One is not required to eat bread at a meal, even if it means that he will not bentch (except on Shabbat and Yom Tov when one needs a meal including bread). Nevertheless, regularly avoiding eating bread because he doesn’t want to be bothered with bentching is regrettable.

If one has the philosophy that you espouse to try to wash and bentch at every meal, he should be careful not to cause more halachic problems than it is worth. One issue involves netillat yadayim. Although it is good to be stringent and wash before eating any amount of bread (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 158:3), the obligation likely begins only with a k’zayit (size of an olive) and possibly even a k’beitza (size of an egg). Therefore, one may not make a beracha on netillat yadayim for less than that amount (ibid.:2) (the questions of one who eats in between a k’zayit  and a k’beitza and of how to calculate the sizes are beyond our present scope).

Eating small amounts of bread in order to cover all the berachot under the umbrella of the meal’s berachot (Hamotzi and Birkat Hamazon) raises another problem. The gemara (Berachot 41b) says that wine exempts all other drinks from a beracha because of its importance and that bread exempts other foods that are eaten during the meal. However, according to the accepted opinion, Hamotzi can exempt foods only when they are subsumed under the meal. Based on this, the Magen Avraham (177:1) suggests that if one eats a little bread in order to exempt other foods, then the other foods do not revolve around the bread and the Hamotzi may not exempt them from their berachot. He counters that it is possible that the exemption was instituted across the board, regardless of one’s intention. However, according to the more accepted understanding of the Magen Avraham (see Machatzit Hashekel, ad loc.; Mishna Berura 177:3), one should not set up a situation where he is eating bread just in order to subsume other foods or presumably to set up a situation where he will have to bentch. Admittedly, some prominent authorities say that other foods are exempted even in that case (Even Ha’ozer 174:12; Aruch Hashulchan 177:2; Igrot Moshe OC IV, 41). However, this is hardly an optimal situation that we would suggest for one who would be happy not to eat bread at all. If one would eat bread for its own sake but would prefer not to “be bothered” with washing and bentching, it would be fine to convince him to regularly eat some bread and the Magen Avraham’s issue would not apply (see V’zot Haberacha, pg. 71).

If one does not eat even a k’zayit of bread then although he still recites Hamotzi, almost all authorities say he must make all of the individual berachot. Furthermore, he will not be able to bentch in any case and will have to make the appropriate berachot after eating. One also has to eat the k’zayit within k’dei achilat pras (a contested amount of time, which is within the range of a single digit of minutes) (Mishna Berura 210:1).

While we have not weighed all of the plusses and minuses (including the issue of one who eats bread-like foods during a full meal without bread- see Igrot Moshe, ibid.), we can fairly say that if a person is not interested in eating approximately a slice of bread, he should feel free to go without eating bread and “washing and bentching.” Whichever approach one takes, he should become familiar with the several halachic questions that arise in “bread meals” and “non-bread meals.”

Let us begin with a story, whose relevance should be clear later. An Ashkenzi boy got engaged to a Sephardi girl. At the engagement party, the girl’s father wished the boy’s father that soon he would have a grandchild named after him. The recipient of the “blessing” got upset, and the “good wisher” took it as a sign that he did not want to share grandchildren with the latter. It took some explaining for the Ashkenazi to realize that Sephardim covet grandchildren named after them while they are alive and he intended to bless his new mechutan. The Sephardi learned the hard way that Ashkenazim do not name after live grandparents, explaining the negative reaction.

The gemara (Berachot 42b) spells out when a person can make a beracha on behalf of others who are eating with him. Basically, there are two scenarios: they recline to eat together; they make a statement that they intend to eat together. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 167:11) points out that nowadays when people rarely recline when eating, the first criterion depends on whether they sit down to eat at one table. In your case, both criteria were apparently met (one is sufficient) and, therefore, you had reason to consider it appropriate that one person would make Hamotzi and the others would only answer and eat. In fact, when starting the meal as one group, there is a benefit in one making the beracha on behalf of all, based on the concept of “with a multitude of people, it is a glory for the King” (Mishlei 14:28) (Bi’ur Halacha to 167:11). (Regarding Birkat Hamazon after the meal, only if there is a zimun (three reciting Birkat Hamazon as a group) is it proper for one to listen and answer rather than recite separately (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 193:1).)

May a woman make Hamotzi on behalf of others? Only one who is fully obligated in a mitzva can perform it on behalf of others who are fully obligated (Berachot 20b). Women, who are not obligated in shofar blowing, cannot blow shofar for men to fulfill their mitzva (Rosh Hashana 29a). However, women are obligated (rabbinically, like men) to make berachot before eating and can exempt men. Indeed, in some fine families, the wife makes Hamotzi at the Shabbat meal.

It is understandable then that you might feel that your friend’s husband acted on an insulting social/political basis by making his own beracha, but it may be similar to the story above. Without crawling into his head, it is likely that he just followed a broad minhag (which you apparently do not share), which is well over a century old, that people generally make their own berachot rather than suffice by listening to another. One reason given is that we fear that one will speak between answering the beracha and eating (Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 167:18). A convincing reason for the general custom regarding many berachot is that we are afraid that people will not focus in a manner that enables them to be exempted by another’s beracha (Mishna Berura 8:13).

Only on Shabbat and Yom Tov is it still widely practiced that one person makes the beracha on everyone’s behalf, and this is because there is usually only one set of lechem mishneh (double loaves) upon which the beracha is recited. If one makes his own beracha on a piece of bread, it is questionable whether he is connected to the two loaves (see Mishna Berura 274:8 and Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 55:19). Even then, there are communities where people make their own beracha after the central one was made (see ibid.).

We must start by seeing why a wife takes on her husband’s origin’s customs and rulings.

The oldest direct source we know regarding a wife conforming to her husband’s traditions is the Tashbetz (III, 179). He says that it is inconceivable that a husband and wife would live together governed by different practices. There are varied explanations of this concept. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe OC I, 159) compares the husband’s home to a community and says that when his wife joins his household, she takes on “the place’s practices” just like a new permanent resident of a community (Shulchan Aruch, OC 468:4). Others (Admat Kodesh II, OC 2; see Igrot Moshe, ibid.) claim that a woman was not fully connected to her father’s traditions, as the expectation always had been that she would leave to join her husband’s family and accept his minhagim.

What happens when a couple gets divorced (or widowed)? If the matter is that they cannot have different minhagim under one roof, then when they no longer live under one roof, the woman would revert to her former minhagim. In fact, the Tashbetz says this but with a major proviso. If the woman becomes widowed and her husband leaves her with children she would maintain her husband’s family’s minhagim. One of the precedents he brings is from a halacha from the Torah in regard to the eating of terumah. The daughter of a kohen eats terumah because of her father until she marries. If she marries a non-kohen she no longer eats terumah, but if he dies or divorces her she goes back to her father’s house, and his terumah. However, if she has children from the non-kohen husband, she does not return to eat terumah (see Vayikra 22:13). Thus, we see, says the Tashbetz, that a widowed woman with children retains the family status of her marriage.

Rav Yosef Engel (Gilyonei Hashas, Yevamot 86a) takes this comparison very formally and also understands it to work by linking her to her ex-husband. It sounds from the Tashbetz that her relationship with the children prevents her from reverting back naturally to her father’s household and way of life. It is also likely that this concept is based not on a halachic derivation but on a sociological situation that the Torah recognized. Namely, the mother of children who have their father’s halachic status is expected to continue to act in a way that is consistent with their upbringing. This then would apply even if she was divorced, as the Tashbetz himself states. Even when they are grown up, although she no longer has to raise them, halacha recognizes the likelihood that she will be very connected to them and may spend much time with them (see Ketubot 54a; Even Ha’ezer). Therefore it makes sense that she should not be more connected to her father than to them and it is not necessarily appropriate to change to her childhood minhagim.

Igrot Moshe does not rule on what happens in the case that a wife is widowed or divorced. However, his logic seems to imply that if practically she went back to interacting with her former community she could and maybe should go back to their minhagim. He does raise the possibility (within his explanation of the Rambam’s minority approach) that a woman waits until she marries to accept her lifetime minhag and that she should keep it thereafter (at least until she remarries).

In the final analysis it seems that a divorcee without children should revert to her old minhagim and that children, who play a pivotal role in the divorcee’s lifestyle, should prompt her to retain their joint minhagim. In general, though, if she has chosen either her old or her adopted community as her religious/cultural center, she can follow its minhagim.

The concept of tosefet arises in connection with holy days (or Shemitta years), originally regarding Yom Kippur. The gemara (Yoma 81b) learns from the Torah’s mention of fasting from 9 Tishrei in the evening until the next evening that the fast begins a little before day’s end and ends a little after it. It shows that one should act similarly regarding refraining from melacha (forbidden work) on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Admittedly, the Rambam omits this concept in the laws of Shabbat and even in the laws of Yom Kippur mentions it in regard only to fasting (see Maggid Mishneh, Shvitat Asor 1:6). However, the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 261:2 requires tosefet Shabbat.

There are two or three elements to tosefet. 1) One violates tosefet if he ignores the coming day’s laws until it begins (Beitza 30a, regarding those who ate “until dark” on Yom Kippur. 2) One’s acceptance of the new day is binding even if he did so earlier than necessary (Shulchan Aruch, OC 263:10). 3) It is a mitzva or even an obligation to accept tosefet actively. It is #3, which is not clear, about which you are inquiring.

The Mishna Berura (261:21) says that accepting Shabbat is accomplished orally. He cites the Rama (608:3 and 553:1) that cognitive acceptance without speech is invalid and therefore one who only mentally decided to end eating before a fast may eat again. The Mishna Berura (553:2) cites important poskim who feel that a mental decision is binding and does not seem to decide between the approaches. Based on these passages, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (46:2) says that one is required to accept Shabbat before day’s end, preferably with speech, although it is possibly binding with a cognitive decision. Neither author mentions dissenters to this concept (#3).

Two things trouble us. First, few observant Jews or shuls are careful to actively accept Shabbat early. In fact, many shuls finish Mincha moments before or even after sunset, at which time tosefet has likely kicked in automatically and one has lost the mitzva. (It is unclear how long tosefet is but it is a matter of (almost certainly single digits of) minutes- see opinions in Piskei Teshuvot 261:2). It is also strange that the Mishna Berura does not cite a source for the need to accept Shabbat early. The Rama he cites refers only to element #2, that oral voluntary acceptance is binding. Possibly, it just makes sense that one should accept (even though it is not done before Shemitta or at Shabbat’s end) rather than be forced into tosefet and that it is meaningful only if done in a binding manner. However, it is still troubling that the classical sources do not seem to mention this requirement, even regarding Yom Kippur, the original source (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 608:1).

In fact, it is not clear that explicit acceptance is necessary. Rav O. Yosef (Yabia Omer VII, OC 34) argues that if one is in a shul where Mincha (which must be done before Shabbat) will finish after sunset, he may daven without accepting Shabbat, claiming that the essence of tosefet is simply refraining from melacha. Shevet Halevi (I, 50) is also not convinced that acceptance is necessary, although he says that many Rishonim consider it a mitzva (mentally may suffice). Ohr L’Tzion (18:2) concurs and understands even the Mishna Berura to have been referring only to element #2.

There is little reason not to actively accept Shabbat a few minutes before sunset, when it is unlikely to need to do melacha. However, the fact that most people do not do so need not be a mistake. For Ashkenazi women, the matter is a non-issue, as they normally accept Shabbat when lighting Shabbat candles (Rama, OC 263:10). When they do not do so, their status is like a man’s.

The prohibition of bishul akum, is a rabbinic enactment.

The general principal of bishul akum is that anything that is impossible to eat when uncooked—anything that needs to be cooked in order to become edible—and is “suitable to be served on the table of kings”, if a non-Jew cooked it, the food is forbidden to eat. Even if the food item was made in a Jewish-owned vessel and in a Jewish home, the food would still be forbidden to eat. The reason for the enactment is a fear of intermarriage. It follows that food items that are not considered fit to be served to royalty or things that are eaten uncooked since it is not the manner of people to invite one’s friend—in such cases, the Sages did not prohibit (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 113:1; Taz, Ibid., sif katan 1).

You should know that if a Jew participates in the cooking or baking process, there is no prohibition of bishul akum, eating food cooked by a non-Jew. The Shulchan Aruch and the Rama are in disagreement what constitutes participation. According to the Rama, it is enough for a Jew to merely ignite the oven. However, according to the Shulchan Aruch, merely lighting the oven is not enough. Rather, the Jew must place the actual food item on the fire (Shulchan Aruch, Ibid, sif 7).

You must make an effort not to eat in a restaurant without kashrut supervision. In a place where the only way to eat kosher food is by double-wrapping the kosher food and cooking it or heating it in the restaurant’s or hotel’s oven is not kosher, you must ensure that a Jew lights the oven (for Ashkenazim) or (for Sefardim or Ashkenazim) that a Jew will put the food in the oven.

Regarding the use of knife to cut fish: If the knife is clean, you can use it to cut the fish, but only if the fish is cold (cf. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 94:7, and in Sefer “Derashot”, perek 23, 25).

Regarding the type of cooking: There is no difference whether the food is cooked, roasted, fried, or toasted. The prohibition of bishul akum applies to all forms of cooking (cf. Sefer Bein Yisrael LeNochri, Inyanei Yoreh Deah 10:3).

Fish are not [generally] eaten raw. Fish dishes certainly are fit for royalty. Therefore, the prohibition of bishul akum applies.

Vegetables: It depends if they are eaten raw (like cucumbers, tomatoes, peppers), then no prohibition of bishul akum exists. If they are only eaten cooked (like beets), the prohibition of bishul akum applies.

Potatoes: Halachic authorities debate their status whether they are considered to be served on the table of royalty or not. The Aruch HaShulchan (113:11) is inclined to permit (although he concluded, “one should ponder the matter”). The Chachmat Adam, however, prohibits eating potatoes that were cooked by non-Jews. He considers potatoes as fit for royalty (66:4). Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner is also inclined to side with the Chachmat Adam’s opinion (Shevet HaLevi, volume 2, siman 45). It also seems to be the generally accepted practice in our times. Therefore, potatoes that were cooked by non-Jews are prohibited.

The response is based on the information provided.] Apparently, those who ate from the questionable keilim violated no Torah prohibition. Involved discussion of this question’s kashrut element is beyond this presentation’s scope, but the most pertinent point follows. If the taste given off by a k’li has a negative impact on the food with which it came in contact, which is assumed if the k’li had not been used in 24 hours, the food remains kosher (Yoreh Deah 103). One who is unaware of the recent use of a non-kosher k’li can assume that food heated in it remains kosher because it was likely not used that day and, even if it was, the taste may combine negatively with the new food (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 122:7 with commentaries). However, it is rabbinically forbidden to use a non-kosher k’li even if it was not used within 24 hours in a manner that it may give off taste (Avoda Zara 76a).

If one sells another Jew non-kosher food without disclosure, the buyer can void the sale (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 234:3). The mishna (Bechorot 37a) says that even if the buyer ate the food and thus cannot return it to the seller, the seller must return all of the money. Rashi (ad loc.) posits that this is a penalty against the seller, prompting the Shach (YD 119:25) to say that this would not apply if the seller was unaware of the problem. The S’ma (234:4) adds that any benefit the buyer received was counteracted by the disgust of eating non-kosher food.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) says that if the prohibition on the food was only rabbinic, the seller does not have to return the money when it was eaten. Although the Pri Chadash (YD 119:24) says the buyer recovers the price difference between non-kosher food and that which he paid, most poskim say that the seller returns nothing. How can the seller withhold the kashrut problem and end up getting a higher price than the food’s market value? The Maharit Algazi (Bechorot 5:51) explains that since the buyer got the same benefit as if it had been kosher and would have anyway paid the price of kosher food (and the seller did lose when the buyer ate it) he must pay the planned price of the enjoyment. The Shach (ibid.:27) says that when the Rabbis instituted food prohibitions, they stipulated that the prohibition should not cause the extracting of money between litigants.

According to the Maharit Algazi, ostensibly since X was willing to pay the amount he did and benefited as if it were mehadrin, he should not get any money back. However, the Shach’s novel idea to treat rabbinically non-kosher food like kosher food regarding money is limited. When one pays extra for a special feature, whether it be for “environmentally friendly” or for mehadrin, he should not pay the higher price if he received instead something standard. We should consider also that since X was troubled already during the affair about the kashrut questionability, he did not get the feeling of security that people who want mehadrin pay for. Despite the reasons to return this extra amount of the money (and the Pri Chadash’s aforementioned minority opinion), it is difficult to extract money from Y. However, it is appropriate, based on compromise, for Y to return the difference between kosher and mehadrin (approximately 10%), as Y was originally willing to do.

People must determine the most practical solutions among the valid solutions to the challenges of Erev Pesach on Shabbat, according to the halachic possibilities their rabbis present. One practical assumption is that people will use only Pesachdik and/or disposable utensils, keeping remaining chametz separate. Some form of bread is needed for the first two Shabbat meals and is preferred for seuda shlishit (Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5), which should be held in the afternoon (ibid.:2). Since the prohibition to eat chametz begins after “four hours” (around two hours before halachic midday- consult a local calendar) something must give. Let’s take a meal-by-meal look.

Friday night meal - Halachically, almost anything goes. Those who don’t want to worry about keeping chametz around can eat matza according to most poskim. If one has the minhag not to eat matza from the beginning of Nisan, matza ashira, often called “egg matza,” is an alternative.

Shabbat morning meal - If one finishes eating the chametz part of the meal by the end of the 4^th hour, accomplished by davening early, matters are halachically simple. (How to get rid of crumbs or leftovers by the end of the 5^th hour is beyond our present scope.) Matza is desirable for situations when it is hard or nerve-racking to deal with chametz. However, Chazal forbade eating matza on Erev Pesach, according to most, from the beginning of the morning, so that when we eat it at the seder, it will be clear that it is for the mitzva (see Rambam, Chametz U’matza 6:12). However, one may eat matza that cannot be used for the mitzva (Shulchan Aruch 471:2), primarily, matza ashira, which is kneaded with liquids other than water (see Pesachim 35a). If it contains no water, most Rishonim rule that it cannot become chametz, and one would seemingly not need to rush.

Yet there are two issues. Firstly, as Ashkenazim are stringent to treat matza ashira as possible chametz and are permitted to eat it on Pesach only in cases of great need (Rama 462:4), the time issue reawakens. (Some poskim rely on the Noda B’yehuda (I, OC 21) that it is sufficient to be wary of matza ashira only after midday of Erev Pesach).  Secondly, matza ashira may have a status of pat haba’ah b’kisnin, similar to cake, making it a questionable substitute for challa. (Igrot Moshe OC I, 155 explains that this is not a problem on Shabbat but still seems to prefer challa when convenient. To see Rav O. Yosef’s preferred solution, see Yechave Da’at I, 91).

Seuda shlishit (ss)- Two preferred opinions about how normally to perform ss conflict this Shabbat. One is to eat bread at ss. The other is to have ss after midday, at which time chametz and matza are forbidden, and matza ashira is problematic for Ashkenazim. The Rama (444:1) says that we eat other foods such as fruit or meat at this ss. The Mishna Berura (444:8) cites another solution: divide the morning meal into two so that one can fulfill ss on challah or matza ashira at that time. He requires a break between the two meals to avoid a problem of an unnecessary beracha, but he does not say how long it should be. Opinions range from a few minutes to half an hour; some suggest taking a short walk in between (see Piskei Teshuvot 444:6). One who is not usually careful to have challa at ss throughout the year need not consider this idea. He can eat a normal ss for him (no bread) in the afternoon, preferably earlier than usual to leave a good appetite for the seder. Even those who are stringent about ss may follow the Rama over the Mishna Berura’s suggestion, which is somewhat counter-intuitive and not without halachic problems. Sephardim, who can use matza ashira, must do so before three hours before sunset (Shulchan Aruch, OC 471:2).

We will explore three halachic issues, starting with lashon hara. If one sees Reuven wronging Shimon monetarily, he may take steps to protect Shimon’s rights at the expense of defaming Reuven if seven conditions are met (Chafetz Chayim, Lashon Hara 10). If you were sure of what you saw, the only questionable condition here is the need to rebuke the culprit in a soft manner before causing him embarrassment in order to give him the opportunity to rectify the matter without embarrassment (ibid. based on Rambam, De’ot 6:8). If that proves ineffective, you would not have to worry about lashon hara before approaching the driver and enabling him to rectify the situation.

The next question is whether it is permitted or required to take such steps. In general, there is a mitzva from the Torah to rebuke for a sin (Vayikra 19:17). It makes little difference whether one rebukes in order to encourage possible rectification or to cause remorse and a decision not to repeat the sin (like the steps of teshuva we know of from our preparations for Yom Kippur). This mitzva is strongly related to the responsibility of afrushei mei’isura, to distance our counterpart from sin. In your case, the youngsters continued to illegally make use of the bus apparently with no intention to pay. Yet, if one thinks about it, we have ample opportunities to rebuke people on the bus, and, for better or for worse, we rarely do so. For example, if we someone eating without a beracha or telling lashon hara, we have an, at least theoretical, obligation to rebuke him and/or prevent the continuation of the sin. Our general working assumption is that since our generation is not proficient at rebuking and receiving rebuke, respectively, we have more to lose than to gain by doing so. One could argue that a clear man-to-man sin such as sneaking onto a bus is one that everyone would admit is inexcusable and the rebuke would work. However, many, likely including the youngsters you saw, are able to rationalize away such activity or don’t care if it is wrong.

The final issue is hashavat aveida (returning something lost). Although the most famous discussions of hashavat aveida refer to physical objects, the mitzva refers to a variety of actions that need to be taken to prevent loss to our friend. For example, if one sees that his friend’s property is in danger of being damaged, he must protect it (Bava Metzia 31a). Furthermore, it appears that according to at least most poskim, one is required to take steps to enable his friend to receive the money he is owed. One example is that, in addition to the specific mitzva to testify on a friend’s behalf, several poskim say that the general mitzva of hashavat aveida also mandates testimony (Netivot Hamishpat 28:1; Sha’ar Mishpat 28:2; see Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 1:(63-65)). No matter how we classify the aveira of getting on a bus without paying (stealing for using property without permission, withholding fees due, etc.; analysis is beyond our present scope), Egged deserves to be paid and your action could have ostensibly enabled them to receive payment.

However, it is likely that you were still not required to do so. First of all, it is likely that even if the driver would have decided to confront the cheats, they would have gotten off the bus rather than pay, and thus the money would not have been gained. More fundamentally, though, one is not required to put himself in a situation of significant embarrassment in order to do hashavat aveida (Berachot 19b). Since asking the offender to pay and/or going to the bus driver to snitch is likely to be a very upsetting experience, you were likely exempt from doing it.

At first glance, your friend is making Kiddush at a time when he is not obligated to do so on behalf of those who have (presumably) accepted (or are accepting) Shabbat and are thus obligated in Kiddush. In general, one who has already discharged his obligation of a certain mitzva can perform the mitzva with its beracha to fulfill the obligation of one who has not yet done so (based on the concept of arvut) (Rosh Hashana 29a). However, the mishna limits this. The one who performs the mitzva must be as obligated in it as the one for whom he is doing it. We must consider: is your friend considered obligated in Kiddush because generally it applies to him, like one who already fulfilled his obligation? Or should we say that one for whom the time is such that the mitzva does not apply is not considered obligated at all?

Regarding cases similar to this, Acharonim cite a Yerushalmi (see Tosafot, Yevamot 14a) that says that inhabitants of un-walled cities cannot read the megilla on behalf of those from walled cities (whose obligation is a day later). We see that one who is obligated in theory but not at this time is not considered obligated. R. Akiva Eiger (to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 277) in regard to our case, raises the following distinction. Here, the one who has not accepted Shabbat can accept it and become obligated immediately. Therefore, the obligation is considered relevant even before he did so. However, R. Akiva Eiger left the matter as an unsolved doubt.

In the past generation, several poskim have tried to resolve the doubt. Tosafot (Berachot 48b) says that one who did not eat is considered obligated in regard to performing Birkat Hamazon on behalf of one who ate because he could eat. Rav S.Z. Orbach (Minchat Shlomo I, 3), makes the following distinction between that case and ours. At the time of Birkat Hamazon, the mitzva applies to the one who has not eaten if only the circumstances were that he had eaten. In contrast, before Shabbat is simply not a time that Kiddush is relevant for one who has not accepted Shabbat even if he could do so.

On the other hand, we should consider whether it is clear that Kiddush is inappropriate before Shabbat. The Rambam apparently does not accept the concept of tosefet Shabbat (the ability/obligation) to usher in Shabbat early. Yet he (Shabbat 29:11) says that it is possible to recite Kiddush toward the end of Friday afternoon. This lends credence to the concept that Kiddush (as well as its parallel, Havdala) applies and can be done close to the time of the transition between Shabbat and weekday. Thus the obligation of Kiddush may already apply on a certain level soon before Shabbat even for one who has not accepted Shabbat. While it is difficult to rely on this thesis, it can be thrown in to the mix when contemplating grounds for leniency in various related cases (see Minchat Shlomo, ibid.).

Some of our generation’s important poskim have differed as to whether it is proper to rely on R. Akiva Eiger’s more lenient position and allow one who has not accepted Shabbat to make Kiddush for others. In a case such as ours where one is doing a mitzva by doing so and it is not easy to replace him with someone else who can make Kiddush in a better way, we feel that it is proper to be lenient on the matter (see Tzitz Eliezer XII, 25; Yabia Omer VIII, OC 46). While it is best if someone who is hearing the Kiddush should be eating upon it at that time, it is possible that even this is not an absolute necessity (Tzitz Eliezer XII, 24). (The details of that issue are beyond our present scope.)

The gemara (Berachot 45b) says that if three eat together, one stops to answer for two who want to bentch, but two do not stop for one. Rashi explains that one should show proper manners to answer, implying that there is no halachic imperative that he must take a break in his eating to do so. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 200:1) rules like the Rishonim who say that it is halachically required for the third to answer, and even if he refuses to answer, the two (only) fulfill the requirement of zimun.

In order to answer your question, regarding two who want to use a third when there are more than three participants in the meal, we need to understand the reasoning behind the halacha above. Poskim explain that it is based on the concept of rov (majority) (Birkei Yosef, OC 200:5; Mishna Berura 200:2). The minority that is not yet ready to bentch has to follow the majority of the group that is interested. According to important poskim, this idea of rov can be extended to other groups. The Eliyah Rabba (OC 200:6), for example, says that six who want to do a zimun with Hashem’s Name also create a majority to force four to answer.

If the matter depends on rov, it does not appear that a minority of a group can force a majority or even two sub-groups of the same number of people cannot force one another to do a zimun. The Birkei Yosef (200:5) assumes simply that which the Eliyah Rabba implies: five cannot make five answer. One could claim that the important thing is to have a majority of the necessary quorum who are ready to bentch and then they can use whomever they want. Thus two could force any one they wanted, while five, which is only half way to the zimun of ten, could not. However, the language of the poskim implies that it is a matter of deciding when the most appropriate time is for the group to do the zimun. There is no reason to assume that two can select one from the main group and turn him into their minority.

The exact definition of what constitutes a rov in this regard is important for the following common case. One person wants to bentch, and a second is not yet finished but is interested in helping his friend and agrees to be the second. Can those two force the third? The Birkei Yosef (ibid.) (discussing five and five with one of the “non-bentchers” volunteering) leans toward the view that he cannot. The person who volunteers is still not an interested party who creates a rov who are bentching. On the other hand, Rav Kook (Orach Mishpat, OC 40) leans toward the approach that even when only one of the two is bentching now, the two can force the third. His impression is based on the following gemara (Berachot 45b). Rav Papa was eating with his son and a third person. Only his son was ready to bentch, and Rav Papa accommodated him. The gemara says that Rav Papa had gone beyond the letter of the law in agreeing. Rav Kook understands that once Rav Papa agreed, the third’s willingness was irrelevant. (One can deflect the proof and say that, given Rav Papa’s stature, it was clear that the third person would not object.) It seems that a majority of poskim accept the Birkei Yosef’s approach that only two who are actually bentching can force a third. In practice, most people do accommodate their friends anyway, which is good. (Vaya’an Avraham (OC 16) suggests the possibility that if the second agrees because he is halachically required to respect the person who wants to bentch, it would be considered a rov; he himself rejects the suggestion).

It is worthwhile to recall that, for Ashkenazim, when someone answers zimun before bentching, he must wait until the end of the first beracha before resuming eating (Rama, OC 200:2).

Is it better to daven without a minyan before work or do some work first and daven with a minyan later (at a halachically acceptable time)?

Answer: Work is one of the things that one should not do before davening once alot hashachar (some 72 minutes before sunrise) has come (Berachot 14a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3). Work, in this regard, is not limited to the place one goes to earn money but includes a wide variety of household tasks of even moderate time duration. The logic is that when one gets up in the morning, addressing his Maker should be the first concern. Therefore, there are significant similarities in logic and halachic parameters between this restriction and those of not traveling, eating, or greeting people before davening (Berachot ibid. and 10b; various places in OC 89).

Generally, if the activity one is involved in is mitzva-related and cannot wait until after tefilla, it is permitted because it is not considered an affront to Hashem (Mishna Berura 89:36). In such cases, one should first recite Kri’at Shema, which is a mitzva from the Torah, (and probably Birkot Hashachar- see below and Ishei Yisrael 13:(61)) before doing the work (Mishna Berura 250:1). Sometimes steps still need to be taken to reduce the concern that one may get carried away and miss davening on time altogether (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:6 regarding learning).

The obvious first reaction to your question is that it is better to daven with a minyan before working. However, in cases of significant need, the pre-davening restrictions can be waved. One of the classic examples is going on the road before davening when the caravan will not wait until after one davens (see Mishna Berura 89:20). One should consider whether such a trip is justified (but such distinctions as between a potential loss of money and an opportunity to gain money (see Mishna Berura 90:29) are beyond our present scope). The Ishei Yisrael (13:(47)) says that under similar circumstances of need one could also do work before davening. These circumstances are certainly grounds for missing a minyan (see Mishna Berura, ibid.).  

Assuming that the fact is that you will not be able to both daven with a minyan and before starting work, the question is which factor should take precedence. There do not appear to be many sources on the matter but the consensus is that it is better to daven before work than to start working in order to get a minyan later (Ishei Yisrael 12:13 and Riv’vot Ephrayim  I, 66 in the name of Rav Hadaya). The ruling is readily understandable. It is forbidden to work before davening. In contrast, it is not forbidden to daven without a minyan. Rather, davening with a minyan is an important element of tefilla, which also makes it more effective (Berachot 8a- see also Living the Halachic Process A-5). Since a serious inconvenience is grounds to miss a minyan (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 90:16 and Mishna Berura 90:52), avoiding a prohibition is also grounds.

That being said, the case for always davening first alone is not iron-clad. Firstly, the Rama (Orach Chayim 89:3) cites and does not totally reject the opinion that after saying Birkot Hashachar one may do work. Although we would not normally condone this, when it “buys time” to allow someone to daven with a minyan, it is not unreasonable. Secondly, those who have to daven so early may be saying Shemoneh Esrei before sunrise, which is permitted only under pressing circumstances (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:8). Thus, if the minyan alternative would also have the benefit of being at or after sunrise, this might tip the scale. Finally, if the quality of the davening, from a practical or even psychological perspective, is enhanced at the minyan (see Mishna Berura 89:39), this too is a major factor. Therefore, we suggest that you discuss the different considerations and options with a rabbi who knows you and your situation well.

Your assumption is overstated, as we will explain, but your question is fascinating to explore regarding cases where the assumptions apply.

It is forbidden (as theft) to borrow other people’s objects without permission. Where we believe that the owner would want the borrower to take it, the matter is more complicated (see Ask the Rabbi, Pinchas 5765). However, regarding an object that people generally are happy for others to use, they may do so. Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 14) say that people are happy to let others borrow an object to be used for a mitzva (based on Pesachim 4b that one is happy for his money to be involved in a mitzva). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 14:4), following this assumption, allows one to borrow a tallit that he finds in shul. The Rama (ad loc.) adds that one can do the same with tefillin and elsewhere (OC 649:5) says the same for a lulav. Indications (from the Beit Yosef and commentators) are that the Shulchan Aruch and Sephardi poskim agree.

The question of borrowing religious articles does not have a yes or no answer. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) makes a condition that one returns the tallit folded if it was found that way. The Magen Avraham (14:7) permits it only on occasion and requires that the object remain in the building where it was found. The Rama (ibid.) says that one may not similarly borrow sefarim to learn from. The reason is that the concern that the sefarim will get ripped makes it unclear that the owner would be happy to lend them.

The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav 14:7) claims that the minhag is to borrow siddurim in shul without permission. He opposes the minhag based on the Rama’s and others’ rulings. The Aruch Hashulchan, a more recent leading posek, who tends to be very minhag-oriented, turns everything upside down. Regarding a tallit, he not only interprets the classical leniency narrowly but observes that people are now more particular about others borrowing their tallitot (OC 14:11). On the other hand, he says that people are no longer disturbed by others borrowing their siddurim and sefarim and, therefore, that should now be permitted (ibid.:13). Actually, even classically, when one asked a talmid chacham to watch sefarim for him, the latter could use them because of an assumption that the owner who said nothing would let (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 292:20). So, we find fluidity based on the circumstances and we do not find explicit, major differences between Ashkenazi and Sephardi poskim (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 14:31). In practice, the matter is disputed, and different places (especially yeshivot) have different practices. However, regarding using sefarim at their place, considering their relative low cost and high durability, few mind.

We will now re-ask your question. If one received a p’sak that he can borrow, can he borrow from one who has a p’sak not to borrow or vice versa? Presumably, the machloket arises because owners’ intentions are borderline and/or depend on how much to adapt classical rulings when recent observers sense that the situation has changed somewhat. These questions are for the borrower(’s rabbi) to determine and do not depend on the specific owner/lender. If a ruling became very famous among a group, we might say that the p’sak became a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating a minhag to allow or forbid others’ use. As far as we are aware, neither Ashkenazim nor Sephardim have broad, well-known practices on the matter. However, one who enters a yeshiva or shul where there is a stated policy can assume that the sefarim owners there conform to the local standard, and we would follow the lender’s presumed position. (One should look at a sefer’s inside cover to see if the owner left contrary instructions).

1.            The agreement of the halachic authorities is that one should not start the Passover Seder prior to nightfall.

2.            If one is in unusual circumstances (such as one who is ill), one could recite an abbreviated portion of the Magid section, but one should make sure to say the parts dealing with enslavement.

The minimum sections to recite from Magid are:

a.      The verses that start with the words, “Avadim Hayinu leFaroh…,” “We were slaves unto Pharaoh…”

b.      The verses that start with the words, “Raban Gamliel omer… Pesach…Matzah Zu… Maror zeh…,” “Rabbi Gamliel said…What does the paschal offering represent...What does this matzah represent... What do these bitter herbs represent...?”

c.      The blessing “asher go’alnu,” “that You have Redeemed us.”

If one is able to prolong the Seder slightly further, one should also say the section of “Mitchilah ovdei avodah zarah hayu…, “We were originally idolaters…”, and the section of “Be’chol dor va’dor chayav adam…,” “Throughout every generation, one is obligated…”

If one is able to recite the entire Magid without skipping, it is preferable.

After the Seder, one could understandably complete the sections that were skipped.

3.            If by one’s eating prior to Seder Night, one could recite the Seder at the proper time and not need to abbreviate it, then it is recommended to eat a meal before night (Notwithstanding that one is usually not permitted to eat after the ‘tenth hour,’ in this case, one’s purpose in eating is so one could fulfill the mitzvah of the Seder – eating matzah, drinking four cups of wine, reciting Magid, etc., in the proper time – it is permitted for him to eat).

4.            If there is no possibility at all to wait until nightfall due to medical reasons, etc., then that person is except due to circumstances beyond his or her control.

(Sources: Shulchan Aruch, siman 477, Shulchan Aruch HaRav, siman 473. We recommend reading our responsa regarding a similar question in the responsa BaMareh Bazaq, volume 3, 55).

Although you are aware of the basic bottom line on egg matzot, it is worthwhile to review relevant sources. The gemara (Pesachim 35b) says that fruit juices do not leaven flour. According to most Rishonim this applies to eggs as well (see Tur and Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 462). However, there are several problems with using this ruling to make various types of what we call egg matzot a simple Pesach solution. (Realize that different brands of egg matzos use different liquids other than water. We will call all of them egg matzot for simplicity’s sake.)

According to many Rishonim and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:2), not only can fruit juice mixed with water that is kneaded with flour become chametz, but it is expected to happen quicker than with flour and water alone. Thus, a hashgacha would have to ensure that the flour was not exposed to water before its preparation and not included in the egg matza dough. There is also a dispute between Rashi (stringent) and Tosafot (lenient) (Pesachim 35b) whether the gemara meant that egg matzot do not become chametz at all or just that their leavening is not complete enough for one who eats it to be chayav karet but that there is a lesser prohibition. Most Rishonim, including the Rambam (Chametz U’Matza 5:2) agree with Tosafot, but the Rama (OC 462:4) says that the minhag is like Rashi. The Rama’s compromise is that only when there is a pressing need to be lenient, such as a sick or a very old person, may one eat egg matzot on Pesach. The Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.) is lenient, and thus Sephardic practice is to allow eating egg matzot on Pesach (see Yechaveh Da’at 1:10). In any case, it would be wrong for healthy Ashkenazim to eat egg matzot on Pesach (They are allowed to possess them and eat them after Pesach- Mishna Berura 462:18).

On seder night there is an additional problem. An egg matza, even if not chametz, is matza ashira (rich), which is not valid for fulfilling the mitzva of the night. Therefore, even Sephardim and the sick should not have egg matza where matza is required for the seder. (Other alternatives for those who don’t chew or digest “regular matza” well exist but are beyond our present scope).

It is a good question whether putting egg matzot on tables, knowing that some people who shouldn’t be eating them will, is a violation of lifnei iver. (See Yechaveh Da’at (ibid.) who demonstrates that even a Sephardi, who may eat egg matza, may not give them to an Ashkenazi). If you are not aware of the status of the people at each table, then you could use the principle of t’liyah (see Yoreh Deah 251). This means that when it is quite possible that the object one is giving will be used properly, it is permitted to give it to another even though there is a good chance it will be used improperly. While this is a legitimate approach to take in cases with problems without easy solutions (e.g., someone who runs a large store and cannot keep track of who is buying what), it is not acceptable here. Firstly, what do you, your waiter, or your mashgiach do when he learns who is who and sees them acting improperly? Also, how could you allow those who were told the kashrut is good to make a mistake and eat that which was on the table?

A simple solution is to have a table in the corner with egg matzot with a large sign that identifies the egg matzot as something that Ashkenazim may eat only when the situation is pressing. You may suggest that those with questions should ask the rabbi/mashgiach.

We will focus on only a few of this question’s many permutations. We first assume that you refer to foods that are eaten as separate entities (e.g., a piece of cake and a piece of apple), not in a combined manner (e.g., a k’zayit of cake that has fruit filling).

The general rule is that one cannot fulfill the obligation of Me’ein Shalosh by reciting Borei Nefashot or vice versa, even b’dieved  (Mishna Berura 208:62). (An exception is that if one is already making an Al Ha’etz on fruit of the seven species, this exempts him from Borei Nefashot on fruit of trees that are not of the seven species- Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:13). Therefore, when one is not sure whether he should recite Me’ein Shalosh or Borei Nefashot, he is in a bind because if he guesses wrong, he will be making an inappropriate beracha (see Rama, Orach Chayim 208:18 and  Mishna Berura 208:80). We do not say that Borei Nefashot is a generic beracha (as its text may imply) that works b’dieved for any food as we do regarding Shehakol (Magen Avraham 208:26). Some Acharonim (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I, 74; Kaf Hachayim 202:79) argue at least partially and say that if it will be impossible (for halachic or technical reasons) to recite Me’ein Shalosh, then saying Borei Nefashot is not a beracha levatala and is better than saying nothing.

Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham (210:1) says that if one ate half a k’zayit of Me’ein Shalosh food and half a k’zayit of a Borei Nefashot food, he makes a Borei Nefashot. The Machatzit Hashekel explains that Borei Nefashot does apply on a basic level to all foods. If a food is of a higher level of importance, so that it receives a Me’ein Shalosh, Borei Nefashot becomes the wrong beracha, and one is not yotzei with it. However, if there are certainly not grounds for Me’ein Shalosh (i.e., he had less than a k’zayit of that type of food) then the basic applicability of Borei Nefashot can connect it to another food to warrant a joint Borei Nefashot. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (210:2) adds another justification for the Magen Avraham’s ruling. That is that some Rishonim say that just as one must make a beracha before eating any amount of food, so must one recite at least the simple beracha of Borei Nefashot after eating any amount of any food where a higher beracha acharona is not recited.

In order to recite Borei Nefashot on less than a shiur (the amount one needs to eat to require the beracha) of foods that join together to be a shiur, it is necessary that the two foods share a shiur. Therefore, half a k’zayit of a food and half a revi’it of a liquid do not join to require Borei Nefashot (Magen Avraham 210:1).

Regarding foods that combine two different ingredients (regarding beracha) in one food, there are different opinions and minhagim. Regarding a beracha rishona, as long as there is a significant amount of flour from the major grains, one makes Mezonot, but regarding beracha acharona one needs to have a k’zayit of the major grains without the help of other grains (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:9). The question is, though, if the flour is joined by only supplementary foods such as sugar and spices, whether one would make Al Hamichya only if there is a k’zayit of flour or even a k’zayit of cake is sufficient. (The Mishna Berura 208:48 takes the latter opinion, but some argue. Further discussion is beyond our present scope.)

 If the owner works in the store on Shabbat, one has to assume that he has the status of a mechallel Shabbat b’farhesia (one who desecrates Shabbat publicly), who loses all halachic ne’emanut (credibility) (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 119:6; see Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 175 regarding operating a store on Shabbat). If, though, a wife who does not violate prohibitions vouches for all the food’s purchase and preparation it would be permitted to eat there. Your question implies that the owner only keeps the store open, and let’s assume with non-Jews selling and working. You also imply that the person seems to generally follow the laws of the Torah.

Since you give no details, we cannot say whether your acquaintance’s store is allowed to be open on Shabbat with non-Jews working in it. Some relevant factors include whether there is a non-Jewish partner and the nature of the partnership; whether it is known publicly that it is a Jewish-owned business; how the workers are paid and whether they are required to open on Shabbat. We will work with your apparent assumption that the owner violates a rabbinic prohibition by keeping it open. There is considerable debate, without a clear consensus, regarding whether the sweeping disqualification for chillul Shabbat b’farhesia applies to the violation of rabbinic prohibitions of Shabbat (see Baer Heitev, Yoreh Deah 2:15; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 2:8; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, ad loc.; Aruch Hashulchan, YD 2:16).

Besides the special disqualification of a mechallel Shabbat, there is the general matter that one who does follow a halacha loses credibility. The gemara (Bechorot 30a) cites a machloket Tannaim whether one who is not trustworthy in one area of halacha is not trusted for anything or whether he is trusted in areas that are more severe and thus it is less likely that he would violate them. We accept the opinion that one is still believed regarding matters that are more severe (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:5). On one hand, one who violated rabbinic prohibitions should not be suspected to violate ones of Torah origin (Bechorot 30a). On the other hand, when one eats by someone, he has to be sure that not only are there are not Torah violations but that there are also not rabbinic violations. Regarding questions of general kashrut, this should not be a problem because the transfer of distrust from a severe violation to a lighter one applies only when the violations are of the same general type (i.e., from forbidden food to forbidden food) and would not apply from Shabbat to kashrut (see Shach 119:12). Yet, if one wants to eat in this person’s house on Shabbat, don’t we have to be concerned that he will violate a rabbinic prohibition of Shabbat as he did regarding the store?

The solution to these problems is found in the Rama (YD 119:7). One does not lose his reliability if he violated a prohibition that people don’t think is a real prohibition. Since there are cases where one can have his store operated on Shabbat and since, for a long time in many places, there has been an atmosphere where many believed that doing so in general is not forbidden, the storeowner is not categorized as a mechallel Shabbat nor is he considered one who is suspect of sinning. Of course, it may be questionable if someone of this level knows enough to keep a sufficiently kosher home, but the matter of the store per se should not make it forbidden to eat in his house even on Shabbat.

If the question related to other eating violations (e.g., a sick person had to eat non-kosher food), the answer is simple. Just because one was forced to perform a major violation once is no reason for it to be less severe later. The question is whether eating on Yom Kippur is a normal "eating violation," wherein every shiur of food is a violation, or whether it is a violation of the obligation to fast. If the latter is true, then arguably, once one was forced to suspend his fast, further eating does not fundamentally change things.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 568:1) says that when one has to fast on a specific day (even if it is self-imposed) but ate, he must continue fasting and cannot say that fasting the rest of the day will not help. This would seem to answer our question. However, the Binyan Tzion (34) suggests that this requirement to continue the fast might only apply if he ate improperly. In contrast, when halacha allowed him to break his fast (by eating a full shiur), we might say that there no longer is a fast to continue. At that point, whether or not he eats a full shiur or is careful to eat small amounts and take breaks might be irrelevant. The Mikraei Kodesh (Yamim Noraim, 39) goes a step further, saying that even if one were to get better and not need to eat any more, it would still arguably be halachically permitted to eat.

There are certain indications that eating on Yom Kippur is not a classical prohibition on eating but a mitzva to go through a day-long fast: The Torah says (Vayikra 23:27) to “afflict yourselves” (as opposed to “do not eat”); in that context, it says from “evening to evening,” implying that there is a single unit; the shiur is not the usual k’zayit but a larger one that “puts his mind at ease” (Yoma 81a). (The matter of putting the mind at ease should not be exaggerated. The violation is not when one goes from a state of hunger to one of relatively less hunger. After all, one who ate half an hour into Yom Kippur and is still satiated from the seuda hamafseket still commits a full violation. Rather, the violation is to eat significantly in a way that generally suffices to put one’s mind at ease that he has eaten (S’fat Emet, Yoma 73b).)

The crucial source in trying to resolve this matter is the gemara in Kritut (18b). In looking for a case of one who violated prohibitions that would require separate korbanot but having done so on Yom Kippur, the day one gets atonement for sins, the gemara mentions eating forbidden fats in the morning and afternoon. Tosafot and the Rosh (in Shita Mekubetzet) (ad loc.) ask why the gemara didn’t just talk about one who is obligated in two korbanot for eating anything twice on Yom Kippur. The Binyan Tzion suggests that this might only obligate in one korban because, as above, once he ate there is no fast to break. However, the aforementioned, more authoritative sources do not give that fundamental answer, and give less satisfying technical answers. This suggests that which most poskim (see also Yalkut Yosef, Moadim, pg. 96) seem to posit: although there is a positive element of fasting a whole day, every act of eating is a violation of eating on a day when eating is forbidden.

You do not want your restaurant to be responsible for people eating improperly. While women’s eating in a sukka is optional, a male is generally forbidden to eat a meal outside the sukka. On the other hand, is it your job to play police any more than you do regarding people making berachot on the food? Actually, there is a difference between the issues. Normally, you provide your customers with kosher food, which is the most you can do. Regarding many people, you can assume they will or may make berachot as they should, and if there is someone who you are sure will not, he would act the same wherever he eats! (This is a simplified treatment; see also Minchat Shlomo I, 35). Here, though, some of the customers would likely eat in a sukka at home or another kosher eatery if yours is closed.
Let us take a look at the prevalence of people who are exempt from eating in a sukka. Travelers­, even for non-mitzva purposes, are exempt from sitting in the sukka during their travels (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 640:8). That may apply to many men who will visit your restaurant. There are limitations on the use of this leniency (see Igrot Moshe, OC III, 93, who is particularly strict). The most important one is that it must be that he does not have easy access to a sukka (Mishna Berura 640:40). Even if you can assume that most people do not need a sukka (which we cannot determine from here), it will not help when you recognize people as locals, who prefer your cuisine to their sukka.

Anyone may eat outside a sukka when he is not having a halachically recognized set meal (Shulchan Aruch, OC 639:2). This means eating bread the size of an egg, but also applies to foods from the major grains (foods upon which one makes Mezonot, except for rice) eaten in a serious manner (ibid.). Exactly how much one has to eat of non-bread products is a matter of dispute, as is the question if other foods can be eaten in a meal-like manner outside the sukka (see Mishna Berura, ad loc.:16; Biur Halacha, ad loc.; Teshuvot V'hanhagot I,178). If you wanted to use this avenue of leniency, there is what to talk about with a reasonable amount of improvising (which we could try to help you with). If you set up a situation whereby you have reasonable menus that can be eaten out of a sukka, then you could even serve some bread with a visible note that says that those who need a sukka should have less than x amount of bread. Then you can use the rule of teli'ah, that you may assume that an object you give someone will be used properly if there is a reasonable possibility that this is the case, even if the person may be apt to use it in a forbidden manner (see Avoda Zara 15b). This idea would help regarding most scenarios of take-out.

It is usually problematic to get paid for work done on Chol Hamo'ed, but it is permitted when done for ochel nefesh (to facilitate eating on the chag) (see Biur Halacha 542:1). While it might be against the spirit of the law to use a leniency for the needs of the chag in a manner that lessens the mitzva of sukka, halachically, it is still ochel nefesh.

Let us summarize as follows. If you are in a place that lacks kosher eateries, it would be religiously worthwhile to use legitimate leniencies to stay open and try to arrange things so that few if any people will violate their obligation to eat in the sukka. If there are plenty of options with a sukka (in which case, the volume of customers at a kosher restaurant without a sukka would not be that great), it would be best to give yourself and your workers a deserved rest on the chag. (We also would understand if your hashgacha would not allow you to open.) However, in these difficult economic times, we do not want to rule out the possibility of working things out, as we began to outline.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 165:1) deals with the problem of one who has just left the bathroom and is ready to eat. If he does netillat yadayim once for both needs, he will have a problem of whether he should first make the beracha of Asher Yatzar for doing his needs, or first make the beracha on the netillat yadayim followed by Hamotzi and only afterward recite Asher Yatzar. Either way, there are issues of hefsek (improper break) in between the time the second beracha became necessary and when it was recited. Therefore, the Shulchan Aruch says to wash two times, the first to be followed by Asher Yatzar, and the second one by Al Netillat Yadayim. So we see that the fact that the hands were just washed does not preclude doing another formal washing for eating bread.

Does that mean that a second netillat yadayim is a mitzva that requires a beracha even if it adds nothing practical, except that now it is done for a bread meal? That seems to be the subject of a machloket. The Beit Yosef (OC 158) understands from Tosafot's (Pesachim 116b) statement regarding the two washings that we do on seder night that if one does a lower level obligation netillat yadayim for non-breads dipped in liquids and then needs to do one for bread, the latter netillat yadayim is a full obligation. However, the Darkei Moshe (as the author rules in the Rama, OC 158:7) says that this is so only when a while passed in between washings so that we can assume that he took his mind off his hands. Otherwise, one would not make a beracha on the second netillat yadayim.

Similarly, in the former context, the Mishna Berura (165:2) cites Acharonim that the first washing done to enable reciting Asher Yatzar should be a washing of cleanliness, not one of a valid halachic nature. One way to do this is to not use a washing cup (and preferably not use the first spurt of water from the faucet- see Tzitz Eliezer VIII, 7), which is a requirement for netillat yadayim. If one touched a covered part of the body or some other "dirty" thing that makes netillat yadayim necessary in between the washings, the netilla would be necessary (I imagine that this would undo much of the hygienic gains you want to accomplish).

This leaves the matter of whether one should dry his hands in between the hygienic cleaning and the netillat yadayim. There is a similar case that is discussed by the poskim. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 162:2) talks about pouring some of the netillat yadayim water on the hands to remove dirt prior to the main netilla. The Biur Halacha (ad loc.) says that there is no mention of a need to dry the hands after doing this, which could be necessary if we said that the water becomes tameh (impure) in the process and would ruin the netilla. He says that this is either because this pre-washing is part of the netillat yadayim process, whereby water can become tameh and be removed by the second washing, or, to the contrary, that other than regarding poorly executed netilla, water that gets on the hands is not considered tameh (based on the Magen Avraham 162:10). While the Yalkut Yosef (OC 159:1) agrees with this approach, there are significant poskim, both Ashkenazi and Sephardi, who disagree (Ben Ish Chai, Shemini 11; Chazon Ish 24:20; K’tzot Hashulchan 33:4). They say that in that case, one should dry the hands from the questionable water before commencing the real netillat yadayim. Without getting into the intricacies, it would seem that our case is more lenient than the one these poskim discuss, and thus it would seem that drying the hands that were washed for hygienic reasons is not necessary. 

We will first introduce the stringency of “right before Shabbat” that you refer to and then apply it to your case.

There are two categories of cases regarding having foods on a flame (irrespective of the melacha of actually cooking): shehiya and hachazara.

Shehiya means leaving a pot/food on the flame, after putting it there to cook or to heat up before Shabbat. In certain cases (about which there is a major machloket for thousands of years), one must do something to the system to reduce the chance that he will “stoke the coals” or its equivalent. The bottom line is that blechs and non-adjustable hot plates fulfill the halachic requirement, when necessary.

Hachazara means returning a food/pot to a heat source after it had previously been removed. The classic case is when one does so on Shabbat. Hachzara is a more severe case than shehiya (for reasons beyond our present scope) and in order for it to be permitted in the classic case, five basic requirements must be met: 1) The food must be fully cooked before returning it. 2) The heat source must be covered. 3) The pot should remain in one’s hand since being removed. 4) The remover should have had in mind to return it. 5) The food should still be warm. Only condition #2 applies to shehiya.

The general assumption, that the difference between shehiya and hachzara is that the former is when the food is left from before Shabbat and the latter is on Shabbat, is challenged by the following gemara (Shabbat 38b). “According to the one who says people may do hachzara (as we pasken), he may do hachzara even on Shabbat.” This implies that there is a case of hachzara that is not on Shabbat (and is easier to permit). Tosafot (Shabbat 36b) say that this refers to putting the food back on the flame so close to Shabbat that if the food were cold, it would not have a chance to become hot before Shabbat. Although several Rishonim disagree with Tosafot, the Rama (Orach Chayim 253:2) says that it is good to follow Tosafot's opinion.

If putting food on the flame at that time is hachzara, does that mean that all of the aforementioned five conditions of hachzara are needed? Your question raises the possibility that the food needs to be warm at the time of this Erev Shabbat hachzara or at least that the food has to be fully cooked. (While the soup is fully cooked, reheating liquid is forbidden like cooking uncooked solid foods.)

This is actually not the case. The five conditions of classic hachzara can be broken up into a few categories of the problems they solve. One is that putting the food on the flame should not violate bishul. This applies to condition #1 and #5. However, one will not violate bishul when he puts food on before Shabbat, and we have no source to extend this rabbinically to Erev Shabbat. Within the remaining three conditions, the covered flame (#2) is a matter of standard concern, whereas keeping the food in the hand and having intention to return it are special stringincies regarding hachazara. The Rosh (Shabbat 3:2) says that the stringency of hachazara soon before Shabbat applies to #2 no matter what state the food is in, which is not the case regarding shehiya (see Shabbat 36b and Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:1)) However, the other requirements do not apply before Shabbat (Mishna Berura 253:72). Since a non-adjustable hot plate is no worse than a blech (which solves #2), you do not have a problem.

Let us point out that regarding non-adjustable hot plates, important poskim allow returning fully cooked food (dry, or, if liquid, when it is still warm) even on Shabbat.  Also, exactly what time one has to put up the food in order to avoid Tosafot’s stringency is a topic that deserves discussion. However, in the case you described, you can ignore this stringency.

The gemara (Berachot 42a) discusses a category of food called pat haba’ah b’kisnin (phbbk), which is a baked grain-based food that shares qualities with bread but also is distinguished from normal bread. The gemara says that whether one recites Hamotzi or Mezonot on it depends on whether one is kovei’a seuda (sets a meal) on it. The Shulchan Aruch says that the other special halachot of bread apply to phbbk when one is kovei’a seuda, namely, that one recites Birkat Hamazon on it (Orach Chayim 168:6) and has to wash before eating it (ibid. 158:1). Let us now discuss pizza.

For something to be a candidate for bread status, it must be made from the five main grains and be baked or look like bread (corn bread and spaghetti are not treated like bread no matter how much one eats of them - see Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:10). Of foods that pass those tests, there are still characteristics that can make a food phbbk instead of bread. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) cites three opinions: it has a pocket of sweet filling; its dough contains significant amounts of ingredients such as sugar and oil, besides flour and water; it is thin and crisp. It is unclear whether these opinions are mutually exclusive or whether any significant non-bread characteristic makes it phbbk (see Biur Halacha to 168:8).

Pizza might be phbbk for one of the following reasons: 1) its dough may contain a lot of liquid other than water (e.g., oil, apple juice, milk); 2) it is baked together with pizza sauce and cheese, which make it similar to the pocket of filling above. However, it might not be phbbk. #1 requires that there to be a lot of other liquids (for Sephardim, enough to taste; for Ashkenazim, a majority of the non-flour element - Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 168). This is often not the case. Regarding #2, it is not clear that all fillings remove the bread status. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:16) says that a pashtida (knish-type food) filled with meat, fish, or cheese receives the beracha of Hamotzi on any amount. The Mishna Berura (ad loc.:94) explains that classic phbbk is made from sweet fillings that make it dessert-like (e.g., cake), as opposed to these that are more meal-like. The Taz (168:20) says that all fillings are the same, and the matter is usually treated like a doubt.

Furthermore, the Beit Yosef (OC 168; see also the Aruch Hashulchan, OC 168:25) says that phbbk is something that, because of its characteristics, one does not usually center a meal around. One can argue that people eat regular pizza as the main food for a meal, rather than as a minor part of the meal or as a snack between main meals. So, indeed, this respondent treats pizza like bread, for any amount (see Am Mordechai, Berachot 25). Many distinguish between water vs. fruit juice based dough or treat the matter as a doubt to be avoided (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 217).

In any case, according to the prevalent custom that pizza is phbbk, how much does one have to eat to require the halachot of bread? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 168:6) says that one has to eat the amount that most people consider having a meal. In another halachic context, the size of 3 or 4 eggs suffices. It is a question whether that suffices here or a full meal’s worth is needed (the Mishna Berura 168:24 leaves the matter open). There is also a question whether in the meal discussed the phbbk by itself is filling, or whether it is sufficient for it to be a filling meal that is centered around the phbbk (Mishna Berura ibid.) Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC III, 32) goes a step further, saying that nowadays, when bread’s role in meals is less than it once was, even a small amount of phbbk in the midst of a meal would require washing, Hamotzi, and Birkat Hamazon. Nevertheless, the most famous practice is that only two or perhaps three slices of average sized pizza are treated like bread.

A description of the domestic dishwasher in question is as follows:

The user is required to first rinse off the “serious” dirt (which would otherwise cause a blockage of the dishwasher). Then he may stack the dishes into the dishwasher, onto a wire tray that ensures a gap between the dishes. After closing the dishwasher door, the dishwasher begins to operate.

Its’ program consists of three stages-

During the initial stage, the dishwasher uses only water to rinse the dishes by means of a sprinkler device, which sprays water from the bottom of the dishwasher towards the dishes in order to rinse them. In some dishwasher models, the water is heated within the space of the dishwater by a heating element attached to the dishwasher bottom. The water reaches a temperature of at least 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit).

During the second stage, detergent is added to the water and the second rinse cycle of the dishes within the dishwasher begins.

During the third stage, the dishes are again rinsed using hot water in order to rinse off the detergent. Note that the dishwasher has a filter installed, which prevents leftover solid food items from clogging the drainage system. In such a case, the food would remain within the dishwasher space.

To answer the question, we must differentiate between several situations:

1.             When the dishes are dirty:

a.      If the initial rinsing of the dishwasher is done with hot water without detergent: since the water rinsing the dishes is like a keli rishon [“primary vessel”], if there is enough water to nullify the dishes and the dirt on them (by having sixty times the amount of water more than the dishes and dirt) – the dishes and the dishwasher are permissible to use. However, in the event that there is no possibility to nullify the forbidden item, the dishes and the dishwasher are forbidden and consequently require koshering.

b.      If the initial rinsing in the dishwasher is done with cold water and the dishes don’t have any remnants of food particles that don’t dissolve in water: one should regard the taste of meat and milk which was absorbed into the dishes during the second rinse cycle as a taste which has become spoiled (ta’am lifgam). This is due to the mixing of the detergent into the dishwasher water. In such a case, the dishes are kosher.

c.      If there are remnants of food particles in the dishwasher filter: one should regard the food particles which remain in the dishwasher after rinsing with detergent as pieces of food whose taste has become spoiled. Consequently, they don’t make the dishes forbidden to use. Also according to those who consider the taste that remains on the dishes hasn’t become spoiled, when there is enough water to nullify the remnants of food particles (by having sixty times the amount of water) – the dishes and the dishwater are kosher according to all opinions.

2.             When the dishes that were stacked into the dishwasher were clean:

a.      If the initial rinse cycle of the dishwasher is done with hot water but without detergent – since the dishwasher water is like a keli rishon [“primary vessel”], the dishes and the dishwasher are forbidden according to the Ramah. However, according to the Shulchan Aruch they are permitted.

b.      If the initial rinse cycle of the dishwasher is done with cold water, one should regard the taste of the meat and milk as spoiled, due to the mixing of the hot water with the detergent during the second rinse cycle. In such a case, the dishes are kosher.

You are correct that the Torah associates the destruction of the First Temple with the sin of not observing the seventh Sabbatical year.  This connection is not only in the sources that you mentioned, but is in the Torah itself as well, see Vayikra (Leviticus) 26:43.  The Book of Daniel contains prophecies about the forthcoming destruction of the Second Temple, such as Daniel 9:25-26.  In addition, the Book of Daniel also makes reference to the intensity and duration of the upcoming exile, in the many references to the ferocity of the “Fourth Beast” or “Fourth Kingdom.”  For example see Daniel chapters 2 and 7. 

Regarding the reasons for the destruction of the Temple and exile, the Talmud offers several suggestions.  In Tractate Yomah 9b, the Rabbis suggest that the destruction was the result of baseless hatred between Jews.  In Tractate Gitin 55b-58a, the Rabbis bring a series of stories where someone’s wrongdoing hastened the destruction.  On a positive note, in Tractate Pesachim 87b, there is a suggestion that the current exile has been so long in order to provide an opportunity for converts to be absorbed into the Jewish people.

We will start with your assumption that the feed is fully forbidden as basar b’chalav, the combination of milk and meat. The halachic ramifications are very complicated, and we will but summarize them.

Generally, when a forbidden food undergoes a major change so that it reappears in a totally different form, the new food is permitted. Thus, for one of many examples, a bird born from the egg of a treif bird is permitted (Temura 31a). Nevertheless, we must contend with the following source. The mishna brings an opinion that if a kosher animal drank the non-kosher animal’s milk, it should not be used for a korban. The gemara (ibid.) says that it refers to a case where it drank milk in a manner that would sustain it all day. Tosafot surmises that similarly if an animal was sustained consistently on grains of avoda zara, it would be forbidden, apparently even for regular eating (not only as a korban).

Despite an apparent abundance of sources permitting such a case (see Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 60:5; Igrot Moshe, YD I, 147), the Rama (YD 60:1) rules like Tosafot’s stringency regarding animals that have consistently been fed non-kosher feed. The Shach (ad loc.:5) and others argue on two major grounds. First, Tosafot was explaining an opinion that is not even accepted as halacha. Secondly, Tosafot’s suggestion is regarding feed of avoda zara, which is assur b’hana’ah (forbidden in benefit), whereas the Rama forbade it even due to simple eating prohibition.

The second point suggests a distinction whereby more opinions can accept the stringency regarding issurei hana’ah. This raised a lot of discussion regarding milk on Pesach from animals that were fed chametz on Pesach. We can address this matter only superficially in this forum. A major principle indicating leniency is the acceptance of the opinion (Avoda Zara 49a) that zeh v’zeh goreim, mutar (=zvzgm), In other words, when something is the product of two or more physical factors, some of which are permitted and some forbidden, the resulting object is permitted. Here, the milk is a result of the chametz but also other feed and/or the animal’s body, and thus it should be permitted. One question, though, is whether the major dependency on chametz, especially over time, makes the animal and its milk some type of continuation of the chametz (along the lines of the Rama). There is also an issue that regarding chametz, where the rules of bitul (nullification) do not apply, zvzgm might not either (see Magen Avraham 445:5). Oversimplifying the matter, the Mishna Berura (448:33) is equivocal and Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled leniently (Igrot Moshe, ibid.).

Important to us in Rav Feinstein’s thesis is that he rejects not only the Rama but also the Shach’s distinction. He says that the use of a by-product of an issur hana’ah that is now gone (i.e., the animal feed) is far too indirect to be considered benefiting from the original item. The prohibition could only be based on seeing the milk as an extension of the original object, which is a fringe opinion we do not accept.

Instead of citing all the various opinions and applying them to the similar but slightly more lenient case of basar b’chalav, we will obviate the issue by sharing our assumption, corroborated by an OU web page. Even regarding the calf feed that is a mixture of milk and meat (not all are), the milk and meat are not cooked together. That feed thus is forbidden only rabbinically and it is permitted to benefit from (Shulchan Aruch, YD 87:1). It is hard to imagine that even according to the Rama, a rabbinic prohibition (whose nature is procedural to require a person to refrain from eating, rather than saying the object is intrinsically forbidden- see Chelkat Yoav II, 20) would extend on to a transformed by-product.

1.         The halachah doesn’t prevent building a synagogue in which the entrance to the men’s and women’s section uses a common hallway.[1]

2.         If the women are dressed according to the laws of modesty, there is nothing that prevents one from reciting blessings in front of them.[2]

At first glance, there would not seem to be fundamental problems with operating the machine on a timer, as the same activation of the electric device and the heating of the water will occur regardless of if you fill the racks with dishes. As for the removal of the grime from the plates by using hot water (which occurs only because you put the plates in), that is not considered borer (removing impurities) or bishul (cooking). The reasons this is true are beyond our present scope. Some say that the soap is being cooked and should be put in before Shabbat (Techumin XI, pp. 137-154).
However, a safety device usually changes everything. In order that hot water should not come out of the dishwasher, the system is designed so that the machine works only when the door is locked until the end of the cycle. Obviously, the door is open when you load the dishwasher on Shabbat, and then you must lock it in order that the timer will be able to activate the machine. Closing the door thus causes the prohibition of Shabbat to occur at a later point when the timer will activate the dishwasher. Such a delayed reaction is only gerama, which is not a full violation of Shabbat, and is permitted in certain special situations that warrant a low-level violation of Shabbat (see Shabbat 120b and Rama, Orach Chayim 334:22). However, in most cases, it is forbidden to cause such a delayed reaction. For example, we do not allow one to press the buttons of an air conditioner to make it go on when a timer activates the system.
There is a technical solution, albeit a problematic one, that one can arrange with an electrician’s help. You can by-pass the aforementioned safety device (The Zomet Institute provides this service). Then when you lock the door, it will make no difference regarding the dishwasher’s operation. Unless one can ensure that this will not cause dangerous situations (such as opening the door during operation), we would say this is forbidden because “danger is more severe than prohibitions.” However, we cannot preclude the possibility that someone can create safeguards.
Regarding using the dishwasher a second time, when the dishes will not be reused, there is an additional problem. It is forbidden to prepare on Shabbat for after Shabbat (hachana), even if the preparation does not include a prohibited action. Filling the racks with dishes need not be preparation, as many people find it a good place to temporarily store dirty dishes. However, refilling detergent is clearly done to facilitate cleaning the dishes, and if they will be used only after Shabbat, it is hachana.
A final issue, which may or may not cause it to be forbidden to have the dishwasher go on, is called avsha milta. The Rama (Orach Chayim 252:5, as opposed to the Shulchan Aruch, ad loc.) forbids operating from before Shabbat a mechanism that is forbidden to operate on Shabbat if it makes noise. This problem certainly exists if the system went on by timer during Shabbat. It is permitted only if it is common for people to set up the mechanism in advance and thus there is no reason to suspect that one desecrated Shabbat in its regard (ibid, regarding a chiming clock). This could be a problem for a dishwasher. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 70) says that the forbidden level of noise is such that it is expected to be heard in the next room, which is borderline for a dishwasher. While Rav O. Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at III, 18) and Rav N. Rabinowitz (Si’ach Nachum OC 15) say that avsha milta applies to dishwashers, regarding relatively quiet models, this issue would not be a problem.
In short, while there may be a way to use dishwashers on a timer on Shabbat, a combination of technical and halachic problems makes it not simple in practice.

Millet and sorghum cannot become chametz and matzot cannot be made from their flour. Nevertheless, they are considered kitniyot products, which Ashkenazim may not eat on Passover. (Therefore, Sephardim may eat them.) However, even Ashkenazim may keep them in their homes during Passover – they need not be thrown out. Likewise, if some kitniyot accidently fell into a cooked dish, it doesn’t make the rest of the contents of the dish forbidden. Even more so, there is no need to clean or to change dishes in which they were cooked.

Regarding matzah, there are special matzot for people who have celiac. The matzot are made from oats, which are more easily digested than wheat. If your wife’s condition allows the eating of a small quantity on the Seder nights, it is recommended that she does so.

It is possible that abstaining from eating kitniyot might not apply in your case due to your wife’s medical condition – even if you are Ashkenazim.

Please feel free to call for further information.

The truth is actually not simple. You will see that much of the difficulty is not halachic but culinary: why is it that many people prefer schnitzel (breaded cutlets) to cutlets that are not breaded?

Clearly, the ikar (main part) of schnitzel is the poultry inside. In general, we make a beracha on the ikar, which exempts us from a beracha on the less important ingredients (Berachot 44a), and this is usually determined by the majority (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:7). However, an exception to this rule is that if the minority is from the major grain species (which includes standard flour), we make Mezonot on the mixed food (Shulchan Aruch ibid.:2). This exception is on condition that the grain product has a significant role in the food’s character. A minority of Rishonim seem to understand that the grain rule is just an application of the assumption that grain usually shapes the character of the food even when it is a minority. According to this approach, in a case like ours where the poultry is clearly the main ingredient, the beracha should be Shehakol. However, the more accepted approach is that grains have a halachic precedence, because of which the beracha follows them even when it they certainly are not the main ingredient, but a significant one (see Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). The classic case where it is not considered significant is when the grain product is there to make the other food stick together (ibid.; Tosafot, Berachot 36b).

The question then is what contribution schnitzel’s coating makes. We have seen claims of all of the following elements (after each, we will write what beracha is appropriate if this is the factor): 1) The coating tastes good, as a nicely seasoned doughy food (Mezonot). 2) It captures the oil from the pan and gravy from the cutlet in one rich (albeit not so healthy) layer (the beracha can go either way, as the doughy part tastes good, but mainly because of what it absorbed; still, it would seem to indicate Mezonot). 3) It causes the spices that are placed on top of the cutlet to not slide away (Shehakol). 4) It keeps the cutlet from drying out (Shehakol). 5) It allows frying at a high temperature with a reduced chance of burning (Shehakol). Although a majority of these theories point toward Shehakol, it does not mean that that should be the end result. This is because if all of the above are true, then there are important food elements to the coating, which make Mezonot appropriate, irrespective of additional “Shehakol” benefits.

Regarding the bottom line, some important poskim say that one should make Mezonot on schnitzel when the coating is relatively thick and Shehekol when it is thin (see opinions in V’zot Haberacha, pp. 256-261). Some contemporary authorities differ if “standard” schnitzel has a thick or thin coating (ibid., Birkat Hashem III, 10:59). Rav M. Feinstein is cited as requiring berachot on each, as neither element is dominant enough to outweigh the other; others suggest first eating a little of each separately to avoid doubt. (This solution makes halachic sense, but we do not like mandating convoluted practices to avoid making halachic decisions). Of crucial importance is that the minhag is quite clearly to make Shehakol. Admittedly, such minhagim often develop because Shehakol is the safe beracha, as one always fulfills his obligation after the fact with Shehakol (Shulchan Aruch, OC 204:13). This makes particular sense since the ruling can change depending on the time, place, and piece of schnitzel. Although some say Mezonot is also a “catch-all” beracha for almost all foods (Biur Halacha 167:10), this is far less certain. Therefore, although we think that most schnitzels deserve Mezonot, there is not enough certainty in the matter to instruct people to change the standard practice of reciting just Shehakol.

Your assumption has some basis in the sources, but halacha l’ma’aseh, the ruling is much more lenient than you imagine. We will take a look at the primary source and several machlokot (halachic disagreements), and then sum up the practical halacha.

The mishna (Pesachim 120a) says: “If some slept, they may eat; if all, they may not eat. Rabbi Yossi says: If they dozed off, they may eat; if they fell asleep, they may not eat.” The mishna certainly refers at least to the eating of the Korban Pesach, and, explains the Rashbam (ad loc.), it is a stringency based on the idea that, after the break of sleeping, it looks as if he is eating in two different places, which is forbidden for the Korban Pesach.

The first machloket to consider is whether this applies only to the Korban Pesach or even to afikoman, the matza we eat at the end of the meal, which is modeled after the korban, which was eaten on a relatively filled stomach. Most Rishonim (including the Rashbam, ibid.) say that it applies also to the afikoman, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 478:2) rules this way. The gemara (120b) strongly indicates that this is so, as it tells of an exchange between Abayei and Rabba about whether the latter slept too much to continue eating. Since they lived after the time of the Beit Hamikdash, this would indicate that the halacha lives on regarding afikoman. Tosafot (Pesachim 119b) differs, saying that it applies only to Korban Pesach and says that the gemara was exploring only the parameters of sleeping based on a parallel but different application (the beginning of a fast).

Another machloket is whether Rabbi Yossi, like whom we pasken, who introduced the distinction between dozing off and sleeping, added a leniency, namely, that only when everyone fully sleeps is it a problem (Rambam, Chametz U’matza 4:14). The Rosh (Pesachim 10:34) says he came to be stringent, that if even a minority of the group fully sleeps, they may not continue. The latter approach reads more easily in the aforementioned story, and although several opinions agree, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) says that only if everyone (or one person eating alone) sleeps is there a problem. Thus, this is not much of a problem, as it is rare that a whole group at a seder actually falls asleep (deeply enough that if one asked him a question, he would not respond- gemara ibid.).

Let us present yet another strong reason that this matter is almost never a problem. Almost all authorities agree that the problem of being in two places applies only to the Korban Pesach and its modern counterpart of the afikoman. However, if everyone falls asleep before the afikoman, they can get up and eat the afikoman (Rama, OC 478:2). Although the Shulchan Aruch sounds like he is stringent on this point, it is apparent from the Beit Yosef that he agrees, as Sephardic poskim understand and rule (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 478:9). Additionally, the Pri Chadash claims that only if one already ate his required k’zayit of afikoman would we tell him to stop eating.

While the problem regarding not being able to eat the afikoman is basically theoretical, it still might be better not to nap. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 473:133) says that it is improper to take a serious break, which includes sleeping, from the beginning of the seder until the end of Hallel. However, this is only a preference and one would have to balance the pros and cons according to his situation. Recall that one who sleeps during a meal should do netilat yadaim when he awakens without a beracha and if he goes to sleep in bed, he must make Hamotzi again as well (Mishna Berura 178:48).

On the subject of afikoman unnecessary stringencies, we remind afikoman snatchers and snatchees that a lost afikoman may be replaced by another matza (Rama, OC 477:2).

The reasons for the custom of spreading one’s fingers during Birkat Kohanim:

1.             The Aroch - the Kohanims’ fear of the Divine Presence compels them to spread their fingers outwards.

2.             To indicate which part of the blessing they are reciting, so that they shouldn’t get confused (Cf. entry “Balan”).

3.             Our Sages derived from the verse in Shir HaShirim (2: 9), “Meititz min hacharakim – he appeared through the lattice”, which refer to the Kohanims’ fingers (Yirei’im, Batei Midrash, Tanchumah, Nishal 5).

4.             In the verse says "koh te'varchu"(bless like this). If one adds a vov to the word ‘koh’ [comprised of a kof and a hey], you can read it as ko’ah [kof-vov-hey], which means “window” in ancient Hebrew. Therefore the verse would be read – "through a window you must bless".

As to the customs – Two different customs exist:

1.             Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei HaAvodah, ot 12) says that we should imitate the angel's six wings. This is achieved by spreading the fingers in the familiar gesture of Kohanim; creating a space between the ring finger and the middle finger separates the fingers into three separate units on each hand, six units altogether, which recalls the verse in Isaiah, "six wings each."

2.             The Zohar (Naso) states that one must separate every finger from the others.

First one needs to do determine from whom the note likely fell. The gemara (Bava Metzia 26b) talks about finding lost items in a store and distinguishes between the part of the store that is frequented by customers and the proprietor’s area. Assuming you found it in the customer area and especially considering that credits are usually ripped up after being redeemed, you can assume it fell from a customer (unless you found it next to some counter on the worker’s side).

Next, we must discuss whether you should try to return the note to the person who lost it. This depends on whether it has a siman (a distinguishing characteristic, so that one can prove that it was he who lost it). Assuming the credit note is for an amount that corresponds to the value of a specific item (as opposed to a coupon that is like a gift certificate of a set denomination), it seems that this is a siman (based on Bava Metzia 23b). If so, you should put up a note in an appropriate place in or around the store or give a customer service worker your phone number in case someone comes to look for it. If the store is being unhelpful or it is clear from the type of store it is that you will not be able to return it, you can assume that the person who dropped the note will give up hope of finding it. (It would have been nice if you waited a few moments to see if someone was looking around the store for it, although this was probably not halachically required.)

The credit note is like a partially open check (i.e., regarding its recipient) of the store. This type of “document” was prevalent in previous centuries, and the poskim called it a mamrani. It was usually written by a borrower who gave it to a lender to ease collecting the loan, as he could collect directly from the borrower or easily sell it to someone else. The Pitchei Teshuva (Choshen Mishpat 54:1) has a lengthy discussion of the Acharonim’s opinions about a case where a lender was given a mamrani, lost it, and asked the borrower, who knew he had not paid to pay him even though he was unable to return the mamrani. One of the main issues was whether the lender could write a shovar (receipt) that effectively said that whoever would present the mamrani for payment would no longer be able to receive payment, thus saving the borrower from paying twice. He cited the Tzemach Tzedek as acknowledging a custom that in such cases, an announcement would be made in the local shul/community that anyone who possessed this mamrani of the borrower in question must produce it within a certain amount of time or no longer be able to. The poskim’s general orientation is that a mamrani is not like cash or an object of value but a device for having loans paid, either to the lender or to the person who bought the mamrani from him. Thus, it was improper, albeit possible, for a finder to receive payment.

This situation is likely to continue to exist regarding credits at local or small stores, where there is a relationship between the proprietor and at least many customers. In such a case, if the customer said he lost the note, the proprietor is likely to believe him and honor it. If that happens, the note is not like money, which if lost is lost, but rather is a reminder of a debt. In that case, one who uses someone else’s credit is cheating the store. In contrast, in large, impersonal supermarkets, if one loses the note, he will not receive the credit, and the supermarket has “gained” by not paying its debt to the customer. Another who redeems it just replaces the deserving recipient and is not causing the store a loss. The store views their note as something of value, which can be used, sold to someone else, … or lost and found. If the finder cannot return it to the one who lost it, he may keep it and use it as he does if he finds a normal object that has no simanim.

The matter of milk and meat is one in which we employ considerable stringency. This applies both to what is considered milchig and fleishig and to the separation between eating the two. We will see if your case also falls on the side of stringency.

In general, when something not kosher is cooked in a pot, it makes the pot “not-kosher,” which, in turn, makes the food that later cooks in it not kosher, etc. However, kosher foods that have the potential to become not kosher lose that ability when they are sufficiently separated from their original state. Based on this idea, known as nat bar nat, hot pareve food that was placed in a milchig or fleishig utensil does not become forbidden when mixed with the opposite type of food (Chulin 111b, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 95:2). However, the Rama (ad loc.) says that if the food was cooked or roasted in a milchig or fleishig pot that had been used for its type within 24 hours, it may not be mixed with the other type of food. On the other hand, we do not treat the otherwise pareve food totally as milchig or fleishig, as the Rama says that you may put this food into a utensil of the other type. Your good question is whether according to Ashkenazim, who follow this Rama, this food is fleishig enough to require washing hands and mouth before eating milchig.

Let us peruse the laws dealing with the amount and type of separation between milk and meat. The gemara (Chulin 104b-105a) talks about waiting between eating meat and subsequently eating cheese but says that no time is required after cheese before meat. It does, though, say that one should either check or wash his hands and clean his mouth before eating meat. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 89:3) rules that the above requirements are true only regarding actual meat and milk/cheese, but between two pareve foods, one cooked together with meat and one with milk, he does not need to wait or wash. In practice, the minhag seems to be to wait even after pareve food that was cooked together with significant enough amounts of fleishig to give a taste before eating even pareve cooked in milchig (see opinions in Badei Hashulchan 89:82). In any case, the Rama (YD 89:3) states unequivocally that if one ate pareve food cooked in a fleishig pot, he can eat even cheese right afterward. This makes a lot of sense, as we saw that according to the Shulchan Aruch, one could even mix this basically pareve food straight into milk. In fact, to give this statement more of a chiddush, some say that it is talking about a case where there was a little actual meat gravy in the pot (Shach 89:19) or when the food that was cooked in the pot is sharp, in which case the leniency of nat bar nat does not usually apply (R. Akiva Eiger, ad loc.). Certainly, in the case of normal pareve food in a clean fleishig pot, one does not have to wait afterward.

What about washing and rinsing, which are more widely required than waiting, e.g., after eating dairy? While one could contemplate stringency, the Eliyahu Rabba (Orach Chayim 173:4) says that one does not have to take any of those steps, and this approach is accepted by the Kaf Hachayim (YD 89:61) and contemporary poskim (including the Halachos of Kashrus, p. 204). The Badei Hashulchan (Biurim to 89:3) raises the possibility that when the pareve food is sharp or when one actually sees or feels residue on the hands or mouth, one should have to remove them. However, as he seems aware, he did not substantiate his claim with sources, and as the logic can go either way, we will not introduce even further stringency than exists. Thus, the answer to your question is that after eating any pareve food cooked in a fleishig pot, no washing is needed.    

There are a few circumstances in which a non-Jew can do work on a Jew’s behalf on Shabbat. Some involve using hints, as you mention. One possibility is to use a hint in which you mention only the need and do not use any active verb. For example, you could say, “It is too light in many of the rooms for people to fall asleep,” as opposed to, “It would be nice if someone shut the lights before people go to sleep” (based on Rama, Orach Chayim 307:22 and Mishna Berura 307:66). Also, one can use even the latter type of hint before Shabbat so that the non-Jew will do the action on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:2).

Despite the fact that these distinctions are quite accepted, there are certain problems with their application. The Magen Avraham (252:9) says that one is not supposed to allow a non-Jew to do melacha for a Jew with the latter’s property, even when he does so of his own volition. This can be remedied by katzatz, i.e., having the non-Jew receive money by the piece of work done. However, even the leniency of katzatz does not work on a Jew’s property when people are apt to think that the Jew may have paid him according to time, and even if the non-Jew starts doing the work of his own volition on Shabbat, he should be stopped (Shulchan Aruch, OC 244:1). Why, then, does it help to do a special hint to the non-Jew if, when push comes to shove, he is doing the work on the Jew’s property? Acharonim struggle with this issue (see the Sanctity of Shabbos, p. 24), but in general the minhag is to allow this type of non-commercial activity.

Even when it is considered that the Jew did not tell the non-Jew to do the work, it is prohibited to receive positive, direct benefit until after Shabbat from that which a non-Jew did on a Jew’s behalf on Shabbat (Shabbat 122a). However, not everything is considered such benefit, and a classic example the poskim discuss is creating darkness, which is considered just removing light and is permitted.

In addition, there is an over-arching heter for allowing telling (even directly) a non-Jew to shut the lights under the circumstances you describe. Shutting a light is a rabbinic prohibition (Mishna Berura 278:3). Under quite a few circumstances of need, it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to do a rabbinic prohibition, including shutting a light to allow a child to sleep (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 38:26). One of the examples is for a mitzva (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:5) and here there is a double mitzva. One is the (albeit, small) chance that this act of the non-Jew will be a part of enabling your Jewish participant to embark upon a way of life of Shabbat/Torah observance. The other is the mitzva of afrushei me’isura (preventing one from sinning), even on a one-time basis. Although we do not usually say that one should perform a small sin to save someone else from a big sin (Shabbat 4a), the rules of instructions to non-Jews have a special built-in leniency for such cases.

Therefore, in addition to permissibility through hints, it should be permitted because of your perceived need. This being said, we would caution that your plan, especially if not planned properly, could have negative educational ramifications in addition to positive ones. Since you are in the field of working with this population, we leave such considerations to your discretion.

Question: The defendant (=def) hired a distinguished law firm (=pl) to work on a major project. After pl sent def a letter outlining the work and payment guidelines and def responded positively, pl began working for def in 02/07. One matter that was raised was that billing would be on a quarterly basis. For 02-04 /07, pl billed for 73,000 shekels. In 06/07, def met with members of pl; one of the issues was def’s dissatisfaction with the high fees. Def claims that pl then set the total fee for successful completion of the project at 100,000 shekels (50,000 to be paid immediately). After much activity from 05/07 till 02/08, pl sent def a bill for 207,000 shekels. Def refuses to pay the full amount with the following claims: def did not sign a formal contract with specific sums of money spelled out; the agreement was changed to have a 100,000 shekels cap; def had specified his expectation that a specific senior lawyer would handle the project, while he actually did little work; pl did not succeed in the project’s goal.

Answer: The written communication between the pl and def, even if it involved def’s representatives, suffices to set the work agreement between the sides. It specified that they are governed by pl’s standard practices and rates. While def’s response mentioned his trust in a specific lawyer’s ability to succeed, it does not stipulate the level of his involvement. It is standard practice at law firms for younger staff members to do most of the work, under the supervision of a seasoned lawyer.

Pl denies they agreed to change the billing procedure. Def brought witnesses only to the fact that he said after the meeting that he was relieved by its outcome, whereas he is required to prove a change was agreed to. The fact that there was a long delay in billing after the meeting fits well with def’s claim but falls short of proof.

The main question is whether the delay in billing is a significant breach of contract. Considering the agreed upon fact that def reacted strongly to the quarterly bill of 73,000 shekels, it was clearly and legitimately important to him to realize the mounting costs that reached an additional 207,000 shekels. While small delays should not invalidate a contractual agreement, there must be some cutoff point. We conclude that after five months without billing (10/07), def was no longer bound by their written agreement.

Even without a contract, one has to pay for work done on his behalf, but the rate must be determined. There are a few halachic models, none of which fit perfectly here. When one is hired but no rate is discussed, one pays according to the lower rate for such workers in the field. However, it appears to us that had def known how much this work would cost him, he would not have continued pl’s employment (he already had full-time legal counsel) so it is not considered working with approval. If the work was slated to be done, he receives the amount that a person would pay for such a job. If not, he is paid no more than expenses (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 375:1). Here it is hard to determine because he wanted the work done but not at the cost discussed now.

Our case seems more similar to people who ate someone else’s meat, thinking it was from their animal. The gemara (Bava Kama 112a) says that they pay at a cheap rate (two thirds of the going rate- Bava Batra 166b) because they would have refrained from eating had they known how much they would have to pay out of pocket. In this case, where def had legal counsel on hand at a lower rate per extra work, one third of the requested payment, starting 10/07, suffices.

Def’s claim that there was no benefit is rejected because pl helped in certain areas and also made progress regarding the project, for which they deserved compensation. The fact that afterward things did not work out does not retroactively erase the previous obligation.  

If we had to guess, we would assume that this question is not an actual case but an inquiry into the halachic view on issues of monopoly (if not, we will need more details). This is not the forum to write a complete learned treatise on the Jewish approach to monopoly law. The matter also depends on local laws, as on a matter of public welfare like this, halacha accepts the law of the land as binding (see Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 44, regarding the opposite question of too much competition). However, we will provide a reasonable picture based on classical rabbinic sources to help understand how a Torah-based society would handle such issues.

This specific question’s most basic problem is the matter of mispricing. If the proprietor raises prices 20% above an item’s going rate, he violates the Torah prohibition of ona’ah (Vayikra 25:14; see Shulchan Aruch, CM 227:1). While the price can depend on different factors and change, one cannot create a monopoly, artificially changing the supply and demand equilibrium and then say that his price is the local going rate. (One may mildly affect the prices by deciding how much of his own produce to put on the market – see Bava Batra 90b and Rashi, Bava Metzia 60a).

The gemara (Bava Batra 90b) forbids charging artificially high prices, most especially for staple goods in Israel (so rule the Rambam, Mechira 14:6 and Shulchan Aruch, CM 231:25). The question is how this is different from the laws of ona’ah. The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 231:25; see also Pitchei Choshen, Ona’ah 14:(31)) understands that this is referring to market manipulation to alter the price. The gemara (ibid.) also forbids creating a scarcity of staple produce, irrespective of the pricing issue. Historically, there have been many ordinances approved by leading rabbis to root out market abuses, including monopolistic practices.

So much for the public impact upon the consumer. Is there a problem in regard to unfairness to competitors? The most acute issue of competition is when an “outsider” sets up shop where a local is selling (hasagat g’vul- Bava Batra 21b). Other than that, it is permitted to do promotions or charge lower prices in order to gain more customers at the expense of others. The gemara (Bava Metzia 60a) explains that, regarding promotions, competitors can also do promotions, and regarding prices, one cannot outlaw it because of the benefit to consumers.

One can make the claim that here he is leaving no room for anyone else, so that the person who would have wanted to open a business will be totally unable to do so. When one person’s business makes another’s untenable, we have the concept of pasik l’chiyutei (Bava Batra 21b) which in some cases requires him to stop his activities. However, that is when one already has a business and is financially pressured to give it up. If one just arranges things so that another decides it is not advantageous to open a store as he was contemplating, we find no prohibition (see Pitchei Choshen, IV, 9:(9)). It is even possible that the monopolist had reason to fear that planned competition would have made his business untenable or otherwise have used unfair practices, in which case preventing such competition would not be halachically or morally objectionable.

There is an approach that even an ostensibly good practice such as lowering prices can be wrong. The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 228:14) says that lowering prices to an unsustainable price is unfair to other proprietors who cannot follow suit. After all, Bava Metzia 60a agreed to special incentives to the consumer because it was possible for the others to do likewise. Whether this would hold someone back when the competition does not exist yet and therefore no one is having his existing livelihood taken away is very questionable.

 There are two realms to discuss regarding the use of a goy shel Shabbat. One is mentchlichkeit. You are apparently talking about one who is paid by the community, whose main concern is its members’ most pressing needs. This includes taking people to the hospital, preventing large losses, and helping with a great need of individuals or groups. He is possibility not paid for helping with small inconveniences (and might ask for more money if he is bombarded incessantly). More importantly, he cannot be in two places at the same time, so if he is taking care of one person’s small need, he will be temporarily unavailable for someone else’s big needs. Sometimes that delay is crucial.

Now we will discuss the laws of Shabbat. While it is not a simple matter, we assume that some types of hints are considered as if the Jew did not make a request. The source is the Magen Avraham 307:31, who distinguishes between types of hints to answer the following contradiction. The Rama (Orach Chayim 307:22) says that whenever one may not do something, he may not hint to a non-Jew to do it for him. He contrasts that with classical sources that say that one may tell a non-Jew that he cannot read a letter, thereby hinting to open the letter. He answers that one is allowed to mention a need but not tell the non-Jew to do an action in a way that will serve as a hint to do that which he wants the goy to do. The Mishna Berura (307:76) and contemporary poskim accept this Magen Avraham, which is apparently referred to in your question.

However, there are two problems that must somehow limit use of this leniency. Firstly, when one sees a non-Jew doing forbidden work in a Jew’s home and/or using the Jew’s property on the Jew’s behalf, he is required to protest the activity (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2). This is because the Jew appears like one who is enlisting the non-Jew’s help in a forbidden manner. If it is necessary to protest when the goy initiated the work, how could it be permitted to hint to him to do it in the first place? The other problem is that if a goy does forbidden work on a Jew’s behalf, even without his involvement or knowledge, the Jew may not benefit from the result until enough time transpires after Shabbat for that particular chore to have been done (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:1). Again, a hint is no better, and it should be forbidden to benefit from the result.

Thus several recent poskim limit the efficacy of hinting on Shabbat to cases such as the following: 1) a situation where the Jew could have continued doing what he was doing without the non-Jew’s action, such as eating in a room where there was already sufficient (if less than ideal) light to eat by (Igrot Moshe, YD III, 47.2). 2) The nature of the benefit provided is one of removing impediments, not one of providing something positive new (Orchot Shabbat 23:(46)). Examples include shutting a light and perhaps opening an envelope (the Magen Avraham’s case; see various opinions in article #14 at the end of Orchot Shabbat). 3) He will receive benefit only after Shabbat.

In cases of significant need, where it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform what would be for us a rabbinic violation, it is also permitted to benefit from whatever work was done. Therefore, if one was careful on the mentchlichkeit matter and thus the need is great, there are many additional cases where the benefit element is resolved as well. In any case, if one is not familiar enough with the halachot, he may have to ask a rabbi before going to the goy shel Shabbat. Many communities help out in the matter by having the goy keep “an instruction manual” (as it were) handy for those who seek his help.

One who is on a journey, during which a sukka is not readily available is exempt from eating/sleeping in a sukka (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 640:8). This certainly applies on a plane.

Let us first note that Kedusha is a series of three important p’sukim (Kadosh, Baruch k’vod, and Yimloch), each preceded by an introductory passage (Nekadesh, or Nakdishach for Sephard, Le’umatam, and U’vidivrei), with additions for Shabbat. Many hummers are concerned that it is forbidden to say the words along with the chazan.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 125:1, based on Shut Harosh 4:19) says that no one but the chazan should recite Nakdishach at all. The Machatzit Hashekel (to Magen Avraham 125:1) and Mishna Berura (125:1) explain that this passage was instituted for the chazan, as shaliach tzibbur (representative of the congregation) to prompt the congregation, who would respond with the p’sukim alone. The Beit Yosef is uncertain as to whether this idea applies to the other introductory passages as well. In practice, we do say Nekadesh (and Sefardim often sing it together- see Yabia Omer, VII, OC 14). This can be attributed to a few things: 1) The Taz (125:1) questions what the issue could be about saying these passages, especially as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 109:2) rules that one who starts Shemoneh Esrei along with the chazan’s chazarat hashatz says Kedusha with him word for word. 2) The Ari (cited in Ba’er Heitev 125:1) says that one should recite all of Kedusha along with the chazan silently. 3) The minhag is to say Nekadesh. (The Aruch Hashulchan 125:2 says that the minhag is to say only Nekadesh and not Le’umatam and U’vidivrei; on Shabbat, the minhag is to say the long additions).

What about repeating these words a second time? The Rama (OC 125:1) says that one should not speak during Kedusha. The Magen Avraham (125:1) says that one should not even learn without speaking but should listen to the chazan. However, he says that this restriction does not apply when the chazan is singing tunes without words or during the extended passages for Shabbat, which are not critical to Kedusha. If so, restrictions on saying extraneous things or usurping the chazan’s role at that point are also not likely an issue. Although the poskim advise not to talk until the end of the beracha after Kedusha (see Mishna Berura 125:9, in the name of the Maharil), it appears that the issue is of disrespect to Kedusha. The poskim on the above issue do not say that unnecessary recitation is a hefsek (formal interruption). Only when words are repeated nonsensically to fit in with a musical piece is that an issue (see Yabia Omer, VII, OC 14; Igrot Moshe, OC II, 22). Singing the words of Mimkocmcha, for example, should not have that problem.

There is an issue when, with religious/musical fervor, the congregation drowns out the chazan. One problem, disgrace to the words, should apply to all of Kedusha (as above). This should not be such a problem when people say the appropriate words, albeit not in the classical manner of the chazan alone being audible, but in a way many feel inspiring. Presumably, it is a problem when people are “stringent” to hum, but so loudly that the words are not heard clearly from anyone. Another problem is that those who are in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei need to hear Kedusha, as they cannot recite it. It is a machloket (Az Niddbaru II, 60 - yes; Igrot Moshe, OC III, 4 - no;) whether they can fulfill this by hearing people other than the chazan say the words, considering that they do not have in mind to do it on the davener’s behalf. However, this applies specifically to the p’sukim of Kedusha (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 8:38), which are less commonly sung.

The following is our advice. During Kadosh and Baruch k’vod (and perhaps the final words of L’umatam and U’vidivrei), the chazan should be heard clearly, and the congregation should do no more than hum quietly. During the longer Shabbat additions, people may sing along as they like, and if this competes with the chazan’s voice, they should recite the words. (If one plans to do this, it is preferable to refrain from saying it while the chazan is waiting).

 The gemara (Pesachim 76b) says that one should not eat fish that was roasted together with meat because of the danger of leprosy. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 116:2) codifies this in regard to eating meat and fish together. The Rama adds not to roast meat along with fish because of reicha (the aroma) but says that if this was already done, the food is not forbidden.

Your case seems to be like the Rama’s. The idea behind his compromise is as follows. In the context of roasting kosher and non-kosher foods together (Yoreh Deah 108:1) and baking bread near meat with the intention of eating the bread with milk (ibid. 97:3) we say that roasting things near each other facilitates only minor taste transfer (reicha) between the foods. While these situations are to be avoided, food does not become forbidden without more direct contact, including by cooking in the same pot, when the process produces zeiah (significant water vapor) in the oven, or when the foods touch. While one should avoid even roasting meat and fish together in an oven, it is fine if one of them is covered reasonably well (Shulchan Aruch, YD 108:1).

Even in your case, there is room for leniency as we will explain. The Maharshal (Chulin 7:15) allows one to roast meat and fish together in one oven, at least in a relatively large oven (like most of ours). He claims, based on the Rambam (Maachalot Assurot 9:23) that the prohibition referred to cooking the two together in one pot, whereas in one oven there is no danger. The Taz (116:2-3) cites the Maharshal but relies on his leniency only in regard to bread baked in the same oven with meat to be eaten with fish (not fish and meat together). The Shach (YD 116:1) cites the Maharshal leniency regarding our case as well, apparently even in a small oven. On the other hand, he also cites an opinion that it is forbidden even b’dieved (after the fact) without clearly favoring one opinion. There is an agreed upon issue regarding meat and fish that is more lenient than regarding matters of standard “religious” prohibitions: one can use the same utensils for meat and fish (Taz 116:2). In other words, not in all cases of transference is there deemed to be danger. On the other hand, there are opinions that we are stricter for meat and fish than we are regarding standard prohibitions, based on the rule that “danger is more severe than prohibitions.” See the Pitchei Teshuva (YD 116:3) who cites various opinions as to whether to apply the rule of nullification by 60 in this context.

As far as the propriety of following the lenient opinion, it seems that we have to decide how severely the concern of danger should be viewed. For one, is there an issue of a Torah law? Rav Kook (Da’at Cohen 55) writes that the prohibition to inflict on oneself a non-life-threatening danger is only rabbinic. Rav O. Yosef (Yabia Omer I, YD 8) says that while it is forbidden from the Torah to damage oneself, it is only rabbinically forbidden to eat meat and fish, as it only creates the possibility of mishap. Both see the rabbinic status as reason to rule leniently (each in their own context). Furthermore, many notice the Rambam’s (the famous rabbi/physician) apparent ignoring of this halacha. The Magen Avraham (173:1) sees this as support for his suggestion that the danger is not prevalent in our times and places. The Chatam Sofer (II, 101) raises an additional possibility that it applies only to a specific species of fish. (There is a rejected opinion that it does not apply to fowl- see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 116:2). While few go as far as ignoring the idea of not mixing meat and fish, many poskim factor these opinions in when looking for leniency in gray areas.

Therefore, while it is halachically safer to not roast meat and fish uncovered in the same oven, it seems reasonable to do so in a regular, large oven when there is a need.

The Torah commands us to show respect (kavod) to our parents (Shemot 20:12) and treat them with awe (morah) (Vayikra 19:3). The gemara (Kiddushin 31b), in delineating morah, includes not standing in their place or sitting in their place.

What is considered “their place”? Regarding standing, Rashi explains that it is referring to a communal place where some fathers congregate for people to seek their advice. He does not explain what the place of sitting is. The Ramah, cited by the Tur (Yoreh Deach 240) says that one should not sit in his parent’s seat (literally, place of lounging) at home. The Tur implies that Rashi felt that a seat at home lacks the importance for the prohibition to apply, but the Beit Yosef says that Rashi agrees with the Ramah. He says that sitting in a parent’s seat at home is obviously forbidden, and Rashi needed to explain where standing would be problematic, as such a formal place does not exist at home.

In any case, the Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) forbids sitting in a parent’s spot at home as well. The Beit Yosef (ibid.) and Shach (YD 240:1) say that it is permitted to stand where one’s parents usually sit, as this is not taking his or her place in a manner that equates the child’s importance to his parent’s. A contemporary posek (Hilchot Bein Adam Lachaveiro 5:79) says that it is also forbidden to sit in a parent’s physical chair if it is unique (special upholstery, arm rest, etc.) even if it is in an unusual location.

Most sources seem to indicate that the prohibition applies even if the parent is not present. However, there are some opinions that if the parent is not present and it is not a case where all have assumed their regular places except that the son has taken his father’s place, then it is okay (Rishon L’tzion, pg. 94). What several poskim discuss and a consensus permit is after the parent’s death (Chayim B’yad 125). The parent’s place is not holy, and to the contrary, inheritance is very much about taking over that which the parent left behind. (There are opinions that one should avoid sitting in a father’s place in shul during the year of aveilut.)

A parent can waive his right to honor (Kiddushin 32a) and so, with his permission, one can sit in his place. Although there is a machloket whether he may even allow his disgrace (see discussion in Yaskil Avdi 7:21), it seems clear that sitting in one’s place is rarely a disgrace (ibid.). In many cases, permission may be assumed. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:9) uses such an assumption to explain the standard practice that boys sit in their father’s seat in shul when the latter is not there. In general, it seems from the poskim that a practical, logical approach is called for. Rav Elyashiv is quoted (Bein Adam Lachaveriro 5:77) as saying that the prohibition does not apply to a parent’s bed, which is not a place of honor.

 It is possible, in many families, that there is a true parent’s “seat of honor” only at a Shabbat table and that at other times or in a different room things are not as set or viewed as seriously (it depends on the family). Certainly there is no need to create such a seat, and if a parent moves around often, for whatever reason, we would not grant the seat he sits in most frequently the status of his seat. In a similar vein, the Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.) said that while the halacha applies to a mother, it was less common in his time for a mother to have a set seat.

Regarding a guest, certainly the stakes are lower as we are not discussing the serious commandment of honoring a parent. However, it is worthwhile for a guest to ascertain whether there is a strongly defined set place for the head(s) of the family. If there is, it would be appropriate for him to respect it as well.

 This is a very hard question to answer, not just because it is hard to predict the likely potential scenarios, but because there is a conflict between values, as we will explain.

Hachnasat orchim (welcoming guests) is a rabbinically mandated application of the Torah command to love one’s counterpart (Rambam, Avel 14:1). It applies both to poor and rich guests and, in theory, can be accomplished even when taking money for expenses (food, telephone calls, etc.) by providing a warm, welcoming place to be (Ahavat Chesed 3:1). Thus, even if someone can afford to stay in a hotel, (and, maybe, from her perspective, should do that) if she asks to stay at one’s house or the situation is such that such an invitation is the normal nice thing to offer, the mitzva is normally a responsibility.

There is a general question about the obligation to fulfill a mitzva that has a large physical or emotional price, and this comes up in different contexts. In Living the Halachic Process (vol. II, D-15) we dealt with someone who can expect to have a moderate allergic reaction to eating matza on Pesach. The basic assumption is that one does not have to make himself sick in order to fulfill a mitzva, and while it is hard to do, one has to try to figure out what is a normal “price” one has to pay to fulfill a mitzva. In this case, when it is a matter of your needs against another person’s needs and feelings, the matter is certainly not easy to determine, but one should try to consider this in an idealistic but realistic manner. The availability of alternative arrangements is a factor in this context (see Ahavat Chesed 3:2)

There is another element to the complex nature of this question. Just as a host is urged and, to a great extent, commanded to extend himself to make the guest happy and welcome (ibid. 1) so is the guest required to not take advantage or overdo her welcome (Halichot Bein Adam Lachveiro 8:28). If she is outright damaging to her hosts, they are not required to keep her (ibid. 6, in the name of Sefer Chasidim). We would certainly say that if she were stealing from her host, presumably even if the host is willing to spend similar amounts of money to feed her), she can be asked to leave. You could make the claim that gezel sheina (deprivation of sleep) would be equivalent. On the other hand, it is hard to know where to draw the line on such a matter (otherwise, we would all be thieves at one time or another).

A final, related issue is that if your guest continues to grossly abuse her rights, she is seriously sinning. By letting her continue to do so, in some ways you are wrongly facilitating her sins. The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 205) says that rebuke, in addition to correcting “religious” sins and those affecting third persons, is intended for people who are being abused (as opposed to harboring resentment – see Vayikra 19:17). While we are cautious about the use of rebuke, having your guest continue to upset you is unlikely to be in her best interest.

All this being said, we think you should consider seriously the likelihood that your guest was not aware of how her behavior disturbed you. She is less likely to trip the alarm again, and you can probably unplug the phone or mention calmly how its ringing disturbs you greatly. Hopefully, your friend is a nice person who will be a much improved guest in the future. So, if you can put up with her for another night and see how it goes, you would probably be doing a big mitzva, even if you arguably can get out of it. Feel free to follow up as things develop.

The Shulchan Aruch didn’t render as halachah the custom that forbids eating kitniyot (legumes) on Passover. Even according to Ashkenazi practice to refrain from eating kitniyot (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 452: 1), the custom is relating to a case in which the legumes are by themselves, or when they’re the main component of a mixture. However, in the case of Diet Cola, even if the source of the sweetener is from legumes, it is not on its own, and therefore such a case was never accepted in the minhag (custom). Furthermore, the sweetener is a derivative of legumes, which was never part of the custom either, even on its own (cf. Ramah, Ibid.; Chok Yaakov, siman 453, sif katan 6).

For more detaosl see BeMareh HaBazak, volume 2, siman 51, p. 90.

 There are many sources on the idea of connecting one’s tefilla to that of the tzibbur (congregation). Not only do important sections of tefilla require a minyan and it is more respectful to Hashem to join a group when turning to Him (the larger the better- Mishna Berura 90:28), it is also more conducive to the tefilla being accepted favorably (Berachot 6a). The matter of davening at the time the tzibbur davens comes up within the latter context. The gemara (Berachot 7b) tells that Rav Nachman told Rav Yitzchak that he had been too weak to come to shul. Rav Yitzchak asked why he did not have someone tell him when the tzibbur was up to tefilla (apparently Shemoneh Esrei) so that he could benefit from the eit ratzon (time of good will) at that time to help his tefillot. Tosafot (Avoda Zara 4b) says that there are different levels of advantage: together with the tzibbur, one’s tefillot are “heard”; at the same time in different places, they are “not pushed away.” These levels of acceptance probably depend on other factors, and we are not able to comprehend such Divine matters’ exact meanings.

In any case, following this guideline is not a full halachic requirement but something one should try to avail himself of (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 90:9.). It is related to the idea of davening in a shul even if one cannot do so together with a minyan (ibid.). The latter matter is a double-edged sword, as the one real prohibition in this regard is davening in a shul ahead of the tzibbur (Berachot 28b).

Let us now address your question. The closest source we have found in the Rishonim is in the Semag (Aseh 19, p. 102a, cited by the Rama, OC 90:9), who says that if there is no local minyan, one should follow the time that “communities of Israel” daven. This implies that, ideally, one follows the local minyan but that there could be some type of official average time. We do not know the extent to which there was a uniform time in his days, but we cannot identify such a time nowadays. (There is a general preference for vatikin, but if the Semag had that time in mind, he would have said it.)

The Mishna Berura (90:31) seems to say that in places where there are many minyanim, all times are good. However, he and his source, the Chayei Adam (16:3), is talking about refraining from davening before the right time, and says that it does not apply when there are many minyanim. One can still ask whether there is something to do if one specifically wants to avail himself of the positive element. Ishei Yisrael (8:(32)) seems to say that all times are good. Avnei Yashfe says in the “name” of an unnamed gadol that in such a case there is no preference (sounding like nothing is particularly good). However, we prefer the following compromise approach. Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted as saying that the gemara implies that this matter requires one to focus on a specific minyan (Ishei Yisrael, op. cit.). While it is not clear to us where Rav Auerbach saw this in the gemara, it leads in the logical direction of his disciple, Rav Neuwirth (cited ibid.). If one usually davens with a specific minyan but cannot make it on a certain day, he gets the positive element of davening when he davens at the same time as they do even if there are many other minyanim in town. (This makes particular sense if this matter depends more on psychology than on mysticism.) Rav Neuwirth brings an interesting precedent from the Sha’ar Hatziyun (551:56) that if one is eating fleishig at seuda shlishit during the Nine Days, he should stop when his regular shul has davened Ma’ariv. If one is not connected to a specific minyan and there are many minyanim in town, then there is apparently neither anything positive nor any requirement to try to correspond to some random minyan.

This question features the overlap of a few areas of halacha.

The first question is whether it is indeed enough to eat less than a k’zayit of karpas, as in general, such an amount is not considered halachic eating. The Rambam (Chametz U’Matza 8:2) actually requires eating a k’zayit, but we accept the Rosh’s opinion that it is unnecessary because the mitzva is not a classic one of eating karpas but of incorporating it in the order of observances (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 473).

We prefer not having a k’zayit to avoid two doubts regarding berachot. If we ate a k’zayit, it would be unclear if we would need a beracha acharona after eating it for the following reason. Usually one makes a beracha acharona on what he eats before a meal (Mishna Berura 176:2). However, one of the exceptions is when the beracha he made before that food exempts him from a beracha on a food that would normally take a beracha during the meal. That linkage connects the two eatings and allows Birkat Hamazone to relate to the food before the meal (ibid.). Regarding our case, there is a machloket about the reason for the consensus that there is no beracha of Borei Pri Ha’adama on maror. The Rashbam (Pesachim 114b) says that it is because the beracha made on karpas covers it. This is not simple given that the (hopefully) long section of maggid separates the two. If it does cover, then karpas is connected to the meal, making a beracha acharona on it unnecessary, even if he ate a k’zayit. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 473:6), while suggesting to eat less than a k’zayit, says that no beracha acharona is made even if one ate a k’zayit of karpas (see Mishna Berura 473:56).

The Gra (to OC 473:6) claims that the Rama would not agree to connect karpas and maror because he considers the delay for Maggid a halachic break. Evidence of this is the Rama’s ruling requiring a new beracha for the second cup of wine (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 474:1). According to this approach, the Rama does not require Borei Pri Ha’adama on maror because of the Ri’s opinion (Tosafot, Pesachim 115a) that, since it is eaten after Hamotzi, maror is subsumed under the meal. Thus there is no connection between the berachot on karpas and on maror and if one were to eat a k’zayit of karpas, he would need a beracha acharona. Another reason to require a beracha acharona is that the break is too long for Birkat Hamazone to relate back to it (Ohr Zarua, cited in Chazon Ovadya 18). Even after a full meal, one should normally bentch within 72 minutes of the end of the eating (Shulchan Aruch, OC 184:5). Because of all of these varied opinions and the fact that we strive to avoid doubt especially regarding berachot, it is better to have less than a k’zayit of karpas. (On less than a k’zayit there is a beracha rishona but not a beracha acharona– Shulchan Aruch, OC 210:1).

Based on what we have already seen, there is another benefit for not having a k’zayit of karpas. If we were to believe that a beracha acharona was called for on the karpas, then most agree that it ends the efficacy of the beracha rishona (the Magen Avraham 190:3 is a notable exception). Therefore, the Borei Pri Ha’adama on karpas would not cover the maror, which is pertinent if we do not accept the aforementioned Ri, that maror is subsumed under the meal.  It would be improper to unnecessarily require an extra set of berachot, and we would not want a doubt as to whether there should be one (see Chazon Ovadya, op. cit.)

Another interesting point is that having less than a k’zayit makes it questionable whether there is a need for netillat yadayim before it (see Biur Halacha to OC 473:6). However, since we anyway do not make a beracha on the netillat yadayim (because it is only on a dipped vegetable, not bread), this doubt does not concern us.

The children may wait 3 hours. She should wait 6 hours. Of course if the mother decides to arrange the meals so that it is compatible for her and that affects them, this is no different then eating in a public setup (yeshiva, hotel) where the 3 hour people will in practice do a lot of waiting 6 hours.

If there is chametz in clearly marked and covered areas in the room, it is permitted to enter. He may bake things that are double wrapped in chametzdik ovens or ranges but otherwise should kasher the heating elements he is using. Kosher food, including on Pesach is double-wrapped by the producers and that is the way the traveler should find them.

Chametz that is owned by a Jew over Pesach is forbidden for him or any other Jew to eat or benefit from (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 448:3), but not chametz that is owned by a non-Jew. According to classic halacha, in a marriage, the husband receives his wife’s salaries, owns "family property," and controls the property his wife brought into the marriage while they remain married. However, this is not an intrinsic law but an arrangement the Rabbis instituted, if the wife agrees, in return for the husband’s obligation of full support and other matters (Ketubot 47b). Your parents are not halachically married. Furthermore, the Rabbis did not get involved in the financial arrangements in non-Jewish marriages. Thus ownership of property of a non-Jewish or intermarried depends couple depends on individual agreement, societal norms, and/or secular law. It is safe to assume that when a 21^st century, Western-society spouse buys crackers in the supermarket from joint finances, they are jointly owned.

Therefore, at first glance, your mother has a share in the chametz, and it will be forbidden to you, while your father’s will not. How is one to know whose share he is eating from? There is a concept called bereira, which, among whose applications and when it applies, is that when joint owners of property divide it amongst themselves, we say that the part that each person received was his all along. We rule that one can apply bereira regarding rabbinic, not Torah, law (Beitza 38a). Although chametz is a Torah law, the prohibition after Pesach is a k’nas (rabbinic injunction) against those who were lax regarding the prohibition of possessing chametz on Pesach (see Beit Yosef, OC 448; Mishna Berura 448:2). Thus, if a system could be arranged so that your father would take chametz articles for himself and then give to you, the problem would be solved. (The Sha’agat Aryeh (90) argues that even the Jew’s part should be permitted because he may have gotten the non-Jew’s part, but even if we accept that, there should still have to be a division among the food and one could not take from everything (see ibid. 91 and Mekor Chayim 448:1)). However, the guidelines of activating bereira are difficult enough to explain to them for us not to recommend it. If your parents are willing to cooperate with your halachic lifestyle, it makes more sense for your mother to appoint you an agent to sell her (part in the) chametz and ask her not to buy on Pesach at least chametz that will last until after Pesach (it is easy to figure out when bread was bought). As far as the possibility of mix up, one can be quite lenient, at least when there is need, regarding assumptions of which food was obtained when (see Chulin 4b).

There are lenient opinions regarding chametz possessed by a totally irreligious Jew. The Taz (448:2) and Mishna Berura (448:11) say that if a Jew sold chametz to a non-religious Jew, the latter can sell it after Pesach to a non-Jew and give the money to the Jew instead of having him incur a great loss. They do not allow a Jew to eat the actual chametz. There is a fringe opinion that the injunction to discourage people from possessing chametz does not apply to those who disregard their halachic responsibilities as Jews (see She’ilat David (Karlin), OC 5). In your case, there is one further point for leniency [which would not be appropriate to discuss publicly]. We imagine that in order to eat in the house, you anyway must have different utensils and food. If so, buying packaged chametz after Pesach from appropriate sources would seem not to change things so much. However, if there is a strong need for leniency, please contact us again so we can discuss your specific needs and options.

One may eat edamame from the pods on Shabbat just like other foods with a peel may be eaten, if they are eaten immediately after being peeled (see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 321, 19).

 There are two elements to this question. One is to what extent there is a mitzva to have a seuda (meal) in honor of a brit mila. The other is to what extent invited guests are required to take part in such a seuda.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 265:12) says: “We have the practice to make a seuda on the day of the mila.” The Rama adds: “and people have the practice to have a minyan for the seuda of a mila, and it is called a seudat mitzva.” There are several sources in Chazal to support this claim. Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer derives it from the brit that Avraham performed for Yitzchak. The Torah writes that Avraham made a big party on the day that “higamel Yitzchak” (Bereishit 21:8), whose simple translation is that he was weaned. The Orchot Chayim derives the idea from the word’s letters (the first two, based on numerical value), namely, 5+3 mal, i.e., on the eighth day he circumcised. This, thus, was the event that prompted a party. The gemara (Ketubot 8a) seems to assume that there is a special meal, comparable to that of sheva berachot, and therefore needs to point out the difference between the bentching at the two. Before Birkat Hamazon of sheva berachot one says “shehasimcha bem’ono” (that the joy is in His abode), whereas this is not recited before Birkat Hamazon at a brit mila due to the pain of the child.

One of the applications of the determination that the meal for a brit mila is a seudat mitzva is the fact that invitees to this meal may eat meat and drink wine even during the Nine Days (Rama, Orach Chayim 551:10). The Rama and his commentaries point out that one should not artificially include people who are not naturally part of the festivities to compromise the standard laws of the day.

There is a well known but apparently somewhat misapplied concept relating to the invitees to a brit mila. Let us start with the background. The gemara (Pesachim 113b) lists people with the regrettable distinction of being menudeh lashamayim (roughly, shunned in the Heaven) for what they do (or refrain from doing). One such person is one who does not recline (i.e., set himself to eat) with a group of mitzva. Tosafot (Pesachim 114a) says that this refers to one who does not eat in the seuda of a brit mila, which he says has the ability to save one from being judged to go to gehinom (purgatory). From this idea developed the practice of not inviting people to a brit mila (Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 265:18), so that people not be in the situation where they should be going and refrain from doing so. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim II, 95) explains that the matter is not so much that there is an obligation to take part in the mitzva of mila. After all, there are many mitzvot that one might miss, and the idea of menudeh lashamayim is not mentioned broadly. It has more to do, he says, with the lack of honor that one shows toward the father who is fulfilling the mitzva and trying to include others in it. It is told in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein that one discharges the minimum obligation by eating anything at the meal or smaller reception. One is not required to eat bread (which should be done by the core participants- see Sefer Habrit 165:161) or stay for the whole meal.

In any case, it is of note that many people know of the minhag not to invite but apparently do not do it correctly. First of all, many people just inform about the brit mila, but once people come to the mila itself, they invite all assembled to the meal, even they know that many will not be coming. As we have seen, the sources talk in terms of the meal. Secondly, some people make it very clear that they want and even expect a certain friend to come, just that they do not use the word “inviting.” In this case, it appears that the spirit of the invitation is the issue, and not there is nothing intrinsic about the use of the word “invite” if one transmits an expectation that friend or family attend.

Lactose containing pills are not considered dairy and therefore they may be taken after one has eaten meat (Kovetz Teshuvot of Rav Elyashiv, volume 1, siman 73).

First, let us understand what happens. When gas goes into a fatty substance (like whipping cream), the fat traps much of it, causing it to fluff up and coalesce. Whipped cream canisters contain pressurized nitrous oxide. Pressing their button does two things more or less at the same instant: forces gas into the fatty liquid; forces the contents out of the canister. There are several possible grounds, some stronger than others, upon which to base a prohibition. After a quick review, we will present a practical answer.

Arguably, combining two substances so that they form a mixture that is different in texture than each one separately is lisha (kneading) (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 11:(124)). However, trapping a gas (even if in unnoticeably small pockets) inside a liquid so that it turns into foam is different enough from classic lisha for it to be difficult to forbid without classical sources.

The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (11:31) prohibits hand-whipping cream for a few reasons. One is related to the scrambling of eggs, which is forbidden because it is usually a step in the cooking process. While one can argue whether or not this applies to whipping cream, the process is totally different when done by pressing the button on a canister.

Recent poskim discuss creating seltzer/soda on Shabbat, where a somewhat significant change occurs to a liquid by inserting a gas. While some poskim object to it for creating something new (see Maharsham I, 140), the most realistic problem is uvdin d’chol (weekday-like activities, in this case, of producing things). While this might apply to the process of inserting a gas canister and fastening a machine to make soda (or the similar device for cream), it is hard to apply it to using a pre-prepared canister, which the average user sees as simply dispensing.

The most serious issue is molid, creating a new reality by changing the phase of an object. The baraita (Shabbat 51b) forbids crushing ice and snow. Rashi explains that it is like a melacha, in that one creates something new, i.e., a liquid from a solid. Some say that, similarly, one may not turn a liquid into a solid, e.g., freeze water to make ice cubes (see Doveiv Meisharim I, 55). We dealt with this issue in Hemdat Yamim (Miketz 5767), and cited strong grounds for leniency. Orchot Shabbat (15:(45)) says that even those who forbid making ice cubes could permit spraying whipped cream from a canister because the only purpose of the cream in the canister is to be turned into whipped cream. On the other hand, here one actively and directly, with the press of the button, creates the foam, as opposed to putting water in a freezer, which only provides a cold setting for the slow process of freezing to begin (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 10:(14)). However, Rav Mordechai Willig told me another reason for leniency: the change, from a thick liquid to a foam, is not enough to be considered molid.

While one can make the argument that it is forbidden to spray whipped cream from its canister, common practice is to permit it. Since we have shown the halachic basis for the practice, we do not feel it is necessary to change it. (We have not dealt with the issue of using the cream to write words or make likenesses of specific objects.)

The gemara (Arachin 4a) says that the Tannaic statement that kohanim and regular Jews can join together for zimun is obvious and posits that it is needed for a case where kohanim ate teruma (which is forbidden for a non-kohen) while the others ate regular food. The reason that they can join, says the gemara, is that the kohen can eat the food of the others.

Rishonim extend the concept to parallel cases, based on which the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 196:3) says that if the kohen ate something non-kohanim may not and the others ate a non-Jew’s bread, which the kohen is careful not to eat (a halachic question- see Yoreh Deah 112), they do not form a zimun. The Magen Avraham (196:1) raises the matter of dairy and meat and points out that they can join together because the one eating dairy can also eat meat. (Acharonim discuss what happens, according to the various opinions, regarding the necessary break between dairy and meat- see discussion in Piskei Teshuvot 196:10).

The Magen Avraham also raises your issue that when this group bentches, the dairy eater, who is the one who unites the individuals into a group for zimun, should “make the beracha to exempt the other.” One would have thought that the point is moot because the eating that creates the obligation of zimun is that of bread, which is classically pareve, and why should one care that the “side dishes” are meat and dairy, respectively. The Magen Avraham is sensitive to this and points out that the discussion applies to a case where the bread is “soiled” with meat and dairy. B’tzel Hachochma (IV, 169) points out that in a case (e.g., like at the seder), where one eats a k’zayit of bread, creating the zimun obligation, before meat is brought out, this matter does not apply. There is a machloket about a case where that which one ate was off limits to the other but bread which everyone can partake of is available (see Taz 196:2), but we assume that the matter is determined by what was eaten (see Hitorerut Teshuva III, 61).

It is not clear why, when they form a group for zimun, it makes a difference who leads the zimun (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 196:8), and indeed some Acharonim do not cite this ruling (see opinions in Sha’ar Hatziyun 196:12). Even those who cite it view it as a minhag, not an absolute requirement (Chayei Adam I, 48:19; Mishna Berura 196:9; Aruch Hashulchan, op. cit.). One can also point out that the Magen Avraham cites the practice regarding a case where the mezamen does the bentching and exempts the others, whereas current practice is that all bentch separately and the stakes regarding zimun are much lower.  Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Sha’ar Hatziyun (op. cit.) says that if one of the meat eaters is a kohen, the more established halacha of giving respect to kohanim trumps the preference of the dairy eater.

Regarding your case of four eating together, where there is a zimun anyway, the matter probably depends on the Magen Avraham’s reasoning, which is not spelled out. If we prefer the person who is most connected to everyone, it still pays to have the dairy eater do the zimun. If it serves as a reminder that who ate what can affect the viability of the zimun, then when the zimun does not depend on the dairy eater, it should not be necessary. However, one can raise counter arguments. In any case, the matter is of so little importance that it does not warrant worrying which possibility is more likely, and one can do as he likes.

(Our answer does not relate to the precautions one should take when some are eating dairy while others are eating meat (see Yoreh Deah 88)

The gemara (Berachot 10b) cites and explains two p’sukim relating to not eating before davening: “Do not eat on the blood” (Vayikra 19:26), meaning, do not eat before you have prayed for your blood (life). “You thrust me after gavecha” (Melachim I, 14:9) – read as geiecha (your haughtiness) – in other words, only after haughty [involvement in pleasures] did the person accept ohl malchut shamayim (the yoke of Heavenly Kingdom).

The most convincing approach as to the interrelationship between the two derivations is that the second clarifies the first. In other words, there is not a formal prohibition to eat, but rather one should not eat in a manner of haughtiness. Therefore, one may drink water (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:3), a “drink of humility.” Also, the Pri Chadash (89:3) says that when one needs to eat for medical reasons (even real food - Mishna Berura 89:24), he may do so before davening even if he can wait.

At this point, we would posit that since davening with a minyan is a real advantage and eating in your circumstances is totally permitted, it is better to eat first than give up on minyan. However, the Leket Hakemach (cited by the Baer Heitev (89:11), the Biur Halacha (to 89:3), and recent poskim (including Yalkut Yosef 89:29 and Ishei Yisrael 13:27)) says it is better to daven first without a minyan than to eat before davening. (The omission of this opinion by such important codes as Chayei Adam, Shulchan Aruch Harav, and Aruch Hashulchan may imply that they do not accept it). There are two approaches one can take to explain the Leket Hakemach. 1) The serious (perhaps Torah-level) problem of eating before davening overrides the preference or lesser obligation of davening with a minyan (Ohr L’Tziyon II, 7:8). 2) The service of Hashem involved in davening first despite one’s need to eat lends the tefilla a strong positive force (see Eretz Hatzvi (Frimer) II, 2).

Nevertheless, we believe, for the following reasons, that you may decide which of the options is more appropriate for you. In addition to the absence of the Leket Hakemach’s opinion in early sources, all the sources that mention it talk about it being a preference, not a requirement (see also Magen Avraham 90:21). Also, in your case the option of eating first and then davening with a minyan later is stronger than in the Leket Hakemach’s case for the following reasons. He spoke about someone whose weakness made it difficult to hold out until after davening but did not address medically required eating, which in your case may make it less problematic. He also spoke primarily about the long Shabbat davening, where it is too long to wait, so the solution is to shorten the first part of davening. In contrast, in your case the standing medical orders are to eat as soon as possible, after which it is time for normal davening. Furthermore, your situation would regularly preclude your davening with a minyan. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 109:5), discussing the case of one who davens slowly enough that he consistently has to choose between davening with others and answering to Kedusha, rules that davening with others has precedence (even though he rules differently for a one-time basis such as coming late). He reasons that you cannot deprive someone of full tefilla b’tzibbur on a regular basis.

If you follow the standard rule that those who must eat should say the early parts of davening including Kri’at Shema first (see details in Ishei Yisrael 13:27), you anyway avoid the full problem the gemara referred to. After all, you will have first fulfilled a minimal but basic mitzva of tefilla (see Magen Avraham 106:2) and accepted ohl malchut shamayim (see Biur Halacha ibid. and Keren L’Dovid (Greenwald), OC 21). This might suffice even for healthy people according a minority opinion (see Rama, OC 89:3). Therefore, it is legitimate for you to make the call, and even factor in what improves your davening, embarrassment, etc. 

A fleishig pot has kosher meat taste in it, but there is a danger that it could become not kosher if that taste combines with milk taste. However, this cannot happen once the taste is sufficiently weakened. In one such case, known as nat bar nat, hot pareve food that was placed in a milchig or fleishig utensil does not become forbidden when mixed with the opposite type of food (Chulin 111b, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 95:2). However, the Rama (ad loc.) says that if the food was cooked or roasted in a milchig or fleishig pot that had been used for its type within 24 hours, it may not be mixed with the other type of food. On the other hand, the Rama does not treat the otherwise pareve food totally as milchig or fleishig, as he permits putting this food into a utensil of the other type. Your eggs are such a pareve/fleishig food known as chezkat besari, and you want to know if an Ashkenazi can eat them at a milchig meal. We will also see if other precautions need to be taken.

Let us peruse the laws dealing with separation between milk and meat. The gemara (Chulin 104b-105a) talks about waiting between eating meat and subsequently eating cheese but says that no time is required after cheese before meat. It does, though, say that one should either check or wash his hands, and clean his mouth before eating meat. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 89:3) rules that the above requirements are true only regarding actual meat and milk/cheese, but between two pareve foods, one cooked together with meat and one with milk, he does not need to wait or wash. In practice, the minhag is to wait even after otherwise pareve food that was cooked together with fleishig food in a manner that it tastes fleishig.

In any case, the Rama (YD 89:3) states unequivocally that if one ate pareve food cooked in a fleishig pot, he can eat even cheese right afterward. This makes a lot of sense, as we saw that, the Shulchan Aruch’s opinion is that one could even mix this basically pareve food directly into milk. In fact, to give this statement more of a chiddush, some say that it is talking about a case where there was a little actual meat gravy in the pot (Shach 89:19) or when the food that was cooked in the pot is sharp, in which case the leniency of nat bar nat does not usually apply (R. Akiva Eiger, ad loc.). Certainly, in the case of normal pareve food in a clean fleishig pot, one does not have to wait afterward.

What about washing and rinsing, which are more widely required than waiting (e.g., after eating dairy)? While one could contemplate stringency, the Eliya Rabba (OC 173:4) says that one does not have to take any of those steps, and this approach is accepted by the Kaf Hachayim (YD 89:61) and contemporary poskim (see Halachos of Kashrus, p. 204). The Badei Hashulchan (Biurim to 89:3) suggests that when the pareve food is sharp or when one actually sees or feels residue on his hands or mouth, he should wash and rinse. However, he did not substantiate his claim with sources, and as the logic can go either way, we will not introduce further stringency than appears explicitly in the poskim. Thus, after eating any pareve food cooked in a fleishig pot, no washing is needed. They just cannot be eaten together.  

What constitutes eating together? Two things are apparently included. First, the foods cannot be discernibly mixed before entering the mouth. Therefore, the same plate or flatware should be used only if they appear clean. The second thing is that if one has not finished chewing a bite of these eggs, he should not yet, for example, drink milk. There is more room for leniency when the pot went 24 hours since being used for fleishig (based on Rama, YD 95:3), but we are not allowed to use utensils having in mind to rely on that leniency (Chochmat Adam 48:2). Therefore, it is proper to kasher the pan (with hagala or libun kal­ – details are beyond our present scope) if you plan to regularly use this pan at milk meals.

Let us start our discussion with old clocks, which were operated in a manner that is halachically equivalent to winding watches. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:3) says that one can set such a clock before Shabbat even though it chimes loudly on the hour. Acharonim explain that people will assume he set the matter into motion before Shabbat (and thus the special marit ayin of noises does not apply – Mishna Berura 338:14). There is a major discussion among poskim whether pulling the chains to begin the operation of such clocks is considered creating or fixing a utensil (Chayei Adam 44:19) or whether this is just considered the way of using an existing utensil (Panim Meirot II, 123). According to the former, it is forbidden, very possibly on the Torah level, to set the clock into operation on Shabbat, and this is the consensus.

The next question is whether one can wind a watch that is already working to keep it operational longer than it otherwise would be. The Ktav Sofer (OC 55) compares this to cutting off part of a candle in a way that will make it go out earlier. A simple watch, though, seems to be significantly more lenient in that nothing problematic is happening later, and the question is whether making a change to keep an already operating instrument working longer is equivalent to creating a working instrument. Indeed, the Da’at Torah (on the Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) champions the idea that just extending efficacy is not forbidden. The Ktav Sofer also raises the possible distinction between clocks that chime for more hours than they otherwise would have and cases where the gears and handles just move longer. In any case, the minhag developed to not allow winding to continue the existing operation even if there is no chime, unless there are mitigating or extenuating circumstances (see Mishna Berura 338:15; Sha’ar Hatziyun 338:17; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:19-21).

More recent poskim have dealt with the advent of self-winding watches, which wind by one’s movements. In this case, the consensus has been that it is permitted while the watch is still working (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:28). Here the aforementioned case for leniency regarding watches that wind is bolstered by the fact that the person is not doing a discernable or intentional act of winding but that it is happening as a certain side result of his activities (p’sik reishei). Additionally, regarding this relatively new case, a minhag to be stringent has not developed.

The recent invention of kinetic watches is slightly different from self-winding watches. The mechanism of kinetic watches is based on a quartz system, which is normally operated by battery. In this case, instead of a battery, movement generates the small amount of electricity that the watch needs, and the watch stores the energy for anywhere from days to months. The relatively new question of a mini, mechanical electricity recharger is not a simple one, and we have found rabbis coming out in either direction. However, our feeling, is that such a transfer of energy of movement to electricity to be transferred again to “harmless” mechanical movement, without creating new circuits, is not included in the prohibitions of electricity that the halachic world has assumed since the advent of the use of electricity. (We may reverse our decision if a consensus forms to forbid it.)

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:6) says that single men not living with their families must light Shabbat candles. The Mishna Berura (263:29) adds that this is so even if they eat away at someone’s house. (This is a topic of its own.) Regarding this case, the Mishna Berura (ibid. 30) says that the candles should be long enough that he will use them when he returns; otherwise, his beracha is l’vatala (in vain). This seems to be based on the Shulchan Aruch’s (ibid. 9) ruling that if one lights in her house but eats in his courtyard and the candles will not suffice for him to use them, her beracha is l’vatala. What many women who go away for the meal do is have some benefit from the candles during twilight (see Mishna Berura 263:41). Presumably, your guest does not accept Shabbat with the lighting before davening Mincha and, thus, cannot do this. Therefore, at first glance, what your guest did was necessary.

However, the primary sources discuss a slightly different case: where there was no plan to use the lights. Given that your guest’s practice is to benefit from the candles and something arose to alter that, would he fulfill the mitzva without returning? It depends on which of the following formulations of the mitzva of lighting candles is correct: 1) The act of lighting candles is a matter of k’vod Shabbat, i.e., honoring Shabbat on Friday by preparing in a manner that should make it pleasant; 2) Ensuring that the house one occupies is set for pleasant usage on Shabbat; 3) The mitzva is the oneg Shabbat (enjoying the light, parallel to eating tasty food) itself on Shabbat, just that this must be prepared before Shabbat.

According to #1, your guest’s visit at home was unnecessary. At the time of the lighting, there was an expectation that the light would be of value. Therefore, at that time he honored Shabbat, and this is not uprooted retroactively by changes in the situation. (If one often does not benefit, then his “plan” is disingenuous and his lighting valueless). According to #2, the same is true. His room was properly lit, and it does not matter that he unexpectedly was not in there at the relevant time. According to #3, your guest’s actions were necessary because without benefit, it turns out that the mitzva was not fulfilled. The rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and Mishna Berura (above) do not apply here because in those cases, there was no expectation of using the lights.

One can find a basis for all the approaches, but we can only scratch the surface in this forum. The simple reading of Rashi (Shabbat 25b) is that the mitzva is kavod (#1) and of Tosafot (ad loc.) is that it is oneg (#3). The Rambam (Shabbat 5:1 and 30:4) mentions kavod and oneg, but his language implies that #2 is correct. Possibly, while the mitzva was instituted with the hope people will benefit (shalom bayit- see Shabbat 23b), the formal mitzva and its beracha relate to the act of kavod by lighting (Beit Halevi  I,11; Az Nidbaru 9:1). This side is bolstered (but not proven) by the fact that there is a beracha, which is recited well before the benefit (see Yaskil Avdi III, OC 18), and that if the candle was lit too early, it has to be re-lit (Rama, OC 263:4). If we follow the model of Chanuka candles, then as soon as the candles were lit properly, the mitzva is fulfilled even if they went out. (One telling matter is the machloket between the Magen Avraham (263:11) and R. Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) whether a non-Jew can light the candle on a Jew’s behalf (see Shulchan Aruch Harav 263, K.A. 3).)

Since the simple reading of the poskim is to require your guest to return and it is difficult to prove it wrong, you can applaud his diligence. On the other hand, we would not label failure to do so a breach of responsibility, especially if going would cause his host hardship.

If the iron cookware was used only with cooking with water, it may be koshered by haga'alah. One would need to thoroughly clean it, wait 24 hours since its last use, and immerse it in boiling water which preferably has soap in it. If it was used with food directly on it, such as roasting, grilling, etc. it requires libbun, which would mean heating it to an extremely high temperature (approximately 700 F). One practical way to do it would be to place it in a self cleaning oven for a self clean cycle, although one should first make sure that safety wise this may be done.

You may buy used cookware and kasher it, but unless there is special need we would recommend not doing so and thus avoiding the problems that may arise in the koshering process.

Regarding foods made from the five types of grains there are four possible berachot:

1.      Shehakol – if it is eaten in a way usually considered inedible, such as eating dough.

2.      Ha'adama – if eaten in an edible fashion which is not the normal way of eating, such as eating the seeds ("koses chitim").

3.      Mezonot – if cooked.

4.      Hamotzi – if grinded to flour and then bread made from it.

"Koses Chitim" is when the seeds are eaten whole and the peel was not removed from them (Orach Chaim 208, 4). The Mishna Berurah (ibid 15) states that if the peel was removed, some say that one should bless mezonot and some say ha'adama. However, this is only if the seeds are whole. If they are not whole then the blessing is mezonot. Burgul (what the taboule is made from) is cracked wheat from which the peel was removed, and is soaked in hot water, and therefore is not "koses chitim" and thus the blessing is mezonot.

The prohibition of melaben (literally, whitening, but, for our purposes, laundering) comes in various forms. We will investigate if this use of salt fits into one of the prohibited ones.

Melaben applies to cleaning fabrics and not to removing external dirt on top of hard surfaces. Whether a certain means of removing filth is permitted can depend on the surface from which it is being removed. For example, one may pour some water over a dirty leather object, but this is forbidden for a fabric, while one may wipe the fabric with a cloth (Mishna, Shabbat 142b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:9). In discussing this distinction, the gemara (Zevachim 94b) says that regarding fabric, “soaking it is laundering it.” Since a tablecloth falls under the category of fabric, putting water on it when it has become soiled is forbidden.

Removing liquid from a fabric might also be forbidden. The Rambam (Shabbat 9:11) says that squeezing water out of a garment is included in the prohibition of laundering. The Rishonim disagree as to whether this applies to all liquids or only to water, which is what is normally used in the laundering process (see Kesef Mishneh ad loc.).

Removal of dirt from a garment by means of shaking it out is also a matter of dispute. The gemara (Shabbat 147a) says that it is forbidden to shake out a garment on Shabbat. Tosafot says that this is talking about shaking out water from the garment, which makes it part of the laundering process. Rashi says that the prohibition applies even to shaking off dirt, and the Rama (OC 302:1) says that one should try to follow the strict opinion. The gemara, though, says that the prohibition applies only to the type of garments that one is careful to wear without the material that is shaken off.

With this background, let us now discuss removing wine by absorbing it with salt. Simply absorbing a big wine spill with a napkin or even a cloth rag is permitted (see Mishna Berura 302:60). This is on the condition that one is careful not to press on the tablecloth in a manner that would squeeze liquid out of it and not to squeeze the rag afterward (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:37-38).

In some ways, doing so with salt seems even better, as one places the salt in a manner that is less likely to squeeze the tablecloth, and it is not feasible to squeeze the salt afterward. However, our research indicates that the salt does not only absorb excess surface liquid. Rather, it draws out the wine that has already been absorbed in the tablecloth and would not be absorbed by, say, a paper towel. This is specifically why the “home remedies people” say that salt prevents the stain from setting and even removes at least some of it, which requires more than just absorbing surface liquid. From the world of halacha, as well, we know that salt is put on meat to draw out the blood from deep beneath the surface. On the other hand, we have seen that not every action that helps make a fabric cleaner is forbidden. In some ways, the salt acts similarly to water, which stops the dirt from setting, and “encourages” some of the dirt to come out (more complete results are reached through agitations/scrubbing).

With a dearth of classical sources on this or exactly identical cases, our gut feeling (based on the halachic precedents) is that putting on the salt is applying a stain remover to a fabric and is forbidden. A similar gut feeling may be what brought Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited and accepted by Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 15:(74) and Orchot Shabbat 13:20) to say that it is forbidden to put talcum powder on greasy clothes to soak up the fat. As our case seems to be equivalent, we concur with that ruling and recommend soaking up what one can with paper towels on Shabbat and treating the tablecloth after Shabbat.

Most people would not eat raw cacoa beans, and therefore the beracha is Shehakol. That is part of the reason that on cooked chocolate we make Shehakol.

Let us start with some background. The beracha of Shehecheyanu is a proper response to the happiness of something enjoyable returning to our lives. Regarding produce, Shehecheyanu applies only when there are distinctive seasons during the course of the year (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Orach Chayim 225:6). The Rama continues that for this reason we do not make Shehecheyanu on a vegetable, “for it stands in the ground all year.” He expounds elsewhere (Darchei Moshe, OC 225:2) that it is hard to discern which vegetable is from the old crop and which is new.

A common question regarding is what to do if, despite there being different growing seasons, they are available almost all year without interruption. This depends on how to understand the aforementioned Rama (“stands in the ground”). The Mishna Berura (ad loc.:18) points out that almost every vegetable has distinct growing seasons, making the Rama’s generalization about vegetables hard to understand. (Due to use of hothouses, it is now common for vegetables to be grown throughout the year.) One of his explanations is that the Rama was referring to vegetables stored in the ground for long periods. In other words, even if something does not grow all year long, if it is available throughout, we do not recite Shehecheyanu on it. When fresh produce is far superior to refrigerated produce, there is likely cause to make Shehecheyanu on the new fresh fruit (B’er Moshe V, 65). This is particularly understandable in light of the Rama’s stress that it must be noticeable whether a given fruit is from the new season or the old (see V’zot Haberacha, pg. 161).

Certainly, if a species is available only canned, one makes Shehecheyanu on new, fresh produce. Another situation where produce is available throughout the year is when it is imported from regions with different growing seasons, in which case, we do not make Shehecheyanu on either local or imported fruit. The determining factor is not the agricultural phenomenon of a new crop, but the consumers’ experience upon reaching a new season of availability.

Is the determining factor the individual consumers or general society? Regarding one who has not partaken for a long time in fruit that has been available, the Mishna Berura (225:16) says: “Although he did not eat it, others did.” Thus, it is not enough that it is new for certain individuals. You ask about the opposite case, where it is new in the society where you presently find yourself, but it is not personally new to you. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II, 151) and Halichot Shlomo (based on Rav S.Z. Auerbach’s writings) say that one who travels from a place where the season had already come to a place where there is a new season makes the beracha again in the new place. However, both require that thirty days of lack of access to the fruit must pass in the interim. In other words, there has to be a basic level of renewal both for the individual and for the society. If it has been available without a minimum interruption for either society or the individual, then the individual does not make Shehecheyanu.

The newcomer’s thirty days can be a combination of time in his place of origin and in the new place. It is not clear whether the individual’s break follows having eaten the fruit for thirty days or having access. (We should note that the original halacha is that the beracha is on seeing the fruit, but the minhag is to make it only upon eating it (Shulchan Aurch, OC 225:3)). Since we refrain from berachot out of doubt, we recommend that the traveler not make a beracha unless he spent a combination of thirty consecutive days without access to the fruit and the fruit should locally be one that is not widely available all year long. In your case, only if you spent thirty days in Israel before the avocado season should you make a beracha when it comes out.

The general consensus seems to be that one should indeed make a bracha on chewing gum. What follows is a brief summary of two of the central issues discussed (a fuller discussion, together with sources, we can send you in Hebrew if you wish):

1)     One does not recite a bracha on food unless one's palate enjoys it (eg. no bracha is made on tasteless food eaten for health purposes, water drunk only to clear one's throat, etc.). However, most chewing gums are indeed chewed (initially) for their taste and therefore they require a bracha.

2)     When eating a "main" food together with an "ancillary" food (eg. one eats a piece of bread solely to make it easier to eat a very salty or spicey food), one does not recite a bracha on the ancillary food (the bread). Some suggest that the gum's sugary taste is ancillary to the main rubbery gum base [which people want specifically for the (non- palate related) chewing], and therefore no bracha should be recited on the taste. However, others point out that the above rule only applies when one is making a bracha on the main food- in such a situation, the ancillary food's bracha is exempted by that of the main food. But since no bracha is being recited on the rubbery gum base, a bracha is indeed required for the sugary taste.

Regarding the issue of kashrut by gum:

The flavor can be non-kosher

The gum base is made with glycerine which can be from an animal source.

There are many legitimate positions. Let us explain and put things in perspective, regarding the three main issues: shehiya, hachzara, and hatmana.

Shehiya (leaving on the ‘flame’): Chazal were concerned that with food cooking on a flame, one might stoke the coals to hasten the cooking. Tannaim (Shabbat 36b) dispute if this concern applies when the food was minimally cooked before Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 253:1) and Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) lean toward stringency, whereas the Rama (ad loc.) seems to lean toward leniency. Rav M. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe OC 1:93) raises further logic for leniency – the fuel in our gas stoves work (electricity is similar) does not resemble the coals of former ages but the more lenient case of straw (where one increases the flame by bringing more fuel). In any case, the minhag is to require a blech, certainly if it is not minimally cooked.

What needs to be covered? Igrot Moshe (ibid.) says that one covers the heat source to show he is reducing the heat and does not plan to raise it. Rav Aharon Kotler required covering the knobs, as a reminder not to adjust them. Many blechs cover both, as Igrot Moshe recommends. Regarding a crock pot, foil over the coils is not discernable and, more importantly, does not significantly reduce the heat. (The rocks or metal balls some use do allow heat to escape.) Therefore, it is necessary and reasonable to rely on Rav Kotler (along with the other indications for leniency) and cover the knobs. Removing the knobs or putting enough tape to make it difficult to turn is even better (see Shabbat 18b).

Hachzara (returning to a flame): If one removes the pot insert and wants to return it, there are many more necessary requirements, not specific to crock pots (fully cooked; still warm; holding the pot; having in mind to return it; a covering). A major issue for crock pots is that one may not return a pot to a closed oven (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2), which a crock pot resembles in some ways (as heat comes from the sides in addition to the bottom). There are, through, grounds for leniency beyond our scope (see Am Mordechai, Shabbat 4).

Hatmana (insulating): In one of his last rulings, Rav S.Z. Auerbach claimed that a crock pot is a form of insulation, apparently because the pot (the ceramic insert) is surrounded relatively tightly by additional walls. Since additional heat is entering the system (mosif hevel), one may not leave the food there even though it is set it up before Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 257:5). The minhag among crock pot users for years was not this way and the standard halachic assumption is that hatmana is only when there is an extra covering on all sides (a crock pot has only a single, standard cover). However, the idea of stones was devised to make the crock pot conform to Rav Auerbach’s objections. Since the crock pot is slightly tapered, raising the insert a couple inches removes the level of closeness that makes it hatmana. We would not require one to follow this stringency, but we would not scoff at one who follows Rav Auerbach, whose rulings, including many lenient ones, so many of us follow.

Adding water: For Ashkenazim, it is permitted to add water, as long as the chulent is fully cooked and the water is warm. (Rav O. Yosef forbids this for Sephardim- Yechaveh Da’at IV:22). Some say to be careful to pour it in gently to avoid the issue of mixing (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:17). Some usually recommend removing the pot from the heat source (where mixing is less of a problem) before pouring in water and returning it. However, in this case, we believe that one who strives for stringency loses by doing this because he creates the need for a bigger leniency regarding hachzara (as above).

The Torah forbids eating milk and meat only when they are cooked together. Chazal forbid eating them together in any case, and after meat we must wait significantly before eating milk products (Chulin 104-105), according to most, for six or so hours (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 89:1).

There are practical disputes in cases of nat bar nat (double removed taste = nbn). Sephardim permit eating milchig with pareve food heated up in a meat pot, while Ashkenazim forbid that if the pareve food was cooked or fried in the meat pot. Your good question is whether it follows that chezkat chalavi is considered milchig to the extent that one may not eat it within the six hours after eating meat.

In the opposite question, the answer is easier. After eating pareve food cooked in a meat pot, one does not have to wait six hours (Rama, YD 89:3).  The Shach (ad loc. 19) says that this is so even if there was a small amount of meat residue left in the pot (even if there was not 60 times more pareve than meat- Pitchei Teshuva 89:7). Rabbi Akiva Eiger (ad loc.) says that even after eating a sharp food that was cut with a meat knife, which is treated like meat, not nbn (Rama, YD 95:2), one is not required to wait. The reason for these leniencies is that not everything that is considered meat requires six hours, just as we do not wait after milk. The reasons for the wait after meat are: meat between the teeth (Rambam, Ma’achalot Asurot 9:28); a taste left in the mouth (Rashi, Chulin 105a). Thus, if the meat component of a food is qualitatively weak, it lacks the special qualities that make six hours necessary.

However, if the milk is the nbn component, the logic is weaker. After eating meat and being assumed to have meat between his teeth and/or a taste in his mouth, eating chezkat chalavi should be like eating milk and meat together. Also, the Yad Yehuda (89:5) says in the case of the meat nbn, it is likely that when one ate it, he did not discern a meat taste, in which case there is more room for leniency. Regarding nbn milk food one wants to eat after meat, how can he assume he will not taste the milk?

Despite these indications for stringency, Rav Shlomo Kluger (Tuv Ta’am Vada’at III, 183) strongly rejected the possibility of such a ruling. He points out that the Rama and others who said that one should not eat nbn meat and milk together should have added not to eat nbn milk “within six hours of meat,” and no classical works say that (stimat haposkim). He also says that the standard practice (minhag ha’olam) is not to wait.

What are the grounds for leniency? The first answer is based on adding up the indications of leniency. Rav Kluger argues that we do not know there will be taste in the mouth, but just that there might be. Plus, even Ashkenazim do not say that nbn is certainly milchig or fleishig, as if it already got mixed in with the other type of food, one may eat the combination (Rama, YD 95:2). Thus, when there is a ‘double doubt’ indication for leniency (with the worst-case scenario being rabbinic), we can be lenient. Furthermore, he says, perhaps there is definitely no problem. Eating milk after meat is forbidden because it resembles eating the two together. When the second food has at most a weak taste of milk and no actual milk, it no longer resembles eating them together.

The Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 494:6) says that one must wait six hours before eating a sharp pareve food cut with a dairy knife. This goes well with Rav Kluger’s reason of adding up indications of leniency, as a sharp food cut with a meat knife is treated as more certain fleishig (see Rama, ibid.). Apparently, the minhag is not to be careful about this, and this can be justified by Rav Kluger’s second reason. Furthermore, regarding sharp foods that were sautéed in a dairy pan or were cut with a clean knife that had not been used for 24 hours, there are additional sources and logic for leniency (see Yad Yehuda 89:5).

One must distinguish between different levels of “kitniyot observance” and different reasons and degrees of veganism.

The main reasons for veganism are: 1) Ethical (the idea of using animals or concern for the inhumane treatment of commercially raised animals); 2) Health (the belief that a vegan diet is healthier); 3) Environmental (the various negative impact of mass raising of animals on the environment). 4) Emotional (the difficulty of eating something that comes from an animal).

All things being equal, vegans motivated by health or environmental concerns should make allowances in their vegan practice during Pesach if keeping the binding minhag of kitniyot harms their diet or significantly curtails their enjoyment on Pesach. A little flexibility for a short, well-defined time period need not compromise the general approach (barring special health concerns). On the other hand, many vegans can keep up their lifestyle only in an “all or nothing” manner. Such disciplined, idealistic people who take special steps to care for their bodies and the world (which the Torah encourages (see Devarim 4:15 and Bereishit 2:15)), deserve appropriate leniency. Those motivated by ethics or emotion are naturally are more likely to refuse partial exceptions. While we cannot expect all people to be vegans or vegetarians, there is a serious school of thought that vegetarianism is preferable (as Rav Kook wrote). Certainly in times where there are serious ethical/halachic concerns with the treatment of commercially raised animals, there is additional value in veganism.

Our general ruling is that, barring extreme circumstances, an Ashkenazi should continue the centuries-old practice of not eating kitniyot on Pesach. While there are dispensations for babies and sick people (Mishna Berura 453:7), a vegan has enough alternatives to be able to avoid kiniyot. However, the rule (with exceptions) is to be lenient regarding questions regarding kitniyot and we believe that many vegans (see above) have the right to follow the most lenient opinions on kitniyot.

We will mention the major areas in which a vegan may be lenient (see Bemareh Habazak IV:51 for more detail).

Species: peanuts, soy, and, quinoa. Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim III:63, discussing peanuts) presents the thesis that one does not add to the list of kitniyot species based on the logic of botanical characteristics or usage, except where the minhag is indisputable. If there is another questionable food that is important to your diet, feel free to ask us.

Derivatives: Oil derived before Pesach from kitniyot was permitted by some poskim (see Bemareh Habazak, ibid.). If, as is likely, the standard “Kosher for Pesach” alternatives are sufficient, one does not need leniency.

Mixtures: The Terumat Hadeshen (113) says that the stringencies of mixtures for Pesach do not apply to kitniyot. The Rama (OC 453:1) applies this leniency even to a simple majority of non-kitniyot, if the kitniyot element is not discernable and removable (Mishna Berura 453:8). While one may not create such a mixture on Pesach, there is room for leniency to buy it or prepare it before Pesach for Pesach use (see Bemareh Habazak, ibid.).

Not exposed to water: Since even grain does not become chametz without water, if one can insure that kitniyot did not come in contact with water, one can rely on the majority of classical poskim who permitted the matter.

An unsupervised kitniyot product may contain real chametz. Therefore, one either has to obtain and check the raw materials or buy products with a Sephardic Kosher for Pesach hasgacha and check that it does not include a majority of or discernable full-fledged kitniyot.

There are two relatively minor changes that are worthwhile discussing. (We understand that you are not referring to the more obviously different rules for cooking and reheating on Shabbat, as opposed to the significantly more lenient rules for Yom Tov.)

Preparing the saltwater for dipping the karpas – One is not allowed to make large quantities of saltwater on Shabbat for soaking vegetables (Shabbat 108a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 321:2). This is because making such saltwater was part of the process that was done to store vegetables for the long term, which is in turn similar to ibbud ha’or (tanning hides). It is permitted to make small quantities to put into food or to dip one’s bread or the like into, provided one does not use double the volume of salt compared to the water (ibid.; see Mishna Berura 321:11).

Based on the above, several poskim (Taz 473:3; Chok Yaakov 473:13; Mishna Berura 473:21) say that when seder night falls on Friday night, one should prepare the saltwater beforehand. The Magen Avraham does not understand why this is necessary, considering that we are presumably only making a small quantity to use for the seder. The (partial) answer is apparently as the Misgeret Hashulchan (on Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 118:4) says: one is not always careful to make only the necessary amount. If one did not prepare in advance, there are different opinions as to whether it is better to dip the karpas in vinegar or to be careful to make a particularly small quantity of saltwater.

Our discussion, on the uniqueness of Pesach falling on Shabbat, assumes that it is permitted to prepare saltwater on Yom Tov, despite the fact that ibbud, which is the overall issue, is forbidden on Yom Tov. This indeed is the assumption of most classical poskim (see Misgeret Hashulchan, ibid.). However, the Chayei Adam (130:19) and the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (118:4) say that one should prepare the saltwater before Yom Tov even in a regular year. While one might be tempted to say it is just a good suggestion to save time for the seder, they seem to view it as a halachic requirement, as they say that if one has to make the saltwater on Yom Tov, he should switch the normal order and put in the water first followed by the salt.

In summary, then, one cannot really say it is forbidden to make saltwater for the seder on Shabbat. Additionally, some prefer making the saltwater before Yom Tov every year to expedite matters and maybe for halachic reasons. However, the impetus to prepare in advance when the seder is on Shabbat is greater.

Adding wine to the charoset – The minhag is to put (additional?) wine in the charoset soon before using it at the seder (Rama, Orach Chayim 473:5). While the mixing in of the wine may be under the category of lash (kneading), this is forbidden only on Shabbat but permitted on Yom Tov (Orach Chayim 506). When the seder falls out on Shabbat, adding the wine could be a problem. Therefore, the Mishna Berura (321:68) says one should put in the wine before Shabbat. Regarding a case where he forgot to do so, one has to add the wine in a manner that does not violate lash. One possibility is to change the order of mixing together, by putting the wine on the bottom, adding the charoset on top, and mixing them together either by finger or by shaking the utensil that holds them. The Mishna Berura points out that one of the opinions in the Shulchan Aruch requires that the mixture be watery. This raises issues with the fact that we want the charoset to be thick like mortar (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 321:86). This is another reason why one would want to avoid the issue and simply prepare the charoset before Shabbat.

Your question is excellent from the perspective of theoretical halacha but must be totally rejected in terms of halacha l’ma’aseh (practical).

A ketuba functions in two basic areas. First and foremost, it as a legal document that must be capable of being used in beit din. Chazal insisted that every woman have a minimum level of financial security in relation to her husband, much of which is spelled out in the ketuba. Additionally, it is an important traditional part of a Jewish wedding. There are not the tremendous halachic ramifications if a detail is slightly off, as is the case regarding a get. If a couple understandably believes that their ketuba is valid and it turns out that it is not, it does not turn out that they were living in sin (see discussion in this column, from Beshalach 5772). Any discovered mistake should be dealt with seriously, but not with hysteria or concern for the sanctity and success of the marriage.

Therefore, chumrot in the realm of ketubot (i.e., something is written, not wrong, but in an inferior manner) should be viewed with the following in mind. It is extremely rare for the ‘less laudable’ version to be justification for beit din to not award the wife with the sum of money written in the ketuba, which is the most important thing. Regarding the ‘religious’ element of the ketuba, its lack of preciseness is not only less important compared to a get but even compared to a mitzva lack of preciseness may disqualify it (e.g., laining Megillat Esther). Rather, it is generally proper to do something we cherish in the most appropriate manner. In our opinion, it is no less important to follow minhag and not incorporate ideas that were not found in the ketubot of one’s parents or even one’s roshei yeshiva. This is so even if there are respected opinions that prefer the new way and even if it was once or is now the practice in some communities. A change can appear to cast aspersions on our predecessors and our peers, as if their ketubot are not (as) good.

Let us give one example. In a get, where clear, accurate identification of the couple is crucial, there are complicated halachot of how to incorporate not only the Jewish name one received after birth, but also secular names or nicknames. There are sources that recommend that a ketuba should also follow these rules, especially considering the possibility that rabbis might use the names from the ketuba when writing a get. In any case, as the Minchat Yitzchak (VII, 117) points out, this is clearly not the minhag; rather, we use the “name from the cradle.” Therefore, we strongly discourage officiating rabbis from changing the minhag and adding secular names and nicknames, and thereby creating unnecessary new complications in the writing of the ketuba. This is despite the fact that one can argue that adding these names is halachically preferable.

The case (XX) which you ask about, from one perspective is potentially more important and in other ways is less important. There are only a handful of sources that recommend it, and we found none that says that failure to do so renders a ketuba invalid. While the situation does not always arise, the fact that we have never heard of it being implemented indicates that it is clearly not the minhag. Since implementing the chumra would create significant headaches and cast unnecessary aspersions on those who do not, we feel one should not do so. [As explained above, we will omit the halachic rationale.]

The status of an animal which is intended for milking and not eating on Yom Tov is as follows:
1. If there is no Tza'ar Ba'alei Chaim (pain to the animal) in not milking it, it should not be milked.
2. If there is Tza'ar Ba'alei Chaim (pain to the animal) in not milking it, it is preferable that a gentile milk it, and it will be permitted to eat or carry only following Yom Tov. Outside of Israel, where two days of Yom Tov are celebrated, the milk milked on the first day of Yom Tov is permitted on the second day (with the exception of Rosh Hashana), provided that the first day was not also Shabbat.
3. If there is no gentile available, it must be milked in a way in which the milk will immediately be lost, such as milking it to the ground or to some material which will cause the milk to be lost. It is not sufficient to milk it into a vessel, even if one immediately pours away the milk, as it must directly from the milking be lost.
4. If on Yom Tov he needs the milk and he doesn't have something else to eat, he may drink the milk if a gentile milked it, or if no gentile is available, a Jew may milk by milking in a way that the milk will be immediately absorbed by some solid food, such as milking onto bread or rice.
5. On Chol Hamoed it is permitted to milk as usual even not for use on the Moed.

Note: this answer is referring to milking by hand. By milking with a machine there are other possible technical solutions.
Sources: Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 305, 20; ibid 505 with Mishna Berurah; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata chapter 27, 46-47, 52 and note 164; regarding Chol Hamoed, Orach Chaim 533, 5.

This question tests the primacy of the following competing halachic rules. One is that once one becomes obligated in one of the additions to Birkat Hamazon, he is to recite it even after the time that it normally applies. The other is that during times that can relate to the preceding period or the following period, we do not allow there to be an internal contradiction (tartei d’satrei) and apply it to both. Let us survey sources and applications of each rule before coming to an answer.

 The first rule is actually not unanimously held. The Rosh (Shut 22:6) says that if one starts seuda shlishit before sunset but bentches after the day is over, he does not recite R’tzei. To the contrary, if he ate a meal before Shabbat but recited Birkat Hamazon only on Shabbat, he would then recite R’tzei. The Tur (Orach Chayim 695) says that according to [his father] the Rosh, one who did not bentch on his Purim seuda until nightfall after Purim he would not recite Al Hanisim. In other words, we always follow the time that one is ready to make the pronouncement. However, we do not adopt the Rosh’s opinion as standard halacha. Rather, we follow the time that one ate and say that if he ate in a way that caused an obligation of a special pronouncement such as R’tzei or Al Hanisim, he is to make it even when its time ostensibly over (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 188:10). (An exception to this is Sheva Berachot that finish after the week is over, as one cannot make independent berachot after the time period- see Sha’arei Teshuva 188:8 based on the Ginat Veradim).

The next rule, that we avoid tartei d’satrei situations, has far too many applications to address, and we will stick to those close to our topic. One discussion is about one who started a seudat Purim on Erev Shabbat and continued it on Shabbat, making Kiddush in the middle. When he eventually bentches, there is reason to say both Al Hanisim, due to that which he ate during the day, and R’tzei, due to that which he ate after Kiddush. The Magen Avraham (695:9) says that one recites Al Hanisim, apparently in addition to R’tzei (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 695:19), whereas the Chayei Adam (155:32) says that you cannot say both Al Hanisim and R’tzei in the same Birkat Hamazon when the two relate to different days.

Another case where the issue of tartei d’satrei arises regarding R’tzei is when one starts eating on Shabbat and continues eating bread after night begins and Rosh Chodesh starts. There is a theoretical obligation to say both R’tzei and Ya’aleh V’yavoh but, again, the two belong to two different days. Here, the Magen Avraham (188:18) says that one cannot say both and since it is more clear that there is an obligation of Ya’aleh V’yavo than it is that there is an obligation of R’tzei, one says just Ya’aleh V’yavo (we will not deal with reconciling the Magen Avraham’s two rulings). The Taz (188:7) says that one may say both despite the apparent contradiction, and the Mishna Berura does not come to a clear distinction.

There is some logic to say that tartei d’satrei exists only when one has to say two contradictory things in the same context, e.g., within Birkat Hamazon. If so, since there is nothing in Birkat Hamazon that indicates that it is Motzaei Shabbat, saying R’tzei would not be a problem. However, the consensus of poskim is that davening Ma’ariv is such a strong indication of ending Shabbat that it is not possible to say R’tzei in bentching afterward (see implication of Beit Yosef, OC 188, Magen Avraham 188:17; Mishna Berura 188:32; Aruch Hashulchan 188:27). The loss of R’tzei is also not a critical matter. Because not all agree that one has to eat bread at seuda shlishit, if one forgets R’tzei at sedua shlishit, he does not repeat Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 8). What some major poskim (Magen Avraham 263:33; Rabbi Akiva Eiger to Magen Avraham 188:17) are unsure about is if one said Hamavdil but did not daven, whether that precludes saying R’tzei.

In Living the Halachic Process (vol. I, E-6) in discussing the prohibition of commerce in non-kosher food, we touched on “ownership on paper” through the stock market. Futures trading has both elements of stringency and of leniency in relation to standard stock transactions. We will start with basic background.

The gemara derives from the pasuk, “… vesheketz yiheyu lachem” (Vayikra 11:11) that one may sell non-kosher species that come into his possession but may not make efforts to acquire and then sell them. This also applies to some other foods forbidden by Torah law (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 117:1).

According to most Rishonim, the prohibition of trading in forbidden foods is on a Torah level (See Shut Chatam Sofer, YD 104-106, 108; Yabia Omer VIII, YD13). The Rashba (Shut III, 223) says that the reason is to minimize the possibility of eating forbidden foods; others say it is a gezeirat hakatuv (Heavenly decree without a known reason). In any case, it has something to do with eating, as it applies only to objects that are usually owned for eating purposes (Shulchan Aruch, YD 117:1).

The consensus of poskim is that this prohibition applies as long as a Jew owns the food, even if he is not expected to come in direct contact with the food (Chatam Sofer, ibid.108). It is debatable whether holding a small amount of stocks is forbidden as partial ownership of a company (see Mishneh Halachot V, 102). Let us analyze how futures contracts differ. A futures hogs contract acquires for its buyer the, usually theoretical, right to obtain that commodity at a future date. Should this come to fruition, he will become the outright owner and controller of the pigs, which is forbidden. In this way it is worse than stocks, where one only has financial rights and not control over the company’s individual assets (a stockholder of McDonalds cannot demand 1,000 Big Macs for his shares). On the other hand, in the commodities futures markets, the average trader has no interest in obtaining the commodity but plans to sell it (hopefully at a profit) while it is still ‘on paper’ to another buyer.

Based on standard halachic rules, a futures transaction is often a davar shelo ba la’olam (something which is not presently fit to be transferred from the seller to the buyer). The pigs that an eventual buyer will get on the expiration date are usually not born at the time of most of the transactions. Although the sale takes effect based on situmta (societal consensus), the contract is not viewed legally as the sale of pigs but a commitment to provide the pigs at the specified time of delivery.

Ostensibly this resembles the Terumat Hadeshen’s (I, 200) case of a Jew who wanted to lend money to a non-Jew, using pigs as a guarantee for the loan. He suggests that this might be permitted because a Jew does not acquire ownership over collateral he receives from a non-Jew. Similarly here, a process through which he can receive pigs has commenced, but it is not clear this will happen. The Rama (YD 117:1, apparently as a chumra) says that one may not lend with forbidden food as a guarantee, which might imply that our futures sales are prohibited. However, there the problem is (see Chatam Sofer, ibid.) that the lender demanded collateral because he foresaw a situation where he would collect, with the claim that it is permitted to protect himself from loss (Rama, ibid). However, here an average trader foresees no scenario in which he will ever become the owner of the pigs. This case is not similar to that which the Torah forbade – owning and/or controlling non-kosher food sources with commercial intent. Rather, the trader is involved in a form of speculative trade on paper of mainly theoretical rights to future commodities. Therefore, from the perspective of commerce with forbidden food, it is permitted (see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 117:6).

One of the korbanot the Torah describes is a Korban Todah (sacrifice of thanksgiving) (Vayikra 7:12). However, the Torah does not say when one offers it. The gemara (Berachot 54b), in the context of Birkat Hagomel (blessing after surviving dangerous situations), says that the “survivors” of four situations have to give thanks: a voyage at sea, traversal of the desert, illness, and captivity. The gemara demonstrates how each of these situations is described in Tehillim 107, the mizmor that deals with thanks after being saved from difficult situations. Even at the time of the Beit Hamikdash, it appears that people such as these were not obligated to bring a Korban Todah. Rather those are among the appropriate situations to volunteer one (see Rashi, Vayikra 7:12 and a thorough presentation in Nishmat Avraham, Orach Chayim 219:1).

Eating is a major element of the Korban Todah. This korban included 40 loaves of meal-offering, 36 of which were to be eaten. The Abarbanel and the Netziv (both on Vayikra 7) famously explain that the Torah required a lot of eating in a short amount of time to encourage the thankful person to bring together many people where he would hopefully give proper public thanks to Hashem.

What do we do without a Beit Hamikdash to bring a Korban Todah? The Rosh (Berachot 9:3) and the Tur (OC 219) say that Birkat Hagomel was instituted in place of the Korban Todah. While the simple reading is that Hagomel is an obligatory beracha, the Magen Avraham (beginning of 219; Pri Megadim, ad loc. disagrees) suggests that it might be optional. In any case, it provides a defined opportunity to thank Hashem publicly (it must be recited before a minyan, preferably including two distinguished people- Shulchan Aruch, OC 219:3).

Whether or not the Korban Todah or Birkat Hagomel is obligatory, a seudat hodaya for being saved from dangerous illness is certainly not obligatory. This may explain its absence from explicit discussion in most classical works (including the Shulchan Aruch). However, significant sources provide precedent and support for the idea of doing something more than saying Hagomel, including a seuda. The Mishna Berura (218:32, in the name of “Acharonim”) says that one who was saved from possible death (apparently even if the salvation was natural) should do the following. He should set aside money for tzedaka and say that he wants it to be considered as if he spent the money on a Korban Todah, donate things that help the public, and on every anniversary find a special setting to thank Hashem, be happy, and tell His praises. Certainly, a seudat hodaya is an appropriate setting for it, but it is not part of a set formula.

The gemara (Berachot 46a) tells that when Rabbi Zeira was sick, Rabbi Avahu promised that if he recovered, Rabbi Avahu would make a festive meal for the rabbis, which, baruch Hashem, occurred. Some say that not just the meal but the promise to make it is significant, as the promise of such an event if the sick person recovers is a segula (good omen) for the recovery (see Gilyonei Ephrayim, ad loc.). This would evidently only work if the seuda of that nature is desirable. The Chavot Yair (70; see also Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 444:9) in discussing different meals that are a seudat mitzva, mentions the seuda after being saved from danger. While some seudot mitzva are obligatory, many are not but are positive ways to give prominence to noteworthy events.

We will end off on a hashkafic note. Rav S.Z. Auerbach explained (see Mizmor L’todah (Travis) p. 185) that by eating in the context of thanksgiving to Hashem one expresses the following idea. A person should know and show that the goal of life and the physical world that he is enjoying after his recovery is to serve as a medium through which to further his spiritual life and give thanks to Hashem.

The prohibition against eating fish and meat (including fowl - Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 116:2) that are intermingled is based on a fear of danger and is governed by the rule that danger is harsher than ritual prohibitions (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 173:2). The gemara (Pesachim 76b) writes that fish which is roasted with meat is forbidden to eat because it is bad for one’s breath and for tzara’at (roughly, leprosy). This also applies to eating together fish and meat that were prepared separately (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 116:2). The Shulchan Aruch require cleaning one’s hands and mouth between the two (ibid., 3), whereas the Rama (ad loc.) rules that it suffices to just eat and drink something between the fish and meat.

Since the aforementioned opinion in the gemara assumes there is a significant transfer of matter from one food to another when roasted together, an opinion we don’t normally subscribe to, some authorities say that the problem exists only when the meat and fish are cooked together (Taz, Yoreh Deah 116:2).  There is also a question if gravy of one fell on another, and there is less than 1/60^th of one of them, whether one can employ the halachic rule of bitul b’shishim.  The gemara (Chulin 111b) discusses whether fish that is placed hot on a meat plate can be eaten with milk. It seems to imply that it is not a problem to eat the fish cooked in a fleishig pot by itself. While some argue (see Taz, Yoreh Deah 95:3), the minhag is to allow cooking fish in a meat pot, whether for Ashkenazim (Badei Hashulchan 95:8) or Sephardim (Yalkut Yosef, Issur V’heter III, 87:85).

It would seem that one can be lenient in these and other related questions, as several major poskim point out that this danger is no longer prevalent (see Magen Avraham 173:1; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 116:3, in the name of Chatam Sofer; Aruch Hashulchan, YD 116:10).  It is perhaps for that reason that the Rambam doesn’t bring this halacha.  While we will not permit that which Chazal forbade, this does justify a tendency toward leniency (Chatam Sofer, ibid.). Others explain the Rambam’s omission based on the possibility that the gemara was talking about a specific type of fish, which is no longer prevalent (see Pitchei Teshuva, ibid.).

How does use of a grill for both meat and fish fit into the picture? Most people do not clean a grill as they do other food-preparation utensils, mainly because of the difficulty in doing so thoroughly. If so, the residue of the fish or meat will combine with the new food being grilled and make it forbidden (see Taz, ibid.). Even if the grill has not been used for more than 24 hours, the impact of time passed helps only for that which has been absorbed into the walls of the utensil. If we were sure that the residue is less than 1/60^th of the food being grilled, we could be lenient, as above, but that it is not always the case. Indeed, we saw instructions on the Star-K website (focused on meat and milk) that indicate that one should double wrap fish that he wants to grill on a meat grill.

It seems, though, that this is more stringent than is necessary. First, since one is allowed to use a clean fleishig utensil for fish, a single separation (if done carefully) should be enough. Second, we would suggest the following system, if one prefers it to wrapping. Clean the grill reasonably well between meat and fish. In that way, what will remain will probably be burnt residue. As “charcoaled” remains are not halachically considered food in regard to a variety of halachot, it does not seem that we would have to assume that it is still considered meat or fish, respectively, in regard to our issue. In case a small amount of edible residue “survived” the previous grilling and the cleaning, we can assume it is batel b’shishim in the food. (One is not allowed to set up such a situation regarding non-kosher residue.)

Seuda Shlishit: The baraita (cited in Ta’anit 29a) says that one may eat as extravagant a meal as he wants on Shabbat even when Tisha B’Av falls on Motza’-ei Shabbat. The Tur (Orach Chayim 552) brings minhagim that one is allowed and would do best to curtail the Shabbat meal. This is especially so at Seuda Shlishit, which is, in effect, the Seuda Hamafseket (the last meal before Tisha B’Av, which usually has special elements of mourning). However, these considerations are countered by the need to avoid displaying mourning on Shabbat. Therefore, there are no real restrictions, even at Seuda Shlishit (Shulchan Aruch 552:10). However, the mood should somewhat reflect the coming of Tisha B’Av, as long as it does not bring on clearly noticeable changes (Mishna Berura 552:23). One important halachic requirement is that one must finish eating before sunset (Rama, ad loc.).

Havdalah: One says Havdala in tefilla or separately in the declaration of “Baruch Hamavdil…,” which enables him to do actions that are forbidden on Shabbat. Havdala over a cup of wine is done after Tisha B’Av (Shulchan Aruch, OC 556:1). If one forgot to mention Havdala in Shemoneh Esrei, he does not repeat Shemoneh Esrei even though he is not making Havdala over wine until the next day. Rather, he makes the declaration of Baruch Hamavdil (Mishna Berura 556:2). Unlike Havdala during the Nine Days, where we try to give the wine to a child (Rama 551:10), after Tisha B’Av an adult can freely drink the Havdala wine (Mishna Berura 556:3). The beracha on besamim (spices) is not said this week. On Tisha B’Av it is not appropriate, because it is a reviving pleasure, and one can only make this beracha only on Motza’ei Shabbat.

The beracha on the fire is specific to Motza’ei Shabbat, is not a pleasure, and does not require a cup. Therefore, the minhag is to recite the beracha on fire in shul after davening, before the reading of Eicha (Mishna Berurah 556:1). There are those who say that a woman should, in general, avoid making Havdala. This is because of the doubt whether a woman is obligated in the beracha on the fire, which is not directly related to Shabbat and thus is a regular time-related mitzva, from which women are exempt (Biur Halacha 296:8). Therefore, it is better for one whose wife will not be in shul at the time of the beracha to have in mind not to fulfill the mitzva at that time, but to make the beracha on the fire together with his wife (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 62:(98)).

Taking off shoes:  As mentioned, one may not do a noticeable act of mourning before Shabbat is over. While finishing to eat before sunset or refraining from washing need not be noticeable, taking off shoes is. There are two minhagim as to when to take them off: 1) One waits until after Shabbat is out, says “Hamavdil,” and then changes clothes and goes to shul. One can do so a little earlier than the regular time listed for Shabbat being out, which is usually delayed a little bit beyond nightfall to allow for a significant adding on to Shabbat at its end. The exact time is not clear and depends on the latitude of one’s location. It is advisable to start Ma’ariv a little late in order to allow people to do so and make it to shul (ibid.:40; Torat Hamoadim 9:1), unless the rabbi has ruled that everyone should take the following approach. 2) One takes off his shoes after Barchu of Ma’ariv. One who takes the second approach should bring non-leather footwear and Eicha/Kinot to shul before Shabbat to avoid the problem of hachana (preparations for after Shabbat). However, if one uses these seforim somewhat in shul before Shabbat is out, he can bring them with him on Shabbat (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.:41).

There are a few things that one is to avoid before davening. The main ones are eating, drinking, doing work, traveling (ibid.), and greeting people (ibid. 2). Each one has its rules and exceptions, either because of need (e.g., someone is weak) or because a certain activity is not a significant activity (e.g., drinking water). It seems, though, that regarding traveling, the rule is intrinsically more limited. If we understood the prohibition too broadly, the halachot would end up being inconsistent, as we shall explain.

How bad is to travel before davening? If one has two shuls in town, there is a preference to go to the one that is farther away so that he can get reward for the extra traveling (Mishna Berura 90:37). Furthermore, consider the following. If one has a shul within eighteen minutes from his house, he is expected to go there to daven with a minyan, but he is not required to do so if it is farther away than that (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:16). We have never heard that, if the shul is more than eighteen minutes away, it is required or even preferable to daven at home because of the prohibition to travel before davening. So it would seem that your traveling to shul, even if in a different town or part of town, is permitted.

One might claim that there is a distinction: it is fine to travel if the point of the traveling is to go to shul, but if the traveling is intended to get to the place one wants to go, just that there is also a shul there, then it is a problem. If so, we would have to consider how to categorize our case. On one hand, you need to travel to the area irrespective of davening. On the other hand, the reason that you would travel at that time is in order to get a minyan.

One can ostensibly prove that in this complex scenario, the traveling is not a problem. We mentioned that one only has to travel eighteen minutes to be able to daven with a minyan. However, if the minyan is located along a path one is traveling anyway, then he has to travel up to 72 minutes for the minyan (ibid.). So we see that an hour-plus of traveling before davening is preferable to davening first without a minyan, even though one is traveling along a route that is necessary for his personal, non-davening purposes. According to Ohr L’tziyon (II:7:6) one might be able to deflect the proof, as he says that the problem of traveling is only for trips of more than 72 minutes. However, assuming your commute is less than that, he would permit and likely require you to travel to the minyan in any case.

Therefore, our analysis indicates that traveling to another area before Shacharit so that one will be able to join a minyan is permitted and proper even if that is not the only reason he is traveling. This is also the practice of many.

The only authoritative source we found on a similar case is the Shevet Halevi (VIII:19). He discusses a case where one can daven with a minyan near his home, but he is concerned that if he travels later, he will have significantly more traffic. In that case, he recommends first reciting Birchot Hashachar before traveling, as the Rama (OC 89:3) brings an opinion that the prohibition on travel does not apply after doing so. Although the Rama says that it is “good to act stringently in the matter,” the Shevet Halevi reasons that one can be lenient in a case of need. In our case, the ability to daven with a minyan would certainly be a valid need. While we argued that in our case (where there is no option of a minyan before traveling), one should be able to be lenient on fundamental grounds, it does not hurt to recite Birchot Hashachar before going, and, therefore, there is a slight preference to do so.

The gemara (Berachot 8b) refers to a mitzva to eat on Erev Yom Kippur, which is either mandated by the Torah or by a rabbinic requirement with a hint in the Torah. It says that one who fulfilled it is like one who fasted for the two days. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 604:1) and many others discuss eating more than usual. One indication of the significance of additional eating is that poskim (Magen Avraham ad loc., Mishna Berura ad loc. 1) derive from the gemara that one should learn less Torah than usual on Erev Yom Kippur in order to leave time for it. Regarding the details, we must distinguish between the minimum and the preferred. Even if one eats only at the seuda hamafseket (the meal directly preceding the fast), he has minimally fulfilled the mitzva, and this is what is suggested for one who wants to fast due to a very ominous dream (Magen Avraham 604:1). However, it is expected that one do much more eating than that.

Let us first look at the main reasons suggested for this halacha, as this will help us find the most appropriate practical approach. The Rosh (Yoma 8:22) and Tur (OC 604) say that we are to eat in order to be able to fast without undue difficulties. Rabbeinu Yona (Shaarei Teshuva 4:9) and the Ritva (Rosh Hashana 9a) mention a different reason: it is appropriate to eat because the proximity to Yom Kippur, the wonderful day of atonement, gives the day a semi-Yom Tov status. Other reasons are given, including kabbalistic ones.

We will present some cases that might depend on which reason is correct and the accepted ruling regarding each one. If the mitzva is to facilitate a good fast, then it should not apply the night before, which is too removed from the fast to make a significant difference. If it is because of a Yom Tov status, it might apply at night as well. The more accepted opinion is that there is no obligation the night before, but that it might be positive to do so (see a ramification in Mishna Berura 604:2).

At first glance, women should be exempt from the mitzva because it is a time-based positive mitzva. However, there is logic to apply the mitzva to women either due to the style of the derivation from the pasuk or because of the logic that anyone who is going to fast needs to eat properly beforehand. The standard assumption is that women are obligated (see Yechaveh Da’at I:58).

Another possible consequence is whether one should eat food that one has a reason to believe will cause him to fast well or whether he should eat food that is festive or otherwise appropriate for a Yom Tov (such as meat and bread). The Minchat Chinuch (#313) assumes that there is no need for any specific type of foods, just that one eats. However, there are strong indications that the minhag was and is to eat meat (see Magen Avrahama 604:1) and have a formal type of meal, one in which there is a feeling of Yom Tov or at least imminent Yom Tov. There seems to be an emphasis on the quality of the food, along with concern that the food make sense for people who are about to fast (it is hard to know if the latter is on practical or religious grounds).

In most of our circles, the only eating that is done as ritual is the seuda hamafseket. Otherwise, it is positive to eat more than usual, but in a format that is convenient. There are significant numbers of people and communities who have a morning or early afternoon meal, which is similar in scope to the seuda hamafseket. It is hard to make a claim that this is an obligation or something that one should try to impose upon the mother of the house or others who find it difficult. The impetus for this practice seems to be along the kabbalistic approach and is not obligatory, unless one is part of a community in which this is a clear minhag.

The gemara discusses the question whether mitzvot tzrichot kavana (= mtzk – a mitzva is valid only if performed with intention to fulfill a mitzva), including in the context of reading Kri’at Shema and blowing shofar without specific intent to perform the mitzva. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 60:4) rules that kavana is required, and there is significant discussion about whether this is true even regarding mitzvot  which are only rabbinically mandated (see Mishna Berura 60:10). Thus, one could claim that whether or not one fulfills yEY without kavana depends on whether the mitzva is from the Torah (Ramban) or is rabbinic (simple understanding of the Rambam (see Amud Hayemini 22).

However, there are several opinions that the question of mtzk does not apply to all mitzvot. The Ran (7b of Rif, Rosh Hashana) says that even the opinion that usually requires kavana, does not require it for mitzvot of eating. Some say that this applies to matters of physical enjoyment, a distinction we find regarding the obligation of a korban for an unintentional sin (see Kritot 20b). YEY apparently does not fit into this category, as the mitzva is fulfilled by the fact that he lives in the Land, not by a specific act of physical enjoyment. However, others (see Sdei Chemed, vol. IV, p. 305) understand that the above is true for any mitzva that is done through physical action (including the mitzva of lulav- ibid. p. 306), as opposed to a mitzva of speech, in which case it yEY would not require kavana.

A similar distinction is found in Kovetz Shiurim (II:23). He says that one fulfills mitzvot that that are conceptually result-oriented even without the intention; the important thing is that the result was reached. Examples he gives include repaying debts and pru u’revu (procreation). YEY is tricky, in that one does not reach a result, where he can say the mitzva is over. However, the mitzva is apparently to be in the state of living in the Land (the parameters are beyond our present scope). Thus it is a mitzva of an ongoing state/resultand according to this approach, too, YEY would not require kavana. Rav Asher Weiss (heard orally) explains this distinction as follows. Mtzk is an issue only for mitzvot that are significant only when done as service of Hashem, which requires intention. The result of having children is significant even without being performed as service of Hashem, and presumably so does yEY.

Despite the above, to a great extent, the question is moot. There are two elements to fulfilling a mitzva: 1. technical fulfillment, whose greatest ramification is that it exempts one from repeating the mitzva. 2. The reward one receives for fulfillment. The various halachic discussions focus on the first element – the operative one. What happens with reward?

A few things are clear. First, Hashem will not give the same reward to one who accidentally performed a mitzva or solely for self-interest as to one who did it for the right reasons (see Nazir 23a). The Imrei Binah (Orach Chayim 4) cites the Chochmat Adam’s author’s formulation. Even if and when one is credited with fulfillment of a specific mitzva without kavana, he fails to perform the general mitzva of “to serve Him with all your heart” (Devarim 11:13). There is no way for human beings to determine Hashem’s reward accounting in every case. Remember, in this regard that there are different reasons for not having kavana, including the following: lack of belief in Hashem; a Satmar ideology; not thinking about the mitzva, etc. These possibilities and many other variables impact on a person’s virtue and thus on his reward for the mitzva.

Regarding the element of fulfillment exempting from repeating the mitzva, the question is moot. One never completes the mitzva of yEY. Thus, whether or not he fulfilled the mitzva in the past, the mitzva continues, and it is certainly better to do it now with kavana.

According to the consensus of poskim and many (not all, and it may depend on the type of sensitivity) health experts, oats can be used as a wheat substitute for gluten-sensitive people, and the halachot are identical to those regarding the other major grains. While you look into the health feasibility, this answer is written for one who cannot eat anything that is Mezonot.

The gemara (Pesachim 101a) says that Kiddush must be done in the place where “a meal” will follow. On the other hand, it refers to “tasting” after Kiddush, implying that a full meal is unnecessary. While some say that this taste must include bread, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5) rules like the Geonim that wine can also be used. While there are opinions in either direction, the consensus is that a revi’it (approximately 3 fl. oz.) is needed and sufficient (see Mishna Berura 273:22, 27).

The Magen Avraham (273:11) reasons that if the Geonim can accept wine in this context, then it is true of anything made from the grains, which is more meal-like than wine (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5 regarding the laws of seuda shlishit). This is the source of the common practice of having cake for the post-Kiddush “meal.” Along these lines, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 273:11) permits dates for this purpose, based on the halacha that if one mistakenly made Birkat Hamazon on dates, it is valid after the fact, because dates are particularly filling (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:17). The Tosefet Shabbat argues, and most Acharonim say that one should not normally rely on dates for eating after Kiddush (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 273:42; Yabia Omer VII, OC 63).

While according to the spirit of the law, there may seem to be little difference between the Shehakol and Mezonot pastries, the former do not fit the halachic parameters for the eating after Kiddush. As we have seen, there are other alternatives. For cases where there are not viable alternatives, we mention two fringe leniencies. There is an opinion that in a case of need, any food can be used (Chayei Adam 6:22). There is also an opinion that Kiddush works for all assembled if one person eats the requisite amount (see B’tzel Hachochma IV:2). If one must rely on one of those opinions, it is proper for him to eat something that fulfills the spirit of the law.

We will now discuss a related context where the spirit of the law is important (and might fit the letter of the law also) – the full meal. One needs to have two loaves of bread/challa, eat a k’zayit, and recite Birkat Hamazon at the end of the meal, and these require halachic grain. It would be regrettable for a gluten-sensitive person to consider himself as incapable of fulfilling the mitzva of seuda, prompting some to do whatever they feel like. It is proper (we cannot create an outright obligation) to have two nice loaves of bread, of whatever flour one can use. There actually is halachic precedent of bread that is not subject to Hamotzi and Birkat Hamazon.  The halacha is that an eiruv chatzeirot must consist of bread, but the bread can be from rice or lentils (Shulchan Aruch, OC 366:8), because that is considered legitimate bread (Mishna Berura ad loc. 47). Notice also that the concept of loaves of bread is learned from the manna in the desert, and that was not made from normal grain. What is important is that this was their bread (see overlapping idea in Minchat Yitzchak III:113). For the gluten-intolerant, these are their breads. While we would not suggest such an approach if one has the opportunity to follow the regular rules (including using oat challa), one who is in such a situation should view his meal as a seudat Shabbat.

It is also worthwhile to drink enough wine, or eat dates or another relevant food, to enable the recitation of a long Beracha Acharona, which contains the basics of Birkat Hamazon and mentions Shabbat.

There is no set obligation to have a meal in honor of Chanuka (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 670:2) as there is on Purim (ibid. 695:1). First we will discuss why there is a difference.

The broadly accepted general distinction between the holidays in this regard has to do with the type of danger involved. In the Purim story, there was danger of physical annihilation. In contrast, in the Chanuka story, the Jews’ ability to keep the Torah was attacked, but had they given in, there would not have been a physical danger. According to the Taz’s (670:3) understanding of the Levush (670:2), the Chanuka salvation was, therefore, less important and did not warrant as much festivity. The Taz disagrees based on the idea that one who causes someone to sin is worse than one who kills him.

The Taz himself says that physical salvation, in this world, is most appropriately celebrated with physical celebration, whereas spiritual salvation is to be celebrated in a spiritual manner (lights). This idea seems inconsistent with other sources. For example, on Shavuot, a festive meal is required because it is the day the Torah was given (Pesachim 68b). Also, the Taz himself (along with the Rama and others) says that the reason for some festivity on Chanuka is that it was the time of the dedication of the mizbe’ach (altar), which was spiritual. (It is unclear whether the celebration relates to the mizbe’ach in the Mishkan in the desert or the one retaken and purified at the time of the Hasmoneans- see Darchei Moshe, OC 670:1; Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 670:2).) Perhaps he means that the preservation of life deserves physical celebration, but for spiritual matters, it is only if there is something new, as occurred on Shavuot and with the mizbe’ach. Mishnat Yaavetz (Orach Chayim 79) adds halachic reasoning, pointing out that if Chazal would have created a full obligation of a meal, there could have been problems of bal tosif (the prohibition of adding on to the mitzvot of the Torah).

The Rambam refers to Chanuka as “days of simcha (joy) and hallel (songs of praise),” a term that usually relates to festive eating. At the very least, this includes a prohibition on fasting during Chanuka (Shabbat 21b). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.), who says that there is no obligation to have festive meals, implies that there is, nonetheless, a practice to have them, but that they are reshut (voluntary). The Rama (OC 670:2) cites an opinion that there is a slight mitzva to have special meals for Chanuka, with the reason relating, as above, to the mizbe’ach.

The Rama adds that the practice is to sing and praise Hashem at special meals made in honor of Chanuka, and then the meal is a seudat mitzva. There are two points of possible significance to a seudat mitzva. One is the mitzva to have the meal. The other is the meal’s religious significance when one has it. For example, on Yom Tov or after a brit mila (according to the minhag- see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 265:12), one is required to have a festive meal. In contrast, if one completes a unit of learning that warrants a siyum, he is not obligated to make a celebration. However, if he does, it has a special status, which, for example, allows one to eat meat during the Nine Days. On Chanuka, one does not have an obligation to have a seuda, just not to fast. If he does have a special seuda, it is quite clear that he has fulfilled a mitzva by so doing (see Torat Hamoadim (D. Yosef) 9:(10)) if there is some sort of praising of Hashem. The reason for this condition is as follows. If one does not praise Hashem, what makes it a Chanuka party (would it be heretical to say that latkes and dreidel playing do not qualify)? Since, as the Rambam writes, these are days of simcha and hallel, a simcha that is not accompanied by some sort of hallel lacks significance.

I imagine you are referring primarily to the colloquial usage of Kiddush – a celebration involving food and hopefully divrei Torah – a borrowed term from the eating after the tefilla of Shabbat morning , which starts with Kiddush. We will see there may also be some significance to that setting.

It is generally a mitzva to thank Hashem for joyous and/or miraculous events that occur to us. One of the applications of this concept is Birkat Hagomel, which we make after being saved from danger. (See specific rules in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 219). While a meal is not required, sources indicate that it is a nice idea (see Berachot 46a), which parallels the Korban Todah in the time of the Beit Hamikdash.

It is unclear if there is an expectation that there be a celebratory meal for the birth of a child. When a boy is born, there is a seuda at the time of the brit and the pidyon haben (where applicable), but those are related to specific mitzvot, not the birth per se. The gemara (Bava Kama 80a) mentions two celebrations after the birth of a boy, shevua haben and yeshua haben, and there are different opinions as to whether one of them is what we call a shalom zachar.

There are also different opinions as to the nature of a shalom zachar. In brief, there are three basic approaches: it is a celebration of the safe extrication of the child from his mother’s womb to birth; we console the baby for loss of the Torah learned during gestation; it is related to the upcoming brit. The Dagul Meirevava (Yoreh Deah 178) says that it must be related to the brit mila because if it were related to birth, we would have it for the birth of girls. He, therefore, says it should be done the night before the brit. This is indeed what Sephardim do (Brit Yitzchak) and many Ashkenazim do special things on that night (in Yiddish, vach nacht). If so, there may not be a clear source for a birth celebration. There is an ancient Sephardi minhag of a zeved habat, which some have on the sixth night from the birth of a girl (Rav Pe’alim, Even Haezer I:12).

For Ashkenazim, there is no set time or formula for the celebration of a girl’s birth, and the consensus is that one is not obligated to have one. In some circles, people try to have one on the day of her naming (an event to which some attribute tremendous meaning – see Ta’amei Haminhagim 929). In turn some do the naming specifically on Shabbat, when many people will be present. (The presence of many people is generally desirable for meals of thanksgiving). Combining these elements, there may be special significance of having a celebration after Shabbat morning tefilla. There is also a baraita (Avel Rabbati of Massechet Semachot 2:3), which refers to a shevua habat (of a girl) in the context of shevua haben (see above). Perhaps that too has to do with Shabbat (based on one meaning of shevua).

The simple approach, though, is that while there is no specific obligation, timing, or setting, it is just good old logic to thank Hashem for such a monumentally joyous occasion (see Teshvot V’hanhagot I:609). There is also a classical source. The gemara (Bava Batra 91) talks about Boaz making 120 celebrations in honor of his sixty boys and girls, and Rabbeinu Gershom (ad loc.) says that 30 of those were after the births of 30 girls. Some also stress the importance of the berachot people make for baby and parents at the celebration (see ibid. II:132), and there are differing “legends” as to how important this is.

In summary, there is abundant general basis for a “kiddush” in honor of the birth of a girl and some sources for an established practice on the matter. It is our opinion that it should not become a necessary burden on the head of new parents, to be done at a specific time. It certainly should not have to include a high level of expense or toil, which may cause them difficulty at an often stressful time. Hopefully, the parents will find a good time to share their joy.

One should not eat a meal before lighting Channuka candles (Mishan Berurah 672, 10). However, if one makes a reminder to light later, he may eat a meal (Mishna Berurah 235, 18).

We will begin by looking at a precedent regarding non-standard cooking. The gemara (Shabbat 39a) says that it is permitted to “cook” a food in the sun on Shabbat. The prohibition of cooking is when something is cooked by heat that emanates from some sort of fire (Shabbat ibid.). Rashi (Shabbat 39a) says that the leniency is because it is not normal to cook in the sun. The Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim III:52) says that because of the abnormality, we cannot extend the prohibition from the cases of cooking in the Mishkan, which are the model for what is forbidden. Others disagree, based on another gemara (Pesachim 41a), which says that just as there is no Torah level violation of Shabbat to cook meat not through fire or its by-product (e.g., hot springs) so there is no prohibition of eating Korban Pesach meat that was so cooked. Since it is the result, not the process that is important regarding Korban Pesach, the Avnei Nezer (OC 163) and Minchat Shlomo (I, p. 105) say that Chazal must have posited that the unusual process produces a result that is different from standard cooked food.

The Pri Megadim (OC, Mishbetzot Zahav 318:6) briefly discusses whether it is permitted to put something that has been cooked in the sun through a conventional cooking process on Shabbat. His context is the machloket of the Rishonim on whether it is forbidden to cook (in liquid) on Shabbat something that was baked (dry) before or vice versa. We rule stringently but not conclusively (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 318:5; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:(180)). The Pri Megadim’s case has elements of both stringency and leniency in comparison. On one hand, there the food already underwent a halachic cooking, whereas here it has not. On the other hand, cooking something baked and vice versa makes a discernable change, which might not be the case when repeating basically the same process in a “halachic manner.” The Pri Megadim’s leaning is that there is certainly not a Torah violation and it is likely permitted, apparently based on the idea that the cooking process is (fully) forbidden only when it changes and/or improves the food (see Rambam, Shabbat 9:3).

If we equate microwave cooking to cooking in the sun, your question is equivalent to the Pri Megadim’s. However, that equation deserves evaluation. With the advent of microwaves, the question arose whether it is as a new-fangled but essentially standard form of cooking or whether it is a new application of Chazal’s non-halachic fireless cooking. (Problems of the use of electricity basically preclude the use of a microwave on Shabbat in any case.) The Igrot Moshe (ibid.) claims that since microwave cooking is now a normal form of cooking, it is derivable from the Mishkan. While the context of his ruling was to be stringent (not to cook), which is easier to do than to rule leniently (see Rashi, Beitza 2b), he probably considers microwaving to be cooking regarding the halacha that there is no problem of cooking thereafter. In fact, all might agree that the results of microwaving are more similar to regular cooking than cooking in the sun is and permit reheating such food with a standard heat source.

Some people like rice crispy, and the relatively high heat of many of today’s hotplates can accomplish that. Doing so is a problem even for normally cooked rice, as this is a significant act of baking after cooking (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:60). If one makes sure it will not become crispy, that should suffice for our case as well.

If one wants to be stringent (see uncertainty in Tzitz Eliezer X:62; Yalkut Yosef 318:(19)), he can bake the rice in a regular oven after taking it out of the microwave, to make sure it is halachically cooked before Shabbat (see Be’ur Halacha to 318:5). Five minutes, a nominal cooking process, should suffice. If one likes the rice crispy, this should be done on Friday (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:71).

If eight people plus the chazan had finished Shemoneh Esrei, they could have started without you. The main source for that assertion is the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 55:6, in the context of Kaddish), who says that someone who is sleeping or is in the midst of Shmoneh Esrei and cannot answer can count as one of the ten people needed for a minyan. This comes from the Hagahot Maimoniot (Tefilla 8:9), who is based on opinions in the gemara that are lenient regarding the qualifications of the tenth person for a minyan.

There is not unanimity on two related points. Some Acharonim (see Eliya Rabba 55:7, Aruch Hashulchan, OC 55:13) say that while we can count only one sleeping person, we can use more people who are reciting Shemoneh Esrei, as they are involved in sanctifying Hashem and can stop their tefilla to at least listen. Only six people (including the chazan) have to be actively involved in the Kaddish. The Mishna Berura (55:32) is inconclusive on the matter. Another matter is that the Shulchan Aruch Harav (OC 55:7) says that for chazarat hashatz we require nine people to actually answer and cannot even use one who is sleeping or davening. In Living the Halachic Process, vol. I, A-10, we took the middle approach – we can use one person in Shemoneh Esrei toward the minyan for chazarat hashatz (see Tzitz Eliezer XII:9).

Does someone who is starting with the chazan count as one who is involved in chazarat hashatz or is he like anyone else who is in the midst of Shemoneh Esrei? It is brought in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach Halichot Shlomo (Tefilla 9:2) and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yalkut Yosef, Tefilla 10) that one who is reading along word for word with the chazan counts fully toward the minyan, as doing so is no worse than listening and answering Amen. Assuming others will finish Shemoneh Esrei by Kedusha, you would no longer need the daveners to be reading along word by word.

There is a classical source that one who is reading along counts like one who is answering Amen. One is not supposed to start Shemoneh Esrei if he will not be able to answer Kedusha and Amen to a few critical berachot (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 109:1). However, he may recite these passages along with the chazan (ibid. 2). This is because reciting the beracha along with the chazan is like saying Amen (Beit Yosef, ad loc.).

Following this logic, it would seem that you could use more than one such person toward the minyan. Could you say that all can be davening for the first time along with the chazan? We do have a similar practice in heiche kedusha (see Rama, OC 124:2), but that is conceptually different. In heiche kedusha there is actually no chazarat hashatz, as the chazan himself is not repeating Shemoneh Esrei but saying it for the first time. Here, we probably need a majority of a minyan to make chazarat hashatz meaningful, and the people who are reading along make it considered that a full minyan are related to do it.

It is not crucial to have nine people answering Amen. While the Rosh (Shut 4:19), who is the main source that nine people have to be listening, says that all should answer Amen, in regard to b’dieved he is bothered only if others are not following along. In general, saying Amen is an important mitzva but is not required to be credited with the beracha (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 213:2). (In the context of heiche kedusha, the Rama says that there should be at least one answering.)

The main issue involved in this question is the definition of tochein (grinding). While the classic case is grinding wheat into grain flour, the gemara (Shabbat 74b) states that it is forbidden even to cut up vegetables into fine pieces. In the past [Mishpatim 5772, regarding making guacamole], we cited different opinions as to whether the Rashba’s leniency (Shut IV:75) that one may do the above soon before eating applies only when he leaves the vegetables in “slightly big pieces.” We also cited Rav Moshe Feinstein’s opinion (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:74) regarding mashing bananas that this is not grinding, as one does not create new fine particles, but just mashes the food into a softer form. On the other hand, the Chazon Ish (OC 57) rejected this distinction.

Skipping other possible leniencies mentioned in that context that can be applied to the potatoes you discussed, let us get straight to the leniencies that applies to your potatoes, that did not apply to guacamole. The poskim (see Rama, OC 321:19) understood from the Rambam (Shabbat 21:13) that one may take a food that was already made soft by cooking and complete the process of mashing it. The Chazon Ish (OC 58:9) explains that the softness created by the cooking causes the additional mashing to be too trivial to be forbidden by the melacha of tochein. Contemporary poskim (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:9; Orchot Shabbat 5:9) discuss your explicit case and say that it is permitted to mash soft, well-boiled potatoes on Shabbat for this reason.

However, the bad news is that you violated a rule of this leniency. That is that even when tochein does not apply, it is forbidden to use a utensil that is set aside for the mincing or crushing of food items (Shulchan Aruch, OC 321:10). A hand-masher seems to fit that bill; you should have used a fork. This stringency applies even to a food to which tochein does not even apply, such as cheese (ibid.), and even if one did the mincing right before the use (Mishna Berura 321:36; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 6:2). The reason for this prohibition is that using such a utensil is uvdin d’chol (a weekday-like activity) (see Mishna Berura ibid.).

There is disagreement on the topic of alternative medicine. Like in most topics, extreme opinions are rarely right. It is clear that some treatments under the umbrella of alternative medicine are helpful, and it is clear that some are quackery and serve as a placebo at best. There is also a significant category of medicines and treatments (homeopathic or conventional) whose efficacy is unclear or varies greatly from person to person. We are not in the position to take a stand on the important question as to which treatments fall into which category.

These questions are relevant regarding cases where we want to do something which would otherwise be forbidden in order to heal the sick (see Orach Chayim 301, 328). However, your question does not depend on this matter. It is not that the status of medicine uproots the need for a beracha. Rather, berachot were instituted for the benefits of food (primarily, taste), not for medical benefits alone (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 204:8). If one receives both benefits, he must recite a beracha (ibid.). Therefore, if any medicine’s taste is good, a beracha would be required on it. If there is not a good taste, then even if there is no medicinal value either, there would be no beracha. (Indeed, there is no beracha on swallowing paper).

However, there is still a question about the beracha for anything taken for medicinal purposes that has additives that give it a somewhat positive taste. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (204:37) says that medicinal food does not need to have a particularly good taste; the main thing is that it does not have a bad one. One might claim that the classic sources discuss cases where the therapeutic agent has a reasonable taste but that if the medicine tastes bad and sweetener improves it, the sweetener is the medicine’s less important part and should not count regarding berachot (see Berachot 36a). However, the rule that the beracha follows a food’s more important ingredient for berachot applies only when the important part has a beracha, but if the medicinal part has no beracha, we should make a beracha on the sweetener (Pitchei Halacha, Berachot pg. 246; Yalkut Yosef, Berachot, pg. 442).

Yet, there still are cases where a beracha is doubtful. If one swallows a pill, it is not considered a manner of eating in regards to berachot even if it leaves a sweet taste on the tongue before swallowing (V’zot Haberacha pg. 311). Also, Rav S.Z. Auerbach is quoted by several as minimizing the cases in which a beracha is called for. Nishmat Avraham (IV, OC 204:8) quotes him as saying that if the sweetener is on the outside of a chewable pill and one enjoys the taste before getting to the medicinal part there is a beracha, but if the tastes are all mixed together, there should not  be a beracha. This is based on the assumption that the mixture does not have a taste which would interest anyone as a food. V’zot Haberacha (pg. 312) cites Rav Auerbach from a different angle. If the active ingredient’s taste is neither bad nor particularly good, the minor taste enjoyment suffices for a beracha. However, for an external taste to turn a non-food into a food, the medicinal mixture must have an actually good taste overall. Not all agree with Rav Auerbach (see ibid.), and it is logical to say that as long as one appreciates the positive element, the fact that the negative element neutralizes it somewhat does not take away from the beracha. However, it is hard to require a beracha against Rav Auerbach’s opinion. There also will be borderline cases regarding how they are to be considered according to the different opinions.  In a case of doubt, one should not make a beracha (one who wants, can eat something else first, having in mind to cover the medicine).

Halachot like these involving clothes tend to be subjective. However, one needs to start with the halachic philosophy and standard situations. We wrote (Eikev 5771) about wearing shorts, with a focus on a chazan, and we refer you there for additional sources.

When one davens, he stands before Hashem and should be dressed respectably (Shabbat 10a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) says that this includes covering one’s legs, when this is how people dress before important people. The Mishna Berura (91:12) adds that one should wear a hat, explaining that this is the way people dress publicly. (In some circles, this is still true; in others, it does not apply at all).

Even in surroundings where one should cover his legs, there are limits to the severity of the matter. One’s tefilla is invalid after the fact only if his private parts are uncovered (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91:1) or there is no separation between his heart and private parts (Biur Halacha ad loc.). There is some question as to whether it is better to daven or to skip davening if he is not able to cover his chest (ibid.). Regarding other “improper attire,” including one who has only shorts, he may daven. However, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 5) writes that when it is possible, one must be properly dressed.

Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at IV:8 – see also the dissenters he cites) says that in places (e.g., kibbutzim) and for people (children during the summer) where shorts are commonplace, it is permitted to daven in shorts (not as a chazan). We accept that approach, which leads to the challenge of determining whether short pants are commonplace enough in a give venue.

Does Shabbat change anything? Actually, shorts on Shabbat, not just at the time of davening deserves a similar discussion to the above, as one is supposed to wear nice clothing on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 262:2). This is not a matter of oneg (enjoyment) but of kavod (honoring Shabbat), and this applies even when one is by himself (Mishna Berura 262:6) or prefers more casual clothes. Here, too, societal factors are crucial in determining what types of clothes are necessary, praiseworthy, and appropriate. (The Biur Halacha to 262:3 discusses whether wearing white clothes is showing off. In some circles, the same question could be raised about wearing a black hat, while in others a hat or even a shtreimel are expected). Factors such as age, weather, venue (vacation resort, camp) may also play a role.

Logic dictates that since we are taking a practical, subjective approach, there is every reason to combine factors. On average, people dress more formally at tefilla on Shabbat than they do either at tefilla during the week or on Shabbat outside of shul. The same is true regarding standing before important people, the model for attire for davening. One is likely to dress more formally at a formal setting with an important person than at a casual setting with him. We also find the honor of Shabbat elevating the prominence of other halachic matters. For example, a Shabbat meal warrants Sheva Berachot even without panim chadashot (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 62:8); even minor eating (ara’i) is forbidden on Shabbat before taking ma’aser  (Rambam, Ma’aser 3:4).

In summation, if it is rare for people to come to shul in your community with shorts on Shabbat, we would certainly agree with the content of the person who spoke to you (hopefully, in an appropriate way, which is not always easily done). If it is not uncommon, one needs to know where to draw the line, which is best done by local rabbis with a finger on the pulse of the community. In general, though, it is appropriate for the norm to be to wear long pants.

There are clear halachot in the gemara (Berachot 50b; 52b) and poskim (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 171, 180) regarding “respect” due to food in general and especially bread. Two related issues are involved: not causing food to be wasted; not degrading food.

First we shuld mention that if one plans things as he or she should, there should little waste of sizable pieces of bread (or other foods). Leftover bread can be frozen, used for breadcrumbs (while avoiding meat/milk issues), or left for birds. Where this is difficult is at semachot, where there can be half-eaten rolls, etc.

One is not allowed to involve food in non- eating, in a way that it is likely to become soiled and become unappetizing (Shulchan Aruch OC 171:1). It is forbidden to throw any food that could get soiled upon falling and to throw bread even if it will not become soiled, due to bread’s extra importance (ibid. - see Beit Yosef, ad loc.). The gemara (Berachot 52b) explains Beit Shammai’s opinion that one should clean the eating area before washing with mayim acharonim so that the water not fall on and ruin the food. Beit Hillel is not concerned because people will know to remove k’zayit-sized pieces of bread. We are not concerned about smaller pieces, as Rabbi Yochanan says these can be destroyed. Seemingly then, sizable pieces are due respect, while small ones are not, as the Shulchan Aruch (OC 180:3-4) assumes.

However, the matter is complicated. The gemara in Shabbat (143a) says in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that one may not destroy even pieces smaller than a k’zayit. The gemara in Chulin (105b) also says that not being careful with small pieces of leftover food makes one susceptible to poverty. Tosafot (Shabbat 143a) says that our text in Shabbat, which follows Rashi, is incorrect, as the gemara in Berachot says that one is not required to care for small pieces. On the other hand, Tosafot (Berachot 52b) says that even if there is no prohibition, disgracing small pieces could cause poverty. The Magen Avraham (180:3) distinguishes based on different types of lack of care. One is not required to preserve small pieces; however, he may not disgrace them, e.g., by having people trample them. Water falling on them and making them not usable is not a disgrace. Bigger pieces must not even get soiled by water. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) claims that according to the Rambam, there are no halachic limitations on small pieces, although perhaps there is a danger of poverty.

Even regarding big pieces, if one has decided not to eat them and there is no issue of not wasting them, what should one do with them? Presumably one should discard them without disgracing them, but what is considered a disgrace? Is putting them in the garbage, the normal place to discard things, a disgrace? Every written source I found on the topic (see V’zot Haberacha, p. 16; Etz Hasadeh 19:4; Rav E. Melamed - online) said (without classical sources) that one must put k’zayit -sized pieces in a bag before throwing them into the garbage, and many people, especially in Israel, are careful about this.

Is there any explanation for at least most of the American community within which I grew up, who are not careful about this? We have mentioned in the past (Beshalach 5768) that Rav Yisraeli’s ruled that one can put food with the sanctity of Shemitta in a bag before throwing in the garbage even together with foods without sanctity, as long as those other foods are not spoiled. Touching and even getting a little soiled by other foods before being thrown into the garbage dump may not be a disgrace. One could claim, then, that most kitchen garbage bins contain bags in which there are various leftover food and disposable matters; thus, putting bread in there may not be a disgrace. However, the easier position to justify, in regard to halacha and avoiding poverty, is to put bread leftovers (at least, bigger pieces) that cannot be salvaged, in a separate bag before putting it in the garbage.

The gemara in Pesachim (85b), in the context of eating Korban Pesach within a certain area, discusses whether those who are within the doorway of the border are considered inside or outside. The gemara says that the same is true for tefilla, i.e., tziruf (formation of a minyan). The gemara in Eruvin (92b), regarding a minyan split between adjacent courtyards of different sizes, distinguishes between different configurations. One might have argued that these sources are not referring to cases under one roof. However, it is clear from Rishonim, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 55:19) and many poskim that the guidelines for separate rooms inside a building are much the same as those of separate courtyards.

The Rashba (Shut  I:96) asks why it is allowed for a chazan to stand on the bima when its dimensions make it a separate domain, thus separating the chazan from the tzibbur. He gives two answers: 1. A bima specifically functions as an integral part of the shul; 2. If some people in one domain see some people in the other one, they constitute one unit (as they do regarding a zimun for bentching- Berachot 50a). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) cites the Rashba’s first answer as halacha regarding tziruf for a minyan, while citing an opinion that this is only on condition that the bima’s partitions do not reach the ceiling. These are among the many sources that debunk the claim you were told, as a bima is obviously under the same roof as the rest of the shul, and still other reasons are needed to explain the tziruf.

Most practical cases depend on the extent to which we accept the Rashba’s second answer – that a visual connection between the two groups suffices. (Another scenario, based on the details of the aforementioned gemara in Eruvin (see Shulchan  Aruch ibid. 15), is rarely applicable. Those standing in the doorway probably do count (Mishna Berura 55:50), but that is not of much help.)  The major question is whether the parameters for connecting groups regarding zimun (i.e., visual) apply to creating a minyan for tefilla. The Mishna Berura (55:48 & 55:52) is not conclusive on the matter. Therefore it is best, when possible, to have ten people in one room.

Once a minyan is achieved in one room, most opinions assume that those in the overflow room receive the benefits of a minyan, regardless of the visibility connection. The Radbaz (650) says that those in the small room are fully considered as davening with a minyan if the small room can be accessed only through the main room. In any case, those not in the room with the minyan may answer to those parts of tefilla that require a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 55:20) and be exempted from obligations by those inside the main room (Mishna Berura 55:61). The logic is that the ten in one room create the setting (the shechina – see Mishna Berura 55:60) for the matter of kedusha, after which we say that partitions do not prevent the sanctity to flow (see ibid. and Pesachim 85b). (See further opinions in Piskei Teshuvot 55:27.)

The beracha acharona of Al Ha’eitz, the Me’ein Shalosh (often colloquially called Al Hamichya) for fruit of the sevens species (olives, dates, grapes, figs, and pomegranates) is an interesting hybrid. It is similar to Birkat Hamazon in terms of content; it is a single beracha , similar to Borei Nefashot, yet it begins and ends with a beracha form, and is of a higher level (see below); it does not mention the specific fruit, unlike the beracha on wine.

With this background, let us answer your first question. One who ate both fruit of the seven species and other fruit should make Al Ha’eitz to fulfill all the obligations (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:13). Since Al Ha’eitz thanks Hashem for fruit generally, this stronger beracha can cover “lesser fruit” as well. The Mishna Berura (207:1) says that even if one recites Al Ha’eitz improperly (e.g., after eating only an apple), he still exempts himself from Borei Nefashot. Since the exemption is based on the language of Al Ha’eitz, it does not apply regarding fruit that does not grow on a tree, i.e., those fruit whose beracha is Borei Pri Ha’adama (Shulchan Aruch ibid.; Sha’ar Hatziyun 208:64). Admittedly some say that even “fruit of the ground” are included in tenuvat hasadeh and are exempted by Al Ha’eitz, and according to Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, V, OC 17), one who already recited it should not make Borei Nefashot (see below). The logic is stronger according to those who end off Al Ha’eitz with the words “al hapeirot,” as opposed to “al pri ha’eitz,” as the former refers to fruit generically and not to the fruit of the tree.

Regarding the order of the berachot acharonot, conceptually it is proper to recite the Me’ein Shalosh first because it is a higher level beracha than Borei Nefashot for one or more of the following reasons. According to some (see Beit Yosef, OC 209), it is actually a Torah-level obligation; it is longer and more extensive; it is more specific than Borei Nefashot (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 202:206; Be’ur Halacha 202:11). However, some say that because of the opinions above that Me’ein Shalosh fulfills the obligation for all sorts of fruit, it is preferable to make Borei Nefashot first, for if not, it will be unclear if he should or should not recite Borei Nefashot afterward. If the Borei Nefashot is needed for something that does not grow from the ground (e.g., meat, water) and according to many if one is drinking fruit juice (which lost its status of fruit regarding berachot –see Mishna Berura 208:63), this is not an issue (Yabia Omer ibid.), and it would be preferable to recite the Me’ein Shalosh first.

The Magen Avraham (202:26) is not concerned with the opinion that one should say Borei Nefashot first, and this is the accepted ruling and practice for Ashkenazim (see V’zot Haberacha p. 54). For Sephardim, it is hard to say. The Shulchan Aruch seems to not believe that “ha’adama fruits” can be included in Me’ein Shalosh. Furthermore, Ohr L’tzion (Rav Abba Shaul, II:14:24) employs very strong logic – one who plans to say Borei Nefashot after Me’ein Shalosh is considered like one who has in mind not to have the Al Ha’eitz cover the Borei Nefashot fruit, in which case there are ample sources that it is not effective for those foods. (One would do well to have this in mind explicitly.) On the other hand, the Kaf Hachayim (208:73) says it is better to avoid the situation and recite Borei Nefashot first (V’zot Haberacha cites Rav M. Eliyahu as agreeing). Rav Ovadia Yosef (ibid.), basing himself on the rule he champions to avoid doubtful berachot even when the Shulchan Aruch approves them, says that if one already said a Me’ein Shalosh, he should not make a Borei Nefashot . Given his authority, it is hard to tell a Sephardi to not follow his position, at least in regard to l’chatchila.  

The practice of standing up as the chatan/kalla walk past those who are seated is a relatively new phenomenon. The traditional approach to new practices in a religious setting is to be wary about them, for several reasons. One reason is that some new practices are against the spirit or even the letter of halacha or Jewish thought. Another is that it creates confusion, when it is difficult to distinguish between important minhagim from which one can learn and gain and between spiritually meaningless practices. A third dimension is a feeling many have that if this practice is a proper one, generations before us would have initiated it.  A related idea is that initiating a new minhag gives the impression of arrogance and dismissal, as if to say: “We know better than our predecessors.”

Let us analyze the practice in light of the above. It is hard to find anything significantly objectionable about standing up for a chatan/kalla. Maybe some people are irked by the tendency toward attributing them special powers (see scant sources regarding their power of prayer in Nitei Gavriel 9:15, indicating it is not a mainstream approach in non-Hassidic philosophy). However, there is a staggering amount of sources that support the idea being generally appropriate. We are commanded to stand for various people we are required to honor (see Kiddushin 32-33), and we find numerous sources about making a big deal of the chatan/kalla. These include such halachot as halting Torah study to escort the kalla and giving precedence to a wedding procession over a funeral procession (Ketubot 17a). One could claim that these represent a mitzva to make them happy rather than honoring them per se. However, numerous sources (including Tosafot ad loc. and the Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 360) refer to kavod (honor) and compare it to the kavod of others. 

In truth, there are different ways of showing kavod to different people. For example, a husband and wife should honor each other greatly (Rambam, Ishut 15:19-20). Yet, we do not find a halacha that they should stand up for each other. The main honor for a chatan and kalla is showing interest in and excitement about their marriage and future home. Certainly, it is more appropriate to sit in rapt attention than to rise but continue talking to a friend. However, standing would also seem to be a reasonable expression of honor.

People quote the concept of chatan domeh l’melech (a groom resembles a king) as grounds for standing. This phrase comes from Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer 16, along with examples of similarities: they both are praised for seven days; they wear nice clothing; they are involved in partying (regarding a chatan, it is for seven days, and some understand it to mean they may not go to work); they do not go in the street alone. The latter two are brought as halacha in the Rama (Even Haezer 64:1). The gemara (Moed Katan 28a) makes another interesting comparison: a chatan is like a kohen and, therefore, sits at the helm. We did not find a classical source requiring standing before chatan.  

There are semi-classical sources that speak about standing for the chatan as he goes to get an aliya during the week before and after the wedding (see Nitei Gavriel 2:7 and Chashukei Chemed, Gittin 62a, who are not overly impressed by the case for standing). The lack of a source about standing specifically on the way to the chupa should not be surprising – for hundreds of years, weddings were done outside and indications (including old paintings) are that seating was not the norm.

In summation, we find nothing compelling to require standing for the chatan/kalla but agree it has logic and is not intrinsically objectionable. Out of respect for our predecessors who did not do so, we would not have initiated the practice, but out of respect for present-day peers who do it (and perhaps chatanim/kallot who already expect it), we encourage joining along. 

This case is similar to permitted “coverings” discussed in the gemara and Rishonim and to a different one that was forbidden by the Acharonim. Let us see those sources and see where your parasol falls.

Since you don’t keep this garden parasol open for long, there is only a question of a rabbinic prohibition of making a temporary tent (ohel ara’i), not of a Torah violation on a permanent tent (see Shabbat 138a and Shaar Hatziyun 315:6). The halacha of a temporary “tent” can depend on its use. If it is to protect that which it covers, it is forbidden even if there is only a roof of a tefach (a handbreadth) (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 315:2). If a horizontal surface is spread out just to serve the area above it (e.g., a table) and the fact that it also covers something is incidental, it is forbidden only if the “roof” is placed on vertical “walls” (ibid. 3). At first glance, your parasol seems forbidden, as it is a roof to shade the area beneath.

However, we must consider that the prohibition on making tents is a subcategory of binyan (building). Therefore, Chazal (see Shabbat 138a) allowed several apparent walls/roofs when they were not creating something new. One is extending an existing surface of a tefach (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2). Although the folded up parasol has a width of a tefach that hangs over the ground, opening it is worse than just extending because the existing tefach is measured only from beyond its folded up state.

Another broad leniency is when the “tent” is attached in a way that it is ready to be opened. When a cloak is attached by a string, ready to be pulled open, it is permitted to do so (Shabbat 138a). Another case is a folded chair whose seat is soft leather, where the leather becomes a horizontal surface when the chair is opened. This too is permitted (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5). The Rama (OC 626:3) allows opening an extending roof over a sukka to protect from rain, when it is attached by hinges to the wall.  

Based on the above, one would expect it would be permitted to open an umbrella on Shabbat, as its “tent” is made ready to be opened and closed easily. Why then is it accepted that it is forbidden to do so? The Noda B’Yehuda (II, OC:30) is concerned with the Rif’s opinion that the leniency for the cloak with the string is limited to cases where there will not be a tefach of horizontal extension. He also says the chair is permitted because it is not done to protect that which is underneath. Many (see Shut Chatam Sofer, OC:72; Chazon Ish, OC 52:6;) reject the Noda B’Yehuda’s strict analysis. The Chazon Ish argues that his distinctions do not apply where the leniency is based on the fact that the ohel already exists and is in waiting to be opened.

Your garden parasol is essentially an umbrella. Many see the umbrella prohibition as largely a stringency (with many nuances raised as to what factor(s) triggered the minhag- see Be’ur Halacha 315:8; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 24:15; Chazon Ish ibid.). It is likely this minhag does not extend to your parasol, which is different in several ways. Perhaps most significantly, the fabric extends from a stationary pole, which is unlike picking up an umbrella and creating an ohel situation in its present location from scratch (see Noda B’Yehuda ibid).

Therefore, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) rules that it is permitted to open garden parasols, and we concur. Whatever can be opened on Shabbat can also be closed. (Based on your picture and description, it appears that it is even easier to be lenient in your case. Your apparatus is movable enough to not be considered attached to the ground, something that made Rav S.Z. Auerbach “wary” of the above leniency – see ad loc. (57). It also looks like the downward slope is too small/gradual to be considered additional vertical walls, which was one of the reasons the Noda B’Yehuda forbade umbrellas.)

There are two basic halachic precedents and one major distinction for the halachot that apply here, with poskim offering differing opinions regarding in-between cases.  

The Rashba and others infer from Rav Pappa’s rules (Berachot 41b) about which foods need a beracha at different stages of a meal that foods that are brought to the table during the meal are generally covered by the original beracha. This serves the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 206) as a source that berachot generally cover foods that were not present at the time.

The Taz (ad loc. 7) rejects this broad application, as a meal has a special ability to subsume many foods. He and the Magen Avraham (ad loc. 7) prefer the precedent of a shochet who makes a beracha before shechting several animals and then other are brought. The Tur (Yoreh Deah 19) cites several opinions as to whether a new beracha is needed: it depends if the animals are of the same species (Itur); it depends if the new animals were brought while some original animals had still not been shechted (S’mak); it depends if one had in mind to cover animals that were not yet present (Tur). The Shulchan Aruch (YD 19:7) follows the S’mak’s distinction, and the Rama (YD 19:6) follows the Itur.

Yet, in the Laws of Berachot, these pillars of halacha do not make such distinctions. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 206:5) seems to say without distinction that one does not make a beracha on the newly brought food. The Rama (ad loc.), while not necessarily arguing, says that one should preferably have in mind that the beracha goes on all the food that will be brought, and Sephardi poskim agree that this is worthwhile, considering that the Beit Yosef cites differing opinions (Yalkut Yosef 206:21).

Let us now put things in perspective. All agree that if one had in mind to eat only certain foods or amounts of the foods (e.g., those with dietary goals), the beracha is limited to that (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 174:5). All agree that explicit intention for other foods works in all but exceptional cases. The machloket between the aforementioned Taz and Magen Avraham and the accepted reading of the Shulchan Aruch is in regard to cases where one did not give the matter thought or come to a conclusion.

Based primarily on distinctions found regarding shechita, Ashkenazi poskim say that a new beracha is needed on food upon which one did not have clear intention unless one of the following situations exists: 1) the food was before the person when he made the beracha (Mishna Berura (206:20); 2) the new food is of the exact same type as that upon which he made the beracha (ibid. 22); 3) he was not finished eating the original food when he decided to eat the new food (ibid.); 4) he sat down to eat a significant amount of this type of food (ibid.); 5) the person in question is dependent on others to determine what he will be offered to eat, e.g., a guest (Mishna Berura 179:17 – see V’zot Haberacha, p. 68).

The exceptions in which (some of) these factors do not help to exempt from a beracha include: 1) when the new food came from an unexpected place, e.g., a guest brought it after the beracha was made (Shulchan Aruch, OC 177:5); 2) if, according to the rules of order of berachot, the beracha should have been made on the second food, only explicit intention allows the first beracha to cover it (based on Rama 211:5). (For more details, see V’zot Haberacha pp. 65-67; Piskei Teshuvot 206:18).

Since the detailed halachot are hard to remember and many of them are based on machloket, it is best to follow the Rama and have clear intention to cover a wide variety of foods. If one does so on a regular basis, he should not need very clear intention each time (possibly not all agree with this – see V’zot Haberacha p. 65 – but this seems like the correct ruling).

Your first question is about the ability to come back to bentch where you ate. There is no question that you are able to come back; the major question is whether you are required to come back in order to bentch. Beit Shammai (Berachot 51b) said that if one forgot to bentch at the end of the meal and remembered when he was in a different place, he is required to return to bentch in the original place. Beit Hillel says that he is permitted to bentch where he remembered. The gemara (ibid. 53b) says that if he purposely left the place of eating without bentching, Beit Hillel agrees that he must return. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 184:1) cites two opinions among the Rishonim whether we accept Beit Shammai or Beit Hillel’s ruling regarding returning after forgetting to bentch and does not give a clear indication of which opinion he accepts. The Mishna Berura (184: 6,7) says that one should return if it is not difficult, and that in any case, it is better to return if he is willing to. If one has bread in the new place and is willing to eat even a small amount of it, he need not return to bentch the original place as the new place is also a place of eating (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 2).

As far as how long he has to bentch, there is no difference between whether he is in the same place or a different one. The mishna (Berachot 51b) says that one has until the “food has been digested in the intestines.” We accept the explanation that this means that a feeling of hunger has not begun to return (Berachot 53b; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5). This depends on how much one ate; it is also difficult to pinpoint the moment. Therefore, we usually work with the assumption is that one has, from the last eating, the amount of time it takes to walk four millin, which most hold is 72 minutes (Mishna Berura 184:20).

There are other significant questions regarding leaving the place of eating. One is when one continues eating upon his return. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 178: 1,2) rules that unless one left behind people who continue eating in the original place, there is a break between the returner’s two eating sessions and he has to first bentch for the first part and then recite a new beracha for the second installment. The Rama (ad loc.) rules that if the food one had eaten mandates a beracha acharona before he leaves, then the meal continues without additional berachot. It is a matter of debate what is included in that category of food (see Mishna Berura 178:44), but a bread meal certainly. Still, it is not proper to leave for any extended period from the place of the meal with the intention to return without first bentching without a pressing reason to do so, including the need to perform a mitzva elsewhere (Rama ibid.). Although Sephardim generally accept the Shulchan Aruch’s rulings over those of the Rama, this is an example of the counter rule that one does not recite a doubtfully justified beracha even if the Shulchan Aruch says to recite it (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 174:1; Yalkut Yosef, OC 178:(1)). For a Sephardi, though, it is even more important to leave with the intention to return and continue eating, as this creates a situation where he will not be able to comply with the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling to make new berachot (see V’zot Haberacha pp. 63, 142).

If one ate with others who remain, his connection to the original eating is certainly a strong one (one ramification is that the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) agrees that he does not require new berachot). There is no question that in such a case, where he had an obligation before he left to join his counterparts for a zimun, he can do so upon returning (see the related discussion in the Shulchan Aruch, OC 194:2).

The general halachic rule, which applies to you and to others, is that in cases of doubt regarding berachot, one does not make a beracha that might be a repeat. Technically, the exception to the rule would be Birkat Hamazon, but we would not want you to unnecessarily recite that more than once either. 

We would generally suggest that you take some combination of the following two courses of action, which will be helpful in regard to non-ritual activities as well. 

1) Get used to taking care of matters as soon as they become feasible - in this case, it would mean making berachot right away, e.g., right after washing one's hands after leaving the bathroom, right after finishing eating, etc. Then if the question arises later whether the berachot were made, one can say with greater confidence that they were and there is no need to repeat them. Indeed if you get used to that approach, the beracha will usually have been said.

2. Get used to having reminder systems - so many older people use the pill box method for making sure they are keeping to schedule with medications. One can have similar systems for berachot as well. One possible example - one has a place at the table where he puts a bentcher when he starts eating and another place where he puts it when he has finished bentching.

We do not mean that you have a halachic obligation to do X and Y. These are just general ideas that you can use to give you more of a sense of security regarding religious obligations, as you deserve as much security as you can for all elements of your life. See what works for you.

Again, though, the most basic rule regarding forgetting whether you made berachot, is not to make berachot out of doubt.

We will start with a brief overview of the question of saying v’ten tal u’matar outside Israel during this time period (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. II, A-11) before relating to your specific question.

The Rabbis instituted saying vtul according to the needs for rain of the time’s major Jewish communities. The entire Diaspora follows the needs of Bavel, starting 60 days after the beginning of Tekufat Tishrei (Dec. 4 or 5). The Rosh (Shut 4:10) rules that countries that require rain at other times of the year can insert the request accordingly. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 117:2) agrees with the Rosh in principle, but not in practice because of the minhag, and he treats the case of one who said it at that time as a doubt, so that he repeats Shemoneh Esrei as a voluntary prayer. The Rama (ad loc.) does not require repeating Shemoneh Esrei.

The Mishna Berura (117:5) cites two opinions on whether one who resides in Israel but is abroad on and after 7 Cheshvan follows the Israeli schedule or that of the place where he is. The rationale to follow Israel’s needs is more convincing if he will benefit from Israel’s rain, either if his family is there (Baer Heiteiv 117:4 in the name of Maharikash) or he plans to return during the year (ibid., in the name of the Pri Chadash).

Because of the doubt that surrounds this matter, major poskim (Rav S.Z. Orbach and Rav Elyashiv, quoted in Yom Tov Sheni K’Hilchato 10:2; Yalkut Yosef, Kitzur 117:15) suggest to says vtul in Shomeia Tefilla during the questionable period and is safe according to all opinions. This works because it is permitted to ask for rain during the summer in the beracha of Shomeia Tefilla, and it is sufficient b’di’eved to do so during the winter. Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC II:102) implies that Israelis visiting countries where rain is desirable at that time should recite vtul in its regular place. However, the former opinion is preferable, especially for Sephardim (see Birkei Yosef, OC 117:5; Kaf HaChayim, OC 117:11).

We now move to your question. The Chida (Birkei Yosef, OC 117:6) says that one who started saying vtul in Israel and left with plans to return should continue to recite it normally. He explains that it is like a farce to begin saying it and then stop. There is a similar concept in the gemara (Taanit 4b-5a) regarding the discussion how to introduce “mashiv haruach …” in chutz la’aretz, where we treat two days like the possible end of Sukkot. Some say we should start saying “mashiv haruach” on the first day and then stop for some tefillot before resuming it on the second day. The gemara concludes that once we start, we do not stop. This, though, is not a halachic proof to the Chida’s concept, as commentaries explain the ruling differently (see Ritva, Turei Even ad loc.). Also, there is logic to distinguish between how the Rabbis institute the matter in the first place and what one does in the special situation of visiting a place with a different practice.

In any case, the Chida’s ruling that avoiding the “farce” of stopping what one started overcomes the rule to follows the practices of a host community – during the silent Shemoneh Esrei is the accepted one (see Ishei Yisrael 23:38). According to most authorities, an Israeli in chutz la’aretz at this time can be a chazan, in which case he says vtul in his silent Shemoneh Esrei but omits it during chazarat hashatz (ibid. 39).

The logic of continuing what one started does not suffice for one who has a fundamental reason to stop asking for rain. Therefore, an Israeli who is moving permanently abroad during this time and a ben chutz la’aretz who started saying vtul while visiting Israel in deference to local practice cease doing so when they leave Israel (Yein Hatov, OC 35; B’tzel Hochochma I:62).

We will try to make a little order in what the Shabbat mode does and what it does not do. We will be able to provide only an overview of the most basic of the many complex halachot that remain to be discussed.

The main element of the type of Shabbat mode you describe is to circumvent systems in modern ovens that cause problems for Shabbat. The obviation of the shut-off feature is of technical value for the Shabbat observer and is irrelevant to the question of returning food on Shabbat.

Another element is to circumvent the direct impact of opening the doors on a variety of lights, sensors, etc., which would make opening the door forbidden. Regarding an oven in which even in Shabbat mode it works with a set temperature that is controlled by a thermostat, there is still an issue that opening the door cools off the chamber and causes the oven to turn back on sooner and/or stay on longer, which is debated by the last generation’s poskim (see Shemirat Shabbat K’Hilchhata 1:29 – stringent; Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim IV:74.28 – lenient; Yalkut Yosef, OC 253:5 – inconclusive). There are ovens in Israel with Shabbat modes that cause the oven to work steadily at a low intensity without a thermostat, and it is thus not a problem to open the door. That does not appear to be the system you are describing.

In any case your question relates to the rules of hachzara (returning food to a heat source), which is a stricter application of the laws of shehiya (having the food stay on the heat source). The basic law of shehiya is that one may not leave food on a heat source on Shabbat when he may have an interest to raise the heat and an ability to do so, without certain steps to reduce that concern. A blech, for example, works by reducing the intensity of the heat on the food by covering the flame, and thus serving as a reminder that reinforces the message not to consider increasing the heat. Non-adjustable hot plates make it unfeasible to raise the heat and thus are permitted. An oven is problematic in that it is hard to duplicate the positive these elements and its heat is adjustable. Leniency can be contemplated if one tapes up the controls or based on the Rama’s (OC 253:1) minhag that for foods that are nominally cooked, there is little interest in raising the heat.

Returning dry food to an oven on Shabbat is much more problematic (including, that it might look like cooking), and it apparently requires the fulfillment of six conditions (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 253:2): 1) The food must be fully cooked (easy); 2) The heat source must be covered according to the aforementioned criteria (see above); 3) If one takes food off, he must hold it if he wants to return it (not feasible in your case); 4) One has to have in mind, when removing the food, to return it to the heat (easy); 5) The food did not cool down (not feasible). 6) The food should be put onto an open heat source, not into an enclosed one, especially when it is a place where food is often cooked (see Mishna Berura 253:58; Yalkut Yosef OC 253:8). An exception to these requirements is a place that is less hot than yad soledet bo (app. 45̊ C= 113̊ F) (Rama, OC 253:2) or one made for reheating rather than cooking where it is also not feasible to adjust the heat. These include ovens that are off with residual heat (Rama 253:5) and, according to some, non-adjustable hot plates made for Shabbat reheating (see Yechaveh Da’at II:55).

There are certain conditions in which there are opinions (including one by Rav Soloveitchik, which requires much explanation) that one can reheat in an oven, and you are free to ask the rabbi of your choice about the matter. The point of this overview is to explain that your Shabbat mode is no better in regard to reheating than standard ovens of decades past.

The laws of orlah, not benefitting from the fruits of a tree during its first three years apply also outside of Israel. However, in cases where there is doubt whether three years have passed, one may be more lenient outside of Israel.

Regarding replanting, if the tree was removed with enough ground attached to it to live for another two weeks without being replanted, one does not need to restart the counting of the three years. If there is doubt regarding this, in Israel one should be stringent while outside of Israel one may be lenient.

The gemara derives from Vayikra 11:11 that one may sell non-kosher species that come into his possession but may not actively acquire and then sell them. This applies to most foods that are forbidden by Torah law (mainly meat and fish – not wine, …) (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 117:1).

According to most Rishonim, the prohibition of commerce in forbidden foods is from the Torah (see Shut Chatam Sofer, YD 104-106, 108; Yabia Omer VIII, YD 13). The Rashba (Shut III, 223) says that the reason is to minimize the chance one will eat forbidden foods; others say it is a gezeirat hakatuv (Heavenly decree without a known reason). In any case, it applies only to things that are usually acquired for eating purposes (Shulchan Aruch, YD 117:1). The consensus of poskim is that this prohibition applies as long as a Jew owns the food in the framework of a commercial process, even if he is not expected to come in direct contact with the food (Chatam Sofer, ibid.108).

The Rama (YD 117:1) rules that it is forbidden to buy non-kosher food in order to feed it to non-Jewish workers. The Taz (ad loc. 2) explains that for one who is required to feed his workers, buying them the cheaper non-kosher food is a commercial act like buying it to pay a debt. The Shach (ad loc. 3) argues with the Rama, apparently because he considers it using the food for his own non-eating purposes, not using it commercially. He asks on the Rama from a Yerushalmi that says that how one who bought pig to give his workers can sell it. (The Taz counters that the Yerushalmi was discussing getting rid of what was bought improperly.)

All agree that one can give money to his non-Jewish worker so that he can buy food for himself, even if he knows the non-Jew will buy non-kosher (Knesset Hagedola, YD 117, Beit Yosef 20). Based on this, the Pri Chadash (YD 117:3) argues that since the Jew does not benefit by acquiring the food and then giving it to the worker (as opposed to giving the money to the worker), the prohibition of commerce does not apply. Those who are stringent can argue that the fact that there another way of getting to the same point does not mean that the acquisition is not beneficial.

There is logic to distinguish between where the food is delivered to or by the Jew, who then gives it to the non-Jew, and where he arranges someone to deliver it to the non-Jew. First, when the food enters the Jew’s domain, the concern he might come to eat it, which some say helps define the prohibition’s parameters, pertains. Additionally, it is more difficult to arrange or claim that the Jew does not acquire ownership, which might be at the heart of the problem (see Chatam Sofer ibid.) when it is brought into his home (the details are complex). On the other hand, consider the Aruch Hashulchan’s logic for agreeing with the Shach that there is no prohibition to buy food to give to workers. The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 117:19) argues that if one has workers in his home whom he needs to feed, since the natural thing is that they should eat (the cheaper) non-kosher food, fulfilling that need in the natural way is not considered initiating commerce. If the worker lives and functions independently, but they have included food into his “compensation package,” it is more likely to be considered initiating commerce. Paradoxically, giving non-kosher food as a present is forbidden (see Shach ibid.) because the investment in good relations is considered equivalent to selling to the non-Jew.

 In the final analysis, there are respected opinions on this matter in either direction, and it is legitimate to acquire non-kosher food for a non-Jewish worker in cases of significant need. One should try, if feasible, to arrange that the Jew does not acquire the food but arranges its transfer from supplier to worker and thereby also avoid marit ayin (see Teshuvot V’hanhangot II:394).  

We begin with the possibility of repeating, which is easier for a ba’al korei who presumably did not prepare beyond the normal reading.

We repeat p’sukim in kri’at haTorah only in limited circumstances. Generally, Ashkenazim do not allow one to have an aliya that just repeats that which was already read (see Rama, Orach Chayim 282:2, Mishna Berura 282:10). The Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.) says that it is permitted to repeat (as a hosafa). The Mishna Berura (282:6) points out that even according to the Shulchan Aruch, such an aliya does not count toward the required number of aliyot. Therefore, in our case, where the third aliya has to count, option #1 seems to be a problem.