochvei Yitzchak II, 20 attributes this idea to the author of the Terumat Hadeshen. While one may daven on the road when needed (Mishna Berura 90:11), it is best to daven indoors (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:5) and well-settled there (see similar idea, ibid. 20). It is unclear if the Magen Avraham means that gloves are road-related because outside it is cold, and one should look different inside. If so, the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 91:6) allowing to wear an outer coat during davening when it is cold is instructive. If he means that travelers wear them as a type of work glove (which the Halichot Shlomo says is one of the things the Bach objects to), this should not apply to gloves made to protect from the cold.

In short, we believe, like Halichot Shlomo and Ishei Yisrael (10:4) that in the context of clear protection from the cold, it is permitted to wear gloves, even without extenuating circumstances (like Corona). If someone would want to be machmir (which, again, is not indicated from the sources) as a matter of valor, something would have to give. One of the hardest things in Halacha is, in a situation where something less than ideal is necessary, how does one decide which option is least objectionable. Halacha forbids self-inflicted suffering (see Bava Kama 91b), and it also detracts from kavana, a factor which is behind many halachot of tefilla. The option of davening indoors without a minyan is certainly far less desirable than an unnecessary stringency. Our biggest concern is that chumra could be a tipping point (for someone) toward davening in an indoor minyan. Currently in your location, that could be a deadly mistake. Therefore, one should not entertain stringency on the matter.

It depends. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 135:6-7) generally discusses your two cases, when the mistake was discovered after the oleh began the opening beracha. Both when a yisrael began the beracha for the first aliya before the kohen entered the shul (ibid. 6) and when a kohen began his second aliya when it turned out a levi was present, the mistaken oleh finishes the aliya. The clear implication is that when they had not started, we switch to the correct person even though the wrong one was called up.

The logic of switching is two-fold in the respective cases. Giving a second aliya is an exceptional act (needed to protect the reputation of the kohen –Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8), as is giving a first aliya to a non-kohen (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 4). Therefore, we do this only when there is an important reason. We are not depriving the person who is being asked to step aside of something he deserves: The yisrael  never had claims to the first aliya, and we keep him at the bima until we can give him the third aliya (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 6).The kohen  already had his aliya, he is just being held back from an unusual aliya (and according to some, a b’di’eved one – see discussion in Maharam Shick, OC 61), and the levi getting the aliya after him raises no questions about his standing as a kohen.    

In the case that a yisrael started the first aliya’s beracha, we stick with the “wrong person” to avoid the serious problem of beracha l’vatala (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 135, citing the Avudraham). The concern that not switching then will make it look as if the kohen is not a kohen is not severe. People can understand that he was not present or noticed (ibid. citing the Rashba). We do not call up the kohen for the next aliya because that would actively make him look like a non-kohen, as he follows a yisrael who received the first aliya (Mishna Berura 135:20).

A not simple point becomes evident from the case of the kohen not being replaced after starting his second aliya. That is that even in the case that he really should not have received this exceptional second aliya, that second aliya still counts toward the number of required aliyot.

What is considered having started the aliya is noteworthy. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) rules that Barchu is not considered the beginning, so that the correct person can switch with him after Barchu. That is because commanding the tzibbur to bless Hashem (which is Barchu’s role) and their doing so (“Baruch Hashem Hamevorach…”) has an independent value (Mishna Berura 135:21). According to most, the correct person who takes over repeats Barchu before his aliya (ibid.). Although some say this is unnecessary (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 135:15), it is not a problem to do an arguably extra Barchu (Kaf Hachayim, OC 135:39).

One point that is not agreed upon is whether the first aliya of a non-kohen was valid when the kohen was present and just was not noticed, as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 135:6) addresses the case when he had not yet arrived. The Pri Chadash (135:6) infers from the gemara (Gittin 59b) that passing on the takana to have the kohen go first renders the berachot and the aliya invalid even b’di’eved. The Magen Avraham 135:11 disagrees, reasoning that since regarding the kohen who took the levi’s aliya, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 7) says that the aliya is valid even if the levi was present, the same is true of the skipped kohen. One can argue on behalf of the Pri Chadash that the takana to give the first aliya only to the sanctified kohen is stronger than the halacha that a levi gets the second aliya before allowing the kohen to get another one. However, the Noda B’yehuda cites an interesting proof against the Pri Chadash, and this is what is accepted (Mishna Berura 135:20).

The Rashba (Shut HaRashba 1:249) was asked by someone who assumed that if after reciting Kedusha, one enters a shul reciting it, he would be forbidden to repeat it. The Rashba rejects this, arguing that there is no reason not to repeat Kedusha in this manner. The Rama (Orach Chayim 125:2) in paskening like the Rashba, rules that in this case one should do so. Some posit that not repeating Kedusha with the congregation would appear as if he did not agree with the concepts expressed, which is a disgrace (see Yabia Omer VI, OC 20). All agree to this concept regarding the first pasuk of Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 65:2). Others explain that the opportunity to sanctify HaShem’s Name obligates one to do so (Igrot Moshe, OC III:89). Both pieces of logic also apply to Kaddish and Barchu, where the congregation joins together to sanctify HaShem’s Name (see ibid. and Mishna Berura 65:9). Answering Kedusha is important enough to allow one to recite its crucial sections during P’sukei D’Zimra and Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:3 and Mishna Berura 51:8).

Yet, significant sources posit that there is just a preference rather than a full obligation to answer Kedusha outside one’s own minyan. Rav SZ Auerbach (as cited by Ishei Yisrael 24:(62)) notes that the language of the Shulchan Aruch (OC 55:20) is that one who is adjacent to a minyan reciting Kaddish or Kedusha may answer with them; he does not say they are required to. Rav Elyashiv is similarly cited regarding someone walking outside a shul (Tefilla K’hilchata 13:(119)). Others (see Ishei Yisrael ibid.) argue that while the Shulchan Aruch is focused on the ability to connect to a minyan one hears, if they are able, it is obvious that they must.

There is much discussion about the challenges of davening in a place like the Kotel. Many (including Rav Chaim Palachi in Nishmat Kol Chai I:4) assume that there is an obligation to answer other minyanim and recognize this can be unconducive to focusing on one’s own davening/minyan. That conflict between competing mitzvot allows some to raise concepts such as osek b’mitzva patur min hamitzva (see Tzitz Eliezer XI:3). Also, as part of a different minyan, continuing to daven with one’s own minyan looks less like rejecting the words coming from an adjacent minyan.

Street minyanim may raise other factors. Sometimes one is very close and/or in the same domain even when not part of the minyan. On the other hand, sometimes there can be “dirty matters” (e.g., garbage bins, dog droppings) in between oneself and the minyan, which may preclude answering (Shulchan Aruch ibid.)

First, realize that neither of these differences has to do with being in Eretz Yisrael per se (in contrast to the different practices of asking for rain between 7 Marcheshvan and Dec. 4). Rather, in both matters to which you refer, there is a machloket which applies throughout the world, just that practical halacha has developed that for many Ashkenazim, their natural community rules one way in Eretz Yisrael and another way abroad.

 Let us review the basic rules of competing allegiance between our personal familial minhagim, our communal ones, and our regard for the place we presently are in. Generally and conceptually, communal minhagim takes precedence over personal minhagim when one is set in a community, even if he was not raised there (see Pesachim 51a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 214:2; Living the Halachic Process I, H-12). Therefore, if you moved to Israel permanently (generally, very recommended), you would begin saying morid hatal in the summer and not recite BHLO at Ma’ariv. However, as a visitor, your basic halacha is to continue your practices.

An exception to the rule is based on the important halacha not to publicly do things that contradict the local minhag because of the conflict this could cause. This includes not being more lenient and, when possible, not being noticeably stricter than the locals are (Pesachim 51b-52a).

Saying or not saying morid hatal is certainly not noticeable. The poskim do not view even the longer BHLO as obtrusive if said quietly for travelers in either direction (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim II:102), and therefore you should continue silently as regular.

As chazan, though, one must conform to the local practice to avoid machloket. This is no real concern regarding morid hatal. The gemara (Ta’anit 3a) says that mentioning tal (dew) in tefilla is only optional because it is always present in Eretz Yisrael. Skipping BHLO is also not a problem because it is only a non-unanimous, post-Talmudic institution, based on the idea that the 18 p’sukim recited can represent the Shemoneh Esrei, which not always was done at Ma’ariv in shul because people were afraid of going home late (Tur, OC 236).

The only dilemma is whether it is permitted for a traveler/chazan from Israel to recite it abroad, as he is adding a beracha that his minhag does not recognize. However, there is halachic precedent for a chazan doing this type of thing. The gemara (Pesachim 106a) tells of Rav Ashi being asked as a visitor in Mechoza to make Kiddush on Shabbat morning in a way that sounded like they wanted him to include the beracha of Mekadesh HaShabbat. While he had misunderstood, the gemara implies he was willing to conform to the perceived local practice. The Chida (Chayim Sha’al I:99) rules based on this that a Sephardi who is chazan at an Ashkenazi minyan on Rosh Chodesh may recite the beracha on Hallel, against his regular minhag. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at IV:31) disagrees, but to a great extent because of the word v’tzivanu (He commanded us), which is not used in BHLO. The consensus is that an Israeli may recite BHLO as a chazan abroad if necessary (Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:88; B’tzel Hachochma IV:25). However, it is likely worthwhile to avoid being chazan if not necessary (ibid.).

In your case, though, it is fine to be chazan for no particular need because BHLO may be skipped for a simple need, such as if it will cause you to start Shemoneh Esrei after the tzibbur (Mishna Berura 236:11). You would not be required to make it up after Shemoneh Esrei, although you could do so if you leave out the beracha at the end (ibid.). As an individual as well, you should not recite it if it will cause you to start Shemoneh Esrei after the tzibbur. If you turn out to be a few seconds late, that is fine (B’tzel Hachochma IV:3), and you can answer Y’hei Shmei Rabba and the amen to Kaddish in the middle of BHLO (ibid. 27).

A mishna (Megilla 24a) seems to address your question. Whereas a katan may get an aliya, he may not serve as chazan or be poress al Shema. Rashi (ibid. 23b) explains that poress al Shema is reciting Kaddish, Barchu, and the first beracha of Birchot Kri’at Shema (the latter no longer practiced – Rama, Orach Chayim 69:1) on behalf of latecomers. Shuls that recite Barchu at the end of Shacharit and Ma’ariv (Barchu Batra) do a form of this (see Mishna Berura, intro. to siman 69), and thus we see that a katan may not lead it. Rashi (ibid. 24a) explains that because a katan is not obligated in these matters, he cannot do them on behalf of others.   

However, there are cracks in the opposition to ketanim doing Barchu. Rav Yosef Karo (Beit Yosef and Shulchan Aruch, OC 53:10) refers equivocally to a minhag to allow a katan to serve as chazan for Ma’ariv. The Rama (ad loc.) is even less enthusiastic about it, and the Mishna Berura (53:32) cites being motzi the tzibbur in Barchu as the main problem. However, the minhag and the poskim who justify it must have a way to deal with the mishna. The Rashba (Shut I:239) suggests that there is not a problem of a katan not being obligated in tefilla/Barchu because an older katan is obligated Rabbinically and tefilla is only a Rabbinic obligation even for adults. He proposes then that the reason a katan may not be a chazan is due to kavod hatzibbur, which may allow for flexibility (see Beit Yosef ibid). The Beit Yosef also suggests that since Ma’ariv was originally an optional tefilla, a katan may suffice to lead it (the mishna could relate to Shacharit).

What can we learn from a katan’s ability to recite Kaddish? For one, we see that a katan can recite for the tzibbur something that requires a minyan. On the other hand, according to most, a katan can only recite the Kaddeishim that are peripheral to tefilla (Gesher Hachayim 30:8:4). It is actually because a katan is incapable of being chazan that Kaddish Yatom was set aside for mourners, including ketanim (Mishna Berura 132:10). In some ways, Barchu appears to be less of a problem of being motzi than Kaddish is, as it seems just like a prompt for the tzibbur to bless Hashem with “Baruch Hashem hamevorach…”  (the chazan’s repetition of those words apparently is not to be motzi the tzibbur – see Mishna Berura 57:3-4).